One of the first tank battles of the Great Patriotic War: the oncoming battle near the village of Pelische

One of the first tank battles of the Great Patriotic War took place already on its first day. On June 22, around noon, near the small Belarusian village of Pelishche, the forward units of the German 18th Panzer and, possibly, the 17th Panzer Division and the Soviet 30th Panzer Division, which was moving west from Pruzhany, clashed. It was a classic oncoming battle, which for a while delayed the advance of German tank units from Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group. Around the same time in the afternoon, another tank battle took place - at Alytus in Lithuania, where the battle groups of the German 7th and 20th Panzer Divisions clashed with the vanguard of the Soviet 5th Panzer Division. It so happened that today it is much easier to find information about the battles near the city of Alytus. We'll talk about the tank battle that took place near the village of Pelishche.

On the Soviet side, tanks from the 30th Panzer Division of the 14th Mechanized Corps (14MK, commander Major General S. I. Oborin) of the 4th Army of the Western Special Military District, the location of Slobudka (near the city of Pruzhany) took part in it . The division began to form only in February-March 1941 on the basis of the 32nd Tank Brigade in Pruzhany. The division included the 60th and 61st tank regiments, the 30th motorized rifle regiment and the 30th howitzer artillery regiment. The unit was headed by Colonel Semyon Ilyich Bogdanov, who during the war rose to the rank of Marshal of the Armored Forces (the title was awarded on June 1, 1945). At the beginning of the war, the division had 211 T-26 tanks; there were no other tanks in service with the division.

By order of the chief of staff of the 14MK, Colonel I.V. Tutarinov, on the night of June 22, 1941, the 30th Panzer Division conducted night firing at the tankodrome located in the Poddubno area with one of its tank regiments. On the afternoon of June 21, the commander of the 30th Panzer Division, Colonel Bogdanov, and the Chief of Staff of the 4th Army, Colonel Sandalov, attended the exercises of this regiment.

The position of the troops of the Western Front on the first day of the war (map). Original, Central Administration of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

The order to bring the divisions of the 14th mechanized corps to combat readiness, which was given at 3 on June 30, 22 by the commander of the 1941th Army, Major General A. A. Korobkov, did not manage to be transferred to the units before the start of hostilities. The divisions of the corps rose in alarm already under the explosions of shells and bombs. Colonel Bogdanov independently raised the 4th Panzer Division on combat alert at 4:15 after the German aviation began bombing the Kuplin airfield in the Pruzhany area. The headquarters of the 14th MK, which was located in Kobrin, already in the first hours of the war was subjected to accurate and heavy bombardment from the air, losing almost all means of communication from it. Remaining in 20% of its regular strength, the corps headquarters moved to a reserve command post in Tevli, however, heavy losses in the command staff and in the communications battalion significantly complicated the management of divisions and corps units. Later, in a report to the army headquarters, the commander of the 14MK, Major General Oborin, reported that of all the means of communication he had only one radio station 5-AK, communication with the divisions was carried out by communication delegates.

By 6 o'clock in the morning, parts of Bogdanov's division concentrated in the muster area (in the forest southwest of Pruzhany). The 61st Tank Regiment of Major P.I. Ivanyuk's division, which was on night firing, joined the main forces of the division an hour later. Not receiving any orders from the headquarters of the 14th MK and the headquarters of the 4th Army, Colonel Bogdanov decided to act according to the cover plan, which was developed on the eve of the war. After checking the combat readiness of the units of the 30th Panzer Division, at about 7 o'clock in the morning, they set out for the concentration area (Shcherbovo, Boyars) in two columns, having forward detachments as part of tank battalions reinforced with artillery. At the same time, most of the personnel of the division, which was not provided with vehicles, as well as the howitzer-artillery regiment (which did not have tractors and shells) were left at the location of the unit in order to organize the defense of Pruzhany.

As you can see, the Soviet tankers had to fight the upcoming battle without sufficient support from motorized rifles and artillery, as well as reliable air cover. From Pruzhany to the village of Pelishche, tanks from the 30th division had to go about 45 kilometers during daylight hours. The latter circumstance led to the fact that already from the beginning of the march, the moving columns of the division were discovered by German aircraft, after which they were bombed, having suffered their first losses on the march. According to the report of the commander of the 14th mechanized corps Oborin, by 30 o'clock the 11th Panzer Division was on the march to the concentration area and the head of the column of the main forces went to the Poddubno area, having only one ammunition load and one refueling, enemy aircraft repeatedly attacked on the march of the division .

The forward detachments of the German 18th Panzer Division were already moving towards the Soviet tankmen. She began crossing the Bug along with the 17th Panzer Division at 4:15. Already at 4, the first tanks of the 45th Panzer Division crossed the river and ended up on Soviet territory. During the crossing of the water barrier, the Germans used combat vehicles that they had already tested during the preparations for Operation Sea Lion. The performance characteristics of these tanks allowed them to overcome water lines up to 18 meters deep.

It is worth noting that the 17th and 18th tank divisions were not only well equipped with tanks, the military equipment they were armed with had a qualitative superiority over the vehicles of the opposing 30th tank division, which was armed exclusively with obsolete T-26 light tanks of various years of production and the state of various technical serviceability. As of June 17, 22, the 1941th Panzer Division had 202 tanks (12 PzKpfw I, 44 PzKpfw II, 106 PzKpfw III (with a 50-mm gun), 30 PzKpfw IV and 10 command PzBef), as part of the 18th Panzer divisions - 218 tanks (6 PzKpfw I, 50 PzKpfw II, 99 PzKpfw III (with 37 mm gun), 15 PzKpfw III (with 50 mm gun) 36 PzKpfw IV and 12 command PzBef). Of the 420 tanks of these two divisions, 286 tanks, that is, more than half, accounted for the medium PzKpfw III and PzKpfw IV, which were superior in armor and armament to the Soviet T-26s.

Underwater tanks were able to provide the invasion forces with a fairly significant advantage. The moment of surprise was used by them to the fullest. Already at 8:15, units of "diving" tanks break through to an important crossing over the Lesnaya River, which flows east of the Bug, capturing it intact. At 9:45 "diving" tanks captured another crossing over this river, it was also not damaged. Unlike the Soviet T-37/38 and even T-40 amphibious tanks, German tanks of a similar purpose were not special developments, but the usual adaptation of linear combat vehicles. For this reason, they had the same combat capabilities as ordinary "triples" and "fours", including the ability to fully engage in combat with enemy tanks.

Tank PzKpfw III 18 TD, 1941, after crossing the Western Bug River along the bottom.

However, having vigorously launched the offensive on the morning of June 22, the 2nd Panzer Group slowed down in the afternoon. To the north of Brest, by noon, sappers managed to build crossings over the Bug, but the access roads to them became a bottleneck. Leading from paved roads to the crossing, they went through a swampy lowland, under the wheels and tracks of dozens of various vehicles, the approaches to the crossings rapidly deteriorated. So the tractors of the 17th Panzer Division had to first pull out trucks stuck in the mud, and then pull them to the road, which allowed movement in only one direction. In addition, in the evening, at the crossing of the same division, a bridge collapsed under the tank, which stopped the crossing of the Bug for five hours. As a result, the “diving” tanks that broke ahead into Soviet territory were left without replenishment of ammunition and refueling. The war diary of XXXXVII Motorized Corps, which included the 17th and 18th Panzer Divisions, stated: "By the late evening of June 22, only a small part of both divisions had crossed the Bug."

Apparently, at about noon on June 22, the forward detachments of the 30th Panzer Division collided near the village of Pelische with the “diving” tanks of the enemy’s 18th Panzer Division and other advanced units of the XXXXVII Motorized Corps.

According to the reports of the Soviet side, the division entered into contact with the enemy with its advanced battalions already at 11 am, and with the main forces in the period from 12 to 13 hours. It was reported that the advance detachment of the 60th tank regiment of the division entered into battle with enemy tanks in the Shchebrovo-Pelishche area. A counter tank battle unfolded here, in which dozens of tanks from each side took part. As a result of the battle, German tanks retreated a little back to the village of Vidomlya. For a short time, Soviet tankers managed to delay their advance. At the same time, already from 14:XNUMX in the afternoon, the division again began to be subjected to massive enemy air raids, suffering from them heavy losses in people and equipment.

At about 15 p.m., the command of the 4th Army decided to start equipping the rear defensive line on the line of the eastern bank of the Mukhavets River from Pruzhany to Bukhovichi with the forces of the motorized rifle regiment of the 205th motorized rifle division and foot units of the 30th tank division from the 14th MK. At the same time, the main forces of the motorized rifle division were preparing defenses in the Bereza areas. But with the receipt at 18 o’clock of the directive of the high command to launch counterattacks on the enemy with all available forces, the army command issued a new order: on the morning of June 23, go on the offensive with the entire composition of the 14th MK. Of course, the requirements of both the directives of the NPO and the order of the headquarters of the front and the army no longer corresponded to reality and the situation that had developed in this direction.

By the end of June 22, the 30th Panzer Division (more than 120 T-26 tanks) was still fighting at the Pelishche, Podlesye line and part of its forces north of Rataichitsy. During the battle on June 22, the division lost about 25% of its personnel, 30% of tanks, and also lost three battalion commanders and five company commanders, which indicates the intensity of the battle. At the same time, at night, only the 30th Panzer Division fought from the corps, since the Germans did not stop attacking in this direction at night, advancing in the light of lighting rockets and pushing division units to Poddubno. The fact that in the battles of June 22 the 30th Panzer Division suffered serious losses is evidenced by the fact that on June 23 about 130 T-26 tanks went on the offensive from it, the rest of the vehicles, apparently, were destroyed or damaged during the fighting June 22, enemy air raids, and out of action for technical reasons.

Nothing is known about the losses of the enemy in the battles in the area of ​​\u18b\u40bthe settlement of Pelishche. The 30th Panzer Division reported that it had fought its way to the town of Pelishche. The combat log of the XXXXVII motorized corps indicated that along the way "several enemy tank detachments of up to 18 tanks" were defeated. These were the forward detachments of the Soviet 22th Panzer Division, Colonel Bogdanov. At the same time, in the interim report of Army Group Center, it was indicated that the XNUMXth Panzer Division during June XNUMX "repelled a strong Russian tank attack."

