So, was the Bosphorus expedition a chance? Part of 1. Unrealized Opportunities - 1915 Year

21. 12. 1914, even before the start of the Dardanelles strategic operation of the Entente, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire, S. D. Sazonov, addressed the head of the General Staff from Infantry, N. N. Yanushkevich, with a request about planned military operations with a view to seizing the area of ​​the Turkish Straits.

1. S.D. Sazonov

2. N. N. Yanushkevich

The diplomat was told that the question of a military operation in the Straits would be raised: a) only after a decisive success in the confrontation with Germany and Austria-Hungary and b) if after achieving such success it is not possible to seize the Straits and Constantinople by diplomatic means.

20. 01. X. NUMX Mr. W. Churchill informed Russia about the imminent start of the Dardanelles operation, expressing the hope that she would actively assist her by undertaking a naval operation near the Bosporus and preparing troops for the use of the success achieved.

After the start of the Dardanelles operation, a meeting was held at Headquarters - on what should be done if the Black Sea Fleet and the Anglo-French squadron, breaking through the Straits, approach the Turkish capital. At the meeting, it was noted that after the Goeben temporarily failed (having blown up the Bosphorus on Russian mines), the chances of the Black Sea fleet were high, but the situation was different in the question of the landing operation - there were supposedly no “free troops”.

The stake was skeptical about the landing operation - but since the Emperor was a supporter of the Bosphorus operation, preparations began for it. 24 February The headquarters notified the Foreign Ministry that in the event of a successful Allied breakthrough through the Straits, one Caucasian army corps from the Caucasian Front would be seated on transports and moved to the Bosphorus.

S.D. Sazonov took the news of the formation of the landing corps to capture the Bosporus with satisfaction, but considered that these forces were not enough. Moreover, the Allies have allocated a powerful army for their landing operations.

28 February S.D. Sazonov addressed the headquarters with a request for the possibility of sending additional troops to the Bosphorus. Not hoping for a positive response from the Supreme Commander, he simultaneously addressed a note to the emperor. But the bid response was negative.

The final issue of the start of the Bosphorus operation was resolved on March 1. NN Yanushkevich confirmed (the Allies were also notified) that in case of a breakthrough of the Anglo-French in the Straits, a corps from the Caucasian army would be pushed to the Bosphorus - its loading on the transports will take place in Batum.

Captain 2 Rank Aprelev, an officer in the Naval Control Bureau, posted an entry on February 18 in his diary indicating that an 36000 man (3-I Caucasian Rifle Division, 1-I and 2-I Plastun Brigades) had been assigned to the landing party [Excerpts from the diary cap. 2 rank Apreleva / / Foreign marine collection. Pilsen. 1930. No. 11. C. 9-10].

March 8 a request was received from the allies - when it is possible to conduct a joint attack of the Bosphorus, subject to the entry of the Allied fleet into the Sea of ​​Marmara, as well as when it is possible to count on the Russian corps [Lukin V. K. Notes on the combat activities of the Black Sea Fleet during the period 1914 - 1918. SPb., 2008. C. 133].

After the agreement on the Straits was developed (the British, and then the French, in March-April 1915 agreed to the passage of the Straits and Constantinople to Russia) S. D. Sazonov urged the Allied ambassadors to take a radical decision on this issue. With him was in solidarity and the Emperor. The head of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, together with the Allied ambassadors, prepared a memorandum (memorandum) submitted to the governments of England and France. It contained requirements for the inclusion of the West Bank of the Bosphorus, Constantinople, Southern Thrace, the Sea of ​​Marmara and the Dardanelles into Russia. The document was supported by the allies, and the British ambassador of March 13 even asked to inform "the emperor personally" about England’s agreement with the demands of Russia.

And the pace of preparation of the landing operation has increased. The headquarters informed the allies that an amphibious corps was being formed in Batum and Odessa - and as soon as the Anglo-French fleet, breaking through the Dardanelles, enters the Sea of ​​Marmara, it will advance to the shores of the Bosporus. The composition of the expeditionary corps was very interested in the allies - and the Russian Foreign Ministry reported to 31 in March at the request of G. Kitchener that it was a full-blooded corps under the command of Lieutenant General N. M. Istomin.


