How to assess the degree of protection and the probability of hitting tanks

31
How to assess the degree of protection and the probability of hitting tanksSuccess in solving any problem depends on an understanding of what it is, what its complexity is and where you should be most afraid of mistakes. Today, the problem of the inconsistency of the structure of methods for assessing the protection and effectiveness of the defeat continues to exist. tanks new forms of warfare. The following methods were created back in the Soviet Union and have not been improved for a quarter century.

The existing methodology for assessing the protection and destruction of tanks is in a deep stagnation caused by the degradation of the school, which in Soviet times achieved some success in assessing the effectiveness of armaments based on studying the characteristics of target vulnerability. The question arises: how to solve this problem? The answer can be obtained using the requirements for the improvement of obsolete and the creation of modern techniques.



For example, the new “Methodology for assessing the protection and armament of a tank on a unified platform” should:

- have a mathematical apparatus to justify the feasibility of developing a promising tank with optimal tactical and technical characteristics in relation to the conditions of contactless wars;

- to provide recommendations on the localization of the impact of the enemy in our armored vehicles due to the achievement of high values ​​of the characteristics of survivability, noise immunity, secrecy;

- to carry out a comparison of evaluations of competing options without conducting full-scale comparative tests;

- to predict the effectiveness of weapons promising tank, taking into account countermeasures of the enemy;

- take into account the contribution of group protection (short-range and short-range air defense systems) to increase the survivability of a promising tank.

If we take into account the cost of the armored vehicle and the long terms of its creation, then the importance of solving this problem is obvious.

Fifteen years ago, Valery Grigoryan, General Director of the Research Institute of Steel, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Academician of the RARAN, noted: “Only a comprehensive account of all factors affecting the protection and survivability of a tank, including common ones, allows us to satisfy modern requirements. A mathematical apparatus is needed on a new methodological basis, which would allow to compare the types of protection and layouts under consideration, taking into account a large number of both dimensionally and dimensionless criteria. ”

US RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN MARKET IN TANK CONSTRUCTION

The additional need to improve the methodology for assessing the protection and destruction of tanks is due to the next stage of the modernization of the American Abrams under the ECP1 program (Engineering Change Proposal 1 - Proposals for changing the design of 1). The serial production of the Abrams began in 1980. Since then, the machine has been repeatedly upgraded, which temporarily increased its combat performance. But by 2009, the modernization potential in the limited internal volume of the tank was almost exhausted. It was necessary to fundamentally change the technical modernization policy by constructively re-arranging the internal equipment with the replacement of the old one, which led to a decrease in the reserve space, an increase in the tank mass and deterioration of maneuverability. In connection with the high armor penetration and effective armored action of the Russian ATGM (Kornets, Chrysanthemums, Hermes), the Americans found it difficult to increase the security of vulnerable units in the armored volume.

Thanks to American technology to dramatically reduce the size of electronic and other devices, it became possible to rearrange the internal equipment to ensure the security of the units that increase the survivability of the Abrams. The Americans chose the path of modernization under the ECP1 program on the basis of the М1 and М1А1 tanks available at the storage bases. But those who are in service with the M1А2 are not going to upgrade. The weight of the Abrams ECP1 will be reduced from 62 to 55 T. The new model will have: an automatic loader, a diesel engine, a smooth-bore gun with the possibility of launching rockets. The US Army Command expected to start small-scale production of the Abrams, upgraded under the ECP1 program in 2017. It is planned that the upgraded tanks will remain in operation until the 2050 year, and, corresponding to the new forms of hostilities, will soon begin to creep near our borders. It can be assumed that the modernization of the Abrams under the ECP1 program is an attempt to respond to the creation of the Russian Armata.

SOVIET TECHNIQUES IS A PAST CENTURY

In the Soviet Union, methodologies were created to assess the protection and effectiveness of tank armaments: “Methodology for determining the integrated indicator of the military technical level of armored facilities” (developed by VNIITransmash at the end of the 70); “Methods for analyzing the survivability of armored vehicles when firing various anti-tank weapons” (developed by VNIITransmash in the middle of the 80); “Methodology for the integrated assessment of the effectiveness of the ATGM warhead taking into account the overcoming of the DZ” (the developers are TsNIItochmash, TsNIIHM and the 42261 military unit in the 1984 year); “The method of experimental evaluation of the effectiveness of overcoming dynamic protection, armor penetration and parameters of the armor-based anti-tank warheads at the stages of preliminary and state tests” (developers - TsNIItochmash, TsNIIHM, military unit 42261 in 1986).

