T-34: Battle of Plants
On the labor front, a struggle has begun for an increase in output tanks
At the end of 1941 - the first half of 1942, the production of T-34 tanks was carried out at three factories: No. 183 in Nizhny Tagil, the Stalingrad tractor (STZ) and No. 112 "Red Sormovo" in Gorky. The plant number 183 was considered the head plant, as well as its design office - the 520 department. It was assumed that all changes made to the design of thirty-four by other enterprises will be approved here. In fact, everything looked a little different. Only the TTH of the tank remained unshakable, while the details of the machines of different manufacturers differed significantly from each other.
GENERAL FEATURES
For example, from October 25, 1941 began manufacturing prototypes of simplified armored hulls at plant No. 112 — without machining the edges of the sheets after gas cutting, with connecting the parts into a quarter and spike joint of the frontal sheet with sides and fender liners.
In the drawings of the main plant, which arrived at Krasnoye Sormovo, there was a hatch in the back wall of the tower, closed by a removable armor plate mounted on six bolts. The hatch was intended for dismantling the damaged gun in the field. According to their technology, the metallurgists of the plant fed the stern wall of the tower solid, and the hole for the hatch was cut on a milling machine. It soon became clear that when firing from a machine gun in a removable sheet, a vibration occurs that leads to the separation of the bolts and tearing it off.
Attempts to abandon the hatch were made repeatedly, but each time the representatives of the customer objected. Then the head of the armament sector, A. S. Okunev, proposed using two tank jacks to lift the aft part of the tower. At the same time, in the formed hole between its shoulder strap and the roof of the body, the gun, removed from the trunnions, was freely rolling onto the roof of the logging equipment. On tests on the front edge of the roof of the case, a stop was welded, protecting the tower from slipping during the ascent.
The production of such towers began at the plant number 112 with 1 March 1942 of the year. A. A. Afanasyev, the military representative, suggested replacing the armored visor, which would simultaneously serve as a stop and protect the gap between the tower’s end and the roof of the tower from bullets and fragments, instead of a thrust plate for the entire width of the hull roof. Later, this visor and the absence of a hatch in the rear wall of the tower became the hallmarks of Sormovsky tanks.
Due to the loss of many subcontractors, tank builders had to work wonders of ingenuity. So, in connection with the termination of deliveries from Dnepropetrovsk, air cylinders for emergency engine start on the “Red Sormovo” were used for their manufacture rejected by machining the body of artillery shells.
They also got out at the FTZ: as of August 1941, interruptions in the supply of rubber from Yaroslavl began, therefore, from October 29, all thirty-fours at the FCZ were equipped with cast support rollers with internal damping. As a result, the characteristic external feature of the Stalingrad tanks was the absence of rubber bands on all road wheels. A new design of a track with a straightened treadmill was also developed, which made it possible to reduce noise when the car was moving. Eliminated the "rubber" and on the driving and steering wheels.
Another characteristic feature of the STZ tanks was the hull and tower, which were manufactured using a simplified technology developed by the plant No. 264 following the example of Red Sormov. The armor parts of the hull were connected to each other in a “thorn”. The variants in the “lock” and in the “quarter” were preserved only at the junction of the upper front hull sheet with the roof and the bottom with the lower sheets of the bow and stern. As a result of a significant reduction in the amount of mechanical processing of parts, the cycle of assembly of cases was reduced from nine days to two. As for the tower, they began to weld it from sheets of raw armor, followed by quenching already assembled. This completely eliminated the need to edit parts after quenching and easier to fit them during assembly "in place".
The Stalingrad tractor produced and repaired tanks up to the moment when the front line approached the factory workshops. October 5 1942 of the year in accordance with the order of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry (NKTP), all work on the FCZ was stopped, and the remaining workers were evacuated.
The main manufacturer of the thirty-four in the 1942 year remained the plant number 183, although after the evacuation to reach the desired mode, he was not able to immediately. In particular, the plan for the first three months of 1942 was not implemented. The subsequent increase in the production of tanks was based, on the one hand, on a clear and rational organization of production, and on the other, on reducing the labor intensity of manufacturing the T-34. An exploded revision of the machine design was carried out, as a result of which the production of 770 was simplified and the production of parts names was completely abolished. 5641 purchased products were also canceled. The complexity of machining the hull has decreased from 206 to 260 normal hours.
The undercarriage has undergone significant changes. In Nizhny Tagil, steel skating rinks of the Stalingrad type were cast - without rubber bands. Since January, 1942 has applied three or four such rollers to a tank in relation to one side. Deficient rubber was removed from the guide and drive wheels. The latter, moreover, was made whole-cast - without rollers.
An oil cooler was excluded from the engine lubrication system and the capacity of the oil tank was increased to 50. In the power supply system, the gear pump was replaced by a pump of the rotation type. Due to the short supply of component parts of electrical devices until the spring of 1942, most of the tanks did not install some instrumentation, headlights, rear light, electric fan, signal and TPU.
It should be emphasized that in some cases, changes aimed at simplifying the design and reducing the complexity of manufacturing combat vehicles were not justified. Some of them subsequently resulted in a decrease in the performance of the T-34.
HELPED SCIENCE AND INVENTION
The increase in the release of thirty-fours in 1942 was promoted by the introduction first at the plant number 183, and then at other automatic welding enterprises under a flux layer developed by academician E. O. Paton. The 183 plant turned out to be the leader in this matter not by accident - by the decision of the USSR SNK, the Institute of Electric Welding of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR was evacuated to Nizhny Tagil, and moreover to the territory of the Ural tank factory.
In January, 1942, as an experiment, produced a body in which one side was welded by hand, and the other side and nose, under a layer of flux. After that, to determine the strength of the seams the body was sent to the landfill. As E.O. Paton told in his memoirs, “the tank was subjected to brutal shelling from a very short distance with armor-piercing and high-explosive shells. The first hits on the board, welded by hand, caused a solid destruction of the seam. After that, the tank was turned and a second board, welded by a submachine gun, came under fire ... Seven hits in a row! Our seams weathered, did not succumb! They were stronger than the armor itself. Also withstood the test of fire seams of the bow. It was a complete victory for automatic high-speed welding. ”
At the factory, welding was placed on a conveyor. Several carload carts left over from the pre-war production were rolled into the workshop, cutting out bevels in their frames according to the configuration of the tank hull sides. Above the line of carts, they placed a tent of beams so that the welding heads could move along the beams along and across the hull, and connecting all the carts together, they would get a conveyor belt. At the first position, transverse seams were welded, at the next position - longitudinal, then the hull was moved onto the rib, first with one side, then with the other. Finished welding, turning the case head up. Some places where it was impossible to use the machine, cooked by hand. Thanks to the use of automatic welding, the labor intensity of manufacturing the hull has decreased by five times. By the end of the 1942 of the year, only six automatic welding machines operated at the 183 plant. By the end of 1943, their number in tank factories reached 15, and a year later 30.
Along with the problems of welding, the production of casting towers, which were molded into the ground, remained a bottleneck. This technology required more chipping and gas trimming of the sprues and gulfs into the seams between the form blocks. The chief metallurgist of the plant, P. P. Malyarov, and the head of the steel plant, I. I. Atopov, suggested introducing machine molding. But this required a completely new design of the tower. Her project in the spring of 1942 was developed by M. A. Nabutovsky. She entered into history as a tower of the so-called hexagon or improved form. Both the one and the other name are quite arbitrary, since the previous tower also had a hexagonal shape, perhaps more elongated and plastic. As for the "improvement", this definition refers entirely to the manufacturing technology, since the new tower still remained very close and inconvenient for the crew. The tankers for her close to the correct hexagon form she received the nickname "nut".
MORE MANUFACTURERS, WORSE IS QUALITY
In accordance with the GKO order from 31 in October 1941, the Uralmash Plant (Ural Heavy Machinery Plant, UZTM) was connected to the armored case production for the T-34 and KV. However, until March 1942, he issued only the cutting of the hulls, which he supplied to Krasnoye Sormovo and to Nizhny Tagil. In April, the 1942 of the year began the full assembly of the hulls and the manufacture of T-34 towers for plant number 183. And on July 28, 1942, UZTM was charged with organizing the production of the entire T-34 tank and doubling the production of towers for it, due to the shutdown of Plant No. 264.
The serial production of the T-34 began on Uralmash in September of the 1942. At the same time, there were many problems, for example with towers - due to the increase in the program, foundry shops could not ensure the implementation of the plan. By the decision of the plant director B. G. Muzurukov, free capacities of the Schleman 10 000-ton press were used. Designer I.F. Vakhrushev and technologist V.S. Ananyev developed the design of a stamped tower, and from October 1942 to March 1944, they were made 2050 units. At the same time, UZTM not only fully secured its program, but also delivered a significant number of such towers at the Chelyabinsk Kirov Plant (ChKZ).
However, Uralmash did not release the tanks for long - until August 1943. Then this company became the main manufacturer of ACS based on T-34.
In an effort to compensate for the inevitable loss of the Stalingrad Tractor, in July 1942, the T-bills issued a task to proceed to the release of the Thirty-Fours at the ČKZ. The first tanks left his workshops already on August 22. In March, 1944-th their production at this company stopped in order to increase the production of heavy tanks EC-2.
In 1942, plant No. 34 named after KE Voroshilov, evacuated from Leningrad to Omsk, joined the production of T-174. Design and technological documentation was given to him by plant number 183 and UZTM.
Speaking about the production of T-34 tanks in 1942-1943, it should be noted that by the autumn of 1942, a crisis in their quality had set in. This was due to the constant quantitative growth in the production of T-11s and the involvement of more and more new enterprises in it. The problem was discussed at a conference of NKTP plants held on September 13-1942, XNUMX in Nizhny Tagil. It was chaired by Deputy People's Commissar of the Tank Industry Zh. Ya. Kotin. In his speeches and those of NKTP Chief Inspector G. O. Gutman, harsh criticism was voiced against the plant collectives.
Spacing took effect: during the second half of 1942 - the first half of 1943, many changes and improvements were made on the T-34. Since the fall of 1942, tanks began to install external fuel tanks - aft, rectangular or side cylindrical (on ChKZ machines) forms. At the end of November, the drive wheel with rollers was returned to the thirty-four, they introduced stamped track rollers with rubber bands. Since January, 1943, tanks are equipped with air purifiers "Cyclone", and from March - June - five-speed gearboxes. In addition, the ammunition charge was increased to 100 art-shots, the exhaust tower fan was introduced. In 1943, the PT-4-7 periscope sight was replaced with the commander’s panorama PTK-5, and many other minor improvements were introduced, such as airborne handrails on the turret.
Serial production of T-34 tanks of the 1942 model of the year (so informally, but most often they are referred to in the literature) was carried out at the plants number 183 in Nizhny Tagil, number 174 in Omsk, UZTM in Sverdlovsk and ChKZ in Chelyabinsk. Until July, the 1943 11 tank of this modification was released on the 461.
In the summer of 1943, the T-34 began to install a commander's pinnacle. An interesting detail: the priority in this matter is defended in their reports on tank construction for the period of the Great Patriotic War three plants - No. 183, Uralmash and Krasnoe Sormovo. In fact, tagilchane offered to place the turret in the stern of the tower behind the hatches and put in the tower of the third tanker, as in an experienced T-43 tank. But the two crew members were cramped in the "nut", what a third one there! The Uralmash turret, though it was above the left commander’s turret hatch, was a stamped structure, and it was also rejected. And only cast Sormovskaya "registered" on thirty-four.
In this form, the T-34 was mass-produced until the middle of the 1944 year, with the latter being completed by the production of Plant No. 174 in Omsk.
MEETING WITH "TIGERS"
It was these machines that bore the brunt of the most severe tank confrontation on the Kursk Bulge (in the parts of the Voronezh and Central Fronts, the Thirty-Four were 62%), including the famous Prokhorovsky Battle. The latter, contrary to the established stereotype, did not take place on a single field, such as Borodino, but unfolded on a front of up to 35 km and represented a series of individual tank battles.
In the evening of 10 on July 1943, the command of the Voronezh Front received an order from the Supreme High Command headquarters to deliver a counterattack against the German forces in the Prokhorov sector. For this purpose, the 5-I Guards Army Lieutenant-General A. S. Zhadova and the 5-I Guards Tank Army Lieutenant-General Tank Army P. A. Rotmistrov (the first tank army of uniform composition) were transferred to Voronezhsky from the reserve Steppe Front. Its formation began on February 10 1943. By the beginning of the Kursk Battle, it was stationed in the Ostrogozhsk region (Voronezh Region) and included the 18 and 29 tank corps, as well as the 5 guards mechanized corps.
On July 6 at 23.00:23.15 an order was received requiring the army to concentrate on the right bank of the Oskol River. At 45:XNUMX the advance detachment of the formation set off, and XNUMX minutes later the main forces followed. It is necessary to note the impeccable organization of the redeployment. Oncoming traffic was prohibited along the routes of the columns. The army moved around the clock, with short halts to refuel the vehicles. The march was reliably covered by anti-aircraft artillery и aviation and thanks to this, went unnoticed by enemy intelligence. For three days, the association moved to 330-380 km. At the same time, there were almost no cases of military vehicles breaking down for technical reasons, which indicates both the increased reliability of the tanks and their competent maintenance.
9 July 5-I Guards Tank Army concentrated in the area of Prokhorovka. It was assumed that the unification with the two tank corps attached to it - 2 and 2-Guards in 10.00 on July 12 attacked the German forces and, together with 5 and 6-th Guards combined-arms armies, as well as the 1 tank armies, destroyed in the weapons in the weapons of the army and 11-XNUMX, and also XNUMX-tank armies, and XNUMX-tank armies, and XNUMX-Tank armies, and XNUMX tank armies, and XNUMX tank armies, as well as XNUMX tank armies Oboyansky direction grouping of the enemy, not allowing its retreat to the south. However, the preparation of the counter attack, which began on July XNUMX, was thwarted by the Germans, who delivered two powerful blows to our defense: one in the direction of Oboyan, the other on Prokhorovka. As a result of the partial withdrawal of our troops, artillery, which was assigned a significant role in the counterattack, suffered losses both at the deployment positions and in the movement to the front line.
On July 12, in 8.30, the main forces of the German forces in the SS Leibstandart Adolf Hitler, Reich and Dead Head motorized divisions, which had tanks and assault guns before 500, launched an offensive in the direction of Prokhorovka station. At the same time, after the 15-minute artillery preparation, the German group was attacked by the main forces of the 5 Guards Tank Army, which led to the deployment of an oncoming tank battle, in which about 1200 armored vehicles took part on both sides. Despite the fact that 5-I Guards Tank Army, operating in the 17-19 km band, was able to achieve a density of combat orders up to 45 tanks on 1 km, it was unable to complete the task. The loss of the army amounted to 328 tanks and ACS, and together with the attached connections they reached 60% of the initial number.
So the new German heavy tanks turned out to be a hard nut to the T-34. “We were afraid of these“ Tigers ”at the Kursk Bulge, - the thirty-four former Noskov commander recalled, - frankly. From his 88-mm cannon, he, the Tiger, with a blank, that is, with an armor-piercing projectile from a distance of two thousand meters, pierced our thirty-fours through. And we from 76-mm cannon could hit this thick-armored beast only from a distance of five hundred meters and closer to a new sabot projectile ... "
Another testimony of the participant of the Battle of Kursk - the commander of a tank company of 10 of the tank corps, P. I. Gromtsev: “First, shoot at Tigers meters from 700. You see - you get, sparks armor-piercing carve, and he goes even if that one after another shoots our tanks. Only the strong July heat favored - the “Tigers” caught fire here and there. It turned out later that gasoline fumes often accumulated in the engine compartment of the tank. Directly managed to knock out the "Tiger" or "Panther" only meters with 300 and then only in the board. A lot of our tanks then burned down, but our team still pressed the Germans for two kilometers. But we were at the limit, we could not endure more such a fight. ”
The veteran of the 63 Guards Tank Brigade of the Urals Volunteer Tank Corps N. Ya. Zheleznov adhered to the same opinion about the “Tigers”: “... Using the fact that we have 76-mm cannons that can take their armor in the forehead only with 500 meters, they stood in the open. And try come up? He will burn you for 1200- 1500 meters! Insolent were. Essentially, while there were no 85-mm guns, we, like hares, ran from the “Tigers” and looked for an opportunity to wriggle out like that and board him. It was hard. If you see that at a distance of 800-1000 meters there is a "Tiger" and begins to "baptize" you, while driving the barrel horizontally, you can still sit in the tank. As soon as you started to drive vertically - jump out better. Burn out With me this was not, but the guys jumped out. Well, when the T-34-85 appeared, it was already possible to go one on one here ... "
GENERAL FEATURES
For example, from October 25, 1941 began manufacturing prototypes of simplified armored hulls at plant No. 112 — without machining the edges of the sheets after gas cutting, with connecting the parts into a quarter and spike joint of the frontal sheet with sides and fender liners.
In the drawings of the main plant, which arrived at Krasnoye Sormovo, there was a hatch in the back wall of the tower, closed by a removable armor plate mounted on six bolts. The hatch was intended for dismantling the damaged gun in the field. According to their technology, the metallurgists of the plant fed the stern wall of the tower solid, and the hole for the hatch was cut on a milling machine. It soon became clear that when firing from a machine gun in a removable sheet, a vibration occurs that leads to the separation of the bolts and tearing it off.
Attempts to abandon the hatch were made repeatedly, but each time the representatives of the customer objected. Then the head of the armament sector, A. S. Okunev, proposed using two tank jacks to lift the aft part of the tower. At the same time, in the formed hole between its shoulder strap and the roof of the body, the gun, removed from the trunnions, was freely rolling onto the roof of the logging equipment. On tests on the front edge of the roof of the case, a stop was welded, protecting the tower from slipping during the ascent.
The production of such towers began at the plant number 112 with 1 March 1942 of the year. A. A. Afanasyev, the military representative, suggested replacing the armored visor, which would simultaneously serve as a stop and protect the gap between the tower’s end and the roof of the tower from bullets and fragments, instead of a thrust plate for the entire width of the hull roof. Later, this visor and the absence of a hatch in the rear wall of the tower became the hallmarks of Sormovsky tanks.
Due to the loss of many subcontractors, tank builders had to work wonders of ingenuity. So, in connection with the termination of deliveries from Dnepropetrovsk, air cylinders for emergency engine start on the “Red Sormovo” were used for their manufacture rejected by machining the body of artillery shells.
They also got out at the FTZ: as of August 1941, interruptions in the supply of rubber from Yaroslavl began, therefore, from October 29, all thirty-fours at the FCZ were equipped with cast support rollers with internal damping. As a result, the characteristic external feature of the Stalingrad tanks was the absence of rubber bands on all road wheels. A new design of a track with a straightened treadmill was also developed, which made it possible to reduce noise when the car was moving. Eliminated the "rubber" and on the driving and steering wheels.
Another characteristic feature of the STZ tanks was the hull and tower, which were manufactured using a simplified technology developed by the plant No. 264 following the example of Red Sormov. The armor parts of the hull were connected to each other in a “thorn”. The variants in the “lock” and in the “quarter” were preserved only at the junction of the upper front hull sheet with the roof and the bottom with the lower sheets of the bow and stern. As a result of a significant reduction in the amount of mechanical processing of parts, the cycle of assembly of cases was reduced from nine days to two. As for the tower, they began to weld it from sheets of raw armor, followed by quenching already assembled. This completely eliminated the need to edit parts after quenching and easier to fit them during assembly "in place".
The Stalingrad tractor produced and repaired tanks up to the moment when the front line approached the factory workshops. October 5 1942 of the year in accordance with the order of the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry (NKTP), all work on the FCZ was stopped, and the remaining workers were evacuated.
The main manufacturer of the thirty-four in the 1942 year remained the plant number 183, although after the evacuation to reach the desired mode, he was not able to immediately. In particular, the plan for the first three months of 1942 was not implemented. The subsequent increase in the production of tanks was based, on the one hand, on a clear and rational organization of production, and on the other, on reducing the labor intensity of manufacturing the T-34. An exploded revision of the machine design was carried out, as a result of which the production of 770 was simplified and the production of parts names was completely abolished. 5641 purchased products were also canceled. The complexity of machining the hull has decreased from 206 to 260 normal hours.
The undercarriage has undergone significant changes. In Nizhny Tagil, steel skating rinks of the Stalingrad type were cast - without rubber bands. Since January, 1942 has applied three or four such rollers to a tank in relation to one side. Deficient rubber was removed from the guide and drive wheels. The latter, moreover, was made whole-cast - without rollers.
An oil cooler was excluded from the engine lubrication system and the capacity of the oil tank was increased to 50. In the power supply system, the gear pump was replaced by a pump of the rotation type. Due to the short supply of component parts of electrical devices until the spring of 1942, most of the tanks did not install some instrumentation, headlights, rear light, electric fan, signal and TPU.
It should be emphasized that in some cases, changes aimed at simplifying the design and reducing the complexity of manufacturing combat vehicles were not justified. Some of them subsequently resulted in a decrease in the performance of the T-34.
HELPED SCIENCE AND INVENTION
The increase in the release of thirty-fours in 1942 was promoted by the introduction first at the plant number 183, and then at other automatic welding enterprises under a flux layer developed by academician E. O. Paton. The 183 plant turned out to be the leader in this matter not by accident - by the decision of the USSR SNK, the Institute of Electric Welding of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR was evacuated to Nizhny Tagil, and moreover to the territory of the Ural tank factory.
In January, 1942, as an experiment, produced a body in which one side was welded by hand, and the other side and nose, under a layer of flux. After that, to determine the strength of the seams the body was sent to the landfill. As E.O. Paton told in his memoirs, “the tank was subjected to brutal shelling from a very short distance with armor-piercing and high-explosive shells. The first hits on the board, welded by hand, caused a solid destruction of the seam. After that, the tank was turned and a second board, welded by a submachine gun, came under fire ... Seven hits in a row! Our seams weathered, did not succumb! They were stronger than the armor itself. Also withstood the test of fire seams of the bow. It was a complete victory for automatic high-speed welding. ”
At the factory, welding was placed on a conveyor. Several carload carts left over from the pre-war production were rolled into the workshop, cutting out bevels in their frames according to the configuration of the tank hull sides. Above the line of carts, they placed a tent of beams so that the welding heads could move along the beams along and across the hull, and connecting all the carts together, they would get a conveyor belt. At the first position, transverse seams were welded, at the next position - longitudinal, then the hull was moved onto the rib, first with one side, then with the other. Finished welding, turning the case head up. Some places where it was impossible to use the machine, cooked by hand. Thanks to the use of automatic welding, the labor intensity of manufacturing the hull has decreased by five times. By the end of the 1942 of the year, only six automatic welding machines operated at the 183 plant. By the end of 1943, their number in tank factories reached 15, and a year later 30.
Along with the problems of welding, the production of casting towers, which were molded into the ground, remained a bottleneck. This technology required more chipping and gas trimming of the sprues and gulfs into the seams between the form blocks. The chief metallurgist of the plant, P. P. Malyarov, and the head of the steel plant, I. I. Atopov, suggested introducing machine molding. But this required a completely new design of the tower. Her project in the spring of 1942 was developed by M. A. Nabutovsky. She entered into history as a tower of the so-called hexagon or improved form. Both the one and the other name are quite arbitrary, since the previous tower also had a hexagonal shape, perhaps more elongated and plastic. As for the "improvement", this definition refers entirely to the manufacturing technology, since the new tower still remained very close and inconvenient for the crew. The tankers for her close to the correct hexagon form she received the nickname "nut".
MORE MANUFACTURERS, WORSE IS QUALITY
In accordance with the GKO order from 31 in October 1941, the Uralmash Plant (Ural Heavy Machinery Plant, UZTM) was connected to the armored case production for the T-34 and KV. However, until March 1942, he issued only the cutting of the hulls, which he supplied to Krasnoye Sormovo and to Nizhny Tagil. In April, the 1942 of the year began the full assembly of the hulls and the manufacture of T-34 towers for plant number 183. And on July 28, 1942, UZTM was charged with organizing the production of the entire T-34 tank and doubling the production of towers for it, due to the shutdown of Plant No. 264.
The serial production of the T-34 began on Uralmash in September of the 1942. At the same time, there were many problems, for example with towers - due to the increase in the program, foundry shops could not ensure the implementation of the plan. By the decision of the plant director B. G. Muzurukov, free capacities of the Schleman 10 000-ton press were used. Designer I.F. Vakhrushev and technologist V.S. Ananyev developed the design of a stamped tower, and from October 1942 to March 1944, they were made 2050 units. At the same time, UZTM not only fully secured its program, but also delivered a significant number of such towers at the Chelyabinsk Kirov Plant (ChKZ).
However, Uralmash did not release the tanks for long - until August 1943. Then this company became the main manufacturer of ACS based on T-34.
In an effort to compensate for the inevitable loss of the Stalingrad Tractor, in July 1942, the T-bills issued a task to proceed to the release of the Thirty-Fours at the ČKZ. The first tanks left his workshops already on August 22. In March, 1944-th their production at this company stopped in order to increase the production of heavy tanks EC-2.
In 1942, plant No. 34 named after KE Voroshilov, evacuated from Leningrad to Omsk, joined the production of T-174. Design and technological documentation was given to him by plant number 183 and UZTM.
Speaking about the production of T-34 tanks in 1942-1943, it should be noted that by the autumn of 1942, a crisis in their quality had set in. This was due to the constant quantitative growth in the production of T-11s and the involvement of more and more new enterprises in it. The problem was discussed at a conference of NKTP plants held on September 13-1942, XNUMX in Nizhny Tagil. It was chaired by Deputy People's Commissar of the Tank Industry Zh. Ya. Kotin. In his speeches and those of NKTP Chief Inspector G. O. Gutman, harsh criticism was voiced against the plant collectives.
Spacing took effect: during the second half of 1942 - the first half of 1943, many changes and improvements were made on the T-34. Since the fall of 1942, tanks began to install external fuel tanks - aft, rectangular or side cylindrical (on ChKZ machines) forms. At the end of November, the drive wheel with rollers was returned to the thirty-four, they introduced stamped track rollers with rubber bands. Since January, 1943, tanks are equipped with air purifiers "Cyclone", and from March - June - five-speed gearboxes. In addition, the ammunition charge was increased to 100 art-shots, the exhaust tower fan was introduced. In 1943, the PT-4-7 periscope sight was replaced with the commander’s panorama PTK-5, and many other minor improvements were introduced, such as airborne handrails on the turret.
Serial production of T-34 tanks of the 1942 model of the year (so informally, but most often they are referred to in the literature) was carried out at the plants number 183 in Nizhny Tagil, number 174 in Omsk, UZTM in Sverdlovsk and ChKZ in Chelyabinsk. Until July, the 1943 11 tank of this modification was released on the 461.
In the summer of 1943, the T-34 began to install a commander's pinnacle. An interesting detail: the priority in this matter is defended in their reports on tank construction for the period of the Great Patriotic War three plants - No. 183, Uralmash and Krasnoe Sormovo. In fact, tagilchane offered to place the turret in the stern of the tower behind the hatches and put in the tower of the third tanker, as in an experienced T-43 tank. But the two crew members were cramped in the "nut", what a third one there! The Uralmash turret, though it was above the left commander’s turret hatch, was a stamped structure, and it was also rejected. And only cast Sormovskaya "registered" on thirty-four.
In this form, the T-34 was mass-produced until the middle of the 1944 year, with the latter being completed by the production of Plant No. 174 in Omsk.
MEETING WITH "TIGERS"
It was these machines that bore the brunt of the most severe tank confrontation on the Kursk Bulge (in the parts of the Voronezh and Central Fronts, the Thirty-Four were 62%), including the famous Prokhorovsky Battle. The latter, contrary to the established stereotype, did not take place on a single field, such as Borodino, but unfolded on a front of up to 35 km and represented a series of individual tank battles.
In the evening of 10 on July 1943, the command of the Voronezh Front received an order from the Supreme High Command headquarters to deliver a counterattack against the German forces in the Prokhorov sector. For this purpose, the 5-I Guards Army Lieutenant-General A. S. Zhadova and the 5-I Guards Tank Army Lieutenant-General Tank Army P. A. Rotmistrov (the first tank army of uniform composition) were transferred to Voronezhsky from the reserve Steppe Front. Its formation began on February 10 1943. By the beginning of the Kursk Battle, it was stationed in the Ostrogozhsk region (Voronezh Region) and included the 18 and 29 tank corps, as well as the 5 guards mechanized corps.
On July 6 at 23.00:23.15 an order was received requiring the army to concentrate on the right bank of the Oskol River. At 45:XNUMX the advance detachment of the formation set off, and XNUMX minutes later the main forces followed. It is necessary to note the impeccable organization of the redeployment. Oncoming traffic was prohibited along the routes of the columns. The army moved around the clock, with short halts to refuel the vehicles. The march was reliably covered by anti-aircraft artillery и aviation and thanks to this, went unnoticed by enemy intelligence. For three days, the association moved to 330-380 km. At the same time, there were almost no cases of military vehicles breaking down for technical reasons, which indicates both the increased reliability of the tanks and their competent maintenance.
9 July 5-I Guards Tank Army concentrated in the area of Prokhorovka. It was assumed that the unification with the two tank corps attached to it - 2 and 2-Guards in 10.00 on July 12 attacked the German forces and, together with 5 and 6-th Guards combined-arms armies, as well as the 1 tank armies, destroyed in the weapons in the weapons of the army and 11-XNUMX, and also XNUMX-tank armies, and XNUMX-tank armies, and XNUMX-Tank armies, and XNUMX tank armies, and XNUMX tank armies, as well as XNUMX tank armies Oboyansky direction grouping of the enemy, not allowing its retreat to the south. However, the preparation of the counter attack, which began on July XNUMX, was thwarted by the Germans, who delivered two powerful blows to our defense: one in the direction of Oboyan, the other on Prokhorovka. As a result of the partial withdrawal of our troops, artillery, which was assigned a significant role in the counterattack, suffered losses both at the deployment positions and in the movement to the front line.
On July 12, in 8.30, the main forces of the German forces in the SS Leibstandart Adolf Hitler, Reich and Dead Head motorized divisions, which had tanks and assault guns before 500, launched an offensive in the direction of Prokhorovka station. At the same time, after the 15-minute artillery preparation, the German group was attacked by the main forces of the 5 Guards Tank Army, which led to the deployment of an oncoming tank battle, in which about 1200 armored vehicles took part on both sides. Despite the fact that 5-I Guards Tank Army, operating in the 17-19 km band, was able to achieve a density of combat orders up to 45 tanks on 1 km, it was unable to complete the task. The loss of the army amounted to 328 tanks and ACS, and together with the attached connections they reached 60% of the initial number.
So the new German heavy tanks turned out to be a hard nut to the T-34. “We were afraid of these“ Tigers ”at the Kursk Bulge, - the thirty-four former Noskov commander recalled, - frankly. From his 88-mm cannon, he, the Tiger, with a blank, that is, with an armor-piercing projectile from a distance of two thousand meters, pierced our thirty-fours through. And we from 76-mm cannon could hit this thick-armored beast only from a distance of five hundred meters and closer to a new sabot projectile ... "
Another testimony of the participant of the Battle of Kursk - the commander of a tank company of 10 of the tank corps, P. I. Gromtsev: “First, shoot at Tigers meters from 700. You see - you get, sparks armor-piercing carve, and he goes even if that one after another shoots our tanks. Only the strong July heat favored - the “Tigers” caught fire here and there. It turned out later that gasoline fumes often accumulated in the engine compartment of the tank. Directly managed to knock out the "Tiger" or "Panther" only meters with 300 and then only in the board. A lot of our tanks then burned down, but our team still pressed the Germans for two kilometers. But we were at the limit, we could not endure more such a fight. ”
The veteran of the 63 Guards Tank Brigade of the Urals Volunteer Tank Corps N. Ya. Zheleznov adhered to the same opinion about the “Tigers”: “... Using the fact that we have 76-mm cannons that can take their armor in the forehead only with 500 meters, they stood in the open. And try come up? He will burn you for 1200- 1500 meters! Insolent were. Essentially, while there were no 85-mm guns, we, like hares, ran from the “Tigers” and looked for an opportunity to wriggle out like that and board him. It was hard. If you see that at a distance of 800-1000 meters there is a "Tiger" and begins to "baptize" you, while driving the barrel horizontally, you can still sit in the tank. As soon as you started to drive vertically - jump out better. Burn out With me this was not, but the guys jumped out. Well, when the T-34-85 appeared, it was already possible to go one on one here ... "
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