Net-centrism on paper and in practice
This article raises the question of the importance of understanding the problem of “network-centric” hostilities and their impact on the further construction of the RF Armed Forces, developing weapon systems and control, improving the staff structure, developing tactics, methods and methods of conducting combat operations and offers one solution this question.
Modern armed forces must correctly combine and apply tactical techniques, methods and methods of combat operations, standard operational approaches and technologies in order to successfully perform combat missions in a modern, rapidly changing combat space.
The strongest influence on the forms and methods of warfare has always provided information about both their troops and the enemy and the area where these actions are carried out, but at present information technologies change not only approaches to the development of military equipment and weapons, but increasingly affect questions of changing the principles of organizing the military command system as a whole and organizational changes in the structure of military formations and their tactics.
The result of a breakthrough in information technology was the creation of a control concept on the battlefield, in which control, reconnaissance and defeat systems united into a single network.
This concept is called "network-centric". The ideologists of this concept, Vice-Admiral A. Tsebrovski and D. Garstka, point out that “network-centric wars” are not only the deployment of digital networks in order to ensure both vertical and horizontal integration of all participants in the operation. It is also a change in the tactics of action of promising formations with dispersed battle formations, optimization of the methods of reconnaissance activities, simplification of procedures for coordination and coordination of fire destruction. Moreover, the increase in the combat capabilities of modern formations is a direct consequence of the improved information exchange and the increasing role of the information itself, i.e. implementation of the principles of the new concept.
NATO is implementing the concept of "Integrated network capabilities" (NATO Network Enabled Capabilities), in France - "Information-centric war" (Guerre Infocentre), in Sweden - "Network Defense" (Network Based Defense), in China - "Command and control system , communications, computing, reconnaissance and fire engagement ”(Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Recognizance & Kill), etc.
It is in the “network centrism” that military experts from foreign countries see an innovative tool to enhance the combat capabilities of the reduced armed forces and quite objectively expect to receive economic benefits.
This will allow the creation and implementation of hardware and software systems that collect intelligence data from diverse sources, automate the processing and decryption of incoming information, and form a common intelligence base with distributed access to it.
The basis of information exchange in a single ACS is a picture of the combat situation in which the coordinates of their forces are determined using GPS, and information about the enemy comes from various sources of intelligence.
The created picture of the combat situation is applied to the cartographic basis and displayed on the screen of the onboard PC.
The first experience of operation of the unified ACS of the brigade showed the increased combat capabilities of US Army units due to a significant reduction in the likelihood of "friendly" fire and, consequently, an increased determination of commanders to give timely orders for a fire attack, as well as a reduction in the command and control cycle means of the enemy.
However, the following deficiencies were identified:
- to work with hardware and software requires highly qualified, specially trained personnel;
- receiving, processing information and distributing it to consumers require more and more complex software and hardware;
- limited performance (vulnerability) of data transmission channels and the possibility of their suppression by means of EW;
- high mobility of modern means of destruction and control leads to a decrease in decision-making time.
However, in spite of everything, in the opinion of American military theorists, the troops, relying on joint information support, will become more mobile, will have high impact power, increased survivability and endurance, are capable of rapid operational deployment and immediate use immediately after arriving in the zone of reference fighting and will be able to fight with any opponent with a guaranteed result.
The implementation of this concept will provide an opportunity for geographically distributed armed forces, through their common perception of the picture of the combat situation, to achieve a high level of joint and interrelated actions to achieve goals of various levels and scale in accordance with the plan of the commander of the troops (forces). Technologically, the formation of a unified picture of the combat situation should be based on the widespread use of modern digital information and communication support systems, the development of which is given special attention in the US armed forces and in other developed countries. Further development of information technology will lead to the improvement of software to a level where it can work with minimal human intervention.
Despite the fact that, in practical terms, the development of the network-centric concept has lagged behind the developed technological countries by at least 20-30 years, the Russian Armed Forces are developing practical measures for its implementation.
