An extremely pleasant and intriguing event for us, as well as out of the ordinary for the command of the united NATO Navy, occurred in early August 2017 in the waters of the North Atlantic, where the joint carrier-based strike force is part of the British aircraft carrier R08 HMS Queen Elizabeth, the American atomic carrier CVN -77 USS "George HW Bush", 2-s of British Duke-class frigates (Type 23), US Ticonderoga and Arleigh Burke class cruisers, and the Norwegian frigate F313 "Helge Ingstad" conducted naval maneuvers " Saxon Warrior-2017 "aimed at improving ur This is an efficiency and coherence of actions during crisis situations that have arisen against the background of the emergence of new threats. In fact, the exercises were miserably failed due to the sudden appearance in the area of operation of the American and British AUG of an “unknown” submarine, barely “audible” sonar signs and other physical fields which eloquently indicated that it was a low-noise multi-purpose nuclear-powered submarine of the YN 885 Pr. .
An irrefutable reason for this conclusion was the information provided by the Norwegian resource Aldrimer.no with reference to sources in the North Atlantic Alliance. It reported that almost a full-fledged mixed anti-submarine naval squadron was involved in the search for the alleged K-561 Kazan. aviation NATO, operating with Avb Bodo, Keflavik, Andoya, Lossimaus, as well as unnamed French air bases. The submarine could not be found and escorted either by means of magnetic anomaly sensors on patrol aircraft, or by combining hydroacoustic information from the RSL and modern ship AN / SQQ-89 (V) 3/6 ship mounted on the RKR URO CG-58 USS “ Philippine Sea ”and EM URO CG-75 USS“ Donald Cook ”. This incident fully confirmed the previously made assumptions that even the standard MAPL modification pr.885 “Ash” (without a jet propulsion) has many times more secrecy than pr.971 “Shchuka-B” and only “falls short” of the “Virginia” class .
Later, for obvious reasons, the Allied command and control commanders in every way began to deny the unsuccessful “hunt” for “Kazan”, which found great support and glee among the pseudo-liberal Russian media that regularly sought to discredit and discredit any military-technical achievements of Russia. It is in this case that the inclusion of notes of sound cheers-patriotism in news publications, with their further repost, become more relevant, because not all readers are well versed in the tactical and technical parameters of naval technology and cannot independently get to the bottom of the truth, distinguishing misinformation from the real situation. However, the August "anti-submarine commotion" in the waters of the Norwegian Sea is not the only incident in which NATO AUGs and anti-submarine aircraft lost control of Russian multi-purpose submarines. The most memorable moment can be considered the appearance of the Russian strategic submarine cruiser, project 955 Borey in the Long Island Strait in 2012. Thus, according to a statement by a representative of the Russian defense department, the entry of a low-noise submarine-launched missile carrier with SLBMs on board into the territorial waters of the United States with a further ascent near New York was necessary to correct ship navigation devices that failed during traditional combat duty.
Strategic missile submarine cruiser of the 955 K-551 Ave. "Vladimir Monomakh"
Against this background, it is worth noting that the “critical” navigation element of this class of SSBNs is the inertial navigation system “Symphony-U”, equipped with a “Scandium” gyrocorrector. The accuracy of determining the underwater coordinates is about ± 1500-2000 m for it, which is a very good indicator. Such figures are achieved even during the weekly stay in the underwater mode, which was confirmed during the combat duty of MAPL K-295 "Samara" (971 "Pike-B") in 2002 year (the submarine is equipped with the similar navigation complex "Symphony-071" ).
The failure of the “Symphony”, designed to accurately determine the coordinates of “Borea” under the rule of enemy patrol aircraft or a conflict with the use of nuclear weapons, is highly unlikely, and therefore the appearance of a submarine several kilometers off the coast of the United States can be interpreted as the first small warning about the inadmissibility of attempts geostrategic pressure on the interests of Moscow in the European and Middle Eastern theaters of military operations. Even if we consider the “semi-fantastic” version with the failure of the PNK “Symphony-U”, it can be noted that the submarine could remain underwater without unmasking its location. By this method, a submarine could easily avoid approaching the American coast by using long-sided conformal acoustic antenna arrays and the bow SSC MHK-600B Irtysh-Amfora-B in passive mode of operation (due to direction finding of sound-emitting targets in the littoral zone). Moreover, the presence of Borey SSBNs would have remained undisclosed. But "to play with muscles", showing the lack of effectiveness of anti-submarine weapons of the US Navy "at their very gates" was simply necessary, and our submariners coped with the task perfectly well.
