The Japanese occupation of South Indochina greatly alarmed Washington. It was necessary to turn Japan to the north (to Russia). But how? This was necessary to ensure that Japan did not become a clear enemy of the United States. For several days in Washington, they discussed the advisability of imposing an embargo on oil exports to the Japanese Empire. Naval command fleet reported that the imposition of the embargo is likely to lead Japan to attack Malaya and the Dutch India without much delay, which could lead to the US becoming involved in the war. "If the United States decided to wage a war in the Pacific, then the actions leading to it should be postponed, if possible, until Japan is tied up in Siberia ... Now it is untimely to impose an embargo on trade with Japan." Thus, the recommendations of the fleet completely coincided with the position of the American government.
The problem was that if the United States did not take any action in response to the advance of the Japanese to the south, this strengthened Tokyo in the thought that Japan was on the right track. Pressure in the south will increase, and the war against the USSR will be postponed. As a result, the United States decided to show strength. 25 July 1941, the US government imposed an embargo on oil exports to Japan and froze all Japanese assets in the United States in the amount of 130 million dollars. The next day, the Philippine army was incorporated into the US military. The War Department established a new authority — commanding American forces in the Far East under the command of General D. MacArthur. In connection with the "repair" for the Japanese closed the Panama Canal. England and the authorities of Dutch India followed the United States, announcing the freezing of Japanese assets and the cessation of trade with it.
Both sides uttered a lot of loud words. The press tried as if the war had already begun. But in reality, the United States was in no hurry to break all ties with Japan. The embargo did not stop, but only limited the US-Japanese trade. The State Department informed trade authorities with Japan that they could issue export licenses by the Japanese so that the export of oil (export of aviation gas was banned) was approximately equal to the level of 1935-1936. Since the Japanese assets were frozen, it was prescribed to ensure that the cost of export was approximately equal to the value of the import. In addition, restrictions were imposed for three months, after the expiration of this period, depending on the political situation, trade could again be restored on the basis of a cashless settlement.
When in London they learned about such a “setup” by the United States, they urgently reconsidered their decision and also opened up limited trade with Japan. The Dutch colonial authorities acted in the same spirit. Otherwise, the entire risk of war in the Pacific fell only on Britain, and the United States could remain on the sidelines. The Japanese government, first concerned about the “sanctions,” quickly calmed down. The diplomacy of the “pacification” of the Japanese empire with the aim of turning its aggression to the north (Russia) was continued.
In early August, the US Navy Commander Kimmel asked the Commander-in-Chief of the US Navy, Admiral G. Stark, for explanations about what to expect in the region and the American position in the event of a Japanese attack on Russia or the Dutch India and British possessions. Will the US support Russia or England? Stark did not report anything new by inviting sailors in the Hawaiian Islands to read newspapers (!). He also expressed the opinion that "the primary goal of Japan is the Soviet Primorye." Japan was supposed to attack the USSR in August and not later than the fall of 1941.
Roosevelt at that time focused his efforts on suggesting to the Japanese leadership exactly how Japan should act. Japan was supposed, in the opinion of the owners of the United States, to attack Russia-USSR. In this case, the United States retained the possibility of avoiding participation in the war. Roosevelt had the head of the British government, Winston Churchill, as a comrade and junior partner in this matter. Although their views on joining the war in Europe were different - Roosevelt did everything to preserve the freedom of hands until the end, and Churchill did everything to involve the Americans as soon as possible.
At the same time, both Roosevelt and Churchill were racists, confident of the superiority of the Anglo-Saxons over the rest of the peoples and races. In this regard, Adolf Hitler was a worthy student of the British and American racists, although this is now not customary to recall. As Churchill said at the height of the war: “Why apologize about the superiority of the Anglo-Saxons over the other (races)? Of course, we are the highest race! ” Following the war, the United States and Britain planned to build their new world order, also caste (racial). Only Hitler voiced it directly, openly, and the owners of the United States and Britain preferred to talk about “democratic values” and “human rights”, but by default they also built a neo-slave world order with the division of races and peoples into “elected” and “subhumans”, representatives of lower races.
