F-14A "Tomcat" Iranian Air Force
The events of recent weeks clearly show that Washington will not miss an attempt to provoke one or several high-intensity local and regional conflicts in both Eastern European and Asian-Pacific theaters of military operations, and in Front Asia. In the immediate vicinity of the DPRK air borders, the crews of the B-1B “Lancer” 8 airborne bomber of the US Air Force Global Assault Command play with fire, provoking Pyongyang to fully justified military countermeasures. Similar but more balanced and accurate US and British Air Force actions are regularly carried out with respect to the Russian Federation in neutral airspace over the Baltic Sea, where P-8A Poseidon anti-aircraft and DER-RC-135W / V aircraft regularly conduct combat duty "Rivet Joint". Donbas TVD is turning into a testing ground for full-scale tests of American small arms and anti-tank weapons (as is known, the US Congress already examines the mechanisms for providing Kiev with FGM-148 Javellin ATGM).
But if the Pentagon does not dare to go into direct conflict with the Russian armed forces, then it is quite capable of pushing to the hybrid confrontation numerous slave regimes (for example, Ukraine) in the near approaches to our state. This is done both with the aim of trying to establish operational and strategic control over the Russian border in one or another area of the European theater of operations, and for comprehensive verification of the technological capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces in combat conditions. The command of the US Armed Forces is interested in the frequency parameters of all radar systems of the Russian Aerospace Forces without exception, as well as similar indicators of tactical information exchange radio stations. Not less interest are the EW and artillery reconnaissance radars, which, for example, are used to cover the republics from the RTR complexes at the disposal of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as to provide a timely counter-battery "response" on active Ukrainian artillery batteries.
Based on all these data, collected bit by bit from each local theater of military operations, the command of the US Armed Forces intends to create an extremely reliable and precise tactical-technical "template" of the capabilities of the Russian army to work out successful counteraction during a major regional and global conflict. Moreover, in front of a possible confrontation with the Russian Federation, our overseas "colleagues" are thinking of holding a large-scale rehearsal at the Persian theater of military operations, where Washington literally in a matter of days again identified the Islamic Republic of Iran as the main opponent of all democratic principles of the civilized world.
Literally overnight, US President Donald Trump and Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman attacked Tehran with a host of accusations of supporting and sponsoring the Al Qaeda and Taliban terrorist organizations, building operational-strategic infrastructure in Syria for a long-lasting war with the Jewish state . And this is claimed by high-ranking officials, under the direct supervision of whom the transfer of various types of weapons, network-centric radio-electronic equipment, provisions, medicines, etc. to the ISIL. Recall even the fact that the Kurdish formations of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF, YPG / YPJ) together with the SSA and the US KMP units made a “green corridor” to retreat the pseudo-caliph formations from the Syrian city of Rakka taken to the tactical boiler.
This event fully confirmed Washington’s intentions to use the terrorist “backbone” together with Kurdish troops for future clashes with the Syrian Arab Army for control of the largest oil fields in the province of Deir ez-Zor. I remember very well how a similar "green corridor" was provided by Saudi Arabia during the ousting of the Islamic State from Iraq, after which the rested militants with new forces went to support the Syrian stronghold of the pseudo-caliphate. Against this background, all the “sharp” accusations made by Trump against Iran, which made a huge contribution to the fight against IS, are nothing more than the next thoughtlessly modeled marasmus of the US special services for the speedy implementation of decades of the ripening plan for the military destruction of the actively developing Central Asian superpower. No less idiotic pearl sounded from the lips of the adviser to the President of the United States on national security, Herbert McMaster, who accused the Corps of Guards of the Islamic Revolution (one of the most important components of the Iranian armed forces) of trafficking in human beings and weapons for their own enrichment. This is claimed by the representative of the state, military transport aviation which drove into the rear areas of the IG on the Syrian theater of impressiveweapons chests. "
What could be the reason for such a sudden outburst of the White House's anti-Iranian rhetoric in interlacing with the voiced readiness of Donald Trump to denounce the “nuclear deal” with Iran, concluded with the participation of Russia, China, the USA, Great Britain and France in July 2015?
