Pentagon strategic tricks
5 February 2018 of the year ends the release of strategic nuclear forces (SNF) of the Russian Armed Forces and strategic offensive forces (SNS) of the United States at the declared levels of strategic offensive arms reduction (START), according to the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on measures to further reduce and strategic offensive arms limitation (the START Treaty). The treaty remains in force for another three years, unless it is replaced earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.In this regard, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov noted: “The deadline for the implementation of the START Treaty is approaching - 5 February 2018. This treaty serves us well, it is one of the cornerstones of the international security system.
In principle, the implementation of this document is going well, but there are technical issues that require constant attention. In addition, the issue of discussing the prospects for extending the contract validity is noteworthy, which cannot be ignored.
We offered the American side to discuss this topic and look forward to its response. ” The question is quite reasonable, and here the problems of international security are for us to ensure first of all the interests of the national security of the Russian Federation, especially in the framework of the implementation of the START Treaty and the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Missiles (the INF Treaty).
Of course, you can start negotiations on the subject of the prolongation of the START Treaty or the conclusion of a new agreement. However, first of all, it is necessary to conduct a systematic analysis of the implementation of the START Treaty, the Protocol and the Annexes, and at the same time the INF Treaty on the subject of their compliance with the interests of Russia's national security.
The question is quite reasonable: why did the main provisions of the START Treaty provide for the formation in the US SNA of a significant return potential on missiles, mines, SSBNs and nuclear warheads? Moreover, the content of most articles of the START Treaty does not have a liquidation focus, as is the case in the INF Treaty. In this regard, reductions and limitations of strategic offensive arms carried out in the US SNA are not irreversible. Therefore, the US SNA has not carried out a real reduction and elimination of strategic offensive arms, which ensures the buildup of their combat capabilities in the event of a complication of the military-political and strategic situation in the world.This conclusion is confirmed by the following arguments, reflecting the author’s personal position in view of the considerable experience of military and operational service in the Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Russian Armed Forces. At the same time, the data on the combat structure of the US SNA for analysis are creatively borrowed from the works of A. Antonov, A. Arbatov, V. Dvorkin, V. Esin, V. Kozin, E. Wolf, G. Christensen, and others.
PAPER REDUCTIONS OF AMERICAN START
The prospective composition of the US SNA is stated in the US nuclear strategy from 2010 of the year. It is possible to sum up the preliminary results of the fulfillment by the Americans of their contractual obligations (table 1).
According to the analysis of open information materials, the state of the US SNA is characterized as follows.
All the 450 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile "Minuteman-3" and mine launchers, declared on February 5 of the year 2011, are preserved in the forces of the ICBM. It is important to emphasize that the American side, before the entry into force of the START Treaty, managed to perform the basic measures for the modernization of the “Minutemen-3” missile system with the extension of its service life. However, the release of the declared levels of the ICBM forces was carried out by removing them from combat duty and decommissioning. Perhaps, when preparing the START Treaty, Russian officials thought that the Americans would rush to eliminate the upgraded missiles. Not a single mine and missile of this combat composition has been eliminated. I heard from the Americans: "We will not destroy anything." Part of the "Minuteman-3" ICBMs are extracted from the silo launchers, dismantled at the stage, put into storage. The rest of them are in combat duty with monoblock warheads, the platforms of which ensure the operative build-up of the number of warheads to three.
Studies are being conducted on the feasibility and feasibility of extending the operational life of the upgraded Minuteman-3 rocket complex. At the same time, the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (Ground Based Strategic Deterrent) project is developing a hybrid design rocket system based on the Minuteman-3 ICBM and equipping it with new rocket engines, guidance systems, warheads using existing launchers, systems management and control.
The US Navy’s combat crews include the Ohio 14 SSBNs, 12 combat-ready SSBNs (according to the 20 SLBM Trident 2, a total of 240 SLBMs), of which six are constantly on combat patrols. It is important to note that the US Navy did not even think about embarking on the elimination of two submarines of the Ohio type, as defined in the nuclear strategy. Re-equipment of four launch shafts on each of the 14 SSBNs of the Ohio type into the state of “impossibility of launching SLBMs” was carried out formally, which ensures their restoration to combat readiness with the loading of missiles that are located at the naval base. The procedures for refitting these mines with the Russian side are not coordinated, and our complaints have traditionally been ignored. By the way, it is appropriate to recall that in the START-2 Treaty (not entered into force), American experts succeeded in including an article on pouring the P-36М2 heavy ICBMs into one third of the volume of empty mines with concrete.