3. N. M. Istomin - Commander of the 5 Caucasian Army Corps

G. Kitchener, making up the combat schedule of the Entente forces storming the Straits, determined the English contingent in 63100 man and 133 guns, the French contingent in 18000 man and 40 guns and the Russian contingent in 47600 man and 120 guns. Total - 128700 people and 298 guns, with more than half of the group consisted in Russia and France.

As a result of the Sarykamysh victory, it became possible to allocate the necessary forces for the planned operation. In March-April, 1915 carried out a concentration of forces and equipment on the orders of the General Headquarters - initially the 5 Caucasian (reserve command of the Caucasian army) and the 2 army corps were assigned to the landing operation, which began to concentrate in the Black Sea ports - first of all in Odessa. The operation was handed over to the commander of the 7 th (separate) army, General of Artillery VN Nikitin [RGVIA. F. 2003. Op. 1. D. 501 (1)].


4. V.N. Nikitin

Archival documents indicated that the project of the Bosphorus combined (i.e., land-sea) operation could have been a success. [RGVIA. F. 2003. Op. 1. D. 502 (3)] if the following conditions exist: the landing of troops simultaneously in several ports (no more than 1 divisions and 1 artillery brigades in each), the landing points of the respective railway infrastructure, each group of transports focuses on its landing point [L. 142]. The success of the operation depended on the thoroughness of the preparation [L. 143].

The purpose of the operation is to acquire the shores of the Bosphorus, the Thracian coast to Chataldzhi, the Vytifinsky coast from the Bosphorus to Sakaria [L.128].

Amphibious troops during the transfer should have food and fodder for 7-day (in addition to stocks in the train), the necessary supply of fresh water (to be delivered by sailors). After the landing, the 5 troops of the Caucasian Army Corps were to be based on Odessa.

On April 5, in a telegram to the governor of the Caucasus, it was noted that for the convenience of landing - landing the 5-th Caucasian Army Corps, concentrated in the Batumi region, was decided to transfer part to Odessa and part to Sevastopol. The corps headquarters, both Plastun brigades, artillery and corps institutions were to go to Sevastopol, and the 3-I Caucasian Rifle Division - to Odessa [Lukin V. K. Decree. cit. C. 134].

5. The emperor among the plasters. Chronicle of War

But the Allies' reckoning for quick success in the Dardanelles was not justified - the April landing operation of the Anglo-French stalled. Accordingly, the concentration of the Russian landing corps to the designated ports began to be postponed.

During the preparation of the operation in March 1915, the question arose of creating the so-called intermediate base of the Black Sea Fleet - closer to the Bosphorus. The commander of the fleet in a secret report sent to the Headquarters, raised the question of the Bulgarian city of Burgas. Justifying his position, he noted that such an intermediate port is necessary for a successful landing of troops under the Bosphorus, since: 1) the transfer is carried out over a considerable distance; 2) changing weather conditions will cause ships and ships to leave for Sevastopol or to stay at sea and wait for the weather to change (and this is exhausting the landing corps); 3) a significant number of transports (more than 70 steamers) and ships of the convoy will attract enemy destroyers at sea (and it will be difficult to fight them at night). In order not to make the success of the operation dependent on the weather, the actions of the destroyers and other circumstances, it is necessary to take the port of Burgas, which is only 110 miles from the entrance to the Bosphorus (Sevastopol was located 300 miles).

This facilitated the fuel supply of the grouping (when basing on Sevastopol, both risks and time and resources were increased). The implementation of the close blockade of the Bosphorus was also facilitated (it was possible to use less autonomous submarines, destroyers and airplanes). When basing on Burgas, it was possible to transfer minesweepers from Sevastopol to it, because they could only be used if there was a close base. The minesweepers solved a very important task - after all, the enemy’s coastal batteries could only be destroyed by a fleet that can freely maneuver without fear of mines.

Finally, old battleships, canludos, small vessels can be relocated to Burgas. The principle of continuity of operation is implemented. The admiral referred to the experience of the British, who had looked into the intermediate base during the Dardanelles operation, the island of Lemnos. After the occupation of Burgas, stated A. A. Ebergard, the Bourgas Bay would be equipped with a safe anchorage and a point of supply for the forces of the fleet and the landing corps protected from the sea. A floating base (workshop, hospital, coal, oil and water transports), a rescue vessel, scuba diving bases and sweeping forces are equipped, air transport ready, mines stock sufficient to mine the approaches to the base [Ibid. C. 115-123].


