The decisive battle of the First World War. East Prussian operation 1914 of the year. About the transfer of buildings from the West

31
As we noted, the most important strategic consequence of the East Prussian operation for the Russian Front of the First World War was the ability to defeat the main mass of the Austro-Hungarian troops in Galicia. But there was another major strategic consequence - which affected the course of the entire struggle of the Entente, decisive for the outcome of the war.

Under the influence of the victories of the 1 and 2 armies under Gumbinnen and at Orlau-Frankenau, the German High Command decided, by weakening the strike force on the French front, to transfer a number of formations to East Prussia. The 3 corps came into motion: the Guards Reserve, being withdrawn from the 2 Army, the 11 Army from the 3 Army (and also the 8 Cavalry Division) departed to East Prussia, and the 5 Army Corps was withdrawn from the composition of the army of the Kronprinz and prepared for the transfer (although it was not sent, but could not take part in the decisive battles in France). Moreover, the Guards Reserve and 11 Army Corps were taken from the composition of the troops before this weakened and responsible right flank.



Yu. N. Danilov described the reasons why the corps were removed from the shock flank of the German Western Front: the situation in the east seemed urgent to the German command, and such connections were assigned to the transfer that could be shipped by rail faster than others. The general noted that the decision taken by the German High Command to transfer forces (and from the flank that had bypassed the French) to the Russian front was a factor of great importance for the further course of the war on the Western Front. This decision not only numerically weakened the blow delivered to the Anglo-French, but also denied the destructive influence on the morale and will to victory of the German command. [Danilov Yu. N. Russia in World War. C. 180].


Infantry General Yu.N. Danilov

The strategic planning of A. von Schlieffen - G. von Moltke was destroyed - the Germans did not have enough of these compounds in the West, especially in the days of the Marne Battle.

So considered Soviet military historians and experts.
Professor Prof. A. Melikov, describing the "indiscriminate mad offensive" of Russian troops in East Prussia, noted the fact of weakness in the strategic purposefulness on the part of Moltke Jr., who withdrew from the main direction (right flank of the German armies advancing on Paris) I transferred them to the Russian front. This decision had the hardest consequences for the German troops - after all, these buildings, so necessary during the Battle of the Marne, in the right place and the right time was not [Melikov V. A. Strategic deployment from the experience of the First Imperialist War 1914-1918. and the Civil War in the USSR. T. 1. M., 1939. C. 306].

Colonel F. Khramov wrote that such a serious weakening of the shock group of the right flank of the German forces in the West was certainly one of the most important reasons for the unsuccessful outcome of the Marn battle. And the Russians, who forced the German command to begin the transfer of part of the forces from the Western Front to the Eastern Front, rendered serious assistance to France - which was of crucial strategic importance for the further course of the war. [Temples F. Decree. cit. C. 20].

Major General of the Soviet Army, member of the First World and Civil Wars M. R. Galaktionov completely agrees with them. [Cm. Galaktionov M.R. Paris. 1914 M.-SPb., 2001].

Military historians of the Russian emigration agree with Soviet historians.

Thus, the front-line general Baron A. P. Budberg noted that the absence of the 11 Army and Guards reserve corps, which were taken from the right-flank 3 and 2 armies moving on the shock flank of the German offensive, had a negative effect on the Germans 21-24 August - in the Border Battle in the region of Dinan-Charleroi. The critical 5-French army suffered a very serious failure - and it escaped from the encirclement and subsequent destruction only because the German 2-th and 3-th army, acting against it, were weakened by these 2 corps. The German armies did not have enough reserves to complete this operation. This, in turn, saved the British army, because after the liquidation of its neighbor, it would be cut off from the French and defeated. But even this is insignificant in comparison with those extremely important consequences - fatal for the Germans and saving for the Anglo-French - which became the inevitable consequence of the absence of these buildings in the fateful days of the Marnian battle of 4 - 9 of September [Budberg A.P. The Armed Forces of the Russian Empire in the performance of all-Union tasks and duties during the 1914 — 1917 war. Paris, 1939. C. 6].

A war veteran, Professor General N. N. Golovin, believed that the transfer of German corps from the French front to the Russian side in August 1914 was the most blatant strategic mistake that any of the belligerents made during the First World War [Golovin N.N. From stories 1914 campaigns on the Russian front. The plan of war. Paris, 1936. C. 253].

