Syria: crossings and crossroads

4


In late September - early October, the final phase of the hostilities began in Syria. The release of Deir ez-Zor with the release of the Syrian army and the Russian VKS supporting it on the Euphrates coast stepped up militants banned in the Russian Federation "Islamic State" (in the area) and "Dzhabhat an-Nusra" (in the province of Idlib), the onset of which, according to Russian military, was provoked by their American curators.



At the same time, diplomatic activity increased in the Russian-Turkish and Russian-Saudi areas, and China expressed readiness to join the talks in Astana. Consider the situation in Syria on the basis of materials IBE expert J. Shcheglovina.

Border race

The Russian military erected a bridge over the Euphrates River a few kilometers from the city of Deir ez-Zora. Along it, military equipment and personnel of the SAR army are being thrown to the eastern shore. A 210-meter-long small road collapsible bridge (MARM) was equipped with shelling in less than two days. MARM supports the weight of heavy armored vehicles (Tanks, BMP and multiple launch rocket systems). Throughput - eight thousand cars per day. The bridge will also be used to deliver humanitarian supplies to the liberated villages and evacuate the wounded. Government forces liberated most of Deir ez-Zor in early September. The main forces of the IG are thrown to the east coast. Prior to the erection of Marma, the advanced forces of the Syrian army crossed the river in pontoons. Now the main forces of government troops are preparing to force the Euphrates.

There were reports that units of Syrian special forces were removed from Deir ez-Zor - they were transferred to the eastern bank of the Euphrates for fighting for the main oil fields of the region, 80 percent of which are controlled by tribal Sunni militia, and the IG receives a “tax” for protection and patronage. A new phase of the battle for Deir ez-Zor is to establish Damascus control over the majority of the province’s oil fields and the government forces on the border with Iraq. This is a general task, the solution of which will finally break the resistance of the IG. We don’t talk about Raqqah, the attack on it slowed down, since all the pro-American troops were thrown into Deir ez-Zor to thwart the solution of this task.

At the Pentagon, reports have appeared that the likelihood of an open clash between Russian and American forces is very high. At the same time, the Americans call the main stumbling block the race between Moscow and Washington for the establishment of control over the Syrian-Iraqi border. On the eastern bank of the Euphrates, the situation is going to a climax, since the establishment of crossings indicates that the capture of the city is postponed, and the center of resistance of the IG in it is blocked. With the participation of Russian specialists, the plan of the Americans was disrupted to reduce the dynamics of the Syrian government forces offensive, constraining them in street battles for Deir ez-Zor and a distracting blow from pro-Saud opposition groups from Idlib.

Speaking of the latter, we note: losses in manpower and equipment and permanent Russian strikes aviation and the Navy, at the rear supply and logistics hubs of Jebhat al-Nusra (now Tahrir al-Sham), do not leave Riyadh with maneuvers at the request of the Pentagon from this direction. The Saudis fear that they will find themselves bleeding before decisive fights with pro-Turkish groups in Idlib. The same is true for Deir ez-Zor, where IS supporters were ordered to stand to the end. This does not exclude attempts to break out of the besieged part of the city and distracting attacks in other directions, but so far the emphasis is on developing an offensive on the eastern bank of the Euphrates.
The question of the reaction of the Syrian Kurds to the prospect of an open clash with the Syrian government forces on the bridgehead occupied by them and the reaction of the American military to this is becoming a matter of principle. It is essential whether the Americans will use aviation to deter the assad troops. Such an option is likely, if we recall the reaction of the Pentagon to the promotion of Shiite militia in the south of Syria to the border with Jordan and Iraq. But in the Pentagon, the best option for reducing possible open collisions is the activation of the three available channels of communication with the Russian side. This suggests that the United States is not ready for an open forceful countering of Russia. The loyal troops of the Forces of Democratic Syria (VTS) from 14 September are subject to air attacks from Syrian and Russian aviation.