One of the achievements of the Russian military-industrial complex is the development and testing of the Unified Tactical Management System of the ESU TZ Sozvezdie, designed for integrated troop control using navigation systems, as well as satellite and unmanned brigade-level surveillance equipment.
In addition, the troops implemented a set of intelligence control and communications "Strelets M", which provides a solution to the main tasks:
- command and control,
- communication and information transfer,
- individual and group navigation,
- detection
- measurement of coordinates and target identification,
- targeting,
- data generation for the use of small weapons.
There are changes in the regular structure of the parts. Thus, reconnaissance battalions and control battalions appeared in the brigades of a new type, the task of which would be to receive, process and bring information to the means of fire destruction.
But, despite the actions for the practical implementation of the key provisions of the "network-centric" concept in the troops, the following difficulties arise:
1. There is no clear understanding of the essence of "network-centric" conditions of warfare, some military experts confuse "network-centrism" with computer technology. The lack of a list of means and tasks that the troops must perform, i.e. what is needed for the real needs of the troops. The lack of programs and training methods for the formation of a new tactical thinking among officers.
2. Weak introduction of information technology in the daily activities of the Armed Forces. So, the only experimental set of ESU TZ “Constellation МХNUMX” is located in Alabino, where specialists of the concern “Constellation” in specially equipped classes and on equipment studied the work with the system of 1 ombs officers. When this system is introduced into other parts and connections, in the conditions of lack of training time, there will be an acute shortage of specialists for training, as a result of which this equipment will fall dead in warehouses or in subdivisions.
3. Compliance with the existing organizational structure of the military administration bodies with the modern nature of warfare, determined by the “network-centric” conditions of military operations. The main objectives of the CCS are to change the tactics of units and parts with the dispersal of their battle formations, optimize methods of reconnaissance activities, simplify procedures for coordination and coordination of fire destruction.
Consequently, the platoon, company and battalion with attached units will operate at a considerable distance from each other. If at the brigade level, the "command-reconnaissance-defeat" complex was implemented by the creation of reconnaissance battalions and control battalions, then at the battalion-company-platoon level the task of interaction between fire weapons and reconnaissance weapons is not yet organized and worked out.
4. The economic factor. An increase in the technical equipment of troops by means of reconnaissance, control and communications will increase the effectiveness of the use of a subunit (on fire damage, maneuver, command, survivability, etc.), which will allow the same units to solve more tasks.
However, there are limitations for further growth of technical equipment, since This leads to a significant increase in the cost of such developments.
The development of computer simulators (simulators) and their introduction into the troops will give personnel the necessary knowledge and practical experience in working with modern technologies and information systems, as well as allow the consumer (Armed Forces) to formulate a technical task for weapons, communications, intelligence and control.
5. Weak realization of the potential of modern types of weapons in the army. The lack of units in the skills and practice of using weapons of fire at a maximum range (of firing at long ranges).
To implement the CCS in the brigades of the "new type" it is proposed:
1. Improving the staff structure of the battalion level.
The organizational structure of the unit must comply with the following sequence of actions: detection, orientation, control, defeat. To this end, it is proposed to switch to tactical groups formed on the principle of modular construction, which will be based on the relationship between the range of weapons of a unit and the range of reconnaissance equipment and fire adjustment.
A module is a functionally active member of a group that performs a specific function (solving a specific task).
The elements of the modular structure of tactical groups will be:
a) The command module, which will include:
- intelligence module
- control module
- communication module
- fire adjustment module
- module of military escort
- tactical masking module (smoke, radio masking)
- navigation (topogeoesic) module
- hydrometer module
b) Fighting module - means of fire destruction
c) Combat Support Module:
- RCBZ module
- engineering module
- EW module
d) Rear module:
- technical module
- rear module
- medical module
For example, fire weapons of a motorized rifle squad are small arms and a grenade launcher. The effective firing range is up to 500 m. According to the combat regulations, the front of the defense and the offensive of the squad is up to 100 m, i.e. personnel are located close to each other, which allows for controlling the fire, detecting the enemy, using the necessary minimum of special or improvised means (binoculars, thermal imager, night vision devices, voice, whistle, tracing lines in the direction of the target, CGD of various colors). To solve the problems of navigation, there will be enough GPS beacon with the recognition function of your friend or alien from the squad leader.
