Military Review

One of the first tank battles of the Great Patriotic War: the oncoming battle near the village of Pelische

133
One of the first tank battles of the Great Patriotic War took place on its first day. On June 22, at about noon, the advance units of the German 18th Panzer and, possibly, the 17th Panzer Divisions and the Soviet 30th Panzer Division, which was moving west of Pruzhany, collided near the small Belarusian village of Pelishche. It was a classic counter engagement that temporarily delayed the advance of German tank units from Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group. Around the same time in the afternoon, another tank battle took place near Alytus in Lithuania, where the battle groups of the German 7th and 20th Panzer Divisions clashed with the vanguard of the 5th Soviet Panzer Division. It so happened that today it is much easier to find information about the battles near the city of Alytus. We're going to talk about the tank battle that took place near the village of Pelishche.


On the Soviet side, tanks from the 30 Tank Division of the 14 Mechanized Corps (14MK, Commander Major General S. I. Oborin) of the 4 Army of the Western Special Military District, Slobudka stationed near the town of Pruzhany, took part in it . The division began to form only in February-March 1941 of the year on the basis of the 32-th tank brigade in Pruzhany. The division included the 60 and 61 tank regiments, the 30 motorized rifle regiment and the 30 howitzer-artillery regiment. The division was headed by Colonel Semyon Ilyich Bogdanov, who during the war reached the rank of Marshal of the Armored Forces (the title was awarded to 1 on June 1945 of the year). The division at the start of the war had 211 tanks T-26, there were no other tanks in service with the unit.

By order of Colonel I. V. Tutarinov, Chief of Staff of 14MK, on ​​the night of 22 June 1941 of the year, the 30-I tank division carried out night-time firing at the tankodrome in the Poddubno area with one of its tank regiments. In the afternoon of June 21, the commander of the 30 Panzer Division, Colonel Bogdanov, and the Chief of Staff of the 4 Army, Colonel Sandalov, attended the exercises of this regiment.

The position of the troops of the Western Front on the first day of the war (map). Original, TsA MO RF

The order to bring the divisions of the 14th mechanized corps into combat readiness, which was given at 3 a.m. on June 30, 22, by the commander of the 1941th Army, Major General A. A. Korobkov, was not managed to be transferred to the units before the start of hostilities. Divisions of the corps rose in alarm already under the explosions of shells and bombs. Colonel Bogdanov independently at 4 hours and 4 minutes raised the 15th Panzer Division for combat alert after the German aviation began to bomb the Kuplin airfield in the Pruzhany area. Headquarters 14 MK, which was located in Kobrin, already in the first hours of the war was subjected to an accurate and strong bombardment from the air, losing almost all communications from it. Remaining 20% ​​of its full strength, the corps headquarters moved to the alternate command post in Tevli, but heavy losses in the command structure and in the communications battalion significantly complicated the management of divisions and corps. Later, in a report to the army headquarters, Major General Oborin, commander of 14MK, reported that of all communications he had only one 5-AK radio station, communication delegates were communicating with the divisions.

By 6 o'clock in the morning, parts of the Bogdanov division concentrated in the area of ​​collection for alarm (in the forest southwest of Pruzhan). The 61-th tank regiment of the division of Major P.I. Ivanyuk, who was on night firing, joined the main forces of the division an hour later. Without receiving any orders from the 14 MK headquarters and the 4 Army headquarters, Colonel Bogdanov decided to act according to the cover plan that was developed on the eve of the war. After checking the combat readiness of the 30 Tank Division, approximately at 7 hours of the morning, they marched into the area of ​​concentration (Shcherbovo, Boyary) in two columns, having forward detachments of tank battalions reinforced with artillery. At the same time, the majority of the personnel of the division, which was not provided with vehicles, as well as the howitzer-artillery regiment (who did not have tractors and shells) were left at the location of the subunit in order to organize the defense of Pruzhan.

As can be seen, the Soviet tank crews had to wage the upcoming battle without sufficient support from the motorized infantry and artillery, as well as reliable air cover. From Pruzhan to the village of Pelische, tanks from the 30 division should have traveled approximately 45 kilometers in the daytime. The latter circumstance led to the fact that already from the beginning of the march, the moving columns of the division were discovered by German aircraft, after which they underwent bomb strikes, having suffered the first losses on the march. According to the report of the commander of the 14-th mechanized corps Oborin, the 30-tank division was on the march to the concentration area and the head of the main forces column went to the Poddubno area, having only one ammunition and one fuel station, on the march of the division repeatedly attacked enemy aircraft .


The forward detachments of the German 18-th tank division were already moving towards the Soviet tank crews. She started the crossing over the Bug along with the 17 Panzer Division in 4 hours 15 minutes. Already in 4 hours of 45 minutes, the first tanks of the 18 tank division crossed the river and found themselves on Soviet territory. During the crossing of the water barrier, the Germans used the combat vehicles that they had already tested during the preparation of Operation Sea Lion. The tactical and technical characteristics of these tanks allowed them to cross the water line to a depth of 4 meters.

It is worth noting that the 17-i and 18-i tank divisions were not just well-equipped with tanks, the military equipment on their armament had a qualitative superiority over the 30-tank division opposing it, which was armed with extremely outdated T-26 light tanks of various years of release and the state of different technical serviceability. The 17 Tank Division on 22 June 1941 included 202 PzKpfw I, 12 PzKpfw II, 44 PzKpfw III, 106 PzKpfw III, 50 PzKpfw III, 30 PzKpfw III, 10 PzKpfw III, 18 PzKpfw III, and 218 PzKpfw III, CTN. divisions - 6 tanks (50 PzKpfw I, 99 PzKpfw II, 37 PzKpfw III (with 15-mm gun), 50 PzKpfw III (with 36-mm gun) 12 PzKpfw IV graphics and IV figure, and Idry ских iz ских р ских аrt аских р аскихскихскихских искихских и и и и и и и и и и и и искихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихских аскихскихскихскихскихских аскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихских аскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихских искихскихскихских искихскихскихских искихскихских и и иских и и и и и и и и и и и и и и и и и и и и и и и и и и и и див див див див див див див див Of the 420 tanks of these two divisions, 286 tanks, that is, more than half, were in the middle PzKpfw III and PzKpfw IV, which were superior to the Soviet T-26 in armor and armament.

The underwater tanks were able to provide the invasion forces with a weighty advantage. The moment of surprise was used by them to the full. Already in the 8 hours of the 15 minutes, units of “diving” tanks break through to an important crossing over the Lesnaya River, which flows east of the Bug, capturing it in an intact state. In 9: 45, “diving” tanks capture another crossing over this river, it was also not damaged. Unlike Soviet amphibious tanks T-37 / 38 and even T-40, German tanks of a similar purpose were not special developments, but the usual adaptation of linear combat vehicles. For this reason, they had the same combat capabilities as the ordinary "troika" and "four", including they could fully fight the enemy tanks.


One of the first tank battles of the Great Patriotic War: the oncoming battle near the village of Pelische
Tank PzKpfw III 18 td, 1941 year, after overcoming the river Western Bug along the bottom.

However, having launched the offensive on the morning of June 22, the 2-I tank group slowed down in the afternoon. To the north of Brest by noon, the sappers managed to build a crossing over the Bug, but access roads to them became a bottleneck. Leading from paved roads to the crossing, they walked through a marshy lowland, and under the wheels and caterpillars of dozens of very different cars, approaches to the crossings were rapidly deteriorating. So the 17-th tank division had to pull the trucks stuck in the mud, and then pull them to the road, which allowed movement only in one direction. On top of everything else, in the evening at the crossing of the same division, a bridge collapsed under the tank, which stopped the crossing of the Bug for five hours. As a result, the “diving” tanks, which had escaped forward to the Soviet territory, remained without replenishing the ammunition load and filling it with fuel. The combat magazine XXXXVII of the motorized corps, which included the 17-I and 18-I tank divisions, said: "By the late evening of June 22, only a small part of both divisions crossed the Bug."

Apparently, at around noon 22 June, the forward detachments of the 30 Panzer Division collided near the village of Pelische exactly with the "diving" tanks of the enemy's 18 Panzer Division and other advanced units of the XXXXVII motorized corps.

According to reports from the Soviet side, the division advanced its battalions in the morning to 11, and the main forces in the period from 12 to 13 hours. It was reported that the advanced detachment of the 60-th tank regiment of the division engaged in battle with enemy tanks in the area of ​​Shchebrovo-Pelishche. Here the oncoming tank battle unfolded, in which dozens of tanks took part on each side. As a result of the battle, the German tanks moved back slightly to the settlement of Vidomlya. For a short time, the Soviet tank crews managed to delay their progress. At the same time, already from 14 hours of the day, the division again began to undergo massive air raids by the enemy, bearing heavy losses in people and technology.


At about 15, the 4 Army Command decided to start equipping the rear defensive line on the line of the eastern bank of the Mukhavets River from Pruzhan to Bukhovich by the 205 30 motorized rifle regiment and on foot units of the 14 Panzer Division. At the same time, the main forces of the motorized rifle division were preparing defenses in areas of Birch. But with the receipt of the directive of the High Command in 18 on the application of counterstrikes on the enemy by all available forces, the army command issued a new order: in the morning of June 23 go on the offensive with the entire composition of the 14 MK. Of course, the requirements of both the directives of the NCO and the order of the front and army headquarters no longer corresponded to the reality and the situation prevailing in this area.

By the end of 22 June, the 30 Tank Division (more than 120 T-26 tanks) continued to fight at the turn of Pelische, Podlesie and part of the forces north of Rataichitsa. During the 22 battle, June, the division lost about 25% of its personnel, 30% of tanks, and also lost three battalion commanders and five company commanders, which indicates the heat of the battle. At the same time, at night, only the 30 Panzer Division conducted a battle from the corps, as the Germans did not stop the attacks in this direction at night, advancing by the light of lighting flares and crowding the division's subdivisions to Poddubno. The fact that in the 22 battles of June, the 30-I tank division suffered serious losses, says the fact that on June 23 launched an offensive against the T-130 26 tanks, the rest of the vehicles appeared to have been destroyed or damaged during the battles 22 June, enemy air raids, as well as failed for technical reasons.

Nothing is known about enemy casualties in battles in the area of ​​Pelishche. The 18 Panzer Division reported that it had fought its way through to the town of Pelishche. The combat magazine XXXXVII of the motorized corps indicated that "along the way, several enemy tank units of up to 40 tanks were routed." These were the forward detachments of the Soviet 30 Panzer Division, Colonel Bogdanov. At the same time in the interim report of Army Group "Center" it was stated that the 18-I tank division during the June 22 "repelled a strong Russian tank attack."

Tanks X-26 of the 14 MK, abandoned in Kobrin

The encounter that took place near the village of Pelische was characteristic of the early days of the war. Then the Soviet command did not even admit the idea that tank forces could be used for defensive battles at a certain line. Only tank attacks were considered legitimate. Such attacks against the advancing enemy tank units turned into oncoming tank battles, which were more advantageous to the Germans. Such a battle turned into a duel of tank crews in unequal conditions. On our side, in the battles, mostly tanks took part, sometimes completely without infantry, while on the enemy’s side, tank operations were supported by artillery and aircraft. It is quite natural that Soviet tankers, already inferior in skill to more experienced colleagues from Panzervaffe, suffered incomparably greater losses in such battles. German tankers more successfully hit the enemy from short stops than Soviet tankers. In addition, the enemy continuously bombed Soviet tanks. The 30-I tank division lost no less combat vehicles from the attacks of German dive-bombers than from enemy artillery and tanks.