For the organization of a unified approach in assessing the destruction of foreign tanks, a "Baseline data system on the characteristics of the vulnerability of typical elementary ground armored targets and the effect of anti-tank ammunition (SID-83-PTB, 1983 year)" was developed. Since many defense and defense organizations and the Ministry of Defense participated in creating anti-tank ammunition, SID disciplined all participants, avoiding arbitrary changes and interpretations of the Abrams' vulnerability characteristics. SID, being an interdisciplinary document, was approved by the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and defense enterprises. The presence of LEDs in conjunction with the “Methodology for the integrated assessment of the effectiveness of the AF missile warhead taking into account the overcoming of the DZ” made it possible to evaluate the effectiveness of the guided weapons of our tanks. Taking into account that the small-batch production of the Abrams ESP1 is scheduled to start in 2017, the revision of the LED should be accelerated with the inclusion of the vulnerability characteristics of DZ, KAZ and other devices of this tank. In general, a more thorough study of the characteristics of the vulnerability of foreign armored vehicles is required.

For the experimental testing of ATGM and other munitions with tandem warheads, as well as BPS, a “Guidance document was created. The composition of complex barriers for assessing the armor-piercing effect of anti-tank ammunition (RD 401.1. 6-454-85) ”(developed by the Research Institute of Steel in 1985). Today, the taxiway is hopelessly outdated, and all of its shortcomings in DZ and multi-layer frontal protection simulators of foreign tanks are well known. Requires the creation of a new taxiway for frontal protection simulators, as well as protection of the roof and bottom of the "Abrams" ESR1. It is necessary to organize the earliest manufacture of simulators for the evaluation of the effectiveness of ammunition shells of the latest Russian tank.

STRUCTURE OF SOVIET TECHNIQUES

"The method of determining the complex indicator of the military-technical level of the tank" is not a simulation model in which the process of defeating an armored vehicle is played by various anti-tank weapons. This technique is applicable at the stage of research to form the appearance of a new tank with the corresponding main combat and operational characteristics. The complex indicator of the military-technical level (KVTU) of an armored vehicle is determined by multiplying the indices of firepower (К0), protection (CG), mobility (KP) and operational capabilities (EC), that is, KVTU = K0хКЗХКХКЭ. This method based on the calculation and comparison of the KVTU of domestic and foreign armored vehicles allows to establish the advantages of a particular machine. But the significant difference in KVTU estimates of the former head of GABTU, Colonel-General Vladislav Polonsky and VNIITransmash Director General Viktor Stepanov (tab. 1) is alarming. Thus, V. Stepanov compared with V. Polonsky's estimates for the KVTU T-90 KVTU is one and a half times less, and for the M1XNNXX tank almost two times less (HBT No. 2 for 37 a year).

Not so long ago, one of the leaders of a well-known defense enterprise announced the addition of the fifth indicator - “command manageability”. At the same time, he noted that special emphasis was placed on "increasing security and survivability." It should be noted that in the methodology the indicator of security (CC) is present, but survivability somehow remains on the sidelines. Let's try to deal with it.

Vitality is the property of a new tank to maintain combat capability, that is, the ability to perform its functions during combat damage. In other words, the tank must have a high degree of protection in order to preserve “mobility” and “firing” in order to ensure its high survivability. The question arises: what can be characterized by vitality in relation to a new tank? What is a fairly representative criterion of survivability can be used in modern conditions? In this case, the vitality has a greater effect on the sample efficiency than all other characteristics.

The values ​​of the characteristics of survivability of our tanks will be determined by the zone of use of foreign anti-tank weapons and their parameters of the damaging effect. Foreign ammunition operating in operational, tactical and combat contact areas have different armor penetration and different armor action. For this reason, the value of survivability of the newest armored vehicles will be different and correspond to the used ammunition in different zones.

You can find answers to questions on the state of survivability of tanks using the “Methods for analyzing the survivability of armored vehicles when firing various anti-tank weapons”, created under the guidance of Anatoly Komyazhenko, a VNIITransmash employee, candidate of technical sciences. He fully comprehended the potential capabilities of Soviet tanks, improving his knowledge by participating in tank “races” for thousands of kilometers in unfavorable climatic zones of the North and deserts of the South. The technique allows to solve the problem of protecting tanks using mathematical modeling, which is a tool for analyzing the survivability of an object during a shelling based on an assessment of probabilistic indicators of invulnerability, evasion and recoverability of the vehicle.

Under the influence of a foreign anti-tank ammunition on our tank of a new project, the probability of its survivability (RJ) is determined by the difference between the probability of full preservation of "firing" and "mobility" equal to "1" minus the probability value (RU) obtained by simulating a tank defeat by criterion loss of "fire" and "progress", that is, РЖ = 1 - РУ. So, for example, if when modeling a shelling with an armor-piercing piercing projectile (armor penetration - 300 mm / 60 degrees) of the frontal zones of the new tank, the probability of its being hit by 0,3 according to the loss of “fire” and “stroke” criterion was obtained, then RC = 0,7. This is an acceptable result.

The applied mathematical apparatus of the method serves to search, select and substantiate the most effective variants of constructive and layout solutions of an armored vehicle, as well as the composition and characteristics of its integrated protection systems. The structural scheme of the technique is presented in Fig. 1. In the course of modeling the processes of hitting, penetration, and defeat, the technique allows us to consider the functioning of various protective devices, including complex combined systems with active and dynamic protection, and also to take into account dynamic loads. At each stage of impact, a range of indicators characterizing the processes of entry, penetration, destruction, the state of operability of the armored vehicle systems and the complexity of its recovery is determined.

In modeling, an object is represented as a complex system with a complex of functional properties, each of which is described by a corresponding operating scheme, including crew and components (instruments, nodes, units, systems). The loss of a property is a consequence of the defeat of one or more elements (including the crew) that provide this property. In turn, the defeat of the internal elements of the equipment of bronzegli depends on many factors accompanying the impact of anti-tank weapons. At the same time, the technique allows analyzing arbitrarily complex functional states of the health of the armored vehicle and its individual subsystems. In general, the method allows to determine the composition of the internal units that ensure the survivability of tanks. In other words, this technique allows you to determine the values ​​of RP in a wide range of combat conditions.

Computer simulation modeling provides experimental conditions for studying the destruction of a target using the “Methodology for the integrated assessment of warhead missiles, taking into account overcoming remote sensing” (Fig. 2), which allows us to solve problems of justifying the characteristics of promising anti-tank weapons. On the basis of the initial data, the stages of destruction are modeled: shooting, interaction of the ammunition with armor protection, early action. At the stage of interaction with armored protection, the conditions for entering the ammunition into it are determined, and the possibility of the external equipment being damaged by this ammunition is also taken into account. Zabronevy action includes an assessment of the impact of the residual part of the cumulative jet, or the remnants of the body of an armor-piercing sub-caliber projectile and fragments of armor on the crew and the internal equipment of the bronzesels.

What does a tank look like in an imitation model? The body of the tank is represented by a set of hexagon elements that have the faces of irregular flat quadrangles. Internal units are represented in the form of rectangular parallelepipeds, given by the values ​​of the thickness of equivalents, characterizing their vulnerability and shielding properties in relation to the action of the residual part of the cumulative jet penetrating into the tank or fragments of an armor-piercing projectile. For a quantitative assessment of the impact of the defeat of various internal units on the combat properties of armor are used a functional diagram reflecting the relationship between the units that provide these properties. Firepower, for example, is represented by a functional circuit, which includes elements of loading, guidance, fire control, as well as the commander, gunner, etc. A simulation model allows you to determine the internal units of the armored vehicle, due to which one or another type of damage is achieved.

But computer simulation is not a rescue from all evils. In this case, what you put into the computer, you will get. In other words, the computer needs reliable initial data on the protection of the Abrams upgraded according to the ЕРХNUMX program to assess the effectiveness of the anti-tank ammunition of the ammunition of our new tank.

REQUIRED EVENTS

The line of new Russian armored vehicles is being created in the period of a high level of development of foreign technologies of reconnaissance, targeting and delivering small-sized with low radar visibility of guided anti-tank weapons operating on long-distance approaches. These foreign technologies negatively affect the most important characteristics of the secrecy, noise immunity and survivability of the tank.

Stealth is the property of the sample not to be detected by the enemy’s intelligence equipment, determined by the state of the tank (column on the march, armored vehicles in the shelter, tank dimensions and the reflecting properties of its surface). Own protection system, which counteracts detection, does not allow making a new tank completely radio-invisible. It is possible only to reduce the likelihood of its detection by foreign reconnaissance means, if the tank is covered with materials that absorb (weaken) the intensity of the dissipation of electromagnetic energy, or to apply low-reflecting forms of the hull and towers. In the conditions of the sixth generation of wars, foreign reconnaissance-strike combat systems (RUB) use the coordinates of the location of moving tanks, determined with the help of optical and radar reconnaissance satellites, as well as DRLO aircraft. Unfortunately, the process of detecting the Armat column by foreign reconnaissance satellites remains unaddressed. But with the help of domestic reconnaissance satellites and DRLO planes, it is time to test the protection of the newest armored vehicles from the radio-visibility.

In this case, the position of the GABTU on the continuation of a negative attitude towards the most important task of detecting tanks by DRLO planes and US and NATO intelligence satellites, which have enhanced detection characteristics, is not clear. Thus, American radar reconnaissance satellites are able to determine the image of the terrain with a resolution of several tens of centimeters in the dark and with dense clouds. At the same time, the increase in the capabilities of the equipment of American optical reconnaissance satellites makes it possible to ensure resolution of the order of 10 – 15, see the detailed survey of the earth’s surface in the daytime.

The available information on the Krasuha-4 complex, which is effective in countering Lacrosse electronic intelligence satellites (USA), gives us hope for the secrecy of our new armored vehicles, but American optical reconnaissance satellites remain without suppression.

Immunity - the ability to perform combat functions in the conditions of creating interference by the enemy. This property is important for radar, radio systems and other electronics operating in the tank. Evaluation of noise immunity is characterized by the probability of normal functioning of the tank’s electronic equipment under conditions of deliberate interference of the enemy. The enemy in the conditions of EW will carry out electronic suppression (REP) of electronics installed on our tanks. In this situation, the domestic electronic protection (REZ), which is a combination of methods and means ensuring the stable operation of the electronics of our tanks under the influence of the enemy's electronic equipment, must act.

In NATO, to suppress the electronics of our tanks and other equipment of the Ground Forces in combat, there are special units and units that are armed with radio intelligence, active and passive radio-electronic interference, anti-radar missiles, devices for using false targets, radar, thermal and optical masking devices. At the same time, the microwave is actively developing abroad.weapons. Installations microwave weapons are created in mobile versions, based on cars and armored personnel carriers, as well as installed on airplanes and helicopters. Particularly noteworthy are samples of microwave weapons developed by Americans, such as electromagnetic bombs (EMB), which were used in military operations. It was quite difficult to develop a device with a length of less than 3,5 m. The Americans achieved that the new EMB has a length of 1,5 m and a diameter of 0,15 m. Microwave weapons can have a disastrous effect on the electronics of the latest domestic development of armored vehicles, damaging and destroying electronic circuits even then when they are off. This should not be forgotten.

INFORMATION TO THOUGHT

When creating new armored vehicles for non-contact warfare (see NVO No. 32 for 2012), it should be borne in mind that the development of foreign long-range highly effective anti-tank weapons necessitates the strengthening of group (GZ) and collective (KZ) protection of our tank units. Short-range and short-range missiles use short-range and medium-range anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM). It should be recalled that promising foreign aviation ATGMs allow enemy planes and helicopters not to enter the zone of our air defense group defense. In this case, even the latest short-range air defense systems are ready to ensure the defense of the tank brigade not only from carriers of anti-tank weapons (aircraft and helicopters), but also from long-range small-sized guided anti-tank ammunition of the enemy? At the same time, new techniques are needed that can assess the impact of group and collective defense of promising tanks on their survivability (see NVO No. 47 for 2015).

There is a need for the following techniques:

- “Methods of checking secrecy in typical combat situations of detecting a column of armored vehicles by US and NATO optical and radar reconnaissance satellites”;

- “Method of testing the noise immunity of the electronics of the newest tank from the effects of electronic means of suppressing the enemy”;

- “Methods for assessing the survivability of the tank under the influence of NATO anti-tank weapons”;

- “Methodology for assessing the effectiveness of a tank’s missile-artillery armament”;

- "Methodology for assessing the contribution of group protection to increase the survivability of the tank."

Today, the T-90С tanks have a tandem DZ Relikt installed, and a tandem DZ, significantly superior to Relikt, is installed in the samples of the latest development. Existing foreign ATGM with tandem warheads "HOT-2T", "Milan-2T", "Hellfire", "Javelin", "Spike-ER", "Brimstone" and others are not able to overcome the tandem DZ our tanks. But we must not forget that foreign ammunition 25 years ago created a version of a tandem remote sensing. It is strange that our Ministry of Defense and design bureaus did not react to this event. Therefore, our ammunition should succeed in the creation of an anti-tank missile system, overcoming the tandem DZ of foreign tanks. In this case, the ATGM variant with two leading charges (LZ) is inexpedient due to an increase in the length of the rocket and a decrease in the operational reliability of the warhead. There is an option to overcome the tandem remote sensing in the presence of a single shot-out LZ at a tandem warhead that can undermine two explosive layers of explosives. At the same time, as experimentally established, LZ should have armor penetration of the order of 400 mm (see “NVO” No. 45 for 2011 year).

The lack of an analogue to modern foreign BPS for conducting State tests on the evaluation of armor protection "Almaty" is alarming. Our THEM is not capable of reproducing an analogue of the German BPS DM63 (the core material is tungsten alloy, armor penetration - 350 mm / 60 degrees). In other words, there is no analogue of a foreign BPS for checking the body armor of a new tank. At the same time, it must be assumed that for him and all Russian anti-tank weapons the typical targets of М1А2 SEP in SID should be added to the characteristics of the vulnerability of МХNUMXА1 tank, which was upgraded according to the ESR1 program and has increased survivability.

It is obvious that the presented analysis of the shortcomings of the methods and accompanying documents does not cover all aspects of the problem concerned. But there is no doubt that specialists at a higher level will deal with the elimination of deficiencies and the creation of new methods.
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  1. +7
    19 August 2017 08: 21
    M ... yes, the article draws on a dissertation!
    1. +10
      19 August 2017 12: 03
      Quote: andrewkor
      M ... yes, the article draws on a dissertation!

      Exactly. The author opened his mouth to a very large loaf. As a result, I didn’t eat it, and so. bit me.
      1) for me personally, from the material of the article, it is completely unobvious that the Soviet methods are obsolete. The author talks about their obsolescence absolutely unproven.
      2) How the author is mobilizing to calculate his coefficients - not pitifully in principle. Not that the device is not given, but even a ret of the general postulates of calculations.
      3) the author talks about modeling individual systems and the whole tanaa as a whole in the form of a hexagon and rectangles .... Why are they? why not prisms, pyramids, straight lines? It is not clear whether this is a solid-state simulation that takes into account the real physics of the piocess or is it the next layering of round horses in a vacuum? (corollary of paragraph number 2)

      4) we come to noticeability - and here, mom mia !!! That our tagki in proud solitude against all the entire United States are fighting. Either the forces of the dowry air defense units are smashing someone there, then the satellites jam the means of electronic warfare. Here the author climbs far beyond the tank. The question is: why? What does this have to do with tank security? This is the survivability of units and formations not only with manned tanks and in general ...
      In general, there is a clear unproven nonsense and confusion of thought.
      If the author really wants to develop a methodology, then he will have to cut back on the task a little and formulate it at least like this: “development of a methodology for determining the tank’s damage depending on the direction of fire and the type of ammunition used." At the same time, consider that the shell is already flying into the tank (i.e. the tank was detected and a shot was fired at it). I dare to assure you, even in such an interpretation, the technique will stretch to the doctorate.
      1. +1
        19 August 2017 12: 41
        Tchoni, you are right that the author mixed two different concepts: air defense and anti-aircraft defense. It’s clear from the beginning that these are two different concepts.
    2. +3
      19 August 2017 17: 52
      Quote: andrewkor
      M ... yes, the article draws on a dissertation!

      Brevity is the sister of talent, but this is not about the author
    3. The comment was deleted.
  2. +5
    19 August 2017 09: 39
    Short-range and short-range missiles use short-range and medium-range anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM)

    Is that all? In fact, the means of group and collective defense are much, much more ...

    Means of electronic warfare. Such as "Infauna", which is designed for group defense units from precision weapons. "Mercury", designed to protect against shells with radio fuses, is by far the best means of providing air blasting of a shell at the most effective height. (an air explosion is very dangerous even for tanks, as it can ensure the failure of everything hung on the armor, including dynamic protection, active protection systems and optoelectronic suppression)

    Sapper means. First of all, modern multifunctional mine trawls that can protect against almost any modern mine. Including anti-aircraft. However, they greatly reduce the maneuverability of the tank

    Means RKhBzshnikov. First of all, directors of aerosol curtains. Perhaps it is high time to create machines capable of doing this in the battle formations of tank units? Indeed, modern aerosol curtains are capable of a lot of things, including protection in the IR and RL ranges

    Group means of protection against enemy UAVs, including barrage of ammunition. Suppression of the signal of global positioning satellites or signal substitution, suppression of the control and data transmission channel, suppression of UAV sensors in the optical, RL and IR ranges, physical destruction of UAVs or their components and assemblies, including laser and microwave devices

    Group protection against optical and radar reconnaissance. Including systems for detecting and suppressing optics, as well as detecting and suppressing or destroying radar reconnaissance of ground targets
    1. +3
      19 August 2017 10: 59
      Yes, to be honest, the article is illiterate. But BIG. Well, offhand:
      For example, the new “Methodology for assessing the protection and armament of a tank on a unified platform” should:
      - have a mathematical apparatus to justify the feasibility of developing a promising tank with optimal tactical and technical characteristics in relation to the conditions of contactless wars;

      And immediately a lot of questions on only one point.
      - why should the methodology justify the development of a new tank? But what if the best solution is to upgrade the old ones?
      - Who said that wars will be contactless? Perhaps the characteristics of the means of defense and defense will lead to the fact that the battles will again go on short distances?
      Yes, and why are questions posed with such a flagrant violation of scientific methodology, in fact? It’s like “an expert, when conducting an examination, must justify the need for an exceptional punishment” - something like ...
      Few? Then we see:
      - to provide recommendations on the localization of the impact of the enemy in our armored vehicles due to the achievement of high values ​​of the characteristics of survivability, noise immunity, secrecy;
      Again, why precisely due to noise immunity and stealth? Perhaps it is necessary to stupidly make the armor thicker or, for example, generally create remote-controlled BMs?
      And so forth ...
      1. +4
        19 August 2017 11: 18
        The main message of the article is still correct.
        A new modeling system is needed. Fully using both the capabilities of modern mathematics and the technical capabilities of modern computing facilities.
        An "open" system that allows the entry of new factors affecting the battle.
        1. +2
          19 August 2017 11: 33
          Quote: Spade
          The main message of the article is still correct.
          A new modeling system is needed. Fully using both the capabilities of modern mathematics and the technical capabilities of modern computing facilities.
          An "open" system that allows the entry of new factors affecting the battle.

          So who would argue ...
          And if this system is already there? They simply forgot to inform the Author.
          Of course, I can’t say anything, but something tells me that the corresponding techniques and their features are covered with all sorts of vultures - moreover, not chipboard, but more, more solid. To avoid...
          1. +3
            19 August 2017 11: 59
            Quote: Mik13
            And if this system is already there?

            And where will it come from if the last organizations that should work on this topic were closed under Serdyukov?
            Entrust this to the developers of weapons models, as he proposed? I do not think this is an adequate solution.
            Firstly, it makes no sense for developers to invest, frankly, large amounts of money in complex models if they need only a small part of them
            Secondly, developers are always tempted to fit the theory to their existing technical solutions.
          2. 0
            19 August 2017 12: 47
            Let's ask experts about this, otherwise theoretical disputes are futile
            1. +1
              19 August 2017 14: 30
              Quote: Monarchist
              Let's ask experts about this, otherwise theoretical disputes are futile

              Well, I am a supporter of the point of view that specialists in this field have subscriptions about not ... much more than diplomas. So for us the presence / absence of the subject of discussion is the "Russell Kettle".
              wassat
        2. +2
          19 August 2017 14: 49
          Quote: Spade
          The main message of the article is still correct.

          Agree
          Quote: Spade
          A new modeling system is needed

          Anyway, REFINED. Since over the years the existing progress in tank building and battle methods has not stood still.
        3. 0
          19 August 2017 21: 41
          Quote: Spade
          The main message of the article is still correct.
          A new modeling system is needed.

          Very likely.
          But at the same time, one should not forget that the real fire capabilities of the BTT sample, its security, survivability, maintainability can only be shown by tests, especially combat use.
          Therefore, it would be nice to run in all new patterns in the hot in local conflicts.
          Here, judging by open sources, MBT T-90 performed well in Syria.
          So much for the technique: to calculate the combat damage, to analyze the circumstances of their receipt (causes) and the consequences, how much time and effort it took to recover, etc., etc.
          It would be necessary to check the Armat company there in real combat operation.
  3. +1
    19 August 2017 11: 11
    A very competent statement of the problem ... yes, you really need to invest in simulation and the creation of adequate layouts for assessing the fire impact both on your armored vehicles ... and on the armored vehicles of potential friends ...
  4. +2
    19 August 2017 13: 14
    Long time you sir her was on the site! You are a panic specialist, because according to your scribbles, all our tanks are hopelessly outdated baroque, which the West will burn in thousands at the greatest possible distance, because the armor and protection of our tanks leave much to be desired, but Syria showed a different thing, the main thing, smart and right use the tank, defend it, do not revel in the fire of birds and tankers! And you can continue to sow panic - this is not forbidden for us, alas, unfortunately! !!
    1. +1
      19 August 2017 22: 42
      And what did Syria show? How many tanks like T72 were burned and how many crews died on these tanks? On the other hand, if you ignore some propaganda ISIS bombings of Abrams stuffed with explosives, then all those destroyed from the ATGMs were hit in the department with the BK, after which the crews left the tank maybe shell-shocked and with olfactory pants, but alive. There are at least 2 videos on the net, from Iraq mid-zero and today's war against ISIS, where Abrams keeps shelling the Vampire, or its Chinese / Yugoslav versions. The side armor and armor of the turret, starting from certain angles to the rear of the T-90, is much weaker than that of the M1A2, it does not hold RPGs, while Abrams holds, because the lined up Abramsi bombs were pierced by ATGMs, not RPGs. It should also be borne in mind that the effectiveness of A1M2 use by Iraqis is very different from American practice. After all, the Americans would not have fumbled on bare Abrams, without systems for fighting in the city, and they are already far beyond 1000 and they are installed quite quickly in the field. I'm not talking about tactics and capabilities due to the interaction with helicopters, etc., that is, situational awareness due to network-centric communication between all parts and individual machines. It is possible to defend a tank without substituting it for ATGMs and fire, of course, but for the time being, as practice has shown, you will always not hide the tank at the base and use it for single shots to hide it again. So the statement that the T-90 supposedly in Syria showed itself better than Abrams is erroneous and wishful thinking.

