TVD Second Patriotic. 1915 year. Part of 2

When the enemy conducts "Winter Strategic Cannes" during the Second Prasnysh operation [12] the troops of the 12 and 1 armies of the North-Western Front were able to cover the northern flank of the "Polish Balcony".

4 schema. Fights under Prasnyshem 12 – 15 February 1915 g. On the map of the Gregorian calendar. Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 – 1918. B. 7. Berlin, 1931

The operation was carried out to stabilize the strategic situation in the north-west direction. The strategic importance of the Second Prasnysh operation was extremely great. The goal was achieved - the Russians won a decisive victory over a powerful adversary. It was possible to largely eliminate the consequences of the unsuccessful Second August Operation.

In March, the army group M.-K.-V. von Galvitsa, supported by units of the German 10 Army, repelled a Russian counteroffensive. The Germans had to stop the attack on Osovets and the Beaver line. But stabilization was achieved only within a month - as early as April, the German invasion of the Baltic States began.

The result of the Second Prasnysh is indicative of the trophies of the winners (captured before 14000 people - this “record” the French would “beat” in Champagne in just over six months, 58 guns, 100 machine guns and 2 mortars). 2 corps of Germans (1-th reserve and Tsastrova) were defeated and largely destroyed - one in the city of Prasnysh, the other, covering the retreat of the remnants of the German troops. The total losses of the Russian 1 and 12 armies are 40000 people, the German 8 and 12 armies are 60000 people (and the Germans admit the loss only in the city of Prasnysh 13000 fighters [13]).

In order to capture the Russian troops in Poland, the enemy began the implementation of Summer Strategic Cannes.

In the north, the army group Halwitz and the 8 army were supposed to hit the Neman (the group sought to reach the area west of Osovets through Pultusk and Prasnysh), and in the south - army group A. von Mackensen from the German 11 and Bug and Austro-Hungarian 4 armies on Vladimir-Volynsky (the group was advancing between the Vistula and Western Bug rivers across the Hill - Lublin in the direction of Brest-Litovsk). Thus, a powerful strike was planned under the base of the Polish ledge with the aim of destroying the Russian troops there. This grand maneuver was supposed to lead to the encirclement of several Russian armies at once.

And in this situation, the Polish theater of technology again played its special role - and above all its flanks. At the first stage of the "Summer Strategic Cannes" on the northern flank of the "Polish ledge" took place the Third Prasnyshskaya [14], and on the southern flank - Krasnostavskaya and Hrubieshovskaya operations.

5 schema. Deployment of Russian and German troops before the start of the Third Prasnysh operation. Korolkov G. K. The Prasnysh Battle. July 1915 M. - L., 1928

Despite the fact that in the Third Prasnysh operation on the direction of the main attack, the enemy had three and a half times more infantry and seven times more guns (German 100000 with 864 guns against 2 and 11 Siberian rifle divisions - 27000 Russians with 120 guns), the enemy group offensive was foiled. Due to the stubborn resistance of the Russian troops for almost a week of fighting, the Germans were able to advance only 30-35 km, achieving tactical success at the cost of heavy losses in people and material resources. Russian troops were not defeated, but only shifted from their positions and pushed to the p. Narew - they consolidated the front, creating a dense defense on this natural frontier. Operatively Third Prasnysh - the success of the Germans, but strategically he contributed to the Russian plan to competently evacuate wealth and withdraw troops from Central Poland. Thus, the strategic success remained on the Russian side - they kept on the line r. Narev. The third Prasnysh put an end to the development of the northern claws of Summer Strategic Cannes.

The losses of the Russians in this operation are up to 40000 people (which is primarily due to the overwhelming superiority of the enemy), including those killed near 12%, wounded over 37% and about 50% missing (including prisoners around 40 officers and more 16000 privates - many were captured, lagging behind their own during the departure). Lost 12 guns and 48 machine guns. Losses of the Germans reached 25% of the group Glavitsa - that is, more than 40000 people [15].

In the course of Krasnostava [16] and Hrubieshovskaya operations [17] the enemy failed to achieve a tactical breakthrough of the front of the Russian troops.


