On the Soviet side, tanks from the 30 Tank Division of the 14 Mechanized Corps (14MK, Commander Major General S. I. Oborin) of the 4 Army of the Western Special Military District, Slobudka stationed near the town of Pruzhany, took part in it . The division began to form only in February-March 1941 of the year on the basis of the 32-th tank brigade in Pruzhany. The division included the 60 and 61 tank regiments, the 30 motorized rifle regiment and the 30 howitzer-artillery regiment. The division was headed by Colonel Semyon Ilyich Bogdanov, who during the war reached the rank of Marshal of the Armored Forces (the title was awarded to 1 on June 1945 of the year). The division at the start of the war had 211 tanks T-26, there were no other tanks in service with the unit.
By order of Colonel I. V. Tutarinov, Chief of Staff of 14MK, on the night of 22 June 1941 of the year, the 30-I tank division carried out night-time firing at the tankodrome in the Poddubno area with one of its tank regiments. In the afternoon of June 21, the commander of the 30 Panzer Division, Colonel Bogdanov, and the Chief of Staff of the 4 Army, Colonel Sandalov, attended the exercises of this regiment.
The position of the troops of the Western Front on the first day of the war (map). Original, TsA MO RF
The order to bring the divisions of the 14th mechanized corps into combat readiness, which was given at 3 a.m. on June 30, 22, by the commander of the 1941th Army, Major General A. A. Korobkov, was not managed to be transferred to the units before the start of hostilities. Divisions of the corps rose in alarm already under the explosions of shells and bombs. Colonel Bogdanov independently at 4 hours and 4 minutes raised the 15th Panzer Division for combat alert after the German aviation began to bomb the Kuplin airfield in the Pruzhany area. Headquarters 14 MK, which was located in Kobrin, already in the first hours of the war was subjected to an accurate and strong bombardment from the air, losing almost all communications from it. Remaining 20% of its full strength, the corps headquarters moved to the alternate command post in Tevli, but heavy losses in the command structure and in the communications battalion significantly complicated the management of divisions and corps. Later, in a report to the army headquarters, Major General Oborin, commander of 14MK, reported that of all communications he had only one 5-AK radio station, communication delegates were communicating with the divisions.
By 6 o'clock in the morning, parts of the Bogdanov division concentrated in the area of collection for alarm (in the forest southwest of Pruzhan). The 61-th tank regiment of the division of Major P.I. Ivanyuk, who was on night firing, joined the main forces of the division an hour later. Without receiving any orders from the 14 MK headquarters and the 4 Army headquarters, Colonel Bogdanov decided to act according to the cover plan that was developed on the eve of the war. After checking the combat readiness of the 30 Tank Division, approximately at 7 hours of the morning, they marched into the area of concentration (Shcherbovo, Boyary) in two columns, having forward detachments of tank battalions reinforced with artillery. At the same time, the majority of the personnel of the division, which was not provided with vehicles, as well as the howitzer-artillery regiment (who did not have tractors and shells) were left at the location of the subunit in order to organize the defense of Pruzhan.
As can be seen, the Soviet tank crews had to wage the upcoming battle without sufficient support from the motorized infantry and artillery, as well as reliable air cover. From Pruzhan to the village of Pelische, tanks from the 30 division should have traveled approximately 45 kilometers in the daytime. The latter circumstance led to the fact that already from the beginning of the march, the moving columns of the division were discovered by German aircraft, after which they underwent bomb strikes, having suffered the first losses on the march. According to the report of the commander of the 14-th mechanized corps Oborin, the 30-tank division was on the march to the concentration area and the head of the main forces column went to the Poddubno area, having only one ammunition and one fuel station, on the march of the division repeatedly attacked enemy aircraft .
The forward detachments of the German 18-th tank division were already moving towards the Soviet tank crews. She started the crossing over the Bug along with the 17 Panzer Division in 4 hours 15 minutes. Already in 4 hours of 45 minutes, the first tanks of the 18 tank division crossed the river and found themselves on Soviet territory. During the crossing of the water barrier, the Germans used the combat vehicles that they had already tested during the preparation of Operation Sea Lion. The tactical and technical characteristics of these tanks allowed them to cross the water line to a depth of 4 meters.
