After the war, the political leadership of the country and, above all, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Supreme Soviet Joseph Stalin was recognized: “The best, most important thing that we achieved in the Great Patriotic War is our army, our cadres. In this war we got a modern army and this is more important than many other acquisitions. ”
Indeed, our country defeated the strongest opponents in the west and east, liberated the occupied territories and many states of Europe and Asia, returned Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, and the country's international prestige sharply increased. This was not in the history of the Fatherland. However, Stalin emphasized the most important thing: most importantly - the modern army that went through the crucible of battles and the military personnel hardened in them. Victory was achieved by merging the efforts of the entire Soviet people, the front and the rear. But to be or not to be Fatherland was decided on the battlefields, where the main role was played by soldiers and, above all, officers.
By the end of World War II, our army was so well-coordinated organism that no one could resist it in Europe. In this regard, one of the most profound questions arises: how did the army of the 1941 model of the year, which suffered terrible failures and retreated to Moscow, differed from the army of 1945, which confidently and brilliantly ended the war?
Soldiers and officers in 1941 were formally even better (by age, physical data, general military literacy and education), the quality of weapons varied, but insignificantly, there was no particular change in the organizational structure, military management system, except in the Air Force and when staking VGK. The potential of the Red Army, its combat capability at the start of the war, was higher than the combat readiness to repel enemy aggression. The miscalculations of the political leadership and the highest military command led to the fact that by the time of the German attack the troops were not fully operational, their operational deployment was not completed, the first-echelon divisions in the majority did not occupy the intended lines of defense. Therefore, they were in a difficult situation, could not fully realize their potential. Already at the beginning of the campaign, the main part of the personnel army was lost, and it had to be recreated in a hurry. All the more significant is the qualitative jump in combat effectiveness during the war.
How was the army of winners born? Fundamental, qualitative changes occurred primarily in society itself and the Armed Forces. The war shook up all segments of the population, military and civilian, forced them to look at the fate of the country and defend the Fatherland with different eyes.
The trials forced everyone - from the commander in chief to the soldier to get rid of the complacency of peacetime, to mobilize to the limit, to hone managerial and combat skills. In battle, formalism and mistakes were not forgiven, the situation severely punished for any omissions in reconnaissance, fire defeat, provision of troops. The war pushed aside the far-fetched, non-life, all the articles of partners and officials such as Mehlis. In particular, it was clearly revealed that, to a certain extent, both control and over-thinking are needed, but there can be no effective management without trusting people.
Continuous and intense fighting enriched the combat experience, tempered the military personnel, made them more resistant, wise and confident in their abilities, forced them to master the secrets of military art that were still incomprehensible in 1941. At the beginning of the war there was no commander who, in theory, did not know about the need to concentrate the main efforts on crucial areas, the importance of conducting continuous reconnaissance, and organizing reliable enemy fire engagement.
But it took a lot of sacrifice, effort and time, until most of the commanders captured these canons. With all the mercilessness, the war showed that there was a great distance between the knowledge of theory and the practical mastery of military art. Suffice it to recall that the deep essence of the organization of strategic defense was not clarified even at the headquarters top not only in 1941, but also in 1942. And only in 1943, in preparation for the Battle of Kursk, they were able to master it to the end. There were enough other similar problems that had to be comprehended during the war. So difficult to practice the mysteries of military art.
The courage and selfless labor of the people under the slogan "Everything is for the front!" All for victory! ”Reinforced the army not only more and more perfect weapons, material resources, but also a special spiritual power. And the help under the Lend-Lease brought its benefit, especially the appearance of hundreds of thousands of all-terrain vehicles, which made our artillery and troops more maneuverable.
In peacetime, a three-four-day doctrine is considered a great event and, as a rule, gives a lot for training and combat coordination of formations and units. And here - four years of continuous study in combat conditions. Commanders, staffs and troops not only received practice. Before each operation, they practiced many times, recreating the corresponding defense of the enemy on the terrain, similar to the one in which they were to act.
During the war, everything was fine-tuned and brought to perfection. For example, who was at the exercises, could not help but notice how much fuss there is to move a command or advanced command post to a new place. In the second half of the war, the division commander, sometimes without saying a word, showed the head of the operational department the place where the command post should be. And without special instructions, the operator, the scout, the signalman, the sapper, who had been previously appointed for this, knew which car to go to and where to go, what to bring and how to prepare everything. Such coherence was in all affairs and in all links - from the Supreme Command Headquarters to the subdivision. All actions, functional duties of each warrior were fulfilled to automaticity. This ensured a high degree of organization, mutual understanding and management coherence.