Commander 3 A General of Infantry L. V. (P) Lesh


Commander 13 A General of Infantry V.N. Gorbatovsky

The southern armies of the North-Western Front slowly retreated (for example, during the 7-day Hrubieszow operation, the Bug army advanced only 16 km, the result of the Austro-Hungarian 1 army was even weaker), inflicting serious blows on the enemy, reducing his offensive rates. The Russian Imperial Guard showed its combat power and tactical power in these battles. But due to the unfavorable situation on the right flank of the 3 Army, the tactical success of the Russian Guards Corps was not transformed into operational.

The German guard in this operation suffered major losses. Thus, from June to mid-August 1915, according to German data, the 1 Guards Infantry Regiment of the 1 Guards Division lost 53 officer and 3005 lower ranks, and the 3 Guards Infantry Regiment - 17 officers and 2116 lower officers . e. parts actually changed their combat strength. The Austro-Hungarian units were battered before the start of the battle. Thus, according to Austrian data, the 6 Army Corps only in 3 battles in July 1915 lost 4,7 thousand people (including 1,2 thousand killed) [18]. The offensive head of Army Group A. Mackensen gradually exhaled.

During the Hrubieszow operation, Russian troops captured up to 5000 prisoners, several guns, at least 15 machine guns. Yu. N. Danilov described these fights as protracted and very stubborn, often reaching hand-to-hand combat and costly for both sides. The Russians gradually retreated to the south section of the Advanced Theater - to the north, to Lublin and Hill, continuing to challenge every step of the enemy [19].

At the second stage of the “Summer Strategic Cannes” on the north face of the “Polish Balcony” Narew operation [20] decided the fate of Warsaw. The Germans could not achieve the main goal - to get through to Sedlec. During the 11-day persistent battles, the enemy group was only able to capture several bridgeheads on the left bank of the r. Narev. The task of the Russian armies was defense - to gain time needed to withdraw the 2 and part of the forces of the 4 armies from central Poland. The Narev operation was characterized by a significant length of the front (over 140 km) and an abundance of natural obstacles (waterlogged areas, pp. Narev, Beaver, etc.). During it, Russian troops captured up to 2000 prisoners and several machine guns.

At the same time, during the Lublin-Kholmsk defensive operation [21] The southern "claw" of Summer Strategic Cannes was also stopped. The Lublin-Kholm operation became the most important defensive operation of the Russian troops during the 1915 campaign. The Russians became the trophies of the 5000 prisoners, the 36 guns, the 10 machine guns.


Commander 12 A. Infantry General A. E. Churin


Commander 4 A, Infantry General A. E. Evert

While the armies that were on the flanks of the “Polish balcony” were holding back the enemy, the troops in central Poland 21 July left Warsaw and slowly retreated to the Sokolov – Siedlec – Lukow railway line. By the end of this month, the troops of the North-Western Front retreated to the Osovets – Drogichin – Vlodawa – Turiisk front, which decided the fate of Novogeorgiyevsk fortress.

The enemy’s plan to arrange a strategic “cauldron” for Russian troops in Poland failed. A huge breach in the center of the Eastern Front could have disastrous operational and strategic consequences, leading to the early curtailment of Russia's participation in a world war. Russian army out of the "bag" Advanced Theater. The strategic rollback of the Russian troops was carried out according to the plan and was associated with the solution of the most important economic and strategic tasks, of which the main one was the withdrawal of troops and the evacuation of resources from the “Polish balcony”.

6 schema. “Polish balcony” against the background of the overall picture of the Eastern Front by the end of June 1915 in Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 – 1918. B. 8. Berlin, 1932

7 schema. The combat disposition of the Russian southern army group of the NWF and its opponent on the southern face of the "Polish balcony" to the beginning of the Lublin-Kholm operation. Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 – 1918. B. 8. Berlin, 1932

But the loss of the Polish theater of war had an extremely negative impact on the situation on the entire Austro-German front: the connectivity of the Eastern front was broken and the maneuvering ability of the Russian army was largely undermined, largely based on the Polish railway network.

8 schema. Eastern Front in the summer of 1915 Korolkov G.K. Unfulfilled Cannes. M., 1926

9 schema. Warsaw front to 15 July 1915. Washburn S. Victory in Defeat. London, 1916


Notes.