It is worth noting that the 17-i and 18-i tank divisions were not just well-equipped with tanks, the military equipment on their armament had a qualitative superiority over the 30-tank division opposing it, which was armed with extremely outdated T-26 light tanks of various years of release and the state of different technical serviceability. The 17 Tank Division on 22 June 1941 included 202 PzKpfw I, 12 PzKpfw II, 44 PzKpfw III, 106 PzKpfw III, 50 PzKpfw III, 30 PzKpfw III, 10 PzKpfw III, 18 PzKpfw III, and 218 PzKpfw III, CTN. divisions - 6 tanks (50 PzKpfw I, 99 PzKpfw II, 37 PzKpfw III (with 15-mm gun), 50 PzKpfw III (with 36-mm gun) 12 PzKpfw IV graphics and IV figure, and Idry ских iz ских р ских аrt аских р аскихскихскихских искихских и и и и и и и и и и и и искихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихских аскихскихскихскихскихских аскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихских аскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихскихских искихскихскихских искихскихскихских искихскихских и и иских и и и и и и и и и и и и и и и и и и и и и и и и и и и и див див див див див див див див Of the 420 tanks of these two divisions, 286 tanks, that is, more than half, were in the middle PzKpfw III and PzKpfw IV, which were superior to the Soviet T-26 in armor and armament.
The underwater tanks were able to provide the invasion forces with a weighty advantage. The moment of surprise was used by them to the full. Already in the 8 hours of the 15 minutes, units of “diving” tanks break through to an important crossing over the Lesnaya River, which flows east of the Bug, capturing it in an intact state. In 9: 45, “diving” tanks capture another crossing over this river, it was also not damaged. Unlike Soviet amphibious tanks T-37 / 38 and even T-40, German tanks of a similar purpose were not special developments, but the usual adaptation of linear combat vehicles. For this reason, they had the same combat capabilities as the ordinary "troika" and "four", including they could fully fight the enemy tanks.
Tank PzKpfw III 18 td, 1941 year, after overcoming the river Western Bug along the bottom.
However, having launched the offensive on the morning of June 22, the 2-I tank group slowed down in the afternoon. To the north of Brest by noon, the sappers managed to build a crossing over the Bug, but access roads to them became a bottleneck. Leading from paved roads to the crossing, they walked through a marshy lowland, and under the wheels and caterpillars of dozens of very different cars, approaches to the crossings were rapidly deteriorating. So the 17-th tank division had to pull the trucks stuck in the mud, and then pull them to the road, which allowed movement only in one direction. On top of everything else, in the evening at the crossing of the same division, a bridge collapsed under the tank, which stopped the crossing of the Bug for five hours. As a result, the “diving” tanks, which had escaped forward to the Soviet territory, remained without replenishing the ammunition load and filling it with fuel. The combat magazine XXXXVII of the motorized corps, which included the 17-I and 18-I tank divisions, said: "By the late evening of June 22, only a small part of both divisions crossed the Bug."
Apparently, at around noon 22 June, the forward detachments of the 30 Panzer Division collided near the village of Pelische exactly with the "diving" tanks of the enemy's 18 Panzer Division and other advanced units of the XXXXVII motorized corps.
According to reports from the Soviet side, the division advanced its battalions in the morning to 11, and the main forces in the period from 12 to 13 hours. It was reported that the advanced detachment of the 60-th tank regiment of the division engaged in battle with enemy tanks in the area of Shchebrovo-Pelishche. Here the oncoming tank battle unfolded, in which dozens of tanks took part on each side. As a result of the battle, the German tanks moved back slightly to the settlement of Vidomlya. For a short time, the Soviet tank crews managed to delay their progress. At the same time, already from 14 hours of the day, the division again began to undergo massive air raids by the enemy, bearing heavy losses in people and technology.
At about 15, the 4 Army Command decided to start equipping the rear defensive line on the line of the eastern bank of the Mukhavets River from Pruzhan to Bukhovich by the 205 30 motorized rifle regiment and on foot units of the 14 Panzer Division. At the same time, the main forces of the motorized rifle division were preparing defenses in areas of Birch. But with the receipt of the directive of the High Command in 18 on the application of counterstrikes on the enemy by all available forces, the army command issued a new order: in the morning of June 23 go on the offensive with the entire composition of the 14 MK. Of course, the requirements of both the directives of the NCO and the order of the front and army headquarters no longer corresponded to the reality and the situation prevailing in this area.