In the war, Roosevelt and Churchill built their policies in such a way as to win the victory mainly through the hands of others and with minimal cost to themselves. Russian, Germans, Japanese, Italians, Hungarians, Finns and other "subhumans" had to kill each other and free the planet for the "real masters" - the Anglo-Saxons. The most important and secret part of this policy (the ancient strategy of "divide and rule") was the desire to defeat the enemy to take steps that are detrimental to him. Roosevelt and Churchill were convinced that they would win the Great Game. The Germans, Russians, and then the Japanese had to destroy themselves in a mutual slaughter. Even the "allies" of the game owners should have suffered serious losses. In particular, the owners of the United States continued the policy begun on the eve of and during the First World War to transform the British Empire into America’s “junior partner”.
The most important tool in the implementation of this policy were special units in the existing network of special services. Thus, in England, Churchill established the Office of Special Operations in 1940. In the United States, Roosevelt soon after the attack of the Third Reich against the USSR established the Office of Information Coordinator, and in the future, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS, Future of the CIA). Led put his old friend U. Donovan. According to the president’s plan, the Office was supposed to put the best minds of the country at the service of a secret war. The assembled professorship was to engage in in-depth analysis of a wide variety of information and develop a strategy of defeating the enemy by others, including his own, with his hands. Worth noting that Colonel Donovan was a veteran of American intelligence. Back in 1919, he was an adviser to Admiral and the “supreme ruler” of Russia, Kolchak and fiercely hated “Bolshevism” (Russians). He then recommended to provide large-scale assistance to the whites, arm and equip 600 with a thousand army to eliminate "Bolshevism." At the same time, Donovan made contact with the Japanese militarists, who also dreamed of the occupation and dismemberment of the Russian lands.
In August, the first US-English summit meeting (Atlantic Conference) was held on 1941. Roosevelt personally met with Churchill. The president and the prime minister, among other things, discussed the problem of Japan. The British believed that only the firm position of the United States, not fearing the threat of war in the Pacific, could stop Japan. The British wanted to protect their colonial possession of the hands of the United States. Roosevelt hardly agreed with the proposal of the British - the United States and Britain, with its dominions and Holland should have warned Japan that its further aggression would force these powers to take in their hands weapon. In this case, the US policy in the event of a Japanese attack on the USSR has not changed. Washington was not going to act if Japan invaded Siberia or the Russian Far East.
14 August 1941 US President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill met on board the Prince of Wales battleship near the island of Newfoundland in the Atlantic Ocean
17 August Roosevelt invited Nomura and said that if Japan takes further steps to establish domination over neighboring countries with the help of force or the threat of force, the United States will take all possible steps to protect its "legitimate rights and interests." In this case, the owners of Washington did not specify where the boundaries of these "legitimate rights and interests." The United States did not see the need to fight Japan if it attacks the Soviet Union. But the United States could not allow the Japanese to take British, Dutch and American possessions in the Asia-Pacific region.
So that before the war between the United States and Japan it did not come, it was necessary to explain Tokyo which ways of aggression were open for it and which were closed. Therefore, Roosevelt suggested that Nomura resume the US-Japanese negotiations, which were suspended by the occupation of Southern Indochina in Japan. The Konoe government agreed, but asked for a personal meeting with the American president. The president agreed and asked the Japanese to communicate more clearly about their position and plans. The Konoe government, which also did not want war with the Americans, seized on this proposal. The Japanese informed Washington that the troops from Indochina would withdraw after solving the Chinese question that Japan would not take military action against neighboring countries. Konoe emphasized: “With regard to Soviet-Japanese relations, the Japanese government equally declares that it will not take any military measures as long as the Soviet Union stays true to the neutrality pact.” This was not expected in Washington. The Americans were hoping for another Tokyo policy towards Moscow.
The problem was that In Tokyo, the Soviet Union’s military power was more soberly evaluated (the Japanese had already experienced it) than many American politicians and military. In addition, the Japanese quickly noticed that the dynamics of military operations on the Soviet-German front was not in favor of the Reich. One of the most prominent employees of the Japanese Naval Headquarters S. Uchida 8 August wrote in his diary: “Since July, there have been no major changes in the struggle between Russia and Germany. Russian resistance is unshakable. Therefore, Japan cannot launch operations against Russia in Siberia in 1941 ”. So decided in the Main Naval Headquarters. 9 August and the General Staff of the Army decided that in 1941 there would be no operations against Russia. At a meeting with the military and naval ministers, Konoe also dismissed that "there is stagnation in the fighting," therefore "there is no reason to look optimistically at the future of Germany."
