TVD Second Patriotic. 1915 year. Part of 3

Galicia

This is the theater where traditionally for the Eastern Front, the fate of the campaign was decided and decided.

Battle of the Carpathians (January - 22 April 1915 g.) [22] - one of the largest strategic operations. It included the totality of hostilities, initially offensive for the South-Western Front in the framework of the planned breakthrough on the Hungarian plain, then having the character of a return battle in the context of the general operation of the Austrians and Germans to reach the Russians in Poland in the framework of the "Winter Strategic Cannes".

10 schema. Theater of the Eastern Front by the end of the Carpathian operation. Bonch-Bruevich, MD Our loss of Galicia in 1915, Part I. Through the Carpathians to Hungary in the winter of 1915. M., 1921

The Germans transferred to the Carpathians up to 100 thousands of soldiers to reinforce 45 of the Austro-Hungarian infantry divisions [23]. The Russian 8 Army of January 23 captured Mezo Laborch, and on January 26 the 12 Army Corps captured the Lupkov Pass, the key to the Hungarian Plain. March 11 The 24 Army Corps captured the main ridge of the Beskids. 16 - 19 March, the Austro-Hungarian 2 Army was defeated on the Lubenen Heights, and the following days reflected the counterattack of the Austro-Hungarian 3 Army and the German Beskid Corps. 30 March were forced by the Carpathians.

Russian troops in the Carpathians. Great struggle of nations. B. 6. M., 1916

The Carpathian battle was of major operational and strategic importance. Russian troops reached the Hungarian plain, which put the German bloc on the brink of defeat. The fortress of Przemysl fell, the German troops on the Austrian front could neither turn the tide of events in favor of the Fourth Alliance, nor reanimate the activities of their Austrian ally. However, the operation was not completed, after which the Russian army moved to a strategic defense [24].


Commander 8 A cavalry general A. A. Brusilov


9 Commander A General of Infantry P. Lechitsky

Battle of the Carpathians - the most bloody in stories Austria-Hungary battle, finished the remnants of the once brilliant Austrian army and contributed to the transfer of the gravity of the operations of the German-Austrians in the East in the South-Western Front. The Austrians lost the ability to conduct offensive operations without the direct support of the German troops.

The Russian operations that crushed the “Winter Strategic Cannes” (Second Prasnyshskaya and Karpatskaya), as well as preparations for the Gorlitsky operation, caused intensified transfers of German-Austrian troops to the east. In March, 5 German infantry divisions (19th, 20th infantry, 82nd, 81st reserve, 11th Bavarian) and 3 cavalry (3rd, guards and Bavarian) divisions were deployed. The 11th Bavarian division arrived from Germany, all the rest from the French front. By March, the Austrians increased their grouping on the Eastern Front by about 3 divisions, maintaining this figure until June inclusive (until the advent of the Italian Front). The transfer of the Austrians laid bare their Balkan front, as evidenced, in particular, by Admiral O. R. Wulf - according to him, the 8th and 13th army, as well as the combined Krauss corps, left for the Carpathians, and in the Balkans the land assault and the Danube remained flotilla [25]. E. Falkengine testified to the same thing, saying that it was impossible to remove Austrian troops from the Carpathian front for Serbia - on the contrary, units from the Danube had to be moved to the Carpathians [26].

By the end of the Battle of the Carpathians, the 5 of the Austrian armies and up to the 5 of the German corps were concentrated in the South-Western Front. The total loss of the front in this grand battle - up to a million people [27]. Austro-German troops lost to 800000 people [28], including 150000 prisoners. Common trophies of Russian troops - up to 60 guns, up to 460 machine guns, up to 5 mortars and bomb bombers, 8 flamethrowers [29].

Trophy heavy weapon from Przemysl. Gaso

It was precisely in connection with the outcome of the Carpathian battle that the Germans planned a major strategic operation against the South-Western Front. Of the selected formations deployed from the French front, a new one was formed — the 11 — the army — the ram in breaking through the defenses of the Russian troops. The area of ​​the breakthrough is between the Beskids and the upper Vistula - Gorlitz. In addition to the German 11 and Russian 3, the Austrian 3 and 4 and Russian 8 armies took part in the operation. The difference in the volume of artillery ammunition was extremely unfavorable for the Russians - the Germans and Austrians had 1200 shells for light and up to 600 shells for heavy guns, while Russian had up to 40 shots for the barrel.

