Net-centrism on paper and in practice

This article raises the question of the importance of understanding the problem of “network-centric” hostilities and their impact on the further construction of the RF Armed Forces, developing weapon systems and control, improving the staff structure, developing tactics, methods and methods of conducting combat operations and offers one solution this question.

Modern armed forces must correctly combine and apply tactical techniques, methods and methods of combat operations, standard operational approaches and technologies in order to successfully perform combat missions in a modern, rapidly changing combat space.

The strongest influence on the forms and methods of warfare has always provided information about both their troops and the enemy and the area where these actions are carried out, but at present information technologies change not only approaches to the development of military equipment and weapons, but increasingly affect questions of changing the principles of organizing the military command system as a whole and organizational changes in the structure of military formations and their tactics.

The result of a breakthrough in information technology was the creation of a control concept on the battlefield, in which control, reconnaissance and defeat systems united into a single network.

This concept is called "network-centric". The ideologists of this concept, Vice-Admiral A. Tsebrovski and D. Garstka, point out that “network-centric wars” are not only the deployment of digital networks in order to ensure both vertical and horizontal integration of all participants in the operation. It is also a change in the tactics of action of promising formations with dispersed battle formations, optimization of the methods of reconnaissance activities, simplification of procedures for coordination and coordination of fire destruction. Moreover, the increase in the combat capabilities of modern formations is a direct consequence of the improved information exchange and the increasing role of the information itself, i.e. implementation of the principles of the new concept.

NATO is implementing the concept of "Integrated network capabilities" (NATO Network Enabled Capabilities), in France - "Information-centric war" (Guerre Infocentre), in Sweden - "Network Defense" (Network Based Defense), in China - "Command and control system , communications, computing, reconnaissance and fire engagement ”(Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Recognizance & Kill), etc.

It is in the “network centrism” that military experts from foreign countries see an innovative tool to enhance the combat capabilities of the reduced armed forces and quite objectively expect to receive economic benefits.

This will allow the creation and implementation of hardware and software systems that collect intelligence data from diverse sources, automate the processing and decryption of incoming information, and form a common intelligence base with distributed access to it.

The basis of information exchange in a single ACS is a picture of the combat situation in which the coordinates of their forces are determined using GPS, and information about the enemy comes from various sources of intelligence.

The created picture of the combat situation is applied to the cartographic basis and displayed on the screen of the onboard PC.

The first experience of operation of the unified ACS of the brigade showed the increased combat capabilities of US Army units due to a significant reduction in the likelihood of "friendly" fire and, consequently, an increased determination of commanders to give timely orders for a fire attack, as well as a reduction in the command and control cycle means of the enemy.

However, the following deficiencies were identified:
- to work with hardware and software requires highly qualified, specially trained personnel;
- receiving, processing information and distributing it to consumers require more and more complex software and hardware;
- limited performance (vulnerability) of data transmission channels and the possibility of their suppression by means of EW;
- high mobility of modern means of destruction and control leads to a decrease in decision-making time.

However, in spite of everything, in the opinion of American military theorists, the troops, relying on joint information support, will become more mobile, will have high impact power, increased survivability and endurance, are capable of rapid operational deployment and immediate use immediately after arriving in the zone of reference fighting and will be able to fight with any opponent with a guaranteed result.

The implementation of this concept will provide an opportunity for geographically distributed armed forces, through their common perception of the picture of the combat situation, to achieve a high level of joint and interrelated actions to achieve goals of various levels and scale in accordance with the plan of the commander of the troops (forces). Technologically, the formation of a unified picture of the combat situation should be based on the widespread use of modern digital information and communication support systems, the development of which is given special attention in the US armed forces and in other developed countries. Further development of information technology will lead to the improvement of software to a level where it can work with minimal human intervention.

Despite the fact that, in practical terms, the development of the network-centric concept has lagged behind the developed technological countries by at least 20-30 years, the Russian Armed Forces are developing practical measures for its implementation.

One of the achievements of the Russian military-industrial complex is the development and testing of the Unified Tactical Management System of the ESU TZ Sozvezdie, designed for integrated troop control using navigation systems, as well as satellite and unmanned brigade-level surveillance equipment.

In addition, the troops implemented a set of intelligence control and communications "Strelets M", which provides a solution to the main tasks:
- command and control,
- communication and information transfer,
- individual and group navigation,
- detection
- measurement of coordinates and target identification,
- targeting,
- data generation for the use of small weapons.

There are changes in the regular structure of the parts. Thus, reconnaissance battalions and control battalions appeared in the brigades of a new type, the task of which would be to receive, process and bring information to the means of fire destruction.

But, despite the actions for the practical implementation of the key provisions of the "network-centric" concept in the troops, the following difficulties arise:

1. There is no clear understanding of the essence of "network-centric" conditions of warfare, some military experts confuse "network-centrism" with computer technology. The lack of a list of means and tasks that the troops must perform, i.e. what is needed for the real needs of the troops. The lack of programs and training methods for the formation of a new tactical thinking among officers.

2. Weak introduction of information technology in the daily activities of the Armed Forces. So, the only experimental set of ESU TZ “Constellation МХNUMX” is located in Alabino, where specialists of the concern “Constellation” in specially equipped classes and on equipment studied the work with the system of 1 ombs officers. When this system is introduced into other parts and connections, in the conditions of lack of training time, there will be an acute shortage of specialists for training, as a result of which this equipment will fall dead in warehouses or in subdivisions.

3. Compliance with the existing organizational structure of the military administration bodies with the modern nature of warfare, determined by the “network-centric” conditions of military operations. The main objectives of the CCS are to change the tactics of units and parts with the dispersal of their battle formations, optimize methods of reconnaissance activities, simplify procedures for coordination and coordination of fire destruction.