But maybe this is an exaggeration, and the role of the transfer did not have such a crucial strategic tinge at all? What do the winners themselves say on Marne? After all, according to the logic of things, it makes no sense to focus on the merits of an ally - on the contrary, one should only emphasize their contribution to the achievement of this strategic victory.

Marshal J. Joffre testified to the Russians deep gratitude for effective helpthey showed the French army in a tragic time when Germany tried to crush Belgium, France and England. Consciously breaking the basic rules of war for the good of the coalition, Russia threw its forces into East Prussia earlier than they were concentrated and ready. Marshal noted that he would never forget those heavy sacrifices to which the Russian army consciously and heroically doomed themselves, forcing the enemy to turn on her [Budberg A.P. Decree. cit. C. 7].

Marshal F. Foch admitted that by “active intervention” the Russian troops had diverted a significant part of the German forces and this allowed allies "Win on the marne" [Foch F. Memoirs (war 1914 — 1918). M., 1939. C. 186].

General Dupont wrote that when the 2 of the German corps and the cavalry division were withdrawn from the French front, "These measures were probably our salvation". The general, exclaiming, recommended presenting what serious consequences could have happened if 7 of September the Guards reserve corps were on the front between the 1 and 2 armies, and the 11 body and 8 September kavdivision 9 of September were in their 3 Army at Fe Champenois. He clearly mentioned the weakness of the character of G. Moltke, who had removed the 2 corps and the division, in order to send them to Russia as the first reason for the loss of the Marne battle by the Germans [DuPont. German High Command (from the German point of view). M., 1923. C. 88].

General S. Mangein wrote that the Allies should never forget about the help of Poccia, who launched the military campaign “unexpectedly quickly” - thanks to which the 2 of the German corps departed from the French front, being absent from it during the Marne battle. General A.A. Nissel, noting how critical the situation of the Allies was on the Marne, believed that the reduction of the German army of the Western Front on the 2 corps and the division was the burden that tipped the scales of fate onto the side of the Allies. General Kunyak wrote that after a heavy defeat at Gumbinnen, the German Main Apartment made a serious mistake by sending the 2 corps against the Russians - because of this, it did not have strategic reserves during the Marne battle. Colonel de Witt Guizot, noted the merits of Russia, which, in order to help out the Allies, bravely launched an offensive, knocking the Germans over from Gumbinnen. The German General Staff was forced to withdraw infantry divisions from the French front 4 - and the Russians did a great service to their allies. [Budberg A.P. Decree. cit.].

The same was the opinion of other allies.
W. Churchill, noting the speed of the Russian invasion of East Prussia, wrote that this fact hit the nerves of the ranks of the German General Staff that the 2 German corps was heading east from the right wing of the German Marne forces. As noted by W. Churchill - "This fact had a decisive influence on the fate of the outcome of the battle" and the king and his heroic warriors should "be given great honor" [Budberg A.P. Decree op].

A British military agent in Russia, A. Knox, also noted that the absence of corps and a cavalry division from the right wing of the German Western Front to the East Prussia in France was of paramount importance for the battle of Marne. [Knox A. With the Russian army 1914-1917. London, 1921. P. 92].

American Colonel H. T. Naylor wrote that the Battle of Marne "was won by the Russian Cossacks" [Budberg A.P. Decree op].

The British military theorist and war veteran B. Liddel-Harth adhered to the same point of view. [Liddel — Garth B. Encyclopedia of the art of war. M.-SPb, 2003. C. 470-473].



On the march

Well, the Germans, what is their opinion?

E. Ludendorff, the “brain” of the German Eastern Front, noted the special importance of the fact that the reinforcements allocated for the east “were taken from the right wing, on which the decisive task lay” [Ludendorff E. von. Decree. cit. C. 61]. He wrote: “The right wing of the West German army was not strong enough and captured an insufficient front,” noticing that the absence of the Guards reserve and 11 corps felt ominously. [Ibid. C. 72]. The general complains that if G. Moltke didn’t send these units to East Prussia, then everything would be fine ... the offensive on the Western Front was wrecked because of the fact that Moltke had taken these troops - that’s why the “drama on Marne” [Budberg A.P. Decree. cit. C. 9].

