The failed course of the modernization of Soviet weapons
The goal of weapons modernization is to increase the combat characteristics and the expansion of combat use conditions, allowing modernized models to resist foreign models in a given period of time before adopting a new generation of weapons weapons. Traditionally, modernization accompanies modern and new weapons as they improve during the life cycle. The possibilities of modernization are not unlimited. Modernization without improving combat performance turns into running repair of old weapons and military equipment, which reduces the combat capability of the Russian army.
The Su-25 attack plane has long been replaced by more modern machines.
This year, the State Armaments Program for 2001 – 2010 (GV-2010) expires, in which the primary role was given to the modernization of rather outdated Soviet equipment. The first stage of the LG-2010 (up to 2006 year) provided for the modernization of the existing fleet of weapons. At the same time, the false opinion was widespread that domestic old weapons have significant modernization potential. In practice, it turned out the opposite. The ongoing modernization could not make a significant contribution to improving the combat capability of the Russian army, since the bulk of the Soviet weapons created in 70 – 80-ies of the last century were intended for wars of the past generation. In other words, due to the completion of the life cycle of the Soviet weapon, it was impossible to solve the problem of parity in terms of the technical level with foreign models by means of modernization in the period before 2010 – 2020. Unfortunately, our ideologists of modernization could not take this into account.
Timely modernization should always increase the share of modern weapons. But during the period of the HPV-2010, there was a sharp decline in modern weapons from 20%, which was declared by former Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, to 10%, found under the current Minister Anatoly Serdyukov. Are these percentages evidence of the absence of any concept of modernization with the appropriate pace of its implementation? The answer to this question is the revision of the priorities of Russian weapons programs after the operation in South Ossetia. According to First Deputy Minister of Defense Vladimir Popovkin, the Ministry of Defense was too keen on repairing and modernizing equipment to the detriment of purchasing new designs. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense revised the percentage ratio between the modernization and the purchase of new samples in favor of the latter. Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Alexander Postnikov, was more categorical: "We left the policy of modernizing military equipment to purchasing its new models." Thus, serious flaws are observed in the GV-2010, GV-2015 and the commensurate views of military leaders regarding the modernization of weapons. Let's try to figure it out.
INCOMPLETE BET ON CREATING NEW AMMUNITION
In 2002, the article “Military Parade” No. 1 appeared in the article of the head of the department of the 46 Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense, Colonel, Ph.D. Alexandra Skotnikov “New ammunition increases the effectiveness of percussion and fire weapons”, which outlines the modernization ideology proclaimed by the institution responsible for the development of the LG-2010, LG-2015. The author notes that the modernization of the carriers of weapons of destruction by changing their design and layout schemes is very expensive and involves considerable labor costs. For this reason, the direction of modernization has been determined - the re-equipment (re-equipment) of carriers with new, including guided, ammunition. But the author of the article did not take into account that by the year 2001 the ammunition industry had been destroyed, which even today is not capable of creating new samples. But this did not perplex Skotnikov. He even found that the share of modernization work by re-equipping with new ammunition is 85% of the total amount of modernized weapons and military equipment. At the same time, the author of the article considered two areas of modernization:
the existing carrier is equipped with newly developed ammunition, the use of which does not require its modifications and upgrades;
When the carrier is re-equipped with guided munitions, it is necessary to equip it with new means of reconnaissance, target designation, and guidance.
It is not difficult to imagine that with the complete degradation of the ammunition industry, the presented directions of modernization are practically impracticable.
At the same time, new ammunition and means of destruction should correspond to promising methods of warfare in relation to the new generation of wars. In other words, new ammunition should be created according to the appropriate tactical and technical requirements (TTT), based on the results of special research, dedicated to the substantiation of the most important tactical and technical characteristics of the means of destruction to be developed. At the same time, new ammunition should be built into the modern and prospective tactical (strategic) system of enemy destruction.
Over the past 15 years, work has been actively carried out abroad to create optoelectronic countering systems, which, in essence, are the means of protecting ground combat vehicles, aircraft, and ships not only from reconnaissance assets, but also from weapons of destruction.
The main foreign technologies of optoelectronic counteraction are:
means and methods for reducing the possibility of detection by the Russian intelligence agency of weapons and military vehicles
means of suppressing or destroying Russian devices of various purposes (homing heads of guided missiles, night vision devices, laser rangefinders, etc.).