3 Commander A General of Infantry R. D. Radko-Dmitriev

Gorlitsk strategic defensive operation of the Southwestern Front 19 April - June 10 was of paramount strategic importance. At the first stage of this operation, during the actual Gorlitsky breakthrough, the Russian 3 Army resisted many times superior enemy forces [30]. Directly at the breakthrough site, superiority in forces and facilities was overwhelming (in manpower and in machine guns, 2,5 times, 4 times in light and 40 times in heavy artillery). But as a result of the battles with 19 on 21 in April, Austro-Germans advanced only 4 – 8 km.

11 schema. Positions of the South-Western Front to the beginning of the Gorlitsk operation. Collection of documents. Gorlitsky operation. M., 1941

12 schema. Positions of the German-Austrian troops in front of the front of the Russian 3-th army to the beginning of the Gorlitsky breakthrough. Battle of Gorlice-Tarnov 2 - 6 May 1915 M. - L., 1929.

But the uneven tension of the combat activities of the Russian corps and the lack of interaction between them led to the fact that 22 of April at the junction between the Russian 3-m Caucasian army and the 24-m army corps formed a gap, into which the enemy rushed. The actions of the Russian command were reduced, in fact, "to patching holes." Russian troops retreated without trying to maneuver the flanks of the advancing enemy to stop him. Another important omission was the inept actions of the Russian command at the junctions of army units. But, taking advantage of the insignificant pace of the enemy offensive, the Russian troops were able to avoid the enemy's reach — and slowly retreated.

13 schema. Map of the battle area of ​​the Gorlitsky breakthrough. Rotkirch T. Fon. Breakthrough of the Russian Carpathian Front at Gorlitsy-Tarnov in 1915, Pb., 1921

The 3 Caucasian Army and 21 Army Corps counterstrokes did not bring any changes to the situation, and on April 28, disguised as rearguards, retreated, trying to delay the advance of the enemy and allow the rear forces and main forces of the corps to retreat to the r. San, and the reserves of the front command move to the battle area. By this time, the German-Austrian troops, as a result of heavy losses and separation from the supply bases, were no longer able to break the resistance of the Russian rear guards. Therefore, they are not reaching the river. San, stopped.

1 – May 7 between the troops of the Russian 3 th and German 11 th armies, the battle on the river. San for the bridgehead near Yaroslav, and 8 – 15 of May between the Russian troops 3, 8 and German 11, Austro-Hungarian 4 and 2 armies unfolded a battle for the remaining bridgeheads of the Russian units on the left bank R. San y Radymno and Senyavy. The enemy continued to strike at the junctions between the Russian armies and at the most vulnerable points of their defense. The 5 corps of the 3 Army, weakened by the previous battles and stretched into a line, were supposed to detain the enemy, who concentrated on “hammering” in one direction. The defense in such a situation required not just a strong reserve, but the availability of a maneuverable strike group - but there was no such reserve.

May 19 - June 3 hosted an offensive-defensive battle at Lyubachev - but the quantitative and qualitative weakness of the Russian 3 Army did not lead to a significant change in the operational-strategic situation on the South-Western Front. The enemy ignored the tactical defeat of one of his armies (Austrian 4) in order to achieve the strategic goal, and, hiding from the Russian 3 army by Austrian troops, dealt the main blow to the Russian 8 army, using the German forces for this operation 11 st army.

By 22 May, Przemysl was abandoned by Russian units. Having solved a strategic task, the enemy engaged in crowding out the rest of the armies of the Southwestern Front, consistently striking 3, 11, and then 9 armies. On the night of 3 on 4, June, it was decided to withdraw the 3 Army for the river. Tanev. The 8 Army in the night from 6 to 7 in June 1915 moved from Gorodok to the Lvov position. The fall of Lviv 9 June ended Gorlitskaya strategic operation. E. von Ludendorff noted that the frontal pushing off of Russian troops in Galicia was not decisive for the war. The latter fought back as far as the rear messages allowed them to move forward. With these frontal battles, the losses of the Austro-Germans were considerable [31]. Russians have long known the danger of operational coverage and learned to take counter-measures. [32].

From 19 to 27 April, German-Austrian troops captured over 100000 prisoners, 80 guns and more 200 machine guns. The German 11 Army captured 398 officers and 152000 lower ranks for the whole of April, seized 160 guns and 403 machine guns [33]. The losses of the 3 Army (including the reserves poured into its structure) over the month from the start of the Gorlitsky breakthrough, the Germans estimated prisoners at 140000, 100 guns and 300 machine guns. By mid-June, over 250000 prisoners, 224 guns and 600 machine guns were considered common trophies of the German-Austrian forces. [34].

