In October, 1935, the first Soviet series of 26 cruisers was laid.

October 15 1935 was laid the first Soviet series of large warships - cruisers project 26, reports press office Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

According to the agency, the light cruisers of Project 26 “were intended to ensure the fighting of submarines at their bases and at sea, reconnaissance and support of reconnaissance and attacks of destroyers, attack (reflection) of the enemy’s landing and support of their tactical landing, participation in the combined strike of forces fleet on the enemy at sea, battle with enemy cruisers. "

It is reported that “construction was started with the bookmark 15 of October 1935 of the year on the stocks of 1 number of plant No. 198 named after A. Marty“ Order No. 297 ”of the cruiser Voroshilov, and of 22 of October 1935 of the year at plant No. 189 named after S. Ordzhonikidze in Leningrad laid the lead ship Order No. 269 - the cruiser Kirov.

During construction, with the help of Italian specialists, the latest technologies were mastered. The hull structures were previously connected on assembly bolts with subsequent riveting. For the first time in the domestic shipbuilding, all the main and part of the auxiliary mechanisms of such a large ship were mounted on the slipway. Used, albeit to a limited extent, electric welding, which had just begun to be implemented in shipbuilding,

says release.

The rigging was completed in record time - in one year and 38 days. 30 November 1936, the cruiser "Kirov" was launched. The construction work on Voroshilov lasted for 20 months, it was launched on 28 in June of 1937.

Comments

[Komsomol]

The rigging was completed in record time - in one year and 38 days. 30 November 1936, the cruiser "Kirov" was launched. The construction work on Voroshilov lasted for 20 months, it was launched on 28 in June of 1937.
People’s hands just grew from where they needed to ...

[210ox]

It’s not even in the hands. The organization of production, supply. And the socio-political system of the state. People worked in good conscience .. And now you won’t get too fast for money, because it’s very likely that the owner will deceive you.

Quote: Komsomol

The rigging was completed in record time - in one year and 38 days. 30 November 1936, the cruiser "Kirov" was launched. The construction work on Voroshilov lasted for 20 months, it was launched on 28 in June of 1937.
People’s hands just grew from where they needed to ...

Quote: Komsomol

The rigging was completed in record time - in one year and 38 days. 30 November 1936, the cruiser "Kirov" was launched. The construction work on Voroshilov lasted for 20 months, it was launched on 28 in June of 1937.
People’s hands just grew from where they needed to ...

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Komsomol

People’s hands just grew from where they needed to ...

Yeah ... the Italian people.

The construction work was completed in record time - in one year and 38 days. November 30, 1936 the cruiser was launched. This was explained both by the good organization of work, and by the fact that on Kirov a GTZA, already delivered from Italy, with all the auxiliary mechanisms was mounted. Boilers were manufactured by plant No. 189 according to Italian drawings.

They finished the cruiser right up to the middle of 1939 - already after being accepted into the fleet:

September 25, the commission signed an act on acceptance of the ship in the KBF. The next day, a naval flag was hoisted on a cruiser. In the act, the commission noted "a large number of unfinished work." In particular, the rate of fire of the main caliber guns turned out to be low, the armor protection of the torpedo tubes was not installed, the aircraft equipment and the MPUAZO system were not handed over, the paired device, the main turbine gearboxes, the fittings of the main and auxiliary steam pipelines of superheated and saturated steam were not replaced. The acceptance certificate was approved by the Deputy People's Commissar of the Navy, 1st rank flagship I.S. Isakov on October 16, 1938.
By April 1939, most of these deficiencies and defects could not be eliminated, which disrupted the planned campaign of Kirov at the opening of the International New York Exhibition. Some work continued on the ship for a long time. By the beginning of the Soviet-Finnish war, the cruiser as a whole was ready and took part in the hostilities.

The completely domestic Voroshilov, laid down a week earlier than Kirov, was handed over to the fleet on June 20, 1940.

A week earlier, "Kirov", October 15, 1935, on the slipway number 1 of the plant number 198 named after A. Marty laid the "order number 297" - the cruiser "Voroshilov". It was launched on June 28, 1937. Stacking works lasted 20 months, and another 30 months the ship was being completed afloat. Since Voroshilov only installed domestic production mechanisms, many foundations had to be redone for them. In addition, the missile launcher of the Golniya Molniya Group, MPUZO Gorizont and SPN, as well as a 180 mm turret were not delivered to the cruiser in a timely manner.
December 4, 1939 the ship was presented for testing, which ended on May 27 of the following year.

[Berkut24]

People’s hands just grew from where they needed to ...

Well, do not belittle the work of current shipbuilders. The complexity of the ships has grown hundreds of times. You can cook the trough and put 2 dozen cannons even now in less time than in those days. But cable lines, electronics, new weapons, etc. and coordinate all this among themselves ...
The first units have been built for the longest time, usually due to the unavailability of some systems supplied by third-party organizations and the inevitability of design errors. "Ivan Gren" was generally sawn for shifting the cable line, because of which the magnetic field of the case did not correspond to the task. In the 30s of the last century, they did not even think about it.

[Gormenghast]

in one year and 38 days

Chernushniki, reproaching Stalin, and liberals of all stripes must admit that a mobilization economy is no perversion; under certain conditions, it gives advantages over the limitless sodomic freedom of capitalism.

But it is disgusting that the circumstances compelling us to resort to such economic models have not disappeared. Maybe you want unlimited freedom, but only it can completely lead to external enslavement, to the extent of slavery.

[DimerVladimer]

Quote: Gormengast

Chernushniki, reproaching Stalin, and liberals of all stripes must admit that a mobilization economy is no perversion; under certain conditions, it gives advantages over unlimited with .... freedom of capitalism.

Well, yes - they did not suffer from modesty, tanks were allowed to be called by their proper names, ships were intravital. Such a new bar.
The fact that the United States won the Cold War without a mobilization economy doesn’t tell you anything?

The fact that without “sharashka” one could create wonderful weapon systems - life without Stalin proved - by the end of the 70s parity was achieved on the main weapons from the USA, only the constantly mobilized economy could not stand it - it collapsed ...

Academician Korolev with a broken jaw could well tell about the delights of a mobilization economy (he was arrested on June 27, 1938 on charges of wrecking). Due to the untreated injury received in the link (according to the version, see above, the investigator broke Korolyov’s jaw by hitting Sergey Pavlovich with a decanter on the cheekbone; due to unsuccessful bone fusion, Korolev could not open his mouth wide enough during eating), there were difficulties with intubation trachea during surgery to remove a malignant tumor. He was not able to correctly insert the breathing tube into the trachea, which led to death.
Academician Kurchatov - repeatedly re-irradiated while working at a bomb reactor in Ozersk, suffered from a loss of consciousness.

[Roma 1977]

People gave a result. Unlike the current "effective managers." And the parity of the 70s was achieved by the very same “mobilization” people from the Stalin team, who started in the 30s with snotty students and ended in the 70s with venerable laureates. You repeat the deliberate lie of pseudo-liberals about the “collapsed economy”, the economy collapsed after 1991, when as a result of a criminal conspiracy a single economic complex was destroyed and the so-called "privatization".

[Alexey RA]

Quote: DimerVladimer

Academician Korolev with a broken jaw could well tell about the delights of a mobilization economy (he was arrested on June 27, 1938 on charges of wrecking).

And this is not the charms of a mobilization economy, but the consequences of Comrade Korolyov’s decision to continue developing a guided missile despite the impossibility of creating a control system for it, known to him.

Quote: DimerVladimer

Academician Kurchatov - repeatedly re-irradiated while working at a bomb reactor in Ozersk, suffered from a loss of consciousness.

This is not an economy, but a general ignorance of the effects of exposure. On the other side of the ocean, someone built a nuclear reactor under the stands of the stadium.
In the same place, by the way, after the test of nuclear weapons, the decks of Prince Eugen were manually torn. The same "Prince Eugen", which after these works was deemed unsuitable for further use due to too high a level of radiation.