12. Second Prasnyshskaya operation 07. 02. - 17. 03. 1915 was a defensive offensive operation 1 (gen. From cavalry. AI Litvinov; 10 infantry., 6,5 caval. Div .; 100000 bayonets, over 500 op.) And 12 (gen. From Kaval PA Pleve; 13,5 infantry., 2,5 cavalry. Div., 150000 bayonets, before 700 or.) The NWF armies against the 12 and 8 armies of the German Eastern Front (army group general. Artillery M.-K .-V. Von Galvitsa - 12 infantry and 2 cavalier divas; to 140000 bayonets, to 1000 op.). See: Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 – 1918. B. 7; Holmsen, I. A. Decree. cit .; The composition of the German mobilized field corps, cavalry divisions and reserve corps (as reported by March 1 1915 of the year); Borisov A.D. Prasnyshskaya operation.
13. Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 – 1918. B. 7. S. 257.
14. The third Prasnysh operation is a defensive operation 1-th (gen. From cavalry. AI Litvinov) (with the support of the corps 12-th A) of the NWF army against army group gen. artillery. M.-K.-V. Von Galvitsa (12 A) of the German Eastern Front 30. 06. - 05. 07. 1915 d. The ratio of forces - 177000 Germans (14 Pekh. Div.) Vs. 107000 Russians (8 Pekh. Div.) And 1256 Germanic guns against 377 Russians. During the battle, M.-K.-V. Von Galvitz received another 4 division from the 9 Army, and the number of his guns increased to 1382. See: Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 – 1918. B. 8. Berlin, 1932; Korolkov G. K. The Prasnysh Battle.
15. Korolkov GK Decree. cit. C. 138.
16. Operation 3 Army (gen. From infant. L.V. (P.) Lesh; 16 infantry., 2 cavalry division; to 200000 bayonets, to 800 op.) NWF and army groups (11-I German and 4 th Austro-Hungarian Army) gen.-feldm. A. von Mackensen (28 infantry., 1,5 caval. Div., Over 300000 bayonets, over 2000 op.) 4-9 in July 1915, which was deployed in the Lublin strategic direction. See: Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914 -1918. B. II. Wien, 1931; Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 – 1918. B. 8; The composition of the German army according to the 1 in May 1915 Warsaw, 1915; Strategic sketch of the 1914-1918 war. H. 4; Korolkov G. K. Unfulfilled Cannes.
17. The operation between the 13 th Army of the North-Western Front (general. From infant. V.N. Gorbatovsky; 13 infantry and 5 caval. Div. To 150000 people over 600 op.) And the German Bug (general infantry A. von Linzingen; 8 infantry and 1 cavalry divisions; about 100000 people, more than 600 op.) And Austro-Hungarian 1 (feldtseyhmeyster P. Puchallo von Brlog; 6 infantry., 2 caval.; More than 70000 people, more than 400, infantry., 2 caval., More than 8 people, more than 1915, infantry, 2157 caval., More than 1 people, over 116, infantry. ) armies unfolding 2 – 33 July 1915, in the area of ​​Hrubieszow. See: RGVIA. F. 1932. Op. 8. D. 9; Op. 1918. D. 1914; Fighting on the Western Bug in the summer of 1918 of the year. Processed according to official data of the German General Staff; Fights of the Bugsky army. Excerpts // Herald of Volyn. Belgrade. 1914. No. 1918-8; Der Grosse Krieg. Die Kampfe der Bugarmee. Oldenburg, 4; Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg XNUMX -XNUMX. B. II; Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg XNUMX – XNUMX. B. XNUMX. Strategic essay. H. XNUMX; Korolkov G. K. Unfulfilled Cannes.
18. Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914 -1918. B. II. S. 624.
19. Yu. N. Danilov. Russia in World War 1914 - 1915 Berlin, 1924. C. 360.
20. 10 operation. - 20. 07. 1915 between 1 (gen. From Kaval. AI Litvinov; 14,5 peh., 3 Kaval. Div., 150000 man, over 700 op.) And 12 (gen. From infant. A. E Churin; 8 infantry div., 1 cavalry brig; about 100000 people, to 400 op.) Army of the NWF and German 8 army (gen. Artil. F. von Scholz; 5 infantry div. Kaval Brig .; 60000 man, around 400 op.) and army group gen. artillery. M.-K.-V. von Galvitsa (15,5 infantry div., cavalry. brig; 180000 man, before 1100 op. See: RGVIA. F. 2220. Op. 1. D. 159, 160; F. 5265. Op. 1. D. 4, 5; Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914-1918. B. II; Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 – 1918. V. 8; Strategic Essay. 4; Korolkov G. K. Unfulfilled Cannes.
21. Operation 3 (gen. from infant. L.V. (P.) Lesh; 14,5 peh., 1,5 cav., Div .; 200000 man, to 700 or.), 4 (gen. From infant. A. E. Evert; 8 peh., 2 caval. Div., To 100000 people, up to 350 op.) And 13-th (gen. From infante. VN Gorbatovsky; 14 peh., 3 cav. Div; to 200000 man, up to 700 op.) NWF armies against German 11 (gen.-feldm. A. von Mackensen), Bug (gen. Infantry A. von Linsingen), Austro-Hungarian 1 (feldzhehmeister P. Puhallo von Brlog) and 4 th (Gen. infantry, Archduke Joseph Ferdinand) armies (total 35 infantry, 2 caval. Div., Over 500000 bayonets, over 2500 op.) With the support of yoy group gen.-regiment. R. von Voirsha (5 Pekh., 1 caval. Div; to 60000 bayonets, over 350 op.) 9 – 22 July 1915. See: RGVIA. F. 2157. Op. 1. D. 116; Op. 2. D. 33; F. 2279. Op. 1. D. 222; F. 3352. Op. 1. D. 56; Fighting on the Western Bug in the summer of 1915; Fights of the Bugsky army. Excerpts // Herald of Volyn. Belgrade. 1932. No. 8-9; Der Grosse Krieg; Österreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914-1918. B. II; Reichsarchiv. Der Weltkrieg 1914 – 1918. B. 8; Strategic essay. H. 4; Korolkov G.K. Unfulfilled Cannes.