By the end of 22 June, the 30 Tank Division (more than 120 T-26 tanks) continued to fight at the turn of Pelische, Podlesie and part of the forces north of Rataichitsa. During the 22 battle, June, the division lost about 25% of its personnel, 30% of tanks, and also lost three battalion commanders and five company commanders, which indicates the heat of the battle. At the same time, at night, only the 30 Panzer Division conducted a battle from the corps, as the Germans did not stop the attacks in this direction at night, advancing by the light of lighting flares and crowding the division's subdivisions to Poddubno. The fact that in the 22 battles of June, the 30-I tank division suffered serious losses, says the fact that on June 23 launched an offensive against the T-130 26 tanks, the rest of the vehicles appeared to have been destroyed or damaged during the battles 22 June, enemy air raids, as well as failed for technical reasons.
Nothing is known about enemy casualties in battles in the area of Pelishche. The 18 Panzer Division reported that it had fought its way through to the town of Pelishche. The combat magazine XXXXVII of the motorized corps indicated that "along the way, several enemy tank units of up to 40 tanks were routed." These were the forward detachments of the Soviet 30 Panzer Division, Colonel Bogdanov. At the same time in the interim report of Army Group "Center" it was stated that the 18-I tank division during the June 22 "repelled a strong Russian tank attack."
Tanks X-26 of the 14 MK, abandoned in Kobrin
The encounter that took place near the village of Pelische was characteristic of the early days of the war. Then the Soviet command did not even admit the idea that tank forces could be used for defensive battles at a certain line. Only tank attacks were considered legitimate. Such attacks against the advancing enemy tank units turned into oncoming tank battles, which were more advantageous to the Germans. Such a battle turned into a duel of tank crews in unequal conditions. On our side, in the battles, mostly tanks took part, sometimes completely without infantry, while on the enemy’s side, tank operations were supported by artillery and aircraft. It is quite natural that Soviet tankers, already inferior in skill to more experienced colleagues from Panzervaffe, suffered incomparably greater losses in such battles. German tankers more successfully hit the enemy from short stops than Soviet tankers. In addition, the enemy continuously bombed Soviet tanks. The 30-I tank division lost no less combat vehicles from the attacks of German dive-bombers than from enemy artillery and tanks.
Also, the result of the first tank battles was affected by the fact that in the spring of 1941, most of the trained senior driver and tank commanders were transferred to the newly formed units of the new mechanized corps. As a result, the crews of the tanks were updated, the young soldiers who came to their place did not have time to go through full combat training. At the same time, the artillery preparation of the crews remained very weak, the fighters did not receive adequate training. At the same time, the artillery regiments of the new tank divisions were armed only with howitzers with a very limited stock of ammunition, and there were not enough means of traction for artillery. Naturally, in such conditions it was inexpedient to engage in oncoming tank battles with the enemy. At the same time, we should not forget that the use of tank units in defense at that time was not worked out in detail, there was no proper experience, he came to the commanders of the Red Army much later.
Today, the place of the first major tank battle, which occurred near the village of Pelische, has seriously changed: a new road interchange was built at the crossroads of roads near this settlement. Despite the fact that more than 75 years have passed since those events, traces of the battle can still be found in local fields: for example, tracks from tracks of T-26 tanks are still found here. These are the only dumb witnesses of that distant battle, the eyewitnesses of which left practically no documentary evidence about him.
Information sources:
http://myfront.in.ua/krasnaya-armiya/divizii/tankovye-16-30.html
Moschanskiy I. B. Tragedy of the Brest Fortress. Anthology of the feat. June 22 - July 23 1941 of the year / I. B. Moschansky. - Moscow: Veche, 2010. - 128 with.
Isaev A.V. Unknown 1941. The stopped blitzkrieg / A. V. Isaev. - Moscow: Eksmo, 2013. - 480 with.
Materials from open sources.