Under the suppression refers to the impact on the electronics of the means of destruction, in which it loses the ability to function within the required time. And its defeat refers to the impact of, for example, high-power microwave tools, in which it loses its ability to perform a combat mission. Do new TTTs for the development of promising Russian ammunition take into account the availability of foreign optoelectronic countermeasures?
Teachings "East-2010"
At the same time, there is a lack of modernization results proclaimed by Skotnikov, which is confirmed by the content of the Vostok-2010, Kavkaz-2009, Zapad-2009, Ladoga-2009 exercises, which did not demonstrate promising ways of conducting combat operations using new means of destruction. At the same time, the quality of the new combat training program of the Russian troops, which should be focused on the enemy's deep fire attack with effective radio-electronic suppression of the radar, is in doubt; communication systems, guidance and control; anti-aircraft missile systems; automated troop control systems. These exercises, unfortunately, have not demonstrated the use of such new means of destruction as laser, infrasound and microwave.
MODERNIZATION ACCORDING TO THE PAST GENERATION OF WARS
Eight years have passed since the appearance of the article by Alexander Skotnikov, and the proposed modernization by creating new ammunition for old carriers did not take place. There are plenty of examples of this. So, for example, the 152-mm self-propelled howitzer 2C19 Msta-S has been modernized recently, and the troops began to receive a modernized version, equipped with a control system that provides automation of guidance and restoration of pickup. The 2C3 “Acacia” and 2C1 “Carnation” howitzers are undergoing a similar modernization. The main ammunition of these systems consists of high-explosive fragmentation projectiles (OFS). To hit targets with the help of OFS requires a large expenditure of projectiles and considerable time to perform fire missions, which sharply reduces the survival rate on the battlefield of artillery units. The high-precision shells Krasnopol, Centimeter and Kitolov that are in service with these systems are used only for the observed targets. These munitions are equipped with a laser homing head and require target irradiation with a laser target designator. On a flat terrain, the gunner can observe and illuminate targets at a distance of no more than 3 km. With such ammunition it is impossible to carry out a massive use of artillery systems, which will allow you to go to a one-time and guaranteed defeat of the most important objects at the maximum firing range.
152mm self-propelled howitzer 2S19M1
And how are Alexander Skotnikov's ideas being implemented abroad? An example is the implementation of a program to create new types of artillery ammunition. The work on this program allowed the United States to create and use in Afghanistan a new high-precision guided 155-mm projectile "Excalibur" with trajectory correction based on NAVSTAR data. This ammunition is designed to destroy protected command posts, manpower, fire weapons, systems Defense and other objects. The Excalibur projectile has a long firing range (40-50 km) and high accuracy with a virtually vertical final trajectory section and optimal fragmentation dispersion. Even during the Soviet Union, even with sufficient funding, our ammunition specialists failed to create artillery shells filled with self-aiming warheads (such as SADARM, SMArt-155, BONUS), as well as homing mines similar to the Merlin, Griffin, Strix ammunition, to destroy armored vehicles, launchers and other targets.
Skotnikov’s ideas on modernization turned out to be unrealized aviation equipment using new ammunition. Remembering the death of Russian aircraft (three Su-25 attack aircraft and Tu-22M3 bomber) in South Ossetia, it is advisable to pay attention to the modernization of these aircraft. The Su-25 was put into service in 1980 and was tested in Afghanistan, where 23 attack aircraft were lost during the fighting in the absence of modern enemy air defense. In 2009, 12 aircraft were upgraded to the Su-25SM variant. In 2010, no reduction in the “pace” of modernization is foreseen. The modernized attack aircraft (see NVO No. 46, 2009) are installing a new sighting and navigation system PrNK-25SM Bars. It includes a system for processing and displaying information, a radio intelligence station, a digital-analog weapon control system, and a satellite navigation system. It is noted that all this leads to an increase in the accuracy of the combat use of unguided aircraft weapons and bombing. It is good to increase the accuracy of bombing, but it is better not to enter the enemy’s air defense zone. In addition to the old Soviet unguided missiles and bombs, the attack aircraft are equipped with air-to-ground guided missiles (X-23, X-25, X-29, S-25L) with a maximum range of targeted launch of 10 km. The KAB-25 and KAB-500 adjustable bombs included in the Su-1500SM ammunition have a range of 3–9 km and 3–12 km, respectively. The recently adopted KAB-500S-E, adjusted with the help of a satellite navigation system, does not introduce significant changes. Its launch range is 2–9 km. At the same time, in comparison with regular adjustable bombs with laser and television guidance, the KAB-500S-E has an advantage when used day and night in difficult weather conditions. With a range of ammunition of Su-25SM equal to 10 km, the attack aircraft expect big trouble from the enemy’s military air defense. There are great doubts about the quality of the ongoing modernization.