6. A. A. Ebergard

But the conflict with the still neutral Bulgaria was undesirable - and the sailors were advised to take Zunguldak, Eregli or Inadu as an intermediate base. 19 March N.N. Yanushkevich informed the Black Sea Fleet command that the difficulty of forcing the Bosporus and carrying out an amphibious operation while basing on Sevastopol is obvious, and the Emperor ordered to find out urgently how Bulgaria and the Allies would react to the landing in Burgas (without using armed force, of course).

Without resolving the issue of Burgas, the landing operation was difficult to carry out. And soon the situation on the Austro-German front forced 11 on May to decide on a different use of the airborne corps - in the development situation of the enemy's Gorlitsky strategic operation, it was decided to use it on the South-Western front. VN Nikitin, instead of the 5-th Caucasian Army Corps, transferred 2-I, 12-I and 38-I militia brigades.

When the information on the transfer of the expeditionary corps to the Austro-German front reached S. Xazon 13 in May, he pointed out to N. N. Yanushkevich the extreme undesirability of inappropriate use of the corps - after all, Tsargrad, the most valuable acquisition that Russia could give war, will be won exclusively by the efforts of our allies. From the Headquarters they replied that the operational-strategic situation in Galicia does not allow the future Bosphorus landing force to be “marinated” in Odessa and Sevastopol — it is required on the “most important” (as Stavka considered) the Austro-German front.

But the Foreign Ministry was reassured by the announcement of the Headquarters that, although the corps planned for the operation was indeed sent to Galicia, it was replaced by another unit located in Odessa. When S.D. Sazonov decided to inquire about the composition of the latter - he 15 learned in May that it consists of 3-x militia brigades, 3-x naval battalions (including the Guards crew battalion; the tasks of the Bosporus fortifications, Constantinople port and embankments, as well as mobile means), the Cossack regiment (and "one Caucasian division") - just up to 40000 people.

T. o. The Caucasian Army Corps was replaced by an uncombined heterogeneous group of troops with a numerical predominance of the militia units, whose combat value was low.

The corresponding attitude of the High Command of the acting army had negative consequences for one of the most promising operations of the world war. Of course, the unfavorable operational and strategic situation in the spring - summer of 1915 seems to justify the use of airborne troops for other purposes. But what during this period of war could make the corps on the Austro-German front? In the best case, temporarily suspend the development of the Austro-German breakthrough. The overall strategic environment was too unfavorable. On the Bosphorus, the corps could solve an important strategic task.

As soon as it became clear that the situation "did not allow" to allocate serious forces for the landing operation, it was decided to limit the bombardment of the Bosporus fortifications by the forces of the fleet and the demonstrative preparation of the landing forces in Odessa. And even it went to the benefit of the allies. Mr. Lorey in his work “Operations of the German-Turkish naval forces in 1914 - 1918”, pointed out that the German-Turkish command, having information from its agents about the concentration of transports in Odessa and about the preparation of the deployment of troops, concentrated in the Bosphorus region 4's corps - and did not allow military transfer from the area to the Dardanelles.

To be continued

Comments

[svp67]

The chance was unambiguous, but it remained unused

[XII legion]

It is interesting to read about a detailed analysis of the preparation of the operation.
Yes, with the involvement of archival sources
Thank you

[parusnik]

Interesting topic, thanks .. We look forward to continuing

[Barcid]

The eternal theme is Russia and the Black Sea straits. Thanks for the detailed analysis.

[verner1967]

Quote: Barcid

Eternal theme - Russia and the Black Sea straits

Moreover, it’s a pity to realize that they could solve this problem, but did not do it, moreover, twice during the war

[antivirus]

I RECEIVED MANY TIMES FROM DIFFERENT PARTIES ON THE CONSEQUENCE "THERE WAS NOT DID ANYTHING ON THE RESULTS OF PMV, WOULD DECEIVE
and the Dardanelles wouldn’t give back, “sit in Istanbul, there’s a lot for you”
POWER IS NOT NEEDED SO MUCH AGAINST ENEMIES, HOW MUCH AGAINST ALLIES UNDER THE CASE OF TROPHIES