T-26 tanks from the 14 MK, abandoned in Kobrin

The oncoming battle that took place near the village of Pelishche was typical of the first days of the war. Then the Soviet command did not even allow the idea that tank troops could be used for defensive battles at a certain line. Only tank attacks were considered legitimate. Such attacks against advancing enemy tank units turned into oncoming tank battles, which were more beneficial to the Germans. Such a battle turned into a duel of tank crews in unequal conditions. On our side, tanks mainly took part in the battles, sometimes without infantry at all, while on the enemy side, the actions of tanks were supported by artillery and aircraft. It is quite natural that Soviet tankers, already inferior in skill to more experienced colleagues from the Panzerwaffe, suffered incomparably large losses in such battles. German tankers hit the enemy more successfully from short stops than Soviet tankers. In addition, the enemy bombed Soviet tanks continuously. The 30th Panzer Division lost no less combat vehicles from the attacks of German dive bombers than from enemy artillery and tanks.

Also, the result of the first tank battles was affected by the fact that in the spring of 1941, most of the trained senior mechanics-drivers and tank commanders were transferred with an increase to the newly formed units of the new mechanized corps. As a result, the tank crews were updated, the young soldiers who took their place did not have time to complete combat training. At the same time, the artillery training of the crews remained very weak, the soldiers did not receive proper training. At the same time, the artillery regiments of the new tank divisions were armed only with howitzers with a very limited supply of ammunition, and there were also not enough means of traction for artillery. Naturally, under such conditions, it was inappropriate to engage in oncoming tank battles with the enemy. At the same time, one should not forget that the use of tank units in the defense at that time was not worked out in detail, there was no proper experience, it came to the commanders of the Red Army much later.

Today, the place of the first major tank battle that took place near the village of Pelische has seriously changed: a new road junction has been built at the crossroads near this settlement. Despite the fact that more than 75 years have passed since those events, traces of the battle can still be found in local fields: for example, tracks from the tracks of T-26 tanks are still found here. These are the only silent witnesses of that distant battle, the eyewitnesses of which left practically no documentary evidence of it.

Information sources:
http://myfront.in.ua/krasnaya-armiya/divizii/tankovye-16-30.html
Moshchansky I. B. The tragedy of the Brest Fortress. Anthology of achievement. June 22 - July 23, 1941 / I. B. Moshchansky. - Moscow: Veche, 2010. - 128 p.
Isaev A. V. Unknown 1941. Stopped blitzkrieg / A. V. Isaev. - Moscow: Eksmo, 2013. - 480 p.
Materials from open sources.

Comments

[Moore]

At the same time, most of the personnel of the division, which was not provided with vehicles, as well as the howitzer-artillery regiment (without tractors and shells) were left at the location of the unit in order to organize the defense of Pruzhany.
Hmm ...

[vladimirZ]

The oncoming battle that took place near the village of Pelishche was typical of the first days of the war. Then the Soviet command did not even allow the idea that tank troops could be used for defensive battles at a certain line. Only tank attacks were considered legitimate. Such attacks against advancing enemy tank units turned into oncoming tank battles, which were more beneficial to the Germans.
- from article

Encounter battles in the first days of the war are characteristic of all units of the Red Army, not only tank ones.
This is a consequence of the wrong strategy for starting the war, developed by the leadership of the Red Army, and put into practice by People's Commissar Timoshenko and Chief of the General Staff Zhukov.
Zhukov and Timoshenko were practically replaced, signed by I.V. Stalin Plan (Considerations) of the country's strategic defense of September 18, 1940 (B.M. Shaposhnikov's Plan), which provided for active defense at the first stage of the outbreak of the war - the period of mobilization of the Red Army, and the alleged main blow of the Germans from Belorussky (Minsk-Smolensk-Moscow) to the blow of the Germans in the direction of Kiev.
Zhukov and Timoshenko dragged their vision of the beginning of the war - a counter-blitzkrieg against the advancing "suddenly" Germans - into the strategic location of the Red Army troops, placing most of the troops in the KOVO, instead of the ZapVO, and placing a significant part of them, respectively, in the Lvov and Bialystok ledges. The purpose of this arrangement is a counter strike - an offensive in the form of a counter-blitzkrieg against the advancing Germans had no real basis. The leadership of the Red Army did not know either the real strength of the prepared Germans, or the exact directions of the shock units of the Wehrmacht. In essence, the Red Army's strikes were in vain, without proper reconnaissance, without preliminary preparation and concentration of their troops.
The result of such oncoming battles, instead of active, maneuverable defense, was the complete defeat of the Red Army in the border battles of the beginning of the war, the death of hundreds of thousands of soldiers and commanders, the loss of thousands of tanks, aircraft, artillery, the capture of Minsk on the 5th day of the war, with the encirclement of a large number military units and their subsequent death.
It is not clear where Zhukov and Timoshenko had their heads, and what they thought, dragging their version of the start of the war. Although, given the characteristics of Zhukov, given by K.K. Rokossovsky when he was Zhukov's chief, - about Zhukov's dislike and inability for staff work, as well as Zhukov's lack of a systematic special military education, this can somehow be explained.
Only the subsequent removal of Timoshenko and Zhukov from the leadership of the Red Army, Stalin taking over the leadership, changing the strategy and tactics of the troops to active, maneuverable defense with the gradual depletion of the strength of the advancing Germans somehow saved the situation.

[novel66]

where they were, where they were - there are persistent rumors about betrayal in the highest generals

[vladimirZ]

... there are persistent rumors about betrayal in the highest generals - novel66

And this option is not excluded. Suffice it to recall the conspiracy led by Tukhachevsky, the events of the almost week-long defeat of the Western Front, and the occupation of Minsk on the 5th day of the war, a number of other incomprehensible actions of the generals.
I.V. Stalin, already during the war, began a covert investigation into the actions of the top leadership of the Army, for reasons of the border defeat of the Red Army, which continued after the war, when a secret survey of senior officers on 5 questions began, including the question of when to them, before the war , received an order to bring the troops to combat readiness.
These answers, some of them, were published at the end of the 80s in the military history magazine VIZH, and then their publication was abruptly stopped.

[novel66]

only Stalin's reverence for Zhukov after such and such is incomprehensible.

[vladimirZ]

only Stalin's reverence for Zhukov after such and such is incomprehensible. - novel66

Stalin had no "reverence" for Zhukov. Stalin appreciated Zhukov for his businesslike qualities, his rigidity and ability to restore order in a difficult situation, using even cruel measures of influence against his subordinates to obtain the desired result.
I.V. had reverence. Stalin to Marshals Shaposhnikov B.M. and Rokossovsky K.K., to whom, unlike others, he always addressed by name and patronymic, to Chief Marshal of Aviation Golovanov A.E., whom he addressed by name, and with whom he communicated almost daily during the war years.
By the way, here is what Golovanov wrote about Zhukov:

"I would say that he is a characteristic representative of the Russian people. The fact is that G.K. Zhukov became a commander, and not just a commander, but an outstanding commander, having, in fact, neither a military education nor a general one. Everything what he had was a head on his shoulders...
... The contribution of Georgy Konstantinovich to the Victory is great. It must be said that Stalin highly valued Zhukov's military abilities, and I think that there is no other such person who would receive so many awards and be so noted as he ... ".

- No wonder Stalin sent him to Leningrad instead of Voroshilov, and he, using force there, did it! After all, he shot there entire retreating our battalions! He, like Voroshilov, did not run with a pistol in his hand, did not lead the fighters himself into the attack, but set up a machine-gun barrier - and on the retreating, on his own! But I will say that in his place I would have acted exactly the same if the fate of the country is being decided ...

"...- I consider Zhukov a nugget in military affairs. This, of course, is a great commander who was well versed in operational and tactical issues. Strategically, he was weaker, since he did not deal with issues of waging war on a state scale. Politically, he was illiterate, and I don’t even remember Stalin discussing political aspects with him. But as for operational-tactical issues, here Zhukov had a very strong grip ... "

"...- It's one thing - Zhukov's leadership qualities, another - his attitude towards people, towards subordinates. If he cursed, - that's okay, it was common in the war, and he tried to humiliate, crush a person. I remember he met one general: "Who are you?" "He reported. And he told him: 'You're a sack of shit, not a general!'

Further, A. Golovanov noted that the relationship between Stalin and Zhukov was difficult. Stalin also had complaints about Zhukov's work style, which he often expressed to the marshal.
Golovanov rejects the statement of the famous aircraft designer A.S. Yakovlev that Stalin loved Zhukov expresses the opinion that Stalin did not identify personal relations with business ones.
Excerpts from the book "Stalin's favorite about Zhukov" by V. Kasyanov. http://www.proza.ru/2012/12/29/667

[Monarchist]

VladimerZ, about oncoming tank battles. There is no unequivocal opinion: judging by Zhukov (I have the 1970 edition), there was an order from Stalin. To one degree or another, most military leaders support this theme. Historians also have different opinions.
"Stalin took over leadership, changing the strategy and tactics of the troops to active, maneuverable defense ...." Again, there is no unequivocal opinion: before perestroika, the majority believed that Stalin had not yet listened to the professionals. During perestroika, memoirs began to be published more and more fully, and other opinions began to appear. Among the military and historians there is no consensus.
Roman66, do you mean Mukhin's publications?
I am now interested in: Brezkun, Mukhin and 2-3 other authors, but their work radically changes stereotypes. And indeed, in this light, the behavior of some military leaders is suspicious

[vladimirZ]

about oncoming tank battles. There is no unequivocal opinion: judging by Zhukov (I have the 1970 edition), there was an order from Stalin. - Monarchist

Refer to the memoirs of Zhukov G.K. it is impossible, so many times they changed from edition to edition, even after his death.
In addition, in the book of F. Chuev "One Hundred and Forty Conversations with Molotov" there is a phrase by V.M. Molotov:

Zhukov reproaches Stalin, says Molotov. - I do not think that Stalin believed, as Zhukov writes, that the main direction was allegedly towards Ukraine. I don't think so. And I don’t think that Zhukov’s reference to Stalin was correct. After all, I knew no less than Zhukov about what Stalin said,

And although this concerns a change in the choice of the main attack of the Germans from Belorussian to Kiev, it shows that Zhukov purposefully shifted his blame for the defeat of 1941 onto the already deceased Stalin. And as they say "once lied, there is no faith."

