On the verge of a “hot phase”: Transdniestria “under the escalation dome” of NATO. Attempts to dialogue exhausted!
X-NUMX-mm howitzer D-152 sun Moldavia on the US-Moldovan exercises "Fire Shield - 20"
Based on the events of recent days, a rather disappointing conclusion can be made that the worst-case scenario has been launched around the temporarily smoldering Moldovan-Transdniestrian conflict, and that in the foreseeable future we may encounter a fairly large-scale multilateral military confrontation, as in the vicinity of the Dniester estuary, and throughout the south-western part of the “Square”, including the Odessa, Nikolaev and Kherson regions. Escalation can occur either in a temporary link with the exacerbation of the Donbass theater of operations, where the DPR army has already begun to slowly and confidently push back Ukrainian militants from the outskirts of Donetsk and Mariupol, or regardless of the tactical situation in Novorossia. And in the first and second cases, the command "face" will be heard from Washington or Brussels at a time strictly verified by Western specialists, interpreted as the next and irrefutable "casus belli". This is what the West has been actively engaged in over the last century.
The choice of Moldova as one of the main geostrategic "poles" of opposition to Russian influence in Eastern Europe is determined by the combination of the favorable geographical position of the state (under the more powerful, in terms of combat potential, anti-Russian puppet state - Ukraine) with an extremely successful form of government - parliamentary republic . These factors create for the West a unique fertile ground for accelerating the implementation of the plan to remove all post-Soviet states "on the path of turmoil and war" in relations with the Russian Federation, which ultimately should lead to the involvement of the armed forces of our state in several large and protracted conflicts in the East European theater, who are fully capable of weakening the defensive capabilities of the Southern and Western military districts.
Moscow has no opportunity to ignore these conflicts, because in this case the situation will only worsen. First, we will expect a complete loss of friendly and allied territories with the pro-Russian electorate completely disappointed and partially exterminated by enemy regimes. Secondly, in these territories, selected units of the NATO Joint Armed Forces will immediately be deployed, which already today receive the best models of armored vehicles for carrying out assault and offensive operations. A striking example of the preparatory work of the Alliance for large-scale hostilities in the European theater of war is the hasty update of the main combat tanks M1A2 "Abrams" at the 7th training ground of the US Armed Forces in the German Grafenvoyer to the highly protected version of TUSK ("Tank Urban Survival Kit"), intended for successful operation in the areas of military operations saturated with enemy anti-tank weapons.
Let us return to the situation around the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic. As mentioned above, the parliamentary form of government in Moldova almost completely limits the possibilities of the newly elected president of the republic. In particular, despite the more or less pro-Russian vector of the current president Igor Dodon, the pro-Western position of Chisinau is only strengthening, and there is no legal possibility to oppose the Parliament and the Moldovan Cabinet of Ministers to oppose anything to the parliament and Moldovan Cabinet. For example, at the April press conference, the fully pro-NATO Prime Minister of Moldova, Pavel Filip, said that the memorandum of cooperation between Moldova and the EAEU signed by Dodon has absolutely no legal force. Moreover, outside the competence of President Dodon are such procedures as: appointing or dismissing ministers, appointing judges of the Constitutional Court, ratifying any international treaties (including economic and military-technical cooperation) without parliamentary confirmation, etc. In other words, against the backdrop of a legislatively supported nationalist pro-European majority (having decisive legal force) in the Moldovan parliament, the president is perceived as the usual “opposition upstart.” Unfortunately, this is exactly what is happening today.
Take, for example, the recent sensational incident with a ban on the use of Romanian and Hungarian airspaces, as well as Chisinau Airport for an airliner to transit to Moldova with a high-ranking delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister, curator of the military-industrial complex and special representative of the President of Transdniestria Dmitry Rogozin. The crew of the board, on which there was also a group of artists, going to celebrations in honor of the 25 anniversary of the peacekeeping operation in Transnistria, had to make a detour through Minsk, spending the last remnants of fuel. The fact is that Dmitry Rogozin is in the so-called “sanctions list” of the EU, which is very well supervised by such henchmen and “NATO litter” as Bucharest, Budapest and Chisinau represented by the Moldovan Cabinet. By the way, the coherence of actions and commitment to NATO's charters among the member countries of the alliance, our Organization of the Collective Security Treaty, can only be learned. It is only in the structure of our CSTO that one can observe the adoption of the 5-year plan for military-technical cooperation between the strategic "ally" of Kazakhstan and the main opponent - the United States. Yes, and they talk about the creation of the American naval base in the Caspian port of Aktau. And we sell them Su-30CM on favorable terms and we give away C-300PS gratis! This is a military-political alliance!