Consequently, the platoon, company and battalion with attached units will operate at a considerable distance from each other. If at the brigade level, the "command-reconnaissance-defeat" complex was implemented by the creation of reconnaissance battalions and control battalions, then at the battalion-company-platoon level the task of interaction between fire weapons and reconnaissance weapons is not yet organized and worked out.

4. The economic factor. An increase in the technical equipment of troops by means of reconnaissance, control and communications will increase the effectiveness of the use of a subunit (on fire damage, maneuver, command, survivability, etc.), which will allow the same units to solve more tasks.

However, there are limitations for further growth of technical equipment, since This leads to a significant increase in the cost of such developments.

The development of computer simulators (simulators) and their introduction into the troops will give personnel the necessary knowledge and practical experience in working with modern technologies and information systems, as well as allow the consumer (Armed Forces) to formulate a technical task for weapons, communications, intelligence and control.

5. Weak realization of the potential of modern types of weapons in the army. The lack of units in the skills and practice of using weapons of fire at a maximum range (of firing at long ranges).

To implement the CCS in the brigades of the "new type" it is proposed:

1. Improving the staff structure of the battalion level.

The organizational structure of the unit must comply with the following sequence of actions: detection, orientation, control, defeat. To this end, it is proposed to switch to tactical groups formed on the principle of modular construction, which will be based on the relationship between the range of weapons of a unit and the range of reconnaissance equipment and fire adjustment.

A module is a functionally active member of a group that performs a specific function (solving a specific task).

The elements of the modular structure of tactical groups will be:

a) The command module, which will include:
- intelligence module
- control module
- communication module
- fire adjustment module
- module of military escort
- tactical masking module (smoke, radio masking)
- navigation (topogeoesic) module
- hydrometer module
b) Fighting module - means of fire destruction
c) Combat Support Module:
- RCBZ module
- engineering module
- EW module
d) Rear module:
- technical module
- rear module
- medical module

For example, fire weapons of a motorized rifle squad are small arms and a grenade launcher. The effective firing range is up to 500 m. According to the combat regulations, the front of the defense and the offensive of the squad is up to 100 m, i.e. personnel are located close to each other, which allows for controlling the fire, detecting the enemy, using the necessary minimum of special or improvised means (binoculars, thermal imager, night vision devices, voice, whistle, tracing lines in the direction of the target, CGD of various colors). To solve the problems of navigation, there will be enough GPS beacon with the recognition function of your friend or alien from the squad leader.

A grenade launcher, an anti-tank, a flamethrower, and sometimes an engineer-sapper unit, reconnaissance chemists, and a tank can be attached to a rifle platoon, which increases the effective range of fire weapons to 2000 m.

To conduct reconnaissance at such a depth, it is possible to attach special means, for example, the Fara “Farah” or the laser rangefinder of the remote control 4, and for adjusting their fire, and attached fire weapons of the Pear type UAV with a range of up to 10 km.

For processing, studying, summarizing the information received, displaying the data of the situation is sufficient tablet "TT" or "AK", developed at the SEC "Communication".

As a communication module, use radio stations of the type R-168-0,5 U or R-168-5 UN for communication with the departments. If necessary, actions to cock as guidance aviation he may be given the radio station R-853-B2M.

GPS receivers of the section commanders and a platoon commander’s tablet with maps of the area of ​​upcoming military operations are used as a navigation module.

Tactical masking module - used systems 902 "Cloud", located on military equipment.

If necessary, the SIA "Realia-U" or "Tabun" can be included in the modules of the military escort. In this modular structure, in addition to the platoon commander, the calculation of reconnaissance assets and the calculation of UAVs will be required.

Total, by changing the platoon tactical group using the modular construction method, we can increase the front of the platoon action to 3 km (effective use of fire weapons) with a range of damage that will not allow the enemy to fire a weapon in response. Thereby, the combat capabilities of the platoon (mobility, accuracy of fire damage, survivability level) will increase significantly.

A motorized rifle company can be given an artillery battery, an anti-tank, a grenade launcher, an engineering sapper and a flamethrower subunit, and when operating in isolation from the main forces, an anti-aircraft missile (rocket-artillery, artillery) unit can be used that can be fired at a range to 15 km. Accordingly, other forces and means will be needed to control the units, conduct reconnaissance, adjust the fire, and disguise.

That is, to form tactical groups according to the modular construction method in the battalion, it is advisable to enter into the battalion staff a reconnaissance platoon in which reconnaissance groups, UAVs, information gathering, processing and analysis groups will be assigned, which will be attached to the motorized rifle companies during combat operations, significantly increasing their combat capabilities.

Thus, at the battalion level, the task of organizing tactical groups with the ability to solve various tasks assigned to the unit is solved.

2. Practicing the actions of tactical groups in the classroom for combat training.

During the period of the single training, computer simulators and simulators are widely used for mastering techniques and actions with weapons and for arming combat vehicles. Starting from the moment platoons were coordinated, intelligence units would be assigned to battalion units, where they could work on the main tasks: detecting the enemy at the maximum range of firing means, determining the data for firing and adjusting fire. Control exercises on fire training in the period of coordination consider exercises on fire control. Tactical training sessions should be conducted in the form of bilateral team games.

In conducting classes, use new controls, reconnaissance and communications: near-ground reconnaissance stations, night vision devices, thermal imagers, UAVs, tablets for displaying the situation data, equipping them with company-level battalion commanders. If possible, use technical tools and software civilian counterparts, conducting a comparative analysis between them. For effective work in this direction to reward commanders for their rationalization work, showing the best results or offering an unusual solution.