E. von Falkenhayn testified that it made itself felt strongly about the weakening of the Germanic Western Front — it significantly increased the numerical superiority of the Anglo-French. The compounds withdrawn for transfer were drawn from the shock wing of the front - and their absence was especially sensitive during the decisive battle on the Marne, and after it [Falkengine E. von. High Command 1914 — 1916 in its most important decisions. M., 1923. C. 20]. Moreover, the general reiterated this sad fact: “The weakening of the western army ... was unacceptable. ... the absence of troops taken from the Western Front made me feel acutely - and it is hardly possible to sufficiently emphasize the disastrous influence of this fact on the course of the war [Ibid. C. 29]. He noted that the task of achieving a quick military solution, which was the basis of the German plan of war, was reduced to zero. Especially fraught with the consequence that the troops assigned to the Russian front were taken from the right - strike - flank. [Budberg A.P. Decree. cit.].

Colonel-General G.I.-L. von Moltke noted that the transfer of forces from west to east due to the surprise strike of the Russian armies in East Prussia "was a mistake that avenged itself on Marne." The situation on the Russian front "required to send reinforcements to this front before a decisive victory was achieved in the west" [Yemets V. A About the role of the Russian army in the first period of the world war 1914 — 1918. // Historical notes. Issue 77. M., 1965 C. 76].

The decisive battle of the First World War. East Prussian operation 1914 of the year. About the transfer of buildings from the West

"Responsible" transfer G. von Moltke

Field Marshal P. Hindenburg complained that this transfer led to the separation of the existing forces - they deviated from one goal, and the other could not reach [K. Perepelovsky. The Role and Importance of the Russian Front in the 1914 — 1917 War. according to foreign military sources // Military Profit. 1971. No. 111. C. 9].

Representatives of the German officers adhered to the same point of view. For example, Major G. Schmidt wrote that the impression of the Gumbinnen defeat was very strong - and from the troops fighting near Paris, 2 corps and a cavalry division were sent to East Prussia. This event made it impossible to win on the Marne, respectively, led to a retreat, and had a detrimental significance for the entire course of the war, because it broke the hopes for its victorious and speedy end [Budberg A.P. Decree. cit. C. 10].

The military historian O. von Moser also considered sending two corps from the right flank of German forces in the West to East Prussia - a particularly unsuccessful and fatal event of the German command. [Moser O. von. A brief strategic overview of world war 1914 - 1918's. M., 1923. C. 32].

Thus, the strategic results of the East Prussian operation were expressed in that the Russians, keeping the German troops from assisting the allies-Austrians, were able to inflict a severe defeat on Austria-Hungary on the main thing - the Galician - theater, and in the decisive period of operations on the French front were distracted by 2 corps itself and a cavalry division from the German forces operating on the Marne.

The latter circumstance was the most important outcome of the operation for the entire Entente bloc and a key factor for the outcome of the war. After the transfer of these formations, the Entente had already won the First World War in the long run - after all, Marne had marked a gradual transition to a protracted positional war. And a long war on several fronts attracted the inevitable defeat of Germany and, accordingly, the entire bloc led by it.
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  1. +6
    7 September 2017 07: 44
    Yu.N. Danilov- Since 1918 in the Red Army, he led a group of military experts at the Soviet delegation in negotiations with the central powers in Brest-Litovsk. In March 1918, he was a member of the Commission of Military Specialists on the development of a plan for the transformation of the military center for the reorganization of the armed forces. At the end of March 1918 he retired. He left for Ukraine, then moved to the location of the Volunteer Army. In the fall of 1920, he served as assistant chief of the Military Directorate of the Russian Army in Crimea. He emigrated to Constantinople, then lived in Paris. The author of military historical works on the participation of the Russian army in the First World War, his research on the first stage of the war is especially valuable. Biographer of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. He died in 1937 in Paris.
  2. +14
    7 September 2017 07: 56
    Author: "Thus, the strategic results of the East Prussian operation were expressed in the fact that the Russians, having restrained the German troops from assisting the Austrian allies, were able to inflict a heavy defeat on Austria-Hungary on the main theater of Galicia, and during the decisive period of operations in the French the front was distracted by 2 corps and a cavalry division from the German forces operating on the Marne.
    .
    .
    The conclusion is obvious, proven and recognized by all but witnesses of the Bolsheviks ..
    Russia saved France, thereby saving itself from the 1941 disaster. The difficult but wise decision of the country's leadership to carry out an offensive in V. Prussia saved in the end Millions of Russian lives and was the first significant step towards the defeat of Germany
    1. 0
      7 September 2017 12: 16
      I didn’t understand something.
  3. +22
    7 September 2017 09: 45
    When Churchill wrote that the tsar and his soldiers should be given great honor, even when “the present ungrateful generation will not be in the world,” he should probably have foreseen that future generations will be ungrateful in the square. A person’s memory is short, and the state "memory" is even shorter
    1. +5
      7 September 2017 11: 08
      A person’s memory is short, and the state "memory" is even shorter