With regard to the situation with the board S7 "Airlines", it has become very revealing. All that Dodon could do was to angrily chide the Moldovan government, calling its actions “a cheap show and geopolitical game to curry favor with the United States and NATO.” But if everything was so simple and harmless ... In reality, Moscow was shown who was the boss, and this inadequate action can also be interpreted as a warning of tougher actions against the Russian peacekeeping contingent in the near future. And this is far from fiction and a sick militaristic fantasy, but a real reality.
Already, the Moldovan government is in favor of expelling Russian peacekeepers from Transnistria, accusing the military "of showing sympathy for the separatist regime in Tiraspol." Also in a statement made on July 30 in connection with the 25 anniversary of the peacekeeping operation in the Transdnistrian Moldavian Republic, the presence of peacekeepers leads to the freezing of the conflict. What the Moldovan leadership is surprised at is not entirely clear: how can the Russian military not support the sovereignty of the Pridnestrovskaia Moldavskaia Respublika, when a quarter of a century ago for a Russian speech a person could just be beaten on any street of Chisinau and any other city of Moldova by pro-Romanian-minded nationalists. After all, the proclamation of 2 on September 1990 of the PMR was able to put an end to the atrocities of the reckless Moldovan-Romanian radicals, whose actions were reinforced by the armored and infantry units of the Moldovan Armed Forces. It is absolutely clear that the creation of a small and safe enclave off the Dniester coast to save the lives of Russian-speaking Moldovans is not a reformatting of a large state with the orange leadership and part of the population infected with the “orange plague”, but this is quite acceptable and easily digestible according to the concept of world multipolarity, for which Russia is fighting today.
It is quite obvious that official Chisinau does not represent for a second peaceful coexistence with Tiraspol and almost openly announces the future power scenario for the subordination of the Transnistrian Moldavian Republic. It remains to eliminate the only significant tactical barrier - the Operational Group of Russian Forces in the Transnistrian Region (OGRV PRRM). At the moment, the Moldavian “top” has already used some tools to complicate the process of rotation of the Russian group of 1412 troops belonging to one battalion of peacekeeping forces and two battalions of military unit No. 13962 (OGRV), as well as blocking the delivery of additional weapons on board military transport aviation. Not only that, the only weapons of the PMR army and our peacekeeping contingent are only artillery arsenals in the n. Sausage, to carry out rotation it is now necessary to use civilian aircraft flying to Chisinau airport, which is becoming less and less secure, as the Moldovan border police are more meticulously “breaking through” the documentation of passengers arriving from the Russian Federation and often calculating and deporting our peacekeepers back to Russia. The most memorable incident occurred on May 21, 2015, when, after checking the documents from Moldova, the stock sergeant Yevgeny Shashin was deported, who was going to Tiraspol to serve in the 13962th military unit as an MSO shooter.
As we see, at the moment our OGRF is in an extremely difficult situation, which is akin to a tactical “boiler”. In the case of the slightest provocative action on the borders of the Transdniestrian Moldavian Republic, an extremely unpleasant situation can occur: the territory of a small republic can be wiped off the face of the earth in just the first few hours of the conflict escalating. The fact is that the maximum depths of the rear zones of the PMR reach about 20 — 30 km, and in the region of three tactical isthmuses near the settlement. Rashkovo, Zhurka and Novovladimirovka do not exceed 4 — 5 km. This suggests that even the central areas of the Pridnestrovskaia Moldavskaia Respublika are in the radius of confident destruction of large-caliber cannon and rocket artillery of the Armed Forces of Moldova and Ukraine. Dozens of combat vehicles of the RSZO 9K51 "Grad" and 9K57 "Uragan", howitzer D-30, "Msta-B" and "Acacia" can be used against the TMR Supreme Court and the Russian peacemakers, taking the unrecognized republic into a dense ring from the territory of Moldova and Ukraine. In the areas of the above tactical isthmuses, numerically superior to the Moldovan military formations, with the support of the Romanian and Ukrainian nationalists with NATO instructors, will be able to divide the territory of the TMR on the 4 of the site, for stripping which will take no more than two weeks using Moldovan-Ukrainian military resources, and total 4 - 5 days - with Romanian military support, which can be no doubt.
The Moldavian Armed Forces also have 152-mm long-range 2А36 "Hyacinth-B" cannons that can fire at a range of 33,5 km in the case of the use of active-rocket missiles RP-59
Tiraspol will be able to “snap back” quite well, because the PMR army has about a hundred Gradov, 30 100-mm anti-tank 2А29 Rapier and 85-mm divisional guns D-44, as well as a large number of anti-tank missile systems and RPG; nothing more essential, the Transdnistrian Moldavian Republic cannot undertake due to the lack of adequate weapons and the necessary number of them, as well as the small number of personnel of military units; in comparison with the people's militia corps of the LDNR, the Transdniestrian Army looks very, very faded. Do not forget that in the coming massacre many Western European PMCs will take part, having excellent experience in carrying out lightning tactical military operations, which will require Moscow to take swift and decisive actions to protect our military contingent and friendly republic.
The important point is that significant support for Moldova in the preparation of the power scenario of "reintegration" of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic "Square" provides already today. First, as mentioned earlier, this is the transfer of artillery units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to the borders of the Transdnistrian Moldavian Republic. Secondly, this is the deployment of Moldovan border guards, customs officers and military contingent at Ukrainian checkpoints in the Odessa region. So, the first Moldovan-Ukrainian contingent is planned to be deployed at the Kuchurhany - Pervomaisk checkpoint already in 2017. The third, most dangerous and provocative, action of Kiev was the deployment of two C-300PS medium-range missile battalions and several Buk-M1 divisions in the vicinity of the Dniester estuary and Odessa. Together with the modernized Romanian “Hawk PIP-3R” air defense systems located near the Romanian-Ukrainian border, the Ukrainian complexes completely cover all airborne lines to the MTR from the neutral airspace above the Black Sea. Very soon, the 8 of the Patriot PAC-3 purchased by Bucharest will also be added to them, which will lead to the loss of a single and simple transfer route to the Dniester coast of Russian airborne units, as well as the delivery of modern anti-tank artillery reconnaissance systems to create highly efficient artillery reconnaissance defense line of the PMR, which is able to quickly suppress the firing positions of the Ukrainian and Moldavian artillery.
To argue more objectively, all modern armaments to protect the PMR needed to be delivered to the region long before the start of the creation of a solid air defense line over the Odessa region, but time was wasted, and now to maintain the status of an influential superpower, Russia will have to resort to radical measures. To "clear" the ground and air corridors to Tiraspol, a comprehensive offensive operation will be required in the southern part of Odessa region. The key role here will belong to the strike component of the Black Sea fleet The Russian Navy (diesel-electric submarines of the "Halibut" and "Varshavyanka" classes and frigates, pr. 11356), which will deliver 3M14T "Caliber-PL" strategic cruise missiles with dagger attacks at Ukrainian and Moldavian military units south of Chernomorsk (this is the direction in which powerful defensive outpost, represented by the Moldovan-Romanian-Ukrainian contingent for the blockade of the PMR).
Given the presence of Ukrainian “Three Hundreds” closing the airspace over the Dniester estuary, it may be necessary to conduct an anti-radar operation. For these purposes, the ultra-maneuverable multipurpose Su-30CM 38 th Fighter Aviation Regiment deployed at the Crimean Belbek air base will be involved. Their arsenal includes such high-grade air attack tools as X-4® 58-moss anti-radar missiles with a range of up to 250 km with a high-altitude launch, X-38 multi-purpose tactical missiles and X-59XK2 multi-purpose tactical missiles, equipped with a unit, a quick control unit, equipped with a target value. optical homing head. After applying massive anti-radar attacks on the 30H6 Ukrainian C-300PS radars, it will be possible to open an air corridor to transfer airborne units to the southern borders of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic; it will also be possible to “clean up” the remaining formations of the Moldavian army and the Armed Forces of Ukraine with the help of attack aircraft of the Russian Aerospace Forces.
The situation around the Moldovan-Transdniestrian conflict will be complicated not by day, but by the hour, directly proportional to the worsening situation in the Donbas. Moreover, there is a growing likelihood of the provision of anti-tank missile systems and short-range air defense systems to Kiev, which will only increase the degree of turretless Ukrainian “top”. The most correct tactic on Transnistria was designated by the President of the National Strategy Institute, Mikhail Remizov. His idea is to nominate a strict ultimatum to the Moldovan authorities, according to which Chisinau should not impede the work of the “transit corridor” for the rotation of the OGRF in the Transdnistrian Moldavian Republic. In the event of its failure, Russia will receive the full right to a forceful asymmetric response. No other approach to resolving this situation is foreseen today.
Information sources:
http://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/igor-dodon-vyigral-no-ne-pobedil-prezident-moldovy-opredelitsya-vo-vtorom-ture-28120
https://www.pravda.ru/world/26-07-2017/1343430-kazakhstan_usa-0/
http://ru.publika.md/pavel-filip-memorandum-kotoryy-podpisal-dodon-ne-imeet-sily_2095321.html
http://newsmaker.md/rus/kartoteka/chto-mozhet-prezident-moldovy
Information