He suffered heavy losses and the enemy. Only the German 11 Army for the 12 battle days (19 - 30 of April) lost 28000 people [35]. And for the whole operation (from the beginning of the Gorlitsky 19 breakthrough in April and until the capture of Lviv 9 in June) the army lost 87000 people - 69% of the original composition. The German Southern Army only lost to June 25000 people [36]. Even harder were the losses of the Austrian troops - especially the 4 Army. In the course of the Gorlitsk strategic defensive operation, the Russians captured at least 31000 people, seized at least 21 guns, and 60 machine guns.

Impressive troop transfer of the enemy. So, in April, the Germans redeployed the 3 infantry divisions (1-th and 2-th guards, 119-th infantry) from the French front; in May, the 8 divisions (one of the divisions of the Alpine Corps and the 8-I Bavarian reserve divisions arrived from the French front, the 101-I, 103-I, 105-I, 107-I, 108-I, 109-I infantry divisions - from Germany); in June - 1 division (44-i reserve) from France. The 2 divisions arrived in July (the 54 and 58 are all from the French front); In August, 2 divisions were also deployed to Russia (115-i from the French front, 85-i from Germany).

In the course of the Gorlitsk operation, the Russian troops left Galicia for the month of 2, suffered enormous damage in forces and equipment. In an effort to achieve a strategically unnecessary goal (“retain conquered space”), the command of the South-Western Front sacrificed its best troops — moreover, the transfer of corps and divisions to Galicia also undermined the potential of the North-Western Front.

August 14 - The sign Lutsk defensive-offensive operation took place on September 15. [37]. It began with the advance of the Austrian 1 Army from Lutsk, bypassing the right flank of the Russian 8 Army. The Austro-Hungarian 2 Army struck Zborov. During these battles, as well as the 23 – 26 battles of August on p. Horyany enemy was stopped. 31 August The 8 th army counterattacked, defeating the enemy 1 and 2 armies at Dubno and Vishnevets.

September 10 The 8 Army temporarily took the city of Lutsk. The enemy was forced by September 16 to transfer German 3 infantry and 5 cavalry divisions and 3 brigades of Polish legionnaires to this front. In the Lutsk operation, the Austrian 1-I and 2-I armies were defeated, and the 4-I was defeated. The operation did not allow the enemy to cover the flank of the withdrawn central group of Russian armies. In the course of this landmark battle, the trophies of the Russian steel were up to 70000 prisoners, 43 guns, to 80 machine guns. [38].

In the autumn, the 8 Army fought local battles in Polesie, Galicia and Volyn, taking possession of October 5 in the town of Chartoriysk. The Russian 11 Army was also a major success, while 16 - 17 of August counterattacked the advancing enemy forces at Zbarazh.

17. - 18. 08. 1915. A counter battle unfolded between the troops of the 11 and South German armies [39]that has been stopped. 25 August The 11 Army at Seret launched an offensive, inflicting a heavy defeat on the South German army during the 7 day battles. 29 – 30 August Dzvinyach's 9 Army won another tactical victory over the Austrian 7 Army [40]. Battle of Seryet Strype 16. 08. - 03. 09. gave Russian troops over 62000 prisoners, more than 70 guns, 170 machine guns.


11 Commander A General of Infantry D. G. Shcherbachev

Operations in August - October 1915 in Galicia - on Ceret, near Lutsk and Chartorysk were of major strategic importance for the entire Eastern Front. They led to the stabilization of the front in the Galician theater.