Sioux 25SM
Tu-22M3 adopted on 1983 year. Before 1993, the 268 of these bombers, whose ammunition consists of obsolete Soviet missiles and bombs, was launched. Air Force Commander Alexander Zelin last year promised to upgrade the Tu-22М3. At the same time, he noted that the prospects for its further modernization are associated with the implementation of a program to seriously upgrade the composition of the onboard systems and to re-equip with high-precision armament based on guided bomber and missile weapons of the air-to-surface class. Will the implementation of this program allow to avoid the shameful phenomena that occurred during the "breakthrough" of Georgian air defense? If the United States and NATO are experiencing new weapons in any military conflict, the Tu-22М3 bombers were used at the final stage of the war in Afghanistan to launch bomb attacks using the old FAB-500, FAB-1500 and FAB-3000. It can be assumed that the Tu-22М3 did not have new means of destruction that should be tested in combat conditions.
Tu-22M3
RџSЂRѕRІRѕRґRoRјR SЏ RјRѕRґRμSЂRЅRoR · ° F ° C ± P † RoSЏ SЂRѕRЅRμS,R ° RЅRєRѕRІRѕR№ S,RμS ... RЅRoRєRo RЅRμ RѕR ± ‡ RμSЃRїRμS RoRІR ° RμS, S,SЂRμR SѓRμRјRѕRіRѕ SѓSЂRѕRІRЅSЏ ± ± RѕRμRІS P <C ... SЃRІRѕR№SЃS,RІ SЂRѕSЃSЃRoR No. СЃРєРёС ... tanks. The classic layout scheme adopted for the T-72, T-80 tanks has exhausted the possibilities for radically improving protection, especially from the upper hemisphere. Delivered by air, MLRS, artillery Guided cluster munitions from the US and NATO countries will reliably hit our armored vehicles from above at great distances from the line of combat contact.
There are plenty of examples of such modernization, but the scope of the article does not allow publishing most of them.
The BMP-3, which has been in service for two decades, raises many complaints from the Russian military.
Photos from the book "Armed Forces of the Russian Federation"
T-90
PROBLEMS OF MODERNIZATION
Modern military technology is such that there is virtually no branch of natural science and technology, which would not be associated with the development and production of weapons. These are physics and chemistry, metallurgy and mechanical engineering, electronics and computer engineering, radio engineering and instrument engineering. In weapon systems, units and systems based on different physical principles are combined and interact. Therefore, when designing, it is necessary to forecast the development of the natural sciences and technologies that can contribute to the further modernization of weapons systems already adopted. In other words, as the Candidate of Technical Sciences, Colonel Oleg Sergeev determined (see “NVO” No. 10, 2007 year), it is necessary to create a modernization reserve, which determines the long-term development of weapons. Unfortunately, the creation of modernization stocks was not visible, for example, for strategic aviation and the Russian Navy, which leads to premature aging of these weapons.
The upcoming modernization of the strategic bombers T-95MS, Tu-160 is unlikely to close the existing gap in the system of the Russian Armed Forces, associated with the inability to strike with precision weapons in conventional equipment at remote targets. It should be recalled that at one time (see “NVO” No. 8, 2003 year), the modernization of the Tu-160 provided for “teach” him to bomb. At the same time, it was noted that one Tu-160 can take on such a number of bombs as a squadron of Tu-22М3. At the same time, a deep modernization of this vehicle was assumed, under which it was planned to master the use of high-precision adjustable bombs from the Tu-160. It does not require special evidence that the armament of the Tu-160 by free-fall bombs and corrected in the current conditions of development of foreign air defense systems does not correspond to their strategic mission. The use of adjustable bombs occurs from 5 – 8 km altitudes and at a distance from the target near 9 – 13 km, which requires the carrier to be located in the enemy’s air defense zone and leads to a sad outcome. Should you risk such expensive carriers like the Tu-160? It is more expedient to use them for their intended purpose - to carry out strikes from distances 3 – 5 thousand km of ALCM in conventional and nuclear equipment.