[Some kind of compote]

It’s a pity that the project didn’t go any further
And Burgas is a beautiful city and port

[pytar]

Burgas is a wonderful city and a very comfortable haven. But the success of the operation to the allies would be guaranteed if they had listened to the fair demands of Bulgaria! Return to her Macedonia, occupied in the Second Balkan War of Serbia! Low price, for such an important deal! The Bulgarian army in 1915 without doubt could have taken Konstatinopol from the Straits alone! In 1912, the Bulgarians, having no numerical superiority, swept the Ottoman armies from Thrace and reached 46 km from the Bosphorus. The next year, right after leaving in the winter, they were preparing to storm the last remaining Chataldzha fortress that remained in front of Constantinople! The outbreak of war between the allies, prevented the implementation of the plan. In 1915, the Bulgarian army was even stronger than in 1912. If in the First Balkan War, Bulgaria inserted a thousand under the banners of 600. soldier, then during the WWII almost 900 thousand went under mobilization. The allies could limit themselves to blocking the Straits from the sea, while the Bulgarian army would advance by land. The entry of Bulgaria on the side of the Entente could lead to a radical change in the balance of power on the Balkans and would probably give another course to the war. Nicholas II generally considered Bulgaria’s entry into the war on the side of the Entente highly desirable and conducted negotiations with the Bulgarian Tsar Ferdinand on this subject. Admiral Bubnov described his conversation with Nicholas II about Burgas in the fall of 1915: “This Bulgarian port was of great importance for the Bosphorus operation, of which the Sovereign was an ardent supporter. The fact is that Burgas was the only port near the Bosphorus, where it was possible to land a large landing squad, without which our General Staff and, in particular, the gene. Alekseev categorically did not consider it possible to undertake an operation to seize the Bosphorus. Secret negotiations were held with Bulgaria about this port for a long time, which, however, were unsuccessful, because Bulgaria demanded for itself, for joining us and introducing us to Burgos, Macedonia, to which Serbia did not want to give its consent for anything, turning a blind eye to that we, in the name of her salvation, entered this difficult war for us. This black ingratitude, threatening to deprive us not only of the opportunity to solve our national problem, but even of winning the war, deeply saddened and amazed the Sovereign, whose intercession Serbia owed to everyone, and the Sovereign was now looking for ways to do without Burgos to solve the Bosphorus issue. " (c) P.V. Multatuli.

[hohol95]

Or maybe it was necessary to maintain NEUTRALITY and then Bulgaria would not LOSE what it had lost after the CEREBIA of 1918?
Nobody wants a TITLE IN HANDS - HAVE ALL TO SEND THE OLD CRANE ... on the graveyard!

[pytar]

It would hardly work out for a number of other reasons. Or maybe Russia didn’t have to go to this disastrous war for it. Not all political means were exhausted. WWII lost Russia and Germany, and the worst enemies of the Slavs - the Anglo-Saxons - won. It's a pity.

[hohol95]

On May 29, 1915, representatives of the Entente handed over to the Bulgarian government a document in which Bulgaria was invited to speak on the side of the countries of Concord. In the event that Bulgaria opposed the Ottoman Empire, the Entente countries guaranteed the return of East Thrace to the Bulgarian kingdom. The promises of guaranteed territorial increments ended there. The Allies also announced that they would begin negotiations with the Serbian government to transfer some of Vardar Macedonia and pledged to enter into negotiations with the Greek and Romanian governments to resolve issues of Aegean Macedonia and South Dobrudja. In addition, the Entente guaranteed Bulgaria financial assistance. On June 14, the Bulgarian government, in response to this note by the Entente powers, demanded the definition of clear boundaries for those territories in Vardar and Aegean Macedonia that should be part of Bulgaria.
After that, the task of the Entente diplomats became virtually impossible. In addition to the Balkan differences among the Great Powers, negotiations with Serbia, and especially with Greece and Romania, have reached an impasse. The governments of these countries had no desire to lose the territories acquired after the Second Balkan War.
And the GERMANS could GIVE PROMISES (promise THEY could even the MOON to the Bulgarians), as the Americans GIVEN DOLLARS according to the MARSHAL PLAN!
Easy and UNCOMPLETED!