122-mm howitzer in combat. Gaso

To be continued

Comments

[XII legion]

The drawing and logic of the stages of the 1915 campaign are interesting. Indeed - the Polish theater of art associated flank.
Incidentally, the battles in Poland in the summer of 1915 are poorly studied.
It is excellent that the author sheds light on this question - I hope that I will consider these little-studied events in more detail.
The systematic departure from the “Polish balcony” is a major strategic success for the Russian command and MV Alekseev personally.

[Olgovich]

The enemy’s plan to arrange a strategic “cauldron” for Russian troops in Poland failed. A huge breach in the center of the Eastern Front could have disastrous operational and strategic consequences, leading to the early curtailment of Russia's participation in a world war. Russian army out of the "bag" Advanced Theater. The strategic rollback of the Russian troops was carried out according to the plan and was associated with the solution of the most important economic and strategic tasks, of which the main one was the withdrawal of troops and the evacuation of resources from the “Polish balcony”.

The Germans failed Cannes, failed.
And in the 41m-42nd happened, and more than once. It was those surroundings that gave the most terrible losses and the possibility of breaking the enemy deep into the country ....

[Cartalon]

Well, where does 41-42 have anything to do with anything, the Gorlitsky breakthrough and leaving the flag open in Courland are mistakes of the same order as Kiev, Vyazma and Kharkov.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Cartalon

Well, where does 41-42 have anything to do with anything, the Gorlitsky breakthrough and leaving the flag open in Courland are mistakes of the same order as Kiev, Vyazma and Kharkov.

Name Kiev, Kharkov sample 1914-1917. You can’t.

[Cartalon]

The result in the 15th year was the same withdrawal with huge losses, and out of coverage so there were no tank wedges yet.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Cartalon

The result in the 15th year was the same withdrawal with huge losses, but out of coverage so there were no tank wedges yet

What came out of Kharkov? What is the departure? There simply formed a hole.
The same near Vyazma in October 41.

Quote: Cartalon

there were no tank wedges yet.

The article writes about wedgesbut they were restrained and chopped off.

[BRONEVIK]

Result in year 15 the same departure with huge losses

The result is not the same. One is strategic plan action. Other - as a result of disasters

out of coverage so there were no tank wedges yet.

And in 41-42 years. there was no nuclear weapon
We must proceed from the weapons that were available. Tanks in 1941-42 were on both sides. By the way - in 1916-18. tanks never allowed operational breakthroughs.

And in 1915, there was cavalry on both sides, possessing operational mobility. Apply - please. The Germans had powerful horse corps - with artillery and jaeger units. After all, they used it in the Baltic states - the Lauenstein raid, the Sventsian breakthrough. In Poland, even this did not work.
Miscalculations of the German command, coupled with Russian literacy

[Cartalon]

Cavalry is not even ridiculous are not those opportunities, as a result of the company for 15 years, the Russian army lost the ability, primarily psychologically, to conduct an offensive against the Germans, the stupor of Evert and Kuropatkin was caused precisely by the fact that they did not consider their troops equivalent to the Germans.