[DimerVladimer]

Quote: Alexey RA

And this is not the charms of a mobilization economy, but the consequences of Comrade Korolyov’s decision to continue developing a guided missile despite the impossibility of creating a control system for it, known to him.

Why is it impossible?
Rather, "unnecessary" at that time, a shortsighted military and an "effective manager."

The Germans, however, found the opportunity to create an A-4?
On December 22, 1942, Adolf Hitler signed an order for the production of A-4 missiles as a "weapon of retaliation," setting London as a target for developers. After Brown showed on 7 July 1943 a color film demonstrating the take-off of A-4, Hitler was delighted and soon personally gave him the title of professor. For Germany and for that time it was an absolutely exceptional award for an engineer who was only 31 years old.

Let me remind you - at the time of the arrest of Korolev - his products were far ahead of German developments.

Designing is a trial-and-error method — there is so much temptation to pass mistakes, for wrecking ... And this is not a reason to hit the designer with a decanter on the head, such bright heads are expensive - they are priceless, unlike the “stupid” investigators with grades 3-7 education and big ambitions in revealing non-existent conspiracies.

Read what level Brown started from.
What can be achieved with appropriate funding, the Londoners learned well in 1944.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: DimerVladimer

Why is it impossible?
Rather, "unnecessary" at that time, a shortsighted military and an "effective manager."

It is impossible. For the USSR of the late 30s. In which, according to the apt observation of Yakovlev, all aviation design bureaus had fewer specialists than Messerschmidt alone.
The maximum possible for the USSR of that time is the Bekauri telecontrol system. Which, with the beginning of the war, was quickly thrown out and used by the TCAs equipped with it in the usual form.
Not from the good life of the USSR after the war rushed to copy the SU of German guided ammunition.

Quote: DimerVladimer

Designing is a trial and error method - there is so much temptation to pass off errors as wrecking ...

Tell me, please, can the continuation of work on the project be considered a “mistake” after it became known that there will be nothing at the output? That is, the people's money and the time of a few qualified personnel were actually wasted - moreover, Korolev knew about the development failure.
This is how to continue to design the plane after the communication of the allies that there will never be a motor for it.
In addition, Korolev did this at an extremely bad time: when the state decided to check how and what the money allocated by the Design Bureau is spent and what is the way out of R&D. As a result, Kurchevsky, for example, was leaned against the wall. And Brzezinski was given 10 years - the designer promised "Soviet Le Hardi" and continued work after the industry refused to make auxiliary mechanisms on the increased steam parameters (which multiplied the whole concept by zero).

[DimerVladimer]

Quote: Alexey RA

Tell me, please, can the continuation of work on the project be considered a “mistake” after it became known that there will be nothing at the output? That is, the people's money and the time of a few qualified personnel were actually wasted - moreover, Korolev knew about the development failure.

I consider this a shortsightedness of senior management (due to technical illiteracy and lack of understanding of the topic), because it is the designer who knows what can be obtained at the output.
As a result, history showed that the "mistake" was not to deal with these topics (fortunately the Germans made the mistake of choosing heavy water instead of graphite to slow down neutrons and did not get a working reactor until the end of the war).
Catastrophic lag:
- on guided missiles,
- in nuclear physics,
- for turbojet engines,
- in instrumentation,
therefore, we had to urgently copy German, American and British developments.
In our laboratory, there were A-4 (engine compartment) and R-1 nearby - the differences are minimal. Yes, for control systems - mostly German experts pulled P-1 equipment. This does not mean that we could not have reached this level with appropriate funding. An example - the initiation of a nuclear charge, required no less sophisticated equipment, which was developed from scratch - in addition to a little help from intelligence in terms of the direction of work, everything was created at domestic plants.
The same thing happened with the atomic bomb - not-so-distant leaders missed the start of the atomic race and subsequently rushed - re-irradiating - "burning" the personnel of the A-1 reactor in constant emergency and nuclear accidents. At the same time, there were scientists, but until 1942 they were not given funding, not understanding the prospects of the topic.
Accidents occurred where intelligence was unable to provide information: for example, on the manufacture of nuclear fuel cassettes (anodizing aluminum assemblies), which led to accelerated corrosion. Dr. Fuchs could not advise on this matter.

So there is no reason to beat scientists with decanters for the fact that they in their own way understand the need for a particular work.
The work of scientists may not lead to certain results or products, but this is the accumulation of experience, which at that time was sorely lacking.
Therefore, there were errors.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: DimerVladimer

I consider this a shortsightedness of senior management (due to technical illiteracy and lack of understanding of the topic), because it is the designer who knows what can be obtained at the output.

That's when the designer will work for his hard-earned money - then he it will be more visible that it is possible to receive at the exit. And with the Customer’s money you need to do what the Customer orders. Or inform the Customer that it is impossible to do what he requested.
The state issued TK for the development of a specific product - a guided missile. The designer, having received information from the subcontractors that there would be no SU and the missile would be uncontrollable, did not report to the top about the impossibility of continuing work and the need to close the project. And he continued the work, satisfying his curiosity at the treasury expense - but without the technical specifications and the order.
Imagine that you ordered a smart home project for the middle band. Paid the money. Come - and they tell you that since they could not design a control system for a smart home, there is no project. But the money spent - to study the functioning of the house in extremely low temperatures and permafrost.

If Korolev first reported on the impossibility of continuing work on the current project, and then attended to receiving an order and technical specifications for the work that he performed in real life, then he would not have received the “economic and political” article 58-7.

[DimerVladimer]

Quote: Alexey RA

That's when the designer will work for his hard-earned money - then he will know better what can be obtained at the exit. And with the Customer’s money you need to do what the Customer orders. Or inform the Customer that it is impossible to do what he requested.

In any country in the world, science exists either at the expense of the country's budget or through grants from donors - private organizations.
In the USSR, the second option was ruled out, therefore it was possible to satisfy one's curiosity only at the expense of the state.
And Korolev was right that he was doing this - in the end, it gave him the necessary experience and knowledge to understand the design of the captured A-4 and recreate it in a very short time.
A scientist is not a pest, the main thing is to correctly combine his "curiosity" and the need for defense and development of the country.

It was Korolev who led the missile theme to success - Sputnik-1, the first manned flight (in general to the Soviet manned space program - contrary to the military wishes) and created the first intercontinental delivery vehicle for special warheads.
The first significant success of the country is connected precisely with astronautics.
And the few R-7 complexes, as a deterrence weapon, in many respects determined the favorable outcome of the Caribbean crisis.

And where is that ghoul that hit the academician on the head with a decanter? Where is that ghoul so “necessary" to the country and its worthless name?

You never know which scientist will give the result and which not - out of 100 projects, 1 can give the result, the rest - money down the drain or negative experience. Units can create completely new out of nothing.
And in the days of Stalin - “effective”, every failure was equated with wrecking, which indicates a very limited understanding of engineering and science in general.
It was the experience of the Korolev and his associates that gave the country credibility, protection and first positions in the space race.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: DimerVladimer

In any country in the world, science exists either at the expense of the country's budget or through grants from donors - private organizations.
In the USSR, the second option was ruled out, therefore it was possible to satisfy one's curiosity only at the expense of the state.
And Korolev was right that he was doing this - in the end, it gave him the necessary experience and knowledge to understand the design of the captured A-4 and recreate it in a very short time.
A scientist is not a pest, the main thing is to correctly combine his "curiosity" and the need for defense and development of the country.

That is precisely - if a scientist wants to satisfy his curiosity at the expense of the state, he must first clearly explain to the state what this will be for this state, and then from the state to get an open topic, TK and funding. And do not take on one project - and engage in it completely different. This even in today's soft times does not roll.