Also, the result of the first tank battles was affected by the fact that in the spring of 1941, most of the trained senior driver and tank commanders were transferred to the newly formed units of the new mechanized corps. As a result, the crews of the tanks were updated, the young soldiers who came to their place did not have time to go through full combat training. At the same time, the artillery preparation of the crews remained very weak, the fighters did not receive adequate training. At the same time, the artillery regiments of the new tank divisions were armed only with howitzers with a very limited stock of ammunition, and there were not enough means of traction for artillery. Naturally, in such conditions it was inexpedient to engage in oncoming tank battles with the enemy. At the same time, we should not forget that the use of tank units in defense at that time was not worked out in detail, there was no proper experience, he came to the commanders of the Red Army much later.

Today, the place of the first major tank battle, which occurred near the village of Pelische, has seriously changed: a new road interchange was built at the crossroads of roads near this settlement. Despite the fact that more than 75 years have passed since those events, traces of the battle can still be found in local fields: for example, tracks from tracks of T-26 tanks are still found here. These are the only dumb witnesses of that distant battle, the eyewitnesses of which left practically no documentary evidence about him.

Information sources:
http://myfront.in.ua/krasnaya-armiya/divizii/tankovye-16-30.html
Moschanskiy I. B. Tragedy of the Brest Fortress. Anthology of the feat. June 22 - July 23 1941 of the year / I. B. Moschansky. - Moscow: Veche, 2010. - 128 with.
Isaev A.V. Unknown 1941. The stopped blitzkrieg / A. V. Isaev. - Moscow: Eksmo, 2013. - 480 with.
Materials from open sources.
Author:
133 comments
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  1. Moore
    Moore 28 August 2017 06: 26
    +6
    At the same time, most of the personnel of the division, which was not provided with vehicles, as well as the howitzer-artillery regiment (not having tractors and shells) were left at the location of the unit in order to organize the defense of Pruzhany.
    Hmm ...
    1. vladimirZ
      vladimirZ 28 August 2017 08: 11
      +14
      The battle that took place near the village of Pelishche was characteristic of the first days of the war. Then the Soviet command did not even allow the idea that tank troops could be used for defensive battles at a certain frontier. Only holding tank attacks was considered legitimate. Similar attacks against advancing enemy tank units turned into oncoming tank battles, which were more beneficial to the Germans.
      - from article

      Counter-battles in the early days of the war are characteristic of all parts of the Red Army, not just tank ones.
      This is a consequence of the wrong strategy of the outbreak of war, developed by the leadership of the Red Army, and put into practice by the People's Commissar Tymoshenko and the Chief of General Staff Zhukov.
      Zhukov and Tymoshenko almost replaced, signed by I.V. Stalin's Plan (Considerations) of the country's strategic defense of September 18, 1940 (B.M. Shaposhnikov's Plan), which provided for active defense at the first stage of the outbreak of the war - the period of the mobilization of the Red Army, and the supposed main blow of the Germans from Belorussky (Minsk-Smolensk-Moscow) to strike the Germans in the direction of Kiev.
      Zhukov and Tymoshenko dragged their vision of the outbreak of war — an oncoming counter-blitzkrieg on the advancing “suddenly” Germans — into the strategic location of the Red Army troops, placing most of the troops in the KOVO instead of the OVapVO, and placing a significant part of them in the Lviv and Bialystok ledges, respectively. The purpose of this arrangement - a counter strike - an offensive in the form of a counterblitzkrieg against the advancing Germans, had no real basis. The leadership of the Red Army did not know either the real strength of the manufactured Germans, or the exact directions of the shock units of the Wehrmacht. In essence, the attacks of the Red Army were in the void, without proper reconnaissance, without preliminary preparation and concentration of their troops.
      The result of such oncoming battles, instead of active, maneuverable defense, was the complete defeat of the Red Army in the border battles of the outbreak of war, the death of hundreds of thousands of soldiers and commanders, the loss of thousands of units of tanks, aircraft, artillery, the capture on Minsk on the 5th day of the war, with a large number of military units and their subsequent death.
      It’s not clear where Zhukov and Tymoshenko had their heads, and what they thought, dragging their version of the start of the war. Although, given the characteristics of Zhukov, given K.K. Rokossovsky when he was the chief of Zhukov — about Zhukov’s dislike and inability to headquarters, as well as Zhukov’s lack of a systematic special military education, this can somehow be explained.
      Only the subsequent removal of Tymoshenko and Zhukov from the leadership of the Red Army, the assumption of leadership by Stalin I.V., the change in the strategy and tactics of the troops to active, maneuverable defense with the gradual depletion of the forces of the advancing Germans, somehow saved the situation.
      1. novel66
        novel66 28 August 2017 12: 46
        +6
        where they were, where they were - persistent rumors about betrayal in the highest generals
        1. vladimirZ
          vladimirZ 28 August 2017 13: 11
          +4
          ... persistent rumors about betrayal in the highest generals - novel66

          And this option is not excluded. It is enough to recall the conspiracy led by Tukhachevsky, the events of the almost week-long defeat of the Western Front, and the occupation of Minsk on the 5th day of the war, and a number of other obscure actions by the general.
          I.V. Already during the war, Stalin began a secret investigation of the actions of the top leadership of the Army, for reasons of the frontier defeat of the Red Army, continued after the war, when a secret survey of the top command staff was carried out on 5 issues, including including the question of when to them, before the war , received an order to bring troops on alert.
          These answers, some of them, were published at the end of the 80s in the military historical journal VIZH, and then their publication was abruptly discontinued.
          1. novel66
            novel66 28 August 2017 13: 23
            +4
            incomprehensible only the reverence of Stalin in relation to Zhukov after such and such.
            1. vladimirZ
              vladimirZ 28 August 2017 17: 16
              +5
              incomprehensible only the reverence of Stalin in relation to Zhukov after such and such .- novel66

              Stalin did not have any “reverence” for Zhukov. Stalin appreciated Zhukov for his business qualities, his rigidity and ability to clean up a difficult situation, using even harsh measures to influence his subordinates to obtain the desired result.
              Pietetus was at I.V. Stalin to Marshals B. Shaposhnikov and Rokossovsky K.K., whom he, unlike others, always addressed by name and patronymic, to the Chief Aviation Marshal A. Golovanov, whom he addressed by name, and with whom he spoke almost daily.
              By the way, here is what Golovanov wrote about Zhukov:
              “I would say that he is a characteristic representative of the Russian people. The fact is that G.K. Zhukov became a commander, and not just a commander, but an outstanding commander, without, in fact, neither military education nor general. that he had is a head on his shoulders ...
              ... The contribution of George Konstantinovich to the Victory is great. I must say that Stalin highly appreciated Zhukov’s military capabilities, and I think that there is no second person who would receive so many awards and be so honored as he ... "

              - It is not for nothing that Stalin sent him to Leningrad instead of Voroshilov, and he, using force there, coped! After all, he shot entire retreating battalions there! Like Voroshilov, he didn’t run with a gun in his hand, he didn’t lead the fighters himself into the attack, but put up a machine-gun shield - and on the retreating, on his own! But I will say that in his place I would have done the same if the fate of the country was being decided ...

              "...- I consider Zhukov a nugget in military affairs. This, of course, is a great commander who was well versed in operational-tactical issues. In strategic terms, he was weaker, since he was not involved in the conduct of war on a statewide scale. Politically, he was illiterate, and I don’t remember Stalin discussing political aspects with him. But as regards operational-tactical issues, Zhukov had a very strong grip here ... "

              "...- It’s one thing - the leadership qualities of Zhukov, another is his attitude to people, to his subordinates. If he were obscene, that’s okay, it was normal in war, and he tried to humiliate, crush a man. I remember he met one general: "Who are you?" - He reported. And he told him: “You are a bag of shit, not a general!”

              Further A. Golovanov noted that the relations of Stalin and Zhukov were complicated. Stalin also had complaints about Zhukov's style of work, which he often expressed to the marshal.
              Golovanov rejects the statement of the famous aircraft designer A.S. Yakovlev that Stalin loved Zhukov, expressed the opinion that Stalin did not identify personal relations with business.
              Excerpts from the book "Stalin's Favorite about Zhukov" by V. Kasyanov. http://www.proza.ru/2012/12/29/667
        2. Monarchist
          Monarchist 28 August 2017 16: 07
          +1
          VladimerZ, regarding oncoming tank battles. There is no unequivocal opinion: judging by Zhukov (I have a 1970 edition), there was an order from Stalin. To one degree or another, most military leaders support this topic. Historians also have different opinions.
          “Stalin’s taking over the leadership, changing the strategy and tactics of the troops for active, maneuverable defense ....” Again, there is no unequivocal opinion: before perestroika, the majority believed that Stalin hadn’t heard the professionals yet. In perestroika, more and more complete memoirs began to be published and other opinions began to appear. There is no consensus among military and historians.
          Roman66, do you mean the publication of Mukhin?
          I’m now interested in: Brezkun, Mukhin and 2-3 more authors, but their work fundamentally changes stereotypes. And indeed in this light the apparition of some military leaders is suspicious
          1. vladimirZ
            vladimirZ 28 August 2017 18: 20
            +3
            about oncoming tank battles. There is no unequivocal opinion: judging by Zhukov (I have a 1970 edition), there was an order from Stalin. - Monarchist

            Refer to G. Zhukov’s memoirs impossible, so many times they have changed from publication to publication, even after his death.
            In addition, in the book of F. Chuev “One Hundred and Forty Conversations with Molotov” there is a phrase by V. Molotov:
            Zhukov reproaches Stalin, says Molotov. - I do not think that Stalin considered as Zhukov writes that the main direction is supposedly to Ukraine. I do not think so. And I don’t think that Zhukov’s reference to Stalin was correct. After all, I knew no less than Zhukov that Stalin said

            And although this concerns a change in the choice of the Germans' main strike from Belorussky to Kiev, it shows that Zhukov deliberately shifted his blame for the 1941 defeat to Stalin who had already died. And as they say, "Once lied, there is no faith."
          2. vladimirZ
            vladimirZ 29 August 2017 06: 52
            +3
            I’m now interested in: Brezkun, Mukhin and 2-3 more authors, but their work fundamentally changes stereotypes. - Monarchist

