Support tanks in the realities of 1945 year

Despite the fact that the tank itself is a very formidable war machine, as you know, one in the field is not a warrior. Even tanks in real combat conditions support is needed, infantry usually provided such support to tanks during the Second World War, which is especially true during urban battles. But the infantry could not always keep up with the fast armored vehicles, in this case they could be supported by armored personnel carriers or wheeled chassis vehicles with the appropriate weapons.

It is worth noting that this problem is relevant today. In the conditions of hostilities, BMP can provide support to tanks in the fight against enemy infantry armed with various anti-tank weapons. Also, to support tanks in battle can be used a combination of different types of equipment. For example, the Algerian armored units use a combination of Shilka ZSU and Land Rover off-road vehicles, which are equipped with Russian Kornet-E anti-tank systems, to protect their tanks. At the same time, a specialized vehicle was even created in Russia, called BMPT - a tank support combat vehicle. This tank tracked combat vehicle is able to operate successfully as part of tank formations, striking enemy tank-dangerous weapons in battle. The BMPT-72 "Terminator-2" is able to effectively suppress the enemy's manpower, equipped with anti-tank complexes and grenade launchers, various small weapons, as well as hit and armored targets (tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers).

In the 1945 year, the Red Army fighters could only dream of such armament, but already then they had at their disposal numerous wheeled jeeps and tractors, mainly American-made. Their chassis often became a platform for the installation of weapons, in particular, the Doji was widely distributed on which large-caliber 12,7-mm DShK machine guns were installed. The main purpose of such a machine was anti-aircraft functions, which did not limit the possibility of their use in other combat situations.

DShK on Soviet armored train, 1941 year

Although 12,7-mm DShK machine guns on lend-lease arrays were part of the anti-aircraft units of the Soviet tank units, very often, especially at the final stage of the war in 1945, they were used to protect tanks and self-propelled guns from German rocket launchers. Excellent visibility from the open body, combined with high speed and high power of a large-caliber machine gun, made it possible to effectively combat the enemy’s infantry. And the anti-aircraft gun placement in the back of an army SUV made it possible to fire more effectively on the upper floors of buildings during urban battles. Moving a little distance behind the tanks, they could provide them with cover, securing them from the faunters and grenade throwers. The high density of fire and the destructive power of 12,7-mm bullets could have discouraged anyone from risking their lives by attempting to hit the advancing armored vehicles.

Particularly active German infantry molested the Soviet tankers during urban battles, including in the battle for Berlin. The garrison of the city was well armed with various anti-tank weapons, including numerous faust-cartridges, which were also actively used by parts of the Volkssturm. By taking advanced positions in the basements and in the attics of buildings, the harvesters could create serious problems for the advancing armored vehicles and infantry. For example, in the 2 Guards Tank Army during the Berlin operation - the 22,5% of losses accounted for exactly on the faustpatrony. At the same time, in other parts of the Red Army, this figure was lower and practically did not rise above 10% of the total number of tanks lost in battle.

Objectively, an American army off-road vehicle or a heavy Dodge WC-51 SUV was perfect for placing weapons such as the DShK machine gun. This American car was mass-produced in the USA by the same-name company, starting with the 1941 year. Since 1942, it has been supplied to the USSR as part of the implementation of the Lend-Lease program. The WC series cars (from the English Weapons Carrier - “weapon carrier”) differed in manufacturability, simplicity, and a high degree of unification. In the Red Army, the car got its nickname “Dodge three-quarters” because of its non-standard load capacity by our standards - 750 kg (three quarters of a ton).

Dodge WC-51 with a DShK machine gun mounted in the back

The open double cabin, the glass of which was folded forward, provided a good view. On the left side of the cab on the swivel bracket mounted spare tire. The body of the car WC-51 was all-metal, on the sides above the wheels there were boxes that could be used to transport ammunition. On the body there were three arcs for installing an awning. At the same time, on the Soviet versions, the set of arcs could be incomplete, only the cabin of an SUV was covered with an awning. The body of the Dodge Three Quarter was originally intended for the placement of a large-caliber machine gun or a small gun. In the USA, they were even able to create an M6 ACS with its 37-mm anti-tank gun on the stand installation on its chassis, these limited machines had time to participate in the battles in North Africa.