Quote: DimerVladimer

And in the days of Stalin - “effective”, every failure was equated with wrecking, which indicates a very limited understanding of engineering and science in general.

Yes, not for failure planted Korolev. And for misuse of funds. For the fact that he did not inform in time about the impossibility of carrying out work and wasted money and time on extraneous developments.
For the same unsuccessful work on subcaliber shells, no one was imprisoned before the war. Because people were engaged in precisely sub-caliber - and not issues of external ballistics at super-long ranges.
And they didn’t put anyone behind the M-88. Despite the removal from production and six months of refinement. Because the design bureau was engaged in a motor, not interplanetary flights.
But for the 23-mm gun Taubin acted. Because comrade Taubin, instead of fine-tuning the gun, was engaged in projection in the style of Kurchevsky and Dyrenkov, gushing with ideas and proposing new projects instead of fine-tuning the old ones. And when they asked him a question - where is the modified documentation for the gun, which you promised to bring to mind by the current date - Taubin could not show anything that works reliably. Considering the fact that an attack aircraft and a fighter were already being built under his cannon, the end is a bit predictable.

[DimerVladimer]

Quote: Alexey RA

That is precisely - if a scientist wants to satisfy his curiosity at the expense of the state, he must first clearly explain to the state what this will be for this state, and then from the state to get an open topic, TK and funding. And do not take on one project - and engage in it completely different. This even in today's soft times does not roll.

Do you know the concept of initiative development?
Initiative developments either end in failure or in advance - give excellent results.

For the most part - this is not targeted spending of funds - for which they were shot in the 30s. And in the 70s - they were awarded.

Korolev was ahead of the curve - his initiative developments ended for him with beatings, a conclusion.
For many - like Kurchevsky - it ended sadly, and the Germans and Americans brought their experiments to acceptable hand-held Pantsershnek and bazookas. Who knows, if Kurchevsky or a dozen more scientists were competing in this topic - perhaps by 1941, the USSR would have had effective anti-tank infantry weapons ...

How can you not understand that statesmen are not experts in technical matters (with rare exceptions - when a minister is appointed like Yakovlev).
Applied science (engineering) is developing faster than fundamental science, therefore it requires experimental confirmation or refutation.
The most valuable thing is the design idea - a concept that can be partially calculated and, as it were, outline design predicts excellent parameters. But in reality - implemented in metal using existing technologies - it shows results no better than existing samples - i.e. does not justify its creation and the money spent. However, any negative experience is also valuable, it reduces the number of false paths and leads to a breakthrough idea when it is possible to get a qualitative leap in product characteristics.

I remember how, as a young inexperienced specialist, having laid certain parameters of the design, engines, and high-energy fuel / oxidizer pair in the program, I got the estimated range of a two-stage rocket over 11000 km (intercontinental) at the exit, to which the professor “lowered” me from heaven to earth : the coefficients are ideal, in the manufacture of parameters will float and as a result the rocket will "fly" to the "typical" 5000-7000 km.

[DimerVladimer]

Quote: Alexey RA

This is how to continue to design the plane after the communication of the allies that there will never be a motor for it.

It's like designing a motor for a ship that goes beyond the atmosphere ...
But the undergraduate student does not understand the prospects, and only with the advent of A-4, brains started working in the heads of the “strategists” - it turns out that the topic has a military use! Who would have thought...
Well, to a brainless investigator, anyway, whom to beat with a decanter on the head, a future prisoner or a future academician ...
I wonder - then academician Korolev and this stubborn investigator, met?
Surely such an active tracker has advanced in the MGB service, looking for pest enemies.
If the trace were “not careful” and the country didn’t have one future academician, think ...
How easy you are to justify the little-known investigator and the NKVD / MGB methods - and for me, they have done much more harm to the country by killing and torturing the color of Soviet scientists and military in torture chambers - this is their fault in the military disasters of 1941-1942 and behind the world Sciences.
Only when the MGB was given a hand, forbidding to touch scientific experts from the 50s, only then Soviet science stopped being afraid to experiment and went ahead through trial and error and was literally one step behind the United States.
Now there is again a funding gap - there are almost no speeches by Russian scientists at major international conferences - we are again outsiders in world science - because we plundered the budget - sawed the sunshine through friends.

[Gransasso]

Quote: DimerVladimer

Well, to a brainless investigator, anyway, whom to beat with a decanter on the head, a future prisoner or a future academician ...
I wonder - then academician Korolev and this stubborn investigator, met?
Surely such an active tracker has advanced in the MGB service, looking for pest enemies.
If the trace were “not careful” and the country didn’t have one future academician, think ...

Don’t worry so much about the then Soviet science ..... nothing would have changed in any case ... it didn’t exist in the 30s and continued to exist ... with or without a broken jaw ....


The then USSR was a country of miracles ... who was nobody will become everything .. and in science too ... we can, if we are lucky, only break our jaw .... but we can appoint them to academics ... and no matter who .. Queen , Kurchatov or any other Pupkin ... without much difference for the final result.

They got herds of German scientists, engineers, workers, along with drawings, developments, technical theories, machine tools and FAU-2- and the genius Korolev shone .. won the near space ... that's true FAU technology is not enough for flying to the moon ... and there is a deafening failure. .in the form of the never-before-flying miracle of a yudo rocket with how many engines? .20,30? ... genius immediately disappeared somewhere ... along with a reserve of FAA modernization ..



Or let's say Academician Kurchatov ... suddenly shone with genius after reading the secret tidings in Lavrenty Palych’s households ... but as soon as the scoundrel Fuchs did not give a couple of reports, the genius Kurchatov immediately evaporated into atomic dust into which he turned workers, soldiers and so on, who drove them with their bare hands into the reactor ... immediately switched to the non-academic method of poking. the Soviet genius of the Stalin era ... he is ....



Only when these academic methods ended and the first role was played by scientists who did not study with investigators in their offices, Soviet science was able to step further ... somewhere around the 70s

[DimerVladimer]

Quote: Gransasso

They got herds of German scientists, engineers, workers, along with drawings, developments, technical theories, machine tools and FAU-2- and the genius Korolev shone .. won the near space ... that's true FAU technology is not enough for flying to the moon ... and there is a deafening failure. .in the form of the never-before-flying miracle of a yudo rocket with how many engines? .20,30? ... genius immediately disappeared somewhere ... along with a reserve of FAA modernization ..

Yes calm down illiterate. It always amazes me how ignoramuses try to discuss incomprehensible topics on them.

[DimerVladimer]

Fau ended on P-3
Further, even the other components of the fuel go.

[Gransasso]

Quote: DimerVladimer

It always amazes me how ignoramuses try to discuss incomprehensible topics on them.

It's you about those forum figures arguing as an illiterate member of the circle, a young technician on a knee and a piece of paper would have brought the USSR to Mars back in the 30s without any of your Siemens ... only an illiterate tracker broke his jaw (supposedly) .. what saved the Martians from immediate intergalactic communist revolution ....


Or about another forum activist like you, who is massively raving about analog (sic!) Computers on cruisers copied from Italians by Soviet needlework .... and about the role of the British-Soviet naval treaty in the transition from 180 to 152 mm guns on post-war ( sic bis) cruisers ....

Facepalme .....

[DimerVladimer]

Quote: Gransasso

not enough for a flight to the moon ... and there is a deafening failure .. in the form of a rocket with how many engines has never flown a miracle yudo? .20,30? ... genius immediately disappeared somewhere ... along with a reserve of FAA modernization ..

Nothing that "failure" - the NK-15 engines led to the appearance of the NK-33 which are some of the most reliable today?
The NK-33 engine has extremely high reliability - 999,4.
It is used in the first stage of the Soyuz-2.1 V launch vehicle; it is planned to use the Soyuz-2-3 launch vehicle.
It was used in the first stage of the Antares PH (Taurus II) of Orbital Sciences Corporation.
Ay yai - how is there no science in the USSR - what did its practical Americans buy?