3. Testing long range shooting.

Execution of firing at long distances or from closed firing positions will allow: to provide shelter from ground observation of the enemy when firing, provide masking from various types of reconnaissance of the enemy, allow you to have comfortable and hidden access roads, to maneuver forces and means. In the course of firing, commanders acquire the skills to use means of defeating subunits at maximum range, organizing reconnaissance of targets; classification of targets by importance, setting fire missions and maneuvering fire. Above all, it is in these exercises that it is most convenient to use the BLAH to perform a fire adjustment.

Using the principles of modular construction units at the battalion level will give:

1. Management flexibility. Depending on the tasks at the battalion level, fill the modules with fire damage equipment, hardware and software, change their effectiveness. Increasing the front and depth of enemy fire engagement by battalion units.

2. Connect existing technologies and equipment into a single complex. Will allow more efficient use of old systems of intelligence, control and destruction.

3. The personnel will receive the necessary knowledge and practical experience in working with modern technologies and information systems.

4. Reduce the economic pressure on the country. Using computer simulators and simulators, it will allow you to visually shape the learning process, bringing it closer to the real combat situation. Changing the software will allow retraining of personnel to new weapons systems.

Working in the “field” with a real consumer, the needs of the troops for technical means will be determined, allowing the military to formulate a technical task for weapons, communications, intelligence and control. Will create feedback between the manufacturer (MIC) and the consumer (VS).

Our armed forces are now in the role of catching up. The fact that in the west is not only introduced into the troops, but also worked through in the course of numerous exercises, military conflicts and local wars, we are only working through theoretically and starting to enter the troops. Currently, our army is preparing for defense, improving the system of the Strategic Missile Forces, air defense and EW, but the defense of the war does not win, and as soon as the enemy can effectively overcome the defense systems, we will lose.

In addition to the technical equipment of the troops, attention should be paid to tactical methods and methods of warfare. Using the breakthrough tactics of the Blitzkrieg at one time, the German Wehrmacht, even with imperfect weaponry, was able to achieve amazing results, while its more equipped opponents were defeated. And right now it is necessary to form new tactical thinking among commanders of all levels, giving more initiative and creativity, both when conducting classes and performing combat missions, developing students' thinking styles that allow them to identify emerging problems and find unusual ways to solve them.

At one time, the identification of new ways of using UAVs, as well as exploring the capabilities of other advanced weapons and military equipment, fell on the shoulders of the so-called “combat laboratories” - research centers formed in the 90-ies of the last century, in every kind of armed forces, offices and US DoD training centers that have shown enviable persistence in developing new forms and methods of using these tools in modern wars and armed conflicts.
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  1. +5
    31 August 2017 06: 56
    Of course, the future of the armed forces is behind these technologies. There is no point in resisting this and it needs to be developed. However, I believe that along with the training of units in the context of conducting modern wars using network-centric technologies, it is also necessary to conduct ongoing training in the conduct of wars by traditional methods. The fact is that for every technical novelty there can be an antidote. If you imagine that the enemy used some kind of tool that drowned out communications, communication, suppressed drones and so on, then the war would have to be fought as in past times and the troops should be able to do this. Yes, it is more difficult, longer, but if the enemy puts us in conditions when we cannot use high technology, then the army should be able to fight "in the old fashioned way." Therefore, training and exercises should be in the form of 50 to 50 in modern combat and traditional war without technical innovations.
    1. 0
      31 August 2017 08: 52
      Traditional wars also rely on hand and foot contact. Try the German Blitzkrieg without walkie-talkies to hold.
      1. 0
        31 August 2017 15: 10
        Quote: BlackMokona
        Traditional wars also rely on hand and foot contact. Try the German Blitzkrieg without walkie-talkies to hold.

        Do not forget the messengers. Communication may be absent, and sometimes it is safer to transmit an order on purpose. Anything can happen.
    2. +3
      2 September 2017 00: 04
      The author of the article is absolutely not versed in the topic that he covers. The article is full of stupidities and misconceptions and is fully consistent with the views of the highest command level of our Armed Forces ... We have complete conceptual stagnation in this regard, but we should not talk about technical implementation. The author deliberately lies mentioning the Sozvezdie-M1 ESU TK in one copy and not mentioning the idle, useless Sozvezdie-M ESU TZ system, which has been adopted and which our troops are equipped with ... The system was adopted in 2013 Gerasimov personally and was released until 2017, then quietly disappeared ... To hide the uselessness of the system and the enormous costs of its production. ostentatious stuffing about its use is occasionally arranged ...
      In the introduction, clarifying the concept of "network-centric warfare," the author points out the main role of the information component from its authors, the article reflects only the second subordinate part - the management component ... In this error, the whole point of errors and incorrect decisions in the top leadership of the armed forces. It is impossible to control without information about the enemy, the theory of “network-centric wars” has been sharpened on the receipt of information for control ... To read all this nonsense, based on a complete misunderstanding of the concept of “network-centric wars,” is not worthwhile and harmful ... contact in these concepts .... Is it right or wrong is another question .....
  2. +3
    31 August 2017 07: 22
    ... Our armed forces are now in the role of catching up. What in the West has not only been introduced into the troops, but also worked out in the course of numerous exercises, military conflicts and local wars, is only being worked out theoretically and is beginning to enter the troops. At present, our army is preparing for defense, improving the Strategic Missile Forces and Air Defense systems and EW, but we won’t win the defense of the war, and as soon as the enemy is able to effectively overcome the defensive systems, we will lose ...