            You will not be so kind, dear Monarchist, to share the list of authors about which you wrote. I am also interested in the history of the initial period of the war, I have many books on this subject, as authors - supporters of the traitor Rezun, who interpret the malicious intentions of the USSR, who want to be the first to attack Germany (I am skeptical about them and use only the facts that they cite in them) ) and authors - patriots who are really trying to understand the essence of the events that took place then.
            At present I read Martirosyan, in some part I disagree with him, but he has a very real position explaining the tragedy that happened then, replacing (then the leadership of the Red Army) strategic plan of the USSR defense, orienting them on a counter offensive - a counter-offensive against the advancing Germans, instead of active maneuverable defense to exhaust the enemy. And even a warning strike against manufactured Germans on their territory (a developed but not signed Strategy Plan of May 15, 1941).
            With Martirosyan, I finally found the answer “Why were our troops so deployed?” As if they were preparing to be the first to launch an attack on the Germans, and thus, in essence, be the initiators of the outbreak of war - which, incidentally, the supporters of the traitor Rezun insist on, and he himself.
            And this answer - the leadership of the Red Army (Tymoshenko and Zhukov) was preparing a counter strike - a counterattack against the advancing Germans who declared war on us. Illiterate decision (before crime), which led to the defeat of our troops in the initial period of the war.
            1. voyaka uh
              voyaka uh 31 August 2017 13: 34
              +1
              Again, I agree with you. I didn’t read Martirosyan, but a couple of years ago,
              studying the sequence of changes in the plans of the General Staff of the Red Army in the prewar years, came
              to the same conclusions as yours.
        3. zombirusrev
          zombirusrev 23 September 2017 19: 28
          0
          There is a lot of literature on this issue, including a wonderful book by Yu.I. Mukhina "If not for the generals." Where the points of the mechanism of betrayal of Pavlov and his accomplices are clearly laid out. The causes of the catastrophe of the central direction are obvious. It was neither north nor south. The topic of the fall of Sevastopol is also discussed.
      2. voyaka uh
        voyaka uh 29 August 2017 10: 25
        +3
        "" Zhukov and Tymoshenko dragged their vision of the outbreak of war -
        counter-blitzkrieg on the upcoming "suddenly" Germans "////
        ------------------------
        I completely agree with your detailed post.
        It’s better not to state it. good
        Zhukov never admitted the failure of his tactics and his orders
        through 1941. sad
      3. Falcon5555
        Falcon5555 25 September 2017 01: 22
        0
        Zhukov and Tymoshenko dragged their vision of the beginning of the war - a counter-blitzkrieg on the advancing “suddenly” Germans
        Counter counterblitzkrieg is the term: neither counterblitzkrieg nor just blitzkrieg - as far as I know, it is not found anywhere in the published Soviet documents and memoirs. There was a “cover plan” that came into effect after the war started to start by itself, and consisted simply of an offensive (which now causes various interpretations), but to a very modest depth. They tried to apply it without taking into account the current situation - both the activities of the Germans and their own problems (for example, the lack of vehicles is mentioned in the article), and by orders that did not take it into account either.
  2. igordok
    igordok 28 August 2017 07: 09
    +7
    Tank PzKpfw III 18 td, 1941 year, after overcoming the river Western Bug along the bottom.

    In fact, wading the river, also overcoming the "bottom". The tower is dry.
  3. parusnik
    parusnik 28 August 2017 07: 47
    +8
    Well, how can the T-26 be considered obsolete? The T-26 (especially the 1938/1939 model) could withstand most German tanks in 1941, but was inferior to the Panzer III and Panzer IV models participating in Operation Barbarossa in June 1941 . They still participated in battles with the Germans and their allies during the Battle of Moscow in 1941-1942, in the Battle of Stalingrad and the Battle of the Caucasus in 1942-1943. Some tank units of the Leningrad Front used their T-26 tanks until 1944. The defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria in August 1945 was the last military operation in which they were used.
    1. igordok
      igordok 28 August 2017 08: 44
      +3
      It often happens that a new technique becomes obsolete at birth. The system for using light tanks is outdated. Light tanks have become "not fashionable." Yes, and the T-26, new, I still would not call.
    2. BAI
      BAI 28 August 2017 12: 59
      +3
      “In the attack of the thirty-four,” the author A. Raftopullo, commander of the BT-7 tank battalion of the 4th Panzer Brigade (Katukov), tells about the quite successful actions of the BT-7 against the Germans in 41 (near Moscow in the Tula direction). And the BT-7 with equal armament and speed superiority was inferior to the T-26 in armor. With the tactics of the 4th brigade - actions from ambushes, the T-26 could even be more successful than the BT-7.
      Evaluation of Raftopullo's actions from the outside (he does not evaluate himself):
      “On the morning of October 9, 1941, German elite units launched a decisive offensive. An analysis of combat reports from all defense sectors allowed the tank brigade commander M.E. Katukov to conclude that the enemy was delivering the main blow on the left flank of the defense through Sheino to Mtsensk. in ambush, a tank battalion under the command of Raftopullo, who was responsible for this defense unit, and about a hundred enemy tanks, with the support of aviation and artillery, moved towards the line of defense of the guards corps on the Golovlyovo-Ilkovo section.

      On October 9, 1941, near the village of Ilkovo, Raftopullo with his battalion inflicted great damage to the enemy in manpower and equipment. Acting from ambushes, tankers launched fire strikes on enemy columns and quickly retreated to new frontiers. 43 enemy tanks were shot down.

      In this battle, Raftopullo was seriously injured. "
      1. super.ufu
        super.ufu 28 August 2017 14: 21
        0

        In this battle, Raftopullo was seriously injured. "

        everything except this phrase memoirs with its inherent fairy tale
        1. hohol95
          hohol95 28 August 2017 14: 44
          0
          But do you relate to descriptions of the military roads of German panzervods and self-propelled artillery gunners as to FABULOUS MEMOIRS?
          1. super.ufu
            super.ufu 28 August 2017 16: 52
            0
            Of course, I’ll say scary- all memoirs are fabulous
        2. BAI
          BAI 28 August 2017 15: 51
          +1
          everything except this phrase memoirs with its inherent fairy tale

          And in my opinion, completely authentic memories of an eyewitness and a participant in those actions with photographs. I no longer recall the assessment of the actions of the 4th Panzer Brigade by Guderian and Halder.
          1. super.ufu
            super.ufu 28 August 2017 17: 01
            0
            And in my opinion, completely authentic memories of an eyewitness and a participant in those actions with photographs.
            e, and what photos do you have from under mtsensk?
            and the rest I’ll repeat, all fairy tales


            and secondly, what is your credibility based on?
            1. BAI
              BAI 29 August 2017 10: 20
              +1
              e, and what photos do you have from under mtsensk?

              http://feldgrau.info/other/16959-bitva-pod-mtsens
              came



              Quote: super.ufu
              second, what is your credibility based on?

              Eyewitness accounts are taken in court as evidence, especially since they are confirmed by other sources.
              1. super.ufu
                super.ufu 30 August 2017 11: 55
                0
                mtsensky there are exactly 2 and both German and both ... have nothing to do with 1 gtbr
                this time

                the readings are different, for example, such

                What do you think, more precisely, in half a year, or in 30 years?
                1. BAI
                  BAI 30 August 2017 16: 53
                  0
                  Just in 42 could confuse. Too many eyewitnesses confirm those events.
                  "According to the memoirs of M. E. Katukov:

                  At the positions of Samokhin was the battalion commander Captain A. A. Raftopullo with his machine. He led the battle, standing near the tank. An unexpected mine explosion burned his back. In a fever, Raftopullo did not pay attention to it. At this time, a bullet pierced his left shoulder. The nurse bandaged him and offered to go to the medical unit. But Raftopullo categorically refused to leave the battlefield. Only after my order did the captain allow himself to be taken to the medical unit.

                  “I won’t go anywhere,” he told the doctors in the medical unit. - I’ll run away anyway. Here you will tie it up - and still run away.

                  But soon, due to a large loss of blood, Raftopullo lost consciousness and was immediately sent to the front-line hospital. "

                  At the expense of the photo - of course most of the photos of those events are German. Indeed, as a result, the Germans still captured Mtsensk. And the photos taken by the Germans are usually very unpleasant for us.
                  1. super.ufu
                    super.ufu 30 August 2017 20: 30
                    0
                    Just in 42 could confuse. Too many eyewitnesses confirm those events.

                    but, of course, after six months they’re not accurate, but in the 70th year they are accurate))
                    well let it be so
    3. super.ufu
      super.ufu 28 August 2017 14: 19
      0
      Well, how can the T-26 be considered obsolete? The T-26 (especially the 1938/1939 model) could withstand most German tanks in 1941, but was inferior to the Panzer III and Panzer IV models,

      most German tanks are Panzer III
      1. hohol95
        hohol95 28 August 2017 14: 54
        +1
        You forgot Pz.38 (t) - on June 22, 1941 they were in the army the second largest Wehrmacht tank after Pz.III !!!
        1. super.ufu
          super.ufu 28 August 2017 17: 06
          +1
          Quote: hohol95
          You forgot Pz.38 (t) - on June 22, 1941 they were in the army the second largest Wehrmacht tank after Pz.III !!!

          it is you have stained something.

          440 fours
          almost 1000 triples
          almost 900 deuces
          625 38x
          1. hohol95
            hohol95 28 August 2017 20: 08
            0
            Where does this data come from? Indicate the source!
            1. super.ufu
              super.ufu 28 August 2017 20: 36
              0
              Thomas Jents from an article on the site here
              1. hohol95
                hohol95 28 August 2017 22: 58
                0
                According to M. Baryatinsky -
                deuces - 746
                triples - 965 (in 11 divisions out of 17)
                fours - 439
                38's - 625
                You are right - by the number of TWO MORE, BUT 38th are better armed, better armored! And in 5 divisions they were the breakdown force of the divisions !!!
                The 7th division of the Wehrmacht - 53 TWO, 167 - 38th and 30 FOURS!
                1. super.ufu
                  super.ufu 30 August 2017 11: 56
                  0
                  I neighing yes, compare Yents with Baryatinsky ...
                  1. hohol95
                    hohol95 30 August 2017 14: 42
                    0
                    I can also laugh at YENCEM ... Everyone has a different sense of humor!
                    In addition, you have forgotten the initial task of Pz.IV - supporting the infantry in the offensive and the fight against the field fortifications of the antagonist! Based on this concept, he was armed with a 75mm short-barreled gun! Therefore, 38 (t) and the Troika were then considered more universal and suitable for combating enemy armored vehicles.
                    In addition, the data of Yents and Baryatinsky almost the same - as if by piece, probably no one will know!
                    1. super.ufu
                      super.ufu 30 August 2017 20: 23
                      0
                      I can also laugh at YENCEM ... Everyone has a different sense of humor!