Currently, the US Navy is implementing a set of programs to extend the life of an Ohio-type SSBN from 30 to 44 years and to increase the operational life of the Trident-2 missile system to at least 2042. At the same time, a new SSBN with 16 launchers of the Trident 2 SLBMs is being developed under the Saksessor program. At the same time, in violation of the START Treaty, close military-technical cooperation is being carried out with Great Britain, which also develops new-generation SSBNs under the Saksessor program. The missile compartment of the CMC (Common Missile Compartment) in the interests of the US and British Navy is created by General Dynamics, Inc. It may include up to four sections of four SLBM launchers. The laying of the head hull in a series of 12 units at a shipyard corporation is expected in 2021. In addition to the procurement and modernization of the existing Trident-2 SLBMs, a scientific and technical reserve is being created in the interest of developing a promising SLBM with the possible adoption of it after 2028.
In a strategic bomber aviation in order to eliminate the shortcomings identified during the military conflicts, modernization of bombers in service is carried out. In order to increase the combat capabilities of the B-52N bombers, it is planned to equip them with promising high-precision systems weapons (WTO) for actions out of reach of the enemy’s air defense systems. B-1B aircraft are supposedly transferred to non-nuclear status and are considered
the Air Force Command as the main bombers for operations with conventional means of destruction for striking from long distances in the zones of the enemy’s air defense system. These bombers have once again been declared as carriers of conventional weapons, while maintaining the technical capabilities for converting them back to perform nuclear missions. This is confirmed by the results of Russian inspections and reflected in the fact sheets. The claims of the Russian side by the American side are traditionally not taken into account. B-2A aircraft retained the ability to covertly overcome the enemy's air defense system and destroy its strategic and critical objects with conventional and nuclear means of destruction. As a result of equipping these planes with an active phased array, their combat capabilities were increased in search and destruction of mobile missile systems of ICBMs.
Modernization of strategic bombers allows them to remain in service until 2030 – 2040. At the same time, a promising LRS-B long range strike bomber (Long Range Strike Bomber) is being developed in place of the decommissioned B-52H and B-1B strategic bombers.
Obvious nonsense is visible from the 1 table: the rule of counting “one strategic bomber is one nuclear warhead”. A reasonable question is how this counting rule is taken into account when drawing up plans for the construction and development of Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS), combat use plans for VKS, and when formulating the State Armaments Program and State Defense Order Plans and their financial and economic justification?
TRIAD NEW COMBAT OPPORTUNITIES
It is important to emphasize that the military-political leadership of the United States continues to create a new strategic triad of new combat capabilities. The composition of the strike means include strategic nuclear (NWS) and strategic non-nuclear weapons (SNF). In this case, the basis of the SNF is a hypersonic weapon used in the framework of the operational and strategic concept of “Global strike”.
In addition, according to the program of deployment of the European missile defense system, in Romania, the ground-to-surface missile system (PRK) Standard-3 mod. 1B. By the year 2018, the same RCP with the improved Standard-3 antimissile will be deployed in Poland. The infrastructure of the infrastructure for the deployment of the US Navy ships equipped with the Standard-3 naval anti-missile systems and the Aegis control system are being carried out at the Naval Forces naval base (Spain). The ships themselves, equipped with this system, are already on the Navy. At the same time, the threat to the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation is the transformation of these anti-missile missiles into medium-range missiles, subject to the revision of the McNNXX vertical launch facilities (WUP), software and combat control systems.
In this regard, Russian President Vladimir Putin noted: “Launchers deployed in Romania can be easily converted to accommodate medium and short-range missiles. This is a clear violation of the INF Treaty. Moreover, the re-equipment is carried out in a very short time, and for us it will really be unnoticed what is happening there. We can't even control it. ” According to specialists, it is not a serious technical problem to equip these antimissile systems with Tomahawk type cruise missiles, bl. IV, and this is a serious threat to the strategic nuclear forces of the RF Armed Forces.