[pytar]

By the beginning of the WWI in East Thrace, after the defeat of Bulgaria in the Second Balkan War, the Bulgarian population remained. At that time, in Macedonia 90% of the population was Bulgarian and it accounted for a third of the total Bulgarian people in general. In historical, cultural and ethnic terms, Macedonia of the 13 centuries was an integral part of the Bulgarian body. Allies in the Entente recognized this, for which they urged Serbia to agree to Bulgarian requirements. Moreover, in case of victory, Serbia was guaranteed territorial acquisitions at the expense of the Western Balkans, where peoples related to the Serbs live. It was many times more than the area of ​​Macedonia. But Serbia did not agree and the negotiations failed. In Bulgaria, no one would agree to fight for lands where there was no Bulgarian population, while leaving a third of their fellow tribesmen under the occupation of others. For clarity, I will give this example - If your own child was stolen and held captive, will you agree to “compensation” so that someone else’s child is given to you instead? Will you become an ally of those who stole your child? Hardly ... For you, the ally will be the one who helps, return your child! You won’t have any thoughts on such a question!

[hohol95]

No one would voluntarily part with their territorial acquisitions since the Second Balkan!
And you would not get anything!
If only some territories taken from the Ottomans!
And so they lost more territory following the results of the First Imperialist!

[pytar]

According to the Union Treaty between Serbia and Bulgaria of 1912, Macedonia was allocated to the “Indisputable Zone” / South Macedonia /, which was supposed to go to Bulgaria and the “Disputed Zone” / Northern Macedonia /, whose issue of ownership should be resolved with arbitration at the head from the Russian emperor. Serbia, in violation of the agreement, entered into a conspiracy with Greece, occupied the wallpaper zone. Failure to fulfill the union treaty on the part of Serbia led to the Second Balkan War. Nobody say would you not voluntarily lose your territorial acquisitions? Well then the war! We didn’t want to acquire something else’s. We had a question of returning our own. Not yet, and unfortunately lost yet. By the way, Russia as a result of the PMV did not get anything, but lost a lot! A similar situation.

[verner1967]

Quote: hohol95

No one would voluntarily part with their territorial acquisitions

If Russia pressed, the Serbs would not go anywhere. When the threat of a complete loss of statehood hangs, one wonders a lot.

[verner1967]

Quote: pytar

fair requirements of Bulgaria! Return Macedonia to her,

Yes, you are right, Serbia was not only possible, but also had to sacrifice in this game. But ... it remains only to regret that the sovereign did not insist on it

[hohol95]

You can SORRY MUCH on what the Sovereign did not insist ...

[pytar]

I would not say donate! Serbia really increased 4 times its territory following the results of WWI, adding from 63 000 sq. Km. on almost 250 000! Macedonia was only 25 000 sq. Km. of them! Why are the Serbs so greedy, taking away the territories of Macedonia? Serbia originated before the 12 centuries! Bulgaria before the 13 centuries. For all this time, Macedonia being either part of Bulgaria or part of its cultural-ethnic space, and was part of Serbia for only 30 years! In the 14 century under King Stephen Dusan, when he bit her off from the same Bulgaria! Bulgaria then was bleeding under the invasion of the Turks and could not recapture Dushan! Why did Serbia in the second Balkan war take on such a haemorrhoid, which caused many of its disasters later on !? After all, a just solution to the problem with Macedonia would bring to a pro-Russian alliance between Serbia and Bulgaria! And such an alliance in geostrategic and military relations would make Bolkanov impregnable for any external creeps and aggression! Even if we look at the situation from the last 10-15 years! Macedonia, with all the efforts of Serbia, left the SFRY. And est indication that the "Macedonians" begins to return Bulgarian ethnic identity! After all, the land of Macedonia is replete with evidence of its thousand-year-old Bulgarian origin. Conclusion - Greed never leads to good! Do not take what is not yours / Macedonia /! Riskesh to lose his / Kosovo /!

[verner1967]

Quote: pytar

I would not say donate! Serbia actually increased 4 times its territory according to the results of the WWII,

if Russia pressed on it, Serbia could “take offense” and cease to be an ally, I’m talking about that.