If the coalition Air Force does not begin to deliver deterrent attacks, the Kurds will most likely have to retreat from their positions or restrict further progress. In this case, it is necessary to take into account the position of the local Sunni tribes, which, it seems, of the two evils (Damascus and the Kurds), while choosing the second, freely passing them through their territory. To remove the problem in purely military ways is difficult. The offensive will resolve this issue only temporarily, but after entering the Iraqi border with local tribal leaders will have to negotiate. Most of them are under the care of the Americans, who brought part of the sheikhs with their families to the north of Syria, so it would be difficult to reach an agreement.

Riyadh half a turn to Moscow

Moscow is convinced: the upcoming visit of Sauman King Salman will give impetus to bilateral relations. In fact, his arrival in Russia until the last moment is questionable and because of the health of the monarch, and because of the commencement of the procedure of transferring sovereign power to KSA to his son M. ben Salman. This process is most likely postponed until the end of the year due to objections both within the ruling family and the clerical elite, and because of problems in carrying out unpopular economic and social reforms. In addition, Moscow and Riyadh have nothing to negotiate.



In the economy, in addition to an agreement to limit the volume of oil production, there is no progress. The main thing in bilateral relations is the “Syrian dossier”. After the negotiations at the level of foreign ministers and the emergence of the pro-Saud opposition at the talks in Astana, a rollback occurred, as evidenced by the recent attack of Dzhebhat an-Nusra from Idlib. This illogical step was taken at the request of the United States to divert Syrian government forces from the attack in Deir ez-Zor. An order for such an action could only be given personally by the Crown Prince and KSA Minister of Defense M. bin Salman. It is difficult to imagine that he will come to Moscow now. Need a pause.

You can pretend that Riyadh has nothing to do with “Dzhebhat en Nusra”, but this does not change anything. The conciliatory rhetoric of the Russian Foreign Ministry does not reflect the degree of irritation of Saudi behavior in Syria. Russia continues to punish the supporters of "Dzhebhat an-Nusra" in Idlib. Five influential field commanders who led the terrorists who attacked Russian military police on September 9th were destroyed during a special operation. As reported by the Russian Defense Ministry spokesman, Major General Igor Konashenkov, to 18 on September, “as a result of the strike, five field commanders were eliminated, including Abu Sulman al-Saudi (head of the southern sector of Idlib province), Abu al-Abbas Anadin (emir of financial affairs) , Abu Hassan (adviser to the Minister of War Abu Muhammad al-Julani), Walid al-Mustafa (assistant spiritual leader Abdullah al-Muhaysni), as well as Abu Mujagid (Sharia judge) ". Judging by the nicknames, some - come from Saudi Arabia.

Special measures to find and neutralize all the militants involved in the attack on the Russian military in Syria are continuing. The command personnel and military infrastructure of the Dzhebhat an-Nusra in Idlib will be destroyed further, including for the edification of pro-Saud groups. In addition, Moscow, taking into account the apparent unreliability of partners from KSA and their fluctuations in accordance with the American strategy, set a course for the maximum weakening of the pro-Saud segment of the armed opposition in Idlib. If we recall the project of building a protective wall on the border with Syria to establish control over the Dzhebhat al-Nusra material assistance channels from Turkish territory, it is easy to assume that we are witnessing the beginning of a serious competitive struggle of Ankara and Riyadh opposition in Idlib.

Russia is clearly on the side of Ankara. The stage of extrusion of pro-Saudi groups from Idlib and their absorption by Turkish opposition groups begins. If this process goes actively, and the participation of the Russian videoconferencing and fleet It will be obvious that talking about the imminent Russian-Saudi summit can only be done theoretically. Otherwise, such a visit can be considered surrender and an attempt to save face, which does not fit into the desire of M. bin Salman to position himself as a self-sufficient and strong regional leader. Although insecurities in connection with the summit in Moscow may well manifest themselves, including precisely because of conflicts in the Saudi elite ...