Tu-160
Americans are more rational about upgrading their strategic aviation. Thus, the record of longevity belongs to the American strategic bomber B-52, which is ensured by modernization taking into account the use of new technologies. B-52H bomber was adopted in the 1961 year. Currently, the troops are 76 bombers B-52H. The estimated lifetime of this machine is 2030 year. The B-52H bomber is assigned the priority role of a carrier of air-based cruise missiles operating outside the zone of active air defense weapons. In order to eliminate the shortcomings identified in the course of the hostilities in Iraq, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, the B-52H, B-1B, B-2А are being upgraded by upgrading the onboard systems and expanding the composition of the guided weapon payload.
The modernization of weapons is envisaged by GPV-2015, which does not pay due attention to the Navy. On this occasion, Vice Admiral, former Chief of the Operations Directorate, Deputy Chief of the Main Staff of the Navy Viktor Patrushev noted (see NVO No. 36, 2006) that, in accordance with GPV-2015, we can only talk about sluggish modernization of individual ships ... Moreover, the money planned for this should go in the second five-year plan of the GPV-2015. Revealing the shortcomings of GPV-2015, the negative activities of the Ministry of Economic Development and the Ministry of Finance, he substantiated the need to create a financed Comprehensive Program for the Modernization and Repair of Naval Ships and Vessels with its main subprogram “Modernization of the Multipurpose Submarine Group”. The main reason for the modernization of multipurpose submarines is that in the North and Pacific fleets there are no more than three serviceable multipurpose nuclear submarines. Modernization and repair of Project 971 multipurpose submarines will extend their service life up to 40 years, while ensuring their combat effectiveness at a modern level. According to Viktor Patrushev, our naval commanders underestimate the role of multipurpose nuclear submarines in destroying aircraft carriers, detachments of enemy warships and submarines up to the lines of the rise of aviation and missile launches on Russian territory.
Serious problems await the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in connection with the modernization of weapons purchased abroad. In this case, the foreign seller is unlikely to transfer the technologies that determine the modernization stock. Following the laws of the market, it is more profitable for him that after observing the warranty period, a new sample is purchased.
On the whole, the ongoing modernization did not provide an increase in the level of combat characteristics of existing weapons. The Russian brigades are still equipped with old weapons designed for the battles of the past generation of wars.
This year, the State Armaments Program for 2001 – 2010 (GV-2010) expires, in which the primary role was given to the modernization of rather outdated Soviet equipment. The first stage of the LG-2010 (up to 2006 year) provided for the modernization of the existing fleet of weapons. At the same time, the false opinion was widespread that domestic old weapons have significant modernization potential. In practice, it turned out the opposite. The ongoing modernization could not make a significant contribution to improving the combat capability of the Russian army, since the bulk of the Soviet weapons created in 70 – 80-ies of the last century were intended for wars of the past generation. In other words, due to the completion of the life cycle of the Soviet weapon, it was impossible to solve the problem of parity in terms of the technical level with foreign models by means of modernization in the period before 2010 – 2020. Unfortunately, our ideologists of modernization could not take this into account.
Timely modernization should always increase the share of modern weapons. But during the period of the HPV-2010, there was a sharp decline in modern weapons from 20%, which was declared by former Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, to 10%, found under the current Minister Anatoly Serdyukov. Are these percentages evidence of the absence of any concept of modernization with the appropriate pace of its implementation? The answer to this question is the revision of the priorities of Russian weapons programs after the operation in South Ossetia. According to First Deputy Minister of Defense Vladimir Popovkin, the Ministry of Defense was too keen on repairing and modernizing equipment to the detriment of purchasing new designs. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense revised the percentage ratio between the modernization and the purchase of new samples in favor of the latter. Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Alexander Postnikov, was more categorical: "We left the policy of modernizing military equipment to purchasing its new models." Thus, serious flaws are observed in the GV-2010, GV-2015 and the commensurate views of military leaders regarding the modernization of weapons. Let's try to figure it out.