After the above events, the headquarters of the naval forces and the defense departments of the NATO member countries began to think more and more often about the precarious positions of their anti-submarine component, which is practically unable to block the 1300-km underwater lines in the Norwegian Sea and the Danish Strait from the penetration of our nuclear submarines that make up the North fleet Russian Navy. As expected, far from the last role in the desire to strengthen PLO in the North Atlantic belongs today to Great Britain. As you know, the leadership of Misty Albion regularly frightens the population with “bad Russians”, “their powerful submarines and atomic cruisers, pr. 1144.2, who are ready to deliver a targeted attack on London with Granites,” etc.
So, 14 September 2017, London in the face of the company “BAE Systems”, provided the command of the US Navy with comprehensive information on the project of a promising multi-purpose frigate Type 26 “Global Combat Ship”. The event is quite extraordinary: self-sufficient US Navy, which for decades relied on warships, lowered from the stocks of shipbuilding yards Ingalls Shipbuilding and Bath Iron Works sharply began to show interest in the foreign project of the Old World frigate being built on shipbuilding shipyards at scottown This choice of Americans has a multifaceted background.
Firstly, this is the complete decommissioning of morally and technically obsolete frigates of the class “Oliver Hazard Perry” (the last ship of the FFG-56 “Sampson” was decommissioned on 29 on September 2015 of the year). Despite the continuation of service in the 21st century, frigates of this type did not go through the modernization program in the US Navy: the outdated SM-1 single-channel shipboard-to-air missile system, built around the “ancient” radar of illumination and targeting AN / SPG 60 STIR (simpler version of Idzhisovsky AN / SPG-62) and outdated fire control system Mk 86. The US Navy Command decided not to announce an expensive program of updating frigate data in favor of developing and mass production of newer and multi-purpose littoral coastal fighting ships of the LCS-1 “Freedom” and LCS-2 “Independece” types.
Secondly, this is a discrepancy between the technical parameters of the littoral warships of classes LCS-2 / 3 and the requirements that are imposed on the frigate class ships. Thus, the trimaran's LCS-2 cruising range at speeds in 30 - 35 nodes barely reaches 2500 - 2700 miles, while frigates of the "Oliver Perry" type can go 4500 miles at speeds of 20 nodes. In long-distance marches, as well as anti-submarine patrols of vast ocean expanses, the cruising range plays a decisive role in autonomy from tanker ships, which, during the escalation of a major regional conflict, are often in demand in the areas operated by the main carrier-based strike orders. LCS are designed to control the near sea zone with the distance from 300 to 700 km from the coast. At the same time, the list of priority tasks includes: the fight against the "mosquito fleets" of the enemy with the help of tactical missiles AGM-114L-8 (located in promising PU SSMM), search / destruction of bottom and anchor mines using unmanned sonar reconnaissance AN / VLD- 1 (V) 1 as part of the RMV complex and AN / AQS-20A, as well as delivering targeted massive strikes at enemy coastal targets at a distance of 200 km. For this purpose, tactical cruise missiles (locking ammunition) LAM complex XM-501LS, placed in a vertical modular launcher CLU, are used. From this conclusion: "Litoral Combat Ship" in the current version is practically not suitable for the implementation of long-term anti-submarine defense.
Thirdly, the interest of the US Navy in the British Type 26 “GCS” project is related to the impossibility of sending large numbers of Arleigh Burke EMs to the North Atlantic, as the Aids data are designed to drastically increase the impact and defensive capabilities of the US Navy in South Asian and the Asia-Pacific regions, where the Americans are trying with all their might to level the active growth of the combat capabilities of Iran and the People’s Republic of China. The British "Global Warships" Type 26 are able to solve some of the above problems, and therefore the request made by BAE Systems by the US Navy can be considered a huge success for London both in operational and strategic terms, and economically.
The first thing to note is the demand for an impressive amount of Type 26 "Global Combat Ship" for the US fleet against the background of the complete absence of frigate-class ships. To perform antisubmarine operations in the North Atlantic, as well as the North Pacific, Washington needs at least 30 - 40 of similar frigates. This will allow for a good load of the shipyard shipyard in Scottstown for another 9 - 12 years, while the planned contract may replenish the British treasury by a few more tens of billions of pounds. The greatest interest is the combat qualities of the Global Combat Ship in relation to the establishment of anti-submarine lines in the North Atlantic, from which the US Navy and the British Navy expect a "massive breakthrough" of multipurpose nuclear submarines of the 971 Ave. Schuka-B and 885 / M Ave. Ash / M.