Initially, American Dodge WC-51 cars were used in the Red Army as artillery tractors for divisional and anti-tank guns, but then they were used for a variety of military purposes. They were widely used in reconnaissance units, were engaged in escorting columns on the march, and were used as personal officer vehicles. Also in their backs were installed radio stations and machine guns. During the war years, the Soviet Union received almost 25 of thousands of similar vehicles with a wheel formula 4х4, as well as about 300 three-axle cars Dodge WC-63.

The legendary machine gun DShK stands for a large-caliber machine gun Degtyarev-Shpagin. This is an advanced machine gun, created on the basis of a DK machine gun chambered for 12,7х108 mm, it was adopted by the Red Army 26 February 1939 of the year. By the beginning of the war, the Kovrov Mechanical Plant had produced more than two thousand of these machine guns, and the 9 thousand machine guns of this type were fired until the end of the Great Patriotic War in the USSR. DShKs were actively used throughout the war as anti-aircraft and heavy machine guns.

Calculation 12,7-mm heavy machine gun DShK on Dodge WC-52 ready to open fire on enemy aircraft

The large-caliber 12,7-mm machine gun DShK was designed to hit enemy planes flying at speeds up to 550-625 km / h at a distance of up to 2000-2400 meters and at an altitude of up to 2500 meters. At the same time, the machine gun proved to be excellent, and as an effective means of supporting infantry, it could be used to combat the enemy’s light armored vehicles, as well as to destroy their manpower at a distance of up to 3500 meters, including those located in various shelters. It was often installed in the bodies of Soviet trucks - ZIS-5V or GAZ-MM (the legendary lorry), as well as in the body of a cross-country vehicle Dodge WC-51.

Later in his memoir “Years in Armor”, Colonel General of Tank Forces Dragunsky David Abramovich described the option of using Dodge WC-51 vehicles with an 12,7-mm machine gun DShK as a means of supporting tanks. Here is what he wrote: “8 Dodge moved behind my tank, on which, with the barrels lifted upwards, large-caliber anti-aircraft guns were mounted. The anti-aircraft gunners held tightly to the arms of the weapon entrusted to them, they were ready at any minute to open fire on the enemy’s “foustists”, as well as on any other enemy firing points found. I have always tried to keep this company, which repeatedly rescued us in trouble. And now, during a throw over the dead valley to the gloomy forest, Doji, with heavy machine guns mounted on them, was surrounded by a commander tank with a landing force on armor. Tankers turned the towers of their cars in the direction of the houses and smashed the upper floors with high-explosive fragmentation shells, while the ubiquitous anti-aircraft gunners sent fire trails of 12,7-mm bullets to the attics and windows. ”

A convoy of T-34-85 tanks, including a car with a DShK machine gun in the back

After the war, this practice was safely forgotten. Most likely, the "inappropriate" use of technology was not encouraged. In any case, such a bundle was not considered at all as a ground vehicle, but more advanced and effective solutions, including new small-caliber artillery, appeared as anti-aircraft weapons. And there were simply no analogues of the Dodge Three-Quarter car in the USSR, and the resource of the cars remaining after the war was limited.

Information sources:
http://strangernn.livejournal.com/1430062.html
https://www.drive2.ru/l/466744886087909487
https://militaryarms.ru/oruzhie/pulemety/dshk
Open source materials

Comments

[Sergey-8848]

Different wars - different opponents - different tasks. The material is interesting, no doubt, especially the recollections of war veterans and photos, but the conclusions are as if pulled over by the ears. It would be possible to do without them, confining himself to a good front-line reporting, so that the readers themselves would reach tactical or technical solutions.

[Alekseev]

Quote: Sergey-8848

conclusions as if tightened by the ears.

Yes, a DShK on a pickup truck is better than a DP in hand, but such a fire support tool for tanks is itself very vulnerable, especially during an offensive battle in the city, and not, for example, use in ambush.
And after the war, nothing was forgotten, and the KPVT on an APC or BRDM, not to mention the 30 mm 2A42 on an infantry fighting vehicle, is much more effective than a DShK on a Dodge or ZiS.
Another thing is that sometimes untrained troops were led by incapable and sometimes criminally negligent commanders (commanders) ...