A grenade launcher, an anti-tank, a flamethrower, and sometimes an engineer-sapper unit, reconnaissance chemists, and a tank can be attached to a rifle platoon, which increases the effective range of fire weapons to 2000 m.
To conduct reconnaissance at such a depth, it is possible to attach special means, for example, the Fara “Farah” or the laser rangefinder of the remote control 4, and for adjusting their fire, and attached fire weapons of the Pear type UAV with a range of up to 10 km.
For processing, studying, summarizing the information received, displaying the data of the situation is sufficient tablet "TT" or "AK", developed at the SEC "Communication".
As a communication module, use radio stations of the type R-168-0,5 U or R-168-5 UN for communication with the departments. If necessary, actions to cock as guidance aviation he may be given the radio station R-853-B2M.
GPS receivers of the section commanders and a platoon commander’s tablet with maps of the area of upcoming military operations are used as a navigation module.
Tactical masking module - used systems 902 "Cloud", located on military equipment.
If necessary, the SIA "Realia-U" or "Tabun" can be included in the modules of the military escort. In this modular structure, in addition to the platoon commander, the calculation of reconnaissance assets and the calculation of UAVs will be required.
Total, by changing the platoon tactical group using the modular construction method, we can increase the front of the platoon action to 3 km (effective use of fire weapons) with a range of damage that will not allow the enemy to fire a weapon in response. Thereby, the combat capabilities of the platoon (mobility, accuracy of fire damage, survivability level) will increase significantly.
A motorized rifle company can be given an artillery battery, an anti-tank, a grenade launcher, an engineering sapper and a flamethrower subunit, and when operating in isolation from the main forces, an anti-aircraft missile (rocket-artillery, artillery) unit can be used that can be fired at a range to 15 km. Accordingly, other forces and means will be needed to control the units, conduct reconnaissance, adjust the fire, and disguise.
That is, to form tactical groups according to the modular construction method in the battalion, it is advisable to enter into the battalion staff a reconnaissance platoon in which reconnaissance groups, UAVs, information gathering, processing and analysis groups will be assigned, which will be attached to the motorized rifle companies during combat operations, significantly increasing their combat capabilities.
Thus, at the battalion level, the task of organizing tactical groups with the ability to solve various tasks assigned to the unit is solved.
2. Practicing the actions of tactical groups in the classroom for combat training.
During the period of the single training, computer simulators and simulators are widely used for mastering techniques and actions with weapons and for arming combat vehicles. Starting from the moment platoons were coordinated, intelligence units would be assigned to battalion units, where they could work on the main tasks: detecting the enemy at the maximum range of firing means, determining the data for firing and adjusting fire. Control exercises on fire training in the period of coordination consider exercises on fire control. Tactical training sessions should be conducted in the form of bilateral team games.
In conducting classes, use new controls, reconnaissance and communications: near-ground reconnaissance stations, night vision devices, thermal imagers, UAVs, tablets for displaying the situation data, equipping them with company-level battalion commanders. If possible, use technical tools and software civilian counterparts, conducting a comparative analysis between them. For effective work in this direction to reward commanders for their rationalization work, showing the best results or offering an unusual solution.
3. Testing long range shooting.
Execution of firing at long distances or from closed firing positions will allow: to provide shelter from ground observation of the enemy when firing, provide masking from various types of reconnaissance of the enemy, allow you to have comfortable and hidden access roads, to maneuver forces and means. In the course of firing, commanders acquire the skills to use means of defeating subunits at maximum range, organizing reconnaissance of targets; classification of targets by importance, setting fire missions and maneuvering fire. Above all, it is in these exercises that it is most convenient to use the BLAH to perform a fire adjustment.