      And at the expense of panic in the article I do not agree, because the subjects of an incorrect assessment of the combat potential and survivability of the Abrams and T90 have repeatedly been raised. Do testers and developers of Russian tanks have shells similar to Abrams’s most modern BPS, for shelling and testing, as well as reliable data on the armor of potential opponents, I don’t know, but without them they won’t be able to finish Armata to a high level, T-90 except for a more powerful the forehead of the tower and the built-in DZ on the back sheet of the VLD is no different from the same T72 and this is where its modification resource has been exhausted.
      1. +2
        20 August 2017 10: 00
        "Side armor and tower armor from certain angles to the stern
        T-90 is much weaker than that of M1A2, it does not hold RPGs, while
        Abrams holds, because the lined up in BC Abrams were pierced by ATGMs, not RPGs "/////

        The side of the hull Abrams is very weak and made its way in Iraq from RPG-7
        1. 0
          20 August 2017 20: 53
          Dear, and if you take a closer look at the topic and take into account all the layers from the outer 30mm sheet in front of the rollers, right up to the inner lining from Kevlar, then what kind of RPG? ! Can you name at least one specific case, Where did you manage to break through the RPG? There were such cases when during very intense battles there was a break through before the BO, but they went unnoticed, the Americans called them Lucky shot, they were identified or found after the battles already in units. I can at least 2 videos find the shelling of a vampire Abrams, without any consequences. In this sense, Challengers, really powerful armor, showed themselves best.
  5. +2
    19 August 2017 13: 33
    As the sofa tells me: all these scientific calculations are based on assumptions, and theory and practice are completely different things. In what REAL battle did Armata or even T72B3 participate? I do not know this.
    As history testifies, what was good in theory turned out to be different in practice: Fedorov, the creator of the first assault rifle, one of the BEST 20 gunsmiths, said that on the eve of the WWII they criticized the Manlicher store for a hole, and thought that garbage would get there. Even junkers lowered the ball when they doubted the mistake of the Austrians. WWII showed the correctness of Manlicher.
    And the famous shovel-mortar in theory thought ideal after all, but in reality a rare *****
    1. +2
      19 August 2017 14: 35
      Quote: Monarchist
      As the sofa tells me: all these scientific calculations are based on assumptions, and theory and practice are completely different things. In what REAL battle did Armata or even T72B3 participate? I do not know this.
      Well, as for B3 - that is, there are places on this planet ... Even in the photos it lit up.

      Quote: Monarchist
      As history testifies, what was good in theory turned out to be different in practice: Fedorov, the creator of the first assault rifle, one of the BEST 20 gunsmiths, said that on the eve of the WWII they criticized the Manlicher store for a hole, and thought that garbage would get there. Even junkers lowered the ball when they doubted the mistake of the Austrians. WWII showed the correctness of Manlicher.
      And the famous shovel-mortar in theory thought ideal after all, but in reality a rare *****

      And such examples are full.
  6. 0
    19 August 2017 13: 45
    Transfusion from empty to empty.

    Any modern tank without KAZ is hit by tandem ATGMs at the expense of times, how not to simulate a situation. With KAZ - it is not affected by the word at all.

    As for artillery weapons, the caliber of the gun, the firing range and the projected tank projection play a role here. For example, a T-14 with an 152-mm gun spit from a high bell tower on all the science-based methods for calculating the probability of penetration of the armor of tanks of potential opponents at ranges of lay shooting.

    And it's all.
    1. +1
      19 August 2017 14: 50
      Quote: Operator
      Any modern tank without KAZ is hit by tandem ATGMs at the expense of times, how not to simulate a situation. With KAZ - it is not affected by the word at all.
      Well here, as it were:
      1. defeat - does not mean breaking through the armor.
      2. penetration of armor - does not mean incapacitation with loss of combat capability.
      3. incapacitation (knockout) - does not mean the defeat of the crew.
      4. and with all this, the time during which the tank will be restored is essential.
      And modeling the interaction of a tank with weapons - is very, very important, in fact.