[Curious]

The author is trying to present improvisation as a revolutionary tactical device, undeservedly forgotten.
However, to combat the massive use of anti-tank weapons, other types of weapons were widely used, everything that was at hand.
The specificity of urban battles forced to put divisional and attached artillery for direct fire. Paradoxical as it may sound, direct-fire guns were sometimes more effective than tanks. The report of the 44th Guards Cannon Artillery Brigade on the Berlin operation stated: “The use of Panzerfausts by the enemy led to a sharp increase in losses in tanks - limited visibility makes them easily vulnerable. "Direct fire guns do not suffer from this drawback, their losses, compared with tanks, are small." This was not an unfounded statement: the brigade lost only two guns in street battles, one of them the enemy hit with a Faustpatron.
For direct fire, artillery systems were installed up to 203 mm B-4.
In the end, even Katyusha began to put on direct fire. The frames of the M-31 large-caliber rockets were installed in the houses on the windowsills and shot at the buildings opposite. The optimal distance was 100-150 m. The shell managed to accelerate, broke through the wall and exploded inside the building. This led to the collapse of partitions and ceilings and, as a consequence, the death of the garrison.

[da Vinci]

“In the end, even Katyushas began to put direct fire. The frames of M-31 large-caliber rockets were installed in the houses on the windowsills and shot at the buildings opposite. The distance of 100-150 m was considered optimal." ... I do not think that the enemy 150 m will allow you to install a frame for Katyusha!

[Curious]

Your doubts say only that you poorly represent the specifics of the battle in a dense urban area.
"The actions of artillery units in World War II. Sat. 13. Artillery units and units in battles for large settlements. - M.: Military Publishing, 1958."
Page 60. Chapter "The use of rocket artillery in street battles."
Figure from this chapter.

Further quote.
“In the battles for Berlin, rocket artillery units used the rich experience they gained in the battles for the city of Poznan, which consisted in direct-fire firing of single-shells M-31, M-20 and even M-13.
At first glance, such a method of firing may seem primitive; but nonetheless, his results were very significant. Single missile firing during battles in such a huge settlement as Berlin found its widest application.
To conduct such fire in the mortar guards, assault groups were created. The composition of the group was approximately as follows: an officer — the group’s commander, an electrical engineer, 25 sergeants and soldiers for the M-31 assault group and 8–10 — for the M-13 assault group.
To ensure the actions of the infantry, each rifle battalion (regiment) was assigned one assault group of rocket artillery, which performed the tasks set by the commander of the combined-arms assault group.
Typically, assault rocket artillery groups destroyed and burned stone houses and structures, which housed fire weapons and manpower of the enemy, made passages for infantry in stone houses and walls.
The actions of assault groups of rocket artillery, as a rule, boiled down to the following. Having received the task of destroying the object, the group commander chose a firing position as close to the target as possible (most often in a house located against the target); the shells were located on the windowsills, in the openings of windows, balcony doors, etc. The firing range ranged from 50-200 m; in some cases, fire was fired at a range of about 400 m "

[Sharikov Polygraph Poligrafovich]

You confused Katyusha (BM-13)
with Andryusha (BM-31) !!!
The much more powerful RS M-31 did NOT require a long rail to accelerate at all and could start from any
improvised disposable rail
from roughly knocked together boards.
Here is a direct instruction on the use of the times of the Great Patriotic War:

[andrewkor]

For daVinci. Your fellow countryman, mentioning "... even Katyusha" began to put on direct fire, had in mind the use of M-31 shells directly from a single closure, which at the same time was the frame for its launch. There is nothing complicated in this, several fighters 100 kg. bandura, in a fever. battle, at least where to drag!

[Lopatov]

It depends on which frame 8)))
There was a mountain installation, there were various kinds of home-made products, including those based on captured machine guns

[mat-vey]

Yes, my grandfather until finally attributed to B-4 on the "Eatusha" taxied (not for long) said that he could build a guide on the forge in a few hours without problems ...

[alstr]

You can recall the film "Zhenya, Zhenechka, Katyusha." There, they really charged Katyusha in direct visibility.

[ICT]

Quote: Curious

However, other types of weapons were widely used to combat the massive use of anti-tank weapons.

[Dedall]

Everything is new - well-forgotten old! I remember how during the service I looked at the column of tanks and was amazed at how blind and deaf it was. This is me in terms of the fact that nothing was visible in the dust inside the tanks. And first of all, because of this, the tank was dangerous for a simple wheeled vehicle - it will trample and not notice. And secondly, this threatens the tank with the fact that from it you can’t see or hear a flying helicopter or airplane. Therefore, it seems to me that Iraq has lost more than 2 thousand tanks from air strikes. As for the "dodge", the article correctly says that it was used only during street battles.