                      Yes, there are no problems, only Jents is a world-renowned researcher who worked in the archives, and B. is not seen in the archives, but in the retelling of foreign literature is quite.
                      in decent society Baryatinsky and Shirokorad are abusive names
                      1. hohol95
                        hohol95 30 August 2017 21: 32
                        0
                        For whom and world famous Jenz - I do not know such an author!
                        Was it printed in Russian?
                        But not only he explored the real forces of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army! And their abilities in technical and professional terms.
                      2. hohol95
                        hohol95 30 August 2017 21: 38
                        0
                        “On 1 June 1941 in Germany, the number of all tanks and assault guns taken from factories and transferred to the troops of the army and reserve army, as well as under the control of artillery and technical supply offices, was 5639 units. Of these, TI - 877, 35 (t) -187, T-II - 1072, flamethrower - 85, 38 (t) - 754, T-III - 1440, T-IV - 517 tanks. Commanding - 330. Total tanks - 5362. Assault guns - 377. In the army in the east on 22 June 1941, there were only tanks (without flamethrowing) 3332. ”(B. Muller-Hillebrand. Reference book“ Land Army of Germany. 1933 – 1945 ”).
                        T-II (20 mm gun, 7,92 mm machine gun) - 746;
                        38 (t) (37 mm cannon, 2 machine guns 7,92 mm) - 772;
                        T-III (37 mm or 50 mm gun, 3 machine guns) - 965;
                        T-IV (75 mm short-barreled gun, two machine guns 7,92 mm) - 439
                        commander - 230.
        2. Yuri kori
          Yuri kori 18 September 2017 22: 32
          0
          Pz. 38 (t) - Czech tank produced in 1938. The combat weight is 6 tons. Armament - one machine gun. Booking is bulletproof. This is this stuffed animal you present as a "formidable weapon of the tank forces of the Wehrmacht"?
          1. hohol95
            hohol95 18 September 2017 22: 54
            0
            50mm frontal armor do you think is OPPOINT?
            Unless of course you confused 35 (t) (frontal armor 25mm) with 38 (t) models D, E, F, S (the forehead of the hull and turret - 50 mm, the sides of the hull and turret - 30 mm).
            It is stronger than 15mm frontal armor of T-26 tanks!
            In addition, 38 (t) was produced only under the supervision of the Germans since 1939 (only 3 pieces were manufactured for the Czechoslovak army)!
            Yes, the first models A, B, C and part of the tanks of model D were weaker armored -
            The thickness of the armor plates of the frontal part of the hull reached 25, the side - 15, the stern –12. roofs - 10, bottoms - 8 mm. The armor protection of the tower ranged from 15–25 mm.
            But then the thickness of the frontal sheets was increased to 50 mm!
            So this one was clearly not SCARED!
            1. Yuri kori
              Yuri kori 18 September 2017 23: 25
              0
              Let's do it this way: you carefully read this article here https://anaga.ru/38t.htm - and then we'll talk about the “500mm armor” and everything else.
              1. hohol95
                hohol95 18 September 2017 23: 34
                0
                My dear - have you carefully read the recommended article?
                It writes everything that I wrote to you about! Read carefully.
                And not 500, but 50 millimeters! Do not distort!
                1. Yuri kori
                  Yuri kori 18 September 2017 23: 48
                  0
                  Yes, I read it a long time ago, which I also wish you, my dear. 50mm armor, with a riveted body and a 125-horsepower gasoline engine, is a parody, not a tank. The “35-ton” and “38-ton” tanks were so weak that they froze over the ground during the winter during the night and could not tear themselves away from it. Therefore, any photo of these tanks in the winter: the tank stands on logs or on boards. They were easily carried even by our BT-series tanks and not surprisingly: the BT-7M had 2-hp V-500 diesel engines, the oldest BT-2s had 400 hp, the “35-ton” tank had a power reserve 190 km, and BT-7M - 900. Czech tanks were armed with 37 mm cannons, and BT - 45 mm. Once again you do not want to re-read the article, dear? And especially pay attention to the ending: Ausf.G. became the last serial modification released on BMM. From variant E, it was distinguished by the absence of a box for ammunition. 324 cars were manufactured. In July 1942, after the release of 1414 tanks of all modifications, the production of the Pz.38 (t) ceased. Why so? Such a "formidable" tank, 50mm frontal armor ... And already in 1942 the Germans abandoned them.
                  1. hohol95
                    hohol95 19 September 2017 00: 08
                    0
                    How many tons ??? They made laugh - 35 (t) and 38 (t) - the numbering is not by weight but the year of adoption !!! good Super!
                    And with freezing to the ground much ...
                    By 1942, the main armament ceased to meet the requirements - the 37mm Cannon was no longer suitable for fighting! But the tanks themselves were used -
                    in the spring of 1943 they were practically removed from the combat tank units of the Eastern Front.
                    So, before the start of the Battle of Kursk, they were available only in the 8th and 20th tank divisions - three and nine units, respectively. In total, on July 1, 1943 in the Wehrmacht, there were 204 combat-ready tanks of this type.
                    By this time, part of the machines during the repair was converted into self-propelled artillery installations. Tank towers were used at various fortifications as firing points.
                    By the summer of 1944 there were 351 such towers. A significant number of Pz.38 (t) tanks served in security and police units in the occupied territories, as well as in German armored trains.
                    As of October 1944 (this month statistics on Pz.38 (t) ends) in the Wehrmacht there were another 229 combat vehicles of this type.
                    1. Yuri kori
                      Yuri kori 19 September 2017 00: 30
                      0
                      Yes, you made me laugh, dear. Why did I put “38-ton” and “35-ton” in quotation marks, didn’t I figure it out?)) But thanks anyway for hardworking me repeating what I wrote to you more than an hour ago:

                      "" Come to your senses. The letter "t" in the index is from the word Czech, in German Tschechien. The captured tanks from the Germans received their original index, with the name of the country of manufacture added in brackets of the first letter. The captured Soviet T-34s, for example, were featured among the Germans as the T-34 (r) Pz.38 (t)-Czech tank produced in 1938. ""

                      Okay, come on seriously, with no desire to hurt: these Czech freaks are very weak tanks. For the Greeks and other Norwegians, who had neither tanks nor anti-tank artillery at all, they still somehow suited. But to compare them with our 1941 tanks is simply not serious.
                      1. hohol95
                        hohol95 19 September 2017 08: 13
                        0
                        What OUR tanks are not serious to compare Pz.38 (t) with?
                        Announce the entire list!
                    2. Yuri kori
                      Yuri kori 19 September 2017 00: 50
                      0
                      By the way, about the “power” of this tank: please see this photo. This is PzKpfw 38 (t) in the USSR in June 1941. Summer. There is still no dirt, much less snow. And on the tank lies the LOG. And one end is covered in mud. Can you tell me why it lies there, and why is it in the mud?
                      1. Gransasso
                        Gransasso 19 September 2017 00: 54
                        +1
                        So what? ... on another branch there is a photo of the modern T-90 ... and there is the same log on the tank ... for the same purposes
                      2. hohol95
                        hohol95 19 September 2017 08: 12
                        0

                        Normal log for self-extraction of the tank! And in the Russian mud a lot of equipment got stuck! And light and heavy!
    4. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 28 August 2017 17: 08
      +1
      Quote: parusnik
      Well, how can the T-26 be considered obsolete?

      All the shortcomings of the T-26 are that its modernization was carried out exclusively along the path of least resistance - increasing armor, engine power and weapons. It is necessary to radically rework the suspension, which is now significantly overloaded and does not provide the guaranteed mileage provided by the manufacturer. In addition, the disadvantages of the T-26 should be considered - the angular shape and lack of streamlining, low power density and technical speeds. High specific pressure due to narrow tracks. Unreliable construction of a long driveshaft. The armament for this type of tank so far generally meets its purpose and somewhat surpasses that of the best foreign models ... The design of track tracks does not guarantee their jumping out of the road wheels. The fingers of the tracks are destroyed by heavy loads when moving the tank over rough terrain.
      T-26 is an obsolete tank. It is urgent to develop a worthy replacement for this machine.

      © T-26 test results at the NIBT training ground in 1938.
      Quote: parusnik
      The T-26 (especially the 1938/1939 model) could withstand most German tanks in 1941, but was inferior to the Panzer III and Panzer IV models that participated in Operation Barbarossa in June 1941.

      Tanks do not fight tanks. © Order No. 325
      The main enemy of the tank - PTP. And for the “beater”, that T-26, that BT are permeable in all projections and at all distances. As shown by Spain and Khalkhin Gol.
      But for the “forty” “deuce” with their 30-mm forehead KC were a tough nut.
  4. Predator
    Predator 28 August 2017 09: 13
    +3
    Quote: parusnik
    Well, how can the T-26 be considered obsolete? The T-26 (especially the 1938/1939 model) could withstand most German tanks in 1941, but was inferior to the Panzer III and Panzer IV models participating in Operation Barbarossa in June 1941 . They still participated in battles with the Germans and their allies during the Battle of Moscow in 1941-1942, in the Battle of Stalingrad and the Battle of the Caucasus in 1942-1943. Some tank units of the Leningrad Front used their T-26 tanks until 1944. The defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria in August 1945 was the last military operation in which they were used.

    Well, he couldn’t quite. All the types of panzers had thicker frontal armor. And the T-26 made its way even with the armor-piercing 7.92 caliber (PTR Wehrmacht), and most importantly the panzers didn’t go alone, but only as part of the camphor groups, i.e. art and infantry .
  5. irazum
    irazum 28 August 2017 09: 30
    +2
    And what is a tank without fuel and ammunition? A large piece of scrap metal, nothing more ...
  6. hohol95
    hohol95 28 August 2017 09: 40
    +1
    Dear author, you should write an article about the battles of the Soviet 5th Panzer Division (it included 268 tanks - 50 T-34s, 30 heavily worn T-28s, 170 BT-7s and 18 T-26s) on the NEMAN River held from June 22 to 23, 1941, with units of the 7th German Panzer Division (271 tanks and self-propelled guns - 53 Pz.II, 30 Pz.IV, 167 Pz.38 (t), 15 commander and 6 self-propelled infantry guns SIG33 on the chassis Pz.I).
    1. BAI
      BAI 28 August 2017 12: 49
      0
      Well, the article clearly stipulates that this battle is considered, other battles are separate topics.
      1. hohol95
        hohol95 28 August 2017 13: 14
        +3
        The title and content - no complaints! But there were LOTS of such fights that day! But you chose this one! But only T-26 tanks took part in it. And in the article I proposed for another article, there were T-34 and T-28, and BT-7 with T-26, and the Germans had a decent range of models!
  7. Same lech
    Same lech 28 August 2017 10: 45
    +3
    the enemy continuously bombed Soviet tanks. The 30th Panzer Division lost no less than military vehicles from strikes by German diving bombers than from artillery and enemy tanks.


    The scourge of the first months of the war ... German pilots were hunting literally for solitary targets.



    Ju 87 dives on target
    1. Gamer
      Gamer 28 August 2017 14: 28
      +1
      30 minutes from target detection to the bombing of the Battle of Kursk
  8. Predator
    Predator 28 August 2017 13: 37
    +4
    Quote: hohol95
    The title and content - no complaints! But there were LOTS of such fights that day! But you chose this one! But only T-26 tanks took part in it. And in the article I proposed for another article, there were T-34 and T-28, and BT-7 with T-26, and the Germans had a decent range of models!