Of course, in peacetime, it is impossible to conduct combat training with such tension all the time. But internal mobilization, responsibility for the fulfillment of military duty should permeate a military person in any position.
Admiral Makarov constantly kept repeating to his subordinates: “Remember the war,” but having fallen on it, in the very first real clash with the Japanese, he ruined himself and some fleet. It turns out that we need knowledge (military science) and the ability to bring this knowledge to life (military art).
Without getting a long time of combat practice, any army gradually “turns sour”, its mechanisms begin to rust. Germany in the second half of the 30-x constantly "run in" his army in various kinds of military actions and campaigns. Before the attack on the USSR, the Wehrmacht participated in hostilities for two years. One of the underlying motives of the Soviet-Finnish war was also the desire to test the army in action. Many of the armed conflicts unleashed by the United States were designed to give the control bodies and troops military practice, to test new types of weapons and military equipment.
In order for the army to be ready in peacetime, it is necessary to conduct exercises and trainings not only with formations and units, but also with strategic and operational management authorities. Before the war, it was believed that the commander of a company or battalion should be systematically trained in management with subunits, but at the strategic level this is not necessary, as a result, it turned out to be the least prepared for solving the assigned tasks.
This conclusion is confirmed by the latest scientific research. For example, program-oriented planning, as well as the systems approach in general, assumes that the whole is greater than the sum of the constituent parts. Holistic system has such properties that do not directly follow from the properties of its parts, but can be identified by analyzing their totality, internal relations and the results of the interaction of the parts with each other. This, in fact, is the difference between the integrated approach, which allows to consider only a simple sum of the elements, and the system approach. Thus, with the program-targeted method of planning military construction, we operate with combat potentials of formations and units. But depending on the rationality of the organizational structure and management system, and above all in the top echelon, the overall combat potential of the armed forces may be less (as in 1941), and much more than the simple sum of the combat potentials of the formations and units that make up the unification and the armed forces in general (as in 1945).
In the light of this, it is all the more important and in peacetime it is extremely responsible to treat every occupation, teaching, to bring them as close as possible to the combat conditions. In the postwar years, especially under the Minister of Defense Marshal Zhukov, there was a very strict attitude towards the preparation and conduct of the exercises. After each, according to its results, an order of the Minister was issued. Officers who did not cope with their tasks were often suspended from office or imposed penalties on them. Then they still remembered how hard it was to pay in battle for the slightest omissions, and it was considered a great sin not to stop them. This is the main point of the systematic alarms and exercises that are being held lately by order of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Army General Sergei Shoigu.
Characterized by two episodes told by Ivan Konev. Before the war, commanding the troops of the North Caucasus Military District, he conducted a command and staff exercise with the 19 Army. At this time, he was summoned to the government telephone, and for his late arrival he received a serious suggestion. After the war, a similar incident occurred, but the reaction of Moscow was already quite different. The Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Konev, then supervised the command-staff exercise with the Transcaucasian Military District. At that moment, the head of the Ministry of Defense called. The duty officer reported that Marshal Konev was in training. The Minister of Defense said: “Well, do not tear off Comrade Konev from this important matter, let him call me when he has the opportunity.”
This is how severe tests taught and changed people, including their attitude to combat training. In this regard, we have to think about it: is it really necessary to have another war, so that leaders of all levels again understand the role and significance of officer cadres in the life of the state and that the main purpose of the army, in general of military people, is incessant preparation for combat tasks. If not, the army loses its meaning. It is not by chance that it is customary to assume that a war for a personnel officer is an exam, which is not known when it will take place, but it is necessary to prepare for it all my life.
Of course, the deadly clashes with the enemy improved the combat skills of not only our troops, but also the enemy, whose combat capability had dropped significantly by the end of the war. The opposing sides took over the experience of others. And in this process, the decisive role was played by such factors as the just goals of the war, the conquest of strategic initiative and air supremacy, and the overall advantage of Soviet military science and military art. For example, in our army, a more perfect system of fire destruction in the form of an artillery and air attack was developed. In the German divisions there were about one and a half times more guns. But the presence of a powerful reserve of the Supreme Command and its maneuver on the decisive sectors of the front led to the fact that we constantly participated in active hostilities up to 55 – 60 percent of artillery, while in German troops - only about 40 percent.