      It's just another state, NEROSSIA. He captured Russia, defeated, - and the attitude towards it is appropriate: to slander, smear with dirt, defame.
      1. +18
        7 September 2017 11: 27
        Foreigners, this is also oh. As I understand it, Churchill had in mind European society,
    2. +3
      7 September 2017 12: 21
      Churchill himself was awesomely "grateful", at the beginning of 45 he asked for the help of the Soviets and exalted Russia in every possible way, and in the spring of 45 he was preparing to fight with it, and in the summer he asked the Americans to bomb Moscow with nuclear bombs. Stalin, of course, is a villain and a criminal, but Churchill is no better Perhaps. Plus, the defeat of Dresden in February 45, that would have been Moscow to spoil and scare her.
  4. +16
    7 September 2017 10: 19
    Thanks to the author for the interesting article!
  5. +2
    7 September 2017 11: 56
    But nothing that the corps did not belong to the shock group? Until August 25, the GRK and the XI Corps stormed the Namur fortress, after the fall of the last forts of the GRK receives an order to join the 2nd Army, and the XI Corps to the 3rd. But they could not immediately come out to join the corps, it took time to put the troops in order. So the order to advance to the Eastern Front was received on August 26, in fact the advance was launched on August 27.
    At that time, the 2nd Army was on the line of the towns of Marbe-Boulogne-Furmi, if you use the most convenient routes through the Philippville-Courve-Chime or Charleroi-Beaumont-Chime, then for joining the left flank of the 2nd Army in the area of ​​Furmi GRK to overcome about 100 km, if we take the average pace of advance of the advancing hulls of 20 km per day, the GRK lagged behind the main forces by 5 transitions, taking into account the willingness to perform on August 27, by about 6-7 transitions. At the same time, XI Corps must be thrown through Philippville, and the road through Charleroi was used to transport 7 reserve corps (sent for the siege of Mobège).
    I read somewhere that von Bülow, after the fall of Namur, completely refused reinforcements, believing that he already had enough strength.
    1. +18
      7 September 2017 12: 22
      On August 26th, it’s probably in a new style.
      In our opinion - minus 13 days.
      The shock group is, after all, 1, 2, 3 armies.
      Okay, the French and British - the highest German generals admit that these corps: were on the strike wing and that their transfer had a very negative impact on subsequent events.
      In any case, such a powerful reserve as 2 corps, given the balance of forces, would be far from superfluous on the Marne
      1. +1
        7 September 2017 13: 07
        In our opinion - minus 13 days.

        Well, so the 2nd army did not stand still.
        Okay, the French and British - the highest German generals admit that these corps: were on the strike wing and that their transfer had a very negative impact on subsequent events.

