Military Review

22 June 1941 of the year. Whose fault is in “peacefully sleeping airfields”?

184
There is a good reason for a question mark. In general, it is considered to be true historical a line that says that Germany suddenly and treacherously attacked the USSR on June 22, the bulk of the Soviet Air Force was destroyed at "peacefully sleeping" airfields, and Stalin, who did not believe intelligence information, was responsible for everything - hence the famous "do not give in to provocations ".




However, there are documents, and not secret ones, which make you think a bit: was it really so?

These documents were published more than once; they were first to do it, if I am not mistaken, in the collection “The Great Patriotic War: Orders of the People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR”, then Drabkin and Krivenets.

The picture is very interesting. Sometimes it is worth plunging into the boring world of official orders, if the result is a rearing hair and an overwhelming desire to take up the machine gun.

However, judge for yourself. And, naturally, express your opinion if I am somewhere wrong. Most interesting, to be honest.

If you carefully examine the documents signed by the highest ranks of the Red Army in the pre-war years, you will, willy-nilly, come to the conclusion that, to put it mildly, there was a mess in the Red Army air force. On the one hand, the slogan “youth on a plane” attracted new personnel to the Air Force, on the other hand, and here, perhaps, it was the repression of 1933-1935 that was to blame, there was no sensible organization and education.

"Despite the fact that the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) and the government in 1932, and then in 1936, the Red Army Air Force posed the whole issue of fighting accidents, over the past two years, accidents have not only decreased, but significantly increased especially in January, February and the first half of March 1938.

In 1937, the number of emergencies in the Air Force as compared to 1936 increased: a) on accidents by 80%, b) on accidents on 70% ".


Further, of course, recommendations and guidance on 12 points. This is the “Resolution of the Main Military Council of the Red Army on the accident rate in the Red Army AFC units”, June 1938 of the year. (t. 4, op. 15, d. 18, l. 4 — 7. Typog. ind.).

Helped? Look at the next document, a year later.

"Order on measures to prevent accidents in the Red Army Air Force units No. 070 from 4 June 1939” (F. 4, op. 15, d. 18, l. 4 — 7.

The number of flight accidents in the 1939 year, especially in the months of April and May, has reached extraordinary levels. During the period from January 1 to May 15, 34 catastrophes occurred, in which 70 people died. During the same period, 126 crashes occurred, in which the 91 aircraft was broken. Only for the end of 1938 and the first months of 1939. we lost 5 outstanding pilots - Heroes of the Soviet Union, 5 the best people of our country - vols. Bryandinsky, Chkalov, Gubenko, Serov and Polina Osipenko.

These heavy losses, like the vast majority of other disasters and accidents, are the direct result of:
a) criminal violation of special orders, regulations, flight manuals and instructions; b) the extremely poor work of the command and political staff of the air forces and the military councils of the districts and armies for training the flight technical staff of the aviation units;
c) poorly organized and even worse planned planning and consistency in combat training aviation parts;
d) inability of senior commanders and commissioners to establish flight technical training with each crew and pilot individually in accordance with the level of their special knowledge, preparedness, and their individual and specific abilities and qualities;
e) still unsatisfactory knowledge by the personnel of the material part and, as a result of this, its poor exploitation and
f) the most important thing is the unacceptable weakening of military discipline in units of the Air Force and laxity, unfortunately, even among the best pilots, including some Heroes of the Soviet Union.

People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union K. Voroshilov.


What can I add here? It can be added that the commissions conducting investigations into the deaths of the above-mentioned Heroes of the Soviet Union came to an unambiguous result: the deaths of all five were caused by violations on the part of those who died. Accordingly, no repression followed. Polikarpov’s story with I-180, however, was recalled a little later.

Speaking of reprisals ... I do not know how many people were planted or shot in 1938-39 in connection with the outrageous lawlessness that prevailed in the BBC, but a year later the following document appeared:

F. 4, op. 11, d. 86, l. 198 - 199. Script.

Order on the tasks of the Red Army Air Force in connection with the high accident rate No. 0200 from 28 in August 1940.