The anti-tank and anti-aircraft defense system that was conceived in the Battle of Moscow was brought to perfection already near Kursk. The German command, which suffered great losses from the division, usually disbanded and created new ones, which made them difficult to put together. We often maintained and conducted combat operations of a division numbering three to five thousand people. Therefore, the corresponding compounds and associations were more than the Germans. But while maintaining the backbone of the experienced officers in the divisional (regimental), and in the second half of the war and in the battalion level, it was easier to complete these divisions, to include replenishment in the system.
Such organizational and operational-tactical techniques, which increased the combat power of the army, made our military art more effective.
The Soviet command in the Great Patriotic War attached great importance to the timely generalization and bringing the combat experience to the troops. The headquarters of the Supreme Command, the General Staff, the Main Political Department, the People's Commissariat of the Navy, the command and headquarters of the branches of the Armed Forces and the armed forces, associations and formations were not only practical leadership bodies, but also the main centers of military theoretical thought. The management of operations is unthinkable without creative work in the preparation of informed decisions, the development of charters, instructions and orders, summarizing all the advanced. During the war, the General Staff created the Directorate for using the experience of war, and in the headquarters of the fronts and armies, departments and divisions respectively. The rich military experience of the Soviet army was reflected in the developed and constantly updated statutes, manuals and instructions. For example, in 1944, the field and combat regiments of the infantry, the Guide to River Crossing, the Guide to Troop Operations in the Mountains, the Manual on Breakthrough Positional Defense, and others were developed and revised. In total, 1943 – 1944 was revised and developed again 30 regulations, manuals and instructions related to the maintenance of the database and the training of troops.
The specificity and objectivity of military scientific research, strict subordination to their interests in the successful conduct of warfare on the fronts, draws attention to itself. At the same time, the German army, despite a significant discrepancy between the pre-war charters and combat experience, especially after the attack on the USSR, did not rework any of them, although it fought for six years. According to captured trophy documents, the testimony of captured officers, it was established that the analysis and synthesis of combat experience ended with the publication of individual memos and directives. Many of the fascist generals in their memoirs call one of the reasons for the defeat the fact that they fought in the east according to the same patterns as in the west.
Thus, the war has once again confirmed that a well-developed theory alone gives little if it is not captured by cadres. In addition, it requires a developed operational-strategic thinking, organizational and volitional qualities, without which a high level of military art cannot be shown.
But all that has been said does not fully answer the question: how did the phenomenon of the all-crushing victorious army appear by the end of the war? It is worth thinking about it thoroughly, especially when all sorts of reorganizations and reforms are being undertaken. The main lesson is that externally effective transformations, if they concern only the surface of military life and do not affect the internal springs of the functioning of the army, do not change the essence of the existing system, do little to improve the quality of combat readiness and combat readiness of the Armed Forces.
During the war, they attached great importance to the training of a combined-arms commander, capable of uniting in his hands the efforts of all the armed forces. Of course, nowadays in infantry schools they’re not training infantrymen anymore - cadets master tanks, and artillery, and sapper business, but the problem, for example, debugged interaction with aviation in combined arms combat, it still remains not completely resolved. And the development of solid practical skills for officers in command and control of troops (forces) lags behind what the modern situation requires.
There are other problems. The issues of military legacy officers of outstanding military leaders, generalization and study of combat experience do not lose their importance. Including a lot of work in the study of the experience of the Afghan and Chechen wars, the fighting in Syria, and other local conflicts of the postwar period. How to study, describe the experience? Do not get carried away with praises, critically disassemble operations. Things will do it for themselves. Keep your sycophants away from this job. The last wish was the hardest to engraft in military history work and not only in the Soviet era. The lies and falsification of the history of the war, the discredit of the Great Victory became commonplace in the liberal press and on television. This is not surprising: the task has been set - to humiliate the dignity of Russia, including its history, and these people regularly work out their grants. But the press, which identifies itself as a patriotic cohort, does not always take a principled position.
In recent years, there are many books about war. Formally, pluralism, seemingly infinite. But the anti-Russian writings go out and spread in huge circulations, and for truthful, honest books, the possibilities are extremely limited.