As a result, Roosevelt began to evade meeting with the head of the Japanese government. The Japanese military-political elite began to prepare for war with the United States. 5 September the emperor gathered the government and the military. He asked the military how long it would take to campaign against America in the Pacific. General Sugiyama bravo declared: three months. The emperor sharply reminded the general that he was the minister of war in 1937, when the war began with China, and promised to end the problem in one month. As a result, the war continues to this day and there is no end or edge to it. Sugiyama began to make excuses, to talk about the vast expanses of China, which make it difficult to carry out the operation according to plan. The emperor remarked that if China is great, then the Pacific Ocean is unbeaten. The general mingled and fell silent. He was assisted by the Chief of the General Staff of Nagano. He noted that the position of the Japanese Empire resembles the condition of a seriously ill patient who is to undergo an operation. Without it, the patient will die out, but the operation is dangerous. According to the military, it is necessary to achieve success through negotiations, if it is not possible, then go to the operation - to start a war.
September 6 1941 held a key meeting with the emperor. It was agreed that if Japan did not meet its minimum requirements by the beginning of October in negotiations with the United States (positions in China), then they would immediately decide to prepare for war against the United States, Great Britain and Holland. Time was chosen under the pressure of the military. The best weather for amphibious operations was in November, in December it would have been more difficult to act, and January was excluded due to northeast winds. Since that time, the Japanese military engaged in accelerated preparation for war, including an operation against Pearl Harbor. And diplomats tried to achieve satisfaction of Japanese demands by negotiating with the United States.
The Konoe government has again offered to hold a summit. However, the American leadership avoided meeting and certain answers that would give Tokyo confidence that their demands would be met. Numerous documents that were exchanged in September and in the first half of October, the United States and Japan, did not move the negotiations forward a single step. The Americans offered to the Japanese to concentrate on the note of Hel from July 21, which led to Japan losing all previously won positions in the Far East (primarily in China). On this the Japanese could not go. In fact, they were offered to abandon all previous victories gained by great blood. This position of Washington strengthened the position of the militarist party, which sought to seize in the south. Not surprisingly, the US ambassador to Japan Grump 29 September warned Washington: if Konoe and Roosevelt do not meet, then this government will fall and be replaced by a military dictatorship that does not want to avoid a collision with the United States. However, Roosevelt stubbornly refused to meet with Konoe.
The militarists increased the pressure. On September 20, at the regular meeting of the Coordination Committee, the military presented an ultimatum to Konoe - to decide on the start of the war in the Pacific Ocean no later than October 15. Otherwise, the armed forces will not have time to properly prepare for war. The military staff officers calculated when the spring thaw in Siberia will end, after which you can begin operations against Russia. On this basis, 120 days were allocated for the acquisition of the South Seas area. Therefore, the war against the United States and England had to start no later than the beginning of December 1941.
Konoe tried to persuade the military to make concessions, believing that war threatens Japan with unpredictable consequences. He recalled the 1904-1905 war. Then, before the final decision on the attack on Russia, the emperor summoned Ito's trusted adviser and asked him if there was any chance of a complete victory. Ito replied that he did not, but Japan could consolidate its first successes by the rapid conclusion of peace through the mediation of the United States (which is exactly what happened). At present, noted Prince Konoe, there is no such intermediary power. And the affairs of Germany on the Russian front are not going well. It is better to solve the Chinese problem, wait for the outcome of the war in Europe and play a decisive role at the peace conference, relying on the remaining military power of the empire. However, the military continued to insist on the need for decisive action. 16 October 1941. The Konoe government resigned. The new cabinet was headed by a supporter of the war, the War Minister, General Tojo. He retained the post of Minister of War and took the portfolio of the Minister of the Interior. The composition of the new government was called by the Japanese liberals "Manchu gang."
Interestingly, the fact that the government in Japan was led by notorious militarists was considered to be an encouraging sign in the United States. The Americans correctly noted that the victory of the Japanese Nazis "smacks of gunpowder." Tojo breaks into battle. In 1937, he declared: "Japan must be ready to fight simultaneously with China and Russia." The Japanese empire has already clashed with China, and the concentration of the powerful Kwantung Army in the north suggests that Japan is about to attack Russia. But the Japanese were wiser, they did not become the American "cannon fodder" in the war with Russia, and began to prepare a strike on the main enemy - the United States.
To be continued ...