Repetition traversed

Preface. This message is unplanned for "The unexpected war of Hitler's Germany with the USSR", And it will re-examine individual events already known to regular readers. Many minor details (probably uninteresting to the majority) of one event will be considered - the flight of the U-2 aircraft to Zapovo 17-18 in June 1941 of the year. Therefore, perhaps, this message should be missed ... The author apologizes in advance to those readers whose opinions differ from the proposed version of events, the confirmation of which has no documentary facts.

The following abbreviations are used in the text: an artillery regiment, military unit - military district, armed forces - armed forces, General Staff - General Headquarters, iad - Fighter Division, spacecraft - Red Army, cd (CP) - cavalry division (regiment), MD - motorized division , MK - mechanized corps, PW - border troops, front (pp) - infantry division (regiment), RO - reconnaissance division, RS - reconnaissance message (summary), RU - Reconnaissance Directorate, etc. (tp) - tank division (regiment).

Repetition traversed The sites asked the author to consider a reconnaissance flight in June 1941, and also to study the writings of one of the writers. Since this proposal does not contradict the theme of the main message and is associated with the Directive of the General Staff of 18 June 1941, the author has prepared this message. Due to the large number of repetitions and not very necessary private detailing, this article was not included in the cycle about "Unexpected war ..."

Let me remind you of the individual events discussed in the previous parts of the message cycle, which in the opinion of the author are associated with the flight in question.

All RSs about the German Armed Forces (from Soviet ambassadors from Germany and other countries; residents of the foreign intelligence service of the NKGB; military attaches, residents of military intelligence and intelligence of the Navy; reports from the MF NKVD; reports of intelligence agents (illegal and legal) (for example, employees who periodically pass on the Reich railways)) and reports of the RO VO concerning the German Armed Forces were used by the GS GSH to create uniform intelligence reports on the German Armed Forces for the military-political leadership. With any document that was associated with an attack on the USSR, the slave И.al I. Stalin.

In the second half of June, 1941, when Germany’s disinformation reached its maximum, the Directorate General Staff and the Foreign Intelligence Directorate of the NKGB prepared documents about the information that the Soviet intelligence was able to obtain about preparing Germany for an attack on the USSR. With the beginning of the war the documents became outdated and lost their relevance. When sometimes websites write about the existence of some more secret RSs that are still classified and are not included in these documents, they probably assume that Stalin did not have access to this information ...

Consider what was reported by the RCA (including using the information of the RO VO) about the period from mid-June 1941. Since we are interested in flying along the border Zapov, we confine ourselves only to this direction.

RS №5 RU GSH KA 15.06.1941 "The total number of the German army on 1.06.41 was determined by the 286 — 296 divisions ... The total number of German troops on our western border (including Moldova and Dobrudja) on June 1 reaches 120-122, including: 14 td and 13 md.

German troops are distributed along the following lines:

... b) in the Warsaw area (against ZOVOVO) 30 divisionsincluding ... 1 md, 1 td and 6 tp (total 4 td), 1 cd and 8 pp;

... d) in the area of ​​Danzig, Poznan, Thorn - 6 front, 1 CP ... "

In accordance with the RS RU GSH KA, the number of German divisions in the Army Group "Center" (against ZOVOVO) was: on 15 May - 30 divisions (of which 5 td and md), On 1 June - 30 (6) on June 15-20 - 30 (6). For the month, the number of divisions that could be used against ZOVOVO has not changed.

RS RO ZOVOVO (1,5 days before the outbreak of war): "Top secret. In recent days, the German command has been making reinforced transfers of troops - infantry, artillery and tanks to the borders of the USSR.

1. At the end of May, 3 and 9 ap from Biala Podlaska and 27 kp from Mezhirechye departed to the borders of the USSR.

On May 17 five armored trains arrived in Biala Podlaska. During 1-8.6.41 through Warsaw in the direction of Terespol marked movement 18 td, followed in the vanguard 11 TP.

4-10.6. in the Warsaw area, Prague concentrated 38 td.

On the river Vistula marked parts flotilla with №№ 60, 300, 500, 600. The numbers are not decrypted.

From 4 to 6 June, through Rembertov station eastward (the end point was not installed) proceeded to 10 military echelons with infantry, artillery and rear units.

According to unverified data, the headquarters of the eastern group at the end of April relocated to Otwock (4 km s-century. Karchev). In the area Kodeni marked up to 100 tanks.

May 18 on the airfield Belyany installed to 125 fighters. At the airport of Pulawy - 50 bombers.

In late May, from Pulawy to Lublin proceeded to the infantry division.

In Rozhanka (10 km north of Wlodawa) arrived 475 nn.

From 6 to 12 June through Minsk Mazowiecki to Sedlec proceeded:
280 vehicles with infantry (20 — 22 people per vehicle); 900 vehicles with infantry, some of them proceeded to Lublin;
15 guns over 150 mm, 12 guns - 150 mm and 12 guns 105 mm; 75 PTO guns - 37 mm; anti-aircraft guns: 17 - 37 mm and 60 - 105 mm; Xnumx tanks.

In the region of Janów Podlaski delivered to 35 aircraft, allegedly disassembled.

According to unverified data, General von Klyuk came to Sokolov to recruit an army from units arriving from Yugoslavia and France.

2. According to human and radio data, the corps headquarters are installed in the following points: Radin, Lukov, Mezirechie. According to radio intelligence, in the Warsaw area, two large radio stations have been established that independently maintain contact with the headquarters of the main command, Berlin. Perhaps one of the radio stations belongs to the headquarters of the eastern group, relocated to Otwock, the second to the headquarters of the 8 army.

During the period from 8 to 14 June, the most intensive flights of airplanes were noted in points: Königsberg - 41; Danzig - 35; Warsaw - 51; Breslau - 99.

3. According to RO PribOVO on 16.6, 291 PD is deployed in Klaipeda, Silute - 161 MD, Nejrich - 217 DD, Tilsit - 158 and 290 PD and 8 MD.

With 11.6. The evacuation of the families of officers from Klaipeda and Šilutė began. At the end of May, Seyny arrived - headquarters 26 PD, 12 PP, 110 CP, tank.bat and scooter battalion ...

Conclusion:

1. Previously received data on the intensive redeployment of German troops to the borders of the USSR are confirmed, mainly in the districts of Suwalki and Sedlets.

2. The data on the redeployment of the Eastern Group headquarters to Otwock and about 18 and 38 etc require additional verification.

3. In recent days, there have been numerous cases of desertion and non-execution of orders in the army, but the army as a whole is a powerful bulwark of German fascism.

The chief of the RO Headquarters Zapovo Colonel Blokhin
Head of 3 Branch RO Major SAMOYLOVICH 21.6.41. ”

From the above, the RS shows that it does not contain any extra-important information about the possible beginning of the 22 war of June. On the morning of June 21, this message was reported to the VO leadership.

RO ZOVOVO discovered 19 "new" German divisions (bringing the total number of divisions at the border against the district to 49) only when they enter the source areas for an attack on the USSR 21.06.41 g. This PC from 20-00 21.06.41 got to the command only in 15-20 22.06.1941 Late in the evening, the head of the RO tried to convey the new information to the commander of the military school ... Probably, everything was spoiled by the previous RS, brought to 12 hours before that and having "quite a peaceful content" ...

Earlier, the author presented a version of events showing that the Directives of the General Staff of the SC from 18 of June could not be due to the disbelief of the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff in a full-scale war with Germany in the twentieth of June. According to the writers, in accordance with this Directive of the General Staff, district troops [OdVO, KOVO, SOVOVO, PribOVO and LVO] should have been put on alert for 21 Jun. These arguments are based mainly on the Order of Commander PribOVO of 18 June. When it comes to withdrawing the reserve areas of 12 MK from PribOVO (raised 16.06.41 to 23-10), it begins to reason that the MC was raised according to the GS Directive from 12-13 of June in accordance with which the reserves of the districts called 2-th operational echelon of the district) and MK border armies. In the 4-th part of the article, we addressed the issue related to the rise of the MC in five HE. Very curious details were found out: all MCs were raised only in PribOVO (there were two of them). In KOVO, only the compounds 19-th micron and 8 td (from 4 micron) are raised.

Here is an excerpt from one of the Directives of the General Staff No. 504205 ov / ss from 13.06.1941. "To increase the combat readiness of the troops for 1 July 1941, all the deep divisions and corps control with corps will be transferred closer to the state border to new camps ... 1) 31 ck - hike; 2) 36 ck - hike; 3) 55 ck - hike; 4) 49 ck - by rail and hike; 5) 37 ck - hike. " As of the morning of June 22, these units were located in 200-250 km from the state border and could not take defensive positions on the state border. Interestingly, they marched only 17-18 numbers. And the places of the camps for them were located in the zone of the location of the MK armies of cover (the so-called second line). And from there more than one transition of rifle troops to the state border ... Everything is quite logical: new formations arrived in the territory of KOVO, which (partially) were included in the reserves of the district. Therefore, the units of the reserves of the district were moved closer to the state border (but not to border divisions). Readers should decide for themselves in their version of events: either the leadership of all districts were traitors, or the 18 June Directive simply did not exist.

In the same part, it was shown that the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff were not properly prepared for the transfer of Directive No. 1 to the troops on the night of 21 on June 22, and also did not take responsibility for bringing and explaining this lengthy Directives to military councils of higher education through other lines of communication. As a result, the VO leadership found itself in a difficult situation and at the beginning of the war, the official order to open fire had to be made either to the commanders of divisions and regiments, or to open with a delay ...

The leadership of the spacecraft believed in provocative military operations on the border and did not believe in a full-scale war. RU GSH (with the help of other intelligence services) at that time was able to detect German divisions on the western border of the USSR 129 (of which up to eight - in areas somewhat remote from the state border). According to the German Army’s General Staff, the German military needed an attack on the USSR in the month of June before the 220 divisions (without taking into account allied formations).

Did reconnaissance flights of Soviet aircraft take place in June 1941? In the book of the historian A. Isaev "1941. Stopped Blitzkrieg "refers to the observation by the Germans of the activity of the Soviet intelligence aviationacting without violating the border of the neighbor. Reports flicker like “two reconnaissance aircraft were boarding near the border” or “5 Russian reconnaissance planes flew along the border at an altitude of about 1000 m.” On June 8, 1941, a rather long stay of the Soviet aircraft over German territory was recorded: “At 12-05 a Russian monoplane flew over the border. Flight direction: Kolno - Vinconta - Turau. At 13-05 the plane flew the border in the opposite direction. ”

Since the German leadership, special services, the diplomatic apparatus and many other ministries and services took part in the misinformation actions, the German High Command should have been consider the impact of Soviet intelligence. In particular, the possible emergence of Soviet reconnaissance aircraft near the border and over German territory.

There is mention of a reconnaissance flight in June 1941 of the year in the book GN. Zakharov “I am a fighter”: “... Somewhere in the middle of the last pre-war week — it was either 17 or 18 in June 1941 — I received an order from the ZAPOV aviation commander to fly over the western border. The length of the route was about four hundred kilometers, and was to fly from south to north - to Bialystok.

I flew to the U-2 with the navigator 43 th Major Rumyantsev. Border areas west of the state border were clogged with troops. In the villages, on the farms, in the groves stood poorly camouflaged, if not completely camouflaged tanks, armored vehicles, guns. Motorcycles darted along the roads, cars — apparently, staff ones — cars. Somewhere in the depths of the vast territory, a movement was born, which here, near our border, was slowed down, resting on it, as if it were an invisible barrier, and it was just about to overlap through it.

The number of troops recorded by our eyes, at first glance, did not leave me any other options for reflection, except for one thing: the war is near. Everything that I saw during the flight was layered on my previous military experience, and the conclusion I made for myself could be formulated in four words - “from day to day” ...

We flew then a little more than three hours. I often put the plane on any suitable site, which might seem random if the border guard did not immediately approach the plane. The border guard appeared silently, silently took the visor and waited for a few minutes while I wrote a report on the wing. Having received the report, the border guard disappeared, and we again rose into the air and, having traveled 30-50 kilometers, sat down again. And again I wrote a report, and the other border guard waited silently and then, with a salute, disappeared silently. By evening, therefore, we flew to Bialystok and landed at the location of Sergei Chernykh's division.

In Bialystok, the deputy commander of Zapov, General I.V. Boldin analyzed the recently completed exercises. I briefly reported to him about the results of the flight, and that same evening, on the fighter plane provided to me by Blacks, flew to Minsk.

District Air Force Commander General I.I. Kopec listened to my report with the attentionwhich testified to his long and complete trust in me. Therefore, we immediately went with him to the report to the district commander.

Listening, Army General DG Pavlov looked at me as if he was seeing him for the first time. I had a feeling of dissatisfaction when at the end of my message, he smiled and asked if I was exaggerating. The commander's intonation frankly replaced the word "exaggerate" with "panic" - he clearly did not fully accept all that I said. Then Kopets, ahead of me, said that there is no reason to take my report into question, and the district commander, in order to smooth out the embarrassing pause that had arisen, uttered several conciliatory phrases in tone and thanked for the clearly accomplished task. With this we left ... "

Since there is currently no other published information confirming this flight, then, according to preliminary estimates, we can say: the probability that the flight was actually made is 50%. The likelihood that this may be a “military bike” is also 50%. Anyone can believe in this event or not. We have already met in previous parts with incorrect interpretations of events in memoirs ...

А how some writers view this flight (unfortunately, there are several of them): “... And now don’t consider it a burdensome job to think deeply into the essence of what Stalin and Beria actually did. After all, before you is a brilliant description of lightning carried out aerial reconnaissance along the entire borderline of SECO! And not just aerial reconnaissance, but carried out in real time. Because every 30 – 50 km Zakharov planted an airplane and wrote an urgent report, and the border guards who knew in advance about the arrival of such an aircraft silently received and sent Zakharov’s report. Moreover. In real-time, but within one daylight, integrated intelligence information was collected about the Wehrmacht’s military preparations for an attack on the USSR in the most dangerous direction from the point of view of the Soviet leadership - Belarusian! On the scale of the entire border SOVOVO!

It only remains to add that from 0.45 to 1.50 17 (as stated in the “Journal of Stalin’s Cabinet Visits”, in fact, it’s already 18) on June 1941 of Stalin at the reception was the commander of the RKKA Air Force Zhigarev, who received instructions to immediately organize such aerial reconnaissance. Well, Beria immediately organized his eagles - border guards. This is how Stalin took the intelligence information reported to him on June 17. He demanded to recheck all the data in an unconventional way, but in real time and only in an integral way. And on the most dangerous and most important direction - on Byelorussian, on the scale of the entire line of the border of the Western Special Military District.

As a result of the actions taken, all intelligence information about the impending attack was rechecked completely and unambiguously, and Stalin had a completely clear picture of what was happening, which did not allow double interpretations. And that is why, without waiting for the third call, on the same day, 18 June 1941, Stalin ordered to send to all commanders of the Western military districts a directive to bring the troops under their command into full combat readiness ... Simply put, Stalin used any opportunities to ensure with absolute accuracy the imminence of war in the very near future. After all, the future of the state depended on the validity of its actions. And when he got the 100% validity, a directive followed. ”

It should be clarified that the Belarusian Theater of Military Operations of the General Staff of the Spacecraft was regarded as secondary. "... The possibility is not excluded that the Germans will concentrate their main forces in East Prussia and on the Warsaw area so that through the Lithuanian SSR inflict and develop the main blow in the direction of Riga or Kovno, Dvinsk. Simultaneously, you must expect auxiliary concentric beats from the side of Lomza and Brest with their further development in the direction of Baranavichy, Minsk ... "(From the plan of the General Staff on the strategic deployment of the USSR Armed Forces 11.03.1941). In the developed “Cover Plans” of the General Staff, the Germans assumed that the Germans would deliver three converging blows to Bialystok and one to Baranavichy (via Brest). Again (according to specialists GSH) not a strategic operation ... To counter this threat, it was believed that Zapov’s forces were sufficient. Therefore, the redeploying reserve army on the territory of the VO was not included in its composition (if necessary, it could be relocated to the Baltic States), in contrast to the 16 army in KOVO.

Consider the visit journal of I. Stalin 17 June 1941 of the year:
t.Molotov 20 h. 15 m. Output 1 h. 50 min
T.Kaganovich L. 21 h. 45. 1 output h. 50 min.
t.Shakhurin 23 h. 10. 1 output h. 50 min.
t.Petrov 24 h. Output 1 h. 50 min.
T. Yakovlev 24 h. Output 1 h. 50 min.
t.Zhigarev 0 h. 45. 1 output h. 50 min.

Zhigarev went to Stalin in 0-45, in whose office 5 was also present. The meeting in addition to Molotov and Kaganovich attended by representatives of the aviation industry. It is very likely that the meeting discussed issues of aircraft manufacturing and the Air Force. All of these persons came out simultaneously. Beria was absent. If Stalin had instructed Zhigarev on air reconnaissance, then Yakovlev would have noted this fact in his memoirs. If Zhigarev had lingered, it would have been noted in the journal. Therefore, the assertion about the giving of an order by Stalin to Zhigarev 17.06.41 to conduct aerial reconnaissance at the border of Zapov is not a confirmed fact.

Who could ever give a mission for reconnaissance flight? Stalin, Beria, the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff, the head of the RU (through the leadership of the General Staff or VO), the commander of the troops, the deputy commander and the Secondary School ZOVOVO. Why is it considered Stalin, as the person who gave the order to conduct aerial reconnaissance? Because - this is a sensation - the expectation of war is about to come. Because Stalin fits well in the version of "Intelligence Flight - Directive of the 18 June General Staff - any arbitrary interpretation of subsequent events." The only justification is the joint work of the servicemen of various People's Commissars. But to answer the question: why was the need for a joint aerial reconnaissance operation by servicemen of various People's Commissariats not interested in the writer. In the proceedings of this event there is no sensation. This trial reduces everything to everyday details ...

Stalin called D. Pavlov once - under Golovanov (confirmed) and, possibly, called repeatedly. Why did Stalin not give such an order directly to the commander of the troops Zapov? Does any reader think that D. Pavlov would dare not execute such an order? Only "techies" go down to the details, everything is very clear with the writers. They are probably much smarter than the author, who does not believe the words of gentlemen ...

Could G. Zakharov be appointed precisely by I. Stalin to conduct aerial reconnaissance?

From G. Zakharov’s book: “... At the end of the fortieth year I was again called to Moscow for a meeting. The meeting was held in Stalin's office ... Then Stalin turned to Rychagov:

- Will anyone else speak?

- Comrade Zakharov, - I heard Rychagov's answer. Stalin nodded. I have risen.

- The commander of the 43 th iad Major General Zakharov.

- I know... »

Stalin had a good memory. He could remember the pilot-commander and choose him for the flight.

What could such important intelligence reports be before 17-18 in June?

14.06.41 "X": “Information from Berlin suggests that military preparations continue and ministries are convinced that war will be started in the first half of June with. g. " (Part 2).

16.06.41 g. "Starshina": “... All the German military activities for the preparation of an armed offensive against the USSR are fully completed, and a hit can be expected at any time... » (Part 1).

16.06.41 g. The British leadership handed over to the Soviet ambassador a map with the scheme of the German grouping near the Soviet borders. According to these data, there were 76 divisions in Poland (of which 2 td and 2 md), in Romania, Hungary and Slovakia - 29 divisions (of which 4 td and 2 md), the transfer of 2 divisions in the Baltic Sea and 2 divisions was assumed for the Baltic Sea and 109 divisions in the divisions of the Baltic Sea and XNUMX divisions. to Northern Finland. In total, the diagram shows the XNUMX of the German divisions. (Part 2).

17.06.41 Ramsay: “... The German courier told the military attache that he was convinced that the war against the USSR was probably delayed until the end of June. The military attache does not know whether there will be a war or not ... ” (Part 2).

Knowing that Stalin was studying all the documents about the attack on the USSR, we can assume that theoretically he could give a mission to fly after reading the messages from 16 June 1941.

Who would Stalin be assigned to carry out such a flight? Obviously not the commander of the Air Force KA, because The commander of the Air Force Zapovo would have had to inform the commander of the military forces, D. Pavlov, about this task (no need to invent a version about special secrecy and concealment of this task from Pavlov - this is nonsense). Stalin is easier to give the task to the People's Commissar of Defense or directly to Pavlov. If the order came from Stalin or the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense (Chief of the General Staff), the commander of the ZOVO would simply give the order to carry out this flight and report on the results of the flight to Moscow as soon as possible. In this situation, he does not need to think about the accuracy of the information supplied - the main thing is to execute the order. From the memoirs, we see D. Pavlov incredulously reacted to the report, because he now had to report on this flight to Moscow. And from the information above, we know that the RU GSH (and RO ZOVOVO in particular) did not have information about the increase in the number of German divisions - all of them also remained 30. The People's Commissar of Defense and the head of the General Staff were obliged to believe this MS.

Only two questions: 1) Why did Stalin not give the order for the reconnaissance flight personally to L. Beria? 2) Or did Beria himself not give such an order? (After all, it is logical - to double-check the military!)

In Bialystok, there was the Directorate of the Defense Forces of the NKVD of the BSSR (the head of the department was General IA Bogdanov). In the area of ​​the village Korolino (in 6 km southwest of the city of Grodno) there was 10-I separate aviation squadron PVsubordinate to the control of the MFV of the NKVD BSSR. The squadron consisted of four air links of three P-10 reconnaissance aircraft each (the I. Bogdanov's 13 aircraft was assigned to the squadron). Flights were carried out from field sites located near outposts, commandant's offices and detachments. Aircraft crews daily inspected the control and trace strip and conducted reconnaissance in the border area. The information collected in the flight, passed on to the command of the PV. Of course, from Bialystok RS came to Moscow. It turns out, Beria from the list of persons listed above who could have given an order for reconnaissance flight, already disappears - it was not interesting for him. Just like other Muscovites fell away ...

The state border within ZAPOV was guarded by four border detachments: 86 (Augustus), 87 (Lomza), 88 (Shepetovo), 17 (Brest).

The figure shows the location of the border units. The figure also shows five settlements, for which below are detailed post-war maps of the area (hardly any vegetation has changed much).

We see that from the German side there is a sufficiently large number of forests and groves. There must still be a lot of small places planted with trees and shrubs that are not shown on the maps. The presence of "green" zones allows you to mask military equipment or locate it on the western side, which is not visible during reconnaissance flights along the border by Soviet aircraft. The Germans were where to hide their military equipment.

Consider the individual details of the above flight.

1) The length of the route was about four hundred kilometers - this distance corresponds to the departure from the airfield near the city of Brest, the flight along the border to the ZOVOVO-PribOVO demarcation zone and continue to the airfield located in Bialystok.

2) G. Zakharov flew with the navigator. When landing, he wrote a report on the wing, therefore, piloted the plane navigator. So the observation, mainly produced Zakharov.

3) G. Zakharov often landed the aircraft on any suitable site, which might have seemed accidental if the border guard had not immediately approached the plane.

Why are not indicated landing sites? The secrecy of this information at the time of this writing was no longer presented. The event itself is described in detail, and this moment in passing. Whether the author could not remember: where exactly the plane landed. Whether it is a “bike” and a landing site is not indicated so that the surviving border guard witnesses “do not catch it”. Again 50% to 50%. In addition, the absence in the memoirs of the mention of buildings (located nearby) indicates that the field sites for the 10 th squadron near the commandant's offices and detachments were not used. Again the question: why are such difficulties with the secrecy of landing sites? We already know that reconnaissance flights aircraft "Р-10" along the border and so it happened daily, the Germans knew about them and were obliged to provide for their flights in their preparations for the attack. But the unusual landing of the army U-2 on the grounds of the MF NKVD could remain in the memory of aviation border guards for a long time. Too many unexplained difficulties and oddities ...

4) “... The border guard appeared silently, silently took the visor and waited for a few minutes while I was writing a report on the wing. Having received the report, the border guard disappeared, and we again rose into the air. ”

People who do not really understand the specifics of the regime of secrecy, understand this: there is an access to information, for example, to "ov" and a soldier is allowed to do everything. This is not true. There is another term “tolerance delimitation” - everyone is allowed to what they are dealing with in the service. In the GSH in 1941, there were dozens of officers with access to the documents "ov", and, for example, fewer 10 people from the GSH leadership could enter the SHO. In the leadership of the armies and corps - there were only two such people. All PCs (not only from agents) are classified as “CC”. The pilot was obliged to seal the RS. But this is not described in the book. Again, 50% to 50%: whether the author has forgotten or did not attach importance, or this is a bike. We do not know of a single case (noted in the media) of the transfer of completely secret documents without receipts or marks in a journal from the hands of military personnel in the prewar time, except for the described case ...

5) “Having received the report, the border guard disappeared, and we again rose into the air and, having traveled 30-50 kilometers, we sat down again. And again, I wrote a report, and the other border guard waited silently and then, with a salute, disappeared silently ... "

When flying directly along the border, the aircraft flew about 350 km. Consequently, he could land to send a PC from 7 to 10 times.

For the interpretation of this strange event, the writer proposed a version: “...Here is a brilliant description of lightning-carried out aerial reconnaissance along the entire borderline of SECOVO! And not just aerial reconnaissance, but carried out in real time. Because every 30 – 50 km Zakharov landed an airplane and wrote an urgent report ...»

Writers are simple - they have no questions ... How and where was the PC delivered? In theory, the border detachment. Next to the control of the MF NKVD, which is located in Bialystok. So in Bialystok and flew G. Zakharov and should be there faster than these PCs! In Bialystok, Zakharov was at a reception with the Deputy Commissars of the Military Academy of Boldin. Why such a complicated procedure with MS? Reports in no way could in real time not only arrive in Moscow, but also arrive in Bialystok.

How could send the RS from the border detachment to the control of the MF NKVD? Transmit as PC messenger or transmit as encryption.

Could a cryptographer be in the border detachment? Was. At the Border Troops forum it is indicated that Nikolay Akulov, a junior lieutenant, a cipher clerk (missing 86 g) was among the dead of the 23.06.1941 squadron. By telephone, HF did not recommend transmitting information on the heading “ss” in peacetime. And whether there was a HF communication in the border guard detachments of the BSSR of the pre-war state is unknown. According to the author - it is unlikely ...

To send the encryption to the border district is to spend at least two times on 40 minutes and additional time to transfer messages through communication nodes. The total time could be more than 2 hours. By this time, it is still necessary to add the time for moving the border guard from the border to the border detachment. Only three landings from 7-10 could occur at a relatively close distance from the detachment's location (from the outposts located not far from the location of the detachment, this distance from 10 to 15 km. For more remote outposts - this distance increased significantly). Why do we need more 4-7 landings and such difficulties with reports? Again, strangeness ... Whether it was, or not, or sat down just 3 times. It is strange that the writer did not think about it. Why do we need a writer who does not think?

6) “... Somewhere in the depths of a huge territory, a movement was born, which here, near our border, slowed down, resting on it, as in an invisible barrier, and is ready to just overrun through it. The number of troops recorded by our eyes, at first glance, did not leave me any other options for reflection, except for one thing: the war is near. Everything that I saw during the flight was layered on my previous military experience, and the conclusion I made for myself could be formulated in four words - “from day to day” ... "

It cannot be ruled out that subsequent events of the imminent war could be superimposed on the post-war memories of General G. Zakharov. He could write this text on the basis of the “well-known” version of events in the post-war society, in which he believed ...

As part of the last stage of misinformation, German troops mainly moved to the border in the evening after 18 hours.

From 10 June 1941, German troops began to move into their home areas, which were located 7-20 km from the Soviet border - for infantry formations and 20-30 - for tank forces. From June 18, the first echelon divisions at night began to move to their original position for the invasion. By noon, the 21 of June, the German Air Force first-strike formations concentrated on airfields west of the Vistula, and in the evening at low altitude they relocated to operational airfields near the USSR border.

Consider the three documents of the German armies of Army Group Center, which cover the last peaceful days of June 1941. Excerpts from the documents are provided from the “Personal Website of the Historian Mark Solonin” (http://www.solonin.org/doc_3-ya-tankovaya-diviziya)

3 fighting magazine td (from the 24-th MK 2-th tank group)

“... The 09.06.41 Division continues its march from the old to the new quartering area ... When the division was already in motion, it was caught up by the instructions of the headquarters officer of the movement of troops, Major General Bornemann, that parts of 4 etc. were in the Lowicz-Bochaczew area with 18-00 will be on vacation. There is a danger that the advanced parts of the division will encounter the backslider of the 4 th ... After establishing the connection with the 4 th, it turned out, however, that its backward parts will pass through the Lowicz-Bochaczew section only in 2 hours [nights]... It was discussed the intention to obtain from the command of the corps the replacement of the outposts of the 34 th front with two battalions of motorized infantry, one division of light and one heavy artillery.

10.06.41 Division rests one day and evening in 18-00 It protrudes from the exit point of the column through Warsaw to the Minsk-Mazowiecki region, Kalushin ...

11.06.41 ... The division went into 18-00 on the road ...

13.06.41 Divisions report arrival in a new area of ​​concentration ... Parts in the forest camps persistently complain of torment from mosquitoes ...

14.06.41 In correspondence - as previously stated, for telegraph (telephone) communication - within the division and with higher authorities ordered to enter conditional names. In the order on reconnaissance, the units were ordered to conduct a reconnaissance of the initial positions. East of the restraining line, a thorough disguise is prescribed.

15.6.41 ... The 9 light anti-aircraft division subordinate to the division, and the first division of the 11 anti-aircraft regiment, on the orders of the corps command, move forward in the evening to the area of ​​the original lines. The 83-th rear battalion is already moving 16.6.41 to the starting area for road improvement work. Since the 16 division of June in 0-00 takes over control of the border, the 3 and 394 motorized infantry regiments receive a special order to replace [border guards]. Enhanced advanced team sent forward.

16.6.41 The division order for the initial frontiers is sent by ordinance officers to units. In 4: 00 divisional order of the attack was sent to the part ... 18-00 the division continues to expand to the initial positions ...

17.06.41 ... The masking control carried out by the forces of the reconnaissance aviation assigned to the 4 Army revealed a completely unsatisfactory level of disguise during the march of troops to the east, as well as bivouacs and parking lots. Divisions' attention is once again being drawn to camouflage activities ... Anti-aircraft artillery and fighters are given the right to immediately open fire on Russian aircraft over German territory ...

19.6.41 ... The adjutant of the 104 anti-aircraft regiment, on the instructions of his commander, discusses with the head of the operations department the approach to anti-aircraft artillery positions and expresses the most serious concerns of the commander regarding the occupation of positions in the night from B-2 to B-1 [on June 21], as a result of a) the generated noise, and also b) insufficient masking from the view from the air and the earth ... may reveal the day the operation starts... [Anti-aircraft gunners] reach the final before approaching the position last night only.

By order of the division commander, there are changes in the nomination plan, since on the night from B-3 to B-2 [on 20 June]In addition to the previously assigned units, the 3 th motorcycle battalion, the 1 th reconnaissance battalion, the 543 th and 521 th anti-tank battalions also returned to their initial positions; on the night from B-2 to B-1 [on June 21] the 3 and 6 1 battalions of the same regiment came out for the 2 th battalion of the 1 th battalion. Thus, on the night from B-5 to B, only the headquarters of the 6-th tank brigade and the headquarters of the XNUMX-th TP with the remaining regimental units leave the Radzyń area to the area of ​​the initial positions.

20.6.41 Released from the зыdzyn district [64 km from the Soviet border] in accordance with the order of the division commander, the units go, according to the plan, to the area of ​​their initial positions ... The command of the 4 Army is commendable to the division’s march eastward.

21.6.41 ... In 23: 30, parts report on the readiness and occupation of the latest starting positions. ”

The HBS speaks about the movement of troops in the evening and at night, about the placement of units in forests. June 17 talks about the unsatisfactory level of disguise during the march of troops to the east - we are not talking about the deployment of troops at the border. Subunits of the infantry division are replaced by two motorized rifle battalions and two artillery divisions. Separate parts of the division 20 June were a few dozen kilometers from the state border. East of the restraining line, a thorough disguise is prescribed. In order not to alert the Soviet military, the exit of anti-aircraft units is carried out on the last peaceful night. From June 16, individual battalions of the division begin to advance. Tank battalions begin to move to the border only on the night of 20 and 21 in June. In this case, the battalions do not concentrate right at the border. The initial positions for the attack on the USSR are concentrated in the 23-30 on June 21.

3 Tank Group Fighting Log ([i] Panzer Group focused for fighting against PribOVO)

«21.06.41 0-00 39-th and 57-th MK took their sections (of the front) and changed the traffic police at the border ...
20-20 57-st AK reports that two SS brigades ... block promotion 19 td...
The advancement of the Tank Group took place according to plan. Emerged due to the small number of roads and the shortness of nights march continuation also during daytime, did not prevent secrecy... The divisions stood under the cover of artillery, heavy guns and anti-aircraft guns, perfectly camouflaged and ready to attack ...

22.06.41 02-00 Divisions took the starting position. "

Also referred to the movement of parts of the tank group in the evening and at night. 21 June relocation was carried out in the daytime. In the vicinity of the initial frontiers for attacking the USSR, units were carefully disguised.

20 Army Corps Order (from the 9 Army)

“... 2. Divisions are nominated in their districts ... so that they can, at daybreak "B" [22 Jun] start an offensive. At the same time, it is necessary to strive to ensure that the most powerful units in their capabilities are moved to their initial positions only on the night from the date of “B-1” to the day “B” ...
Pulling up to the border should be done ... as late as possible and unnoticed. Defense (defense) of the initial positions should be limited to the most necessary; Unreasonably high protection measures will allow the enemy’s intelligence to reveal our intentions prematurely ... ”

We also see that the hull parts, although they are being moved to their initial positions from the 18 number, but they are required to move out as late as possible and imperceptibly.

Since the reconnaissance flight was conducted in the zone of the location of the units of the Army Group "Center", the author presented a small number of Wehrmacht documents belonging to this army group. All formations of this army group were to be guided by unified orders on troop movements. Similar orders can be traced among the troops concentrated against PribOVO and KOVO. Consequently, the secrecy of the movement of the German troops is the single policy of the German high command.

It turns out that during the conduct of air reconnaissance the pilot could not observe the tanks. They almost did not have near the border 17-18 numbers. Perhaps the pilot confused tanks with armored vehicles, armored personnel carriers or tracked transporters. Perhaps there could be a small number of tanks in the reconnaissance battalions. But the pilot did not have to observe the global movement of troops during the day to the border.

We do not know at what altitude the U-2 flew in this flight. Perhaps at an altitude of about 1000 m. From a height of 1000 m the horizon line can be seen up to 120 km, and from 3000 m - to 200 km. To the naked eye to see a fixed tank (even without masking) at a distance of 3 kilometers from an airplane flying at an altitude of 1000 m, is quite a difficult task. A T-IY tank in this case will be an object of size 17 mm, which the observer looks at from a distance of 5 meters. Besides, this is not a contrasting goal. In the movement of the tank column will be better visible because of the plumes of dust. In this case, the equipment in the column at a distance can be confused with other types of military equipment, including the automotive one.

But, the tanks 17 or 18-th June were at a much greater distance from the border (to 20-30 km).

Of course, they can tell the author - there are binoculars that the observer could have. Although G. Zakharov does not mention his presence of binoculars. Forgot again? It is unlikely that this can only be our conjecture ... In this case, the detection range of a T-IY tank can be up to 10 km. But as we read above - the equipment at the parking places had to be disguised ... What is the characteristic feature of a summer afternoon? Increased turbulence due to upward and downward flows. The zone of turbulence can reach 1500-2500 m. There is such a thing - vertical wind shear ... Streams can alternate every 20-50 meters. You must admit that it is very problematic to watch with binoculars a distant target in conditions of "bumpiness." You can climb to the height of 2500-3000 meters, but at the same time the detection range of technology will drop to 6-7 km. In addition, ascending convective currents impair visibility over long distances. It turns out that Zakharov did not mention binoculars correctly.

Thus, when conducting aerial reconnaissance, the pilot could not detect the detection of tanks and the mass movement of troops to the border. The pilot could see only those units that were already reported by intelligence in reports, and could also observe the movement of supply columns, rear, technical units and battalions. True, there could be an exception. The pilot could see what the German command wanted to show.

Note of the GS GS KA in the NKGB USSR "The German command reinforces the grouping of troops in the border with the USSR strip, making massive redeployment of troops from the interior of Germany, the occupied countries of Western Europe and the Balkans ... Along with the actual increase in troops in the frontier zone, the German command simultaneously maneuvers, transferring individual units in the border area from one locality to another, so that if we evaluate them, we will have the right impression.
... The German command in the border with the USSR strip is a series of exercises ... that are also associated with the movement of troops ... "

What can I say? At this stage, Hitler, his entourage, intelligence and military command "outplayed" Soviet intelligence and our command. This should be recognized ...

From the presented materials we can say the following:

1) fragments of the book G. Zakharov could be superimposed post-war memories of the author. Unfortunately, you cannot trust them with the 100% guarantee. There are some oddities that are difficult to explain;

2) an observer pilot could be struck by the abundance of a large number of German military equipment, which he had not seen so much before. This technique, of course, was very much. But the pilot hardly knew that the number of German divisions near the border of the BSSR was estimated by our intelligence to a number of thirty.

3) for disinformation of Soviet intelligence, the German command strenuously used the movement of military units and columns.

The author doubts that the received RSs could have hit the spacecraft and I. Stalin leadership, because did not contain something grandly new. Since there are no reliable documentary facts, every reader can believe in any version of the event in question. On one of the author’s websites they informed that there is a document relating to the archive of the former KGB about this flight. For the author, the words of this source do not require confirmation - he believes them, and for you, dear Readers, - this may be the author's trick...

A version of the author that is not documented. The commander of Zapovo, D.Pavlov, of course, was “in the know” of the flight, but he was not the initiator - he just gave up ... Therefore, he condescendingly listened to the pilot as the teacher listens to a middle-school student ... Most likely, the flight was initiated by the Air Force commander ZOVOVO General I.I. Kopec.

In the USSR, there was a practice: in order to begin to develop the military chief of the high rank of the NKVD, he had to receive a sanction for his “development” from the People's Commissar of Defense, as well as for arrest. So, for example, Tymoshenko sanctioned the "development" of the Commander of the Air Force PribOVO in mid-May 1941, and arrested General AP Ionov, 26.06.41,

Since spring 1941, in the USSR, the “work of aviators” begins to “unwind”. 12.04.41 P.V. Rychagov was removed from the post of Deputy Commissar of Defense for Aviation - Chief of the Main Directorate of the Air Force KA and sent to study at the General Staff Military Academy. After removing P.V. Rychagov, the People's Commissar of Defense, was supposed to sanction the "development" of other generals of the KA Air Force.

31.05.41 - arrested the commander of the Air Force of the Moscow Military District, PI Pumpur 01.06.41 - Assistant General-Inspector of the Air Force KA N.N. Vasilchenko. 04.06.41 - Deputy to the NS NS KA Air Force PP P.P. Yusupov. 07.06.41 - Deputy Commander of the Air Force LWO AA was arrested Levin 08.06.41 - arrested the assistant chief of the General Staff for the Air Force Ya.V. Smushkevich.
17.06.41 - arrested the commander of the Air Force DF KM Gusev.

I.I. Kopets should have suspected that he could also be “developed” by the authorities because of his “tarnishing” ties with the command of the Red Army Air Force. The idea, coming from I. Kobets, about reconnaissance flight could have caused a negative reaction in Pavlov, since This initiative contradicted the line of the leadership of the spacecraft and intelligence reports of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Therefore, General Kopts should have been supported by someone else from the VO leadership. The Chief of Staff of the VO, D.Pavlov, “crushed under him.” The deputy commander, I.V. Boldin.

I.V. Boldin was in the same village with the head of the NKVD PV IA Bogdanov. I.Boldin could enlist the support of I. Bogdanov in this matter, since it was dangerous to “follow the lead” from the commander of the Air Force IN. And to carry out this flight, as a joint operation of the district troops and the control of the PV of the NKVD, you could try. It was beneficial to both border guards and the leadership of the Higher School of Defense. D. Pavlov could allow an reconnaissance flight (at the suggestion of Boldin, Kobets and Bogdanov) as part of a joint operation. In this case, it is understandable why Zakharov reports on the flight to I. Baldin in Bialystok, and is not in a hurry to immediately fly from the airfield to Minsk for a report to the commander of Zapov. It is not known whether I. Bogdanov was present at the report. In any case, the RS, received from the pilot of the Air Force KA, could strengthen the RS I. Bogdanov, coming from the frontier detachments, and subsequently sent to Moscow. Near the border, the atmosphere of the near war was felt stronger than that of the leadership in Moscow ...

In this case, the report from the MF of the NKVD of the BSSR went to Moscow, and L. Beria could have been sent to 19-20 in June (after familiarization with the commander of the MF NKVD, Maslennikov). Then the path of this RS (as well as all documents about a possible attack on the USSR) should have ended on Stalin's table. It is not known whether it managed to reach the specified addressee before the start of the war or not. But it doesn’t matter - at that moment nothing new was given by the RS. Even 22 of June in the report of the GSG KA RU did not change the number of German divisions against PribOVO with respect to pre-war data, but against ZOVOV increased by only one compound ...

RS No. 1 / 660724 RU GSH KA on 20-00 22.6.1941

1. As a result of the fighting for the day, 22.6.1941 received actual confirmation of the information available on 20.6 about the following enemy groupings located directly on the border with the USSR:

... a) on the North-Western Front - 29 divisions, of which 4-5 td and 5 md

b) on the Western Front, in the Warsaw District - 31 Division, of which 21 pd, 1 md, 4 td and 1 cd ... "

I.I. Kopets, as it were, “balanced on the edge of a knife,” and any of his rash actions could give rise to arrest. The fact that this man is capable of action is proved by the encryption from Colonel VVS Tarasenko in 4-08 21 June 1941.

«As instructed by the Air Force Commander... "Air Force Commander General I.I. Kopets brings his units on alert through Colonel Tarasenko in the city of Lida. In the afternoon of June 21, the VO leadership (or the leadership of the NKO and the General Staff, through the VO command) “pushes” the cancellation of this order. Having shot at 22 Jun, General Kobets, of course, was crushed by the loss of the aircraft entrusted to him, since the combat readiness "took off" it was he for 11 hours before the war, and many pilots left the airfields to rest. And it didn't matter to him who exactly made him do it. The fact that he did not go to Pavlov before his death indicates that the commander is one of the perpetrators of the defeat of ZOVOVO aviation. Since there is a mention of similar events in PribOVO on the initiative of Zhukov, it probably did not go without the guidance of the spacecraft. It’s not for us to judge General I.I. Kobtsa He was "set up" and he saved his name so as not to be arrested as an "enemy of the people" and saved his relatives, who could also be subjected to repression ...

About 17-00 in the air division VO receives verbal confirmation from Colonel Tarasenko to cancel the previously issued order. The commanders of the air divisions were given a chance not to de-alert, to request written confirmation or to take responsibility ... A similar situation occurred in PribOVO, when 21.06.41 member of the military council of VO Dibrov ordered to hand over ammunition to the warehouses, and the commander of 11 sk asked the 8 army headquarters to write confirmation of this order, which, naturally, was not received ...

Comments

[DimerVladimer]

There is no doubt that this flight was taking place; organizational measures for the army followed.

How could send the RS from the border detachment to the control of the MF NKVD? Transmit as PC messenger or transmit as encryption.

The telephone message transfers particularly urgent and important information from the outpost to the border detachment. At that time, there was no talk of wiretapping telephone lines between outposts.
The plane landed near the outpost at the nearest suitable site (it was not required for the Po-2 large) to transmit an operational message by telephone.
This information does not represent secrecy (this is an overview of the operational situation at the border), therefore, they were not encrypted. Each outpost conveyed a piece of information, Zakharov brought a big picture - which was of strategic value.

[alstr]

Moreover, I think that flights were carried out all over the western border. Just about the rest, because pilots could perish in the first hours of the war.

Regarding the issuance of the order personally by Stalin - this is more than likely, because Stalin wanted to have his sources of information. Moreover, this could be carried out both through Beria and directly through the leaders of the air units. There are several options. Moreover, these orders may not be reflected in the call lists.

[vladimirZ]

I believe to believe General Zakharov G.N. about reconnaissance flight along the border between June 17-18, 1941, and described later in his book, is possible. There is no reason not to believe.
Such an extraordinary flight, before the outbreak of war, with repeated landings, with written reports of what was seen at each interval of the flight, in order not to confuse what was seen, and guaranteed to convey to the recipient, easily remains in memory.
Such reconnaissance flights along the border were carried out regularly.
Suffice it to recall the memoirs of aviation lieutenant general Dolgushin S.F., at the beginning of the war, a lieutenant flying his plane along the border on June 20, 1941, and reporting to the generals Pavlov (commander of the military forces) and Koptsa, who were at that time in their regiment. After which Kopets himself immediately flew to reconnaissance on Dolgushin’s plane and became convinced of the correctness of what he saw by the pilots.
Nevertheless, at the end of the day on June 21, 1941, the regiment received the order of General Kopts to disarm the aircraft, removing machine guns and guns from them, which the pilots and technicians grumbled and did not understand.
On reconnaissance flights of aircraft along the borders. This is a common practice in aviation. I myself served in a reconnaissance air regiment in Transbaikalia in the mid-70s, on an airplane wearing the so-called "radio container", capable of detecting all the radio stations of a potential adversary on all conceivable radio frequencies. Constantly once a month from Moscow an order was received at a strictly defined time to fly along the border in order to direction finding all the radio stations on that side of the border. No other flights were scheduled for this day on my plane. We sat in readiness, waiting for an order to take off, and strictly on time the plane took off to complete the task. The information that was not decrypted was sent to Moscow.
So, what not to believe General Zakharov G.N. there was no reason for a reconnaissance flight along the border with the Germans.

[DimerVladimer]

http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/zaharov/04.ht
ml
Here is the description of the aerial reconnaissance episode on the eve of the war from Zakharov’s book Georgy Nefedovich “I am a fighter” - I don’t understand why I need to doubt the memories of the air division commander — there are no logical connections.

It must be remembered that the German government attributed the concentration of divisions on the border in the spring and summer of 1941 to the rotation of troops. I so wanted to believe in it ...

[DimerVladimer]

In this case, it is understandable why Zakharov reports on the flight to I. Boldin in Bialystok, and is not in a hurry to fly immediately from the airfield to Minsk to report to the commander of ZAPOV.

Is he a robot? Flew all day without rest, several landings, to make a report and send by special communication - this is a more reasonable decision than to fly to Minsk on the night.

[DimerVladimer]

Zakharov flew with the navigator. When landing, he wrote a report on the wing, therefore, the pilot navigated the plane. So the observation was mainly made by Zakharov.

The speculation of the author. The U-2 had dual control, usually the division commander himself piloted, and if necessary, he could transfer control to the navigator - for this there is no need to change seats or change places :)) and he and the navigator could make observations.

an observer pilot could be struck by the abundance of a large number of German military equipment, which he had not seen so much so far. This technique, of course, was very much. But it is unlikely that the pilot knew that the number of German divisions at the border of the BSSR was estimated by our intelligence to thirty.

Why would an experienced pilot with combat experience, be “struck” by the amount of military equipment - he knows the rules for assessing the number of military equipment, since the priority task of the flight crew from the flight commander to the command staff of the division is to assess the ground situation as well.
I wouldn’t raise a question about the presence of binoculars during the reconnaissance flight, since at each air regiment there were and are binoculars on the KDP for observing flights in the area of ​​the airfield.
In the presence of binoculars, from 10 km it is possible to determine not only the type of BT, but also the type of aircraft, and to distinguish the columns extended to the border can be tens of kilometers.

By the way, I flew in that area (Grodno) at an altitude of 1000 m and more — visibility for tens of kilometers — the terrain was completely open, small copses and forest belts — it was impossible to hide dozens of divisions.

[alstr]

I add that in addition to the technology itself there are also its traces. It is much more difficult to disguise them.

[DimerVladimer]

As well as smoke from field kitchens, dust from columns on country roads.
If you start from a flight altitude of 1000 m and good visibility, Zakharov could see with binoculars in detail 10-15 km of the border territory and estimated to a depth of 40-70 km. Those. to understand that the troops are not just deployed, but partially deployed, concentrate - there was no doubt about this experienced military pilot with experience in Spain and China.

[VS]

It’s not for nothing that people say - du..ak, b..d and the dead man is forever)))) And I, very, still, hope that this does not apply to the author))))

“When sometimes on the websites they write about the existence of some more secret RSs that are still classified and are not included in these documents, they probably assume that Stalin did not have access to the specified information ...”

Why do you come up with some kind of garbage for your opponents and then expose YOURSELF as a result of a stupid thing?))) WHO YOU said that intelligence data that had been secret until now had not been reported THEN to Stalin? Why did you decide that the ONE book — the collection of anti-adviser Yakovlev’s bulletins, both complete and not fraudulent — and the ONLY ones, was published and that MORE are not in the archives of OTHER bulletins and information, the publication of which DOES NOT NEED either officialdom or even the same cutters even? WHAT DID YOU TAKE ON WHICH THE PUBLICATION IN YAKOVLEV'S COLLECTION IS NOT PERSONATED AND NOT DIRECTED DOCUMENTS? DO YOU SCANNES SEE THESE DLCS?

YOU GOT AN EXAMPLE - Pavlov’s directive at 2.25 - his version of the so-called deer 1! The publication of which in the collection of Yakovlev led to a distortion of the EVENTS of that night. And even the PHOTO of this directive - for the amateur - did not help - you personally continued to carry nonsense, but Pavlov signed the encryption on the INCOMING !!))) But this is HIS DIRECTIVE !! Outgoing already - in the army
They pointed out this fact to you, but you persistently continue to carry nonsense and do not learn anything))))

“Earlier, the author presented a version of events showing that the Directive of the General Staff of the KA dated June 18 could not be due to disbelief in the leadership of the People’s Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff in a full-scale war with Germany on the twentieth of June.”

And who told you that the Kremlin did not believe in the attack on the 20th? YOU how many times to repeat - STUDY YOURSELF at last the events of THESE days - WHAT THE orders and directions from NGOs and the General Staff with the Kremlin in the okrug went to IN THOSE days - IN THOSE DAYS !!
And you - rushing about with muddy reports and THINK for them for the Kremlin - who was THINKING there. You are your thinkers - try to keep it with you - if you are not able to study the FACTURE of the pre-war days - you will be happy)))

To be smart about the directives of June 18 - and there were LOTS of them - NOT ONE - and what they are about - WE NEED TO KNOW the invoice of THESE days and WHAT orders went to the divisions in THOSE DAYS.

“According to the writers, in accordance with this Directive of the General Staff, the troops of the districts [OdVO, KOVO, ZAPOVO, PribOVO and LVO] were to be put on combat alert by June 21. These considerations are based mainly on the Order of the PribOVO Commander of the forces of June 18. When it comes to the withdrawal of 12 MKs from the PribOVO to reserve areas of concentration (raised on June 16.06.41, 23 at 10-12), discussions begin that the MKs were raised according to the General Directive of June 13-2, in accordance with which the reserves of the districts were relocated (the so-called 4nd operational echelon of the district) and MK border armies. In the 19th part of the article, we examined the issue associated with the rise of MK in five HE. It turned out very interesting details: all MK were raised only in Pribovo (there were two of them). "Only the compounds of the 8th micron and 4 TD (from the composition of XNUMX microns) were raised in the KOVO.”

YOU were told - for MEKHKORPUSSOV at all, there were OWN - SEPARATE directives in those days - and this was not “June 13” but LATER a bit)))

And MK rose in ALL districts, and not just in one PribOVO. TELL you - yes, finally start to study the FACTORY OF THESE days))) STUDY the answers of the divisional commanders about THOSE DAYS - what they were ordered to and on what days and what THEY DID in those days.

[VS]

Further))))

“Here is an excerpt from one of the Directives of the General Staff No. 504205 s / s dated 13.06.1941/1/1941.” To increase the combat readiness of the troops by July XNUMX, XNUMX, all depth divisions and corps control with corps units should be transferred closer to the state border to new camps. ”

Again, you showed yourself to be an ignoramus and an amateur who did not want to find out what others dug up - there is NO such directive dated June 13)) The date for this directive is for KOVO on June 12))) And you received it in Kiev on June 14 in the evening. A directive similar to this one - for Minsk - has a date of June 11)) In the “robin”, which for you has apparently become a bible, it stands “not later than June 20” —that lies to the publishers. And - in the ZAPOVO the withdrawal of troops according to the directive for them - from June 11 !! Which they received in the evening of June 11 - but the conclusion on it - STARTED at 7 a.m. on the 11th already)))

“As of the morning of June 22, these units were 200-250 km from the state border and couldn’t take up defensive positions at the state border. Interestingly, they went camping only on the 17-18th. And the camp sites for them were located in the area of ​​the MK defense armies (the so-called second line). And from there, there’s more than one transition of rifle troops to the state border ... "

Well, you can’t expose yourself as an ignoramus)))))
But - as I understand it, that you are on these directives and are making nonsense that the type in the Kremlin was waiting for the attack not on June 22 ??)) I would even say - gygygs)))))

Madame - you are not the only one on THIS))))
1st - THESE specifically designated divisions - the so-called “Deep”, i.e. - second tier and reserves - DON'T TAKE DEFENSE AT THE BORDER AT ALL !!!)))

2nd — Their PP AREAS — were within 100 km FROM THE BORDER!))) And these are not “defensive positions”, but - areas of concentration!)))
After all - NOT THEY are the first to enter the battle and they are not taking the first blow !!))
FIRST strike - take on the PP - BORDER divisions))) and not "deep"))))))

For which it is indicated in the directives of June 11-12 - in the directives for the withdrawal of second echelons and reserves under the Cover Plan - wait for a special order of the people's commissar))))

Those. - at the deadlines for the conclusion of the DATA divisions - only an ignoramus and can compose - when someone was waiting for an attack in the Kremlin)))))

And now look at what the KOVO directive says about one but the BORDER division — its deadline is June 17 !!!))))

[VS]

Further))))

“Everything is quite logical: new compounds arrived on the territory of KOVO, which (partially) became part of the district’s reserves. Therefore, the compounds of the district’s reserves were transferred closer to the state border (but not to the border divisions). Readers themselves should decide on their version of events: either the leadership of all the districts were traitors, or the June 18 Directive simply did not exist. ”

Smart people - build versions not on “logic” but on INFORMATION))))

By June 18, everyone was waiting for an order - special from NPOs - for withdrawal of frontier divisions through the border guard.
On MK directives received in the districts - IN ALL - June 14-16)))
Finally study the FACTURE of those days - which YOU have long shown in your books by the same Kozinkin ..)))
And then - you just have stupidity - “Readers should decide their own version of events: either the leadership of all the districts were traitors, or the June 18 Directive simply did not exist”))

WHAT directive - one of the - did not exist?))))

Let me tell you - the directives "about BG" - WASN'T FROM Moscow districts - definitely)))

But if you study those orders that went to the divisions in the armies and the more the answers of the divisional commanders - THEY ALL showed - they were given orders about BG))))) - bring them to BG. )))

“Of the same part, it was shown that the People’s Commissar of Defense and the chief of the General Staff were not adequately prepared for the transfer of Directive No. 1 to the troops on the night of June 21st and 22nd, and also did not assume responsibility for bringing this clear Directives to military councils of HE in other lines of communication ”

Cho for nonsense))))

What do you mean - they weren’t prepared ???)) The text was written in Stalin’s office, at 22.20 NGOs and the General Staff left the tyrant, and at 23.45 the text rewritten in the office of the NPO arrived at SHO OU GS for sending. And at 1.15, ALL okrugs received this text.

WHAT DOES IT MEAN - did you use other communication lines ??
YOU have clearly shown that they accepted the text in the KOVO but could not decrypt it because the cryptographers had not arrived in Ternopol yet. Those. - in KOVO, for example, according to YOUR “logic”, COULD NOT comply with this directive !!)))
HOWEVER, nsh KOVO Purkaev clearly showed - WHAT the text was about - and what he did next - raising the army at 3.30.
Those. - The General Staff despite the fact that they could not decipher the text deer in Ternopol. B.N. (which you bluntly call Deere 1) - brought to KOVO the exact meaning of this directive !!)))
Purkaev: “In the period from 1 hour to 2 hours on June 22, the district commander received an order from the General Staff, which demanded that the troops be put on full alert, in case the Germans cross the state border, reflect all forces and means, do not cross the border and do not fly over until further notice. ”

[VS]

Further)))
“The VO leadership was in a difficult situation, and at the beginning of the war, the official order to open fire had to be taken either by the commanders of divisions and regiments, or opened belatedly ...”

Do not get tired of carrying nonsense in a circle?)))
LEARN THE ANSWERS OF THEIR DIVISIONS - on that night. THEY ANSWERED to question No. 3 of Pokrovsky — it was about this night that they showed - who forbade them there and how they acted)))

READ escho once again the words of nsh KOVO Purkaev - WHAT the GS dir prescribed. BN: “In the period from 1 hour to 2 hours on June 22, the district commander received an order from the General Staff, which required to bring the troops into full combat readiness. IF the Germans cross the state border, REFLECT ALL FORCES AND MEANS, do not cross borders and do not fly until further notice. ”

No need to invent - WHAT DO YOU PERSONALLY have seen in some docks. This is generally not important !!))
IMPORTANT - WHAT UNDERSTAND IN THEM those TO WHICH THEY ARE INTENDED !!!)))

“The leadership of the spacecraft believed in provocative military operations at the border and did not believe in a full-scale war.”

Who did you say that? OR - guessed by a crystal ball ??))

“At that time, the Main Intelligence Directorate (with the help of other intelligence services) was able to detect 129 German divisions on the western border of the USSR (of which up to eight were in districts somewhat remote from the state border). According to the assessment of the General Staff of the spacecraft by the German military, an attack on the USSR in June required up to 220 divisions (excluding allied formations). ”

Calm down - on THIS stupidity FOR THE GENERAL STAFF many invent something that was not))))

But all the hedgehog - AND WHY YOU personally took that the General Staff thought so - since there aren’t 220 divisions then there will be no attack?)) Have you come up with yourselves or have you seen some kind of fool ??))


“It should be clarified that the Belarusian Theater of Operations GSh KA was considered as secondary. "... It is possible that the Germans will concentrate their MAIN FORCES in East Prussia and in the Warsaw direction so that through the Lithuanian SSR they can deliver and develop the main strike in the direction of Riga or Kovno, Dvinsk. At the same time, auxiliary concentric attacks from Lomzhi must be expected and Brest, with their subsequent development in the direction of Baranavichy, Minsk ... "(From the plan of the General Staff on the strategic deployment of the USSR Armed Forces 11.03.1941)."

MADAM - this plan is no more than a draft, the routine work of the General Staff to compose VARIOUS options and is not an APPROVED plan in case of war. Do not be stupid))))

[VS]

We pass to the following passages of anonymous madame)))

“And as some writers view this flight (unfortunately, there are several)

Unlike YOU - these authors have a name and surname and do not hide behind network clicks))))


“If Stalin had instructed Zhigarev about aerial reconnaissance, then Yakovlev would have noted this fact in his memoirs. If Zhigarev was delayed, this would be noted in the journal. Therefore, the statement that Stalin had ordered him to Zhigarev on June 17.06.41, XNUMX to conduct aerial reconnaissance at the ZapOVO border is not a confirmed fact. ”

Nonsense))

1st - and what - ALL memoirists wrote ALL what happened and what they were eyewitnesses to?)))
2nd — and why should Zhigarev linger — if he received the necessary instructions?))

T .. e - YOUR personal "logic" again YOU personally failed))))
Since Yakovlev did not mention these instructions, that means they didn’t exist !!!)) WRONG logic !!)))) purely female definitely))))

And other eyewitnesses did not mention these instructions)) And what is this talking about? Yes, nothing))) They generally left no memoirs about that night))))

.
“Why is it considered Stalin, as the person who issued the order for air reconnaissance? Because - this is a sensation - the expectation of war is about. ”

BECAUSE besides Stalin, NO ONE flight in coordination with Beria - with the border guards - could not be organized.)) Do not be stupid))))

“Why was a joint aerial reconnaissance operation necessary for servicemen of various People’s Commissariats? The writer is not interested. In the proceedings of this event there is no longer a sensation. This trial brings everything to mundane details ... "

Zdraaaaste - this flight - to verify intelligence data)))) And the writer on the Surname Martirosyan shows this completely .. So - DO NOT LIE to Madam))))

“Why did not Stalin give such an order directly to the commander of the ZapOVO troops? Do any of the readers think that D. Pavlov would dare not fulfill such an order? Only "techies" go down to the details; everything is very clear with the writers. "

Yes, so that the data was as objective as possible, Madame))) In order for the data to go to the Kremlin through the border guards while flying yet !!!)))) Madame))))

OTHER military personnel in the BORDERLINE band the pilot could not have found in those minutes and hours)))) do not be stupid))))

[VS]

Further)))
“Stalin had a good memory. He could remember the pilot-commander and choose him for this flight. ”

The pilot - first of all - this is a commander of the IAD and not an ordinary pilot)))) With the navigator of DIVISION)))

“It is easier for Stalin to give the task to the People’s Commissar of Defense or directly to Pavlov.”

Stop Fantasizing from scratch))) You want to blame the commander of the IAD for lying, your problems)))) Madame)))

“Why did Stalin not give the order for reconnaissance flight personally to L. Beria? 2) Or did Beria himself not give such an order? (It’s logical to double-check the military!) ”

Well, it started ..)))) "logic" is rushing)))))

“Why aren't landing sites indicated?” The secrecy of this information at the time of writing was no longer "

Yes, because it’s NOT IMPORTANT this is already - all the more FOR memoirs))) And - a clearing in the forest for U-2 is EASIER than NKVD planes - and therefore it LESSES more space for landing and take-offs))))

“So that surviving border guards do not“ catch ”. "

Yes, they do not care about it)))

“The pilot was obliged to seal the RS. But this is not described in the book. ”

I’ll tell you a terrible secret !!)) THE BORDERS ALSO collected data about the German troops))) That is, FOR THESE ANY secret in the data from these pilots, WAS NOT by definition))) And - how do you know what “security clearance” the one had took the data from Zakharov - KOMDIVA IAD?))) How did you get that the border guard was ordinary and not for example the head of the outpost?)))

“Not a single case (noted in the media) of the transfer of top secret documents without receipts or notes in the magazine from hand to hand of the military personnel in the pre-war time is known, except for the described case ...”

You yourself have come up with something - customizing the described case for YOUR fantasies and then famously all debunked))) BRAVO)))

“How and where was the RS delivered? In theory, in the border detachment. Further to the management of the NKVD PV, which is located in Bialystok. So G. Zakharov flew to Bialystok and should be there faster than these RS! "

Why, then, ONLY in Bialystok could they wait for the reports of the border guards and - And WHAT shit of these reports could they send by radio codes or by phone - with the ENCRYPTIONS to the border guards ?? Where did you get the idea that they then took THIS data to the authorities in paper form?)))

“The reports could not in real time arrive not only in Moscow, but also arrive in Bialystok.”

Iron "logic" ...)). Purely womanish)))) not female, namely, woman's - that is how Madame WANTS to think - so it was and it MUST be))))

[VS]

Dale))))

“It was not recommended to transmit“ ss ”stamp information in peacetime by telephone to the HF. It was not known whether there was an HF connection in the border detachments of the BSSR of the pre-war state. According to the author - it is unlikely ... "

But you never know what it seems to YOU ​​PERSONALLY unlikely))) And what can or cannot be transmitted via HF communications - secure communications .. In Ternopol there were NO cryptographers in place, but Purkaev somehow miraculously guessed what was ordered to the deer. B.N.)))

Madame does not want to show off logic - AND SAME Purkayev found out the contents of the deer. B.N?))) ... if the text itself is deer. B.N. there they decoded ONLY at 12.45))))


“Why do we need a writer who does not think?”

So far - this is YOU SHOWING not only not the ability but also the READY to think and learn information about which you stupidly did not know getting into a topic in which others worked for YOU - the same Kozinkin)))

"He could write this text on the basis of the" well-known "version of events in the post-war society, in which he believed"


Actually - the post-war version - it’s just not about WHAT Zakharov described)))) Madame)))

“From June 10, 1941, German troops began to advance to the original areas, which were located 7–20 km from the Soviet border — for infantry formations and 20–30 for tank formations.”

Madame is aware that it was the border guards who tracked the TU side in those days - 400 km .. ??)
DIDN'T KNOW go about such facts?)))) It’s - they’ve actually been hammered into the charters))))

"" ... 09.06.41 The division continues the march from the old to the new cantonment area ... "

Madame - BEFORE the division moves there FIRST, FIRST days or so the command and headquarters leave for several or even weeks)))) And on June 5 they brought to Sana that only 17 infantry and 6 tank divisions stick out against Brsate - this then the STAFF of these divisions were opened)))))

Clear Madame?)))

Well, you yourself brought it - “due to a) the noise being created, and also b) insufficient masking from the REVIEW from the AIR and the ground ... may reveal the day the operation began”)))))

[VS]

Further)))

“The pilot should not have observed the global movement of troops to the border during the day.”

Madame said on the basis of her personal logic))))

“They can tell the author - there are binoculars that an observer pilot could have. Although G. Zakharov does not mention his binoculars. Forgot again? It is unlikely that this can only be our speculation .. "

I didn’t mention it - it means there was no binoculars)) BRAVO !!))) But Dolgushin was talking about binoculars - when HE flew along the border with intelligence the same ON THE SAME days - and even - flew to the other side)))

Letekh did not forget to take the binoculars, but the IAD divisional commander was a stupid person who did not take binoculars on reconnaissance on that side))))

“Hitler, his close associates, intelligence and military command“ outplayed ”Soviet intelligence and our command. This should be recognized ... "

Madame decided on the basis of her female logic, ignoring other facts and documents))))

Long published by other researchers)))


“A version of the author that is not documented.”