Notes

22. In January, the 41,5 Austro-German infantry. and 8 Kaval. div (over 500000 people, 3000 op.) army group gen. kaval F. von Pflanzer-Baltina, South Germanic (A. infantry A. von Linzingen), Austrian 3 (General Infantry S. Boroevich von Boine) and 4 (General Infantry Archduke Joseph Ferdinand) opposed the 31 Infantry. and 11 Kaval. div (about 400000 people., 1500 op.) South-Western Front (gen. from artil. N. I. Ivanov). And at the end of March, 30 PEKH. (of which 9 is Germanic) and 1 kav. (German general. Kaval. V. von Marshall) divisions (350000 people, 2200 op.) As part of the Austrian 2, one German (Southern) army and the German Beskyd corps (general Kaval. G. von Marwitz) fought Russians 8 (gen. from Kaval. A. A. Brusilov), 9 (gen. from infant. P. A. Lechitsky) by the armies and two separate corps (7 and 22-th army) (23,5 . and 7 cavalry divisions - over 300000 people, 1200 op.). See: Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 – 1918. B. 7; Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914-1918. B. II; Strategic essay. H. 3; Borisov A.D. Carpathian operation.
23. Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 – 1918. B. 7. S. 142.
24. Borisov A.D. Carpathian operation. C. 103.
25. Wolf, O. R. Austro-Hungarian Danube Flotilla in World War 1914 - 1918. SPb., 2004. C. 19.
26. Falkengayn E. von Decree. cit. C. 62.
27. Nowak KF Der Weg zur Katastrophe. Berlin, 1919. S. 76.
28. Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914-1918. B. II. S. 270.
29. Oleynikov A.V. Captured in battle. Trophies of the Russian army in the First World War. M., 2014. C. 316.
30. In the course of the tactical breakthrough of the defense of the 3 Army of the South-Western Front, held on 19 – 20 on April 1915 (gave the name of the Gorlitsk operation 19. 04. - 10. 06. 1915), the German 11. Mackensen), Austrian 3-I (general. Infantry S. Boroevich von Boine) and 4-I (general. Infantry, archduke Joseph Ferdinand) of the army (31,5 infantry and 3 caval. Div. - about 400000 people, 2300 op.) They opposed 3-A of the UZF (gen. from infant. R. D. Radko-Dmitriev; 18,5 infantry and about 6 caval. div. - about 300000 people, to 1000 guns). See: Collection of documents. Gorlitsky operation; Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 – 1918. B. 7; Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914-1918. B. II; Rotkirch T. Fon. Breakthrough of the Russian Carpathian front at Gorlitsy-Tarnov; Strategic essay. H. 4; Bonch-Bruevich M.D. The loss of Galicia by us in 1915; The Battle of Gorlice-Tarnow 2-6 May 1915 g .; G. Kellerman. Breakthrough of the 11 of the German army at Gorlice.
31. Ludendorff E. background. Decree. cit. C. 145.
32. Falkengayn E. background. Decree. cit. C. 111.
33. Rotkirch T. Fon. Decree. cit. C. 79, 87.
34. Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 – 1918. B. 7. S. 428; B. 8. S. 237.
35. Rotkirch T. Fon. Decree. cit. C. 87.
36. Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 – 1918. B. 8. S. 236, 252.
37. The 8 Army of the UZF (gen. From the cavalry. A. A. Brusilov; 15,5 infantry and 5 caval. Div. - 200000 people, to 800 op.) Was opposed by the 4 (gen. Infantry, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand), 1 th (feldtseyhmeyster Puhallo von Brlog) and 2 (gen. cavalry. F. Böhm-Ermolli) to the armies (up to 30 infantry and 3 caval. div. to 400000 bayonets, over 2000 op.). See: Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 – 1918. B. 8; Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914-1918. B. II; Strategic sketch of the war. CH 4.
38. Oleynikov A.V. Decree. cit. C. 317.
39. The 11 Army of the UZF (gen. From infants. DG Shcherbachev; 6 infantry and 1 caval. Div. - to 80000 people, to 300 op.) Resisted the German Southern Army (general infantry von Botmer; to 6 -they infantry div. - over 70000 bayonets, over 400 op.). See: Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914-1918. B. II; Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 – 1918. B. 7; Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 – 1918. B. 8.
40. The 9 Army (gen. From Infant. P. A. Lechitsky; 13 infantry and 7 cavalry divisions - to 200000 people, to 700 op.) Opposed the Austro-Hungarian 7 army (gen. Kaval. F. von Pflanzer-Baltin; 9 infantry and 3 cavalier diva - 120000 people, over 700 op.). See Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914-1918. B. II; Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 – 1918. B. 7; Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 – 1918. B. 8.

To be continued

Comments

[XII legion]

Yes, the fateful theater
It’s a pity that they didn’t finish in the Carpathians
A reasoned and informative article
A bunch of facts and figures
Thank you!

[Cartalon]

Even if they didn’t change anything in the Carpathians, there were no opportunities for a deep operation in Hungary.

[XII legion]

If we had confined ourselves to one offensive operation - in the Carpathians, and would not have struck with “horns”, and in East Prussia and the Carpathians, we would have managed to get reserves (January-February). Another reserve was the Siege Army (11) at Przemysl. She was released on March 9, when the Carpathian operation was still underway.
Ammunition was straining - yes
But then again, due to passive sectors of the front and better logistics, it was possible to solve.

[Cartalon]

And how do you forgive to supply troops on the Hungarian plain? with logistics, and so the trouble so here the mountains to the rear, most likely the Hungarian campaign would have ended in complete disaster, would have been the same Gorlitsa, but it was already impossible to get out from the Carpathians.

[XII legion]

Of course, such risks were present.
But the Hungarian plain is on the Sahara desert.
I will not recall the experience of the Soviet army after crossing the Carpathians in the Second World War. Other times, conditions, scales and logistics.
I can only say that there was experience in supplying a large group (maybe not as much as the SWF, but still) in the conditions of a mountain theater — the experience of the Caucasian army. They coped well, and for several years.
If there was a chance to break Austria-Hungary and end the war faster (saving human lives) - it should have been used. And on the East Prussian theater of war, burrow into the ground, like the Germans.

