We all remember the degree of hysteria that arose in the Western media in April 2014, immediately after the observation flight of the Russian tactical reconnaissance Su-24MR marine aviation Black Sea fleet in the immediate vicinity of the American destroyer URO DDG-75 USS "Donald Cook". As you know, this action was a worthy demonstration of the Russian presence at the strategically important southwestern high-speed aircraft at a rather crucial moment when the Republic of Crimea came under the control of the Russian Federation. Twelve attacks of "Drying" of an attacking nature were enough for later 27 sailors-crew members of the "trump" Aegis destroyer to submit dismissal reports. Our military analytical and news the resources immediately began to claim that the KS-418E containers of the Khibiny electronic warfare complex placed on Sushka’s suspensions had successfully blinded the AN / SPY-1D (V) radar systems, paralyzing the operation of the air defense circuit terminals of the Aegis combat information and control system . Later it turned out that the “Khibin” on the pendants of the Guards “Fencer” that had flown out of the AvB was not there at all: the jingoistic patriotic surge sharply decreased. Why, then, did this situation demoralize the crew of the Donald Cook?
First of all, the mere appearance of the Su-24MR link rather alarmed the crew of the American destroyer, who was well aware of the complex military-political situation around the Crimea (no one could expect a staff aggressor here). Secondly, Donald Cook was probably taken to be accompanied by the M-101 “Bayonet” side-mounted side-view radar system, the radiation of which forced the radiation warning system integrated into the EW AN / SLQ-32 complex to react accordingly. Naturally, this could not but cause even more confusion at the operator's places in the hall of the management of the Aegis BIUS. In short, the task of intimidating the American sailors on the ultra-modern anti-missile destroyer of the US Navy in the area of responsibility of the Black Sea Fleet was performed on 5 +. Moreover, let's not forget that coastal anti-ship batteries K-300P "Bastion-P" had been given at least one active-passive radar complex for long-distance over-the-horizon detection and target designation "Monolit-B" developed by Tayfun Scientific and Production Enterprise OJSC »And deployed on the heights of the southern part of the coast of Crimea. In the passive mode, Monolith-B is capable of detecting radio-emitting objects at a distance of about 250 km and accompanying the 10 of them. Consequently, in conjunction with the onboard means of the DER Su-24MR, Monolith-B completely determined the radar profile of the Donald Cook, which in the future will allow it to create new frequency algorithms for the operation of Russian EW airborne facilities.
With reference to the classic Aegis system with operating radar facilities, these algorithms will be valid for several years, because the first one can boast a lot of technological flaws. The most significant of these is the use of single-channel parabolic radar for illumination and targeting (also called radar “searchlights” of continuous radiation) AN / SPG-62 with a diameter of 2,3 antenna array m. These stations with 10 kW power operate in X-, Ku- and J -wave ranges (from 8 to 20 GHz) and are intended for direct illumination of targets to anti-aircraft guided missiles with semi-active radar homing heads such as RIM-67D (SM-2ER Block III), RIM-156A (SM-2ER Block IV), and also RIM -162 ESSM designed to intercept you okomanevrennyh RCC and flies WTO. The problem is that the number of AN / SPG-62 RPN placed on Aegis ships of various types varies from 2 to 4 units. Consequently, at the moment of directly reflecting the massive “star raid” of anti-ship missiles and other air attack means, only 2, 3 or 4 target channels of simultaneous illumination are activated, despite the fact that the computing means of the Mk 99 fire control subsystem (main air defense / missile defense) are capable of Simultaneously adjust the flight 22 missiles of various types.
At that moment, when one of the targets is destroyed, the Mk 99 sends to the “released” radar AN / SPG-62 target designation for a new target (and so on for each of - 2-x, 3-x or 4-x RPN). In the case when the enemy anti-ship missiles are moving the ship with a dense “swarm” of 16, 20 or more units, the three radar “searchlights” of destroyers like “Arley Burk” are simply not enough to highlight all of the enemy’s missiles and the “semi-active Standards” will simply “leave” into milk ", because the MRLS AN / SPY-1D works in decimeter S-band, which does not realize such high accuracy qualities for highlighting targets that are subject to centimeter X-band. The massive use of the X-41 Mosquito, 3М55 Onyx or 3М54E Caliber missiles allows you to quickly load and exceed all permissible AN / SPG-62 throughput qualities, which will result in multiple hits and vehicle decommissioning.
To eliminate this flaw, the American company Raytheon developed the ultra-long-range anti-aircraft guided missile RIM-174 ERAM (SM-6), which has a range of 300 — 350 km. Its main trump card, in contrast to the SM-2, is the presence of an active radar homing head, developed on the basis of ARGSN AIM-120C / D AMRAAM air-to-air missiles. Active radar guidance allows you to get away from the need for constant illumination from the AN / SPG-62. The “Sixth Standards” on the march section of the trajectory can receive target designation from both the SPG-62 and the AN / SPY-1D multifunctional radar system, while the final section of the missile will be induced solely according to its own ARGSN. But it is worth noting that with the help of only one type of RIM-174 ERAM missiles, it is extremely difficult to comprehensively solve the problem of protecting Arley Burke from modern, unobtrusive means of air attack. The snag here is in the technical features of the interceptor missiles, as well as in the outdated Aegis radar architecture. And now more.
