Vladimir Karpov was the first to speak about the alleged secret negotiations of the USSR and Germany in February 1942, citing documents in the middle of 90's in the book “Generalissimo”. His version was studied on all sides by historians and military, writers and journalists. But there were no new arguments for and against. Each stayed with his. However, as often happens, история through the years already seen in a different light.
After what the “Generalissimo” just did not write! That one of the governors obliged administration officials to buy a book and study it. That granddaughter Julia Khrushchev sued the writer, who, in her opinion, offended the memory of his father, Leonid Nikitich. That people's deputies sent Karpov’s book to rural libraries and presented them to veterans. The quotation of the CIA founder Allen Dulles, quoted in the book, was disputed about the methods by which the Russian and Soviet people would be duped and disintegrated after the war. And so on. However, with many reviews and variegated feedback from the sensational chapter on negotiations, almost no one noticed. Or did not give her value, taking for artistic speculation.
As if justifying the genre of the book as “mosaics of Stalin’s deeds,” Karpov referred to Vissarion Belinsky, who believed that “true reproduction of facts is impossible with the help of one erudition, but also fantasy is needed”. Maybe the writer put this quotation of literary authority as a shield to justify his speculation in the essentially documentary work?
The "Generalissimo" read the former Minister of Defense Marshal Dmitry Yazov, the head of the GRU, Colonel-General Fedor Ladygin, deputy chief of the Joint Staff of the Warsaw Pact, Lieutenant-General Yevgeny Malashenko, read the manuscript, and everyone responded positively. Presumably, they approved the chapter on secret negotiations with the Germans.
When those 1942 events of the year took place, the former cadet of the Tashkent infantry school, Volodya Karpov, was cutting wood in Tavdinlag. He got there, according to his story, because in private conversation he downplayed Stalin’s historical role. In October 1942, after several letters to “All-Union Elder” Kalinin, Karpov was in the penalty company. In February, the 1943-th conviction was lifted. After many years, the former convict, who became the Hero of the Soviet Union, decided, apparently, to correct the mistake of youth and pay tribute to the leader of the peoples.
According to Karpov, events developed as follows. After the battle for Moscow won by Soviet troops, contrary to the opinion of the General Staff, he insisted on continuing the offensive in all directions. It seemed to him that the activity of the Red Army demoralized the German leadership and Hitler would go to peace talks. The leader ordered the intelligence service to find outlets for the Germans and to present proposals to the Nazi command. The basis for secret negotiations was: back in 1938, the NKVD and the Gestapo concluded a cooperation agreement. Karpov gives the title page of this document in the book.
The meeting of negotiators allegedly took place in the German-occupied Mtsensk 20 – 27 February 1942. In the "Proposals to the German Command" drawn up by Stalin personally there are only four points. But what! From 5 May to 1 August declare a truce. Before 22 December of the same year, the German troops must withdraw to the lines marked on scheme No. 1 (not given), and by the end of 1943, together with the Soviet troops, begin fighting against the British and Americans and lead them to 1944. reorganization of world space. " As an excuse for the new alliance, it was proposed to “accuse international Jewry in the form of England and the USA in fomenting war”. Stalin warned the Germans: if his demands were rejected, their troops would be defeated, and the German state would cease to exist.
But the Nazis did not behave as expected. Their representative SS Gruppenführer Wolf was arrogant when meeting with negotiators and did not even think about defeat. As a result of a weekly debate, a report appeared in the name of Stalin, First Deputy People's Commissar of the Interior of the USSR Merkulov. From the document it appears that the Germans agreed to stop the fighting, but wanted to leave the borders along the existing front line until the end of 1942. At the same time, they offered the government of the USSR "to immediately end Jewry." The German command did not rule out the creation of a united front against Britain and the United States, and also agreed to move its borders in the east in favor of the USSR. As a sign of change in relations, the Germans even expressed their readiness to “change the color of the swastika on the state flag from black to red.” However, in the territorial issue for serious concessions did not go. Latin America should belong to them, the Arab world (including the north of Africa) should become their protectorate, and China should go to Japan. In a word, the parties did not agree on their views, and the negotiations ended in vain.