INCOMPLETE BET ON CREATING NEW AMMUNITION
In 2002, the article “Military Parade” No. 1 appeared in the article of the head of the department of the 46 Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense, Colonel, Ph.D. Alexandra Skotnikov “New ammunition increases the effectiveness of percussion and fire weapons”, which outlines the modernization ideology proclaimed by the institution responsible for the development of the LG-2010, LG-2015. The author notes that the modernization of the carriers of weapons of destruction by changing their design and layout schemes is very expensive and involves considerable labor costs. For this reason, the direction of modernization has been determined - the re-equipment (re-equipment) of carriers with new, including guided, ammunition. But the author of the article did not take into account that by the year 2001 the ammunition industry had been destroyed, which even today is not capable of creating new samples. But this did not perplex Skotnikov. He even found that the share of modernization work by re-equipping with new ammunition is 85% of the total amount of modernized weapons and military equipment. At the same time, the author of the article considered two areas of modernization:
the existing carrier is equipped with newly developed ammunition, the use of which does not require its modifications and upgrades;
When the carrier is re-equipped with guided munitions, it is necessary to equip it with new means of reconnaissance, target designation, and guidance.
It is not difficult to imagine that with the complete degradation of the ammunition industry, the presented directions of modernization are practically impracticable.
At the same time, new ammunition and means of destruction should correspond to promising methods of warfare in relation to the new generation of wars. In other words, new ammunition should be created according to the appropriate tactical and technical requirements (TTT), based on the results of special research, dedicated to the substantiation of the most important tactical and technical characteristics of the means of destruction to be developed. At the same time, new ammunition should be built into the modern and prospective tactical (strategic) system of enemy destruction.
Over the past 15 years, work has been actively carried out abroad to create optoelectronic countering systems, which, in essence, are the means of protecting ground combat vehicles, aircraft, and ships not only from reconnaissance assets, but also from weapons of destruction.
The main foreign technologies of optoelectronic counteraction are:
means and methods for reducing the possibility of detection by the Russian intelligence agency of weapons and military vehicles
means of suppressing or destroying Russian devices of various purposes (homing heads of guided missiles, night vision devices, laser rangefinders, etc.).
Under the suppression refers to the impact on the electronics of the means of destruction, in which it loses the ability to function within the required time. And its defeat refers to the impact of, for example, high-power microwave tools, in which it loses its ability to perform a combat mission. Do new TTTs for the development of promising Russian ammunition take into account the availability of foreign optoelectronic countermeasures?
At the same time, there is a lack of modernization results proclaimed by Skotnikov, which is confirmed by the content of the Vostok-2010, Kavkaz-2009, Zapad-2009, Ladoga-2009 exercises, which did not demonstrate promising ways of conducting combat operations using new means of destruction. At the same time, the quality of the new combat training program of the Russian troops, which should be focused on the enemy's deep fire attack with effective radio-electronic suppression of the radar, is in doubt; communication systems, guidance and control; anti-aircraft missile systems; automated troop control systems. These exercises, unfortunately, have not demonstrated the use of such new means of destruction as laser, infrasound and microwave.
MODERNIZATION ACCORDING TO THE PAST GENERATION OF WARS
Eight years have passed since the appearance of the article by Alexander Skotnikov, and the proposed modernization by creating new ammunition for old carriers did not take place. There are plenty of examples of this. So, for example, the 152-mm self-propelled howitzer 2C19 Msta-S has been modernized recently, and the troops began to receive a modernized version, equipped with a control system that provides automation of guidance and restoration of pickup. The 2C3 “Acacia” and 2C1 “Carnation” howitzers are undergoing a similar modernization. The main ammunition of these systems consists of high-explosive fragmentation projectiles (OFS). To hit targets with the help of OFS requires a large expenditure of projectiles and considerable time to perform fire missions, which sharply reduces the survival rate on the battlefield of artillery units. The high-precision shells Krasnopol, Centimeter and Kitolov that are in service with these systems are used only for the observed targets. These munitions are equipped with a laser homing head and require target irradiation with a laser target designator. On a flat terrain, the gunner can observe and illuminate targets at a distance of no more than 3 km. With such ammunition it is impossible to carry out a massive use of artillery systems, which will allow you to go to a one-time and guaranteed defeat of the most important objects at the maximum firing range.