[pytar]

Russia entered the war, because of Serbia! Moreover, Russia was not ready for war! The fact that fighting with the enemy, Russia was defeated along with him, talk about the incorrectness of her position in relation to the willfulness of Serbia! Russia could not depart from the principle of justice! Bulgaria had fair demands! And the Serbs and Bulgarians are Orthodox, Slavic, Russophile peoples! I will give an elementary example again! Imagine you have two children! You love their wallpaper, they love you too! One of them stole another's favorite thing! You loving both, what would you do? Act unfairly, you will receive one child whom you no longer believe and the second one whom you learned to steal! That's how it happened with Russia and "her children" Bulgaria and Serbia!

[verner1967]

Quote: pytar

Bulgaria had fair demands!

I’m writing about the same to you, Russia could have donated Serbia so that Bulgaria entered the war on the side of the Entente.

[hohol95]

There was no chance!
Fleet operations against the coast in the Black Sea in 1914-1917.
N.V. Novikov
Completely block the supply of coal from the Zonguldak coal region or DISPOSAL the landing there to DESTROY coal storages and marinas.
Give you the straits ...

[BRONEVIK]

Or maybe there was no such purpose?
If there are resources and opportunities, there is always a chance.
But transportation in the interests of the Caucasus Front (brigades and divisions) was excellent. And Fleet historian V. Dotsenko considers them exemplary.
But here is the pluralism of opinions.
It remains to wait for the final articles

[hohol95]

Yeah pluralism !
But all for (drafts bare) - FOR Hurray, the landing ...

[Rotmistr]

It’s like with an operation by a surgeon - if you don’t do it, you will die for sure, but if you do it, it MAY BE you die
The grain of truth is in all judgments.
In my opinion, the failure of Turkey was the key to winning the First War. The question of the blockade of Russia was removed and a bunch of fronts curtailed.
And Bulgaria on the side of the Entente (at any cost) - this was to become a fix idea for the Foreign Ministry. It was a guarantee of success.
A world war broke out in the Balkans, and in the year 18 the Balkan Front started a chain reaction for the Fourth Bloc.
Exactly the ilium of Europe

[hohol95]

In the movie ALASKI Foxes, a doctor of a SOVIET submarine amputated the arm of an American pilot and his partner said -
IF YOUR HANDS DO NOT AMPUT YOUR FRIEND WILL DIE FROM GANGRAIN AND GUILTY PUT US (Soviet sailors) ...
IF TO AMPUT THE HAND - YOU DECLARE THAT WE DID IT WITH A DISABILITY ...
SO WE WILL BE GUILTY FOR YOU ...

[verner1967]

Quote: hohol95

In the movie "ALASKI Foxes"

Wow! Did you watch it too? I went with my father in childhood, and now I just can’t find anywhere.

[hohol95]

On one of the TV channels, somehow he was spinning for a week.
On the Internet comes across. On Tfilm there is.

[verner1967]

Quote: hohol95

On one of the TV channels, somehow he was spinning for a week.

Oh, sorry, I didn’t. Anyway, thanks for the info

[verner1967]

Quote: hohol95

Give you the straits ...

And there were allocated comparable forces and means?

[hohol95]

Read the indicated book and draw your own conclusions.

[hohol95]