[vladimirZ]

I am now interested in: Brezkun, Mukhin and 2-3 other authors, but their work radically changes stereotypes. - Monarchist

Would you be so kind, dear Monarchist, to share a list of authors about whom you wrote. I am also interested in the history of the initial period of the war, I have many books on this topic, as authors - supporters of the traitor Rezun, who talk about the evil intentions of the USSR, who want to be the first to attack Germany (I am skeptical about them, and using only the facts that they cite in them ) and authors - patriots, really trying to understand the essence of the events that took place then.
I am currently reading Martirosyan, in some part I do not agree with him, but he has a very real position explaining the tragedy that occurred then, by replacing (by the then leadership of the Red Army) the strategic defense plan of the USSR, orienting them to a counter offensive - a counteroffensive against the advancing Germans, instead of an active mobile defense to exhaust the enemy. And even a warning strike against the prepared Germans on their territory (the Strategy Plan of May 15, 1941, developed but not signed).
I finally found the answer from Martirosyan "Why were our troops so deployed?", As if they were preparing to be the first to launch an offensive against the Germans, and thus, in essence, be the initiators of the outbreak of war - which, by the way, supporters of the traitor Rezun insist on, and he himself.
And this answer - the leadership of the Red Army (Timoshenko and Zhukov) were preparing a counterattack - a counteroffensive against the advancing Germans, who had declared war on us. An illiterate decision (to the point of crime), which led to the defeat of our troops in the initial period of the war.

[voyaka uh]

Again, I agree with you. I didn’t read Martirosyan, but a couple of years ago,
studying the sequence of changes in the plans of the General Staff of the Red Army in the prewar years, came
to the same conclusions as yours.

[zombirusrev]

There is a lot of literature on this issue, including the wonderful book by Yu.I. Mukhina "If not for the generals." Where the mechanism of the betrayal of Pavlov and his accomplices is clearly laid out point by point. The reasons for the catastrophe of the central direction are obvious. It was neither north nor south. The theme of the fall of Sevastopol is also analyzed.

[voyaka uh]

"" Zhukov and Timoshenko dragged their vision of the beginning of the war -
oncoming counter-blitzkrieg on the advancing "suddenly" Germans "////
------------------------
Completely agree with your detailed post.
It's better not to state it.
Zhukov never acknowledged the failure of his tactics and his orders.
by 1941.

[Falcon5555]

Zhukov and Timoshenko dragged their vision of the beginning of the war - a counter-blitzkrieg against the advancing "suddenly" Germans

"Counter-blitzkrieg" - this term: neither counter-blitzkrieg, nor just blitzkrieg - is not found anywhere in the published Soviet documents and memoirs, as far as I know. There was a "cover plan", which came into effect after the war, as it were, began by itself, and consisted simply in an offensive (which now causes various interpretations), but to a very modest depth. They tried to apply it without taking into account the current situation - both the activities of the Germans and their own problems (for example, the article mentions the lack of vehicles), and according to orders that did not take it into account either.

[igordok]

Tank PzKpfw III 18 TD, 1941, after crossing the Western Bug River along the bottom.

In fact, wading the river, also overcoming the "bottom". The tower is dry.

[parusnik]

Well, how can the T-26 be considered obsolete? The T-26 (model 1938/1939 especially) could withstand most German tanks in 1941, but was inferior to the Panzer III and Panzer IV models that participated in Operation Barbarossa in June 1941 . They also participated in battles with the Germans and their allies during the Battle of Moscow in 1941-1942, in the Battle of Stalingrad and the Battle of the Caucasus in 1942-1943. Some tank units of the Leningrad Front used their T-26 tanks until 1944. The defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria in August 1945 was the last military operation in which they were used.

[igordok]

It often happens that a new technique, at birth, becomes obsolete. The very system of using light tanks is outdated. Light tanks have become "out of fashion". Yes, and the T-26, new, I still would not call it.

[BAI]

"In the attack of the thirty-four" by A. Raftopullo, commander of the battalion of BT-7 tanks of the 4th tank brigade (Katukov), tells about the rather successful actions of the BT-7 against the Germans in 41 (near Moscow in the Tula direction). And the BT-7, with equal armament and superiority in speed, was inferior to the T-26 in terms of armor. With the tactics of the 4th brigade - actions from ambushes, the T-26 could even be more successful than the BT-7.
Assessment of Raftopullo's actions from the outside (he does not evaluate himself):
"On the morning of October 9, 1941, the German elite units launched a decisive offensive. Analysis of combat reports from all sectors of the defense allowed the tank brigade commander M.E. Katukov to conclude that the enemy was delivering the main blow on the left flank of the defense through Sheino to Mtsensk. In an ambush, a tank battalion under the command of Raftopullo, who was also responsible for this defense center, about a hundred enemy tanks, supported by aviation and artillery, moved to the line of defense of the Guards Corps in the Golovlevo-Ilkovo sector.

On October 9, 1941, near the village of Ilkovo, Raftopullo with his battalion inflicted heavy damage on the enemy in manpower and equipment. Acting from ambush, the tankers delivered fire strikes on enemy columns and quickly retreated to new lines. 43 enemy tanks were hit.

In this battle, Raftopullo was seriously wounded.

[super.ufu]

In this battle, Raftopullo was seriously wounded.

everything except this phrase is a memoir with its inherent fabulousness

[hohol95]

And do you feel the same about the descriptions of the battle roads of the German panzervods and self-propelled gunners - as for FAIRY MEMOIRS?

[super.ufu]

of course, I’ll say something terrible - all memoirs are fabulous

[BAI]

everything except this phrase is a memoir with its inherent fabulousness

And in my opinion, absolutely reliable memories of an eyewitness and a participant in those actions with photographs. I no longer recall the assessment of the actions of the 4th Panzer Brigade by Guderian and Halder.

[super.ufu]

And in my opinion, absolutely reliable memories of an eyewitness and a participant in those actions with photographs.
uh, what photos do you have from under mtsensk?
but for the rest I will repeat, all fairy tales


and second, what is your credibility based on?

[BAI]

uh, what photos do you have from under mtsensk?

http://feldgrau.info/other/16959-bitva-pod-mtsens
is

Quote: super.ufu

second, what is your credibility based on?

The testimony of eyewitnesses is accepted in court as evidence, especially since it is confirmed by other sources.

[super.ufu]

there are exactly 2 mtsenskkhs and both are German and both ... have nothing to do with 1 Gvtbr
this time

indications are different, for example:

What do you think, which is more accurate, in half a year, or in 30 years?

[BAI]

Just at 42 they could get it wrong. Too many eyewitnesses confirm those events.
"According to the memoirs of M. E. Katukov:

At the positions of Samokhin was the battalion commander, Captain A. A. Raftopullo with his car. He led the battle, standing near the tank. The unexpected explosion of a mine burned his back. In a fever, Raftopullo paid no attention to this. At this time, a bullet pierced his left shoulder. The orderly bandaged him and offered to go to the medical unit. But Raftopullo categorically refused to leave the battlefield. Only after my order did the captain allow himself to be taken to the medical unit.

“I’m not going anywhere,” he told the doctors in the medical unit. - I'm still running. Here you bandage it - and I'll run away anyway.

But soon, due to a large loss of blood, Raftopullo lost consciousness and was urgently sent to a front-line hospital.

At the expense of the photo - of course, most of the photos of those events are German. After all, as a result, the Germans captured Mtsensk anyway. And the photos taken by the Germans are usually very unpleasant for us.

[super.ufu]

Just at 42 they could get it wrong. Too many eyewitnesses confirm those events.

ah, well, of course, after six months they are not accurate, but in the 70th year they are accurate))
well let it be

[super.ufu]

Well, how can the T-26 be considered obsolete? The T-26 (especially the 1938/1939 model) could withstand most German tanks in 1941, but was inferior to the Panzer III and Panzer IV models,

most German tanks are Panzer III

[hohol95]

You forgot Pz.38 (t) - on June 22, 1941 they were in the army the second largest Wehrmacht tank after Pz.III !!!

[super.ufu]

Quote: hohol95

You forgot Pz.38 (t) - on June 22, 1941 they were in the army the second largest Wehrmacht tank after Pz.III !!!

it's you who missed something.

440 fours
almost 1000 triplets
almost 900 twos
625 38x

[hohol95]

Where does such data come from? Specify a source!

[super.ufu]

Thomas Jentz from the article on the site here

[hohol95]

According to M. Baryatinsky -
deuces - 746
triples - 965 (in 11 divisions out of 17)
fours - 439
38's - 625
You are right - there are MORE TWOS in terms of the number, BUT the 38th is better armed, better armored! And in 5 divisions, it was they who were the penetrating force of the divisions !!!
7th division of the Wehrmacht - 53 TWO, 167 - 38 and 30 FOUR!

[super.ufu]

yes, I neighed, to compare Yenz with Baryatinsky ...

[hohol95]

I can also laugh at YENTZEM... Everyone has a different sense of humor!
In addition, you forgot the original task of the Pz.IV - supporting the infantry in the offensive and fighting the enemy's field fortifications! Based on this concept, he was armed with a short-barreled 75mm gun! Therefore, 38 (t) and Troikas were then considered more versatile and suitable for combating enemy armored vehicles.
In addition, the data of Yenz and Baryatinsky almost the same - no one will know for sure!

[super.ufu]

I can also laugh at YENTZEM... Everyone has a different sense of humor!

Yes, there are no problems, only Yenz is a world-famous researcher who worked in the archives, and B. was not seen in the archives, but he is completely retelling foreign literature.
in a decent society, Baryatinsky and Shirokorad are abusive names

[hohol95]

For whom and Yenz with a worldwide reputation - I don’t know such an author!
Was it printed in Russian?
And only they are not the only ones who study the real forces of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army! And their technical and professional abilities.