        Well, still, then you have to blame yourself for captain-mood, and then in a panic.
        The order was to join the left flank, and the hull was needed on the right, for another time. Plus the ratio of forces: 1 GRK against 3 buildings of the British. Enough for a panic?
        1. +21
          7 September 2017 13: 43
          Sometimes the fly will sit on the side of the bar - and the second will outweigh) And then there are already 2 bodies
          You know, after all, the Germans lacked reserves on the Marne, and the French army of Monouri was so feverishly formed.
          And by the way, that all the chiefs of the field General Staff during the war (Moltke, Falkenhayn, Hindenburg) say the same thing about this transfer - it is worth a lot. Moreover, those of them who had nothing to do with her.
          Hindenburg cannot be blamed for the panic - the comrade was balanced like an elephant))
          1. 0
            7 September 2017 17: 23
            You do not understand, this is the number of transitions to which both corps will lag behind their armies, and the GRK will be more difficult than the XI corps, the flank is entering.
            Of course, otherwise we would have to disassemble the actions of Kluk, who, in pursuit of the British, shifted to the Bulov offensive zone leaving the right flank of his army (i.e. the flank of the entire right wing) to the IV reserve corps, the actions of Moltke Jr., who approved this. The reasons for the panic at the headquarters of the 2nd Army, because despite the powerful forces (the 5th Army shot down the cavalry barrier, 3 English corps launched an offensive between the armies), the British attacked slowly, with an eye on it. Kluk had chances, the retreating Germans were not even pursued.
            1. +18
              7 September 2017 17: 29
              Clear
              About the headquarters of the 2nd army. And I thought - for the mood of Moltke.
              But basically, I generally said
              Such a powerful resource as 2 corps and cavalry divisions departed at a crucial moment - the Germans did not have enough of these forces, which they recognize.
              The rest is the details
              1. +8
                7 September 2017 17: 35
                3 cases. 5 AK did not have time to send.
                1. +17
                  7 September 2017 17: 43
                  Yes, of course.
                  3 withdrew, 2 of them went to East Prussia
              2. 0
                7 September 2017 19: 50
                They disappeared at the time of the formation of the Namur strike group (GRK, XI corps, division VII of the Republic of Kazakhstan, heavy artillery, only 107 thousand people). To realize this crucial moment of the GRK (one rather than two corps) you need to catch the difference 6-7 transitions with access to the junction with the 1st Army, and not with the 3rd.
                It’s just convenient to say “couldn’t” instead of digging in dirty laundry.
                1. +16
                  7 September 2017 21: 13
                  Please tell me, are the calculations of such experts who analyzed the balance of power in the Border and Marne battles, like Mikhail Galaktionov (USSR) and Sergey Pereslegin (RF) authoritative for you?
                  1. 0
                    8 September 2017 10: 11
                    I didn’t read Pereslegin, M. Galaktionov-do you mean the book "Paris. 1914 (the pace of operations)"?
                    There, in chapter 2. March to Paris, Schlieffen's initial plan of 1905 is given. According to him, out of 72 APs, 61 APs should perform a maneuver of entry, 12 territorial brigades are intended for the siege of French and Belgian fortresses, 8 “ersatz corps” for the siege of Paris. In fact, west of Verdun, Moltke had not 60, but about 40 PD. Another 7 PD were transferred to the left wing (as they developed, they should have been transferred to the right wing, but they refused it after the Border Battle), 4 PD were sent to the Eastern Front (GRK and XI Corps), 4 divisions besieged Antwerp (3 and 9 reserve corps), 2 detachments besieged Mobierz (8 res. corps), 1 division of Zhive (24 reserve), 2 divisions were between Verdun and Thionville, to repel the French attack from the Verdun-Tul area, 8 corps of ersatz were or wasted, or not formed. With a front width of 4 km for the division, the right wing could not maintain a deployment front of 240 km (according to the plan), but only 160 km, which portended gaps with a total length of up to 80 km.
                    T.O. Galaktionov (as Svechin A.A. or Nefedov D.F.) does not distinguish 2 corps from the total mass of "missing" troops.
                    1. +16
                      8 September 2017 10: 46
                      Yes, Paris 1914 (pace of operations).
                      Galaktionov S. 586. in the table analyzes the balance of forces on the Western Front from August 15 to September 4.
                      And it turns out that if on the right wing of the Franco-German Front on August 22, 36 German divisions opposed 27 allied, then on August 28 - 23 German divisions opposed 29 allied. That is, the balance of power has changed a lot, the strike flank of the Germans has lost a significant amount of its power. And the transfer to the East takes first place in this matter.
                      Galaktionov in S. 587 writes about the reasons for the change in balance: "Germany: the allocation of two buildings to the east, and only then - the allocation of units to the blockade of Antwerp, Maubeuge, for the security service, etc.
                      S. Pereslegin, a well-known modern analyst and historian, in comments on B. Tuckman’s book “The First Blitzkrieg” in his essay “Schlieffen’s Plan in Action” analyzes the transformations of the plan - Moltke’s short stories that did not fundamentally distort the Schlieffen scheme in S. 563. writes about this transfer to the east: "The corps was taken from the armies of the right wing. Now it has finally become weak."
                      And all in a row all the generals and historians of the French, British and Germans cannot be mistaken - the fact is. Nuances regarding transitions, etc., are nuances that correct time and movement. And 2 corps and cavalry division is actually an army group. And sometimes, as you know, a battalion can outweigh the scales.
                      1. +1
                        8 September 2017 11: 33
                        But nothing that the GRK and the XI corps allocated in the "Namur strike group" before August 19? As of August 25, they are not in the table, not because they are directed to the Eastern Front, but because they storm Namur. The assault is over on August 25, but up to the 2nd and 3rd armies about 100 km on foot (along the shortest route that is already taken), and it takes time to put the troops in order. Does one of the authors explain how to do this, taking into account the fact that the advancing armies themselves were actively moving forward? (1st Army before the battles on the Urk River, 2nd Army before the battles in the Send Gond swamps). How do you "correct" the nuance of 6-7 transitions? Double time? And so they were committed, 35-40 km. The 3rd and 9th corps generally made about 120 km in two days (“castling” on the orders of Kluk, this is an example of the “simplicity” of marching from the left flank to the right), but still did not have time.
    2. +8
      7 September 2017 14: 02
      Those. would advance from Namur on August 26-27, and the Allied counterattack and the September 5-7 fracture. Those. 10 days (minimum) to reach the allies by the beginning of their counteroffensive, and even more to fend off it. And 3 corps and 1 cavalry division is a very serious trump card.
  6. +2
    7 September 2017 18: 27
    In war, everyone makes mistakes, and Moltke is no exception. I respect and honor Suvorov, but he gave the battle of Novi, where a strong French army was entrenched in good positions, contrary to meaning. It is clear that a soldier is a soldier, but it was possible to maneuver and impose battle in the best conditions, as Turenn always did.
    1. +2
      7 September 2017 20: 19
      Quote: Novel 11
      but it was possible to maneuver and impose battle in the best conditions