First, it was necessary to resolve the issue with the COAL DISTRICT OF THE ZUNGULDAK ...
"But be that as it may, the question of Zunguldak was completely resolved only by the landing.
We do not have documents specifically covering the question of why the Black Sea command avoided solving the Zunguldak problem in this way. But, analyzing the actions of the command as a whole, we should note the following.
Apart from landing operations in general, among the tasks of the fleet, the command rejected the idea of ​​them as risky operations that could drag the fleet into a number of complex obligations. In one of his reports to the headquarters (March 1915), foreseeing the possibility of a task to prepare for operations to seize the Bosphorus, Admiral Eberhard writes: “... Base calculations on the successful landing of troops near the Bosphorus, transporting them from Batum, that is, for more than 500 miles, it’s impossible: the weather is so inconsistent, so different in different parts of the sea, that the transport flotilla, having successfully made the transition by sea, can at the end of the journey be made impossible to land landing troops. Convenient for landing sections of the coast in any fresh weather become inaccessible. The inability to land at a selected site and at the appointed time will force one to make one of two decisions: either go to Sevastopol, the port closest to the Bosphorus, 300 miles away, or stay at sea and expect weather to improve, which may last several days, during which the landing troops will suffer from pitching and cramped space, which will inevitably respond in the most undesirable way to the fighting qualities of the troops. In addition, the presence in the sea near the Bosphorus of a significant number of transports and escort vessels will give easy and loyal prey to enemy destroyers, which we will not be able to fight with at night. ”
He goes on to say: "The only way out of this situation can be for occupying our forces in the port of Burgas, located 110 miles from the entrance to the strait."
Pointing to the benefits of owning this port, the command all the time emphasizes the disadvantageous conditions in which the fleet is located to carry out foreseeable, but not desired, landing operations. Listing the likely countermeasures of the enemy, the actions of his fleet, mine deployments, coastal batteries, field troops on the coast, the command says: “All these funds can be countered by the fleet, only maintaining a close blockade, relying on Burgas; while basing it on Sevastopol, the fleet will be forced to leave for coal to the base, since loading fuel on the high seas, due to the special arrangement of ships, is possible only in calm and very slowly. ”
At the same time, according to the command, "proximity to the Bosphorus will allow the enemy to use all their even secondary forces, which during the absence of our fleet will be masters of the situation and capable of undertaking operations behind our landed troops."

[Rotmistr]

This is Lukin in my opinion.
For 15 years - undoubtedly
But for the 16th, after the entry into operation of 2 dreadnought - created 2 maneuverable groups (each headed dreadnought). And they took turns blocking the Bosphorus. Plus the old brigade of battleships in the wings.
The question of an intermediate base has disappeared

[hohol95]

Fleet operations against the coast in the Black Sea in 1914-1917.
N.V. Novikov

[Rotmistr]

This is part of Admiral Eberhard’s report.
It is in the work of V.K. Lukin, "Notes on the combat activities of the Black Sea Fleet," published by the Russian State Autonomy and Military Fund. So Novikov also worked with this report

[hohol95]

WERE THERE BY 1916 HUMAN RESERVES FOR THE FORMATION OF LANDING PARTS?
This is also not an insignificant question ...

[Rotmistr]

Of course there were
Already several divisions could be collected
The Black Sea Maritime Division was formed (the process needed to be intensified), the Baltic Maritime Division and the Guards crew were transferred from the Baltic
Yes, it doesn’t matter.
In August 1916, after the completion of the Ognot operation, the Caucasian army was no longer active. From its composition could take any troops

[hohol95]

If the Black Sea Fleet had EVERYTHING in abundance - warships, landing transports, landing troops themselves, and were full of warehouses and bins, then WE WILL APPOINT ROMANIA THE CHIEF VINCULAR ON Dismantling the BOSFOR airborne assault!
She entered the war in 1916 and it took 2 corps to save the defeated Romanian army !!!

[Rotmistr]

The Romanian front was then so pumped up by troops - that it absorbed a quarter of the army. So 2 buildings is the beginning.
I meant that the activity of the Caucasian army since the end of August 16 was minimal - and it was possible to take troops from its composition. They are accustomed to theater of operations, they know the tactics of the Turks, and they are used to beating them.
I think that the "barracks" let us down - we decided to calmly and measuredly prepare the SPECIAL LANDING HOUSING, not taking much time - a year earlier, a year later. No one thought that in February 17th the whistle would begin.
And it was necessary to take any suitable troops - and act as quickly as possible.
We all think about the future, but it may not come. The time factor is the most important. We think it is - but it doesn’t think so

[hohol95]

Or "gentry" or unwillingness to bear responsibility for failure ... But what if it did not work out! The British could not ...

[Rotmistr]

And this moment was also probably present - the experience of the Dardanelles operation was fresh.
But, as often happens - success could come when you do not particularly expect it. And not any negative experience is repeated

[hohol95]

Only the fleet had no more "Ushakovs, Sinyavins and other great naval commanders." Everything was subordinated to the help of the army !!!

[Lieutenant Teterin]

A wonderful and objective article !. What is noteworthy is that the preparation of the landing has begun only after signing the Straits Agreement, i.e. the tsarist General Staff and Headquarters did not intend to do their work for the Allies and lay down the lives of Russian soldiers for the interests of others, but they waged a war for Russia and the interests of the people and Patronymic.
The author - my sincere gratitude for the work done!