“From 1 to 10 on August 1940, my deputies have been checked by 28 aviation regiments. The inspection covered the air units of the Baltic, Western, Kiev, Odessa, Transcaucasian, North Caucasus and Trans-Baikal military districts.

The check was made in order to find out the reasons for the unacceptably high accident rate in the Red Army air force units.

It is established that the main causes of accidents are:

1. Extremely low discipline, lack of discipline and lack of organization in the units of the Red Army Air Force. As a result of poor control, flight orders, regulations and manuals for flight operations are not firmly and consistently executed ...

A large number of debuts with debauches, unauthorized absences and other immoral offenses incompatible with the rank of commander, Red Army, characterized by a low state of discipline and cause accidents.

2. The formulation of combat training in many shelves is unsatisfactory.

The planning of combat training is carried out "out of time and space", which is a consequence of the lack of knowledge of squadrons' preparedness and leads to the formulation of impossible and unrealistic tasks.

The squadrons still have not learned how to approach the pilot individually - set tasks in accordance with his training, as a result of which accidents and disasters occur.

District Air Force commanders did not understand the need for consistent training of units ...

3. Navigator training in most parts, and especially in the fighter, is at a low level.

Knowledge of basic navigation is weak. There is an excessively large number of loss of orientation, including that of senior commanders.

4. As a mass phenomenon - poor knowledge of the material part of the flight and technical staff. Pilots and some commanders are poorly aware of the data of their aircraft and engine.

Pilots, not knowing the material part, are afraid to control the work of the technical staff.

The commanders of units and subunits, who themselves do not know the material parts of the aircraft and the engine, do not require or test knowledge of their subordinate personnel.

Reception of the aircraft by a pilot from a technician, as required by the order of NKO No. 93 **, is not organized, turned into a formality; as a result of this, people and the material part are dying ...

In one regiment Zapovo, an aircraft reception and delivery book was found, in which the pilot signed the adopted car ten days in advance.

Technical studies are poorly deployed, and in a number of regiments there are none throughout the summer, which leads to poor material condition, flight without fuel, with fixed clamps, ignorance of how to emergency release the chassis and how to switch off the fuel tank valves.

5. A large number of breakdowns, accidents and disasters occur during takeoffs and landings of aircraft. This suggests that the important elements of piloting technology, takeoff and landing from young pilots are not worked out.

6. The testing of piloting equipment is poorly performed, is carried out irregularly and not within the time specified by the No. 69 NPP-38.

Viewing flight books showed that the errors noted during the verification of piloting techniques are not eliminated, but only fixed, that is, the most outrageous outrage deliberately occurs when the pilot continues to fly to the more complex task with known and unresolved errors, repeats mistakes, beats the plane and dies himself.

7. In the units of the Air Force, commanders with insufficient experience in the management of units and subunits occupy the posts of regimental, squadron, and unit commanders.

Link commanders do not have instructional and methodological experience; they do not know how to show and teach their subordinate.

District air forces commanders, divisional and regiment commanders did not understand the need to train and educate personnel especially, and left them to themselves.. This leads to the fact that the commander of the link and the squadron does not know how to build work, makes mistakes that cause accidents.

The reasons given for the accident rate cannot remain in the air force units and must be eradicated by the most decisive measures. Division commanders (brigades) are primarily responsible for restoring order and discipline in the aviation units.

Those who do not want to understand the need for discipline, execution of orders, statutes and manuals should be withdrawn from the units of the Red Army Air Force.

People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Tymoshenko ”.


Yes, p. 7 indirectly indicates that the losses in the Air Force were, and the repression was one of the reasons. I specifically singled out what belonged to the commanding staff, which was not properly prepared.

However, the 1 clause for repression is not sewn by any means. If we are talking about total repression, the fear in which the NKVD kept everyone and everything, then how to understand drunkenness? Moreover, this is not a document from the district chief or the division commander, no. This is an order from the Commissar of Defense. That is, drunkenness and other violations were known at the top, and, obviously, took such a scale that the drug addict had to fight with this.