And how are Alexander Skotnikov's ideas being implemented abroad? An example is the implementation of a program to create new types of artillery ammunition. The work on this program allowed the United States to create and use in Afghanistan a new high-precision guided 155-mm projectile "Excalibur" with trajectory correction based on NAVSTAR data. This ammunition is designed to destroy protected command posts, manpower, fire weapons, systems Defense and other objects. The Excalibur projectile has a long firing range (40-50 km) and high accuracy with a virtually vertical final trajectory section and optimal fragmentation dispersion. Even during the Soviet Union, even with sufficient funding, our ammunition specialists failed to create artillery shells filled with self-aiming warheads (such as SADARM, SMArt-155, BONUS), as well as homing mines similar to the Merlin, Griffin, Strix ammunition, to destroy armored vehicles, launchers and other targets.
Skotnikov’s ideas on modernization turned out to be unrealized aviation equipment using new ammunition. Remembering the death of Russian aircraft (three Su-25 attack aircraft and Tu-22M3 bomber) in South Ossetia, it is advisable to pay attention to the modernization of these aircraft. The Su-25 was put into service in 1980 and was tested in Afghanistan, where 23 attack aircraft were lost during the fighting in the absence of modern enemy air defense. In 2009, 12 aircraft were upgraded to the Su-25SM variant. In 2010, no reduction in the “pace” of modernization is foreseen. The modernized attack aircraft (see NVO No. 46, 2009) are installing a new sighting and navigation system PrNK-25SM Bars. It includes a system for processing and displaying information, a radio intelligence station, a digital-analog weapon control system, and a satellite navigation system. It is noted that all this leads to an increase in the accuracy of the combat use of unguided aircraft weapons and bombing. It is good to increase the accuracy of bombing, but it is better not to enter the enemy’s air defense zone. In addition to the old Soviet unguided missiles and bombs, the attack aircraft are equipped with air-to-ground guided missiles (X-23, X-25, X-29, S-25L) with a maximum range of targeted launch of 10 km. The KAB-25 and KAB-500 adjustable bombs included in the Su-1500SM ammunition have a range of 3–9 km and 3–12 km, respectively. The recently adopted KAB-500S-E, adjusted with the help of a satellite navigation system, does not introduce significant changes. Its launch range is 2–9 km. At the same time, in comparison with regular adjustable bombs with laser and television guidance, the KAB-500S-E has an advantage when used day and night in difficult weather conditions. With a range of ammunition of Su-25SM equal to 10 km, the attack aircraft expect big trouble from the enemy’s military air defense. There are great doubts about the quality of the ongoing modernization.
Tu-22M3 adopted on 1983 year. Before 1993, the 268 of these bombers, whose ammunition consists of obsolete Soviet missiles and bombs, was launched. Air Force Commander Alexander Zelin last year promised to upgrade the Tu-22М3. At the same time, he noted that the prospects for its further modernization are associated with the implementation of a program to seriously upgrade the composition of the onboard systems and to re-equip with high-precision armament based on guided bomber and missile weapons of the air-to-surface class. Will the implementation of this program allow to avoid the shameful phenomena that occurred during the "breakthrough" of Georgian air defense? If the United States and NATO are experiencing new weapons in any military conflict, the Tu-22М3 bombers were used at the final stage of the war in Afghanistan to launch bomb attacks using the old FAB-500, FAB-1500 and FAB-3000. It can be assumed that the Tu-22М3 did not have new means of destruction that should be tested in combat conditions.
RџSЂRѕRІRѕRґRoRјR SЏ RјRѕRґRμSЂRЅRoR · ° F ° C ± P † RoSЏ SЂRѕRЅRμS,R ° RЅRєRѕRІRѕR№ S,RμS ... RЅRoRєRo RЅRμ RѕR ± ‡ RμSЃRїRμS RoRІR ° RμS, S,SЂRμR SѓRμRјRѕRіRѕ SѓSЂRѕRІRЅSЏ ± ± RѕRμRІS P <C ... SЃRІRѕR№SЃS,RІ SЂRѕSЃSЃRoR No. СЃРєРёС ... tanks. The classic layout scheme adopted for the T-72, T-80 tanks has exhausted the possibilities for radically improving protection, especially from the upper hemisphere. Delivered by air, MLRS, artillery Guided cluster munitions from the US and NATO countries will reliably hit our armored vehicles from above at great distances from the line of combat contact.
There are plenty of examples of such modernization, but the scope of the article does not allow publishing most of them.