[BRONEVIK]

Nothing funny
Horse corps were very active in the Baltic states, on the Dniester - solving important operational tasks.
Psychology is a volatile thing.
An example of this (no need to go far) is the offensive of Russian troops in the Vilna operation in September 1915. This is if we are talking about purely Germans so to speak.
A stupor of persons is replaced by a change of persons.
Evert and Kuropatkin considered their troops equivalent to the Germans. They believed that without powerful heavy artillery to break through defense in depth is problematic.
And in general, they were right

[soldier]

I will allow myself to add something else.
1) Regarding the quality of Russian and German troops by the end of the campaign. In the fall of 1915, an RIA officer and military special Svechin wrote about the Russian army: "phenomena were observed in the troops that did not at all resemble fighting enthusiasm." But he also wrote about the Germans: "The attacking German infantry also did not represent the fighters of 1914; she needed even more solid artillery preparation when she came across a calm enemy, and was also exhausted by continuous battles."
And the Soviet military historian Podorozhny, in a work devoted to the Naroch operation, drew attention to such an interesting fact as a decline in the fighting spirit of the German troops and a decrease in their quality (primarily due to the losses and deaths of military personnel of the personnel army): “... the Germans consider their position on the Russian front extremely serious and have little hope of a successful fight, although they try to hide it. Impression of captured officers - few intelligent; there is no previous arrogance, they are kept much more modest. "
Russian troops also successfully operated on the German sector of the front: in the fall of 1915, in the spring and summer of 1916, and even in the winter of 1917.
In the spring of 16, at Naroch, the offensive potential of the Northern Fleet and the Northern Fleet was undermined - which left its mark on the summer campaign (in particular, on the issue of transferring the severity of the main attack). Nevertheless, the German tactical defense was successfully torn - Naroch, Baranovichi, Bausk. It was not possible to enter the operational space - due to objective and subjective factors. There was a positional war. It needed a lot of firepower and the defense was too powerful.
But even at the offensive stage of the Mitava operation in December 16, it managed to break through the front. Hindenburg wrote: "We assumed that in the winter of 1916-1917, the Russians, as in previous years, will be able to recover their losses and make their army capable of an offensive."
Enemy positions, prisoners, machine guns and whole batteries of light and heavy artillery were captured.
2) About Evert and Kuropatkin.
During a meeting at Headquarters on April 1, 1916 (plan for the summer campaign), the Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the Northern Front A.N. Kuropatkin stated that, with strongly strengthened German positions, hope for breakthrough of the front (meaning an operational breakthrough) is difficult, and that we will suffer heavy losses, especially with a lack of heavy artillery shells.
M.V. Alekseev objected to A.N. Kuropatkin, but stated that we still have not enough heavy shells. The Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the Western Front A.E. Evert joined the opinion of A.N. Kuropatkin and stated that until heavy artillery is loaded with shells in abundance, it is better to stay defensively.
What does it have to do with equivalence?
3) As for the cavalry. The Russian cavalry (I’m talking about operational significance) showed itself especially in the Baltic states (Shavli) and on the Dniester (battle for the Dniester, March 15) and under Buchach (1916). German - in the Baltic states (Shawli, Sventsyansky breakthrough).
If in Poland the Russian cavalry did something (Prasnysh during the Second Prasnysh operation and Neradovo during the Third Prasnysh operation), then the German did NOTHING. Von Hollen's corps, for example, during the Second Prasnysh modestly hid in the rear. And there were opportunities

[Dzmicer]

did not consider their troops equivalent to the Germans.

Because they knew perfectly well about the superiority of the Germans both in the material and technical part, and in their superiority in logistics (and logistics is 90% of any war). Germany had been preparing for war for decades, which Russia could not afford.

[soldier]

Dzmicer

did not consider their troops equivalent to the Germans.
Because they knew perfectly well about the superiority of the Germans

Evert with Kuropatkin in the fact that they considered their troops to be disparate German - not seen

[BRONEVIK]

The Germans failed Cannes, failed.