By the way, the famous order of Tymoshenko, for which the pilots were so offended by him, who let out of the sergeants' schools, and not the lieutenants, should be disassembled separately. This is a very interesting document. And very logical in those conditions.

In general, the overall situation in the Red Army Air Force could not be called satisfactory in many respects. And today it is difficult to say who was to blame. But the fact that a certain licentiousness and actions in the style of "what I want, I do," had a place to be. From the bottom to certain tops. And at the top often the commanders simply could not cope with the freemen reigning in the units.

There is no need to look for evidence, it is enough just to study the causes of the death of the above-mentioned Heroes of the Soviet Union.

Difficult question only with Chkalov. Test pilot from God, the favorite of Stalin and the whole country. And a rather crude fighter, the I-180. But why, despite the personal prohibition of the “owner,” Chkalov not only lifts this car into the air, but pilots it not in the airfield zone, but to the side? And goes for a forced landing in a place that is completely inappropriate for this? Yes, Chkalov was the king of difficult landings. But not this time, unfortunately.

"... Chkalov on this plane with not completely eliminated defects in three days not only took off, but began to make its first flight on a new plane and a new engine outside the airfield, as a result, as a result of an emergency landing on an unsuitable cluttered area, the plane crashed and Chkalov died. "

"... The commander of the 2 Air Force OKA Sorokin without any need and permission from the center, but with the consent of the 2 Command OKA flew on TB-3 to the landing site of the Rodina plane, obviously, with the sole purpose that you could say later that he, Sorokin, also took part in the rescue of the Rodina crew, although no one authorized him to do this and the Rodina crew was already discovered.

Following Sorokin on Douglas, Bryandinsky flew out, who also had neither instructions nor rights, the purpose of which was obviously the same motives as that of Sorokin.

Both of these big aviation commanders, committing misconduct and self-righteousness, in addition to this, in the flight itself showed indiscipline and criminal negligence in the flight service, which resulted in a mid-air collision, the death of 15 people and two expensive aircraft. ”

“... The hero of the Soviet Union, the deputy commander of the BOVO Air Force, Colonel Gubenko, an excellent and courageous pilot, died because he performed an aerobatic flight at an unacceptably low altitude on the I-16.

Colonel Gubenko, despite his high post of deputy commander of the air forces of the military district, despite the fact that even before his death, holding a meeting with his aircraft commander subordinates on accidents in the air forces, he pointed out indiscipline as the main cause of all accidents in aviation , personally admitted indiscipline bordering the crime.

Colonel Gubenko appealed to the BOVO commander of the commander of 2 rank com. Kovalev with a request to allow him to fly aerobatics using runways.

The commander of the Belarusian Special Military District, commander of the 2 rank, comrade Kovalev, categorically forbade Colonel Gubenko to fly. And yet, Gubenko not only grossly violated the direct order of his superior and direct superior, but at the same time violated all the orders and instructions on flights, starting aerobatics at an unacceptably low altitude. ”

"... Two Heroes of the Soviet Union, the Chief of the Flight Inspection of the Air Force, Commander Krivrig Serov, and Inspector of Piloting Technology of the Moscow Military District, Major Polina Osipenko, died because the organization of a training session on blind flights at training camp for inspectors on piloting technology It should be thought out and prepared, and most importantly, the flight of commander Serov and Major Polina Osipenko, who performed one of the first tasks under the hood, was made at an altitude of only 500 — 600 meters instead of razhneniya height of not less than 1000 meters.

This ugly, moreover, criminal violation of the elementary rules of flights, obligatory for each pilot, and chiefs - in the first place, was fatal for Serov and Polina Osipenko ”.


This is also from the order number 070 from 4 June 1939.

It is impossible to detect here any sabotage or anything else. Moreover, in the case of Chkalov and Gubenko, there was a violation of the order of the higher authorities, which only confirms the findings.

What happened below the levels can only be understood from the reports of accidents and orders, which I cited here.

Meanwhile, the war was just around the corner ...