    Well then, it is better to meet the battle 2 td with 6 td 4 of the tank group on the Dubissa river. (The famous battlefield near Rassenyi is from its composition) .Then 2 td while there were shells and fuel drove 6 td 40 km and completely trampled the land of KG Seedorf.
    1. hohol95
      hohol95 28 August 2017 14: 59
      +1
      Better good
      "... the fate also befell another division of the 3rd mechanized corps - the 2nd Panzer, which alone found itself in the offensive zone of the 4th German Panzer Group. The 2nd Panzer Division (252 tanks - 32 KV-1, 19 KV-2 , 27 T-28, 116 BT-7, 19 T-26 and 12 HT-26) had to enter battle with almost the entire 41st German tank corps: first with the 6th Panzer Division (245 tanks - 47 Pz.II , 30 Pz.IV, 155 Pz.35 (t), 15 commander), then the 1st tank (151 tank - 43 Pz.II, 71 Pz.III, 20 Pz.IV, 11 commander and 6 infantry joined it SPGs), 36th Motorized and 269th Infantry Divisions. Abandoned by the command to their fate, the 2nd Panzer Division was surrounded and defeated."
  9. nivander
    nivander 28 August 2017 14: 08
    +1
    the author literally quotes Isaev and his immortal creations (or maybe this is the master Isaev under a pseudonym)
    1. super.ufu
      super.ufu 28 August 2017 14: 19
      0
      no, it's Caruso's rehash
  10. Monarchist
    Monarchist 28 August 2017 16: 39
    0
    Dear author, this is a well-established stereotype that German tanks and artillery were superior to the Red Army, I suspect that Nikita “kukuruznik” consciously launched this mule (you guess why), and if we figured out our technique was not inferior, or even surpassed the German one. Our 45mm guns until the fall of 1942 were a dangerous enemy for enemy tanks.
    In 1941, the Germans had 2/3 of the tanks: Pckpf1 and Pzkpf2, various L38 and other unauthorized vehicles. There is a d / f of the Discovery channel, where I talk about tanks of the Wehrmacht. In the late 80s I saw a book where we were. Illustrations and a brief description of ALL samples of WWII equipment.
    I doubt that our tankers were opposed by the T22 armada on June 3. Just 30 TDV aviation well battered
    1. hohol95
      hohol95 28 August 2017 17: 08
      0
      Regarding Pz.38 (t), you are wrong - the cars were at a high level - both in terms of observation devices and armor (brought the forehead to 50mm), the gun took our T-26 and BT-2/5/7, T-28 easily, and could take the T-34 under certain conditions! There were communications! Naturally, he was better than the subsequent T-60 and T-70 !!!
      1. Yuri kori
        Yuri kori 18 September 2017 22: 38
        0
        Come to your senses. The letter "t" in the index is from the word Czech, in German Tschechien. The captured tanks from the Germans received their original index, with the name of the country of manufacture added in brackets of the first letter. The captured Soviet T-34s, for example, were featured among the Germans as the T-34 (r) Pz.38 (t)-Czech tank produced in 1938. The combat weight is 6 tons. Armament - one machine gun. Booking is bulletproof. This is this stuffed animal you present as a "formidable weapon of the tank forces of the Wehrmacht"?
        1. hohol95
          hohol95 18 September 2017 22: 58
          0

          Not a frail machine gunner with a caliber of 37mm ...
    2. hohol95
      hohol95 28 August 2017 17: 11
      +1

      Start with this book!
    3. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 28 August 2017 19: 48
      0
      Quote: Monarchist
      Our 45mm guns until the fall of 1942 were a dangerous enemy for enemy tanks.

      As you should be aware, the tests of shelling a new German tank conducted in the autumn of 1940 showed that the 45-mm anti-tank gun arr. 1937 g. Is unsuitable, as it can penetrate its armor at a distance no further than 150-300 m ...
      © Kulik. Materials about anti-tank artillery brigades.
      The “New German Tank” is the model of the “three” with a 30-mm forehead already removed from production by that time.
      The reason for this sharp discrepancy between the table and the actual penetration is simple - the cementation of the armor. On the domestic armor of medium hardness of 45 mm (and even the 76th) BBS calmly showed tabular values. But when KC armor hit the target, it turned out that the 45-mm BBS pierce it only from the above distances, and they break apart instead of punching it regularly. The body of the 76-mm BBS with collision angles different from those close to normal also collapsed (the armor-piercing tip, which in theory was supposed to destroy the surface-hardened armor layer, simply broke off in practice).
      As a result, the data of these shootings, the available data on the modernization of German tanks with increased armor protection up to 50-60 mm (which 45 mm were just too tough) and regular reconnaissance reports about new German tanks with armor 80-100 mm and led to the pre-war trying to switch to a 57 mm caliber. However, Kulik, knowing perfectly the weakness of our industry in terms of serial production of fundamentally new systems, hedged himself and ordered the development of the “modernized magpie” - a long-barrel 45 mm (the work on which resulted in the M-42).
      Quote: Monarchist
      In 1941, the Germans had 2/3 of the tanks: Pckpf1 and Pzkpf2, various L38 and other unauthorized vehicles.

      The classic numbers for the presence of armored personnel carriers in the army in the East are: 189 conventional and 185 combat "units", 825 conventional and 84 flamethrower "twos", 155 Czech 35 (t), 625 "Prague", 264 "triples-37", 732 " triples-50 ", 439" fours "and 230 command vehicles. Plus 83 trophy cars in 211 otb, 100 and 102 obot. Total - 3811 tanks.
      So the "ones", "deuces" and 35 (t) made up only 38% of the Wehrmacht armored.
      As for non-authority "prag"then ...
      The results of the shelling of the Czechoslovak tank "Prague" 38T from a 45-mm gun mod. 1934 with an armor-piercing tracer shell ... A 45-mm armor-piercing tracer shell pierces the frontal armor of 50 mm from a distance of 200 meters.
      © NIBT report of a test site for testing German tanks with shelling from armor-piercing and fragmentation shells from tank guns.
      And for racially loyal Germans, the firing results were even worse:
      The results of the shelling of the German assault tank "Art-Assault" from a 45-mm domestic cannon arr. 1942, mounted on the T-70 tank, armor-piercing tracer shell manufactured in 1938 .... 45-mm armor-piercing shell, when fired from a gun mod. 1942, 50-mm frontal armor does not penetrate at any distance. The reason is the lack of projectile strength.
      The results of shelling a German tank T-III from a 45-mm gun mod. 1934 with an armor-piercing projectile ... a 45-mm armor-piercing projectile of 60 mm of frontal armor does not penetrate at any distance.
      The results of the shelling of the German tank T-IV from a 45-mm gun mod. 1934 .... 45-mm armor-piercing shell, when fired from a gun mod. 1934, breaks through frontal armor 50 mm thick from a maximum distance of 50 meters.
  11. Monarchist
    Monarchist 28 August 2017 16: 46
    0
    Quote: hohol95
    Dear author, you should write an article about the battles of the Soviet 5th Panzer Division (it included 268 tanks - 50 T-34s, 30 heavily worn T-28s, 170 BT-7s and 18 T-26s) on the NEMAN River held from June 22 to 23, 1941, with units of the 7th German Panzer Division (271 tanks and self-propelled guns - 53 Pz.II, 30 Pz.IV, 167 Pz.38 (t), 15 commander and 6 self-propelled infantry guns SIG33 on the chassis Pz.I).

    Apparently, the author does not have such materials, and if you have something to share, it will be interesting to everyone
    1. stalkerwalker
      stalkerwalker 28 August 2017 17: 00
      +3
      Quote: Article
      At about the same time in the afternoon, another tank battle took place - at Alytus in Lithuania, where the battle groups of the German 7 and 20 tank divisions clashed with the vanguard of the 5 Soviet tank division. It so happened that information about the battles near the city of Alytus today is much easier to find.
  12. gurzuf
    gurzuf 28 August 2017 18: 27
    0
    Quote: super.ufu
    Of course, I’ll say scary- all memoirs are fabulous

    You're right! Churchill came up with all the memoirs in the 18th year! laughing
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 28 August 2017 19: 56
      +3
      Quote: gurzuf
      You're right! Churchill came up with all the memoirs in the 18th year!

      No. Just who wants to write about themselves beloved truth, only the truth and nothing but the truth? Here, on the one hand, innumerable hordes of T-34 appear in the memoirs, flying through the mud like dry land, destroyed 300-500-700 per operation and immediately mysteriously restored from the ashes.
      And on the other hand, innumerable hordes of “tigers”, “panthers” and “ferdinands” walk through memoirs, only thanks to which the Germans held on. Moreover, from these memoirs they migrated into official history ... as a result, the real composition of German forces at the same Prokhorovka was a shock for many.
  13. Captain Nemo
    Captain Nemo 28 August 2017 20: 12
    0
    Glory!!! And eternal memory !!!
  14. myobius59
    myobius59 28 August 2017 21: 10
    +2
    90% of the reason for the defeats at this time was that our tanks had no connection. That is, even commanders of tank units didn’t have radios, not like simple tank crews.
    At the same time, German tanks (as, by the way, airplanes) were equipped with radio stations by almost 100%. They were even on armored personnel carriers, REMs, and other vehicles.
    there is no need to explain to anyone that in a maneuvering war, communications are PRIORITY. For the Germans, it was well established not only between units and crews, but also the branches of the armed forces. So these same tank units worked closely with aviation and artillery, which allowed them to get the latest intelligence on time, and in severe cases to call for help,
    In our country, such an interaction was established only from the middle of 43 years. As my acquaintance, a veteran tanker, told me, before the age of 43, they did not see our aircraft at all.
    And 10% is the mediocrity of the commanders and the poorly trained crews .. And in terms of performance characteristics our tanks were not inferior to the Germans, but superior to them. And the Germans did not have close ones like the T-34 and especially the KV. But the t-34 was more than 1000 pieces. -at that time it was a huge force. Look, for example, how many Germans had the most advanced “triples” with a 50 mm gun, the rest was frank junk, at the level of our t-26s. But the lack of communication, and the mediocre leadership negated the advantage of our army in tanks ... By the way, throughout the war, we surpassed the Germans in the number of tanks. and planes. But they didn’t know how to use it. And the Germans concentrated the greatest number where they needed it, while our tanks and planes were "spread all over the front. And only after 44 years did it go, and what the Germans did at 41m and 42m, ours began to do even better, and surpassed them. (Of course, due to the quantity, huge superiority in the number of tanks and aircraft)
    1. Vadim237
      Vadim237 28 August 2017 21: 56
      0
      The Germans and anti-tank artillery was at their best, from the beginning of the war began to use their 88 mm anti-aircraft guns against tanks.
      1. hohol95
        hohol95 28 August 2017 23: 03
        0
        They began to use them back in 1940 against the French and British!
        Faced with new Soviet tanks immediately put them in the ranks of the VET!
        Helped and gaining dominance in the air! It was possible to distract part of the anti-aircraft guns in the fight against tanks!
      2. Yuri kori
        Yuri kori 19 September 2017 00: 36
        0
        I apologize, but anti-aircraft artillery has nothing to do with anti-tank artillery, and the use of anti-aircraft artillery to fight tanks means only one thing: the Germans themselves had very weak anti-tank artillery, and they had to use anti-aircraft guns from despair.
        1. hohol95
          hohol95 19 September 2017 08: 24
          0
          The Germans had to use anti-aircraft guns against tanks out of despair - if 37 and 50 mm could not cope! Until the Pak 40 - 75mm anti-tank gun appeared!
          The use of anti-aircraft guns against ground targets was also helped by the absence of an air threat from the enemy air force!
          The British did not use their anti-aircraft guns against German tanks in North Africa and “danced” there with the Germans for 3 years!
          "The question is logical - if the Germans did not have either quantitative or qualitative superiority over the enemy, then how can their success be explained? Here is what answer to this question gives in his memoirs, Major General von Mellentin (at that time he served in the rank of Major Rommel headquarters):
          “In my opinion, our victories were determined by three factors: the qualitative superiority of our anti-tank guns, the systematic application of the principle of interaction between the combat arms, and - last but not least, our tactical methods. While the British limited the role of their 3, 7-inch anti-aircraft guns (very powerful guns) to the fight against aviation, we used our 88-mm guns to shoot both tanks and aircraft.
          In November 1941, we had only thirty-five 88-mm cannons, but, moving with our tanks, these guns inflicted huge losses on the British tanks. In addition, our 50-mm anti-tank guns with a high initial projectile speed were significantly superior to the English two-pound guns, and the batteries of these guns always accompanied our tanks in battle. Our field artillery was also trained in interacting with tanks. In short, the German Panzer Division was a highly flexible unit of all arms, always in both offensive and defense, which relied on artillery.
          The British, on the contrary, considered anti-tank guns a defensive means and failed to make proper use of their powerful field artillery, which should have been trained to destroy our anti-tank guns. ”
          1. Yuri kori
            Yuri kori 19 September 2017 14: 49
            0
            No doubt, the Germans had very good anti-aircraft artillery. But the anti-tank was very bad. To go to war against a country that has 24000 very good tanks, having at its disposal three and a half thousand very weak tanks and not having good anti-tank artillery ... You have to be either an idiot, or it was a war of despair.
            1. hohol95
              hohol95 19 September 2017 16: 29
              0
              Do not underestimate the German VET system!
              Going to fight against the USSR, the Germans have already tested the anti-tank defense system in the French and the British!
              Even the 37mm Cancer 35/36 cannon with its PzGr 39 (armor-piercing) and PzGr 40 shells (introduced into the ammunition in 19440; armor-piercing subcaliber; effective up to a distance of 400m) pierced 48 / 27mm (with 500 / 1000m) and 65mm (with 100m) respectively !
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 29 August 2017 11: 38
      +1
      Quote: myobius59
      90% of the reason for the defeats at this time was that our tanks had no connection. That is, even commanders of tank units didn’t have radios, not like simple tank crews.
      At the same time, German tanks (as, by the way, airplanes) were equipped with radio stations by almost 100%. They were even on armored personnel carriers, REMs, and other vehicles.