[bnm.99]

Article +, and in general, first learned about this. our use of such gantraks in 1941-1945. True, I read (with Baryatinsky and others) that in Berlin anti-infantry ZSU M17 was used like that, but it’s still armored vehicles of industrial production and even mass production

[Conductor]

Heh, in training, in 1992, our art team from D 20 shot direct fire at blanks, a reflection of a tank attack, a spectacle even when the blank ricochets off the ground. But I wouldn’t see what they would shoot really cumulatively.

[svp67]

For example, in the 2nd Guards Tank Army during the Berlin operation - Faustpatrons accounted for 22,5% of the losses. At the same time, in other parts of the Red Army this figure was lower and practically did not rise above 10% of the total number of tanks lost in battle.

There is a lot in Russia writing about the Great Patriotic War, relying on ARCHIVE DOCUMENTS. Here is how he describes these losses in comparing the 1st and 2nd guard tank units, precisely these days ...

“Actually, the battles for Berlin accounted for a smaller part of the losses of M.E. Katukov’s army. During the street battles in Berlin, the 1st Guards Tank Army irretrievably lost 104 armored units, which accounted for 45% of the total number of lost tanks and self-propelled guns and only 15% to the number of tanks in service by the beginning of the operation.
What could be said about the means that knocked out Soviet tanks on the streets of Berlin and on the Zeelovsky heights? Damaged tanks were selectively inspected. The collection of statistics was an obligatory procedure: reports on combat damage were sent to the Main Armored Directorate of the Red Army. Subsequently, such statistics were used to develop technical requirements for new equipment. For 75 irretrievably lost tanks and self-propelled guns 1st Guards. tank army damage was distributed as follows. Of the 65 T-34 tanks examined, 58 vehicles received fatal damage from artillery fire, 2 vehicles from air strikes, and a total of 5 tanks were hit by “Faustpatrons” {221}. All 7 IS-2 heavy tanks inspected were hit by artillery. Of the three ISU-443 inspected [122], two self-propelled guns were shot down by artillery, and one by the Faustpatron. A total of 75 tanks inspected had 113 hits, with 60 (53%) being on board the hull, 16 (14,6%) in the forehead of the hull, 6 (5,3%) in the stern, 27 (23,9%) in the turret and 4 (3,54%) in the chassis.
The authors of the report note with annoyance: “Thus, the most affected area of ​​tanks, especially T-34s, is the side armor, and the gas tanks, more precisely,“ fuel tanks ”. - AI>, located on the sides, are sources of fire and irrecoverable death of tanks "{222}. So the pre-war design solution with the installation of a diesel engine with "fire-safe" tanks in the fighting compartment of the T-34 tank reverberated around the tank. [444]
In addition, for the entire period of hostilities, 199 armored units received combat damage that did not lead to the death of the tank. Here 103 vehicles were inspected, having received 199 hits, and most of the hits that did not lead to the destruction of the tank or self-propelled guns fell on the frontal part. Among the damaged vehicles inspected, only 17,4% had hits in the side armor.
Thus, according to dispassionate statistics, from the Faustpatrons in the 1st Guards. tank army lost only 8% of the tanks. If we take this percentage of losses from the famous Faustpatrons as a basis, then it turns out that in Berlin, only 8 or, in the worst case, 10 vehicles were lost from the fire of the “Faustpatrons”. I even agree to an overvaluation of 15 tanks and self-propelled guns. On a tank army scale with hundreds of tanks and self-propelled guns, these are pennies. In addition, not all of these tanks were burned directly during the offensive. In the general conclusions of the report, we can find these words: “Acting along one street up to 50 meters wide, brigades could use no more than 2-3 tanks, 3-4 self-propelled guns and up to 6 guns at a time. The rest of the equipment, its own and attached, could not be used, cluttered the streets and suffered losses from the artillery and “Fausters” of the enemy, remaining after the passage of advanced groups ”{223}. That is, the tanks of the army of M. Ye. Katukov, located in the near rear, motionless on the street without sufficient security and, possibly, even without crews, became victims of the “Faustians”.