Ranged ZUR RIM-174 ERAM, equipped unified with antimissile «SM-3» starting RDTT Mk 72 and sustainer SPRM Mk 104, seamlessly reaches 270-300-kilometer boundaries due to the high specific impulse in 265 seconds and acceleration up to speed in 5M and more . Yes, it is great for intercepting remote air command posts, DRLO airplanes, tactical fighters and non-maneuvering cruise missiles and ballistic targets “loaded” with weapons, but absolutely useless against modern supersonic and hypersonic Onyx or Zircon anti-ship missiles. After capturing the same "Onyx" through the homing head RIM-174, the first is able to perform anti-aircraft maneuvers with overloads more than 15G at medium and high altitude. For a successful interception, “Standard-6” should “squeeze” around 45 — 50 units, which is not technically designed for, exactly like other SAMs of the Standard-2 family.
For such a high-energy maneuvering, another SAM is great - RIM-162A ESSM. The product has a radius of 50 km, a maximum flight speed of 4350 km / h and the ability to maneuver with 50 overloads. and more. This became possible due to the introduction of a gas jet thrust vector deflection system, represented by 4 aerodynamic planes in the nozzle channel. At the same time, the RIM-162A is equipped with a semi-active radar seeker that needs to be illuminated by the SPG-62. The latter is a conventional parabolic antenna with an extremely narrow lobe of the radiation pattern. This provides extremely high breeding opportunities for “capturing” individual targets in the group, but makes the station very vulnerable to directed electronic interference emitted by modern air-based EW stations. Someone may argue that the more noise-free AN / SPY-1D will correct the AN / SPG-62 “capture” stall and the guidance process will be restored, but there are also some pitfalls here.
Firstly, the AN / SPY-1D complex is built on the basis of 4's passive phased antenna arrays of 4350 MRP each. As is known, passive HEADLIGHTS, unlike active ones, have much lower noise immunity and the impossibility of forming “zero sectors” of the radiation pattern in the direction of interference sources. Such a flaw is observed in connection with the use of a single microwave traveling-wave tube in the PPAR, which is not capable at the required moment to use the required group of receiving-transmitting modules. In AFAR, the parameters of the “petals” of the radiation pattern are predominantly set by amplifiers placed in each PPM. As you can see, all the flaws of the current Aegis IIC focus mostly on the shortcomings of radar tools. However, over the next 5 - 7 years everything can change dramatically.
According to the Military Analytical Resource “Military Parity” with reference to the portal www.defense-aerospace.com, September 7 2017 of the year, on the ground of the Hawaiian Islands, successful field tests of the promising American shipborne multifunctional radar complex AN / SPY-6 (V ) AMDR (“Air and Missile Defense Radar”), which should replace the aging AN / SPY-1D (V). The exercise consisted in the simultaneous detection and stable tracking of several different types of air targets at the same time — operational-tactical ballistic missiles and air-based cruise missiles. The product coped well with the assigned tasks, but what are its features and how it differs radically from the usual AN / SPY-1D (V).
In the advanced ship radar AMDR, all the best technological developments of the end of the 20th - beginning of the 21st century are embodied. In particular, the antenna canvases of this station are built on AFAR-technology, which will make it possible to achieve an order of magnitude higher noise immunity and reliability in the event of failure of a certain number of receiving-transmitting modules. It is also known that the antenna grids AN / SPY-6 (V) will be made on the basis of gallium nitride, capable of operating at temperatures in 200 ° С, while for antenna arrays based on gallium arsenide, the normal temperature is considered to be the indicator in 50 ° С . As a result, each AMDR AMR radar can work with 3-x or 4-x power excess compared to standard GaAs-based MIS modules.
Modular antenna post prototype MRLS AN / SPY-6 AMDR
According to the official website of Raytheon, this will increase the target detection range by about 2 (standard targets with EPR around 5 and 2 can be detected at a distance of 500 - 700 km; of course, with a high altitude of 25 - 35 km) . Targets with 0,01 m2 EPR may be dialed at a distance of 120 - 150 km. The number of aerospace attacks accompanied by AN / SPY-6 can also increase by 3 - 4 times in comparison with the standard PFAR-RLK AN / SPY-1D (V) and make up 900 - 1200 units, having overtaken the indicators of the British radar Sampson ". In order to preserve the long-range capabilities, AMDR will also operate in the S-band (at the 2-4 GHz frequency), and therefore, to target missiles with PARGSN, centimeter RPN will be required.
Layout of a deeply modernized EM URO class "Arleigh Burke Flight III". You can see the left antenna post from the X-band on-load tap-changer of the new generation, which should replace the AN / SPG-62 (however, the standard SPG-62 is noticeable) on the side-mounted main superstructure. Also considered is the option of placing a multi-channel AFAR-radar for illumination of the front hemisphere in the central part of the superstructure, with a slight excess relative to the AN / SPY-6 canvases
Their role will be fulfilled by the already non-primitive 1-channel “searchlight plates” of the continuous illumination AN / SPG-62, but small AFAR sheets “looking” in the same direction as the AMDR antenna arrays. It will be much more difficult to break their work using noise or directional noise, and each such canvas will be able to “capture” up to two or three dozen enemy ballistic or aerodynamic objects. Under the updated AN / SPY-6 AMDR radar image, the MK 99 FCS hardware and software structure will have to be redrawn, which should significantly reduce the response time to all known types of threats, especially against the background of the appearance of hypersonic anti-ship missiles, such as Zircon.
The first serial AN / SPY-6 multi-function radars will begin to install Arleigh Burke Flight III on American EMPARS in a few years, which will complicate our anti-ship potential in the ocean zone. Moreover, in accordance with last year's consultations of the command of the American fleet with the leadership of the shipbuilding giant Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII), the 4-sided antenna post of the AMDR radar complex can be placed on the main superstructure of the LPD-17 helicopter-dock San Antonio »Together with the MUP 41 UVPU into several hundred transport and launch containers, as part of the project of a heavy surface missile defense ship. To ignore such disturbing "bells" would be extremely stupid.