[Gransasso]

Quote: DimerVladimer

Quote: Gransasso

not enough for a flight to the moon ... and there is a deafening failure .. in the form of a rocket with how many engines has never flown a miracle yudo? .20,30? ... genius immediately disappeared somewhere ... along with a reserve of FAA modernization ..

Nothing that "failure" - the NK-15 engines led to the appearance of the NK-33 which are some of the most reliable today?
The NK-33 engine has extremely high reliability - 999,4.
It is used in the first stage of the Soyuz-2.1 V launch vehicle; it is planned to use the Soyuz-2-3 launch vehicle.
It was used in the first stage of the Antares PH (Taurus II) of Orbital Sciences Corporation.
Ay yai - how is there no science in the USSR - what did its practical Americans buy?

If you could learn how to write and read ... Only when these academic methods ended and scientists who didn’t study with investigators in their offices came to the first place, Soviet science could go further ... somewhere around the 70s



......

[Alexey RA]

.

Quote: DimerVladimer

It's like designing a motor for a ship that goes beyond the atmosphere ...
But the undergraduate student does not understand the prospects, and only with the advent of A-4, brains started working in the heads of the “strategists” - it turns out that the topic has a military use! Who would have thought...

In this case, the "dropout high school student" understands that the designer was ordered to design a weapon to protect the country. Instead, the designer satisfied his curiosity at public expense.
If Korolev was engaged in his work, but if he gave out a guided missile project, no one would have said a word.
If Korolev informed about the need to close the project due to the lack of SU and justified the opening of a new project for his work, no one would have said a word.
But the worst option was chosen - and the guided missile project was not completed, and the money and time spent on work not related to the project.

And also, you know, it’s very good to investigate the “transatmospheric engine” while the army (for the money of which this is done) does not have normal conventional aircraft engines. And the situation in Europe is heating up ...

Quote: DimerVladimer

How easy you are to justify the little-known investigator and the NKVD / MGB methods - and for me, they have done much more harm to the country by killing and torturing the color of Soviet scientists and military in torture chambers - this is their fault in the military disasters of 1941-1942 and behind the world Sciences.

Judging by the results of the demonstration exercises of 1935-1936, the "color of the Soviet military" was not much different from the "wild" commanders who came in their place.

Tankers Yakir and Uborevich were advancing blindly - their intelligence was poorly organized, did not show activity and (according to the head of the Red Army Training Directorate (UBP) watching the maneuvers, the commander of the 2nd rank A. I. Sedyakin) was "incapable." As a result, the T-26 from the 15th and 17th mechanized brigades of the KVO repeatedly hit “in an empty place”. BT-5 and BT-7 from the 5th and 21st BVO mechanized brigades were not able to detect ambushes (and ambush actions were a favorite technique of German tankers). T-28s from the 1st BVO tank brigade “suddenly” (!) Found themselves in front of a strip of tank traps and gouges and were forced to sharply turn aside - to an unexplored area, where they got stuck. “In reality,” brigade commander V.F. Gerasimov of the UBP concluded, “they would have been destroyed.”
But even greater losses in a real battle with the Germans would be incurred by the infantry of Yakir and Uborevich. Firstly, she “everywhere” launched an attack on “enemy” machine guns not in rare chains, but in thick “crowds from squads”. “With such constructions, the attack would have been thwarted in reality, drowned in blood,” stated A. I. Sedyakin, who himself participated in such attacks in 1916 and then hung five times on the German wire. “Reason: solitary fighters, squads and platoons are underestimated.” On the offensive, the fighters instinctively clung to each other, and the poorly trained commanders of squads and platoons were not able to restore the statutory battle order.
Such “crowds” would not have been helped by tanks of direct infantry support, especially since in the KVO (even in its best 24th and 44th rifle divisions) neither infantry nor tank crews could interact with each other. The artillery support of the attack would not have saved, the more so since in KVO the “issue of the interaction of artillery with infantry and tanks” by the summer of 1937 was “the weakest,” and in BVI the artillery support of the attack was often ignored altogether.
As for Uborevich’s infantry, she did not know how to conduct offensive close combat. In the maneuvers of 1936, her “offensive” consisted of a uniform forward movement. There was no “interaction of fire and movement”, that is, detachments, platoons and companies went on the attack, ignoring the fire of defense, they did not prepare their attack with machine-gun fire, did not practice bedding and dodging, self-digging, and did not throw grenades. “Concrete methods of action,” concluded A. I. Sedyakin, “automatism in interaction ... has not yet been mastered.” The KVO infantry, and not only the 7th, 46th and 60th infantry divisions, but also the 44th — one of the best in Yakir, turned out to be poorly trained melee tactics.
However, the BVO and KVO infantry could not have effectively prepared their attack with fire: like the whole Red Army on the eve of 1937, the soldiers fired poorly from the DP light machine gun, the main automatic weapon of small units. So, the 135th rifle regiment of the KVO at the autumn inspection shootings of 1936 received only 3,5 points for shooting from the DP on a 5-point system, and the 37th rifle division of the BVO - 2,511.
Summing up the work of the BVO and KVO troops in the Belorussian and Polesie maneuvers, A. I. Sedyakin revealed the main, in our opinion, defect of the Red Army of the era of Tukhachevsky, Yakir and Uborevich: “Tactical training of troops, especially a soldier, squad, platoon, machine, tank platoon The company does not satisfy me. But they will fight, take victory in battle, success “by the horns”. S. M. Budenny expressed this idea even more clearly (after the execution of the “talented military leaders” on November 21, 1937): “We sometimes hover on a very large operational and strategic scale, and what we will operate if the company is unsuitable, the platoon is unsuitable Is the department unsuitable? ”
Worst of all, this situation did not reveal any improvement trend.

The reasons for the defeats of 1941-1942 lie much deeper than the simple explanation "the best commanders were repressed, if they weren’t ...". The low level of education of draftees and cadets, the poor preparation of the command staff before the war (incidentally, the legacy of those “smart commanders”), 50-60% lack of junior commanders (however, the picture was no better) - due to the transition from territorial-militia army and "triad" to the personnel-cropped system, an acute shortage of technically trained personnel, a low level of discipline (a disciplinary charter appeared in the army only in 1940). And to this - a weak industry, unable to provide the army with even 3 tons of trucks, and often delivering not what was ordered, but what can be done.

[DimerVladimer]

Quote: Alexey RA

In this case, the "dropout high school student" understands that the designer was ordered to design a weapon to protect the country. Instead, the designer satisfied his curiosity at public expense.
If Korolev was engaged in his work, but if he gave out a guided missile project, no one would have said a word.
If Korolev informed about the need to close the project due to the lack of SU and justified the opening of a new project for his work, no one would have said a word.
But the worst option was chosen - and the guided missile project was not completed, and the money and time spent on work not related to the project.
And also, you know, it’s very good to investigate the “transatmospheric engine” while the army (for the money of which this is done) does not have normal conventional aircraft engines. And the situation in Europe is heating up ...

Science is a way to satisfy your curiosity - if that.

Well, in the end, who did they turn to in order to understand - what kind of products are they and what are they for?
And who was right in the end and in a hurry created the country's missile arsenal?
Seminar criminal or brilliant scientist?
Who could figure out the remnants of what the Americans removed from German plants?

[Alexey RA]

Quote: DimerVladimer

Science is a way to satisfy your curiosity - if that.

Right.
But you need to make out this satisfaction correctly - open the topic and receive money for the subject of your curiosity. Or to satisfy your curiosity without prejudice to the main job.

Quote: DimerVladimer

And who was right in the end and in a hurry created the country's missile arsenal?
Seminar criminal or brilliant scientist?

Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria.

[DimerVladimer]

Quote: Alexey RA

But you need to make out this satisfaction correctly - open the topic and receive money for the subject of your curiosity. Or to satisfy your curiosity without prejudice to the main job.

This is in a planned economy - not real. Begging for funds is 50% of the time of the chief designers in the USSR.
Therefore, they "found reserves" from existing budgets - a ready-made article for misuse of funds, but by the 70s they looked at it differently - the main thing was to give a result and they gave it.
When we stopped punishing initiative initiatives in the 60-70s - we got brilliant design solutions - specifically, according to Makeevka Design Bureau on the R-29 - it was a "engine sunk in the tank" - under Beria, they would only be shot for such an idea, sounding insanely (to immerse the heat engine in combustible components!), and so - the highest layout density was obtained. And the missile refueling ampouled at the factory - which had not previously been used for such powerful missiles (SLBMs).
On the R-39 - this is an opportunity for an ice start.

[DimerVladimer]

Quote: Alexey RA

This is not an economy, but a general ignorance of the effects of exposure. On the other side of the ocean, someone built a nuclear reactor under the stands of the stadium.

Well, the first F-1 experimental reactor in Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences was built - also in the city - in the capital ...

And Kurchatov consciously went to radiation - because he considered it impossible for himself to avoid danger when he was forced to "burn" people when analyzing the "goats" at the A-1 reactor (bomb). Hence the "nuclear tan" and constant fainting and sudden death at the age of only 57 years ...

"... Stalin advised Kurchatov (during their meeting on January 25, 1946) to work extensively, on a grand scale and not to spare money. All this is true, but on the other side of the balance was uranium, which at that time (until the end of 1949 d) there was only one reactor load in the country. It was possible to build two reactors in parallel, but it was impossible to start them simultaneously. As we will see later, it was this circumstance that turned out to be the narrowest and even critical place of the entire project, which led to severe accidents and re-irradiation of hundreds of people in the first months of work re actor. "

IN AND. Merkin
Chapter from the book “Outstanding MIHMovtsy
in creating the country's nuclear shield ”

In the text of V.I. Merkin pointed out the serious difficulties encountered, but without going deeper into the dramatic consequences and human tragedies, with obscuring verbal turns. So, he writes about difficulties, while disasters and calamities occurred, accidents with catastrophic consequences. In the end, according to V.I. Merkin, difficulties were overcome, and this is the main thing. Almost nothing is said to them about the cost of overcoming them.

The first accident with catastrophic consequences for health occurred almost immediately, on June 19, 1948, a day after the start-up of the reactor. It was caused by the appearance of the so-called "goats" - the clogging of technological channels and the impossibility of excavating uranium blocks in the prescribed way, i.e. from below using a cassette.

“We had to make a choice: either to stop the reactor for a long period, which, according to Yu.B. Khariton could be one year, or save the uranium load and reduce losses in the production of plutonium. The leadership of PSU and the supervisor made a second decision. Uranium blocks were removed by suction cups through the top of the reactor with the involvement of all the male staff of the facility in this “dirty” operation.

Worked for the first two days on sorting blocks I.V. Kurchatov received a radiation dose of approximately 250 R and was almost forcibly taken out of the hall. According to E.P. Slavsky: "... this epic was monstrous! If (Kurchatov) had sat, while he had sorted everything out, then he could have died!" In that year, about 60% of reactor workers received doses from 25 to 100 R, and more than 30% from 100 to 400 R. The permissible dose for the liquidators of the accident was established by a special order of the director of the plant at 25 R. Already on the fourth day, all male personnel the reactor scored the established exposure rate. Then, soldiers of construction battalions were involved in the work. The proposal for the use of prisoners was considered, but it did not pass for security reasons. All the same, there was still not enough people, even with such a norm, the most class-conscious workers were hired twice and thrice to work in the reactor room ”[Mityunin. Email resource].

[DimerVladimer]

As the author told the deputy director of the Institute of Molecular Physics, RSC KI doctor phys.-mat. sciences professor Yu.V. Gaponov, indeed, in the first six months, the reactors constantly had leaks in the reactor core. Unanodized uranium blocks corroded and swelled very quickly. Squeezed deadlines. The first test of the atomic bomb by the government (read: Stalin) was planned to be carried out in 1948. But when it became clear that plutonium did not have enough time to produce enough, the term was postponed several times. Scientists and engineers all the time were in a state of extreme stress, and it was not always compensated by labor enthusiasm. Failure to anodize the first boot blocks was a blunder. Obviously, this technological operation was not contained in the intelligence either, as D.Holloway writes: “In 1948, Fuchs was asked how rods are made of uranium metal, but he could not help.” From a report by G. Smith published in the USA in 1946, Kurchatov knew that the problem of the shell of the rods was one of the most difficult [Holloway. S. 247].
http://7iskusstv.com/2013/Nomer8/Gorobec1.php

Brokhovich was re-irradiated (Boris Brokhovich - Hero of Socialist Labor, Lenin Prize laureate, 18 years leading the nuclear industry giant Mayak) .. The dubious fame of the goat-breaker was entrenched in him. This is an extremely unpleasant situation when the radioactive block - the fuel assembly - gets stuck in the reactor channel due to swelling or mechanical damage ... Of course, while this, people were in the zone of increased radioactivity.
- When I was the main power engineer of the radiochemical plant, I experienced a terrible tragedy. From numerous accidents re-irradiated, but in fact - grind all the staff. And the staff is mostly young girls who have just graduated from institutes. They began to retire with an experience of: two years!

I don’t know how anyone, but the representative of the MGB interfered with my work, especially in the early years of the plant’s construction. There was such an odious person - Lieutenant General I.M. Tkachenko. He called himself "the special representative of Stalin," and we called him "anshef-fiscal." The situation was unhealthy. Now you can remember and talk about it openly, and then the denunciation, gossip, the "fifth point" in the questionnaire could have broken your life.

[faiver]

the next nonsense - the us won the cold war because they planted the entire world economy on the dollar through oil quotes

[Black5Raven]

Quote: faiver

hoisted on the dollar the entire world economy through oil quotes

An economic victory is also a victory, and much less casualties.

[HEATHER]

Grandfather molemanil them. His son, my uncle went shopping. Having a gun on the tank with a package of air defense systems. They went to Kunashir. The icebreaking class ship "Mikhail Somov". Registration port-Vanino.

[Serg65]

Quote: VERESK

. Icebreaking class ship "Mikhail Somov." Homeport-Vanino port

My friend, you and "Mikhail Somov" didn’t mess up anything?

[HEATHER]

GreetingsSerg65No, I didn’t confuse. When in the 80s we went to the Kunashir-ship the MANPADS were supplied. there was a military load, he was accompanied by a diesel engine. Uncle said that in the event of a sinking of the ship as an order-yap, there was no way to save the crew. Only fixation of the fact that the ship was destroyed. And they drove everything.

[Serg65]

Quote: VERESK

Greetings, Serg65. No, I haven’t messed up

You see, my dear VERESK, the diesel electric ship Mikhail Somov is a rather famous steamer, it was he who became the prototype of the icebreaker Mikhail Gromov in Nikolai Khomeriki’s film Icebreaker! "Mikhail Somov" was never in the Far East, the home port of Arkhangelsk, until 2000, belonged to the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute. This ship supplied the Soviet and Russian expeditions in Antarctica and made 21 voyages to those lands. From the 2000 year to the present, Mikhail Somov, as part of the Northern UGMS, has been supplying and conducting Arctic expeditions in the Arctic Ocean! At the same time, this diesel-electric ship does not even provide a place for armament.
Here is the model of "Mikhail Somov", where the lack of foundation for the gun on the tank is more clearly visible.

I in no way want to blame your uncle, but maybe he messed up with the name of the ship?

[HEATHER]

Damn! I'm wildly sorry.Maxim Ammosov. Homeport-Tiksi. Diesel-electric icebreaker. What a night shift with memory does! And Somov is already my unpleasant association with breaking through the hull in 2001. We tried to take an emergency helicopter from Novaya. But these two, they didn’t equip classmates. to the sea-waves. The whole ball went around. Because of my incompetence, I almost set it up.

[Serg65]

Quote: VERESK

Damn! I'm wildly sorry. Maxim Ammosov

C'mon, everything happens

Quote: VERESK

o-these two-subdue classmates.

Well, how to say, probably from the same school.
Here Ammosov in faces

[HEATHER]

Namely, a simple dry cargo ship. But against the backdrop of the burnt Khariton, Somov stood. I don’t remember a year. Somewhere 83-85. Maybe earlier. Khariton Laptev burned down at the pier. One of the deceased was sold to Yu.K. on needles. Somov went to the Kuril Islands. I remember that there is a photo. I’ll take it off. Like the burning Khariton. In Y. Sakhalinsk it burned. Photo-from the first person.

[Rebus]

This is an Italian project, finalized in the USSR. By the way, the project was developed by the same company (Gio. Ansaldo & C.) that built the battleship Giulio Cesare / Novorossiysk.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

This is not an Italian project, from Italians there is only a theoretical drawing of the corps, but ours were finished

[Rebus]

How did I write?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

You wrote that this is a finished Italian project

[Gransasso]

Quote: Rebus

This is an Italian project, finalized in the USSR. By the way, the project was developed by the same company (Gio. Ansaldo & C.) that built the battleship Giulio Cesare / Novorossiysk.

This is an Italian project ... specifically the cruiser of the Montecuccoli project ... spoiled by Soviet enthusiastic needleworkers ... shove a 180-mm gun into a tower designed for a 152-mm ... it was only a gloomy Soviet genius who could be capable ... with corresponding consequences .. .and so in all of which had a hand in that project ..

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Gransasso

This is an Italian project ...

Yeah. Schazzz :)))

Quote: Gransasso

specifically the cruiser project Montecuccoli ..

Compare cruisers by geometric dimensions, by internal layout, etc. Maybe you will understand something.

Quote: Gransasso

cram a 180 mm gun into the turret designed for the 152 mm ..

Teaching materiel - shagooom - march. The 180-mm tower was designed without any connection with the 152-mm towers, which are not like three - one 180-mm tower would not fit. Brand new towers were created for TWO 180-mm guns (and, unlike the Italian towers, in different cradles), but then, at the suggestion of the designers, they put three in one.

Quote: Gransasso

and so in everything to which they had a hand in that project ..

You yourself would have to put your hands ... to the sources, a little more serious than Murzilka magazines

[Fedorov]

The man and the ship. Peter’s hands do not reach, the towers are there. The same brand in the album by the way ...

[andrewkor]

I have long been occupied with the question: why in the USSR on post-war cruisers pr. 68 they abandoned the main 180mm caliber. in favor of the less powerful 152mm.? Experts, enlighten!

[donavi49]

Understood your bike is not the best option. These 180mm - barrel resource was not (60 shots incomplete and 30-40 full - because the guns themselves were still floating in quality).

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Surprisingly, our 180 mm had quite acceptable survivability :)))

[faiver]

excuse me, but it seems to me that you cheat about the survivability of trunks three times ....

[avt]

Quote: donavi49

Understood your bike is not the best option.

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

The reason is very simple, the Anglo-Soviet naval agreement + a change in the role of light cruisers in the Russian fleet

26th with 180 mm hit the Washington heavy cruisers.

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

After the war, sailors asked to return the 180 mm to the Chapaevs, but they refused it - the alteration scale was too large, and the ships were needed urgently.

Moreover, no matter how hard they tried, they overloaded everything 68K alone and turned out to be properly balanced.

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

in addition, the industry mastered 152 mm and decided not to bother

In addition, the performance of 152mm was brought to mind and the advantages of some kind of super large 180 mm did not have. Not for nothing that Kuznetsov wanted a cruiser with 229 mm. As opposed to the Baltimore-des Moines.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: avt

26th with 180 mm hit the Washington heavy cruisers.

Yes, it was :))) They were not called heavy, but they were held according to the quota for heavy cruisers.

Quote: avt

And no matter how hard they tried, they all overloaded 68K alone

Absolutely.

Quote: avt

In addition, the performance of 152mm was brought to mind and the advantages of some kind of super large 180 mm did not have.

In general, yes. Although 180 could have shown itself, but subject to the development of a new tower, then cruisers were urgently needed at sea, not a wunderwaffe on the Kuhlmann :))))) So I'm all for the 152 mm Sverdlovs.

[Kolin]

Quote: donavi49

Understood your bike is not the best option. These 180mm - barrel resource was not (60 shots incomplete and 30-40 full - because the guns themselves were still floating in quality).

It was the B-1-K guns of the "Red Caucasus" that were like that, at Project 26 there were B-1-Ps with normal survivability.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

The reason is very simple, the Anglo-Soviet naval agreement + the change in the role of light cruisers in the Russian fleet (from light force leaders for a concentrated attack on reconnaissance squadrons) After the war, sailors asked to return the 180 mm to the Chapaevs, but they refused it - the alteration scale was too large, and ships were urgently needed. And the same with the Sverdlovs - they bet on strengthening air defense, in addition, the industry mastered 152 mm and decided not to bother

[Alexey RA]

Quote: andrewkor

I have long been occupied with the question: why in the USSR on post-war cruisers pr. 68 they abandoned the main 180mm caliber. in favor of the less powerful 152mm.? Experts, enlighten!

There was recently a series of articles on domestic cruisers from uv. Andrey from Chelyabinsk.

Approaches to the construction and use of the fleet have changed dramatically. If earlier the stake was on a combined (or concentrated) strike in coastal areas, during which light fleet forces and coastal aircraft, preferably with the support of coastal artillery, attacked enemy heavy ships, now tactics (though not immediately) have shifted towards the classic squadron battlefield. And it was quite obvious that the tasks of the light cruisers of the "Big Fleet" will have significant differences from those that were set for the ships of projects 26 and 26 bis.
Therefore, already in 1936, a new term emerged: "light cruiser escort squadron", whose tasks were defined as:
1) reconnaissance and patrol;
2) battle with enemy light forces accompanied by a squadron;
3) support attacks of their destroyers, submarines, torpedo boats;
4) operations on enemy sea lanes and raiding operations on its coast and ports;
5) minefields of active minefields in enemy waters.
At the same time, “combat with light forces while escorting a squadron” assumed the protection of its own heavy ships from enemy destroyers, destroyers and other torpedo boats, which set high demands on the rate of fire of the main caliber guns.
In other words, the ability to achieve a quick victory over a ship of its class was no longer required and could not be considered a key function for the domestic light cruiser. Much more important for him was the ability to effectively repel the attacks of enemy destroyers, and in addition, they needed more powerful armor than before, in order to successfully “hold the strike” of artillery of the enemy’s light forces at the “pistol” distances of night battles. The speed close to the capabilities of the destroyers also lost its meaning - why? It was enough to have her at the level of the light cruisers of the likely enemy, well, maybe a little more.
The light cruisers of Projects 26 and 26 bis “Kirov” and “Maxim Gorky” were an almost perfect alloy of tactical and technical characteristics for fulfilling the tasks that were set before them by the leadership of the naval forces of the Red Army within the framework of the theory of the Small Sea War prevailing at that time. But this theory was nothing more than a palliative of real naval power based on heavy warships. Therefore, as soon as the leadership of the country considered that the industry of the USSR had reached a level that allowed to begin the construction of a full-fledged navy, the "Big Fleet", the theory of the small sea war was over. From now on, the tasks of the Soviet light cruisers became different, and the 180 mm guns, no matter how good they were, could no longer find space on ships of this class.

© Andrey from Chelyabinsk
In short, the concept has changed.

[Serg65]

Quote: Alexey RA

There was recently a series of articles

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

The reason is very simple.