Extensive statistical material was also found in the "Report on the hostilities of the 2nd Guards. tank army in the 1st Belorussian Front to defeat the Berlin [445] enemy group and capture the city of Berlin. " During the operation, the army of S.I. Bogdanov irretrievably lost 209 combat vehicles. By types they were distributed as follows: 123 T-34, 53 M4A2 Sherman, 7 IS-2, 7 SU-122, 7 SU-100, 1 SU-85, 6 SU-76 {224}. During street battles in Berlin from April 22 to May 2, 1945, the 2nd Guards. the tank army irretrievably lost 52 T-34, 31 M4A2 Sherman, 4 IS-2, 4 ISU-122, 5 SU-100, 2 SU-85, 6 SU-76 {225}. Before the operation in the army, there were 305 T-34, 176 M4A2 Sherman, 32 IS-2, 41 ISU-122, 46 SU-100, 11 SU-85, 53 SU-76, a total of 667 units. Thus, the total irretrievable losses amounted to 31% of the number of tanks at the beginning of the operation, much lower than in the 1st Guards. tank army. Losses on the streets of the city amounted to 16% of the number at the beginning of the operation, that is, comparable to the army of M.E. Katukov. They received combat damage, but 92 vehicles could be repaired and put into operation. A total of 576 tanks were disabled, of which 259 units were damaged by artillery fire, 25 from mines, 29 from aircraft operations, 106 from faustpatrons, 22 stuck on the road, burned out (apparently, cars were included in this category of losses, whose damage did not allow us to unambiguously determine the cause of death) - 135. I note that in the “disabled” category there is a double score due to damaged vehicles, but again put into operation combat vehicles. Of the total number of disabled 289 T-34 tanks, 108 vehicles were lost from artillery fire, and 65 vehicles from faustpatrons.
If we assume that losses on the streets of Berlin amounted to 20% (both irretrievable and recovered) losses, then the assault on the city itself cost the army [446] S. I. Bogdanov 10 T-34, 6 “Sherman” and 1 IS-2, lost from the fire of the “Fausters”. Two dozen tanks - is it a reason for discussion, to introduce a tank army to the streets of Berlin or not to introduce? In the conditions when Volkssturmists remained in the city and the remnants of the formations defeated at the Zeelovsky heights, the introduction of tank formations into the city and the loss of two dozen tanks from hand-held anti-tank weapons are perfectly acceptable.
However, as we see, the losses of the 2nd Guards. tank army from the "Faustniki" were higher than in the 1st Guards. tank army. According to statistics, at least 20% of tanks were lost from German hand-held anti-tank weapons. This is primarily due to the fact that the army of S. I. Bogdanov acted in Berlin independently, [447] not being distributed as a means of direct infantry support between the rifle corps of the combined arms army. Even mesh screens installed 600 mm from the armor of tanks did not save. As recorded in the report, the diameter of the hole from the Faustpatron was halved, but the penetration of the armor still took place.
Despite this, the commander of the 2nd Guards Tank Army, S. I. Bogdanov, at a conference on the experience of the Berlin operation, pointed to the overestimation of the capabilities of German anti-tank weapons: “On the Faustpatron. I can not agree that the Faustpatron was an obstacle for the tank troops. I believe this is a reassessment of the Faustpatron in the Berlin operation. Why? Faustpatron was in the hands of an untrained, morally, physically, and military-unprepared soldier of the Volkssturm German army, and therefore he was not such a formidable weapon for our Soviet unsurpassed T-34 tank. During the offensive, I spoke very seriously with my corps commanders, brigade commanders, and personnel and found out that the Faustpatron was a bogey, which sometimes groups or individual tanks were afraid of, but I repeat that in the Berlin operation the Faustpatron was not such a terrible weapon, as some ""

[Alexey RA]

With the "Fausts" there is another subtle point - as wrote uv. D. Shein, who dug archival docks when writing his work on the military path of the 3rd Guards. TA, tanks hit by all types of cumulative ammunition were recorded in the column of losses from the “Faustpatrons”.
That is, regardless of the type of "kuma", its defeat of the tank was recorded at the expense of the "Faust".
Any self-propelled gun - “Ferdinand”, any “square” tank - “Tiger”, any “godfather” - “Faust”.

[Izotovp]

Since the days of the Second World War nothing new in tactical situations and methods for solving them has appeared except for the helicopter factor and technical equipment. Although the latter is already not related to tactics, but to the quality of the implementation of tactical tasks.