[hohol95]

“On 1 June 1941 in Germany, the number of all tanks and assault guns taken from factories and transferred to the troops of the army and reserve army, as well as under the control of artillery and technical supply offices, was 5639 units. Of these, TI - 877, 35 (t) -187, T-II - 1072, flamethrower - 85, 38 (t) - 754, T-III - 1440, T-IV - 517 tanks. Commanding - 330. Total tanks - 5362. Assault guns - 377. In the army in the east on 22 June 1941, there were only tanks (without flamethrowing) 3332. ”(B. Muller-Hillebrand. Reference book“ Land Army of Germany. 1933 – 1945 ”).
T-II (20 mm cannon, machine gun 7,92 mm) - 746;
38 (t) (37 mm cannon, 2 machine guns 7,92 mm) - 772;
T-III (37 mm or 50 mm cannon, 3 machine guns) - 965;
T-IV (75 mm short gun, two 7,92 mm machine guns) - 439
commander's - 230.

[Yuri kori]

Pz.38(t) - Czech tank produced in 1938. Combat weight-6 tons. Armament - one machine gun. Booking is bulletproof. Are you presenting this scarecrow as a "formidable weapon of the Wehrmacht's tank forces"?

[hohol95]

Is 50mm frontal armor bulletproof in your opinion?
Unless, of course, you confuse 35(t) (25mm frontal armor) with 38(t) models D, E, F, S (hull and turret forehead - 50 mm, hull and turret sides - 30 mm).
This is stronger than the 15mm frontal armor of the T-26 tanks!
In addition, 38 (t) was produced only under the supervision of the Germans since 1939 (only 3 pieces were made for the Czechoslovak army)!
Yes, the first models A, B, C and part of the tanks of model D were weaker armored -
The thickness of the armor plates of the frontal part of the hull reached 25, onboard - 15, stern -12. roofs - 10, bottoms - 8 mm. The armor protection of the turret varied between 15–25 mm.
But then the thickness of the front sheets was increased to 50 mm!
So this one was clearly not a SCARECROW!

[Yuri kori]

Let's do this: you carefully read this article https://anaga.ru/38t.htm - and then we'll talk about "500mm armor" and everything else.

[hohol95]

My dear - did you carefully read the recommended article?
It says everything about what I wrote to you! Read carefully.
And not 500, but 50 millimeters! Do not distort!

[Yuri kori]

Yes, I read it a long time ago, and I wish you the same, my dear. 50mm armor, with a riveted hull and a 125-horsepower gasoline engine - this is a parody, not a tank. "35-ton" and "38-ton" tanks were so weak that in winter they froze to the ground overnight and could not tear themselves away from it. Therefore, any photograph of these tanks in winter: the tank stands on logs or on boards. Even our tanks of the BT series carried them without difficulty - and it’s not surprising: the BT-7M was equipped with V-2 diesel engines with a power of 500 hp, the oldest BT-2 had 400 hp. The "35-ton" tank had a cruising range 190 km, and BT-7M - 900. Czech tanks were armed with 37 mm cannons, and BTs with 45 mm. Would you like to read the article again, dear? And especially pay attention to the ending: The last serial modification released on the BMM was the Ausf.G. It differed from option E in the absence of a box for ammunition. 324 cars were made. In July 1942, after the release of 1414 tanks of all modifications, the production of Pz.38 (t) was stopped. Why so? Such a "formidable" tank, 50mm frontal armor... And already in 1942, the Germans abandoned them.

[hohol95]

How many tons??? They made me laugh - 35 (t) and 38 (t) - numbering is not by weight, but by the year of adoption !!! Super!
And with freezing to the ground strongly ...
By 1942, the main armament ceased to meet the requirements - the 37mm gun was no longer suitable for battles! But the tanks themselves were used -
in the spring of 1943, they were practically withdrawn from the combat tank units of the Eastern Front.
So, before the start of the Battle of Kursk, they were available only in the 8th and 20th tank divisions - three and nine units, respectively. In total, on July 1, 1943, the Wehrmacht had 204 combat-ready tanks of this type.
By this time, part of the vehicles during the repair was converted into self-propelled artillery mounts. Tank towers were used on various fortifications as firing points.
By the summer of 1944, there were 351 such towers. A significant number of Pz.38 (t) tanks served in security and police formations in the occupied territories, as well as in German armored trains.
As of October 1944 (the statistics for the Pz.38(t) ends this month, the Wehrmacht had 229 more combat vehicles of this type.

[Yuri kori]

Yes, you made me laugh, dear. Why did I put "38-ton" and "35-ton" in quotation marks, didn't you realize?)) But anyway, thanks for the fact that you laboriously repeated to me what I wrote to you more than an hour ago:

""Come to your senses. The letter "t" in the index is from the Czech word, in German Tschechien. Captured tanks from the Germans received their original index, with the first letter of the name of the country of origin added in brackets. Captured Soviet T-34s, for example, appeared among the Germans as T-34 (r) Pz.38 (t) - a Czech tank manufactured in 1938.

Okay, let's be serious, without the desire to hurt: these Czech freaks are very weak tanks. For Greece and other Norway, which had no tanks or anti-tank artillery at all, they were still somehow suitable. But comparing them with our tanks of 1941 is simply not serious.

[hohol95]

With which OUR tanks is it not serious to compare Pz.38 (t)?
Announce the entire list!

[Yuri kori]

By the way, about the "power" of this tank: please look at this photo. This is a PzKpfw 38(t) in the USSR in June 1941. Summer. There is no mud, let alone snow. And on the tank lies a LOG. And one end is covered in mud. Can you tell me why it is there, and why is it in the mud?

[Gransasso]

So what? ... on another branch there is a photo of a modern t-90 ... and there is the same log on the tank ... for the same purposes

[hohol95]

A normal log for self-pulling a tank! And in the Russian mud, a lot of equipment is stuck! Both light and heavy!

[Alexey RA]

Quote: parusnik

Well, how can the T-26 be considered obsolete?

All the shortcomings of the T-26 are that its modernization was carried out exclusively along the path of least resistance - increasing armor, engine power and weapons. It is necessary to radically rework the suspension, which is now significantly overloaded and does not provide the guaranteed mileage given by the manufacturer. In addition, the shortcomings of the T-26 should be considered - the angularity of the forms and the lack of streamlining, low power density and technical speed. High specific pressure due to narrow tracks. Unreliable design of a long cardan shaft. The armament for this type of tank so far generally corresponds to its purpose and somewhat exceeds that of the best foreign models ... The design of the track tracks does not guarantee their jumping out of the track rollers. The track pins are destroyed by heavy loads when the tank moves over rough terrain.
The T-26 is an obsolete tank design. It is urgent to develop a worthy replacement for this machine.

© Test results of the T-26 at the NIBT training ground in 1938.

Quote: parusnik

The T-26 (model 1938/1939 especially) could withstand most German tanks in 1941, but was inferior to the Panzer III and Panzer IV models that participated in Operation Barbarossa in June 1941.

Tanks do not fight tanks. © Order No. 325
The main enemy of the tank is PTP. And for the "mallet" that the T-26, that the BT are permeable in all projections and at all distances. As shown by Spain and Khalkhin Gol.
But for the "forty-five" "deuce" with their 30-mm forehead, the KC was a hard nut to crack.

[Predator]

Quote: parusnik

Well, how can the T-26 be considered obsolete? The T-26 (model 1938/1939 especially) could withstand most German tanks in 1941, but was inferior to the Panzer III and Panzer IV models that participated in Operation Barbarossa in June 1941 . They also participated in battles with the Germans and their allies during the Battle of Moscow in 1941-1942, in the Battle of Stalingrad and the Battle of the Caucasus in 1942-1943. Some tank units of the Leningrad Front used their T-26 tanks until 1944. The defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria in August 1945 was the last military operation in which they were used.

Well, not really. Still, all types of panzers had thicker frontal armor. And the T-26 even made its way through armor-piercing caliber 7.92 (PTR Wehrmacht), and most importantly, the panzers did not go alone, but only as part of campf groups, those and art and infantry .

[irazum]

And what is a tank without fuel and ammunition? A big piece of scrap metal, nothing more...

[hohol95]

Dear author - Then you should write an article about the battles of the Soviet 5th Panzer Division (it consisted of 268 tanks - 50 T-34s, 30 heavily worn T-28s, 170 BT-7s and 18 T-26s) on the NEMAN River , which took place from 22 to 23 June 1941, with units of the 7th German Panzer Division (271 tanks and self-propelled guns - 53 Pz.II, 30 Pz.IV, 167 Pz.38 (t), 15 command and 6 self-propelled infantry guns SIG33 on the Pz.I chassis).

[BAI]

Well, after all, the article clearly states that this particular battle is being considered, other battles are separate topics.

[hohol95]

There are no complaints about the title and content! But there were a LOT of such battles that day! But you chose this one! But only T-26 tanks took part in it. And in the one I proposed for another article, there were T-34s and T-28s, and BT-7s with T-26s, and the Germans had a decent range of models!

[Same lech]

the enemy bombed Soviet tanks continuously. The 30th Panzer Division lost no less combat vehicles from the attacks of German dive bombers than from enemy artillery and tanks.

The scourge of the first months of the war ... German pilots literally hunted for single targets.



Ju 87 dives on the target

[Gamer]

30 minutes from target detection to bombing, to the Battle of Kursk

[Predator]

Quote: hohol95

There are no complaints about the title and content! But there were a LOT of such battles that day! But you chose this one! But only T-26 tanks took part in it. And in the one I proposed for another article, there were T-34s and T-28s, and BT-7s with T-26s, and the Germans had a decent range of models!

Well, then it’s better to have an oncoming battle of 2 TD with 6 TD of the 4th tank group on the Dubissa River. (KV famous under Rassenai is precisely from its composition). Then 2 TD while there were shells and fuel drove 6 TD 40 km and completely trampled Seedorf KG into the ground.

[hohol95]

Better
"... the fate befell another division of the 3rd mechanized corps - the 2nd tank division, which alone found itself in the offensive zone of the 4th German tank group. The 2nd tank division (252 tanks - 32 KV-1, 19 KV-2 , 27 T-28, 116 BT-7, 19 T-26 and 12 KhT-26) had to engage in battle with almost the entire 41st German tank corps: first with the 6th Panzer Division (245 tanks - 47 Pz.II , 30 Pz.IV, 155 Pz.35 (t), 15 commanders), then the 1st tank (151 tanks - 43 Pz.II, 71 Pz.III, 20 Pz.IV, 11 commanders and 6 infantry self-propelled guns), 36th motorized and 269th infantry divisions. Abandoned by the command to the mercy of fate, the 2nd Panzer Division was surrounded and defeated."