Having concluded a “nuclear deal” with the above states, Tehran automatically deactivated a number of economic and financial sanctions: the oil embargo was lifted, access to 50 billion dollars was unblocked on Western banks' accounts, and Tehran again had the opportunity to purchase high-tech sector products on credit terms. At the same time, the products could be purchased both from Asian and Russian, and from some European corporations. From this we can make quite a logical conclusion: some of these products may well be used as components for the element base of promising models of weapons for the Iranian Armed Forces. For example, various types of high-performance processors of the new generation can be used to increase the target channel of the modern anti-aircraft missile complex Bavar-373, reduce the response time and increase the throughput of its radar tools, as well as reduce the effective reflective surface of the intercepted objects. The performance of the main network-centric units of the Iranian air defense system - automated control systems for mixed anti-aircraft missile batteries / brigades can also be significantly expanded, which will help the Iranian air defense systems of various classes to successfully distribute the highest priority targets according to the degree of danger at the time of a massive attack by the Arabian coalition IDF, Navy / US Air Force and Israeli Air Force.
Also, the new element base can significantly increase the sensitivity and accuracy of active radar homing heads created by Iranian specialists for modern ballistic and cruise anti-ship missiles of the Khalij Fars and Noor families, respectively. Even more unpleasant for Washington and Tel Aviv news can be considered the conclusion between the European corporation “Airbus” and Iran of an impressive contract worth 30 billion euros for the purchase of 118 airliners of various classes, among which 45 wide-body A330 / neo with a flight range of about 15400 km, 16 of the newest A350-1000 widebody. km, as well as 14800 wide-body A12 wide-body passenger aircraft capable of transporting a 380 person a distance 853 km. And the snag is absolutely not in the civilian purpose of these machines, and the possibility of their conversion into advanced and economical military transport planes, repeaters, DRLO aircraft and radio electronic intelligence, as well as air command posts, in which the representatives of the Chinese aerospace corporations and scientific research institutes working in the defense sector. As is known, it was China that made a huge contribution to the formation of the modern look of the RTR units and the air defense forces and Iran: what is the similarity between the Iranian anti-aircraft missile system SD-15400M of the Talash complex and the Chinese HQ-2 (LY-16); the only difference is that the Iranian version of the gas-jet system has no deviation of the thrust vector.
The removal from Iran of the above package of sanctions immediately revived consultations with the Russian Federation regarding the preparation of a contract for the purchase of modern multipurpose fighter aircraft of the 4 + / ++ generations, because the “ancient” aviation component of the Iranian Air Force cannot oppose anything powerful and conquering air supremacy over the Persian Gulf. high-tech air forces of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the US Navy, which will be the main opponents of Tehran in the event of a major war. The fighter aircraft fleet of the Iranian Air Force is represented today by no more than 30 combat-capable MiG-29 / U / UB, equipped with outdated on-board radar with Kasnegrand NXNXX "Rubin" (with a target detection range of "F / A-019E / F" about 18 km), as well as a similar number of F-65A “Tomcat” interceptors with powerful “phased-slotted” AN / AWG-14 radars with a target capture range with 9 and 1 EPR radars of order 2 km. Despite the continued high Tomkata LTH, as well as the excellent energy qualities of the 125-channel AWG-6, the main long-range interception missile, for lack of AIM-9A / C Phoenix, is a modification of the low-maneuverable anti-aircraft guided MIM-54B anti-aircraft missile-launched missile. “Improved Hawk”, which although has a high flight speed at the time of the 23-mode TRD, has an extremely low G-limit (within 2 units).