      The question is whether there was such an opportunity. The French are not fools, but the allies we had in mind.
      1. +1
        7 September 2017 22: 26
        Quote: Dart2027
        The question is whether there was such an opportunity.

        That is the difference between Suvorov and Kutuzov .... The latter did not want to accept the battle on the Vorobyovy Gory and, recognizing the position unfit at the council at Fili, made the right decision - to keep the army and leave the capital. After Borodino, Suvorov would most likely continue the battle and I don’t know how it would end, but if we lost the army, we definitely lost the war ..... there was simply no one to restrain it. On the eve of winter Napoleon would hardly have moved to Peter; rather, he would have gone to Kiev to put an end to Tormasov’s army. And as early as next year, having exhausted Kiev region and the southern provinces, he would have launched an attack on the northern capital. There wasn’t much to think about, 100 years before that, the 12th did the same, except that ours in the fortifications near Smolensk did not give him the road to Moscow.

        This is an alternative, but Napoleon carefully studied the wars of the past and the campaign of Charles the 12th in particular.
        1. +1
          7 September 2017 23: 04
          Napoleon in the company of 1812 looks like a frankly stupid person, I don’t know what he studied there, but to the east, to Moscow, he walked like a mousetrap.
          I would think that we wouldn’t lose for any one. If there were a second Borodino (continued) then the French would also suffer losses, they would come to Moscow with their last gasp, so for any winter they would end.
        2. 0
          8 September 2017 05: 57
          Quote: Novel 11
          The latter did not want to accept the battle on the Sparrow Hills and, recognizing the unfit position on the council at Fili, made the right decision

          True, only you forget that he was at home, and Suvorov in a foreign country. Kutuzov had the opportunity to maneuver, but whether Suvorov had it was a question.
  7. +17
    7 September 2017 19: 03
    Russia as usual takes chestnuts out of the fire. Thanks to the author for the article. Plus
  8. +12
    7 September 2017 20: 28
    Great article. As always, performed at a high, informative level. To the author - my appreciation for the work done! hi
  9. +16
    8 September 2017 11: 53
    strannik1985,
    How do you "correct" the nuance of 6-7 transitions? Double time? And so they were committed, 35-40 km. The 3rd and 9th corps generally made about 120 km in two days (“castling” on the orders of Kluk, this is an example of the “simplicity” of marching from the left flank to the right), but still did not have time.

    The battle itself could unfold differently - a new introductory subject to the hulls being introduced. The deadlines could move - after all, "time to time, time to time" was happening in the reality of that existing force grouping.
    And it’s quite possible to drop them by rail as well - by the way both buildings were in the respective areas, and Yu. Danilov wrote for good reason that they were thrown over - it was easier with transportation.
    By the way, in the Reichsarchive there is a whole volume devoted to the work of German railway transport - there are amusing schemes regarding this transfer.
    1. +1
      8 September 2017 16: 31
      If Kluk turns and the GRK is in time, then instead of 2 corps of the 1st Army (left), cavalrymen and scooters of the 2nd Army (in ReI), the front will occupy the GRK (about 40 km), one corps against units of the 5th Army and 3 corps English expeditionary force.
      Where? On the territory of Belgium and France by rail? Where were there fights yesterday? Seriously? Someone nearby managed to capture rolling stock and cars? Was the railway network intact?
      In its territory, I do not argue, on the territory of Belgium and France attacked on foot.