      Heh heh heh ... not so simple. ©
      Radio stations were indeed on all German tanks. But the radio transmitters are not. The fact is that because of the fear of the impossibility of maintaining strict discipline of radio communications in battle, the Germans installed transmitters only on the tanks of the commanders (from the commander’s platoon and above) + headquarters units. But the linear platoon tanks dispensed only with radios. 55% of German tanks in 1940-42 did not have radio transmitters.
      Source - Appendix to the first volume of Yenets (p. 272-274).
      Quote: myobius59
      And in terms of performance characteristics, our tanks were not inferior to the Germans, but superior to them. And the Germans did not have close ones like the T-34 and especially the KV.

      Do you look at the performance characteristics on the tablets in encyclopedias or on the test results? wink
      And then in the spring of 1941 they took three serial T-34s for testing - and found, for example, that their actual range was less than that of the "three" (T-34s went only 165-180 km at full refueling). When they decided to conduct full tests, they found out that the speed of the T-34 on the battlefield does not exceed 12-14 km / h - because it does not work higher in second gear, and shifting gears to the T-34 with a high probability leads to a tank stop.
      Underutilization of engine power also occurs when driving on the ground, as to switch to a lower gear, which means that you can return to normal engine mode without difficulty shifting gears only with a strong decrease in tank speed.
      Switching gears from I to II and from II to III without the use of special techniques (gas leakage, etc.) is always associated with the danger of turning off the engine, as shockless shifting requires a reduction in engine speed to almost idle.

      The T-34 wasn’t doing well with armor protection either - yet at the beginning of 1941 our experts wrote that the T-34 was no longer an anti-ballistic reservation tank, and something needs to be done in terms of increasing the thickness of the armor.
      As for KV ... taking into account the fact that citizen Zaltsman from the beginning of 1940 did not correct a single remark on the design of the tank, by the beginning of the war KV was a crawling bunker. The cooling system boils already at 20 km / h, the air filter needs to be purged every 1,5 hours of the march, the shafts twist, the gears “go bald”, the brakes get jammed in the corners, the tower does not crank at the slightest roll, because the motor is from the T-28 tower . By the way, it is also vulnerable already for a 50-mm anti-tank gun (according to the results of our shooting of captured weapons).
      Quote: myobius59
      Look, for example, how many Germans had the most modern “triples” with a 50 mm gun, the rest was frank junk, at the level of our t-26s.

      Yeah ... deuce, weak penetration of a 45-mm anti-tank gun from a distance of more than 300 m - Junk at T-26 level, sewn "mallet" in any projection from all distances. smile
      Quote: myobius59
      But the lack of communication, and the incompetent leadership negated the advantage of our army in tanks ...

      And how does the presence of communication help the mechanized corps, in which motorized infantry moves on its own, and the agricultural tractor is pulled artillery at a speed of 3-5 km / h? Then at least put Rommel or Guderian - they will not be able to increase speed on the march. So it turns out. that “naked” tanks go on the attack, slightly supported by the infantry that turned out to be near the site of the strike.
      1. Yuri kori
        Yuri kori 18 September 2017 22: 40
        0
        Where did the data come from? The only thing I found that somehow correlated with what you wrote is the test results of 1940.
      2. Yuri kori
        Yuri kori 18 September 2017 23: 01
        0
        And how does the presence of communication help the mechanized corps, in which motorized infantry moves on its own, and the agricultural tractor is pulled artillery at a speed of 3-5 km / h? Then at least put Rommel or Guderian - they will not be able to increase speed on the march. So it turns out. that “naked” tanks go on the attack, slightly supported by the infantry that turned out to be near the site of the strike.


        Well, this is frank nonsense. It was the Germans who used the horse as an artillery tractor, and one of the main problems in their “blitzkrieg” was ... lack of frontiers. Keitel just squealed about this. But with artillery tractors everything was very good. In the summer of 1939, the heavy artillery tractor Voroshilovets underwent army tests at a tank training ground near Moscow. As expected, he showed good results, confidently towed the largest artillery systems and all types of tanks, including the T-35. The towing of the following heavy artillery systems was tested, and successfully, on the terrain: 210 mm guns of the 1939 model (separately gun mounts and barrel), 152 mm guns of the 1935 model, 203 mm howitzers of the 1931 model (separately gun mount and barrel). 280 mm mortars of the 1939 model, 305 mm howitzers of the 1939 model (separately carriage and barrel). The tractor crossed the ford up to 1,3 m (with preparation), the moat up to 1,5 m, lifting with a trailer weighing 18 tons - up to 17 °. The maximum speed reached 42 km / h, the average on the highway with full load - up to 20 km / h, on the ground - 16 km / h. These were the highest speeds among all the tested tractors - the high power density and the more advanced suspension of the Voroshilovets affected. The average technical (estimated) speed on a highway with an artillery system consisting of a “convoy - battery” was 18 km / h, and a “convoy - regiment” was 13 km / h. Equipped with an economical diesel engine, Voroshilovets withstood a continuous daily march without refueling. As fuel could be used: diesel fuel, gas oil or, in extreme cases, a mixture of motor oil with kerosene. Cruising on the highway with cargo without a trailer reached 390 km, with cargo and a trailer - 240 km, for a pound with cargo and a trailer from 125 to 200 km (depending on the terrain).
        1. Gransasso
          Gransasso 18 September 2017 23: 25
          +1
          It was smooth on paper ... but in parades ....



          Do you seriously believe that all the problems that caused the tank columns of the Red Army to arise after several kilometers of march, namely: the lack of qualified mechanic drives, fuel, spare parts, transmission breakdowns, etc. because of any quality of manufactured products, the stupidity of command ... at least one of these problems circumvented the tractors these?...
          1. Yuri kori
            Yuri kori 19 September 2017 00: 04
            0
            I believe that an artillery tractor working on anything up to a mixture of motor oil and kerosene is much more effective in a war than a horse. and if we are already talking about the lack of spare parts, breakdowns in transmissions, and so on, then maybe we will also talk about similar problems with German tanks? About the Tigers, Panthers, Ferdinand? But somehow it turns out weird: we- and the tanks are bad, and the drivers of these tanks- without the experience of military operations, and no spare parts ... But the Germans- everything is perfectly perfect. But in reality it was not so at all.
            1. Gransasso
              Gransasso 19 September 2017 00: 14
              +1
              The only criterion of truth is reality ... and not paper TTX ...



              And the reality is that the Germans on their horses defeated all European armies, including the Red Army, using the blitzkrieg. Which is based on the highest mobility ...


              And the Red Army, with its tanks and tractors “glittering” on paper, for several years, up to 44 years old, was a very clumsy and low-maneuverable mechanism .... flashes and near-by units were fragmented into the battle ... without the support of infantry and artillery ..



              It became a mobile Red Army when it received several hundred thousand Studebakers on which both infantry and artillery landed ... and these miracles of technology of the Comintern and Komsomolets disappeared
              1. Yuri kori
                Yuri kori 19 September 2017 00: 32
                0
                Cool. And I thought that we defeated the Germans, and ended the war in Berlin. And ono, how.))
                1. Gransasso
                  Gransasso 19 September 2017 00: 44
                  +1
                  Not surprising....


                  The 5 millionth Red Army personnel was defeated in 3 months .... from the fall of 41 and 45, nerds, students, collective farmers, shakters, tractor drivers and growing up children were already at war ....


                  And the army that the country plowed for half a year was destroyed very quickly.
                  1. Yuri kori
                    Yuri kori 19 September 2017 01: 01
                    0
                    I completely agree. The war was won by reservists and militias. But- WIN, not lost. That is, the Germans, having started the war in conditions better than which it is impossible to imagine, lost it miserably. On horseback. wink
                    As for the rout of the personnel of the Red Army, the way it was located could not be otherwise. and even if the USSR on June 22, 1941 had not 24000 tanks, but 5 times more, and all of them were entirely T-34 and KV, this would not have changed anything.
                    1. Gransasso
                      Gransasso 19 September 2017 01: 09
                      +1
                      We are talking about unparalleled tractors in general ...
                      1. Yuri kori
                        Yuri kori 19 September 2017 01: 36
                        0
                        That's right. And these tractor units were one of the components of our victory.
              2. Yuri kori
                Yuri kori 19 September 2017 01: 27
                0
                Yeah, I realized: a blitzkrieg, and in general ... And this is how the German army looked, going to carry out a blitzkrieg against the USSR (area - 24 million square kilometers), in 1941, in fact.
                1. Gransasso
                  Gransasso 19 September 2017 01: 30
                  +1
                  And how did the USSR then manage to ... half the country in a few months ... fighting against such an army on some kind of horse? ...
                  1. Yuri kori
                    Yuri kori 19 September 2017 01: 35
                    0
                    Yes, everything is simple. If Mike Tyson gives me the opportunity to approach him with a club and gasp him on the head, I assure you: it will be very difficult for him to win a fight after that.
                    1. Gransasso
                      Gransasso 19 September 2017 01: 45
                      +1
                      Ah, here it is .... suddenness and poor location of troops ..



                      The most terrible defeats of the Red Army is the Kiev boiler September 41, Vyazma-October 41, Krymfront-May 42, Kharkiv 2 times ... May 42 and February 43 ....