    What I did not notice in the Great victories of the Western armies over the past two decades, and the famous commanders did not appear there either, although they fought with much weaker opponents (Iraq, Libya, etc.)! lol Comrade Tripolko, we need to panic less while watching Hollywood blockbusters and listening to the laudatory statements of NATO warriors! Yes
    1. +6
      31 August 2017 08: 54
      The miserable defenseless millionth army of Iraq with 10 years of experience in a large-scale war against Iran with the T-72 and Mig-29 in service, not that the million-strong army of the Russian Federation with T-72 and Mig-29 in service with the experience of only anti-terrorism wars.
      1. +1
        31 August 2017 09: 49
        Quote: BlackMokona
        The miserable defenseless millionth army of Iraq with 10 years of experience in a large-scale war against Iran with the T-72 and Mig-29 in service, not that the million-strong army of the Russian Federation with T-72 and Mig-29 in service with the experience of only anti-terrorism wars.

        You forgot about nuclear weapons.
        Russia never intended to butt with such an adversary as NATO, using exclusively conventional weapons. We simply don’t have enough money for the army, which in its size will correspond to the armies of this bloc.
        1. +1
          31 August 2017 10: 20
          That is, you acknowledge that without nuclear weapons our army will also be crushed into powder like the army of Iraq. And thereby recognize the superiority of the American military machine
          1. +4
            31 August 2017 10: 39
            Quote: BlackMokona
            That is, you acknowledge that without nuclear weapons our army will also be crushed into powder like the army of Iraq.

            Definitely. The enemy will have more losses, but they will tear it down.

            Quote: BlackMokona
            thereby acknowledge the superiority of the American war machine

            American? You do not remind me when the Americans last fought "in one person"?
            I acknowledge excellence NATO unit armies over Russian. Numerical. They are capable of us throwing corpses corny. And therefore, in a clash with NATO, the only opportunity for us is to inflict unacceptable losses on the enemy. With nuclear weapons, this can be done at the cost of lower own losses.
            1. 0
              31 August 2017 10: 48
              But they were not the dead bodies of Iraq.
              1. +2
                31 August 2017 10: 57
                And we are not Iraq.
                1. +1
                  31 August 2017 12: 25
                  This is not a big military difference (excluding nuclear weapons), and you admit it
                  1. +2
                    31 August 2017 14: 56
                    The difference is obvious. Iraq stupidly suppressed anti-aircraft missile defense, bombed it with bombs and missiles, and then bought half of the declared million. Such an approach will not work in a war with us: the territory of the states and western Europe can be attacked by us with approximately the same degree of damage as ours. Therefore, your comparison is incorrect from the word ALL. Well, nuclear weapons to help us.
  3. +2
    31 August 2017 08: 06
    Something this network-centric epic gives a very strong malfunction judging by the losses of the Americans in Afghanistan and Iraq. In different wars they were again bombed for different purposes and far from with the declared results. And this is in the absence of real opposition to the technical means of reconnaissance and control.
    Some kind of vague feeling that the “next” generation had come to life, having played enough in “tanks” and deciding to transfer the principles of a computer game into real life.
    1. +2
      31 August 2017 08: 57
      There, the problem is related to the partisan nature of the enemy’s actions, as well as the lack of secentric capabilities among the allies (Iraqi and Afghan forces)
      1. +2
        31 August 2017 09: 51
        It is precisely the partisan character of the enemy’s actions that provides ideal conditions for modern “network-centricity”.
        1. +1
          31 August 2017 10: 22
          No, since the enemy does not want to fight hard, but wants to carry out terrorist attacks and shoot him in the back from the hospital, and becomes a peaceful sick resident in a second.
          1. +6
            31 August 2017 10: 46
            Quote: BlackMokona
            No, since the enemy does not want to fight hard, but wants to carry out terrorist attacks and shoot him in the back from the hospital, and becomes a peaceful sick resident in a second.

            Are we discussing network-centricity now, or is a golem agitprop?

            What is network-centricity? In the end, it all boils down to the banal cycle of "discovery-decision-defeat." In modern local, this is easiest to implement. In conditions of overwhelming quantitative superiority in intelligence, in communication systems and in weapons.
            In normal wars, when this superiority does not exist, or is not so overwhelming, the ideas of "network-centrism" are much more difficult to apply. For the load is very high at the stage of "decision"
            1. 0
              31 August 2017 10: 49
              Did you find such a sense of the lightning, hit, and struck if the enemy was sitting in a school full of children?
              1. 0
                31 August 2017 10: 56
                Clear. Every Taliban has a school with children, and they are invincible
                In short, agitprop. It is not interesting.
                1. 0
                  31 August 2017 12: 26
                  And here is agitprom, ours are faced with exactly the same tactics in Syria, human shields everywhere
                2. +1
                  31 August 2017 15: 13
                  Lopatov was a stupid liberal like BlackMokona, but after honoring you and other military personnel he changed his mind.
                  Honor and praise to you Russian soldiers hi
    2. +11
      31 August 2017 09: 01
      In vain you are so. As you know, the idea of ​​network-centric war belonged to Marshal Ogarkov, who cannot be attributed to the generation. ACS Maneuver, I remember, was adopted by the 82nd. The perimeter is also an element of network-centric warfare. It’s just that they did it silently in the Union, and then, at a certain time, they stopped doing anything, and so the illusion of lagging arose. By the way, in the mid-80s the ACS Attack was tested (for a tactical link), like, for some reason, I found nothing on the Internet.
      1. +5
        31 August 2017 10: 34
        What Ogarkov proposed and promoted is not network-centric. Rather, it is a system that provides staffs of different levels with more accurate, more timely and more complete information for decision-making in the shortest possible time. While maintaining a rigid hierarchical command structure.
        Network-centricity, on the contrary, provides for the rejection of such rigid structures.