Any historical events or personalities must be studied in all their contradictory complexity to the measure of 1941 and 1945. As Konstantin Simonov wrote in “Winter of forty-one”:
Not to defame someone
And to taste to the bottom,
We truly measure given.
Perhaps now useful
Not letting the memory out of my hands,
That measure, straight and iron,
Check someone out suddenly.
The experience of the Great Patriotic War, local wars, in which the older generation of warriors participated, must be studied and mastered purely critical, creative, taking into account modern conditions, objectively revealing the mistakes of the past. Without this, it is impossible to draw the proper lessons needed for the army today and tomorrow.
In general, the demand for new ideas, the achievements of military science and their introduction into practical activity is one of the main lessons from the past and the most acute problem of our time. In this matter, even today our military press is called upon to play an important role. After the Great Patriotic War, many military leaders and historians lamented the fact that we had incorrectly foreseen its initial period. But in 1940, according to the experience of the beginning of the Second World War, G. Isserson wrote a book “New Forms of Struggle”, where he convincingly showed that this period will not be the same as in 1914. There were other similar studies. However, these ideas were not noticed and not accepted.
How to make it happen again? Nowadays, it is especially important for managers not only to be closer to science, but also to stand at the head of scientific research, be more accessible to communicate with people, military scientists, and not be in a hurry to reject new ideas. At one time, the entire Red Army discussed the military reform program of Mikhail Frunze. And nowadays a broader intellectual front is needed. Only on such a good, vital basis can a future-oriented military ideology and doctrine be created, which should not only be worked out and implemented from above, but also be perceived by all personnel and consciously put into practice as its vital matter.
In peacetime, in order to develop the necessary qualities of the officers, it is necessary in all classes, exercises, in the course of combat and operational training, to create conditions when decisions need to be made in a complex, contradictory situation.
After the war, front-line command and staff exercises were conducted in the Far East. After the report by General Vasily Margelov on the decision to land an airborne assault on one of the islands, he was asked: how long would it take to re-land in another area? General Margelov was silent for a long time and then replied with a sigh: “In 1941, we had already landed one VDK in the Vyazma region, it is still going to ...” There were no more questions. The complexity of the task ahead must be fully imagined by both the subordinate and the senior boss.
Speaking about the methods of work of the command and staffs, I want to draw attention to such unnecessary formalism as extensive reports on assessing the situation and proposals, hearing decisions and instructions on interaction and support of operations. In them, as a rule, there is a lot of general theory, but not enough that relates to a specific case.
Thus, in the methodical development of one of the academies for the moral and psychological support of the battle by personnel lock, two hours before the battle, the following proposals are reported to the regimental commander: “The objectives of the moral and psychological support of the offensive battle are to determine the actualization of patriotic feelings and military loyalty , striving to defend the interests of the Russian people and defeat the aggressor ... creating conditions for maintaining positive emotional states ... for regimental artillery groups - updating the readiness of personnel to effectively support the advancing troops ... ”and so on. Now imagine that you are the regiment commander and you are asked to“ optimize ”and“ actualize ”the readiness of personnel before you enter it into battle. How should you accept and implement all this? Or, say, what's the point when the head of communications is sitting and writing a draft of instructions that the chief of staff should give him. They say: "That's the way it is."
Unfortunately, even in some of our statutory documents, the focus is not on recommendations, as a commander, on staff, to work rationally on organizing the battle, but on setting out the structure and approximate content of the relevant documents. Thus, we are preparing not the commander or chief of the branch of service - the organizer of the battle, but at best a staff officer who knows how to stamp documents. Not only during the Great Patriotic War, but also in Afghanistan or Chechnya there was no such thing that a group of generals, officers would go out on the front line and, in front of the enemy, would give orders for hours — that was simply impossible.
With such formal bureaucratic methods of work of the command and headquarters, when the management activities and actions of the troops are separated, the management process is emasculated, deadened, and ultimately the goal is not achieved.
Therefore, modern officers should carefully look at how George Zhukov, Konstantin Rokossovsky, Ivan Chernyakhovsky, Pavel Batov, Nikolay Krylov acted in a combat situation. That is, you should not abandon the experience of the Great Patriotic War, in a number of questions it is necessary to understand it more deeply, and then go further.