Initially, Iranian sources reported plans to purchase a large lot of 150 (equivalent to 5 fighter regiments) of the Chinese single-engine tactical fighter J-10A, equipped with onboard radar "Pearl"; Later, against the background of the requirements and experience of the Iranian air force's air crews, the republic’s defense department shifted priorities toward Russian-made tactical aviation. This has caused a lot of rumors, in which Tehran’s probable purchase of a certain number of fighters of the transitional generation MiG-35, Su-30CM or Su-35С appeared, but it did not reach the conclusion of the contract; firstly, due to the unavailability of the Zhuk-AE radar to integrate the MiG-35 fighter into KUV, and secondly, due to Rosoboronexport’s fear of insolvency of the Iranian side in terms of paying Su-30CM / 35С for hard currency. Tel Aviv’s dissatisfaction with Tel Aviv at the time could have had a definite effect on the refusal to sell these machines, because paying 18 Su-35С and 6 Su-30СМ for the total amount of 2,2 — 2,5 billion dollars (together with sets of weapons and equipment for ground service ) is absolutely no problem for Iran.
As a result, in August 2017 of the year, the Russian side proposed to Tehran an alternative version of updating the fleet using technologically simpler Su-27CM3 machines belonging to the 4 + generation. Nothing is reported about the number of proposed machines, but it is known that even the 2 Fighter Aviation Regiment (IAP) from 60 machines can significantly improve the potential of the aviation component of the Iranian Air Force to achieve air superiority near the air borders of the state, as well as above the main mountain system Zagros. Su-27M3 is equipped with an upgraded version of the H001 BARSH Sword - H001BE, the main advantage of which is the introduction of the air-to-surface mode, which allows detecting large surface targets of the type EM / Cruiser at a distance of about 220 - 250 km. The energy abilities in the long-range air combat mode almost did not change: the range of “capturing” a target with an 3 2 EPR was about 120 km with a throughput of 10 throughput along the aisle. In contrast to the early Su-27P, there is a noticeable advantage: the SU-VES unified R-77 long-range air combat (RVV-AE) guided missile equipped with the active radar homing head 9B-1348Е from the Institute of Agat. At medium ranges (from 15 to 35 km), this product allows airborne combat in the “let-forget” mode. What can be said here?
Undoubtedly, to win ultra-long air combat against the Arabian F-15SA or Qatari Rafale, hung with the latest AIM-120D and MBDA Meteor, Iranian Su-27CM (with fewer and lower capabilities of the HNNXVE radar and R-XNXXE radar missiles and the R-XNXXE radar missiles and missiles R-XNXM and less Is it possible, but there is one "trick". In order to survive in the airspace of the Islamic Republic of Iran, covered by dozens of air defense systems (including C-001PMU-77 and "Bavar-300"), Hel Haavir and US Navy tactical fighters will be strictly forbidden to "lift their heads" above 2 - 373 m over terrain (including mountain ranges Zagros). With this flight configuration, the onboard radar and infrared means of the aggressor will not be able to timely detect Iranian Su-50CM70 on duty at low altitudes, thanks to which the “Drying” will approach the F-27I or F-3I Israeli radar -15, and here already and to the melee is not so far, where the "drying" will receive full superiority due to the higher angular speed of reversal and the ability to pull the enemy to a height of a couple of kilometers. This is where American, Israeli and Arabian fighters will be in the zone of view of modern anti-aircraft missile systems of Iranian air defense.
All of the above strengthens us in the opinion that the optional (technological) and quantitative renewal of the Iranian Armed Forces with conventional types of advanced weapons, made possible by the signing of a “nuclear deal”, turned into a no less painful blow to the regional domination of the United States, Israel and the Arabian coalition than the development and adoption by the Iranian army of missile brigades of nuclear warheads for OTB "Tondar" and "Fateh", as well as MRBD type "Shahab-3D / M" and "Sajil-2". And what is even more interesting, Washington and its Allied Allies have less and less time to solve the “Iranian problem” by force, because with great probability for the 2022 year, the fighter aircraft fleet of Iran’s air force will differ dramatically from the one we see today, and the ballistic missiles will receive several warheads and modern missile defense systems.