[nivander]

the author literally quotes Isaev and his immortal creations (or maybe this is master Isaev under a pseudonym)

[super.ufu]

no, this is Caruso's rehash

[Monarchist]

Dear author, this is a well-established stereotype that German tanks and artillery were superior to the equipment of the Red Army, I suspect that this cartoon was deliberately launched by Nikita "maize" (guess why), and if you figure it out, our equipment was not inferior, or even superior to German. Our 45mm guns until the autumn of 1942 were a dangerous enemy for enemy tanks.
The Germans in 1941 had 2/3 tanks: Pckpf1 and Pzkpf2, various L38s and other non-reputable vehicles. Eats d / f channel "Discovery", where I talk about the tanks of the Wehrmacht. In the late 80s I saw a book where they were. Illustrations and a brief description of ALL samples of WWII equipment.
I doubt that our tankers on June 22 were opposed by the T3 armada. Simply 30 tdv aviation was well battered

[hohol95]

Regarding the Pz.38 (t), you are wrong - the cars were at a high level - both in terms of observation devices and armor (brought the forehead to 50mm), the gun took our T-26 and BT-2/5/7, T-28 easily, she could take the T-34 under certain conditions! There were means of communication! Naturally, he was better than the subsequent T-60 and T-70 !!!

[Yuri kori]

Come to your senses. The letter "t" in the index is from the Czech word, in German Tschechien. Captured tanks from the Germans received their original index, with the first letter of the name of the country of origin added in brackets. Captured Soviet T-34s, for example, appeared among the Germans as T-34 (r) Pz.38 (t) - a Czech tank produced in 1938. Combat weight-6 tons. Armament - one machine gun. Booking is bulletproof. Are you presenting this scarecrow as a "formidable weapon of the Wehrmacht's tank forces"?

[hohol95]

Not a frail machine gunner with a caliber of 37mm ...

[hohol95]

Get started with this book!

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Monarchist

Our 45mm guns until the autumn of 1942 were a dangerous enemy for enemy tanks.

As you should be aware, the tests of shelling a new German tank conducted in the autumn of 1940 showed that the 45-mm anti-tank gun arr. 1937 g. Is unsuitable, as it can penetrate its armor at a distance no further than 150-300 m ...

© Kulik. Materials about the anti-tank artillery brigades.
The "new German tank" is a model of the "three" with a 30-mm forehead, already discontinued by that time.
The reason for such a sharp discrepancy between the tabular and real penetration is simple - armor cementation. On domestic armor of medium hardness 45 mm (and even 76 mm) BBS calmly showed tabular values. But when the KC armor came across as a target, it turned out that 45-mm ABS pierce it only from the above distances, and regularly split instead of piercing. The hull of the 76-mm BBS at angles of impact different from those close to the normal was also destroyed (the armor-piercing tip, which in theory was supposed to destroy the surface-hardened layer of armor, simply broke off in practice).
As a result, the data of these shootings, the available data on the modernization of German tanks with increased armor protection to 50-60 mm (which 45 mm were generally too tough) and regular intelligence reports about new German tanks with 80-100 mm armor led to the pre-war attempting to switch to 57 mm caliber. However, Kulik, knowing full well the weakness of our industry in terms of mass production of fundamentally new systems, hedged himself and ordered the development of a "modernized forty-five" - ​​a long-barreled 45-mm (work on which resulted in the M-42).

Quote: Monarchist

The Germans in 1941 had 2/3 tanks: Pckpf1 and Pzkpf2, various L38s and other non-reputable vehicles.

The classic figures for the presence of armored personnel carriers in the army in the East are: 189 ordinary and 185 sapper "ones", 825 ordinary and 84 flamethrower "twos", 155 Czech 35 (t), 625 "prag", 264 "troika-37", 732 " troika-50", 439 "fours" and 230 command vehicles. Plus 83 trophy vehicles in 211 battalions, 100 and 102 revs. Total - 3811 tanks.
So "ones", "twos" and 35 (t) accounted for only 38% of the Wehrmacht's armor.
As for non-authority "prag", That...

The results of the shelling of the Czechoslovak tank "Prague" 38T from a 45-mm cannon mod. 1934 with an armor-piercing tracer... A 45-mm armor-piercing tracer penetrates 50 mm frontal armor from a distance of 200 meters.

© NIBT report of a test site for testing German tanks with shelling from armor-piercing and fragmentation shells from tank guns.
And for racially loyal Germans, the shooting results were even worse:

The results of the shelling of the German assault tank "Art-Sturm" from a 45-mm domestic cannon mod. 1942, mounted on the T-70 tank, armor-piercing tracer manufactured in 1938 .... 45-mm armor-piercing projectile, when firing from a cannon mod. 1942, 50 mm frontal armor does not penetrate at any distance. Reason - insufficient projectile strength.
The results of shelling a German tank T-III from a 45-mm gun mod. 1934 with an armor-piercing projectile ... a 45-mm armor-piercing projectile of 60 mm of frontal armor does not penetrate at any distance.
The results of the shelling of a German T-IV tank from a 45-mm cannon mod. 1934 .... 45-mm armor-piercing projectile, when firing from a cannon mod. 1934, penetrates 50 mm thick frontal armor from a maximum distance of 50 meters.

[Monarchist]

Quote: hohol95

Dear author - Then you should write an article about the battles of the Soviet 5th Panzer Division (it consisted of 268 tanks - 50 T-34s, 30 heavily worn T-28s, 170 BT-7s and 18 T-26s) on the NEMAN River , which took place from 22 to 23 June 1941, with units of the 7th German Panzer Division (271 tanks and self-propelled guns - 53 Pz.II, 30 Pz.IV, 167 Pz.38 (t), 15 command and 6 self-propelled infantry guns SIG33 on the Pz.I chassis).

Apparently, the author does not have such materials, and if you have, share it, it will be interesting to everyone

[stalkerwalker]

Quote: Article

Around the same time in the afternoon, another tank battle took place - at Alytus in Lithuania, where the battle groups of the German 7th and 20th Panzer Divisions clashed with the vanguard of the Soviet 5th Panzer Division. It so happened that today it is much easier to find information about the battles near the city of Alytus.

[gurzuf]

Quote: super.ufu

of course, I’ll say something terrible - all memoirs are fabulous

You are right! All memoirs were invented by Churchill in the 18th year!

[Alexey RA]

Quote: gurzuf

You are right! All memoirs were invented by Churchill in the 18th year!

No. Just who wants to write the truth about themselves, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? So, on the one hand, innumerable hordes of T-34s appear in the memoirs, flying through the mud like dry land, destroyed at 300-500-700 per operation and then mystically restored from the ashes.
And on the other hand, innumerable hordes of "tigers", "panthers" and "Ferdinands" walk through the memoirs, only thanks to which the Germans held on. Moreover, from these memoirs they migrated to official history ... as a result of which the real composition of the German forces at the same Prokhorovka was a shock to many.

[Captain Nemo]

Glory!!! And eternal memory!

[myobius59]

90% of the reason for the defeats at this time was that our tanks had no communication. That is, even the commanders of tank units did not have walkie-talkies, let alone simple tank crews.
At the same time, German tanks (as well as aircraft, by the way) were almost 100% equipped with radios. They were even on armored personnel carriers, REMs, and other vehicles.
no need to explain to anyone that in a maneuver warfare, communication is of the utmost importance. With the Germans, it was well established not only between units and crews, but also between the branches of the armed forces. So these same tank units worked closely with aviation and artillery, which allowed them to receive the latest intelligence in time, and in severe cases call for help.
In our country, such interaction was established only from the middle of 43 years. As my friend, a veteran tanker, said, until the age of 43 they did not see our planes at all.
And 10% is the mediocrity of the commanders, and the poor training of the crews .. And in terms of performance characteristics of our tanks, our tanks were not inferior to the Germans, but surpassed them. And the Germans didn’t even have close ones like the T-34 and especially the KV. But there were more than 34 T-1000s. -at that time it was a huge force. Look, for example, how many the Germans had the most modern "triples" with a 50 mm cannon, the rest was outright junk, at the level of our t-26s. But the lack of communication, and the mediocre leadership nullified the advantage of our army in tanks ... By the way, throughout the war, we outnumbered the Germans both in the number of tanks. and aircraft. But they didn’t know how to use it. And the Germans concentrated the largest number where they needed it, while our tanks and planes were “smeared along the entire front. And only from the age of 44 did things start, and that the Germans did in 41m and 42m, ours began to do even better, and surpassed them. (Of course, due to the quantity, the huge superiority in the number of tanks and aircraft)

[Vadim237]

The Germans also had anti-tank artillery at their best, from the beginning of the war they began to use their 88 mm anti-aircraft guns against tanks.

[hohol95]

They began to use them back in 1940 against the French and the British!
Faced with new Soviet tanks, they immediately put them in the ranks of the anti-tank guns!
The conquest of air supremacy also helped! It was possible to divert some of the anti-aircraft guns to fight tanks!

[Yuri kori]

I beg your pardon, but anti-aircraft artillery does not belong to anti-tank artillery in any way, and the use of anti-aircraft artillery to fight tanks means only one thing: the German anti-tank artillery itself was very weak, and they had to use anti-aircraft guns out of desperation.

[hohol95]

The Germans also had to use anti-aircraft guns against tanks out of desperation - if 37 and 50 mm could not cope! Until the Pak 40 appeared - a 75mm anti-tank gun!
Also, the absence of an air threat from the enemy Air Force helped to use anti-aircraft guns against ground targets!
The British did not use their anti-aircraft guns against German tanks in North Africa and "danced" there with the Germans for 3 years!
"The question is natural - if the Germans had neither quantitative nor qualitative superiority over the enemy, then how can their success be explained? Here is the answer to this question given in his memoirs by Major General von Mellenthin (at that time he served in the rank of major Rommel headquarters):
“In my opinion, our victories were determined by three factors: the qualitative superiority of our anti-tank guns, the systematic application of the principle of interaction between military branches and, last but not least, our tactical methods. While the British limited the role of their 3-inch anti-aircraft guns (very powerful guns) to fighting aircraft, we used our 7-mm guns to shoot both tanks and aircraft.
In November 1941, we had only thirty-five 88 mm guns, but moving along with our tanks, these guns inflicted huge losses on the British tanks. In addition, our 50-mm anti-tank guns with a high muzzle velocity were significantly superior to the British two-pounder guns, and batteries of these guns always accompanied our tanks in battle. Our field artillery was also trained to interact with tanks. In short, the German Panzer Division was an extremely flexible formation of all branches of the armed forces, always, both in the offensive and in defense, relying on artillery.
The British, on the other hand, considered anti-tank guns to be a defensive weapon and failed to properly use their powerful field artillery, which should have been trained to destroy our anti-tank guns.

[Yuri kori]

No doubt, the Germans had very good anti-aircraft artillery. But the anti-tank was very bad. Go to war against a country that has 24000 very good tanks, having at its disposal three and a half thousand very weak tanks and not having good anti-tank artillery ... One must either be an idiot, or it was a war of desperation.

[hohol95]

Don't underestimate the German VET system!
Going to fight against the USSR, the Germans have already tested the anti-tank defense system on the French and British!
Even the 37mm Pak 35/36 cannon with its PzGr 39 (armor-piercing) and PzGr 40 (introduced into ammunition in 19440; armor-piercing sub-caliber; effective up to a distance of 400m) shells pierced 48/27mm (from 500/1000m) and 65mm (from 100m) respectively !

[Alexey RA]

Quote: myobius59

90% of the reason for the defeats at this time was that our tanks had no communication. That is, even the commanders of tank units did not have walkie-talkies, let alone simple tank crews.
At the same time, German tanks (as well as aircraft, by the way) were almost 100% equipped with radios. They were even on armored personnel carriers, REMs, and other vehicles.

Heh heh heh ... not so simple. ©
Radio stations were indeed on all German tanks. But radio transmitters are not. The fact is that because of the fear of the impossibility of maintaining strict radio communication discipline in battle, the Germans installed transmitters only on tanks of commanders (from the platoon commander and above) + headquarters units. But the line tanks of platoons managed only with radios. 55% of German tanks in 1940-42 did not have radio transmitters.
Source - Appendix to the first volume of Yenz (pp. 272-274).

Quote: myobius59

And in terms of the performance characteristics of our tanks, ours were not inferior to the Germans, but surpassed them. And the Germans were not even close to such as the T-34 and especially the KV.

Do you look at the TTX according to the plates in the encyclopedias or according to the test results?
And then in the spring of 1941 they took three serial T-34s for testing - and found out, for example, that their real power reserve is less than that of the "three" (T-34s traveled only 165-180 km at full refueling). When they decided to conduct full tests, they found out that the speed of the T-34 on the battlefield does not exceed 12-14 km / h - because it does not work higher in second gear, and shifting gears on the T-34 most likely leads to a tank stop.

Underutilization of engine power also occurs when driving on the ground, because. shifting to a lower gear, which means returning to the normal engine mode without difficulty in shifting gears, is possible only with a strong decrease in the speed of the tank.
Switching gears from I to II and from II to III without the use of special techniques (gas leakage, etc.) is always associated with the danger of turning off the engine, as shockless shifting requires a reduction in engine speed to almost idle.

With armor protection, the T-34 was also not doing well - more early 1941 our experts wrote that the T-34 has ceased to be a tank with anti-ballistic armor, and something needs to be done in terms of increasing the thickness of the armor.
As for the KV ... taking into account the fact that citizen Salzman had not corrected a single comment on the design of the tank since the beginning of 1940, by the beginning of the war, the KV was a crawling pillbox. The cooling system is already boiling at 20 km / h, the air filter needs to be blown every 1,5 hours of the march, the shafts are twisted, the gears are "bald", the brakes are jammed when cornering, the turret does not rotate at the slightest roll, because the engine is from the T-28 turret . By the way, it is also vulnerable to 50-mm anti-tank guns (according to the results of our shooting of captured guns).

Quote: myobius59

Look, for example, how many the Germans had the most modern "triples" with a 50 mm cannon, the rest was outright junk, at the level of our T-26s.

Uh-huh ... deuce, weakly penetrating 45-mm anti-tank guns from a distance of more than 300 m - junk at the T-26 level, which was sewn with a "mallet" in any projection from all distances.

Quote: myobius59

But the lack of communication, and mediocre leadership nullified the advantage of our army in tanks ...

And how will the presence of communications help the mechanized corps, in which the motorized infantry moves on foot, and the artillery is pulled by agricultural tractors at a speed of 3-5 km / h? Here, at least put Rommel or Guderian - they will not be able to increase the speed on the march. That's what happens. that "naked" tanks are going on the attack, lightly supported by the infantry that was next to the strike site.

[Yuri kori]

Where is the data from? The only thing I found that somehow correlates with what you wrote is the test results of 1940.

[Yuri kori]

And how will the presence of communications help the mechanized corps, in which the motorized infantry moves on foot, and the artillery is pulled by agricultural tractors at a speed of 3-5 km / h? Here, at least put Rommel or Guderian - they will not be able to increase the speed on the march. That's what happens. that "naked" tanks are going on the attack, lightly supported by the infantry that was next to the strike site.

Well, this is blatant nonsense. It was the GERMANS who used the horse as an artillery tractor, and one of the main problems in their "blitzkrieg" was ... the lack of limbers. Keitel simply squealed about this. And everything was very good with artillery tractors. In the summer of 1939, the Voroshilovets heavy artillery tractor was undergoing army tests at a tank range near Moscow. As expected, he showed good results, confidently towing the largest artillery systems and all types of tanks, including the T-35. Was tested, and successfully, towing on the ground of the following heavy artillery systems: 210-mm guns of the 1939 model of the year (separate carriage and barrel), 152-mm guns of the 1935 model of the year, 203-mm howitzers of the 1931 model of the year (separate carriage and barrel). 280-mm mortars of the 1939 model of the year, 305-mm howitzers of the 1939 model of the year (separate carriage and barrel). The tractor overcame a ford up to 1,3 m (with preparation), a ditch - up to 1,5 m, a lift with a trailer weighing 18 tons - up to 17 °. The maximum speed reached 42 km / h, the average on the highway with a full load - up to 20 km / h, on the ground - 16 km / h. These were the highest speeds among all the tested tractors - the high power density and the more advanced suspension of the Voroshilovets affected. The average technical (calculated) speed of movement along the highway with an artillery system as part of a "column - battery" was 18 km / h, as part of a "column - regiment" - 13 km / h. Equipped with an economical diesel engine, the Voroshilovets withstood a continuous daily march without refueling. As fuel could be used: diesel fuel, gas oil or, in extreme cases, a mixture of engine oil with kerosene. The cruising range on the highway with a load without a trailer reached 390 km, with a load and a trailer - 240 km, per pound with a load and a trailer from 125 to 200 km (depending on the terrain).

[Gransasso]

It was smooth on paper ... yes, in parades ....



Do you seriously believe that all those problems due to which the tank columns of the Red Army got up after a few kilometers of the march, namely: the lack of qualified mechanics, fuel, spare parts, transmission breakdowns, etc. due to no quality of manufactured products, the stupidity of the command .. at least one of these problems bypassed the tractors these?...

[Yuri kori]

I believe that an artillery tractor, powered by anything down to a mixture of motor oil and kerosene, is much more effective in war than a horse. and if we are already talking about the lack of spare parts, transmission failures, etc., then maybe we will talk about similar problems with German tanks? About Tigers, Panthers, Ferdinands? Otherwise, it somehow turns out strange: we have bad tanks, and the drivers of these tanks have no experience in military operations, and there are no spare parts ... And the Germans have everything just perfect. But in reality, it was not at all like that.

[Gransasso]

The only criterion of truth is reality ... and not paper performance characteristics ...



But the reality is that the Germans on their horses defeated all European armies, including the Red Army, using blitzkrieg, which is based on the highest mobility ...


And the Red Army, with its tanks and tractors "brilliant" on paper, for several years, until the age of 44, was a very clumsy and poorly maneuverable mechanism .... all the time, units were brought into battle separately .. without the support of infantry and artillery ..



The Red Army became mobile when it received several hundred thousand Studebakers on which both infantry and artillery landed ... and these miracles of technology disappeared Cominterns and Komsomol members

[Yuri kori]

Cool. And I thought that we defeated the Germans and ended the war in Berlin. And it's like that.))

[Gransasso]

Not surprising....


The 5 millionth personnel of the Red Army was defeated in 3 months .... from autumn 41 to 45, nerds, students, collective farmers, shakters, tractor drivers and growing children were already fighting ....


And the army on which the country plowed from hand to mouth for 20 years was defeated very quickly

[Yuri kori]

Entirely agree. The war was won by the reservists and the militias. But WIN, not lost. That is, the Germans, having started the war in conditions better than which it is impossible to imagine, lost it miserably. On horses.
As for the defeat of the regular Red Army, the way it was located could not be otherwise. and even if the USSR on June 22, 1941 had not 24000 tanks, but 5 times more, and all of them were entirely T-34 and KV, this would not change anything.

[Gransasso]

We are talking about unparalleled tractors in general ...

[Yuri kori]

Quite right. And these tractors were one of the constituent factors of our victory.

[Yuri kori]

Yeah, I understood: a blitzkrieg, and in general ... And this is what the German army looked like, which was going to carry out a blitzkrieg against the USSR (the area is 24 million square kilometers), in 1941, in fact.

[Gransasso]

And how did the USSR manage then to cover ... half the country in a few months ... fighting against such an army on some kind of horses? ...

[Yuri kori]

Yes, everything is simple. If Mike Tyson gives me the opportunity to go up to him with a club and slam him over the head, I assure you: it will be very difficult for him to win a fight after that.

[Gransasso]

Ah, that's it .... the suddenness and unfortunate disposition of troops ..



The most terrible defeat of the Red Army is the Kiev Cauldron September 41, Vyazma-October 41, Crimean Front-May 42, Kharkov 2 times ... May 42 and February 43 ....



There was no surprise at all, and everything was fine with the arrangement

[Yuri kori]

Let's go back to the Tyson example. If I hit him on the head with a club, open his skull, I won’t be able to finish him off quickly and give him the opportunity to recover, then even if I manage to light him a couple of times between the eyes, in the end he will make a cutlet out of me. Blitzkrieg against the USSR / Russia is impossible in principle. And with German weapons, equipment and resources in 1941, talking about a blitzkrieg is simply ridiculous. Germany could not quickly finish off the USSR. And in a long war, Hitler had no chance. Which was proved by the end result of the war.