For example, one of the strengths of the commander Chernyakhovsky was his efficiency, concreteness and ability to carefully prepare the operation, organize the interaction, all types of operational, logistics, technical support, to achieve mastering and consistency in the execution of tasks by commanders and personnel. After the decision was made, bringing the tasks to subordinates, he focused entirely on this work.
All the activities of the officers were so subordinated to the implementation of the plan of operations, organically merged with the subtlest features of the situation, and the methods of organizing hostilities were so specific and substantive that in all this creative process there was no room for formalism, abstract conversations and empty theorizing. Only what was needed for the upcoming battle and operation was done.
Commanders with front-line experience especially clearly understood that the main conditions that are crucial for a successful defense breakthrough are thorough reconnaissance of the defense system and enemy fire weapons, accurate targeting of artillery and aircraft to the identified targets. From the analysis of combat practice, it is obvious that if these two tasks — reconnaissance and fire destruction — were carried out accurately and reliably, then even with a not very organized attack, successful advance of the troops was achieved. This, of course, does not involve any underestimation of the need for effective action by infantry, tanks, and other combat arms. Without this, it is impossible to make full use of the results of enemy fire engagement. But it is also true that no slender and beautiful attack will overcome the resistance of the enemy, if his fire weapons are not suppressed. This is important in any war, and especially in local conflicts and anti-terrorist operations.
Approach for ages
This is not about imposing the experience of the past war on the army. Everyone understands that the content of military training should be focused on the future achievements of military art. But the approach to solving operational-tactical tasks, the extensive creativity and organization methods that manifested themselves, the thoroughness and laboriousness of working out with the subordinates of all preparatory activities, the ability to train troops exactly what they may be required in a combat situation, and much another, defining the whole spirit of military art, in which there are, if not eternal, then for a very long time living principles and principles.
The experience of any war cannot become outdated completely, if, of course, it is not viewed as an object of copying and blind imitation, but as a clot of military wisdom, where everything positive and negative that has been integrated and the patterns of development arising from it are integrated. In history, more than once after a large or even local conflict, they tried to present the matter in such a way that nothing remained of the former military art. But the next army, generating new ways of warfare, and kept many of the same. At least, there has not yet been such strife, which would have erased all that had been developed in the art of war before.
For use in the future, we need not just an accomplished experience, not something that lies on the surface, but those deep-seated, sometimes hidden, stable processes and phenomena that have tendencies to further development, sometimes manifesting themselves in new, completely different forms than it was before. the war. At the same time, it should be taken into account that each subsequent one keeps less and less elements of the old one and more and more generates new methods and schemes. Therefore, a critical, however, creative approach to the lessons of any war, including the Afghan, Chechen or operations in Syria, where the experience of the Great Patriotic War was used to a certain extent (especially in the substantive preparation of units for each battle with regard to the task ahead), was required Many new combat techniques have been developed.
The art of war begins where, on the one hand, deep theoretical knowledge and their creative application help the commander to better see the general connection of the occurring phenomena and more confidently orient themselves in the setting. And where, on the other hand, the commander, without constraining himself with a general theoretical scheme, seeks to delve deeper into the essence of the real situation, to evaluate its advantageous and disadvantageous features and on this basis to find original solutions and moves that most lead to the solution of a combat task.
Computer is not commander
The maximum degree of conformity of decisions and actions of commanders, commanders and troops to specific conditions of the situation makes itself felt throughout the whole history with such a stable pattern, since this is the main essence of military art, which determines the most significant and stable connections, the ratio of objective and subjective factors , internal driving forces and the main causes of victories and defeats. This is the basic law of military art. His biggest enemies are pattern and schematism. We began to forget this truth after the war. But the understanding of this must be restored.
In the journal “Military Thought” (No. 9, 2017) V. Makhonin, one of the authors, writes that the terms “military art” and “operational art” are scientifically incorrect. Keeping them in circulation, we supposedly demonstrate scientific backwardness. He suggests saying “the theory of warfare”.
The author believes that if it were possible to teach the art of war, then all graduates of the higher educational institutions, where there is a corresponding department, would become outstanding commanders. However, there are only a few of them, in the world - dozens, although millions are trained in military science. But so in any case. Many people also study math and music, but few become Einsteins or Tchaikovsky. So, you need not to abandon the term "military art", and together think about how best to master this most difficult task.