Failure of Anthony Eden
Most famous historians and experts acknowledge that information has been circulating for a long time, but the search for documentary evidence has come to nothing. Although in recent years many interesting things have been found. In particular, the order signed by Tymoshenko and Zhukov from 18 June 1941. It describes the poor condition of the border airfields and contains the requirement to put them in order by October 1 1941. That is, the leadership was confident that the war could be avoided.
But the most sensational is the draft secret Soviet-British treaty of alliance, which Stalin proposed to sign Anthony Eden when he arrived in Moscow in December 1941 of the year. It contained proposals for the post-war structure of Europe, its division into spheres of influence. Including the requirement to recognize the borders of the Soviet Union as of 22 June 1941. Eden refused to sign such a treaty, citing the need for the consent of the parliament and the approval of the United States as an ally of the anti-Hitler coalition.
In a word, there are still documents that have not been mastered by historians, as well as grounds for doubting a secret meeting in Mtsensk.
Some researchers admit the possibility of such negotiations, but in October 1941, when the Germans crossed the Istra River, and the Soviet government went to Kuibyshev. Although then everything was on the map. A defensive, and later a counteroffensive operation, had already been planned. January 1 The 1942 was legally formed by the anti-Hitler coalition - the Declaration of Twenty-six was signed in Washington, in which the participants pledged not to conduct any negotiations behind the backs of the allies. By February, Soviet troops reached the operational area, could carry out large-scale regrouping. The Soviet Union had strategic reserves in the internal districts, the accumulation of forces was going on, the production of new weapons was already established. Stalin felt confident - the victory near Moscow strengthened the morale of the army. In such circumstances, to conduct separate negotiations with Germany was simply inappropriate.
The moral aspect cannot be excluded. By the time Hitler burned out a large part of Ukraine and Belarus, millions were killed or captured. How could the army that saw it all be convinced that the sworn enemies are now our allies? Yes, and the population was waiting for retribution for their loved ones who were killed and enslaved, for their sacrifices and deprivations.
Doubts were strengthened due to the lack of references to the name of the archive, fund number, sheet. In addition, there are several versions of such negotiations. In particular, in the summer and autumn of 1941. This writes the head of 4-th (sabotage) of the NKVD Pavel Sudoplatov in the book "Intelligence and the Kremlin."
In January, 1942, Stalin insisted on an offensive in three strategic directions on six fronts, although there was clearly little strength. The leader did not share with Zhukov the information that came to him from Europe from the “Red Chapel” (through the Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense), from the residence of the Vichy government, other sources. They reported that the German forces were undermined, and if the Red Army kept pace, the Germans would end by spring. And the offensive continued until April 20.
The main thing is that the blitzkrieg was broken. The United States decided to join the war, in March 1942, the Americans were already considering a plan of invasion of Western Europe. Help went on Lend-Lease, an agreement with England was on the way - it remained to resolve some border issues. If all the pros and cons were summed up, Stalin could hardly have agreed to a truce in order to agree with the Germans on joint actions against the Americans and the British. What could hit the British Isles, the United States? Aviationin which those are much stronger? Hitler in 1940 did not dare to operate the Sea Lion operation to land troops in England.
The passage on the Jewish question is also doubtful. And not because in the USSR it would hold back someone. The document could be a fake, turned to international Jewry: give money for war, or else ... The delegation sent to the USA, led by Mikhoels, collected huge sums of money. "Proposals to the German command" stimulated the Allies to increase assistance, otherwise the USSR would go with the Germans to the world. There was so much disinformation during the war that it was very difficult to separate the wheat from the chaff.