                      There was no suddenness whatsoever and with the arrangement all the rules
                      1. Yuri kori
                        Yuri kori 19 September 2017 02: 05
                        0
                        We return for example with Tyson. If I shoot him with a club on the head, open him a skull, I can’t finish him off quickly and give him the opportunity to get rid of him, even if I manage to light him a couple of times between my eyes, he will eventually make a cutlet out of me. Blitzkrieg against the USSR / Russia is impossible in principle. And with the German armament eco-copying and resources in 1941, talking about the blitzkrieg is simply ridiculous. The USSR was not able to finish off Germany quickly. And in a long war, Hitler had no chance. Which was proved by the end result of the war.
                2. hohol95
                  hohol95 19 September 2017 08: 37
                  0
                  In 1944-1945, the Red Army lost 3 tanks stuck in swamps, 537 stuck in mud and 1 sunk in rivers. Total - 420 tanks.
                  No need to ascribe mud and frost miraculous properties! They are the same for everyone!
                  1. Yuri kori
                    Yuri kori 19 September 2017 14: 20
                    0
                    That's right. and if you’re going to fight in a country famous for its dirt and frost, then your weapons must be appropriate to the conditions of this country, and not like the German Pz-I, which could not stand in Russia and two weeks of war. On July 4, 1941, on the thirteenth day of the war, Colonel General F. Halder recorded in his work diary a terrible shortage of tanks in the German troops. The Gotha tank group, for example, at that moment managed to lose half of its tanks. And on the same day, on the same page, Halder writes that the Pz-I tanks are a burden for the troops. He recommends "send them to the rear for internal protection in the domestic territory, coast protection, as well as for combat training." Which was partially done. In an environment where German tanks were sorely lacking, this "tank" had to be abandoned. Better to have nothing than to have Pz-I. Or "38t". smile
                    1. hohol95
                      hohol95 19 September 2017 16: 43
                      0
                      And why are you so fed up on Pz. 38 (t)? He was better than the T-37/38 and T-26! Exceeded the T-40 and T-60!
                      Early models were equal to BT-5/7, and models with enhanced armor exceeded BT-shki!
                      Penetration of Pz.38 (t) gun shells
              3. Yuri kori
                Yuri kori 19 September 2017 01: 31
                0
                This is the column of the Wehrmacht's 16-tank army during the German attack on Stalingrad. Blitzkrieg in general. But on carts.
              4. hohol95
                hohol95 19 September 2017 08: 31
                0
                As of January 1, 1941, there were 1017 Kominterns in the Red Army (4,7% of the fleet of special artillery tractors), although there should have been 1941 in the states approved in April 6891. On June 22 of the same year, the troops there were 1500 of them.
                As of January 1, 1943, only 385 of these tractors remained in artillery, a few more were operated in other branches of the armed forces, including tank ones.
                By the end of the war, there were still 568 vehicles in the army (losses from September 1, 1942 amounted to only 56 units).
                It was a good tractor - there were just a few of them!
                1. Gransasso
                  Gransasso 19 September 2017 08: 51
                  +1
                  Unfortunately, serious shortcomings were noted, confirmed by the subsequent operation of the Voroshilovites in the troops.

                  The caterpillar design turned out to be unsuccessful - in addition to its low coupling capabilities, when wet snow got into the nests of the leading stars, it often fell.

                  Failure of the main clutch could happen after 200 - 300 hours of work. There were frequent, especially on tractors of the first series, breakdown of driven shafts and gears of the second group of multipliers. After 300 - 400 hours of operation, the wear of bearings of the leading gears of final drives was noted. The seals of the units leaked (a traditional defect of the KhPZ machines), pipelines burst from vibrations initiated by a powerful diesel engine.
                  When creating a large pulling force, there were cases of extension of the rear trailer hook, and when driving on hard bumps, the lower frame trim often caved in and broke, which exacerbated the already poor protection of the tractor from below. According to drivers, the winch was inconvenient to use. The intractable task was the cold start of the V-2V diesel engine at low (-20 ° C and lower) temperatures. The procedure with its multiple heating and pouring water and oil often dragged on for 3-4 hours. At the same time, electric starters almost did not “pull out”, and the use of an air start sometimes gave the opposite effect, since the compressed air supplied to the cylinders was supercooled during expansion (up to frost) and did not allow to reach a temperature of 550 - 600 ° C, sufficient for self-ignition of the fuel. The inevitable and rapid wear of the hinges of the undercarriage, especially the bushings of the suspension axles, was the result of insufficient lubrication and poor dirt protection. Particularly unreliable were the primitive labyrinth seals of the bearings of the support rollers, supporting rollers and guide wheels. In particular, in order to reduce wear and prevent breakdowns of the roller bearings of the track rollers when driving on liquid and deep mud, into which they were sometimes completely submerged, they had to be disassembled, washed and copiously lubricated almost every day, which not only sharply increased the complexity of servicing the tractor in field conditions, but also did not allow to make this operation qualitatively. Surprisingly, at the KhPZ, little attention was paid to the compaction of bearing assemblies - a tradition that has also switched to the T-34 tank (on the principle of “and so it will do”). All these shortcomings of the Voroshilovets tractor were exacerbated by the almost complete inaccessibility of the mechanisms for servicing and repairing directly in the troops, however, then the exploiters somehow learned to get out of the situation.

                  By the way, in connection with these shortcomings, the production of Voroshilov’s workers, interrupted by evacuation and war, did not resume further.
                  1. hohol95
                    hohol95 19 September 2017 09: 16
                    0
                    "Komintern" and "Voroshilovets" - different in design and characteristics of the machine!
                    The performance characteristics of the artillery tractor "Comintern"
                    Unladen mass, kg 10 640
                    Platform loading capacity, kg 2000
                    The mass of the towed trailer, kg 12 000
                    with overload, kg 14 000

                    Cabin seats 2
                    Seats in the back 12
                    Dimensions, mm:
                    5765 length
                    width 2208
                    with awning 2300
                    cab height (no load) 2538
                    with awning 2980
                    Base of road wheels, mm 3278
                    Track (in the middle of the tracks), mm 1530
                    Track Width 360 mm
                    Track pitch, mm 170
                    Ground clearance, mm 400
                    Average specific ground pressure with a load on the platform, kgf / cm² 0,49
                    Maximum engine power, at 1280 rpm, hp 131
                    Maximum speed on the highway, km / h 30,5
                    Cruising on the highway with a trailer, km to 170 (in recent series)
                    Cruising on the ground with a trailer, km 80
                    Extreme climbability on hard ground with a load without a trailer, degree 33,5
                    Kilometer fuel consumption on the highway with cargo and trailer, kg 2,5
                    Hourly fuel consumption on the highway, kg:
                    without trailer 18
                    with trailer 22
                    Power reserve for average driving conditions with a trailer, h 11

                    The performance characteristics of the artillery tractor "Voroshilovets"
                    Unladen mass, kg 15 500
                    Platform loading capacity, kg 3000
                    The mass of the towed trailer, kg 18 000
                    with overload, kg 22 000

                    Cabin seats 3
                    Seats in the back 16
                    Dimensions, mm:
                    6218 length
                    width 2350
                    cab height (no load) 2736
                    with awning 3087
                    Base of road wheels, mm 3500
                    Track (in the middle of the tracks), mm 1860
                    Track Width 428 mm
                    Track pitch of a track, mm 170
                    Minimum turning radius, m 5
                    Ground clearance, mm 410
                    Average specific ground pressure with a load on the platform, kgf / cm² 0,578
                    Maximum engine power at a speed of 1500 rpm, hp 375
                    Maximum speed on the highway, km / h 36,2
                    Cruising on the highway with a trailer, km 270
                    Extreme climbability on hard ground with a load without a trailer, degree 41
                    1. Gransasso
                      Gransasso 19 September 2017 09: 27
                      +1
                      So what? .... both were in operation UG and were removed from production with the outbreak of war ....
                      1. Yuri kori
                        Yuri kori 19 September 2017 14: 11
                        0
                        Voroshilovets was bad, the Comintern was bad, Komsomolets is generally rubbish ... Is it a horse. wink Let's put an end to it: any artillery tractor / tractor is better than a horse in a war, and at least some, even Komomolets, would have approached the Germans on our roads, because the “most advanced army in Europe” didn’t have any.
  15. Olaf Uksimae
    Olaf Uksimae 29 August 2017 00: 57
    +1
    The first day of the war, the deepest shock, the unknown, the lack of communication, cover, military supplies, in spite of everything, our grandfathers stood to death, beat the enemy as best they could, won valuable time and died, the first day !! Everlasting memory !!
  16. Predator
    Predator 29 August 2017 09: 03
    +3
    Quote: hohol95
    Better good
    "... the fate also befell another division of the 3rd mechanized corps - the 2nd Panzer, which alone found itself in the offensive zone of the 4th German Panzer Group. The 2nd Panzer Division (252 tanks - 32 KV-1, 19 KV-2 , 27 T-28, 116 BT-7, 19 T-26 and 12 HT-26) had to enter battle with almost the entire 41st German tank corps: first with the 6th Panzer Division (245 tanks - 47 Pz.II , 30 Pz.IV, 155 Pz.35 (t), 15 commander), then the 1st tank (151 tank - 43 Pz.II, 71 Pz.III, 20 Pz.IV, 11 commander and 6 infantry joined it SPGs), 36th Motorized and 269th Infantry Divisions. Abandoned by the command to their fate, the 2nd Panzer Division was surrounded and defeated."

    Well, an obvious exaggeration was defeated at the expense of everything, as usual in 1941 without rear, fuel and shells. As long as everything was fought, it ended, they blew up equipment and walked east. But they made a noise.
  17. Igor Goldberg
    Igor Goldberg 30 August 2017 09: 31
    0
    "[quote = vladimirZ] [quote] In with the surroundings of a large number of military units and their subsequent death.
    It’s not clear where Zhukov and Tymoshenko had their heads, and what they thought, dragging their version of the start of the war. Although, given the characteristics of Zhukov, given K.K. Rokossovsky when he was the chief of Zhukov — about Zhukov’s dislike and inability to headquarters, as well as Zhukov’s lack of a systematic special military education, this can somehow be explained.
    Only the subsequent removal of Tymoshenko and Zhukov from the leadership of the Red Army, the assumption of leadership by Stalin IV, the change in strategy and tactics of the troops to active, maneuverable defense with the gradual depletion of the forces of the advancing Germans, somehow saved the situation. [/ Quote] "


    And can I quote where SUCH Rokossovsky spoke about Zhukov?
    Another point that personally raises a question in your scenario: "Stalin took the lead and this somewhat corrected the situation" - i.e. Zhukov did not have a military education, but did Stalin have it? If not a secret, what military school did Stalin graduate from?
    Tukhachevsky, with his POSSIBLE pluses, had great military disadvantages, which were shown in practice - the loss and defeat of the Red Army in the Polish company, which is very little talked about. At the views of Tukhachevsky on the creation of large tank formations, they missed the side of the need for large tank formations, infantry regiments / battalions / companies ... that just changed Zhukov.
    The next moment, for example, the actions of General Karbyshev, who was appointed chief of the arrangement and arrangement of troops in the region of Brest, the restoration of the Brest Fortress. In fact, a specialist’s decision from military engineering took place, which led to the fact that the majority of the troops of the Brest region had a permanent cantonment located in a "stone bag" of the fortress on a small patch ... And here you are - bomb the storm, storm - "we are all in one place "..... How such a thing can come to the SPECIALIST's head! But these decisions were affirmed "at the top" ...... The hospital was also not promoted to the rear, but rather to the peninsula towards Poland (everything is well described in the exposition of the Museum of the Brest Fortress).