Using the principles of modular construction units at the battalion level will give:
1. Management flexibility. Depending on the tasks at the battalion level, fill the modules with fire damage equipment, hardware and software, change their effectiveness. Increasing the front and depth of enemy fire engagement by battalion units.
2. Connect existing technologies and equipment into a single complex. Will allow more efficient use of old systems of intelligence, control and destruction.
3. The personnel will receive the necessary knowledge and practical experience in working with modern technologies and information systems.
4. Reduce the economic pressure on the country. Using computer simulators and simulators, it will allow you to visually shape the learning process, bringing it closer to the real combat situation. Changing the software will allow retraining of personnel to new weapons systems.
Working in the “field” with a real consumer, the needs of the troops for technical means will be determined, allowing the military to formulate a technical task for weapons, communications, intelligence and control. Will create feedback between the manufacturer (MIC) and the consumer (VS).
Our armed forces are now in the role of catching up. The fact that in the west is not only introduced into the troops, but also worked through in the course of numerous exercises, military conflicts and local wars, we are only working through theoretically and starting to enter the troops. Currently, our army is preparing for defense, improving the system of the Strategic Missile Forces, air defense and EW, but the defense of the war does not win, and as soon as the enemy can effectively overcome the defense systems, we will lose.
In addition to the technical equipment of the troops, attention should be paid to tactical methods and methods of warfare. Using the breakthrough tactics of the Blitzkrieg at one time, the German Wehrmacht, even with imperfect weaponry, was able to achieve amazing results, while its more equipped opponents were defeated. And right now it is necessary to form new tactical thinking among commanders of all levels, giving more initiative and creativity, both when conducting classes and performing combat missions, developing students' thinking styles that allow them to identify emerging problems and find unusual ways to solve them.
At one time, the identification of new ways of using UAVs, as well as exploring the capabilities of other advanced weapons and military equipment, fell on the shoulders of the so-called “combat laboratories” - research centers formed in the 90-ies of the last century, in every kind of armed forces, offices and US DoD training centers that have shown enviable persistence in developing new forms and methods of using these tools in modern wars and armed conflicts.
Modern armed forces must correctly combine and apply tactical techniques, methods and methods of combat operations, standard operational approaches and technologies in order to successfully perform combat missions in a modern, rapidly changing combat space.
The strongest influence on the forms and methods of warfare has always provided information about both their troops and the enemy and the area where these actions are carried out, but at present information technologies change not only approaches to the development of military equipment and weapons, but increasingly affect questions of changing the principles of organizing the military command system as a whole and organizational changes in the structure of military formations and their tactics.
The result of a breakthrough in information technology was the creation of a control concept on the battlefield, in which control, reconnaissance and defeat systems united into a single network.
This concept is called "network-centric". The ideologists of this concept, Vice-Admiral A. Tsebrovski and D. Garstka, point out that “network-centric wars” are not only the deployment of digital networks in order to ensure both vertical and horizontal integration of all participants in the operation. It is also a change in the tactics of action of promising formations with dispersed battle formations, optimization of the methods of reconnaissance activities, simplification of procedures for coordination and coordination of fire destruction. Moreover, the increase in the combat capabilities of modern formations is a direct consequence of the improved information exchange and the increasing role of the information itself, i.e. implementation of the principles of the new concept.
NATO is implementing the concept of "Integrated network capabilities" (NATO Network Enabled Capabilities), in France - "Information-centric war" (Guerre Infocentre), in Sweden - "Network Defense" (Network Based Defense), in China - "Command and control system , communications, computing, reconnaissance and fire engagement ”(Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Recognizance & Kill), etc.
It is in the “network centrism” that military experts from foreign countries see an innovative tool to enhance the combat capabilities of the reduced armed forces and quite objectively expect to receive economic benefits.
This will allow the creation and implementation of hardware and software systems that collect intelligence data from diverse sources, automate the processing and decryption of incoming information, and form a common intelligence base with distributed access to it.