[Dr. Hub]

And during the storming of Grozny they did not remember about this experience

[Izotovp]

Unfortunately, almost everyone shouted that it never happened, that it was impossible to storm the city with attached tanks, and so on ... There was at least one commander (unfortunately I don’t remember his name, for which I apologize personally to him and his esteemed colleagues) , who remembered that in the combat regulations and instructions all this is there and he taught his soldiers to fight correctly. Moreover, it caused a flurry of indignation among our and the Chechen leadership that it did not follow the approved route, which for some reason the militants knew about)).
And before that, the Soviet army in Afghanistan discovered America by acting in the mountains and combating gangs and working with civilians, having completely forgotten that not only invaluable experience was gained in the Second World War, but even earlier, when the Bosmachis were driven across Central Asia.

[CTABEP]

Lev Rokhlin, probably?

[Monarchist]

It is often necessary to look into the charter and HEAD THINK, or some forget the charter, and some think that all cases are written there

[Aviator_]

In Afghanistan, the experience of using SABs during night bombing was completely forgotten. (In the Patriotic War in 2 they only bombed at night, the anti-aircraft gunners first tried to shoot down the SAB in order to see at least something in the sky). Only in Chechen about this application of SABs with great pride writes A. Koshkin "Attack aircraft, 20 years on the Su-25, 820 sorties"

[mat-vey]

I don’t know, I don’t know. My friend told me that the first thing the stormtroopers in the chandelier park were hanging ...

[Aviator_]

In Afghanistan? Koshkin does not mention this, perhaps from the fact that he did not personally use them in Afghanistan, and he draws such a conclusion. In theory, such a method should be in the guidance documents, but it is not there.

[mat-vey]

I don’t know about Koshkin, but I know this “guy” from action ... He mainly paid the debt in the Panshir valley - wounds, shell shock ... medal for courage ... Officer ..

[Andryukha G]

In this (that the experience of real battles was forgotten) there is absolutely nothing surprising, a change of generations is the reason who will read the old (40-50-60s) reports, orders and instructions, instructions?, Everything is safely forgotten and surrendered (not from of malicious intent) to oblivion, but where is the work of the same General Staff, which should and must all this (figuratively speaking) baggage systematize and give recommendations and put them into practice in combat training.

[Alexey RA]

EMNIP, SW. M. Svirin wrote that archival documents on the use of BTT in cities in the Second World War began to be taken only in 1995.

[Nehist]

In addition to infantry, more than one BMPT will not be able to effectively cover tanks from RPGs and ATGMs as it itself will become a target for ATGMs and RPGs. City battles for BTT are something ... Unjustified losses as confirmed by numerous so-called local wars and anti-terrorist operations.

[dDYHA]

The article is interesting. In the last photo, a lorry and not a dodge.

[100ik]

It doesn’t say that it is a “Dodge”

[Servisinzhener]

A jeep with a heavy machine gun is still relevant after 70 years. Even machine guns are sometimes the same DShK. Although the concept is still older. I recall carts from the Civil War. I remember how in the beginning of 90 only the lazy did not pour mud on them, ridiculing the "stupidity" of such weapons.

[Lopatov]

Quote: Servisinzhener

I remember how in the beginning of 90 only the lazy did not pour mud on them, ridiculing the "stupidity" of such weapons.

Rather, they indicated that the real cart and the literary-cinema-virtual are two completely different things.
The main task of the tachanka was to transport the machine gun, its ammunition and water supply. That is, it actually performed the role of the front end of an artillery gun. And not the child prodigy that was virtually created in Soviet films about the Civil.

[Some kind of compote]

A bullet from a DShK pierces a brick wall of 2 bricks thick
The beautiful thing from the Faustors
Good article

[Slipper 2]

Set of standard phrases for "heap"

[Monarchist]

My cousin said that in 1942 they used the DShK as an anti-tank weapon in the defense of Sevastopol

[Monarchist]

Quote: Nehist

In addition to infantry, more than one BMPT will not be able to effectively cover tanks from RPGs and ATGMs as it itself will become a target for ATGMs and RPGs. City battles for BTT are something ... Unjustified losses as confirmed by numerous so-called local wars and anti-terrorist operations.

But what can cover the tank with RPGs or tanks not to use at all?

[voyaka uh]

"The column of tanks T-34-85 which includes a vehicle with
in the back with a machine gun DShK "///

The Americans made it much easier. Mounted large-caliber browning 0.5
right on the back of the Sherman Tower. The tank infantry soldier stood behind
tower and fired on the sides, hiding behind the tower. Ribbon Boxes
mounted on the sides of the tank.
Photo: