Nuclear weapons must be destroyed last
How many times have to deal with issues that would seem to be closed forever. The point is what is the place of nuclear weapons (NW) in ensuring the future of Russia and what should their military-technical appearance be in the light of the military-political configuration of our relations with the US and the NATO bloc. In the final analysis, one thing is essential - whether the nuclear missile weapons of Russia provide a reliable elimination of the threat of nuclear or non-nuclear aggression by guaranteeing unacceptable damage to the aggressor in a deep retaliatory strike.The qualitative appearance is the nomenclature of carriers, tactical and technical characteristics (TTH) of the carriers and their nuclear combat equipment, as well as the survival rate of the SNF during the first strike of the aggressor, the TTH and the composition of the missile attack warning system. Quantitative - the number of carriers and warheads (BB) on them. Qualitative appearance is exclusively a national prerogative, but quantitatively so far is regulated by the START-3 Treaty. How many carriers and BBs do Russia need for an effective nuclear stability regime? Do the numbers of carriers and warheads of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation stipulated by the START-3 Treaty provide a prospective nuclear deterrence regime in the context of America’s deployment of a national missile defense system (NMD)? And even more so — are further reductions of the Russian strategic nuclear forces even on a bilateral basis acceptable without the United States explicitly abandoning NMD?
The questions asked are relevant and correct. The military security of Russia depends on the correct answer to them in conceptual and material terms. Here it is better to “oversalt” in terms of concern than to “over-salt”. It should also be understood that the meaning and significance of nuclear weapons for Russia and the United States are fundamentally different. America wants to be nuclear strong in the name of dictate, and Russia needs to be nuclear strong in the name of peace. Only unscrupulous experts, that is, either experts from the United States or experts loyal not to the interests of Russia, but to the interests of the United States, can put them on the same footing.
Nevertheless, one Russian expert with an academic title assures us that “the US will not get any potential of a“ disarming strike ”against Russia”, that the “raised panic of the upcoming“ disarming strike ”of the USA is a new fiction of domestic“ experts ”and“ failure of consciousness ". Another expert in the rank of general writes that the mutual “nuclear psychosis” is growing stronger and that “in Russia and the US, the military scare the authorities with the strategic superiority of the likely adversary.” A third expert with a doctoral degree in unison condemns those who are allegedly trying to "cause panic and force the Russian leadership to go for meaningless (? - S. B.) wasteful spending" and reassures: "The United States has no chance of winning a nuclear battle with Russia."
Even the first deputy chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, Viktor Poznikhir, is credited with the number of “alarmists” on the basis of a number of his public statements, who pointed out that the Pentagon, under the umbrella of the NMD, is trying to create an opportunity for a sudden disarming strike on Russia.But are there many objective reasons to regard the alarm of the Russian general staff and patriotic experts as “nuclear hysteria”? The expert general, in fact accusing opponents of incompetence, recommends them to “study the materiel”. But what will this “materiel” be in Russia in the foreseeable future? And will it correspond to the challenges of time? Practically each of the theses "lulling" - let's call them so - experts can be refuted in paragraphs, but the limited scope of the article makes it necessary to dwell only on a few points.
ABOUT NUCLEAR ICBLES AND NUCLEAR PARITY
There is nothing secret that would not become apparent. And it turns out that even in 1980-ies, the design of a weapon system with intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) equipped with non-nuclear warheads of increased accuracy was worked out, “since the use of nuclear weapons was considered completely unacceptable”. Reading this, do not believe your eyes! The authors of the absurd project considered the use of non-nuclear ICBMs permissible, although it became possible only with the beginning of the direct military conflict between the USSR and the USA, which was already unacceptable to that extent, since the use of nuclear weapons "was considered completely unacceptable."
The reference to “data on US developments of ICBMs and non-nuclear-equipped ballistic missile submarines (SLBMs)” looks strange, because, firstly, it was a provocative attempt on the part of the United States to withdraw part of the potentially nuclear ICBMs beyond the scope of the treaty. And, secondly, if the United States had implemented a similar project, then for the United States, with their world gendarme role, non-nuclear intercontinental missile carriers would fit into their aggressive logic. But why did non-nuclear ICBMs need the USSR with its support for a retaliatory strike? And even more so why do they need the Russian Federation? At the same time, the expert states: “The fact that nuclear weapon it should not be used, it was so firm a view that neither officials, including the leaders of the USSR and the USA, nor the learned people spoke about the possibility of its use. ”
Regarding the Soviet Union, it is true that as far as the United States, already in the 1940-s, the US leaders adopted the official policy of atomic blackmail of the USSR, and this line remained unchanged even in the 1980-s. Thus, in March 1983, President Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SOI) program, and in November 1983, the United States
have begun to deploy Pershing type missiles in Europe. At the same time, Washington continued to actively implement an unprecedented first-strike potential building program. And these events took place against the background of Reagan’s public statements: “Let the enemy sleep every night in fear, fearing that we will use nuclear weapons” (see Chervov NF Nuclear Circulation: what happened and what will happen. M .: OLMA-PRESS , 2001, p. 89). Therefore, 8 December 1983, the Soviet Union and interrupted the Geneva talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic armaments (OSSV) and the adjacent problem of limiting US nuclear weapons in Europe - in view of their complete futility.The “learned people” was not so peaceful in the USA ... In 1947, a professor at the University of Texas Robert Montgomery stated: “During 24 hours we can destroy 75 millions of Russians without losing 100 people ... If we need to destroy Russians, then let's let's do it now, we will not wait for three years. ” Later this baton of hatred was "worthily" accepted by the notorious Herman Kan and others. So it would not hurt for some people, in addition to studying materiel, to also study nuclear history. In addition, it is illiterate to say that a report poses a threat to the “potential of nuclear deterrence.” As for the US NMD, it threatens not the nuclear deterrence potential (that is, the Russian Federation Strategic Nuclear Forces), but the nuclear deterrence regime, since the effective US NMD is capable of neutralizing the extremely weakened retaliatory strike of the Russian Federation after the first US strike.
And how much are the claims that the path to convincing that nuclear weapons can not be fought, supposedly through the “beginning of the contractual relationship to control and reduce strategic nuclear weapons”? Those who know history know that the United States was forced to agree to negotiate with the USSR on limiting nuclear weapons only after the large-scale efforts of the USSR laid a solid base of parity with the United States. And before that, America quite seriously assessed the possibility of a first strike against the USSR, which even today would not refuse to inflict on the Russian Federation if it did not fear a powerful retaliatory strike, quite real in the absence of NMD.
It is impossible to call a worthy attempt to “substitute” Viktor Poznikhir, unreasonably attributing to him the disavowal of the President of the Russian Federation. When making this literary denunciation, one should be careful about its author, because at first it is reported that the president, in his own words, during the Crimean crisis, thought about the possibility of bringing the nuclear forces into full combat readiness, and then assesses this statement of the president ". What is it like?
However, what is more significant is how justified is the alarm of the Russian General Staff and many specialists in the field of military-political analysis about the fact that the United States is capable of delivering a hidden (unexpected) disarming nuclear strike on Russia under the cover of its missile defense system?
TOMORROW IS TO BE AFTERNOON TOMORROW
President Putin has indeed stated that Russian missiles are capable of overcoming the most technically advanced missile defense system. However, the optimistic assessment of the president does not contradict the ideas of the report of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the General Staff about the strongest threat to US missile defense for a nuclear deterrent in the future. First, the impressive performance characteristics of a single ICBM is one thing. But missile defense is reliably overcome only when massaging ICBMs. No matter how good Pele was on the field, the team won. Secondly, specialists and experts responsible for the future of the Fatherland have in mind the formation of a promising threat from that multi-layered and massed US NMD, which may become a fact not tomorrow, but it may become a fact. And when it can become a fact - the day after tomorrow or after the day after tomorrow, it doesn’t change the essence. It is necessary to prepare for this “after-after ...” today, and more precisely, it was necessary to prepare for this yesterday.
And precisely because of the high probability of the implementation of a massive US missile defense system, no one who recognizes this, does not question the expediency of spending tens of billions of rubles on new strategic nuclear complexes and does not call for “everything to start all over again”. On the contrary, additional expenditures of tens of billions of rubles are needed for the speedy completion of the development, production and commissioning of new ICBMs with reasonable massaging, since quantitative saturation of the aggressor’s missile defense system is the most reliable method of neutralization.
But it is only possible to abandon meaningless wastes if the United States actually abandons plans to suppress Russia by force in a disarming strike. The only meaningful proof of such a refusal may be the complete rejection of the United States of the missile defense project with the dismantling of all bases and elements of the European missile defense system, cutting the ABM frigates, etc. into scrap metal. Then, it is necessary to sign such a new ABM Treaty that would allow the deployment of only a limited object missile defense system exclusively on the national territory, and on this contractual basis - a reasonable mutual reduction of the strategic nuclear forces of the United States and the Russian Federation when the leading nuclear powers are connected to this process. This will still be said.
The “lulling” experts unanimously argue that current estimates of the analytical structures of the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation are incorrect, although today none of these experts have access to sensitive information on the basis of which relatively correct modeling is possible. I emphasize that it is relatively correct, since in all models of the exchange of nuclear strikes, many factors that can determine one or another result are not taken into account. All such estimates, both in the Russian Federation and in the United States, should be considered as approximate. They can only reveal this or that tendency - encouraging or alarming, but no more. One thing is guaranteed for certain: if a potential aggressor has a massed, layered missile defense system, the threat to a potential victim is progressively increasing.
But in any case, the modern calculations of the General Staff of the faith are much more than the supposedly competent assurances of various retirees. In addition, we have no right to forget that just the cohort of “lulling” experts at the time when their opinion turned out to be decisive, on the basis of supposedly convincing calculations, proved to us the beneficence of the START-2 Treaty for the Russian Federation. Let me remind one thing: in the implementation of this treaty, already in 2003, Russia would not have a single ICBM with a multiple rocket launcher, that is, those ICBMs P-36М2 and UR-100НТТТХ, which even today have not been removed from the armament, Silos) of these ICBMs. Russia would not have had the opportunity to maintain the groundwork on which multiply-charged Yarsy, etc., were created. But America would have retained its first-strike potential in the face of the Minuteman-III ICGMs with the FPG that were physically stored in the silos, with the overwhelming superiority of the maritime and air components of the US “triad”. I suggest “lulling” experts - since they are such masters in the calculations, assess the balance of forces and the chances of a disarming first strike by the United States on the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces in the format of the executed START-2 Treaty.
WE ENCOURAGE IF NOT BY ROCKETS, SO AN INDIRECTLY CAP
Allegedly refuting the thesis of the “hidden nuclear strike”, one of the “lulling” experts declares that Russia, like the US, has missile attack early warning systems and that the Russian SPRN is the same as the American nuclear missile warning system ( SPRYAU), "serves the domestic missile defense." We know very well what the American system of NMD is already deployable, and especially promising. It is a powerful military-technical complex with global branching now. But if domestic missile defense is understood to be an extremely limited on the capabilities of the Khrushchev-Brezhnev missile defense system of the Moscow administrative-industrial region, then the very attempt to speak of the US NMD and missile defense of Moscow as comparable systems is proved either by the incompetence of the approver or by the biased nature of his assessments. The materiel really needs to be learned and known.
The confidence that the first strike “must be preceded by a long regrouping of the armed forces of the aggressor country, which cannot be concealed,” also looks strange. Based on what is this stated? Does anyone have a similar experience with the nuclear age? The fact of the matter is that the hypothetical algorithm of an aggressor’s unexpected disarming first strike against the means of retaliation by a victim of aggression does not require visible preliminary preparations.
A lengthy argument about what both US missile defense systems and Russian ICBMs can and cannot look no more balanced. At the same time, assurances that US missile defense assets are supposedly focused on intercepting Russian military units only on the middle and downstream trajectory sites and are not capable of intercepting on the active trajectory segment should be regarded as provocative. Interception on the active part of the trajectory is a promising task of global US NMD facilities, especially when deploying US missile defense systems in neutral waters around the Russian Federation. Recognizing the possibility of such a threat for some reason, only for Russian SLBMs (and where did the ICBM go?), The lulling expert self-confidently declares: “... firstly ... there is an opportunity to prevent American ships from a missile defense system to patrol areas. Secondly, didn’t our submarine missile carriers prove the possibility of launching SLBMs from under the Arctic ice? ”
Well, firstly, how interesting is the Northern Fleet to be able to prevent US missile defense frigates from Russian SSBNs in neutral waters? To ram in peacetime, or what? Secondly, this is not such a simple thing - launching an SLBM from under the ice. Thirdly, you cannot launch an ICBM from under the ice anyway. Fourthly, one wonders if some members of the “expert community” are trying to provoke opponents to a substantive (in an open framework) discussion with the expectation that as a result something will become clearer not so much for the Kremlin as for the White House ?
It is curious, by the way, that one of the “community” members is quite ready to agree with the clearly lobbying “concerns” of US National Security Secretary John Kelly that the US is allegedly “defenseless against Russian missiles capable of breaking through any missile defense”, but at the same time saying He regards the head of the state educational institution about the threat of the US NMD and about the possibility of a “latent” nuclear strike on our country as an unfair attempt to ensure the “infusion of additional funds” into the defense budget of the Russian Federation. But the Yankees are sophisticated in cunning. Knowing this, is it possible to tune the Russian public, and especially the leadership of the Russian Federation, in a “cap-sacking” way?
Those who have studied the ABM problem know that the US has been concentrating its ABM efforts for decades not on the task of creating a combat system, but on large-scale diverse R & D. One of the "lulling" experts, assessing the US rapid global strike (BSU) strategy as just a "rapid global deception strategy", states that Reagan's PIO was "aimed at the strategic disorientation of the Soviet Union." But this is not at all the case. Within the framework of the PIO, propaganda videos were not only created. Means of detecting, tracking and selecting targets, sensors, calculation methods, supercomputers, and so on for future effective US NMD were developed and tested. That missile defense, which, after the collapse of the USSR planned by America and followed by the readiness of the Russian Federation for large-scale reductions, was to become an element of the two-pronged system of ensuring an unpunished US disarming strike on the means of a retaliatory strike by the Russian Federation. The very possibility of such a strike changes the balance and threatens dictates.
Another expert at the academic level states that the assumption of the possibility of a disarming strike by the United States is supposedly an invention, and the growing threat of a real nuclear war after deep cuts in nuclear weapons "is present only in ... inflamed consciousness." His colleague echoes the academician almost verbatim: "Thus, the sharply increased possibilities of a disarming strike from the US ... cannot be regarded otherwise than the progressive inflammation of the consciousness of some" experts. "
With the lips of these academics - yes, drink honey! We have heard similar arguments, I repeat, in the era of lobbying for the START-2 Treaty. As for the GBI interceptor capabilities, the number of promising antimissiles, and the like, the very same GBI tier is only one element in the overall architecture of the multi-layered promising NMD system. At the same time, Russia should proceed from the assumption that the advanced US missile defense facilities will have nuclear weapons. US law prohibits the use of nuclear weapons in the United States, but after all, the first echelons of US nuclear missile defense systems will clearly be taken far beyond the US - in the seas around Russia and in Europe.
WHO INCREASES A DEGREE OF TENSION
In the concert room “Nanai Boys”, one person imitates the struggle between the two. The “lulling” academic experts often use this technique not on the stage, but in discussion. So, a doctor of science first ascribes to opponents "alarmist" assessments, claiming that they make them "under the influence of American publications", and then these, invented by doctors of gullible simpletons who believe in transatlantic fables, allegedly refute them.
However, the thesis that in the future after the full-scale deployment of all elements of a massive US NMD, the threat of such a disarming US attack becomes real when the remaining Russian retaliatory missiles are destroyed by the layered missile defense system is not the result of reading American articles, but the result of a sober complex analysis of the future situation who such a thesis puts forward.
And it’s not about the fact that America in the future will certainly inflict this disarming strike. The point is that if Russia underestimates such a threat, if Russia fails to take adequate military-technical measures (in terms of the qualitative and quantitative image of the SNF) and military-political measures (in the contractual sphere), the threat of a first strike US means of retaliation of the Russian Federation may be highly likely. And it is possible already in the first half of the 2020-s.
A retrospective look at US nuclear policy unequivocally proves that the US elite would always want to strike the first blow at Russia - once not by means of a retaliatory strike, but against the cities and strategic facilities of the USSR. The first plans date back to the end of the 1940s. However, the war in Korea, where a limited contingent of Soviet fighters almost beat strategic Aviation USA, chilled by the "inflamed consciousness" of the Yankees. And as the USSR moves towards systemic parity, as the possibility of a retaliatory strike by the USSR with the USA inflicting unacceptable damage on the United States increases, atomic psychosis in the United States gives way to a sober realization that the first US strike against Russia will not go unpunished. And as long as the nuclear weapons of Russia are massive (the limits of their reduction have long been exhausted), even the deployment of US NMD will not mean an automatic first strike by the United States. However, NMD will increase not only the profits of US military monopolies, but also the threat of a first strike by the United States. Here's what's important: the deployment of NMD creates a temptation for the United States, which we are obligated to counteract if the world for Russia is dear to us.
This is well understood by experts from the General Staff, from the research institutes of the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation, but for some reason already for many years a very narrow group of academic experts stubbornly refuse to recognize the obvious and repeatedly try to take a weighted position of opponents for allegedly alarmist and lulling leadership Russia, for the weighted. Isn't it time to deploy the “great chessboard” in favor of Russia?
Judging by the latest publications, academics are still in good mood themselves and would like to morally demobilize the military-political leadership of Russia. One of their arguments, ostensibly justifying the unreality of a US disarming strike on the Russian strategic nuclear forces, is that although the United States "does a tremendous loss in Russia in the scenario considered," but "these actions will inevitably turn into a boomerang against the United States themselves" - as in terms of material damage , and in terms of rivalry with China, the loss of allies, etc. The Chinese aspect is exaggerated especially zealously, which in itself is quite provocative.
The analysis of the allegedly inexpediency for the US of a nuclear “point” in relations with Russia turns out to be superficial and incorrect. Arguments academics just pathetic. At the same time, the "lulling" experts once again start talking about the allegedly beneficial nuclear disarmament, that "the majority of the UN member states are in favor of developing a legally binding instrument for banning nuclear weapons and their complete elimination." And the complete silence that the situation in the UN more and more resembles the 1940 – 1950-s line with the “voting machine” obedient to America ... That the real threat to stability is not nuclear weapons - and above all not nuclear weapons of Russia, but that mass conventional weapons, which decade after decade takes the lives of millions of people and turns into ruins blooming regions. Nuclear weapons should not be the first, but the last weapon humanity will part with at the final stage of general and complete disarmament, the need for which the "lulling" experts do not even stutter. And once again you have to ask the question: who really are these academic experts?
One of these “experts” in the rank of general at first reasonably states that Russia and the United States “continue the natural process of modernizing strategic armaments, since samples of systems that have developed their resources need to be removed from service and introduce new ones”, but then calmly reassures: This is not the case if modernization is carried out within the framework of contractual relations within the limits of the established quantitative restrictions. ” So, long live START-3 and new abbreviations YV? After all, it is from this group that statements are coming out that “an increase in the possibility of conducting a nuclear war after deep cuts in nuclear armaments” is allegedly present only “in the inflamed consciousness” of those who oppose academic experts. The latter lull Russia, claiming that it has nothing to fear from the threat of Russia's nuclear disarmament during the first US strike.
Behind such statements is viewed a policy of preserving the START-3 treaty and, moreover, further reductions of nuclear weapons, while completely ignoring the fact that America has consistently increased the capabilities of BB to intercept Russia’s retaliation to Russia ... Theorists "argue" simply unmatched, asking why the US should cause RF first strike? For those who studied post-war history, the answer is obvious: the United States needs the opportunity for a first strike in order to get an effective tool of military-political pressure on Russia in the conditions of a new system monopoly or at least absolute superiority, up to harsh dictate. Do not recognize it can either cooks from politics, or - "agents of influence" of the United States. And, perhaps, in the nuclear weapons sphere for Russia comes the "moment of truth." You can study the "materiel" when it is, and if Russia allows itself to be lulled today, then the day after tomorrow it will end up with such a "materiel" in the strategic nuclear forces that will not provide US restraint, but will encourage their adventurism.
The "lulling" doctor of sciences allegedly rhetorically asks: "So can the US president, if he is guided by common sense, national egoism, or just a sense of political self-preservation, venture on such a deliberately disastrous, insane and criminal adventure?"
It is true about crime, but about failure ...
If decision makers in the US think like our doctor of science, then why should they, following common sense, not admit something like the following. The basis of a stable world order can only be systemic parity between the Russian Federation and the United States, with appropriate multilateral treaty quotas for nuclear weapons of the other nuclear powers. Systemic parity in the contractual framework implies:
1) the basing of nuclear weapons of all nuclear powers only on national territory or limited “transparent” basing in territorial waters;
2) complete abandonment of the missile defense system in the country if only missile defense launches on national territory are allowed;
3) approximate equality of the arsenals of the Russian Federation and the United States during the freezing of nuclear arsenals of the other nuclear powers. For example: the United States 1000 warheads on the 1000 warheads of the Russian strategic nuclear forces at 500 PRC warheads, 200 - France, 200 - England, etc.
And on this contractual basis we will go to trust. As a preliminary act confirming the seriousness of intentions, the United States withdraws troops from Europe and calls for the dissolution of NATO.
This is what we need to demand from the West as evidence of its sincere commitment to the ideas of parity and stability. Otherwise, the withdrawal of the Russian Federation from the START-3 regime and the priority full-fledged funding for the work on re-equipping the Russian strategic nuclear forces while ensuring the missile defense of the positional areas of the RF retaliatory weapons.
What is perceived as "inflammation of consciousness" - I will not attach my mind. On the contrary, it’s the one and only one who calls on Russia to have a powerful material barrier against possible US adventurism with their adventurous NMD demonstrates the clarity of professional views and the clarity of its civil position.
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