The BMP-3, which has been in service for two decades, raises many complaints from the Russian military.
Photos from the book "Armed Forces of the Russian Federation"
PROBLEMS OF MODERNIZATION
Modern military technology is such that there is virtually no branch of natural science and technology, which would not be associated with the development and production of weapons. These are physics and chemistry, metallurgy and mechanical engineering, electronics and computer engineering, radio engineering and instrument engineering. In weapon systems, units and systems based on different physical principles are combined and interact. Therefore, when designing, it is necessary to forecast the development of the natural sciences and technologies that can contribute to the further modernization of weapons systems already adopted. In other words, as the Candidate of Technical Sciences, Colonel Oleg Sergeev determined (see “NVO” No. 10, 2007 year), it is necessary to create a modernization reserve, which determines the long-term development of weapons. Unfortunately, the creation of modernization stocks was not visible, for example, for strategic aviation and the Russian Navy, which leads to premature aging of these weapons.
The upcoming modernization of the strategic bombers T-95MS, Tu-160 is unlikely to close the existing gap in the system of the Russian Armed Forces, associated with the inability to strike with precision weapons in conventional equipment at remote targets. It should be recalled that at one time (see “NVO” No. 8, 2003 year), the modernization of the Tu-160 provided for “teach” him to bomb. At the same time, it was noted that one Tu-160 can take on such a number of bombs as a squadron of Tu-22М3. At the same time, a deep modernization of this vehicle was assumed, under which it was planned to master the use of high-precision adjustable bombs from the Tu-160. It does not require special evidence that the armament of the Tu-160 by free-fall bombs and corrected in the current conditions of development of foreign air defense systems does not correspond to their strategic mission. The use of adjustable bombs occurs from 5 – 8 km altitudes and at a distance from the target near 9 – 13 km, which requires the carrier to be located in the enemy’s air defense zone and leads to a sad outcome. Should you risk such expensive carriers like the Tu-160? It is more expedient to use them for their intended purpose - to carry out strikes from distances 3 – 5 thousand km of ALCM in conventional and nuclear equipment.
Americans are more rational about upgrading their strategic aviation. Thus, the record of longevity belongs to the American strategic bomber B-52, which is ensured by modernization taking into account the use of new technologies. B-52H bomber was adopted in the 1961 year. Currently, the troops are 76 bombers B-52H. The estimated lifetime of this machine is 2030 year. The B-52H bomber is assigned the priority role of a carrier of air-based cruise missiles operating outside the zone of active air defense weapons. In order to eliminate the shortcomings identified in the course of the hostilities in Iraq, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, the B-52H, B-1B, B-2А are being upgraded by upgrading the onboard systems and expanding the composition of the guided weapon payload.
The modernization of weapons is envisaged by GPV-2015, which does not pay due attention to the Navy. On this occasion, Vice Admiral, former Chief of the Operations Directorate, Deputy Chief of the Main Staff of the Navy Viktor Patrushev noted (see NVO No. 36, 2006) that, in accordance with GPV-2015, we can only talk about sluggish modernization of individual ships ... Moreover, the money planned for this should go in the second five-year plan of the GPV-2015. Revealing the shortcomings of GPV-2015, the negative activities of the Ministry of Economic Development and the Ministry of Finance, he substantiated the need to create a financed Comprehensive Program for the Modernization and Repair of Naval Ships and Vessels with its main subprogram “Modernization of the Multipurpose Submarine Group”. The main reason for the modernization of multipurpose submarines is that in the North and Pacific fleets there are no more than three serviceable multipurpose nuclear submarines. Modernization and repair of Project 971 multipurpose submarines will extend their service life up to 40 years, while ensuring their combat effectiveness at a modern level. According to Viktor Patrushev, our naval commanders underestimate the role of multipurpose nuclear submarines in destroying aircraft carriers, detachments of enemy warships and submarines up to the lines of the rise of aviation and missile launches on Russian territory.
Serious problems await the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in connection with the modernization of weapons purchased abroad. In this case, the foreign seller is unlikely to transfer the technologies that determine the modernization stock. Following the laws of the market, it is more profitable for him that after observing the warranty period, a new sample is purchased.
On the whole, the ongoing modernization did not provide an increase in the level of combat characteristics of existing weapons. The Russian brigades are still equipped with old weapons designed for the battles of the past generation of wars.
Information