Personal opinion, not claiming the truth: the huge losses in the first days of the war were caused not only by the literacy of the Germans, who managed to learn all the weaknesses of the Red Army Air Force and take advantage of them, but also frankly insufficient training of flight personnel.

Plus, there is also a bad effect. This is the most "yes, we all tear." At all levels. And here I turn to other documents.

F. 4, op. 15, d. 27, l. 560 - 563. Typogr. copy

ORDER ON THE MASKING OF AERODROMES AND THE MATERIAL PART OF MILITARY-AIR FORCES
No. 0367 from 27 December 1940

The order of the HKO 1939, No. 0145 *, required the obligatory masking of all newly constructed operational airfields. The Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Force was to carry out these measures not only at operational airfields, but also at the entire airfield network of the Air Force.

However, none of the districts paid proper attention to this order and did not fulfill it.

It is necessary to realize that without a thorough camouflage of all airfields, the creation of false airfields and the masking of all material parts in modern warfare, combat operations of aviation are inconceivable.

I order:

1. Submit to me for approval to 1 January 1941, the instruction on masking airfields.

2. By 10 in January 1941, to provide considerations on the use of camouflage paint for aircraft produced by the aircraft industry, as well as in combat units of the Air Force.

3. All aerodromes scheduled for seeding in 1941 year, sow necessarily taking into account the masking and in relation to the surrounding area by selecting the appropriate herbs. On airfields to imitate: fields, meadows, gardens, pits, ditches, ditches, roads, so as to completely merge the background of the airfield with the background of the surrounding terrain.

The same way by overseeding to hold on all previously built airfields.

By 1 July 1941, complete the masking of all airfields located in the 500-km strip from the border.

The commanders of the aviation divisions:

4. Before 1 on April 1941, draw up a schematic plan for each airfield to disguise both in terms of seeding, and the placement of portable masking tools.

5. The forces of the parts up to 1 April 1941 to prepare the necessary lightweight portable masking material applicable to each airfield.

6. For operational airfields, leased to Soviet and economic organizations, stipulate in the contracts the requirement for the safety and integrity of the means of disguise.

7. The camouflage seeding of airfields and the equipment of portable masking devices shall be carried out at the expense of funds allocated for the construction of airfields and their maintenance.

8. In the future, do not accept newly built flight fields sown without masking from construction organizations.

9. The Air Force Inspector-General to establish control and report on progress on a monthly basis.

People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Tymoshenko.


Smart document? Yes, no doubt. Especially when you read the memoirs of the participants of that war from both sides, about how the planes "paraded as they were" were shot and bombed. Yes, it was not everywhere. Not all the commanders of the air divisions spat on their duties. Therefore, there were parts where the aircraft were dispersed and disguised. And who began to fight on the first day of the war, and did not become participants in the happy reports of Goebbels.

Paying attention to the deadlines: April 1941 of the year. And we go further.

F. 4, op. 11, d. 82, l. 49 - 58. Script.

Order No. 0042 of 19 June 1941

Nothing significant has been done so far to disguise airfields and major military facilities.

The airfield fields are not all planted, the take-off stripes for the color of the terrain are not painted, and the airfield buildings, standing out sharply in bright colors, attract the observer’s attention by tens of kilometers.

The crowded and linear arrangement of aircraft on airfields in the complete absence of their masking and poor organization of airfield service with the use of unmasking signs and signals finally unmask the airfield.

A modern aerodrome must fully merge with its surroundings, and nothing at the aerodrome should attract attention from the air.

Artillery and mechanized units display a similar carelessness for disguise: the crowded and linear arrangement of their parks represents not only excellent objects of observation, but also targets that are advantageous for air strikes.

Tanks, armored vehicles, command and other special vehicles of motorized and other troops are painted with colors that give a bright reflection, and are well observed not only from air but also from the ground.

Nothing has been done to disguise warehouses and other important military installations.

I order:

1. By 1.7.41, sow all aerodromes with grass according to the color of the surrounding terrain, paint the runways and simulate the entire aerodrome environment in accordance with the surrounding background.