[Cartalon]

I'm not talking about provisions, but about ammunition which is small and how many suitable railway lines were there across the Carpathians? Galicia TVD Austrians were mainly supplied not through Hungary, and the Russians didn’t have a train with the captured Austrian network.

[XII legion]

SWF troops were supplied with ammunition (I’m not talking about volumes, but in general) in the foothills of the Carpathians, in the Carpathians themselves and even crossing the Carpathians (those who overcame the formations).
The Caucasus Front was supplied with ammunition delivered in the mountains - being 250 km deep in Turkey. Moreover, the Caucasians didn’t use the Caucasians as massively as the troops of the South West Coast, the Austrian captured weapons.

[Cartalon]

The scale is not the same as the Caucasian army and smaller in number and intensity of hostilities is lower, in the Caucasus there was, if not a colonial war, then something like a war of the late 19th century.

[XII legion]

The intensity of hostilities is very high - ALL 3 YEARS - A MANEUVERABLE war, moreover, on a Mining theater.
Quantitative (but not territorial) scales are smaller
But

if not a colonial war, then what was like a war of the late 19th century.

2 Turkish armies (3rd and 2nd), defeated in 16, would not agree with this.

[badens1111]

Quote: XII Legion

2 Turkish armies (3rd and 2nd), defeated in 16.

Of course .. And where are you going to get it?
Well, are you here a sort of expert on the point of the article?
The involvement of Turkey in the war was of fundamental importance for Germany. According to the plan of the German strategists, Turkey, having a million-strong army, was to pull the reserves and resources of Russia to the Caucasus, and Great Britain - to the Sinai Peninsula and to Mesopotamia (the territory of modern Iraq).

For Turkey itself, which survived at the turn of the XNUMXth-XNUMXth centuries a series of military defeats, participation in a new war, especially against Russia, was far from a bright prospect. Therefore, despite allied commitments, the leadership of the Ottoman Empire hesitated for a long time before starting a war with Russia. Against this, both the head of state, Sultan Mehmed V, and most of the members of his government spoke out. The supporter of the war was only Turkish Minister of War Enver Pasha, who was under the influence of the head of the German mission in Turkey, General L. von Sanders.

By virtue of this the Turkish leadership in September 1914, through the Russian ambassador in Istanbul N. Girs, brought its position on the readiness not only to be neutral in the war that had already begun, but also to act as Russia's ally against Germany.

Paradoxically, it was precisely this that did not suit the tsarist leadership. Nicholas II the laurels of his great ancestors did not give rest: Peter I and Catherine II and he really wanted to realize the idea of ​​gaining Constantinople and the Black Sea straits for Russia and thereby go down in history. The best way to achieve this was only a victorious war with Turkey. Proceeding from this, the foreign policy strategy of Russia in the Middle East was built. Therefore, the question of allied relations with Turkey was not even raised.
The question is, wasn’t the colonial war of Russia in the Caucasus in the light of the actions of Nicholas 2?

[XII legion]

Why have so many written?
We talked about something else
On the nature of hostilities and supplies
Yeah
Continue your flood
For God's sake

[Cartalon]

By colonial, I meant the expeditionary nature of the fighting on a distant theater of defense against the enemy inferior in training and supply, and not any ideology that is irrelevant.

[badens1111]

[quote = XII legion Yeah [/ quote]
That is nothing to cover?
Well then, do not tell tales about the "second Russian".

[soldier]

badens1111

The question is, wasn’t the colonial war of Russia in the Caucasus in the light of the actions of Nicholas 2?

Firstly, Turkey attacked Russia - the Navy of the Ottoman Empire attacked the Russian Black Sea coast on October 29 (16th according to the old style) 1914 and a new front of the First World War appeared - the Caucasus. On this day, Turkish ships fired upon without a declaration of war. Sevastopol and Odessa, and the next day - Novorossiysk.
The enemy attacked Russia.
Secondly, it was about saving the single-faith Armenian people from the Ottoman yoke.
So the Caucasian theater is the second national

[badens1111]

Quote: XII Legion

A reasoned and informative article

Yeah, especially the name is "second Russian", since when and who came up with this nonsense in relation to the Imperialist War, where did Russia get into by the thoughtlessness of Nikolashka the Second?