The basis of information exchange in a single ACS is a picture of the combat situation in which the coordinates of their forces are determined using GPS, and information about the enemy comes from various sources of intelligence.
The created picture of the combat situation is applied to the cartographic basis and displayed on the screen of the onboard PC.
The first experience of operation of the unified ACS of the brigade showed the increased combat capabilities of US Army units due to a significant reduction in the likelihood of "friendly" fire and, consequently, an increased determination of commanders to give timely orders for a fire attack, as well as a reduction in the command and control cycle means of the enemy.
However, the following deficiencies were identified:
- to work with hardware and software requires highly qualified, specially trained personnel;
- receiving, processing information and distributing it to consumers require more and more complex software and hardware;
- limited performance (vulnerability) of data transmission channels and the possibility of their suppression by means of EW;
- high mobility of modern means of destruction and control leads to a decrease in decision-making time.
However, in spite of everything, in the opinion of American military theorists, the troops, relying on joint information support, will become more mobile, will have high impact power, increased survivability and endurance, are capable of rapid operational deployment and immediate use immediately after arriving in the zone of reference fighting and will be able to fight with any opponent with a guaranteed result.
The implementation of this concept will provide an opportunity for geographically distributed armed forces, through their common perception of the picture of the combat situation, to achieve a high level of joint and interrelated actions to achieve goals of various levels and scale in accordance with the plan of the commander of the troops (forces). Technologically, the formation of a unified picture of the combat situation should be based on the widespread use of modern digital information and communication support systems, the development of which is given special attention in the US armed forces and in other developed countries. Further development of information technology will lead to the improvement of software to a level where it can work with minimal human intervention.
Despite the fact that, in practical terms, the development of the network-centric concept has lagged behind the developed technological countries by at least 20-30 years, the Russian Armed Forces are developing practical measures for its implementation.
One of the achievements of the Russian military-industrial complex is the development and testing of the Unified Tactical Management System of the ESU TZ Sozvezdie, designed for integrated troop control using navigation systems, as well as satellite and unmanned brigade-level surveillance equipment.
In addition, the troops implemented a set of intelligence control and communications "Strelets M", which provides a solution to the main tasks:
- command and control,
- communication and information transfer,
- individual and group navigation,
- detection
- measurement of coordinates and target identification,
- targeting,
- data generation for the use of small weapons.
There are changes in the regular structure of the parts. Thus, reconnaissance battalions and control battalions appeared in the brigades of a new type, the task of which would be to receive, process and bring information to the means of fire destruction.
But, despite the actions for the practical implementation of the key provisions of the "network-centric" concept in the troops, the following difficulties arise:
1. There is no clear understanding of the essence of "network-centric" conditions of warfare, some military experts confuse "network-centrism" with computer technology. The lack of a list of means and tasks that the troops must perform, i.e. what is needed for the real needs of the troops. The lack of programs and training methods for the formation of a new tactical thinking among officers.
2. Weak introduction of information technology in the daily activities of the Armed Forces. So, the only experimental set of ESU TZ “Constellation МХNUMX” is located in Alabino, where specialists of the concern “Constellation” in specially equipped classes and on equipment studied the work with the system of 1 ombs officers. When this system is introduced into other parts and connections, in the conditions of lack of training time, there will be an acute shortage of specialists for training, as a result of which this equipment will fall dead in warehouses or in subdivisions.
3. Compliance with the existing organizational structure of the military administration bodies with the modern nature of warfare, determined by the “network-centric” conditions of military operations. The main objectives of the CCS are to change the tactics of units and parts with the dispersal of their battle formations, optimize methods of reconnaissance activities, simplify procedures for coordination and coordination of fire destruction.
Consequently, the platoon, company and battalion with attached units will operate at a considerable distance from each other. If at the brigade level, the "command-reconnaissance-defeat" complex was implemented by the creation of reconnaissance battalions and control battalions, then at the battalion-company-platoon level the task of interaction between fire weapons and reconnaissance weapons is not yet organized and worked out.