2. Airfield buildings to the roofs inclusive paint over one style with the buildings surrounding the airfield. Gas storage bury in the ground and disguise very carefully.

3. Strictly prohibit the linear and crowded location of the aircraft; dispersed and disguised location of the aircraft to ensure their complete observability from the air.

4. To organize 5.7.41-km of 500-8 border airfields in each air-based area of ​​10-km to 40, equip each of them with 50 — XNUMX aircraft mock-ups.

5. By 1.7.41 to paint tanks, armored vehicles, commander, special and transport vehicles. For camouflage coloring apply matte paint in relation to the location of areas of location and action. Strictly prohibit the use of paint, giving a reflection.

6. Districts entering the endangered zone should take the same measures to disguise warehouses, workshops, parks, and by 15.7.41 to ensure that they are completely unobservable from the air.

7. To carry out a masking of airfields, warehouses, combat and transport vehicles to check from the air, the observation of responsible commanders of district headquarters and photography. All defects revealed by them immediately eliminate.

8. Execution to inform 1.7 and 15.7.41 through the Chief of General Staff.

People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Tymoshenko

Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army General of the Army G. Zhukov.


F. 4, op. 11, d. 62, l. 201 - 203. Script.

ORDER ABOUT MASKING OF AIRPLANES, TAKE-OFF BANDS, AERODROME CONSTRUCTIONS
No. 0043 from 20 June 1941

Airplanes located in the air force units, runways, tents and airfield facilities throughout the paint do not meet the requirements of modern disguise.

Such an attitude towards masking as one of the main types of combat readiness of the Air Force cannot be tolerated any longer.

I order:

1. By 20 July 1941, the aviation forces, with the involvement of the aircraft workshop workers, produce a masking colouration of all existing aircraft according to the enclosed color scheme, with the exception of the bottom surface, which remains the same color as before.

2. By 10 July 1941 to make a mask of all existing runways, concrete taxiways and anchorage of aircraft in relation to the background of the surrounding area.

3. By 1 July 1941 to disguise all airfield structures in relation to the background terrain.

4. By 1 July 1941 to disguise tents in the camps of aviation units.

5. At the airfield aerodromes to have airplanes dispersed under the natural and artificial shelters, on the outskirts of the airfield, not allowing them to be arranged in straight lines.

6. I assign responsibility for the implementation of all camouflage measures, both in quality and in terms, to military councils and personally to the commanders of the Air Force of the districts.

7. Plan an event to report to 23 June 1941.

On the course of painting the planes to the commanders of the Air Force of the districts, report daily on the HF chief of the Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Force from 21 hours to 23 hours.

People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Tymoshenko.

Member of the Main Military Council Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) G. Malenkov.

Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army General of the Army G. Zhukov.


Zhukov in Moscow understood. Tymoshenko in Moscow understood. Otherwise, they did not bombard their orders with commanders of Air Force units.

From the two orders given it can be understood that since the winter of 1940, when the first order was given, no one even started and rushed to carry out these orders. There are enough examples in the memories of veteran pilots.

In the same Pokryshkin, who served far from the worst regiment, there are words in the “Heaven of War” that somewhere in June 20-21 began to bury the benzos into the earth. About disguise - not a word.

But since at least some stirring had begun, apparently, the cry from Moscow had acted. Not exactly as it should be, but at least somehow.

An interesting situation: stupid and talentless Zhukov from Moscow is screaming for air crews to still disguise the planes, and the divisions ... I don’t know what the divisions were saying, but if they moved, there wouldn’t be such a loss on June 22. There would be, but not so fatal.

In general, I would also like to say a few words about the training of flight personnel. In contrast to those who believe that our pilots were just handsome, and their commanders were swamp mud. Well, like Pokryshkin and Krayev, a textbook of such opposition.

Let's see the last document, and then we will go to the conclusions.

F. 4, op. 11, d. 63, l. 330 - 336. Script.

DIRECTIVE ON THE PROBLEMS OF THE RBC ARMY'S BATTLE PREPARATION OF THE RAF ARMY FOR THE SUMMER PERIOD 1941 OF THE YEAR. 34677 No. 17 May 1941

Having considered the results of the combat training of the Red Army Air Force during the winter period of 1941, the Main Military Council notes:

The combat training of the Red Army Air Force was not satisfactory.