In addition, the US has nuclear allies: the UK and France, involved in the development of an operational plan for the application of the US SNA. As a result, the US side reduces nuclear warheads to the level of 1550 warheads and below, since the list of targets of potential enemies and the composition of nuclear weapons for their destruction are annually updated during joint nuclear planning in the United Strategic Command (USC). At the same time, a part of the objects of probable opponents is assigned to defeat the strategic nuclear forces of the allies in the course of elementary operations related to the re-targeting of their SLBMs.
There are also NATO nuclear forces that have tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in service. It should be noted that the United States, deploying tactical nuclear weapons (150 – 200 of the В61 type bombs) on the territory of a number of countries - participants of the NATO bloc, are in flagrant violation of the first article of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). They are developing a modernized B61-12 type bombs, which will be equipped with advanced F-35 fighter-bombers and US strategic bomber planes. For the basing of tactical aviation aircraft - carriers of nuclear weapons and tanker aircraft, the Zokniai (Lithuania), Lielevarde (Latvia) and Ämari (Estonia) airbases were prepared, their training during combat exercises and combat duty were organized.
In this regard, Russian President Vladimir Putin said: “Our tactical nuclear weapons are not strategic in relation to the United States, they do not reach their territory, and US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe will reach our territories. And in this sense, it is strategic for us and represents a great threat to us. ”
As already noted, the texts of the START Treaty, the Protocol and the Annexes to it contain a significant number of one-sided articles that provide Americans with information about the state, location, forms and methods of combat use, the main directions of development of Russian PGRK and the results of their tests. All this is used to test the elements of the missile defense system and in the interests of the use of hypersonic weapons in the framework of the operational and strategic concept of “Global strike”.
Such is the state of the US strategic offensive forces and the main directions of their construction and development within the framework of the START Treaty.
DEVELOPMENT OF COMBAT COMPOSITION US SNA
The results of assessing the possibility of increasing the combat strength of the US SNA are shown in Table 2. Estimates of the provision of carriers of nuclear warheads are given in view of their availability and limited technical capabilities for reproducing the United States nuclear weapons complex facilities. Each SSBN provides for the reloading of missile compartments of up to four SLBMs. The potential possibility of equipping a part of the Trident 2 SLBM with twelve warheads is taken into account, which is ensured by the design of the two-tier head platform and the results of flight tests. The X-NUMX B-52В strategic bomber can be re-equipped to solve nuclear problems, the B-1A and B-2B bombers can be equipped with cruise missiles and bombs according to the standard scheme. Strategic B-1H bombers are equipped with air-launched AGM-52 cruise missiles in nuclear equipment, which are available in limited quantities (up to 86 units). Other measures are planned to increase the combat strength of the US SNA, which, because of the secrecy of information, is not given in the article.
According to the calculations of American experts, the dates for increasing the combat strength of the US strategic offensive forces will be up to 30 days according to the option of the maximum configuration of the MS platforms. This will require serious training and hard work of forces and means of nuclear-technical support, representatives of the US military-industrial complex on manning the required number of warheads and their reproduction, and ensuring the safety of nuclear weapons. The average duration of the technological cycle of re-equipment of one rocket (taking into account the time of transportation of the MS) will be about 12 hours. At each missile base, up to four missiles can be transferred to this complete set of warhead platforms, provided that the required number of warheads is submitted to the missile bases.
In addition, it is necessary to summarize the nuclear missile potential of the United Kingdom, France, NATO tactical nuclear forces - these are on the order of 180 – 200 aerial bombs (AvB). In addition, the British Navy has a multi-purpose submarines of the "Estyut" type, which are in service with the Tomahawk SLCM, the type of equipment of which is unknown. It is important to always remember both the cross-border strategic partner - the PRC, and its growing nuclear potential, which does not even think of joining the treaty processes to reduce strategic offensive arms. A serious threat to the military security of Russia and a destabilizing factor in the situation is the presence in the US Navy of four ATGM-type SSGNs, converted into Tomahawk SLCM bl. IV in non-nuclear equipment (up to 154 on each boat). In this modernization of cruise missiles "Tomahawk" bl. IV provided them with the possibility of loitering in the interests of the search and subsequent defeat of the PGRK. The possibility of their secret re-equipment for nuclear warheads is not excluded.