[hohol95]

In 1944-1945, the Red Army lost 3 tanks bogged down in swamps, 537 tanks stuck in mud, and 1 tanks drowned in rivers. In total, 420 tanks.
No need to attribute miraculous properties to dirt and frost! They are the same for everyone!

[Yuri kori]

Quite right. and if you are going to fight in a country known for its dirt and frost, then your weapon must be appropriate for the conditions of this country, and not like the German Pz-I, which could not stand even two weeks of war in Russia. On July 4, 1941, on the thirteenth day of the war, Colonel-General F. Halder records in his working diary a monstrous shortage of tanks in the German troops. Panzergruppe Gotha, for example, managed to lose half of their tanks at that moment. And on the same day, on the same page, Halder writes that the Pz-I tanks are a burden for the troops. He recommends "sending them to the rear for internal protection on domestic territory, protection of the coast, and also for the purpose of combat training." Which was partially fulfilled. In a situation where German tanks were sorely lacking, this "tank" had to be abandoned. It's better to have nothing than to have a Pz-I. Or "38t".

[hohol95]

And why are you so mad at the Pz.38(t)? He was better than the T-37/38 and T-26! Surpassed the T-40 and T-60!
Early models were equal to BT-5/7, and models with reinforced armor surpassed BT-shki!
Armor penetration of Pz.38(t) gun shells

[Yuri kori]

This is the column of the 16th tank army of the Wehrmacht during the German attack on Stalingrad. Blitzkrieg in general. But on carts.

[hohol95]

As of January 1, 1941, there were 1017 Cominterns in the Red Army (4,7% of the fleet of special artillery tractors), although according to the states approved in April 1941, there should have been 6891 of them. On June 22 of the same year, the troops there were 1500 of them.
On January 1, 1943, only 385 of these tractors remained in the artillery, and some more were operated in other branches of the armed forces, including tank ones.
By the end of the war, there were still 568 vehicles in the active army (losses since September 1, 1942 amounted to only 56 units).
It was a good tractor - there were just not enough of them!

[Gransasso]

Unfortunately, serious shortcomings were noted, confirmed by the subsequent operation of the Voroshilovites in the troops.

The design of the caterpillar turned out to be unsuccessful - in addition to its low traction capabilities, when wet snow hit the nests of the leading sprockets, it often fell off.

Breakdowns of the main clutch could happen after 200 - 300 hours of operation. It was not uncommon, especially on tractors of the first series, breakdowns of the driven shafts and gears of the second group of multipliers. After 300 - 400 hours of operation, wear was noted on the bearings of the final drive gears. The seals of the units were leaking (a traditional defect of KhPZ machines), pipelines burst from vibrations initiated by a powerful diesel engine.
When creating a large traction force, there were cases of unbending the rear trailer hook, and when driving on hard bumps, the lower frame skin often sagged and fell off, which aggravated the already poor protection of the tractor from below. According to the drivers, the winch was inconvenient to use. A difficult task was the cold start of the V-2V diesel engine at low (-20 ° C and below) temperatures. The procedure with its repeated heating and spillage of water and oil often dragged on for 3-4 hours. At the same time, electric starters almost didn’t “pull”, and the use of air start sometimes had the opposite effect, since the compressed air supplied to the cylinders was supercooled during expansion (up to frost precipitation) and did not allow reaching a temperature of 550 - 600 ° C, sufficient for self-ignition of the fuel. The inevitable and rapid wear of the chassis joints, especially the bushings of the suspension axles, was the result of their insufficient lubrication and poor dirt protection. Primitive labyrinth seals for roller bearings, support rollers and idlers turned out to be especially unreliable. In particular, in order to reduce wear and prevent breakage of roller bearings of track rollers when driving through liquid and deep mud, into which they were sometimes completely immersed, they had to be disassembled, washed and generously lubricated almost every day, which not only dramatically increased the labor intensity of servicing the tractor in field conditions, but also did not allow to do this operation qualitatively. Surprisingly, unjustifiably little attention was paid to the sealing of bearing assemblies at the KhPZ - a tradition that has also passed to the T-34 tank (according to the “it will do” principle). All these shortcomings of the Voroshilovets tractor were exacerbated by the almost complete inaccessibility of mechanisms for maintenance and repair directly in the troops, however, then the operators somehow learned to get out of the situation.

By the way, in connection with the listed shortcomings, the production of "Voroshilov", interrupted by the evacuation and the war, was not resumed in the future.

[hohol95]

"Comintern" and "Voroshilovets" - different in design and characteristics of the machine!
Tactical and technical characteristics of the artillery tractor "Comintern"
Weight in running order without load, kg 10 640
Platform load capacity, kg 2000
Weight of towed trailer, kg 12
with overload, kg 14 000
Cabin seats 2
Places in the body for sitting 12
Dimensions, mm:
5765 length
width 2208
with tent 2300
cabin height (without load) 2538
with tent 2980
Base of track rollers, mm 3278
Track (in the middle of the tracks), mm 1530
Track width, mm 360
Track step, mm 170
Ground clearance, mm 400
Average specific pressure on the ground with a load on the platform, kgf/cm² 0,49
Maximum engine power, at 1280 rpm, hp 131
Maximum speed on the highway, km / h 30,5
Cruising on the highway with a trailer, km up to 170 (on the latest series)
Cruising range on the ground with a trailer, km 80
Limit climbable on solid ground with a load without a trailer, degrees 33,5
Kilometer fuel consumption on the highway with cargo and trailer, kg 2,5
Hourly fuel consumption on the highway, kg:
without trailer 18
with trailer 22
Power reserve for average driving conditions with a trailer, h 11

Tactical and technical characteristics of the artillery tractor "Voroshilovets"
Weight in running order without load, kg 15 500
Platform load capacity, kg 3000
Weight of towed trailer, kg 18
with overload, kg 22 000
Cabin seats 3
Places in the body for sitting 16
Dimensions, mm:
6218 length
width 2350
cabin height (without load) 2736
with tent 3087
Base of track rollers, mm 3500
Track (in the middle of the tracks), mm 1860
Track width, mm 428
Track track step, mm 170
Minimum turning radius, m 5
Ground clearance, mm 410
Average specific pressure on the ground with a load on the platform, kgf/cm² 0,578
Maximum engine power at a speed of 1500 rpm, hp 375
Maximum speed on the highway, km / h 36,2
Cruising range on the highway with a trailer, km 270
Limit climbable on solid ground with a load without a trailer, degrees 41

[Gransasso]

So what? .... both turned out to be UG in operation and were discontinued with the start of the war ....

[Yuri kori]

Voroshilovets was bad, the Comintern was bad, Komsomolets was generally rubbish ... Whether it's a horse. Let's put an end to it: any artillery tractor / tractor in the war is better than a horse, and at least some one, even Komomolets, would have come up to the Germans on our roads, but the problem is that the "most advanced army in Europe" had none.

[Olaf Uksimae]

The first day of the war, the deepest shock, uncertainty, lack of communication, cover, ammunition, in spite of everything, our grandfathers fought to the death, beat the enemy as best they could, won precious time and died, the first day !! Everlasting memory !!

[Predator]

Quote: hohol95

Better
"... the fate befell another division of the 3rd mechanized corps - the 2nd tank division, which alone found itself in the offensive zone of the 4th German tank group. The 2nd tank division (252 tanks - 32 KV-1, 19 KV-2 , 27 T-28, 116 BT-7, 19 T-26 and 12 KhT-26) had to engage in battle with almost the entire 41st German tank corps: first with the 6th Panzer Division (245 tanks - 47 Pz.II , 30 Pz.IV, 155 Pz.35 (t), 15 commanders), then the 1st tank (151 tanks - 43 Pz.II, 71 Pz.III, 20 Pz.IV, 11 commanders and 6 infantry self-propelled guns), 36th motorized and 269th infantry divisions. Abandoned by the command to the mercy of fate, the 2nd Panzer Division was surrounded and defeated."

Well, a clear exaggeration was crushed at the expense, everything was as usual in 1941 without rears, fuel and shells. While everything was at war, it ended, they blew up the equipment and walked east.

[Igor Goldberg]

"[quote = vladimirZ] [quote] In with the encirclement of a large number of military units and their subsequent death.
It is not clear where Zhukov and Timoshenko had their heads, and what they thought, dragging their version of the start of the war. Although, given the characteristics of Zhukov, given by K.K. Rokossovsky when he was Zhukov's chief, - about Zhukov's dislike and inability for staff work, as well as Zhukov's lack of a systematic special military education, this can somehow be explained.
Only the subsequent removal of Timoshenko and Zhukov from the leadership of the Red Army, Stalin taking over the leadership, changing the strategy and tactics of the troops to active, maneuverable defense with the gradual depletion of the strength of the advancing Germans, somehow saved the situation. [/ Quote] "

And can I quote where SUCH Rokossovsky spoke about Zhukov?
Another point that personally raises a question for me in your scenario is "Stalin took over the leadership and this somewhat straightened out the situation" - that is, Zhukov did not have a military education, but did Stalin have it? If it's not a secret, what military educational institution did Stalin graduated from?
Tukhachevsky, with his POSSIBLE pluses, had big military disadvantages, which was shown in practice - the loss and defeat of the Red Army in the Polish company, which is very little talked about. With Tukhachevsky's views on the creation of large tank formations, he missed the side of the need for large tank formations to have rifle regiments / battalions / companies ...... which Zhukov just changed.
The next moment, for example, the actions of General Karbyshev, who was appointed head of the arrangement and deployment of troops in the Brest region, the restoration of the Brest Fortress. In fact, a decision was taken by a specialist from military engineering, which led to the fact that for most of the troops of the Brest region, the place of permanent quartering turned out to be located in the "stone bag" of the fortress on a small patch .... And here you are - bomb, fire, storm - "we are all in one place "..... How can THIS come to the SPECIALIST's head! But these decisions were approved "at the top" ...... Also, the hospital was moved NOT TO THE REAR, but rather to the peninsula towards Poland (everything is well described in the exposition of the Brest Fortress Museum).