The answer came to my request to the Department for the Support of the Archives of the President of the Russian Federation: “The requested documents ... are not available. The personal fund of I. Stalin has been deposited in the Russian State Archive of Social and Political History. ” Department staff consider the continuation of searches in the specified array of documents to be useless: during the transfer of the Stalin fund, these were not exactly listed. On the military theme in the Presidential Archive there were many very meticulous researchers who would not miss such materials. However, no one mentions them. The archivists have doubts about the number 1 / 2428, under which goes the report of Merkulov to Stalin. Then there was another principle of registration - using letters.
For wax seals
For the first time, referring to the acute topic of negotiations in Mtsensk, he called Vladimir Karpov himself. I was introduced to a writer at a solemn meeting in the building of the Main Intelligence Directorate. I give a telephone conversation 2005 of the year.
- Vladimir Vasilyevich, the documents you brought are amazing. But authoritative historians with whom I spoke, in one voice speak about the absence of references to a specific archive, case number, inventory, list. Hence the doubts, disbelief, accusations of fiction.
- I saw the documents in the former apartment of Stalin in the Kremlin, now it is called the Presidential Archive. These are Stalin's personal notes, they were in a folder and were not numbered. I watched them many years ago. I could not invent it! If you remember, I was a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, so many documents were available to me, including these, although it was very difficult to get to Stalin’s apartment. Indeed, for many, this information was in doubt. Mostly in people who are not strong in strategy.
Soviet troops under Moscow, having spent all the reserves, went on the offensive. The Germans were driven off to 100 – 120 kilometers. Exhausted even those three armies, which formed Stalin. It was then that he made a mistake: he considered that the Germans had rolled and that now they only needed to be driven and beaten. And ordered to go on the offensive from the White to the Black Sea. As a result, the offensive was continued, suffered a lot of losses and exhausted completely. And Stalin realized that if the Germans, who were still in power, would strike now, there would be nothing to defend themselves.
Therefore, I decided to bluff: I started these negotiations in order to draw time and gather strength. Beria instructed to hold this action. Please note - the text of the “Proposals to the German Command” is not on a form, but on a simple sheet of paper. It was intended only for the one who will negotiate. And at the top of the sheet is written: "To be returned." The report of the First Deputy Commissar of the Interior on the results of the meeting with the Germans serves as confirmation of the fact that there were negotiations. What doubts can there be here!
- Maybe there are other supporting documents?
“Many people don’t know about it, but I watched Beria’s 45 volumes. At one of the interrogations, he was asked if there were any negotiations with the Germans in February 1942. Beria replied in the affirmative. He cites two more facts of such negotiations.
- You are writing about two schemes that were attached to the "Suggestions to the German High Command." What are these schemes?
“I don’t remember the schemes.” You understand: when I saw these documents, my eyes went to my forehead.
- In the special archive of the GRU General Staff, to which you are close, did not try to seek confirmation?
- No, I have not tried it. These negotiations were conducted through the NKVD. I cite in the book the title page of the general agreement on cooperation between the NKVD of the USSR and the Main Security Directorate of the National Socialist Workers Party of Germany. They also doubted the authenticity of this document, they poured mud on me, and then found it and showed this paper on TV, sealed with wax seals. I had attachments to this document, some facts of cooperation, but I did not develop it - this is not my topic.
- You bring only the title page of the general agreement between the NKVD and the Gestapo, but the text itself was omitted ...
- I did not have it. But it was shown on television.
- How do you think would turn the course of war and the whole story, if the reconciliation took place?
“I think the war would have continued anyway.” Simply, Stalin would have taken a breather and brought the matter to a victorious end. There would be no fighting against the Allies at the end of 1943.
Scout, now historian Anatoly Maximov, contributed to the investigation of the 1942 negotiations of the year. At one time I was fortunate enough to be the editor of his first book, Operation Tournament. Anatoly Borisovich - retired 1 rank captain, honorary state security officer. He taught more than 30 for years at the Andropov Academy of Foreign Intelligence, and had access to secret materials. The author of several books from the series “Notes of a Laborer Intelligence”. In Canada, for more than ten years he played the role of an agent of the special services of this country.