Quote: avt

Not for nothing that Kuznetsov wanted a cruiser with 229 mm. As opposed to Baltimore-De Moyne

Greetings, masters IN !!!!!
Do not judge that wholesale!

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Serg65

Greetings, masters IN !!!!!

Yes, which of me is the master? Is that the master who is with a cap
Greetings categorically!

[Serg65]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Yes, which of me is the master?

Well, Andrei, modesty always adorns a person, of course, but when two people are inclined to debate and lengthy discussions, moreover these people with completely different characters, one is a storehouse of historical facts, the other is no less historically savvy but with a subtle sense of humor, sarcasm, and most importantly with a lot of life experience disguised as easy cynicism, and so when these people in their fabrications refer to you, Andrey - this is what it says

[Alf]

Quote: andrewkor

I have long been occupied with the question: why in the USSR on post-war cruisers pr. 68 they abandoned the main 180mm caliber. in favor of the less powerful 152mm.? Experts, enlighten!

If my memory serves me right, there were no liners in the 180s. In 6-inch, they appeared, and the change of liners could be carried out at sea.

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Alf

If my memory serves me, in 180s there were no airliners

Changes were :)))

Quote: Alf

In 6-inch, they appeared, and the change of liners could be carried out at sea.

EMNIP at sea and a 180-mm liner could be changed, another question is that all the same, this is a perversion :)))

[faiver]

and is that all they wanted to write? on Wikipedia, and then in my opinion more is written ...

[Serg65]

Quote: faiver

on wikipedia and then in my opinion more is written ...

Ah handsome !!!!

Quote: faiver

and is that all they wanted to write?

What else do you need to write?

[faiver]

to me? Yes, probably nothing ...

[Kostadinov]

Beautiful Soviet ships. They fought for two years when the Germans beat air superiority and not one beat was lost!
An amazing result is a demonstration of the quality of ships and the tactics of their use.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Kostadinov

Beautiful Soviet ships. They fought for two years when the Germans beat air superiority and not one beat was lost!

Let's just say that KRL pr. 26 and 26 bis went to the brink.
Kirov
In SFV, I almost flew to the Finnish minefield. The cruiser was saved ... the Finns - Russare’s battery opened fire on the KRL a few minutes before he was supposed to cross the MZ border. In 1942, during the “Ayshtoss” KRL suffered severe damage - and if he had not been dragged from the parking lot, then the next day the backlashes would have finished him off. And in 1945, the “Kirov” was hardly saved after a mine explosion near Kronstadt.
Voroshilov:
In 1941, in Novorossiysk, he received 2 bombs of 250 kg each and nearly flew into the air - a fire in the cellar of BSH Group of Companies № 3 extinguished the water from the hole. In 1942, it was blown up by mines near Fr. Fidonisi, but reached the base.
"Maksim Gorky" :
In the first military operation in June 1941, he lost his nose. With great difficulty, the KRL was towed to the shipyard: during the transition, the TSh was blown up and sank with all the maps of the transition, and because of fear of mines, the KRL was led off the fairway, near the coast, literally “to the touch”.
"Molotov"
In January 1942, while docking in Novorossiysk, he was nearly thrown ashore by a forest. In the same 1942, off the coast of the occupied Crimea, he got a torpedo in the stern and barely reached the base - in slow speed, repelling the attacks of backlash. In 1945, it nearly flew into the air due to a fire in the second BS GK.

[WapentakeLokki]

And what was there in the cruiser from the USSR there were probably only 180 mm guns. Everything else was Italian (from boilers and turbines to ...). Purchased and stolen by Manevich and tyap-bliss (without fear for shipbuilders to be an enemy of the people aha). No- actually, Soviet shipbuilding had already begun under Brezhnev (Khrushchev only dolomit what it was)

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: WapentakeLokki

And what was there in the cruiser from the USSR was perhaps only 180 mm guns.

All weapons, all fire control systems (in essence, analog computers) and ... in fact, the cruiser itself :))))) The project is Soviet, very different from Italian counterparts, a fundamentally different reservation system, different hull design ... in general, the Italian EU there - completely, both the basic and auxiliary mechanisms and the theoretical drawing, which ours later ruled anyway.

[Gransasso]

Quote: WapentakeLokki

And what was there in the cruiser from the USSR was perhaps only 180 mm guns. Everything else Italian (

It would be better if the Stalinist young technicians did not put these guns .. they only ruined a good project

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Gransasso

It would be better if the Stalinist young technicians did not put these guns .. they only ruined a good project

What ruined something? The guns (in the latest version) were quite at the level analogues.
The median deviation is 46 m at 70 kb, 55 m at 90 kb, 78 m at 120 kb and 106 m at 150 kb.

Thus, we see that the domestic B-1-P is much more accurate than the "royal" guns. In fact, our 180-mm artillery system for 90 kb beats more accurately than 305 mm dreadnought guns - for 70 kb, and with 203 mm / 50 - there is no comparison at all!

And the mutual influence of neighboring trunks with a full salvo in similar western installations was treated with delay coils.

[Gransasso]

Quote: Alexey RA

Quote: Gransasso
It would be better if the Stalinist young technicians did not put these guns .. they only ruined a good project
What ruined something? The guns (in the latest version) were quite at the level of analogues.
The median deviation is 46 m at 70 kb, 55 m at 90 kb, 78 m at 120 kb and 106 m at 150 kb.

Spoiled by the fact that they shoved these 180 mm guns into the towers that were designed for 152 mm ... the consequences of this decision for calculating the towers, rate of fire and accuracy, I think are understandable ...


After the fact that during the war all the charms of this ingenious decision were actually evaluated, they returned 152 mm back on the next project ...

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Gransasso

Spoiled by the fact that they shoved these 180 mm guns into the towers that were designed for 152 mm ..

Fierce nonsense. 180 mm towers were designed completely out of touch with 152 mm towers.

[Gransasso]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

Quote: Gransasso

Spoiled by the fact that they shoved these 180 mm guns into the towers that were designed for 152 mm ..

Fierce nonsense. 180 mm towers were designed completely out of touch with 152 mm towers.

Teach the materiel .... the 26th series cruisers are nothing less than the Montecuccolo project’s Ialyan cruisers ... spoiled by Soviet needleworkers ... and what led to the pushing of 180 mm guns into towers designed for 152 mm read at least here ... .if you sleep in English ... History, Development, and Use
of the Kirov Cruiser / Project 26


http://www.russianwarrior.com/STMMain.htm?1939vec
_Kirovcruiserhistory.htm & 1


And if not .. continue to write fierce nonsense about "analog computers" on the Soviet fleet of the mid 30s .... a random coincidence

[badens1111]

Quote: Gransasso

keep writing fierce nonsense

You do it.
You read and laugh, what are you sending specially here in shoals, to write nonsense to people who understand you more in ships, tanks and small arms?

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: badens1111

people who understand you more in ships, tanks and small arms

So is he also an expert in tanks and rifle? :)))))))

[badens1111]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

So is he also an expert in tanks and rifle? :)))))))

If there were Gauss blasters and guns, he would be there too, we were giving a lecture in the format of Warhammer ...

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Gransasso

read at least here .... if you spree in English ... History, Development, and Use
of the Kirov Cruiser / Project 26

The link is broken, even /www.russianwarrior.com does not open, so there is no way to read your murzilka. It's a pity. I would laugh heartily :)
I’m wondering - what do you need to think about, according to the SOVIET cruiser, which was created with the well-known ITALIAN help, to quote the English source as the ultimate truth? :)))) I’m from you, members of the sect "Everything That Is Written In English Is The Truth In The Last Instance "just bleed.
Is it really not clear that according to the Kirov it makes sense to refer only to Soviet and Italian sources?