4. The economic factor. An increase in the technical equipment of troops by means of reconnaissance, control and communications will increase the effectiveness of the use of a subunit (on fire damage, maneuver, command, survivability, etc.), which will allow the same units to solve more tasks.
However, there are limitations for further growth of technical equipment, since This leads to a significant increase in the cost of such developments.
The development of computer simulators (simulators) and their introduction into the troops will give personnel the necessary knowledge and practical experience in working with modern technologies and information systems, as well as allow the consumer (Armed Forces) to formulate a technical task for weapons, communications, intelligence and control.
5. Weak realization of the potential of modern types of weapons in the army. The lack of units in the skills and practice of using weapons of fire at a maximum range (of firing at long ranges).
To implement the CCS in the brigades of the "new type" it is proposed:
1. Improving the staff structure of the battalion level.
The organizational structure of the unit must comply with the following sequence of actions: detection, orientation, control, defeat. To this end, it is proposed to switch to tactical groups formed on the principle of modular construction, which will be based on the relationship between the range of weapons of a unit and the range of reconnaissance equipment and fire adjustment.
A module is a functionally active member of a group that performs a specific function (solving a specific task).
The elements of the modular structure of tactical groups will be:
a) The command module, which will include:
- intelligence module
- control module
- communication module
- fire adjustment module
- module of military escort
- tactical masking module (smoke, radio masking)
- navigation (topogeoesic) module
- hydrometer module
b) Fighting module - means of fire destruction
c) Combat Support Module:
- RCBZ module
- engineering module
- EW module
d) Rear module:
- technical module
- rear module
- medical module
For example, fire weapons of a motorized rifle squad are small arms and a grenade launcher. The effective firing range is up to 500 m. According to the combat regulations, the front of the defense and the offensive of the squad is up to 100 m, i.e. personnel are located close to each other, which allows for controlling the fire, detecting the enemy, using the necessary minimum of special or improvised means (binoculars, thermal imager, night vision devices, voice, whistle, tracing lines in the direction of the target, CGD of various colors). To solve the problems of navigation, there will be enough GPS beacon with the recognition function of your friend or alien from the squad leader.
A grenade launcher, an anti-tank, a flamethrower, and sometimes an engineer-sapper unit, reconnaissance chemists, and a tank can be attached to a rifle platoon, which increases the effective range of fire weapons to 2000 m.
To conduct reconnaissance at such a depth, it is possible to attach special means, for example, the Fara “Farah” or the laser rangefinder of the remote control 4, and for adjusting their fire, and attached fire weapons of the Pear type UAV with a range of up to 10 km.
For processing, studying, summarizing the information received, displaying the data of the situation is sufficient tablet "TT" or "AK", developed at the SEC "Communication".
As a communication module, use radio stations of the type R-168-0,5 U or R-168-5 UN for communication with the departments. If necessary, actions to cock as guidance aviation he may be given the radio station R-853-B2M.
GPS receivers of the section commanders and a platoon commander’s tablet with maps of the area of upcoming military operations are used as a navigation module.
Tactical masking module - used systems 902 "Cloud", located on military equipment.
If necessary, the SIA "Realia-U" or "Tabun" can be included in the modules of the military escort. In this modular structure, in addition to the platoon commander, the calculation of reconnaissance assets and the calculation of UAVs will be required.
Total, by changing the platoon tactical group using the modular construction method, we can increase the front of the platoon action to 3 km (effective use of fire weapons) with a range of damage that will not allow the enemy to fire a weapon in response. Thereby, the combat capabilities of the platoon (mobility, accuracy of fire damage, survivability level) will increase significantly.
A motorized rifle company can be given an artillery battery, an anti-tank, a grenade launcher, an engineering sapper and a flamethrower subunit, and when operating in isolation from the main forces, an anti-aircraft missile (rocket-artillery, artillery) unit can be used that can be fired at a range to 15 km. Accordingly, other forces and means will be needed to control the units, conduct reconnaissance, adjust the fire, and disguise.