      Quote: Operator
      As for artillery weapons, the caliber of the gun, the firing range and the projected tank projection play a role here. For example, a T-14 with an 152-mm gun spit from a high bell tower on all the science-based methods for calculating the probability of penetration of the armor of tanks of potential opponents at ranges of lay shooting.
      Oh really? Maybe then immediately screw 203 mm? Or immediately 400, from the battleship?
      There is no need to increase the power of the gun to such a state that it would tear apart an enemy tank, like a drop of a hamster's nicotine.
      And so getting from 125 mm 2A46 from a distance of about 2000 meters will almost certainly destroy any enemy tank (well, with the exception of very successful rebounds). In this case, the enemy’s tank will not be destroyed - it’s only been hit, but in battle this is enough. Without an average (or overhaul) repair, he is still not operational. So 125 mm is more than enough.
      On the other hand, for influencing other targets, such as the infantry in tanks of various shelters, the 125 mm is quite enough and is also no longer needed.
      1. 0
        19 August 2017 22: 58
        Quote: Mik13
        And so getting from 125 mm 2A46 from a distance of about 2000 meters will almost certainly destroy any enemy tank (well, with the exception of very successful rebounds). In this case, the enemy’s tank will not be destroyed - it’s only been hit, but in battle this is enough. Without an average (or overhaul) repair, he is still not operational. So 125 mm is more than enough.


        Only practice has shown that even with a direct hit, the presence of a tandem DZ not only can protect the tank from such a BOPS like Mango, but it also makes it possible to destroy a shooting tank, as it was in Debaltseve, in the T72B3 duet against Bulat. Especially against modern A1M2 or Leo2A5, with their spaced armor and higher, the probability is even lower and without any rebounds.
        1. 0
          20 August 2017 11: 07
          Quote: karabas-barabas

          Only practice has shown that even with a direct hit, the presence of a tandem DZ not only can protect the tank from such a BOPS like Mango, but it also makes it possible to destroy a shooting tank, as it was in Debaltseve, in the T72B3 duet against Bulat. Especially against modern A1M2 or Leo2A5, with their spaced armor and higher, the probability is even lower and without any rebounds.

          Excuse me, but what could the practice of the battle between Bulat and B3 show? DZ knife and K-5 have no relation to tandem DZ. Or there still was a stronghold with a doublet (although doubtful).
          1. 0
            20 August 2017 21: 03
            So there is an invaluable story of the very burnt Buryat NG about this fight! He was a mechanic, and the commander burned down then. So, the fact that his crew struck first, the blow fell on the Bulat tower and DZ reflected a strike, after which a retaliatory strike was delivered. In general, he was crazy about his car, the T72B3 of the first versions.
    2. 0
      19 August 2017 15: 13
      Here, laziness did not allow me to understand the article. And your simple comment put everything in its place.
  7. 0
    19 August 2017 16: 41
    Neighing about satellites. The satellite in place hangs only in geostationary orbit, it is 36000 km.
  8. +3
    20 August 2017 00: 07
    And none of the commentators looked - and who is the author.
    "Mikhail Mikhailovich Rastopshin graduated from the Leningrad Military-Mechanical Institute and did graduate school under him. He worked for more than 35 years at organizations of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Mechanical Engineering. He has a Ph.D. in technical sciences. He has more than 200 scientific papers. Specialist in the field of evaluating the effectiveness of weapons, methodology for creating input systems for characteristics vulnerabilities of targets. "
    I do not want to offend anyone, but the author wrote an article at his level. Not everyone can be popularizers, like Academician Kapitsa.
    And according to the comments, it turns out that the FSUE Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation No. 3 (Mysterious military unit 42261 in the article) needs to be dispersed and recruited from the VO website. Knowledge is more and cheaper.
  9. 0
    20 August 2017 05: 44
    It seems to me that you need to start from above, i.e. with simulation-modeling environment. Such work is underway. With what result - I do not know. And it is precisely in the process of developing a virtual battlefield that questions arise about the need for certain techniques.
  10. +2
    20 August 2017 10: 44
    http://onolitegi.ru/2010-02-02-17-33-09/58-rastop
    shin-mm.html

    Rastopshin Mikhail Mikhailovich
    A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF
    Who is: Ph.D., a former employee of the Steel Research Institute (dismissed in 1985). Constantly published in the Military Industrial Courier, Independent Military Review (IEE), and Nezavisimaya Gazeta.
    What is poured on:
    Criticizes the current state of the Russian armored vehicles, based on data from 20 years ago. At the same time, he is trying to compare them with nonexistent / promising developments of the USA and other Western countries.
    Very often it is corny lying, distorting the facts. He writes all articles as carbon copy, using the same one hundred times refuted arguments.
    Analysis of essays (refutation of publications):
    The lag continues (about tanks)
    46 Central Research Institute against Trastopshin
  11. 0
    22 January 2018 11: 40
    The author plus for the efforts. Although to be honest - the vinaigrette turned out ..... it seems that the material is outlined with some kind of dissertation.

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