So not everything here is so simple - here it’s white, and here it’s black ..... And all memoirs, memories, records are just the look of one person and I think it’s wrong to take this as the truth of that time ....

[Yuri kori]

[/ Quote]. How SUCH can come to the head of a SPECIALIST! But these decisions were approved "at the top" ...... Also, the hospital was moved NOT TO THE REAR, but rather to the peninsula towards Poland (everything is well described in the exposition of the Brest Fortress Museum). [quote]

If defense is planned, then such an arrangement is terrible stupidity. But if a sudden offensive strike with an invasion is planned, then you can’t imagine anything better than such an arrangement.

[super.ufu]

hohol95,
Muller is also possible, but I repeat, here on the site 100 years ago there was already an article on the topic - how many tanks Hitler had

[Graz]

the t-26 was at the level of half of the then german tanks of the initial period of the war, if the tanks hadn’t been driving in vain, destroying motor resources and burning fuel in vain, if there had been normal cover from enemy aircraft, if there had been normal communications and reconnaissance, everything could have been different

[Barcid]

Thanks to the author. Interesting article

[Yuri kori]

I don’t understand something: according to the author, “As of June 17, 22, the 1941th Panzer Division had 202 tanks”
We open the composition of the 17th division in 1941: the 27th infantry division, the predecessor of the 17th tank division, was formed on October 1, 1936, and at first it included the 40th, 63rd and 91st infantry regiments. The division was manned by natives of Swabia, who fought well in southern Poland and France. After returning to Augsburg in October, November 1, 1940, the division was reorganized into the 17th Panzer. She handed over the 91st Infantry Regiment of the 4th Mountain Division, but received the two-battalion 39th Tank Regiment, formed in St. Pölten and Vienna (XVII Military District, Austria) on the basis of the 4th and 33rd Reserve Tank Regiments. The division now consisted of:
39th Tank Regiment, 17th Motorized Brigade (40th and 63rd Motorized Regiments, two battalions each and 17th Motorcycle Battalion, former II Battalion of the 63rd Motorized Regiment), 27th Tank Artillery Regiment ( three divisions) and the usual set of division support units. On August 16, 1941, the 39th tank regiment received the third battalion (the former XNUMXst battalion of the training tank regiment).
That is, the one and only 39th tank regiment, as a maximum, 95 tanks. In the motorized brigades of the Wehrmacht, tanks were not supposed to be in the state.

Where does the 17th Panzer Division have 202 tanks from?

[hohol95]

According to Thomas Yenz, cited in the discussions, there were 39 tanks in the 17th regiment of the 216th Panzer Division of the Wehrmacht:
Pz.I - 22 pcs.
Pz.II - 45 pcs.
Pz.III - 106 pcs.
Pz.IV - 13 pcs.
Commanders - 13 pcs.

[Yuri kori]

With all due respect to Thomas Yenz, 219 tanks in the regiment is nonsense. The entire first tank group consisted of 799 tanks.

[Gransasso]

Division Composition
In the 1941 year:

39th tank regiment
17th Rifle Brigade
40th Rifle Regiment
63th Rifle Regiment
17th Motorcycle Battalion
27th Reconnaissance Battalion
27th Artillery Regiment
27th anti-tank battalion
27th tank sapper battalion
In the 1943 year:

39th tank regiment
40th Panzergrenadier Regiment
63th Panzergrenadier Regiment
27th Tank Artillery Regiment
17th tank reconnaissance battalion
27th anti-tank battalion
297 anti-aircraft artillery battalion
27th tank sapper battalion
27th communications battalion
17th Field Reserve Battalion
Armament Edit


On June 22, 1941, there were 202 tanks in the state (the basis of the then tank fleet of the Wehrmacht was the medium Pz.III armed with a 37-mm cannon), in early July, about 180 vehicles were operating in the battles in the Orsha direction.

In the summer of 1942, 50 Pz.III and its more powerful counterpart Pz.IV were replenished. In October 1942, only 30 tanks remained in service, and after the end of the fighting near Stalingrad, in February 1943, only 6 (!). In July 1943, during the battles near Kursk (the division did not directly participate in this battle, being in the reserve of the 24th tank corps), there were 4 Pz.II, 29 Pz.III, 32 Pz.IV and 2 captured Soviet T-34 . In November 1944, 80 Pz.IV and Pz.V ("Panther") were replenished.

Division commanders Edit
From November 1, 1940 - Lieutenant General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim (seriously wounded on June 27, 1941)
From June 28, 1941 - Major General Karl Ritter von Weber (seriously wounded on July 17 and died on July 20, 1941)
Since July 17, 1941 - Major General Wilhelm Ritter von Thoma
From September 15, 1941 - Lieutenant General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim
Since November 11, 1941 - Major General Rudolf-Eduard Licht
From October 10, 1942 - Major General (from May 1943 - Lieutenant General) Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin
From June 16, 1943 - Lieutenant General Walter Schilling (killed July 20, 1943)
Since July 21, 1943 - Major General Karl-Friedrich von der Meden
Since September 20, 1944 - Colonel Rudolf Demme
From December 2, 1944 - Colonel Albert Brooks (January 17, 1945 - wounded and captured by the Soviets)
Since January 30, 1945 - Major General Theodor Kretschmer

[Yuri kori]

Thank you. I am aware of the composition of the 17th Panzer Division. The question was, where did 219 (202) tanks come from in the division, which had one and only tank regiment?

[super.ufu]

Thank you. I am aware of the composition of the 17th Panzer Division.

it means you don’t know, otherwise there would be no such stupid questions

[Yuri kori]

Well enlighten me. There is one 39th tank regiment. In the motorized infantry divisions and brigades, the Germans did not have tanks according to the state. A tank regiment is 95 tanks. Where did 17 more tanks come from in the 120th Panzer Division?

[super.ufu]

I'm sorry, I don't teach on Tuesdays.

well, open the state of the division and see where there are still tanks in it and how many

[Yuri kori]

It's clear. To grind with your tongue, do not load bags. Childish excuses like "I don't enlighten on Tuesdays", attempts to make a smart face... You don't know why you're climbing?

[super.ufu]

well, that is, you are not able to open Yenz or Doyle, look at the state and find out where else in the td there were tanks the same, you are not even able to understand the structures of tp.
and what for me to tell you something else?
it's easier to send away such a lazy person

[Yuri kori]

Gransasso, weight T-90-46,5 tons. It would be interesting to see how you are going to pull almost 47 tons out of the mud with a log.))) But to be honest, the T-90 is far from the ultimate dream. I don’t want to offend the designers and developers, so let’s say softly: the T-90 is inferior to the best Western models in a number of parameters.)))

[Gransasso]

Take an interest and see how they pull themselves out of the mud with the help of a log

[Gransasso]

Yuri Kori,


Read the history of the use of these "miracle" tractors ... UG they were

[Yuri kori]

Smiled. A horse for transporting heavy artillery is, of course, better.

[Gransasso]

Yuri Kori,



I see .. they re-read Suvorov .... lyrics with batons and Tyson ...



Ps the Komsomolets tractor was so "good" that as soon as the war began and it showed itself in all its "glory" in a real war and not in parades ... it was immediately discontinued ....

[Yuri kori]

An attempt to be ironic is not counted. Do your best. Suvorov has a lot of inconsistencies and, if desired, you can find a lot of mistakes. But in the main he is right; if we accept his version of the reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in 1941, everything falls into place. And if not, we will desperately look for an explanation why 24000 excellent Soviet tanks and 17 or 18 thousand very good Soviet aircraft could not stop three and a half thousand German tanks of much worse quality and 3 thousand German aircraft, which were in no way better than ours. . And we, it seems, were talking about "Voroshilovets"; what does Komsomolets have to do with it?

[Yuri kori]

hohol95,
With any adopted after 1935.

[hohol95]

So you think that the T-38 tanks (adopted and manufactured since 1936), T-60 and T-70 are wartime tanks better than Pz.38 (t)?
If you write an answer, please justify your opinion!

[Gransasso]

Yuri Kori,


Hmm .... a team of horses, yes, more mobile than an eternally broken tractor ...



And as for the Germans, they didn’t have artillery tractors ... google the Wehrmacht Tractors .. you will learn a lot of interesting things for yourself ...

[Gransasso]

anti-aircraft installation for 8t. tractor
Sd.Kfz.008 ---- Heavy 12-ton tractor
Sd.Kfz.009 ---- Heavy 18-ton tractor
Sd.Kfz.010 ---- Lightweight 1-ton tractor
Sd.Kfz.010/4 - Self-propelled 20mm. anti-aircraft installation on a 1-ton tractor
Sd.Kfz.010/5 - Self-propelled 20mm. anti-aircraft installation on a 1-ton tractor
Sd.Kfz.010/6 - Self-propelled 37mm. artillery. installation for 1 t. tractor
Sd.Kfz.011 ---- Lightweight 3-ton tractor



This is only one "family" .. and there were others .. tens of thousands were produced ... learn materiel ..

[Yuri kori]

Outright nonsense begins. Team of horses... Two horsepower. How far will you "ride" on them along our roads of 1941, in late autumn or winter? As for "googling" - you tell yourself. Googled the German tracked artillery tractors of the summer of 1941: I assure you, it won’t take much time.

[Gransasso]

During the years of the Second World War, 70 units were built of various half-track tractors, trucks and chassis.

In total, in the period from the beginning of the 1930s to the spring of 1945, 537,8 thousand wheeled vehicles of all types were built for the German Armed Forces at German enterprises. These achievements made the Wehrmacht one of the most motorized and highly mobile military formations in the world with the highest share of diesel trucks. The contribution of the satellites of the Third Reich, the annexed and occupied countries of Europe to the armament of the Wehrmacht during the war is estimated quite high - up to 100 thousand new cars of various types, excluding the huge and uncountable number of requisitioned civilian vehicles

[Jääkorppi]

Lots of comments. Good writing after 70 years. And then?! It makes no sense to talk about the quality of equipment when the tank had one refueling and one ammunition load. Of course, the advancement of tank units without interaction with other units and aircraft, without reconnaissance and support, without infantry and artillery would only make sense in a war with the Zusuls. But initially, the Russian army has always been and will be, due to climatic and geographical conditions, in a losing position in a surprise attack. A mobilized army is always at an advantage. Just honor the memory of the heroes!