That is, to form tactical groups according to the modular construction method in the battalion, it is advisable to enter into the battalion staff a reconnaissance platoon in which reconnaissance groups, UAVs, information gathering, processing and analysis groups will be assigned, which will be attached to the motorized rifle companies during combat operations, significantly increasing their combat capabilities.
Thus, at the battalion level, the task of organizing tactical groups with the ability to solve various tasks assigned to the unit is solved.
2. Practicing the actions of tactical groups in the classroom for combat training.
During the period of the single training, computer simulators and simulators are widely used for mastering techniques and actions with weapons and for arming combat vehicles. Starting from the moment platoons were coordinated, intelligence units would be assigned to battalion units, where they could work on the main tasks: detecting the enemy at the maximum range of firing means, determining the data for firing and adjusting fire. Control exercises on fire training in the period of coordination consider exercises on fire control. Tactical training sessions should be conducted in the form of bilateral team games.
In conducting classes, use new controls, reconnaissance and communications: near-ground reconnaissance stations, night vision devices, thermal imagers, UAVs, tablets for displaying the situation data, equipping them with company-level battalion commanders. If possible, use technical tools and software civilian counterparts, conducting a comparative analysis between them. For effective work in this direction to reward commanders for their rationalization work, showing the best results or offering an unusual solution.
3. Testing long range shooting.
Execution of firing at long distances or from closed firing positions will allow: to provide shelter from ground observation of the enemy when firing, provide masking from various types of reconnaissance of the enemy, allow you to have comfortable and hidden access roads, to maneuver forces and means. In the course of firing, commanders acquire the skills to use means of defeating subunits at maximum range, organizing reconnaissance of targets; classification of targets by importance, setting fire missions and maneuvering fire. Above all, it is in these exercises that it is most convenient to use the BLAH to perform a fire adjustment.
Using the principles of modular construction units at the battalion level will give:
1. Management flexibility. Depending on the tasks at the battalion level, fill the modules with fire damage equipment, hardware and software, change their effectiveness. Increasing the front and depth of enemy fire engagement by battalion units.
2. Connect existing technologies and equipment into a single complex. Will allow more efficient use of old systems of intelligence, control and destruction.
3. The personnel will receive the necessary knowledge and practical experience in working with modern technologies and information systems.
4. Reduce the economic pressure on the country. Using computer simulators and simulators, it will allow you to visually shape the learning process, bringing it closer to the real combat situation. Changing the software will allow retraining of personnel to new weapons systems.
Working in the “field” with a real consumer, the needs of the troops for technical means will be determined, allowing the military to formulate a technical task for weapons, communications, intelligence and control. Will create feedback between the manufacturer (MIC) and the consumer (VS).
Our armed forces are now in the role of catching up. The fact that in the west is not only introduced into the troops, but also worked through in the course of numerous exercises, military conflicts and local wars, we are only working through theoretically and starting to enter the troops. Currently, our army is preparing for defense, improving the system of the Strategic Missile Forces, air defense and EW, but the defense of the war does not win, and as soon as the enemy can effectively overcome the defense systems, we will lose.
In addition to the technical equipment of the troops, attention should be paid to tactical methods and methods of warfare. Using the breakthrough tactics of the Blitzkrieg at one time, the German Wehrmacht, even with imperfect weaponry, was able to achieve amazing results, while its more equipped opponents were defeated. And right now it is necessary to form new tactical thinking among commanders of all levels, giving more initiative and creativity, both when conducting classes and performing combat missions, developing students' thinking styles that allow them to identify emerging problems and find unusual ways to solve them.
At one time, the identification of new ways of using UAVs, as well as exploring the capabilities of other advanced weapons and military equipment, fell on the shoulders of the so-called “combat laboratories” - research centers formed in the 90-ies of the last century, in every kind of armed forces, offices and US DoD training centers that have shown enviable persistence in developing new forms and methods of using these tools in modern wars and armed conflicts.
Information