The most advanced version of the Global Combat Ship frigate with enhanced anti-submarine capabilities is the Type 26 ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare), which will be equipped mainly with anti-submarine and anti-ship weapons deployed in the universal integrated Mk 41 VLS. Anti-submarine execution Mk 41 provides for the use of specialized elongated transport-launch containers Mk 15, which will be PLUR type RUM-139VLA. Immediately after leaving the transport and launch container, PLUR accelerates to supersonic speeds due to the starting stage with a powerful solid-fuel engine. The system of deviation of the thrust vector brings RUM-139B to the ballistic flight trajectory for further combat “equipment” to the operating area of the enemy submarine. A compact anti-submarine torpedo Mk 46 Mod5A (length is 2700 mm, weight - 258 kg) is used as a “equipment”, capable of overcoming another 10 km after entering the underwater mode, which provides a range of at least 30 - 35 km. At the same time, the unification of this anti-submarine missile with the Type 26 ASW armament control system will require American and British specialists to introduce the elemental base characteristic of American Aegis ships. It is represented by the Mk 16 Mod 6 / 7 submarine targeting and control subsystem designed for synchronization of the PLUR RUM-139B inertial navigation system with the integrated AN / SQS-53B and GUS integrated airspace interfaces with a flexible long-distance towed antenna AN / SQP-IQ. Meanwhile, data on the hardware and software adaptation of the Asroc-VL complex to the new British frigates is not yet available. But even if “Asrok” enters into service with the 19 ASW frigates purchased by Americans, their anti-submarine potential (without the support of the patrol aircraft) will not be seriously affected.
In particular, according to Western data published by US Navy Admiral Jeremy Michael Boorda in 1995, the detection range of Russian submarines of 971 Ave. Pike using the main integrated sonar AN / BQQ-5 (MAPL class " Los Angeles ”) was only km 10 in normal hydrological conditions. After 19 years, in his short article, “Fighting People, Not Ideas,” retired Rear Admiral of the USSR Navy, Vladimir Yamkov, brought a small table for calculating the range of detection of Borey-class SSBNs using the latest ANAC / BQQ-10 ultra low-noise class submarine Virginia ”: it was 50 km (265 cab). Consequently, the MAPL of the X. NUMX / M or “Pike-B” prises can be detected at a distance of 885 and 60 km, respectively, due to the absence of a water jet propulsion unit, which reduces acoustic visibility.
Nevertheless, these indicators can be considered fair only for normal hydrological conditions. Now imagine the waters of the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea, where every winter is accompanied by the passage of powerful cyclones caused by the Icelandic minimum. They cause the most powerful storms that can last for several days and repeatedly worsen the hydrological situation. Direction finding in such conditions may decrease several times and not exceed 20 - 25 km, especially if the same Kazan or K-154 Tiger (advanced 971 ave. With increased acoustic secrecy) will make the transition from the Barents Sea to the Norwegian Sea at speeds up to 7 nodes.
Towed GAS «Sonar 2087»
Above, we talked about the most advanced state-of-the-art sonar complex AN / BQQ-10 installed on the Sea Wolf and Virginia class submarines, while the integrated bow “Bulbovy” type SAC will be installed on Type 26 frigates “Global Combat Ship” AN / SQS-53B / C. Despite the fact that they are equipped with Ticonderoga class cruisers and Arleigh Burke class destroyers, the range in the 2 convergence zone (in the passive mode) reaches only 120 km in normal hydrological conditions, which is noticeably less than that of AN / BQQ-10. Based on this, it is easy to determine that even under conditions of a small storm, the detection range of “Ash” class submarines can barely reach 12 km. The situation and the presence of GUS with Sonar 2087 (Type 2087) flexible extended towed antenna (GPBA) do not “smooth out” the situation. It is a low-frequency sonar instrument - an analogue of the domestic station "Vignette-EM" and is represented by a flexible sound-transparent composite tube with hundreds of piezoelectric elements-receivers of pressure generated by hydroacoustic waves from underwater and surface facilities. In addition to several hundred highly sensitive hydrophones (operating in the frequency range from 1 to 3 kHz), the design is equipped with a sound-emitting towed device for operation in active mode. Its range can be 140-150 km versus a “surface ship” target, while modern MAPL or SSBN can be found at 50-75 km distance in favorable hydrological conditions and similar 12-15 km - in storm conditions.
From all of the above, we conclude that even 20 or 25 26 “global warships” of the “GCS” type will not be able to control the entire 1300-kilometer stretch of the North Atlantic for the operation of our submarines. The additional attraction of anti-submarine aircraft P-8A "Poseidon" and P-3C "Orion" only superficially "brighten up the situation" due to the formation of a denser network of radio-hydro-acoustic buoys.