[XII legion]

Yeah, especially the name is "second Russian", since when and who came up with this nonsense in relation to the Imperialist War

The name of those years. And it is no coincidence - the enemy trampled the Russian land.
And any war is imperialist to one degree or another.
In addition to the name, you can and should sometimes pay attention to the content
ARGUMENTED AND INFORMATIVE
So exactly

[badens1111]

Quote: XII Legion

Name of those years

In urya newspapers? Well, and how much was there enough fuss to scream that she was de "domestic"?
From a formal point of view, this is true: during the reign of Nicholas II, the Russian Empire entered the war with the Fourth Union, the leading link of which was Kaiser Germany, and Russia lost this war; at the same time, the Soviet Union won the war against the fascist Axis countries, the most powerful of which was Nazi Germany. But one moment that is essentially crucial is slipping away from this comparison: what kind of war the Russian Empire was waging, and what kind of war the Soviet Union won. But the difference between these wars to a large extent determined the different outcome of these for Russia.
Immediately in 1914-1917, the propaganda of both imperial and post-February Russia called the ongoing war "Second World War" (by analogy with the Patriotic War of 1812), but this name did not take root among the masses: people called it German or somehow differently, but persistently did not want to name the "Second World War" or the "sacred".
Because neither World War II nor sacred World War I was for Russia and its people.
The "Great Patriotic War" was accepted without hesitation by the Soviet people. And no matter how many different collaborators and their successors from the NTS did not come up with names like "Soviet-Nazi war", in the memory of the People's War of 1941-1945 remained under the name of the Great Patriotic War. This war became the main battle during the war against fascism, proclaimed at the VII Congress of the Communist International in 1935. The Soviet Union assisted China in the fight against the invasion of the Japanese fascists, helped the Spanish Republicans in the battles against the Francoists. And finally, in 1941, the USSR was invaded by Nazi Germany and its allies.

And the people for good reason perceived the Great War against fascism as the Patriotic War. And the fact that the people took it that way, there is a lot of evidence: for example, in Moscow alone, only in the first week of the war, 170 thousand people applied for voluntary resignation to the front. In the appendix to the directive of the High Command of the Wehrmacht of September 8, 1941 it reads: "For the first time in this war, a German soldier is opposed by an enemy trained not only as a soldier, but also as a political opponent who sees his ideal in communism and the worst in national socialism the enemy. "
So it’s not necessary to revive and generate crookedly cross-sewn bloopers, at the expense of some kind of “second Russian” repeating the agitation of all kinds of different Russophobes.

[XII legion]

Rally further
If there is nothing to say directly in the text

[badens1111]

Quote: XII Legion

If there is nothing to say directly in the text

Really pricked eyes?
But to talk about the essence of the article, about what did you intend to replay what happened? No? Then what are you chewing on here, if not trying to squeeze one, the other, along the way, either praising or criticizing the actions of the Russian army?

[XII legion]

I'm not replaying anything
We are discussing military-historical things with colleagues.
Do not like it - at the rally

[XII legion]

But to talk about the essence of the article, about what did you intend to replay what happened? No? Then what are you chewing on here, if not trying to squeeze one, the other, along the way, either praising or criticizing the actions of the Russian army?

For this, military history exists - to analyze and compare. On historical examples.
What is the essence of your articles about Caporetto? Chew also the fact of a hundred years ago. According to one book by Villari, the Italian Front (God forbid if Koke Caporetto has been added yet) - have read and retell in your own words. Why this educational program that is chewing?

[Lieutenant Teterin]

Mr. Baden, this “nonsense" was "invented" by the Russian people during the years of that war:




Will you argue with reality or will you still admit that in the mass consciousness of those years this war was the Second World War, so named by analogy with the Patriotic War of 1812?

[Olgovich]

In an effort to achieve a strategically unnecessary goal ("retaining the conquered space"), the command of the Southwestern Front sacrificed its best troops

Not so simple: they tried to protect the Russian (Russian) population of Galicia, who unconditionally sided with Russia after the territory was taken by the Russian army. They were threatened with revenge on the part of the Austrians.
The retreat of the Russian army led to the tragedy of hundreds of thousands of people forced to abandon their homes and go to the evacuation. Which, in turn, blocked the roads and impeded the maneuver of the army ...

[BRONEVIK]

Not so simple: they tried to protect the Russian (Russian) population of Galicia, who unconditionally sided with Russia after the territory was taken by the Russian army. They were threatened with revenge on the part of the Austrians.

It certainly is so respected Olgovich
But also not so simple
Maintaining army personnel is more important than territory. After all, the Russian population remained after all in Poland (although it was not threatened with the same revenge as the Rusyns).
In order not to be unfounded, I refer to the opinion of G.K. Korolkov, characterizing the actions of General P. A. Pleve in a similar situation in the Baltic states: “Pleve goes against the demands of the Stavka - to keep every land yard to the last extreme (this led to many unnecessary losses without any benefit to the cause) and this shows a correct understanding of maneuver. "
The army is saved - the territory will return.
When political motives influence operational decisions, it’s not good either. An example is Konrad von Götzendorf in August 1914. He so longed to deal with Serbia - that until recently he did not let go of the 2nd army, which was not enough in Galicia.