The Great Patriotic and other wars are the richest treasury of combat experience. Turning to it, each time we find valuable bits of the new, which give rise to deep thoughts and lead to conclusions of great theoretical and practical significance.
In the future, when operations and military operations will be distinguished by increased scope, the participation in them of various types of armed forces and combat arms equipped with sophisticated equipment, high dynamism and maneuverability in the absence of solid fronts, remote defeat, in conditions of sudden and rapid changes in the situation, fierce fighting for the seizure and retention of initiative and strong electronic countermeasures, the management of troops and fleet forces will become much more complicated. At high speeds of missiles, aircraft, increased mobility of the troops, especially in the system of strategic nuclear forces, air defense, air force, administrative combat activity will increasingly be directed to the implementation of pre-designed solutions, programming and modeling of the upcoming battles. A high level of planning operations will be the main prerequisite for successful command and control.
As has already been said, automation, computerization of management require the improvement not only of the organizational structure of management, but also the forms and methods of work of the command and staffs. In particular, the latest achievements of science indicate that the system as a whole can be effective only if it develops not only vertically, but also horizontally. This means, in particular, with the observance of the principle of unity of command as a whole, the all-out expansion of the work front, the granting of greater rights to headquarters, heads of branches of armed forces and services. They have to solve many issues independently, coordinating them with the combined arms headquarters and with each other, since with extremely limited time and rapid development of events the commander is no longer able to personally consider and solve all, even the most important issues of preparation and conduct of the operation, as was the case in the past . It takes a lot of initiative and autonomy at all levels. But these qualities need to be developed in peacetime, laying them into general military regulations.
That is why it is so important to foresee changes in the nature of warfare, new requirements and taking into account these objective factors, and not underlying considerations, to determine the organizational structure, rights and tasks of government bodies, decisively getting rid of the negative manifestations of the past and maximally using modern experience gained in Russia, USA, China and the armed forces of other countries. Based on the practice of antiterrorist operations, local conflicts, emerging common threats, it cannot be ruled out that our armies will also have to cooperate and jointly resolve military tasks in the future. In Syria, for example, now it makes itself felt. It means that a certain compatibility of the systems of military control of countries is required. That is why it is very important not to oppose or absolutize control systems, but to improve them taking into account mutual experience and development prospects of the nature of the armed struggle.
Recently, with technological superiority over obviously weak opponents, the brilliance of military art has faded, a disinformation campaign has been launched, claiming that traditional Russian, German, and French military schools are based on the wealth of experience of great wars (Suvorova, Milutina , Dragomirov, Brusilov, Frunze, Tukhachevsky, Svechin, Zhukov, Vasilevsky or Scharnhorst, Moltke, Ludendorff, Foch, Keitel, Rundstedt, Manstein, Guderian), izhil and myself. Now, according to the advocates of virtual and asymmetric wars, all this must be buried. Some media claim that the personal qualities of a commander capable of demonstrating military skills, courage, courage and courage, staffs and computers develop strategies, the equipment provides mobility and onslaught have now faded into the background ... The same US, having done without brilliant commanders, won geopolitical battle in Europe, established a de facto protectorate over the Balkans.
However, without commanders, military specialists, without their mental activity and ability, it will be impossible to get along for a long time. In the headquarters, after all, not only computers and their attendants. But overly enthusiastic people want to quickly part with everything that happened in the past. In this regard, there are calls to focus on the ever-rising American school, as the only possible one in the future. We can really learn a lot from the USA, especially in creating favorable political conditions for waging war, in the field of high technologies. But neglecting the national experience of other armies, fitting all countries to NATO standards over time can lead to degradation of military affairs. Cooperation, including with NATO members, can be beneficial if it goes through the exchange and mutual enrichment of experience, rather than imposing or blindly copying the standards of only one army without regard for national traditions and peculiarities.
Modern wars are now closely intertwined with non-military means and forms of confrontation. They exert their influence on the methods of warfare. This aspect of the matter also needs to be more deeply taken into account and mastered.
In one of his speeches, Russian President Vladimir Putin stressed that we must protect our country from any form of military-political pressure and potential external aggression. In Syria, for example, it turned out that different countries simultaneously participate in military actions, pursuing their own goals. All this is extremely aggravates the political and military situation. In order to remain at the height of our mission, our duty is to be ready to perform these tasks to ensure the defense security of the Fatherland more generally.