Common language in Idlib

The visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Ankara was of a working nature and was devoted to the “reconciliation of hours” on the main issues on the bilateral agenda. Let us leave aside the construction of the Akkuyu NPP and the Turkish Stream gas pipeline, the supply of tomatoes or the sale of Turkey's C-400 air defense system. Let us assess the prospects for coordinating the actions of the parties in Syria, assuming that the discussion on the monitoring and functioning of the de-escalation zone in Idlib was at the center of consultations. This zone, where the joint Iranian-Russian-Turkish mission should carry out the monitoring of the situation, has recently been disturbing both Moscow and Ankara, although for various reasons.

For Moscow, Idlib, where most of the radicals from the Pro-Saud Dzhebhat an-Nusra are concentrated, is a threat to the destabilization of Syria and the breakdown of armistice conditions. For Ankara, the question of the dominance of pro-Saud groups and the proportional decrease in the level of its influence not only in the north of the country, but in the whole of Syria. Coordination of joint efforts to minimize the activity of “Dzhebhat an-Nusra” in Idlib and was devoted, as you might guess, a significant part of the Russian-Turkish summit.

What the leaders of the two countries specifically agreed on can only be assumed, but judging by the reaction of representatives of the parties after the end of the summit, it is likely that a consensus has been reached on all issues. In this regard, we should expect the imminent entry of the Turkish armed mission into all major administrative centers of Idlib province. The Turkish army will have to play a major role in establishing control over the observance of the conditions for the functioning of the de-escalation zone inside Idlib, and the Iranians and the Russian military will stand along the province’s perimeter. Obviously, the main parameters of the force effect of the Russian VKS and Navy on idlib positions of “Dzhebhat an-Nusra” were also determined. At the summit, an important aspect of Russian-Turkish cooperation in Syria was consolidated: “Dzhebhat al-Nusra” was outlawed within the borders of the truce and de-escalation zones.

It can be assumed that the Turks in Idlib will not limit themselves to monitoring the situation, but will actively contribute to strengthening the combat potential of the controlled groups, primarily the split “Ahrar ash-Sham”. This organization will be able to become a full participant in the armistice process. She boycotted the previous rounds of negotiations in Astana, which caused anger from the chief coordinator of the Astana format from Turkey, the head of the MIT secret service H. Fidan, who two months ago gave a directive to the opposition-controlled opposition groups not to enter into any contacts with Ahrar al-Sham. Now the ban has been lifted, which means that “Ahrar ash-Sham” is in Ankara’s orbit. An indirect confirmation of this was the message of the Russian Center for Reconciliation of the warring parties that the status of 12 representatives of the Ahrar ash-Sham group was settled in the village of Deir el-Fardis de-escalation zone of Homs. The same process will soon begin in Idlib. The Americans at the same time will stand aside. It is naive to expect that they will be able to influence the operations of the Turks to defeat pro-Saud groups in this province.

Another topic for discussion at the Russian-Turkish summit is the referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan. Ankara needed a signal from Moscow that Russia would not support Erbil’s independence initiative and would not participate in supplying weapons and equipment to Iraqi Kurds. Apparently, the necessary assurances Ankara received. The position of the United States on this issue has not changed: they still put on the Kurds in Iraq and in Syria. Relations between the US administration and the IC authorities after the plebiscite will not change. This was emphasized at a press briefing by the spokesperson of the US State Department, H. Nauert. Thus, there is no threat of a US-Turkish alliance in the Syrian direction and Erdogan’s obligations to the Russian side on joint actions in Idlib will be carried out.

Beijing in Astana format

China is ready to join the talks in Astana as an observer if it receives an official invitation. The special representative of the government of the PRC on a Syrian settlement, S. Xiaoyan, told reporters about this. On September 15, following the results of the sixth round of negotiations in Astana on Syria, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister H. Ansari said that the countries that are guarantors of the truce (Russia, Iran and Turkey) are consulting on sending invitations to new observers of the Astana process. The special representative of the president of the Russian Federation on the Syrian settlement, A. Lavrentiev, said that China, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Iraq and Lebanon could potentially become observers. Foreign Ministry spokesman for the PRC, H. Chunin, said that Beijing is ready to actively assist the talks in Astana.