This is exactly
No matter how hard you try
The Soviet military historian G. Korolkov wrote: “The Russians had to not only retreat under the most unfavorable conditions of supply, but also slow down their retreat in order to gain the time necessary for the evacuation of Warsaw. .... Despite such difficult conditions for fighting an enemy who had the superiority of forces and the full provision of ammunition with a large number of guns, the Russian armies moved to their main position and did not allow the enemy to cut off or surround even one part. " Unfulfilled Cannes. S. 47 and 48

[parusnik]

L. V. (P) Lesh-In the Civil War he participated in the White movement in the south of Russia. From December 1, 1918, he was in the reserve of ranks at the headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the All-Union Socialist League. He was evacuated from Odessa on January 25, 1920, in exile in Yugoslavia. He died in 1934 in a military hospital in Kotor (Montenegro) from gangrene. He was buried in the military cemetery of Shkalari.
V. N. Gorbatovsky-In 1919 he emigrated to Finland. Collaborated with General Yudenich. Together with Rear Admiral V.K. Pilkin, he was a member of the military administration of the Special Committee, organized in Vyborg by P. B. Struve. Together with Yudenich he moved to Estonia. Since January 22, 1920 - Chairman of the Commission for the device of the wounded and sick ranks of the North-West Army N. N. Yudenich. After the liquidation of SZA, he lived in Estonia. He was the head of the association of Russian officers in Estonia and the local monarchist organization. He died in Tallinn.
A.E. Churin - In January - February 1917, he was the commander of the troops of the Petrograd Military District, but in March of the same year he was dismissed. He died on April 2, 1917.

[BRONEVIK]

Defending and counterattacking the Russians inflicted heavy losses on the enemy
The heaviest losses during the war - due to the Russian Front of 1915
Russia has become a shield of the Allies - and it’s a pity that it lost the deserved fruits of victory

[Cartalon]

Give a reference to the losses of the German army over the years and along the fronts.

[BRONEVIK]

About how, a reference.
Need to go to Lenin or Istorichka
Take the Soviet journal Military Foreigner and get acquainted with the statistics of the French General Staff -
Lt. Col. Larsche. Some statistics of the war of 1914-1918 // Military foreigner. - 1934. - No. 12. - S. 109-133.
At the end of 1916, the total losses of the German army on the Russian front were more than 1 million 600 thousand people (on the French - 2 million 460 thousand), the Austrian army - about 2 million 700 thousand people (on the Italian and Balkan fronts - about 730 thousand people) and the Turkish army - up to 300 thousand people (and up to 300 thousand on other fronts). Accordingly, from the total losses of the German bloc by the end of 1916, 8 million 90 thousand people - 4 million 600 thousand people (57%) were disabled by the efforts of the Russian army.
And in the 1915 campaign, the total losses of Germans on the Russian front were 1 million people (while on the French - 721 thousand), Austro-Hungarians - 1 million 252 thousand people (on the Italian front - 181,6 thousand people, the Balkan front - 29 thousand people), the Turks - up to 100 thousand people.

[Olgovich]

Quote: BRONEVIK

Lt. Col. Larsche. Some statistics of the war of 1914-1918 // Military foreigner. - 1934. - No. 12. - S. 109-133.

comprehensive, competent, balanced answer!
I will take the data and myself.

[soldier]

There, dear Olgovich, there is also a subdivision breakdown along the fronts.
And the alignment of losses - on the fronts and countries.
What is the uniqueness of the 1915 campaign specifically for the German army is that the ONLY TIME FOR THE WAR (unlike the campaigns of 1914, 1916 and 1917), the losses of the Germans on the Russian front exceeded the losses on the French. And exceeded decently. An illustration of the fact that the Russian Front was the main thing for them this year.
Austrian losses on the Russian front in 1914-16 REGULAR ABOVE the losses of the Austrians on ALL OTHER FRONTS TOGETHER TAKEN

[Olgovich]

Quote: soldier

There, dear Olgovich, there is also a subdivision breakdown along the fronts.
And the alignment of losses - by fronts and countries

Thank you, dear soldier, for the remark.

[Head Physician]

The logic of the campaign of 15 years in the east began to emerge
And somehow I read - it was chaotically stated
It's all on the shelves. Both text and cards in business
I'll wait for the extreme article

[Lieutenant Teterin]

A wonderful, objective and informative article. The stamina of Siberian riflemen is amazing, which testifies to their excellent training, both of the lower ranks and officers of all types of troops, from infantry to artillery.
The author - my sincere gratitude for the work done!