Your versions of Madame ANYONE are not interesting in principle)) alas.))))

“The initiator of the flight was General I.I. Kopec. "

Yeah ... To which type border guards obeyed))))))

“General Kopts was supposed to be supported by someone else from the leadership of VO. The chief of staff of VO D. Pavlov "crushed under himself." Remains the deputy commander I.V. Boldin. "

Madame came up with some kind of complete crap and piled on it even more crap))) hurt))))

“On the table of Stalin. It is not known whether it managed to reach the indicated addressee before the start of the war or not. But it doesn’t matter. ”

Madame decided))) And the fact that on June 18 the conclusion began on the cover plans for the LITTLE DIVISIONS - and this OBJECTS the divisional forces to bring their regiments into combat readiness automatically - spit Madame ... She - with her version - carries like a chicken with an egg but Cho there was in real life - but do not care))))

“Oh, that this person is capable of doing something, the encryption from Air Force Colonel Tarasenko proves in 4-08 on June 21, 1941.”

You want to say that Kopets UNLAWFULLY led to increased BG Air Force ZAPOVO?)) Bravo !!))) And then - who gave him the command to CANCEL this order - after all, on the evening of June 21, B.G. was canceled, and the pilots were allowed to go home ??)) Well ???))) The name of the sister .... Name…))))

"At the direction of the Air Force Commander ..." Air Force Commander General I.I. Kopets puts his units on alert through Colonel Tarasenko

And who in your MTF refer to Tarasenko in this case?))))) On Steel, or what?))))

“In the afternoon of June 21, the leadership of VO (or the leadership of NPOs and the General Staff through the VO command)“ pushes ”the cancellation of this order. "

Yah??!! CAN you do something like this to prove - that the NCO canceled b..g in the air force of this district or we act on the principle - according to the hell of a proof?)))

I’ll tell you a terrible secret - and other districts of their Air Force were also brought to BN in the SAME days)))) For example, EXACTLY proven - PERFECT ....))) Study the answers of the divisors at last ..))))

But the same Pavlov showed in the protocol — KOPETS at 1.30 on June 22 — at Pavlov’s order to bring the troops into combat condition according to the conductor. b, n - reports - the Air Force is given by order of the NPO - until June 21, back in b .. and dispersed .... And not about any cancellation bg he didn’t tell Pavlov)))

[VS]

Dale))))

“There is a mention of similar events in PribOVO on the initiative of Zhukov, then, probably, the leadership of the spacecraft could not do here”

Or maybe YOUR facts would have referred to these - that Zhukov canceled the increased bg in Pribovo. 21st of June? OR lie to you - is it easier ??))

“A similar situation occurred in PribOVO, when on June 21.06.41, 11, a member of the military council of VO Dibrov ordered the delivery of ammunition to the depots, and the commander XNUMX ck”

Madame - Air Force and SK - not similar))))

................

Generally --

Worse not when ladies and even with female logic climb to judge things where knowledge and information are needed)))
But Madame was offered - do you want an adult topic to study ??))))

[VS]

Unfortunately, the disease of many amateurs is the reluctance to learn, and even more so - to answer uncomfortable questions)))


The author of Madame in the previous part piled stupidity and even lies stupid but does not want to answer questions why))
Have to repeat them)))

"" There is such a thing - Pustobrekhh ""

remarkably wonderful)))

But the one that you give out to Madame?)) \

"16.04.41 - The People's Commissar and the Chief of the General Staff submitted to I. Stalin a" Note ... ", in which they set forth their vision of the" Plans ... ", built on a preemptive attack by the German Armed Forces before the end of their concentration against the USSR." "

On APRIL 16, did Tymoshenko and Zhukov offer Stalin a plan for a preventive ular?))

At first I thought - the funny mistake you made happened, but you keep on fucking bullshit)))

"" In March 1941, the top management of NGOs and the General Staff decided that it was not worthwhile to "trifle" and that it was worthwhile to "swing" a preemptive strike on the German forces that were not concentrated. ""

Where did you get the idea - what happened to our non-commissioners in March?))
Actually, the idea of ​​a preemptive strike or attack was the first to be preached to oneself completely in NGOs and the General Staff LATER on March 41st. AND THE SAME MERETSK SHOWS FROM THE TRIBUNE ISSUED COMPLETE. But - FORMALLY, Stalin did not approve such plans - only the Shaposhnikov-Meretskov plan in which Germany was the first to attack. What is there "decided" by the leadership of NPOs and the GNSS - in drafts - it doesn’t matter - it is important that Stalin approved.)))

"" April 26.04 - Directives were sent to the border military organizations for the development of "Plans ..." based on the provisions of the indicated "Notes ...". The author believes that the leaders of the spacecraft would not have decided to send such Directives to the troops without informing Stalin. ""

Yes, you can "count" anything but - first show what secret directives you found such - from APRIL 26 ??))

"" May 10, 12 and 14 - S. Timoshenko and G. Zhukov are present at the meetings of I. Stalin. On the 14th, new Directives on the urgent development of “Plans ...” go to HE. New plans should include only defensive actions of the spacecraft with a possible retreat to the old borders. ""

do not think up - directives for new ones - the May BCPs were sent to the non-commissioned companies - 4-5 and 14 MAY. The dates of these directives are well known for a long time))) But the non-commissioners themselves tried to show the tyrant - only May 15-16. Np of April and MAY. After all, they began to compose this plan at the end of April only after the signing of neutrality with Japan.

"" With the sending of the new Directives, the previous “Plans ...” were canceled. It turned out to be a paradoxical situation: the old cover documents (red packets) were seized in the space forces and no new ones were introduced. ""

what do you invent all sorts of nonsense?))))

They did not seize ANYTHING in the troops - after the non-commissioners threw off their directives on the new software without agreement with the tyrant. All the more red packets. As I understand it, what do you think is that the software packages of divisions and corps are stored in packages?)))
The first volume of the two-volume Chekunov - "Sergei St." - with FULL answers of divisors - already out)))) buy and study)))

[RuSFr]

Unusually, interestingly, it turned out that everything was so simple.

[VS]

Several years of gathering information of facts and studying the docks and - you can make an invoice of the pre-war days completely))) And already knowing what happened the days before June 22 - it will not be difficult to compose some “versions” - try to understand what happened - who is to blame and what are the reasons)))
But the weakness of many lovers is to pick up on tops and even dubious sources such as "robins" - in a hurry to please people with sensations - like, I read any garbage for a couple of months and I'll tell you everything right now)))

I personally especially like the wise men who, having read certain intelligence reports, immediately begin to tell - who is there THOUGHT in the General Staff or the Kremlin even))))
You ask for such - show the source of your knowledge - who thought THAT was there - maybe someone wrote it off in this memoir from this General Staff or from the Kremlin - or what document is there about it - who thought THO there ???))) - sherry in response )) "Logic" turns out to be with us - replaces KNOWLEDGE of facts and events)))

Molotov then spat on the like - how do you know the fool of writing that STALIN thought there if I was next to him day and night and practically didn’t see anything like this or heard from a tyrant))))

[RuSFr]

I'm sorry. I do not participate in discussions. Around freedom and write what to think.
I do not want to think in silence I agree with your words
What do you write your business

[aKtoR]

Thank you for your support!
Interestingly: from the 61 person who put the asterisks, after such criticism of this publication, is there still a desire to wait for the continuation of the cycle from more 3 parts?
Decide, readers. There will be at least 20 asterisks on this message - wait, no - it means the topic is not interesting for users.
The decision is yours.
Regards author

[Mikhail Zubkov]

The author has an opinion, but it has ONLY military-technical justifications in the quality and quantity of aircraft and armored vehicles. This is not enough. From the point of view of the balance of forces in technology and POLITICAL circumstances, the best period for the outbreak of the Soviet-German war was the summer of 1940 (this is my OPINION), beginning in late May, when we finished the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe of the Anglo-French group in Dunkirk, even before the surrender of France and Germany’s capture of huge military trophies, the military industry of all of continental Europe and the actual liquidation of its victorious Western front. If the relations of the USSR with Britain and the West as a whole were not in crisis from September 17, 1939 (Polish campaign of the Red Army, during the first mass mobilization of the Red Army) and especially from November 1939 to March 1940 (war with Finland, local mobilization and serious losses of the order of 70-100 thousand killed, wounded and prisoners, the last approx. 10000), as well as a campaign in Bessarabia in the summer of 1940 with insignificant, as in Poland, losses and expenses of the Red Army and the national economy of the USSR. A large fleet of old mass tanks such as T-26, BT-5 and T-28, including multi-tower ones, was not yet worn out as much as on 22.6.41., And was still suitable for battle. Only T-26 of various modifications in the western border districts, there were approx. 7000, while Germany then had only approx. 3500 tanks with bulletproof armor, inferior in quality to our serial BT-7 and pre-production T-34-76 and KV. But!!! Soviet intelligence in 1940 reported that the Germans had more than 7000 tanks! What ALREADY almost ready for a series of superheavy breakthrough tanks weighing 50-70 tons! That Germany has 10 airborne divisions (!!!), while in real life there was only one sabotage regiment, from strength to the parachute brigade. This FALSE information and influenced the development of the Red Army, made it possible to withdraw from service and stop the production of, in particular, then anti-tank rifles, which in August 1941 was corrected in 22 days! Only these 2 plots prove that at the marshal level the Red Army was treason. And it is entirely possible that Stalin knew that with the unsolved conspiracy of the generals it was impossible to enter the war. Because everything happened as happened, alas, with the huge losses of the Red Army in 1941-42.

[Alovid]

I support +
for continuation