Quote: Gransasso

And if not .. continue to write fierce nonsense about "analog computers" on the Soviet fleet

An explanation for the illiterate is AVM (in common parlance, an analog computer, since the abbreviation “Analog Computing Machine” means “AVM” is little known) is almost any advanced LMS from the First World War, because the technique independently and taking into account a bunch of parameters (bearing / speed / range of the target and the shooting ship, etc.) independently calculated the BH angles for firing. And at least read the basics of the same Platonov in order to realize what the Soviet SLAs were like

[Gransasso]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

I’m wondering - what do you need to think about, according to the SOVIET cruiser, which was created with the well-known ITALIAN help, to quote the English language source as the last resort? :))))

That's really ... well, what do these Englishmen understand in maritime affairs and should they be given an assessment of the pluses and minuses of the ships ... Are they capable of catching something in the ships ... is it the Soviet / Russian naval commanders ... especially Andrei from Chelyabinsk .. The Englishmen didn’t roll around ... Andryukha ... you don’t recall what thread the masterpieces or victories of the Russian fleet say for the last 150 years ... or the most large warship sunk by this powerful fleet built by talented shipbuilders for the 20th century for example .. ..two world wars, Russo-Japanese, Finnish and the rest on the little things ..



Wipe your nose with these Englishmen with their ridiculous knowledge in the maritime industry, who dared to name the project 26-UG)

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Gransasso

Wipe your nose with these Englishmen with their ridiculous knowledge in the maritime industry, who dared to name the project 26-UG)

So already wiped, a series of articles published here :)))

Quote: Gransasso

. well, what do these Englishmen understand in maritime affairs and whether they should be given an assessment of the pros and cons of ships ...

In-in! As I said - I am bleeding from you, sectarian comrades :)))))
The Englishman could give estimates to the Soviet ship, if he could somehow interact with it - serve on it, participate in its creation, etc. or he would come to the Russian Federation and thoroughly rummage around in the Soviet and then Italian archives. Then - yes, no question.
Instead, we have a broken link on which, according to your words, European tales from the times of the Soviet Union are told, in which it was customary to display Soviet equipment with tracing paper from Western samples or completely incapable. Why this was done - it is clear that during the years of the Cold War we also did it, extolling our developments and not penniless Western ones.
But to refer to such stories now, when, finally, you can get a lot of information on Soviet weapons ... This is not evidence of the weakness of the mind, but simply its absence. Well, tell me which documents Your Englishman referred, saying that the Kirovs are tracing paper from Italian cruisers? :)))))

[Gransasso]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

So already wiped, a series of articles published here :)))
Cit

Oh, yes ... the British and Italians are defeated ...... Andryukha showed them Kuzkin’s mother .... only they just don’t know .. but soon they will be drawn to the forum to fill in the gaps ..

[Gransasso]

Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

What documents did your Englishman refer to, saying that the Kirovs are tracing paper from Italian cruisers? :)))))

And who says that ... besides you? ... the Englishman says the same as the Italians ... the Montecuccoli project is taken as a basis ... spoiled by Soviet needleworkers ... the difference is that you think that Soviet young technicians improved it with their modifications ... and they-that spoiled a good project and turned into incomprehensible what and why ...


The reality and fate of these ships and the "innovations" brought to them by young technicians, especially in the Civil Code section, shows that they are right and not you ... you are offended .... but this is so

[Andrei from Chelyabinsk]

Quote: Gransasso

And who says that ... besides you? ...

Don’t have to take it back :)

Quote: Gransasso

the 26th series cruisers are nothing more than the Montecuccolo project’s Ialyan cruisers ... spoiled by Soviet needlework ...

Spoke? Spoke. Well, answer for your words :)

Quote: Gransasso

Englishman says the same as Italians ..

A reference to the Italians, please :)))))) Where do they say that?

Quote: Gransasso

.the project Montecuccoli is taken as a basis ... corrupted by Soviet needlework ...

The difference is that the USSR designed the Kirovs mainly on its own with the help of Italians in certain issues :)))) And I know about this, unlike you. I’ll even tell you more - it’s not at all a fact that the USSR received a set of Montecuccoli drawings, at least no such documents were found. But it is definitely known that the work on Kirov began long before the deal with the Italians

Quote: Gransasso

the difference is that you think that the Soviet young technicians improved it with their modifications ... and they messed up a good project and made it incomprehensible what and why ...

Even more fierce nonsense. Both Italians and we turned out to be quite perfect light cruisers, capable of developing 32-34 knots in everyday use, while ours lost their bow and stern, but not one died. The apotheosis was the undermining of Kirov in a German bottom mine with a TNT equivalent of 910 kg - in theory, the light cruiser could not survive after that. Kirov survived.

Quote: Gransasso

especially in terms of the Civil Code

(taking out popcorn) Well, come on, tell me about the shortcomings of the Kirov 180 mm. And I laugh heartily :)

[Gransasso]

Quote: Alexey RA

And the mutual influence of neighboring trunks with a full salvo in similar western installations was treated with delay coils.

All would be nothing .. if we ignore the real level of Soviet designers, technicians, workers, the level of technology, production culture and a bunch of others

[pin_code]

Quote: DimerVladimer

Well, yes - they did not suffer from modesty, tanks were allowed to be called by their proper names, ships were intravital. Such a new bar.

[pin_code]

and now we don’t have a bar? and there are no streets of bright names?

[DimerVladimer]

Quote: pin_code

and now we don’t have a bar? and there are no streets of bright names?

Those "bar" entertained vanity and lived well, but they worked - not a great mind, but a great hard work and dedication - this cannot be taken away.
The current bar, just for the sake of view, is “mindless” the mind is not great either - for 17 years they have not achieved anything global.
But to cut the budget of the Russian Federation and distribute contracts for "friends of the oligarchs" - this is wonderful at them.

[Gransasso]

Andrey from Chelyabinsk,

Listen ..... the system does not allow you to answer your funny post with quotes ... therefore


Zani Luciano., La Marina italiana e l'Unione sovietica tra le due guerre (parte 1a - 1929/1933 e parte 2a - 1933/1939) in “Bollettino d'Archivio” dell'Ufficio Storico della Marina Militare (Roma).


Enlighten yourself .. the name in Russian is the Italian Navy and the Soviet Union between the two wars ... part 1 covers the period from 1929 to 1933.2 part-period from 1933 to 1939) .1 part is published in the June 1994 issue of the magazine. 2 part-in-issue for March 1996.


This is what Italians write about this masterpiece:


Il progetto iniziale venne fortemente modificato, in particolare per quanto riguarda l'armamento. Infatti, in origine i Kirov avrebbero dovuto montare sei cannoni da 152mm in tre torri binate. Invece, i vertici della Marina Sovietica richiesero l'installazione di nove pezzi da 180mm, utilizzando le stesse torri previste per i 152mm. Il risultato di tale decisione fu che le torri erano troppo piccole, con ovvi problemi di abitabilità per gli inservienti dei pezzi. Inoltre, a causa dell'inesperienza sovietica, venne aggiunta numerosa componentistica “locale” che nel progetto originario non era prevista.

[Gransasso]

And here is what the nifigs who do not understand the British who write in maritime affairs write:


Tactical Use and Limitations

The Kirov class cruisers were designed to be conventional fleet cruisers, although they did not perform that role until well after the Great Patriotic War. The ships were very heavily armed when compared to the original design. They were also more heavily armored than the Italian ships they were modeled after.

The ships also suffered from a number of serious limitations. The first was that the gun turrets were far too cramped to work in easily. The close arrangement of the guns (32.2 inches from gun-center to gun-center) also affected shot dispersion, which was very poor. The ships also tended to be overweight and underpowered.


And about the GK of them ... tell us without verbiage how and when the tests of this miracle took place in the form of 3 180 mm guns in one cradle .... in a tower turned by young technicians into a narrow gas chamber for calculation ... and the wording of the state commission on the results of these tests ...