        As an example: a motorized rifle platoon ran into enemy positions. The BMP is hit, the platoon is pressed to the ground by machine-gun fire.
        Rigid hierarchical: the platoon commander goes to the commander of his company, he passes the coordinates of the target to the commander of the battery supporting the company. Howitzers shoot, ammunition is brought to them to replenish the BM of the BMO brigade machine.
        Network centrism: the platoon commander lays out the requirement for the implementation of fire support in the tactical network. The system selects the closest free artillery pieces with the largest BK. From various artillery units. Perhaps of different systems and calibers. In the amount that the system will consider sufficient to carry out the fire mission. The guns are being worked out, the ammunition for replenishing the ammunition to the guns is transported by the nearest transport vehicles with shells of the corresponding caliber in the back. Again, despite the subordination of machines.
        1. +9
          31 August 2017 11: 42
          Despite the merit - and they disrupt the commander’s plan, to whom do these machines obey? good Well, as an example. laughing
          1. +3
            31 August 2017 16: 22
            Quote: Doliva63
            Despite the merit - and they disrupt the commander’s plan, to whom do these machines obey?

            There, the system is similar to that of air traffic controllers. An airplane from the ground is not commanded from the Main Center, this is done by regional dispatchers, whose responsibility is the aircraft.

            Although network centrism is really problematic in design. What, in fact, I wrote above. That is, when it is a local war and the idea is to destroy the enemy’s manpower to the maximum, network-centrism in ideal conditions. But as soon as the task becomes minimally more complicated, that's it, come.
            1. +2
              2 September 2017 14: 33
              You are making successes with shovels, a lot of sensible thoughts slip through, only you forgot that the network-centric approach does not imply a direct combat encounter - fire contact of fighters with the enemy, moreover, this is the purpose of its application and the main property of modern warfare, although it does not completely exclude it ... .
    3. +3
      31 August 2017 10: 12
      Some kind of vague feeling that the “next” generation had come to life, having played enough in “tanks” and deciding to transfer the principles of a computer game into real life.

      I agree. Once the valiant cavalry and infantry got up and buried in the ground for 3 years, stumbling upon such a "trifle" as a trench, a machine gun and barbed wire. Until the appearance of tanks. There is no experience of large-scale databases with all the complexity of their maintenance, up to the transportation of simple footcloths. And here the platoon offers to stretch for 3 km of the front. In addition to communication, there is still a bunch of necessary for the conduct of hostilities. Whether everything rests on a simple thing - how much you drag on yourself, so much you fight.
      1. 0
        31 August 2017 13: 00
        already pizza drones deliver
        the share is also dry + b \ c + footcloths, in the MTO there will be copters in the state (and what?)
      2. +1
        31 August 2017 16: 59
        Something did not meet in the press the sad experience of the Americans in the war against Hussein. And he was.
        Quote: dauria
        In addition to communication, there is still a bunch of necessary for the conduct of hostilities. Whether everything rests on a simple thing - how much you drag on yourself, so much you fight.

        The "valiant" warriors were surprised to find that in the desert there is nowhere to charge their military gadgets, but for unknown reasons they did not take chargers. As a result, the offensive stopped at least a day. These little things add up to the overall success of the operation.
  4. +7
    31 August 2017 08: 51
    Blah blah blah. The main losses of the USA in Afghanistan and Iraq are "friendly fire".
    And from the observations during the game of shooters. Even in a calm environment, when there are no real dangers, over 90% of the players do not think or learn during the game. They repeat the same mistakes from year to year. And even with the presence of markers above their own, maps and all possible motion sensors. Fell down their own and point blank do not see the enemy.
    The problem is not technology, the problem is people. It is very, very difficult to find those who can fight physically and mentally and at the same time the reality can (even if taught them) to use all these innovations.
    1. 0
      31 August 2017 09: 31
      Quote: ADmA_RUS
      Major US casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq are Friendly Fire.

      Seriously? There are statistics figures or is it so easy to blurt out? Maybe something to talk about the game go read about the campaign in Iraq and Afghanistan?
      1. +1
        31 August 2017 10: 10
        Seriously. You will not get real numbers for a number of reasons. The main thing is that the USA is actively “hiding” losses. They love to juggle with numbers. Recently "found" the extra 2500 soldiers in Afghanistan.
        nnosluzhazhih.html Further, the main hostilities are "private traders", and their losses are not displayed anywhere. And like a cherry on a cake, they do not consider the losses that their allies suffered from their fire.
    2. 0
      31 August 2017 13: 03
      the problem is in people. Find those who can fight physically and mentally, and at the same time, reality can effectively
      it is an invocation, "a master from God", "in its place"
      as a doctor or a dignitary technician, you need to love your job.
  5. +3
    31 August 2017 10: 10
    "Network-centricity" at the moment is just a beautiful theory. She never found confirmation in practice. There is an opinion that the big problems of the Israelis with the fire defeat in the second Lebanese are connected with the attempts to realize this same "network-centricity". In real life, which caused long waiting times for units of fire support, problems with prioritization, etc.

    No, of course, individual elements are advancing, but the same Americans have taken great steps back from this declared theory. Moving from beautiful advertising lures to the good old reconnaissance and strike complexes, which are essentially an artificial limitation of the intelligence received. information and artificial limitation of the number of weapons capable of realizing this information.

    Because everything rests on a person. Decision maker. This is the weakest element of modern "network-centricity," because its ability to process information is limited. And replacing it with artificial intelligence has not yet succeeded.
    1. 0
      31 August 2017 15: 09
      Yes sir! Currently, such military operations can actually only be conducted by the MTR and the WG. In general, it’s difficult to imagine a front stretching for hundreds of kilometers with trenches, a thorn, etc. The most productive strongholds, reinforced in the most vulnerable areas, and mobile reserve in the adjacent zone of the database.
    2. 0
      31 August 2017 16: 18
      Quote: Spade
      "Network-centricity" at the moment is just a beautiful theory.

      this is not a theory, but a way to convey undistorted information from dumb-headed personnel to a wacky command. Dot. So far no one has a distributed control system (although there are its separate parts), but the Americans are closest to it. To our MO, electronic document management could be mastered.
      And the fact that the author writes here is not about network-centricity at all.
      1. +1
        1 September 2017 06: 59
        Quote: twviewer
        this is not a theory, but a way to convey undistorted information from dumb-headed personnel to a wacky command. Dot.

        Do not confuse network-centricity with the development of communication systems and information systems, these are two different things.
        Quote: twviewer
        No one has a distributed control system yet

        Because at the current level of technological development they are impossible.
        1. +1
          1 September 2017 10: 12
          Network-centricity is the principle of organizing management systems that allows to implement a situational awareness mode by forming and maintaining a uniform control for all tiers, a holistic, contextual information environment and including as many sources of primary, not mediated by conventions information as possible in its continuous updating process.
          As for the development of technology, it may limit the functionality, and not the opportunity itself.
          And from the point of view of mathematics, this is a long-solved problem.
          Theory of pancake. lol
          1. 0
            1 September 2017 13: 25
            Quote: twviewer
            Theory of pancake.

            And absolutely civil, is not it?
            For the ideologists of "military network centrism" initially invested in this concept a change in tactics of hostilities
            No wonder they have "Net-Centric" is one thing, and "Network-centric warfare" is another
          2. +1
            4 September 2017 17: 10
            They said balak! We replaced the methods of working with large informational data with an abstract expression - network-centrism .. And of course, this remains not even a theory but a banal rhetoric since there is no basic mathematical basis for creating all groups of relationships — this is, firstly, and secondly, there is no systematic orientation technique for any form of analysis situations regarding tasks and goals. Thirdly, the entire system should be dynamic in the transformation of all local groups of data interaction, and this is generally and fundamentally impossible to implement with modern information and mathematical technologies.
            1. +1
              4 September 2017 17: 28
              The mathematical basis is just there; it has been developed since the beginning of the 20th century. But the computational complexity of the task is very high, hence the limitations. In recent years, in the IT world, many developments have been made on this topic, which have now become popular among the military.
              1. +1
                4 September 2017 17: 46
                I am in no way trying to convince you, but the fact itself is. that since the beginning of the 20th century., as you say, a mathematical basis is being developed, but no results. So I’ll just say that on the basis of the properties of numbers that are applicable in modern mathematics, it’s generally impossible to imagine. what is big or super big data, what is fractal radial information distribution system. There is no way to understand how to get rid of the proportionality of the growth of real energy consumption for the transmission of information. And so on, in order to understand all this, it is necessary to make a discovery in the field of mathematics, which we have made, and the essence of which consists precisely in discovering such properties of numbers that no one even represents what they can be. At the same time, everything is incredibly simple and logical. I have already apparently "eaten bald" with my posts of the same type to those who read me. But the facts remain facts that Russia may be the owner of such knowledge, which forms the basis for the formation of a new worldview based on real mathematical fundamental discoveries.
                All the discoveries you are talking about are not the foundation that allows you to make a breakthrough.
            2. 0
              4 September 2017 18: 01
              The possibility of keeping the infinitely large in the infinitesimal debatable problem laughing However, in reality this is not required, and when it comes to the military it all comes down to primitivism, like
              Quote: twviewer
              not a theory, but a way to convey undistorted information from dumb-headed personnel to a wacky command.

              As for the rhetoric pronounced at the same time, it depends on the funding required in the future and does not claim infallibility hi however, it will remain relevant and undoubtedly in demand in the future. lol
              1. +1
                4 September 2017 21: 20
                It should be understood that infinitely large or small can be expressed by a person’s desire to determine the boundaries of this definition. It would be more reasonable to build a system of analysis of the algorithm for constructing this infinitely large and small. Then we can always determine any point in the process expressed by the description of the process through the language of mathematics. Therefore, those who enjoy the self-development of their intellect and financing are somehow sideways. - they have what money cannot buy.
                1. +1
                  4 September 2017 21: 21
                  I always give an example of comparing infinity built on nine numbers nat. a number and for example a larger number. NUMBER in nat row.
                  1. 0
                    5 September 2017 11: 33
                    In the case of distribution, it is more about generalization; the elements of the system are considered as discrete. And they are easily described by the language of mathematics. In other words, when solving a practical problem, a special case is considered, which makes the task extremely simple. :), but requiring successive execution of a large number of steps.
                    1. +1
                      5 September 2017 12: 22
                      Alas, do not forget about such processes as the transition from generalization to particular and vice versa at all levels. Therefore, you correctly selected the term that "distribution" should not only be on the levels of interaction. but also by a complex of other conjugate properties.
                      In this case, it is possible to carry out the sequence of steps not linear and unit vector, but radial, but on the basis of the formation of the so-called. the potentiality of the interaction between numbers.
                      1. 0
                        5 September 2017 13: 16
                        In any case, you will have to get rid of redundancy, due to the limited possibility of perception. Deprive a customer of management functions? to take away even the indirect opportunity from him to influence events ?! this is a thought :)
  6. +1
    31 August 2017 11: 09
    Never special, but. As the hero of David Duchovny, “Truth is nearby,” said in “The X-Files”. Network centrism of course improves responsiveness. But like any idea elevated to absolute, it also bears in itself its perdition. Say, in a war with a technological adversary with powerful electronic warfare equipment and GPS suppression, betting on one network centrism will not play. At the same time, it is possible to create a local overload in one section of the front and strike in another. With limited resources, the system will fail. In order not to write for a long time - everything is perfectly reflected in Lugovoi’s book “Hot Spring of 2015” (do not count it for advertising). Everything is shown there as an example of the war with NATO over Kaliningrad. There is the Suvalki Corridor and much more. In one of the episodes, our NGS just sets out its vision and methods of struggle in such a war. Which I retold in the first sentences. In short - it is necessary to saturate the troops and learn modern methods of war, but you need to know their weaknesses and not rely solely on computers)))
    1. +1
      31 August 2017 12: 27
      Taki laser communication, inertial navigation systems, etc. And for now, goodbye to EW.
  7. +2
    1 September 2017 16: 30
    And right now, it is necessary to formulate new tactical thinking among commanders of all degrees, giving more initiative and creativity, both during training and in carrying out combat missions, developing a style of thinking among students that allows them to identify emerging problems and find innovative ways to solve them.

    "... more initiative and creativity ..." So, consider, and we flew into a concrete wall along with attempts to implement the domestic version of network-centric combat. (And it’s not necessary just now to find out: network-centrism is bullshit, electronic warfare will do everything, batteries will have nowhere to recharge, etc., etc., or network-centrism is the navel of the earth of all times and peoples, against which there is no reception! .. stop Whatever problems the network-centric concept reveals, no matter what the tactics that the troops will actually use in future wars — at least “setecubism”, at least “fractal-integral blitzkrieg” - are called out, one thing is clear: new technologies will continue to be introduced into the armed forces, and these technologies will inevitably lead to further transformations in the methods of warfare.) "Initiative is punishable" - this is the frequent reality of life in centralized organizational structures, especially in already pretty good times exposed to the rye of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy of the army structure, substitution by a quiet glanders of officially declared (and at the same time real) goals and objectives of the army (ensuring state security in the military sphere) into a conglomerate of careeristic, self-serving "goals" and "tasks" of numerous high-ranking "important commanders" and their zealous subordinates - “commanders” - this is the main enemy of at least some effective use of the armed forces in real hostilities. Here is one of the main sources of all military disasters that have repeatedly befallen our Fatherland even in, sometimes, in general, and ultimately victorious wars. And now, it seems, we have again come to that historic moment when there is a danger of getting a painful blow from this cancer tumor again ... The problem of the manifestation by commanders of all levels and individual fighters of initiative on the battlefield is eternal. She always influenced the conduct of hostilities. Whenever two armies clashed in one war or another, one of which had obvious problems with the initiative of the personnel, where the commanders did not know how or were afraid to take the initiative, take a bold decision, and in the other army the commanders felt quite free to making tactical decisions, they felt support from the higher authorities - always in such a situation it was found that the first army overcame the other with a clear slipping, with a clear loss of efficiency ... Which, of course, the final results war has not yet predetermined. All the same, after all, the war in its course highlighted the “people of war”, those who were able to fight, command and mercilessly defeat the enemy not only with weapons, but also with good tactical decisions, pushing army bureaucrats aside from the real overcoming of the enemy. .. Well, after the war everything could again be rolled up under the asphalt ... So in our case ... AND EVEN MUCH WORSE !!! The development trends of modern military art suggest that the war of the future will demand a broad initiative even at the lowest tactical level, right down to TO SEPARATE SOLDIER! That initiative thinking should be developed among junior command personnel, that sergeants should be capable commanders - AT ALL SILENT. Talking about the importance of the sergeant corps for the whole army is the day before yesterday. This has long been a common truth. The lieutenant should be a capable commander who does not need to put sticks in the wheels, but to whom, on the contrary, the higher authorities should give all possible support, all possible trust, paternal approval in the matter of bold, decisive and persistent implementation on the spot by this very lieutenant and his platoon the general plan of that same superior bosses ... But if in the life of the army more often than we would like, the dominance of bureaucracy is manifested, the desired development of a “new tactical thinking” is suppressed by the paradigm “ her "if she cadre selection system is skewed toward maintenance of the unfortunate paradigm - then all attempts at" modernizing "the Armed Forces can go to ashes when confronted with the harsh reality. The reality of the war is not with a cowardly bunch (hello, Georgian aggression 08.08.08/XNUMX/XNUMX!), Not with another structure taut on the initiative, but with a really flexible opponent. Not even necessarily with a “network-centric” and in general at least no matter how “high-tech” adversary (hi, by the way (!!!), flying units banned in the Russian Federation are really vile, but persistent and resourceful in realizing their goals, the IG !!! ) An adversary who understands what we have it was clear more Suvorov!
  8. +1
    1 September 2017 23: 32
    I wonder why, then, they built polygons in the military districts on budget billions? In Mulino near Nizhny Novgorod, even the German command and control system from the Rhine Metal was bought and there are some developments ...