    So not everything is so simple here - it’s white here, but black here ..... And all the memoirs, memoirs, notes are just one person’s look and take it for the truth of that time, I think it’s wrong ....
    1. Yuri kori
      Yuri kori 18 September 2017 23: 07
      0
      [/quote XNUMX.HOW SUCH A SPECIALIST can come to mind! But these decisions were affirmed "at the top" ...... They also didn’t put the hospital to the rear, but rather to the peninsula towards Poland (everything is well described in the exposition of the Museum of the Brest Fortress). [Quote]

      If defense is planned, then such an arrangement is terrible stupidity. But if a sudden offensive strike with an invasion is planned, then you can imagine nothing better than such an arrangement.
  18. super.ufu
    super.ufu 31 August 2017 11: 55
    0
    hohol95,
    Muller is possible, but I repeat, here on the site 100 years ago there was already an article on how many tanks Hitler had
  19. Graz
    Graz 31 August 2017 18: 14
    0
    The t-26 was at the level of half of the then German tanks of the initial period of the war, if the tanks hadn’t driven in vain destroying motor resources and wasting fuel in vain, if there was normal cover from enemy aircraft, if there was normal communication and reconnaissance, everything could be different
  20. Barcid
    Barcid 1 September 2017 09: 32
    +17
    Thanks to the author. Interesting article
  21. Yuri kori
    Yuri kori 18 September 2017 21: 33
    0
    I don’t understand something: according to the author, “There were 17 tanks in the 22th Panzer Division on June 1941, 202”
    We open the composition of the 17th Division in 1941: the 27th Infantry Division, the predecessor of the 17th Panzer, was formed on October 1, 1936, and at first it consisted of the 40th, 63rd and 91st Infantry Regiments. The division was staffed by natives of Swabia, who fought well in the south of Poland and in France. After returning to Augsburg in October 1 November 1940, the division was reorganized into the 17th Panzer. She transferred the 91st Infantry Regiment of the 4th Mountain Division, but received the two-battalion 39th Tank Regiment, formed in St. Pelten and Vienna (XVII Military District, Austria) on the basis of the 4th and 33rd reserve tank regiments. Now the division consisted of:
    39th tank regiment, 17th motorized brigade (40th and 63rd motorized regiments, two battalions in each and 17th motorcycle battalion, former II battalion of the 63rd motorized regiment), 27th tank artillery regiment ( three divisions) and the usual set of divisions providing divisions. On August 16, 1941, the 39th Tank Regiment received the third battalion (the former I battalion of the training tank regiment).
    That is, the one and only 39th tank regiment, with a maximum of 95 tanks. In the Wehrmacht's motorized brigades, state tanks were not supposed to be.

    Where did the 17th Panzer Division get 202 tanks?
    1. hohol95
      hohol95 18 September 2017 23: 15
      0
      According to the information given in the discussions by Thomas Jenz, there were 39 tanks in the 17th regiment of the 216th Wehrmacht tank division:
      Pz.I - 22 pcs.
      Pz.II - 45 pcs.
      Pz.III - 106 pcs.
      Pz.IV - 13 pcs.
      Commander - 13 pcs.
      1. Yuri kori
        Yuri kori 19 September 2017 00: 11
        0
        With all due respect to Thomas Jents, 219 tanks in the POLKA are stupid. The first tank group consisted of 799 tanks.
        1. Gransasso
          Gransasso 19 September 2017 01: 59
          +1
          Division Composition
          In the 1941 year:

          39th tank regiment
          17th Infantry Brigade
          40 Rifle Regiment
          63 Rifle Regiment
          17th motorcycle battalion
          27th Reconnaissance Battalion
          27 Artillery Regiment
          27th Anti-Tank Battalion
          27th Tank Engineer Battalion
          In the 1943 year:

          39th tank regiment
          40th Panzergrenadier Regiment
          63th Panzergrenadier Regiment
          27th Tank Artillery Regiment
          17th Tank Reconnaissance Battalion
          27th Anti-Tank Battalion
          297 anti-aircraft artillery division
          27th Tank Engineer Battalion
          27th battalion of communications
          17th Field Reserve Battalion
          Armament Edit


          On June 22, 1941, the state had 202 tanks (the basis of the then Wehrmacht tank fleet was the medium Pz.III armed with a 37-mm cannon); in early July, about 180 vehicles operated in battles in the Orsha direction.

          In the summer of 1942, replenished 50 Pz.III and his more powerful brother Pz.IV. In October 1942, only 30 tanks remained in service, and after the end of the fighting near Stalingrad, in February 1943 only 6 (!). In July 1943, during the battles near Kursk (the division did not participate directly in this battle, being in the reserve of the 24th tank corps), there were 4 Pz.II, 29 Pz.III, 32 Pz.IV and 2 captured Soviet T-34s . In November 1944, 80 Pz.IV and Pz.V (Panther) were replenished.

          Division Commanders Edit
          From November 1, 1940 - Lieutenant General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim (seriously injured June 27, 1941)
          From June 28, 1941 - Major General Karl Ritter von Weber (seriously wounded on July 17 and died on July 20, 1941)
          From July 17, 1941 - Major General Wilhelm Ritter von Thom
          From September 15, 1941 - Lieutenant General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim
          From November 11, 1941 - Major General Rudolph-Eduard Licht
          From October 10, 1942 - Major General (from May 1943 - Lieutenant General) Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin
          From June 16, 1943 - Lieutenant General Walter Schilling (killed on July 20, 1943)
          From July 21, 1943 - Major General Karl-Friedrich von der Meden
          From September 20, 1944 - Colonel Rudolph Demme
          From December 2, 1944 - Colonel Albert Brooks (January 17, 1945 - wounded and taken into Soviet captivity)
          From January 30, 1945 - Major General Theodore Kretschmer
          1. Yuri kori
            Yuri kori 19 September 2017 11: 28
            0
            Thank you. I am aware of the composition of the 17th Panzer Division. The question was, where did the 219 (202) tanks come from in the division, which had a single tank regiment?
            1. super.ufu
              super.ufu 19 September 2017 12: 27
              0
              Thank you. I am aware of the composition of the 17th Panzer Division.

              it means not taste, otherwise there would be no such stupid questions
              1. Yuri kori
                Yuri kori 19 September 2017 14: 42
                0
                Enlighten me. There is one 39th tank regiment. Germans did not have tanks in motorized infantry divisions and brigades. A tank regiment is 95 tanks. Where did 17 tanks come from in the 120th Panzer Division?
                1. super.ufu
                  super.ufu 19 September 2017 15: 08
                  0
                  Sorry, I don’t enlighten on Tuesdays.

                  Well, open the staff of the division and see where there are more tanks in it and how many
                  1. Yuri kori
                    Yuri kori 19 September 2017 15: 45
                    0
                    Clear. Grind the tongue, do not ship the bags. Excuses for children like “I don’t enlighten on Tuesdays”, attempts to make a smart face ... You don’t know what you’re climbing on?
                    1. super.ufu
                      super.ufu 19 September 2017 16: 36
                      0
                      Well, that is, you are not able to open Yents or Doyle, look at the state and find out where else the tanks were the same in td, you are not even able to understand the structure of TP.
                      and what for to me still to tell you something?
                      easier to send away so lazy
  22. Yuri kori
    Yuri kori 19 September 2017 01: 47
    0
    Gransasso, the weight of T-90-46,5 tons. It would be interesting to see how you are going to pull almost 47 tons from the mud using a log.))) But to be honest, the T-90 is far from the limit of dreams. I do not want to offend designers and developers, therefore, to put it mildly: the T-90 is inferior to the best Western models in a number of parameters.)))
    1. Gransasso
      Gransasso 19 September 2017 01: 57
      +1
      Take an interest and see how they pull themselves out of the mud using a log
  23. Gransasso
    Gransasso 19 September 2017 01: 47
    +1
    Yuri kori,


    Read the history of the use of these "miracle" tractors ... UG, they were
    1. Yuri kori
      Yuri kori 19 September 2017 11: 12
      0
      Smiled. A horse for transporting heavy artillery is certainly better. laughing
  24. Gransasso
    Gransasso 19 September 2017 02: 13
    +1
    Yuri kori,



    Understandably..suvorova re-read .... lyrics with batons and tyson ...



    Ps tractor Komsomolets was so “good” that as soon as the war started and he showed himself in all its glory in a real war and not in parades ... he was immediately laid off ....
    1. Yuri kori
      Yuri kori 19 September 2017 11: 20
      0
      An attempt to pironizon not counted. Try your best. Suvorov has a lot of inconsistencies and, if desired, you can find a lot of mistakes. But in the main he is right; if you accept his version of the reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in 1941, everything falls into place. And if not, we will desperately seek an explanation of why 24000 excellent Soviet tanks and 17 or 18 thousand very good Soviet aircraft could not stop three and a half thousand German tanks of much worse quality and 3 thousand German planes, which were in no way better than ours . And we, it seems, were talking about Voroshilovites; what does Komsomolets have to do with it?
  25. Yuri kori
    Yuri kori 19 September 2017 11: 10
    0
    hohol95,
    With any adopted after 1935.
    1. hohol95
      hohol95 21 September 2017 09: 06
      0
      So you think that the T-38 tanks (adopted and manufactured since 1936), the T-60 and T-70 - wartime tanks are better than Pz.38 (t)?
      If you write an answer - please justify your opinion!
  26. Gransasso
    Gransasso 19 September 2017 14: 28
    +1
    Yuri kori,


    Hmm .... a team of horses, yes, more mobile than an ever-broken tractor ...



    And as for the Germans, there were no artillery trucks ... google Wehrmacht Tractors .. you will find out many interesting things for yourself ...
    1. Gransasso
      Gransasso 19 September 2017 14: 36
      +1
      anti-aircraft mount on 8t. tractor
      Sd.Kfz.008 ---- Heavy 12 Ton Tractor
      Sd.Kfz.009 ---- Heavy 18 Ton Tractor
      Sd.Kfz.010 ---- Light 1 ton tractor
      Sd.Kfz.010 / 4 - Self-propelled 20mm. 1-ton anti-aircraft mount
      Sd.Kfz.010 / 5 - Self-propelled 20mm. 1-ton anti-aircraft mount
      Sd.Kfz.010 / 6 - Self-propelled 37mm. artiller. installation on 1t. tractor
      Sd.Kfz.011 ---- Light 3 ton tractor



      This is only one "family" .. but there were others too .. got out tens of thousands ... learn the materiel ..
    2. Yuri kori
      Yuri kori 19 September 2017 15: 42
      0
      Frank nonsense begins. Harness of horses ... Two horsepower. How far will you "run" to them on our roads in 1941, in late autumn or winter? About "google" - you tell yourself it. Googled German caterpillar artillery tractors in the summer of 1941: I assure you, it won’t take much time.
      1. Gransasso
        Gransasso 19 September 2017 17: 16
        +1
        During the years of the Second World War, 70 units were built of various semi-caterpillar tractors, trucks and chassis.

        In total, from the beginning of the 1930s to the spring of 1945, 537,8 thousand wheeled vehicles of all kinds were built at German enterprises for the German Armed Forces. These achievements provided the Wehrmacht with the glory of one of the most motorized and highly mobile military units in the world with the highest share of diesel trucks. The contribution of the Third Reich satellites, annexed and occupied European countries to the Wehrmacht's armaments during the war is estimated quite high - up to 100 thousand new cars of various types without taking into account the huge and undetectable number of requisitioned civilian vehicles
  27. Jääkorppi
    Jääkorppi 3 October 2017 08: 26
    +1
    A lot of comments. It’s good to write in 70 years. And then ?! It makes no sense to talk about the quality of equipment when the tank had one refueling and one ammunition. Of course, the advance of tank units without interaction with other units and aircraft, without reconnaissance and support, without infantry and artillery would make sense only in a war against the Zsul. But initially, the Russian army has always been and will be, due to climatic and geographical conditions in a losing position in a surprise attack. A mobilized army is always at a premium. Just honor the memory of the heroes!