At the heart of China’s intention to join the Astana process, in addition to enhancing participation in the Syrian conflict both politically and economically (Beijing announced plans to invest in ATS infrastructure) is a security issue. Chinese intelligence agencies are planning to expand their presence in Syria, strengthen their representation at the Chinese Embassy in Damascus, and establish working contacts with their local counterparts. It is expected that one of the strongest personnel and technical staff in the embassy residency in Damascus will be formed by operational units of the 1 Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security (MOB) of the PRC. This service has seriously increased since 2012, when it was officially handed over to operational search and deportation to the homeland of members of the Uygur Islamist underground. The BOM has always dealt with the Uyghur issue, but only in China. The release of departments in the "outside world" is unprecedented.

In addition, the functions of the ministry include the fight against corruption. By the way, this is used by the main competitor of the MOB - foreign intelligence from the Ministry of State Security (MGB) in order to compromise before the Chinese leadership the very possibility of the MPS to work actively abroad. It is assumed that the agents of the 1 bureau of the Ministry of Defense, who are called pandas in the jargon of the special services, will not only have to analyze the terrorist activities of the Uyghurs in Syria itself, but also participate in their search in the troops of the IG and Dzhebhat al-Nusra militants. Such, according to the Chinese security officials, in Syria and Iraq, more than a hundred.

The IBA takes into account the fact that many Uighurs are now hiding or are living illegally in Egypt, and legally in Turkey. The leadership of 1-bureau was tasked to intensify (in the case of Turkey, reanimate) working contacts with Egyptian and Turkish colleagues. The presence of the Chinese in Astana, where one of the co-sponsors of this format is Ankara, and where Cairo most likely will come as an observer in the near future, is designed to solve this problem. In the case of Turkey, which is considered the main sponsor of the Turkic-speaking Uigurs, this will be difficult. Recall that a year ago a scandal broke out between Beijing and Ankara related to the decision of Bangkok to deport a Uygur Islamist group from Thailand, under pressure from the MGB of the PRC, although those already had passports from Turkey, which were transferred to them through the MIT embassy station in Thailand. The nomination of a MOB for bilateral security cooperation is logical because Turkish security services do not want to deal with the MGB. It is difficult to say how productive this will be. Ankara does not refuse to spread influence in the Turkic-speaking space, and the Uigurs play one of the leading roles in this and are under the care of the MIT, as are the Uzbeks from Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).

The DOB residency in Damascus will actively participate in operations neutralizing Uygur militants in Syria. Most likely, the Egyptians will understand the requests of the OSCE for understanding. At the same time, the question of the opposition of Ankara to the cooperation of Cairo with the Chinese special services will only please the Egyptians, since Egypt and Turkey are engaged in an active subversive struggle against each other. The Turks are stimulating terrorist activity in Sinai, while the Egyptians finance the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) through its representative office in Cairo.
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  1. +1
    4 October 2017 07: 11
    The topic with the crossing is closed, there is no longer it, but there is movement along the right bank of the Euphrates to Mayadin, this is after a meeting of the chiefs of the General Staffs of the USA and the Russian Federation, in general, a deviation from the general line of the regional committee is punishable by the cancellation of the ISIS bombing, and they, in turn, act according to their own view, that and once again take Palmyra. And yes, the article is, though from Satanovsky, but in the style of reality that has a partial relationship
    1. 0
      4 October 2017 07: 27
      We only know what the powers that be want to tell us.
      Kurds are just a bargaining chip, like ISIS. As well as what divides Russia and the USA in the BV under the guise of a war in Syria and Iraq, we are unlikely to know the next thirty years.
      1. 0
        4 October 2017 12: 22
        Quote: demiurg
        How and what divides Russia and the USA in BV under the guise of war in Syria and Iraq

        I also have a synchrophasotron, they share the European gas market
    2. The comment was deleted.
  2. 0
    4 October 2017 07: 58
    The end of the war will not be long.
  3. The comment was deleted.

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