[parusnik]

P. A. Lechitsky - After the February Revolution, he left the command of the army. Since April 18, 1917 at the disposal of the Minister of War. On May 7, 1917, retired. December 3, 1919 was arrested for speculating in food, but was released the next day. Since 1920 in the Red Army. Since January 1921, the inspector of infantry and cavalry of the Petrograd Military District. In 1920, he was arrested as the head of the counter-revolutionary military organization. Sentenced to 2 years in prison. He died in 1921 at the 1st Moscow Prison Hospital.
D. G. Scherbachev - Since December 1918 in the army of Denikin. I agreed with Krasnov on the unification of the forces of the Don Army of Krasnov and the Volunteer Army of Denikin. Then in the army of Wrangel. Shcherbachev advised Wrangel not to launch an offensive, diverting Soviet forces from the Polish front. In May 1920 because of disagreements with General Baron P.N. Wrangel regarding the acceptability of joint actions with Poland, resigned, in 1920 he left for Nice. He lived on the pension assigned to him by the Romanian government. Legitimist monarchist, member of the Sovereign Conference under the Grand Duke Kirill Vladimirovich. He died on January 18, 1932 in Nice. He was buried with military honors by a battalion of French alpine shooters in the Russian cemetery of Kokad.

[27091965]

Another important omission was the inept actions of the Russian command at the junctions of army formations.

In such trenches, it is difficult to fight against 150 mm howitzers for a long time.


Given the number of shells per gun, it was difficult for the Russian troops to restrain the offensive. .

[Rotmistr]

That yes
And the photos are interesting
But speaking of trenches, we do not forget that spring and summer of 1915 are a period of MANEUVER war.
A flanking maneuver allows a lot - even if there is a lack of ammunition.
A similar situation and time period.
Parry breakthrough at the junction of the Russian 4th and 3rd armies of the 25th army corps in June 1915 near Krasnik.
To ensure a joint in the event of a breakthrough, a special chief was appointed at the head of the detachment, which included two infantry regiments, a light artillery division and a Cossack division. The detachment was located in such an area (behind the flank of the corps), which tactically was an advantageous position for hitting an enemy who had penetrated the flank.
And parts of the detachment of Major General A. A. Veselovsky captured about 10 thousand soldiers and more than 100 officers, up to 10 machine guns and a lot of weapons and ammunition.
The actions of the 25th Army Corps led to significant tactical and operational success.
This is JUNE 1915!
And in May of that year, the same general and his corps distinguished themselves under Opatov. Also actively maneuvering and inflicting flank counterattacks. By the way, in defense, Veselovsky ordered not to create a solid line of trenches, but to form resistance nodes.
In total, the corps in May-June captured more than 25000 prisoners - their then real composition.
"Patching holes" in the face of a lack of reserves and supply problems does not always bear fruit. Active defense with wide maneuvering is preferable.

[27091965]

Quote: Rotmistr

But speaking of trenches, we do not forget that spring and summer of 1915 are a period of MANEUVER war.
A flanking maneuver allows a lot - even if there is a lack of ammunition.

The author had an interesting article, "Entente Railways." The Austrians also used narrow-gauge field lines to transport troops and supplies, possessing a certain superiority in mobility, which allowed them to transfer units and artillery to other sectors of the front, which the Russian army could not afford on this front.

[Rotmistr]

Narrow gauge railways also affect of course. And limitations in maneuverability have taken place.
But I gave you a real example - the actions of 25 AK in May-June 1915. Very successful actions.
Active maneuvering, control of joints, and the action on the flanks of erupted enemy groupings are the instruments of the commander of those years in an environment of maneuver warfare

[27091965]

Quote: Rotmistr

Active maneuvering, control of joints, and the action on the flanks of erupted enemy groupings are the instruments of the commander of those years in an environment of maneuver warfare

I agree with you, but the cover groups suffer losses and consume ammunition, all this needs to be replenished, for this, reserves and established supplies are needed. It was not possible to create all the necessary conditions for this on this front.

[Rotmistr]

Supplement about reserves.
Many troops were transferred to the South-Western Front - corps from the North-Western Front and reserves of the Headquarters. But they were introduced into the battle by "packs", were not grouped and were not used to inflict flank attacks. As a result, they only absorbed the enemy’s blow, which was inflicted by powerful fists and burned in turn.
I spoke about this maneuvering.
The author, in a detailed examination of the operations of 1915, will dwell on this issue. I hope more

[27091965]

Quote: Rotmistr

But they were introduced into the battle by "packs", were not grouped and were not used to inflict flank attacks. As a result, they only absorbed the enemy’s blow, which was inflicted by powerful fists and burned in turn.