The Iranian Quadr medium-range ballistic missile has a range of about 2000 km, reaching all strategic targets on the Arabian Peninsula
That is why the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defense of Israel are increasingly and more actively advocating the denunciation of the “nuclear deal,” the next stage of comprehensive sanctions with possible attacks on strategically important nuclear and military-industrial facilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran. But why Washington, despite Israel’s anti-Iranian indifference, for a decade and a half since the intensification of the “nuclear program”, Iran has not decided on a strategic aerospace offensive operation against this state?
To get an answer to this question, you need to carefully look at the list of regional ambitions and risks of Israel in West Asia, and then compare it with the same list for the United States. If Tel Aviv cares about a narrow range of regional issues related to the desire to limit the strategic potential of the main opponents - the Iranian and Syrian armed forces by any means (and there is practically nothing to lose the Jewish state except for its presence on the map of the Middle East) what to lose in the Persian region and in the case of the implementation of the above described scenario of the SWCNO The Pentagon will pay an extremely expensive price.
It is well known that in Qatar, off the coast of the Persian Gulf, there is one of the key US air force bases in the El-Udeid region, which is an important aerodrome for jumping and logistics for the deployment of US strategic bombers B-52H “Stratofortress”, B- 1B "Lancer" and B-2A "Spirit" in the southern part of the Eurasian continent. This airbase is also an advanced base station for KC-135 and KC-10A air tankers, supporting intelligence operations of ground target designation and electronic intelligence aircraft E-8C "J-STARS" and RC-135V / W "Rivet Joint", as well as DRLOI E aircraft -3C / G "Sentry", without which awareness of the US command of the tactical situation in the Middle East would be minimal.
Of no less importance for the American control over the region is the large Al-Dafra airbase, located three dozen kilometers from the UAE capital Abu Dhabi. During the exacerbation of the military-political situation in the region, the unobtrusive multi-purpose X-NUMX-generation F-5A Raptor fighter jets are being regularly and regularly transferred to this facility for covert radio-electronic reconnaissance, as well as gaining air superiority; for the implementation of massed rocket and air strikes against enemy targets on Avb al-Dafra, on a regular basis there is a certain number (several links) of strike fighter F-22E “Strike Eagle” fighters, which are also capable of conducting air interception and long-range air combat using long-range missiles AIM-15D. The Udeid and Al-Dafra airbases hide behind an impressive number of Patriot PAC-120 / 2 anti-aircraft missile batteries, which according to US Defense Department specialists should protect from Iranian medium-range ballistic missiles. Maintenance of all these funds, including infrastructure and equipment for servicing aircraft in proper condition, requires billions of budget allocations annually.
The construction of the AN / FPS-132 Block 5 radar missile warning system in Qatar, an even more “weighty” strategic object playing a crucial role in the US global defense system on the eastern and northeastern aerospace directions. and / or their military units approaching from the People’s Republic of China, as well as the BR in the ascending part of the trajectory launched from South Siberia in the western direction. In the latter case, the AN / FPS-132 Block 5 two-way radar meter-detection radar station deployed in Qatar will provide an opportunity to detect Chinese and Russian ICBMs (launched in the western direction) a few minutes earlier than the similar 3-side radar located at the military base. Fylingdales ”(North Yorkshire, UK). For the destruction of all the above objects worth tens of billions of dollars, plus causing irreparable damage to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates’s Iranian missile units, only a few hours of thoughtful work will be enough, and no “Patriots” and THAADs will be able to cover the US bridgeheads in the Persian Gulf from hundreds of Shahabs and Sajilovs. Consequently, all the anti-Iranian ideas of the White House are destined to remain for a long time only at the level of Trump's loud statements and Lieberman’s angry upheavals.