    The command of divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions should not climb out of such ranges ....
    Each brigade / regiment should go twice a year for a couple of weeks to the training ground as part of one BTG and pass exams on the actions of the unit in any conditions (defense, offensive, encirclement) alone or as part of a division / army, in winter, spring, summer, autumn , under conditions of chemical, bacteriological or nuclear infection ......
    During exams, commanders of regiments / brigades / battalions should manage their own or another unit only with the help of an automated control system, which not only constantly changes tasks and conditions, but also analyzes the correctness and professionalism of decisions made.
    Otherwise, it will not be possible to overcome the rooted principle "I am the boss-you"
    The command of a battalion, regiment / brigade / division should not be the one who serves longer or sits closer to the commander at the festive table, but the one who better passed the unit management exam and confirmed this more than once ....
    1. +1
      2 September 2017 06: 59
      Hot Lois! However, the problem is that the principle "I am the boss, you du.rak" will interfere with the construction of a new type of army until the last. It will not allow you to organize either a new combat training system, or any miracle machine that will impartially evaluate you, or any other system for selecting candidates for command posts starting from the level of a military school and ending with all stages of promotion ... Everything will go with a big creak, so you even have to be surprised from time to time that something will still be done. Separate breakthroughs are possible in separate areas, for example, within the framework of a separate kind of troops, etc. - where there are still quite high-ranking commanders and commanders who understand that they really need "THIS", and that on old developments or on golimy army bureaucracy, ostentatious peacetime, coupled with hatred-inspiring views, and even with oak-headed subordinates far away " in which case "they won’t leave ... For example, paratroopers, as part of a whole kind of troops, will be able to push through the introduction of sufficiently flexible organizational structures, highly sophisticated reconnaissance, target designation and command and control, and personal Tavs will be able to prepare to match all this advanced "good" ... But at the same time, say, their "neighbors" -pathists will only agree to a much more cumbersome structure ... Of course, the next war, within the framework of the "natural selection ", but this method is quite controversial - because, firstly, in the case (God forbid!) of huge losses, in parallel with positive" natural selection "for" people of war ", the deficit can quite coexist, not just sensible, but simply trained commanders and specialists who will have to level amb who work ... And secondly, "chiefs" will still strive to cover up their failures, so that even the conclusions of this or that failure to do will not comme il faut. (Yes, and this natural selection works primarily for junior and relatively middle-level commanders. The high-ranking authorities begin to work well when the military-political leadership really cares about the war itself, before, when, at what cost the goals will be realized and the tasks of the war, when the leadership has the political will to really win the war, then it will allow several talented commanders to advance, so there are clearly no slurred political and technological post-shootings here into account.) And most importantly, since the leadership and the army do not have a clear understanding of the depth of the problem, after the Victory nothing will be done to preserve the result "by itself" ... Thus, such a reform can only be imposed on the army from above - direct "revolution from above." At the same time, the leadership should be strong enough to overcome and exclude the resistance of the army bureaucracy, up to an open revolt, not to sabotage the reform on the ground, and have the will to pursue a policy of this reform for decades! And yes, the most important thing here is the formation of a special system of personnel selection according to certain criteria during the peaceful period of development of the Armed Forces.
    2. +1
      2 September 2017 07: 04
      And yes, we must not forget that the selection of the army is greatly influenced by politics. When politicians are too preoccupied with the generals' loyalty to themselves, so they forget to seriously think about how these generals will show themselves if they are used “for their intended purpose” —this very badly affects the development of the Armed Forces.
  9. +1
    5 September 2017 13: 34
    twviewer, Redundancy of information in the aspect of its perception is replaced by the ability to see the algorithms for the development of processes. But this has a number of such complex phenomena that there will be a period of existence of some more capable in the analysis of people in comparison with others
    1. 0
      5 September 2017 13: 54
      as the system develops, perception will also change.
      1. +1
        5 September 2017 14: 29
        I will clarify . The dynamics of events will naturally form a new perception of large amounts of information. But I’m talking about a really new method of expanding perception based on an understanding of the mathematical model of the structure of space. Therefore, I often say. that our modern perception is based on binary logic and the vast majority of mathematical problems are solved on this logic. But the new perception is based on multipolar logic, and more precisely on the properties of the number to maintain its unchanged value. And it is precisely this immutability that extends the algorithm for constructing numerical sequences. But on the other hand, the constant function of the number makes it possible to build an inextricable number space in which, and this is obvious, in general, the quantitative parameters of the number need not be taken into account. But on the other hand, any process can be described as a precisely defined place in space, the direction of development of this process. as well as its potentiality with respect to any point of this mat. space. Yes, of course, this technique is able to build artificial intelligence exactly likened to the structure of the human brain and precisely on the basis of mathematical principles of perception of information and its analysis .. But! This is a job for machine information processing and this is understandable. At the same time, we observe how, in fact, our brain began to perceive information for analysis. . All primary information began to be perceived at a subconscious level of perception. Ie you do not stop at it. The brain itself works and selects and sorts the information in the brain. And you need to take this calmly. And here is the specific instantaneous information and the levels of prospects are analyzed with the inclusion of a conscious mechanism of perception. And the brain itself extracts from the archive of the subconscious that complements the overall picture, but already in an expanded volume of information. I am already advising people on a variety of issues and revealing to them such nuances that are generally inaccessible to them for analysis. but they are obvious, non-obvious and real, so they remain. I’m talking about chess, but playing in the volumetric space of a cube, and not on a plane, for me this is not an abstraction. Although I remember exactly that I have never been distinguished by the ability of the "own brain" to such an expanded perception.
  10. 0
    7 December 2017 14: 42
    In order for the introduction of new technologies, knowledge and acquired experience to be properly implemented, combat manuals should encourage such an introduction, and not be a brake. For example: The rules for firing ground artillery (PSNA-73) in article 1 said that to achieve success in some other way, and not according to the rules, all other rules were canceled. Whoever did not know this article was always tormented by the choice: "Break the rules, but get the result or not break the rules and get nothing."

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