We came to the same opinion, just from different directions.

[Cartalon]

The Gorlitsky breakthrough had to be closed with a flank blow from the left bank, but in the spring of 15th year the Russian command acted clumsily as never before.

[Rotmistr]

Overall of course
But I wanted to focus on the fact that even with existing and arriving reserves the command of the 3rd army and the yuzf could dispose of more efficiently. And act like the 4th army and its 25th army corps under Opatov and Lublin acted

[Some kind of compote]

It turned out what happened
Excellent article
Thank you

[XII legion]

Cartalon,

By colonial, I meant the expeditionary nature of the fighting on a distant theater of defense against the enemy inferior in training and supply, and not any ideology that is irrelevant.

That is what I tried to explain to badens1111
Who misplaced our conversation

[XII legion]

True, the expeditionary character of the database is applicable only to the Baratov corps. There was a full-fledged front - albeit as part of the same army

[soldier]

on a remote tvd versus inferior in training

I want to clarify: why is a remote theater? For Russia? No, it’s traditional.
Who lagged behind - the 2nd Army (10 infantry from the Dardanelles veterans), transferred to the Caucasus?
The Quartermaster-General of the Caucasian Front, E. V. Maslovsky, gave the following characteristics of the Turkish troops: “The Ottoman Turks, as combat material, were of high quality, brave, brave, extremely hardy, undemanding and modest, and at the same time disciplined; in general, by nature, they were real warriors, possessing nobility distinguishing a true warrior. They fought bravely, almost always took a bayonet strike, applied well to the terrain, attacked well, defended well, and only, shot down from the first line of fortifications, could not always stay on the second line if they were not given time to recover, pursuing persistently: this was reflected in the property of the eastern peoples - sensitivity at failure. ” The same author, speaking of the Turks as a serious adversary: ​​“After all, this was the adversary who, during the same last war, successfully fought with the British in Mesopotamia, captivating some of their forces there and not having numerical superiority. This was the enemy who arrived in the Caucasus with high spirits of the victors of the British and French in a bitter struggle on the Gallipoli Peninsula, where 549 thousand people, colossal technical means and powerful naval artillery were brought into battle by his opponent, quotes the German specialist: “Contrary to all the shortcomings (training and supply), courage, resistance to resistance and discipline of the Turks gave them superiority over all races of Asia and Africa and made them able to fight against European troops. The gradual arrival of the materiel and German specialists to them gave them terrible value, "as well as the British General C. Tausgend (captured by the Turks in Mesopotamia):" These are the most stubborn of all the soldiers of Europe and Asia, disciplined, firmly soldered into one mass, more stubborn and harder than the Germans. "
Turkish soldiers, as a rule, fought to the end, extremely reluctantly surrendering in comparison with the Austrians and even the Germans.
The Turkish army was reorganized primarily under the leadership of German instructors and advisers. Moreover, during the war, up to 6 thousand German and Austrian officers served in the Turkish army. A Turkish statesman, since 1915 the head of the Syrian administration (and a war criminal who participated in the massacres of Armenians and Arabs) A. Cemal Pasha said: “For more than 30 years now, German instructors have been working in our army; our commanding staff received a purely German upbringing and the entire army is imbued with the German military spirit. ”
During the war, direct military assistance from Germany and Austria-Hungary to their Turkish ally was also observed. So, according to Russian intelligence in 1916: “two infantry and one howitzer-artillery Austro-German regiments arrived from Germany in Constantinople, which were then urgently sent to Eastern Anatolia .... For two months, from 100 to 200 Germans went to Constantinople to the Caucasus Front. From 5 to 8 Germans, who fled from Russian captivity through Persia, arrived in Persia daily. ”
So about the inferior Turks - this is a question.
Their victory at Gallipoli and Kut el Amar speak for themselves

[XII legion]

badens1111,

badens1111 Today, 18:15 ↑
[quote = XII legion Yeah

That is nothing to cover?
Well then, do not tell tales about the "second Russian".
[/ Quote]
Yes, in general, no one except you tells tales
You’ve been poisoning them all evening - the truth is out of business and out of place

[Lieutenant Teterin]

Great and informative article. The level of training of the Russian troops is impressive. Despite strategic miscalculations, the quality of the lower ranks, non-commissioned officers and chief officers is beyond praise, which confirms both the staunchness of the Russian troops and the significant losses of the Austro-Germans, incurred by them despite the superior firepower.
The author - my sincere gratitude for the work done!