Thus, as a result of increasing the combat strength of the US SNA includes 7134 warheads, that is, about the same as stated in the original combat strength as of the date of the entry into force of the START Treaty. In this connection, the question is quite reasonable: where are they, real reductions, limitations and elimination of American strategic offensive weapons, nuclear missile balance and strategic parity, as well as equality of combat capabilities of the parties and the criteria for their assessments, which are reiterated by Russian officials, the “wise men” of the disarmament sense and various experts in the field of strategic nuclear forces? It is not there, and therefore Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin declared that "there is a swinging of the international security system, the beginning of a new arms race."
CONCLUSIONS AND OFFERS
It is important to emphasize that the provisions of the START Treaty do not interfere with the implementation of plans for the construction and development of the Strategic Nuclear Forces of the RF Armed Forces, which would have been implemented even in the absence of the START Treaty. At the same time, the content of many articles of the START Treaty and its Annexes in the part related to Topol, Topol-M and Yars mobile ground-based missile systems has a one-sided and flawed character. Moreover, these articles are rewritten from the “old” START-1 Treaty and the INF Treaty.
The US side attains the declared levels of strategic offensive arms reduction by decommissioning parts of ICBMs and SLBMs and transferring them to storage, reducing the number of warheads while preserving the dilution platforms for warheads, eliminating some strategic bombers of 60-s. A set of programs is being implemented for the modernization of strategic offensive weapons with the associated destruction of rocket and aircraft scrap metal and collapsed mines.
It should be noted that the content of most articles of the treaty documents does not provide for irreversible cuts in US strategic offensive arms. So, the question arises: why did the Russian side agree to the American demand for the elimination of the entire ICBM and SLBM upon the liquidation of only the first stage? Where the second and third stages of missiles go, the Treaty does not define, in fact, they are stored as a return potential for missiles.
Another vivid example. Why the Russian side did not insist on the inclusion in the START Treaty text of the key point 5 b) of Article III of the “old” START-1 Treaty: “The number of warheads listed for the Minutemen-3 ICMB is reduced in compliance with the following: iii) platform the warheads of each MinTen-3 ICBM, which has a reduced number of warheads, are destroyed and replaced with a new warhead platform. ” With a comprehensive justification of this procedure and ensuring the most rigorous control over the elimination of the platforms of the warheads, the Americans were deprived of the possibility of creating a nuclear return capability for warheads. All 450 MBTs "Minuteman-3" would have platforms for a single warhead. Thus, this article could influence the formation of ICBM forces. The remaining articles of the START Treaty would be of a secondary nature.
In conclusion, the following is proposed. It cannot be excluded that the next “Reboot” button will still appear. In preparation for negotiations on the extension of the START Treaty, it is necessary (this will be the first time) to conduct a systematic analysis of the content of the entire set of contractual documents for their compliance with the interests of ensuring Russia's national security. Particular attention is paid to the study and independent examination of the content of factual reports, which are developed on the basis of the results of Russian inspections (18 inspections per year), and which are of a supposedly confidential nature.
It is important and timely to conduct a full-scale inspection and study of the current system in Russia for preparing, organizing and monitoring the implementation of treaties in the field of strategic offensive arms. To clarify the role and place of the state and military authorities of Russia participating in their development and related to ensuring their implementation, as well as the effectiveness of their interaction. Examine the existing requirements, principles of selection and the level of training of Russian experts for negotiating and working in bilateral commissions and Russian inspections. The assignment of various types of interns, applicants, people who solve passing problems and “wise men” of disarmament sense from research organizations of the Russian Academy of Sciences should be excluded. They should include people capable of professionally, uncompromisingly and aggressively defending the interests of Russia. To ensure their systematic training on the basis of the structural units of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.
Based on the results of the audit, prepare conclusions and proposals for a fundamental improvement in the system for preparing and monitoring the implementation of the Treaties for the reduction and elimination of strategic offensive arms.
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