If negotiations (Maximov called them Stalin’s “Mtsensk initiative”) took place, it was a misinformation action on our part. And to the top of the Third Reich. There was an attempt to make Hitler believe in the readiness of the Kremlin for peace negotiations and the conclusion of a treaty on the type of Brest peace. The operation pursued two goals: in the event Germany accepted the proposal to gain time, in the event of refusal (with the information leak initiated by Stalin), to strengthen the anti-Hitler coalition, which was afraid of the “union of two devils”. After the death of Stalin, Khrushchev presented an attempt to make peace on the terms of Hitler real. But this is certainly not the case.
Moscow knew about the facts of negotiations of its unstable allies with the German side behind the back of the Soviet leadership. Stalin received more than ten reports of political and military intelligence about the attempts of Britain and the United States to build bridges with the Reich.
Few people know that during the war years in London two ambassadors of the Soviet Union worked. Ivan Maisky was accredited with the British crown, Alexander Bogomolov maintained contacts with the emigrant governments of Belgium, Holland, Greece, Norway, Poland, France, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. From him, Stalin became aware, in particular, that already after the Crimea Conference, the Polish government in exile sent instructions to the underground groups to cease active operations against the Germans and intensify the sabotage struggle with the Red Army units.
When resident Vasily Zarubin at the end of 1941 was preparing to leave for the United States, Stalin accepted him and set one of the main tasks to ensure that Churchill and the Americans did not conclude a separate peace with Hitler against the USSR. Indeed, in the 1943, the Anglo-American Plan Rankin to prevent the Red Army from entering Europe appeared. During the war years, the unstable allies of the USSR had at least 160 times contact with the Germans.
Anatoly Maksimov is sure: "Mtsensk initiative" in the tradition of the secret influence of the Russian and Soviet intelligence. In 1923, a special interdepartmental bureau for disinformation was created at the Cheka-GPU - Disinformbureau. One of its main tasks is to prepare false information and produce documents that distort the true state of affairs inside the country, in the Red Army, political and Soviet organizations, the NKVD in the interests of the state ... However, in the archives of intelligence (political and military), despite a wide range of shares of secret influence , in fact, no documents were left describing specific operations. Most often there is no even an indirect mention of intelligence agents and agents who were involved in their development or implementation. Stalin wrote the proposals to the German command in person. There were only two copies.
Dangerous documents were disposed of in time. In this list, the operation Syndicate-4 (to the Monarchical Organization of Central Russia created by the Chekists) was recruited as the organizer of the upcoming coup Mikhail Tukhachevsky and Duck (the removal of Trotsky). The multipurpose Soviet intelligence "Snow" (http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/1940), started back in 34372, aggravated relations between the United States and Japan before the military clash. After that, Tokyo could no longer open the front against the USSR, which would be the fourth in a row. As a result, the 15 Siberian divisions were redeployed near Moscow and played an almost decisive role in the defense of the capital. Some information about the operation "Snow" became known only in the middle of the 90-x. Recall and disinformation operation "Monastery" ("Outplaying Abwehr"). The information brought by Alexander Demyanov (with us - Heine, in Berlin - agent Max) to the Germans, allowed to change the dates for the start of the German offensive on the Kursk Bulge in the interests of the Red Army. The protagonist of this story was almost simultaneously awarded the Soviet Order of the Red Star and the Hitler Cross for bravery. With the help of the operations of secret influence, they managed to keep the pro-German government of Turkey from joining the war on Hitler's side, and to prevent coups in Iran and Afghanistan. The Caribbean crisis in the years of the Cold War in intelligence is also referred to as the “Great Khrushchev Bluff” and the “Great Rocket Disaster”.
Only with the adoption of the Foreign Intelligence Act in Russia in 1996, it was officially recognized that there were intelligence agencies in the USSR at various times in the Central Committee of the Party, the Comintern's International Communication Department, under the Profintern, the Communist Youth International (KIM), the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and foreign trade.
Among the operations of secret influence could be "Mtsensk initiative." Perhaps there will be new evidence of its reality. As one experienced illegal said, “Intelligence is an expectation.”