Low rates in the combat training of the air units of the Red Army Air Force were accompanied by an extremely large number of accidents and accidents. Especially poorly conducted combat training in parts of the Air Force ORVO, MVO and KOVO.

The main drawbacks of combat training for the winter.

Retraining of flight personnel to new types of aircraft was carried out at a slow pace. Operation of the new material part of the flight-technical structure is poorly mastered.

Training in a dive on the aircraft SB and AP-2 was deployed lightly. No dive bombing training was performed on AP-2 and PE-2 aircraft.

The flight personnel of combat applications — bombing, air firing, high-altitude and route flights — were trained completely unsatisfactory.

In the KOVO, ORVO, and Moscow Military District air forces, each crew has less than one flight for bombing, air firing, air combat, and route flight.

The average flight time per pilot over the entire winter period was in the KOVO Air Force 6 hours, and in the OrVO - 2 hours 12 minutes with an average raid on one pilot on the Red Army Air Force more than 16 hours.

Independent release on combat aircraft of young flight crews was unacceptably long and was not completed by the end of the winter period.

The training of flight personnel for blind and night flights in all parts of the Red Army Air Force was poorly deployed. Blind flight accounted for 5,2% of the total flight time, night flight - 4,6%.

The Red Army Headquarters Air Force, the district air force commanders did not show perseverance in carrying out the NKO order to fly in winter only on wheels, and in some cases often had direct sabotage to follow instructions on clearing airfields from snow, which led to the disruption of flight operations.

The experience of 1941 winter training showed weak and vague guidance of the combat training of air units by the majority of district air force commanders, corps commanders and especially division commanders who showed low exactingness and poor control over the execution of my orders.

People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Tymoshenko.

Member of the Main Military Council of the Red Army Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) A. Zhdanov.

Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army General of the Army G. Zhukov.


I draw your attention that all of the above referred to the Kiev and Orlovsky special and Moscow military districts. Two of the three were on the edge of the enemy strike literally a month later.

You can say a lot about the fact that Stalin did not believe intelligence data and did not prepare the army for war. It can be said that all these documents were written by marshals and generals solely in order not to fall into the tender embrace of Lawrence Beria. Can.

I admit that Tymoshenko and Zhukov wrote orders based on these considerations.

But the question arises: why were those to whom orders were addressed, not afraid of the NKVD and repression, and just spat on them? Why were such holes in training allowed, why the airfields were not disguised, why did the planes stand like at a parade and wait for the Germans?

Moreover, the numerous memoirs of veteran pilots confirm this to themselves.

The conclusion suggests a very ugly and unpatriotic. The command of the air divisions, corps and regiments actually did not correspond to their positions and was simply incapable of training both the flight personnel and the aerodrome activity.

Again repression? In fullness. Tsarist Russia actually did not have its own air force. As well as tank forces. Everything had to be created in 30's. And what was created, as the practice of the first days of the war showed, was not created very well. Despite Hassan, Khalkhin-Gol, Spain and the Finnish campaign.

It was categorically lacking precisely the commanders of middle and senior managers. What, in fact, said in the orders. From squadron commanders to air regiment commanders. Competent commanders who understand what his duties are.

Yes, the war put everything in its place. At the cost of huge losses, a new cohort of commanders who passed the first months of the war was brought up. And it was these people who had gone from an ordinary pilot to the commander of the formation, knocked the Germans out of the sky and provided superiority to our army.

Pokryshkin, Vorozheikin, Ryazanov, Polbin, Kamanin, Kravchenko, Savitsky, the list can be continued for a very long time. These commanders are united by one thing: having passed the way from a simple pilot to a regimental commander and above, having applied their experience and ability to organize the business at the proper level, they became the creators of the aerial victory.

The war gave them what peacetime did not give. But again, the price was exorbitant.

Speaking of those who stood at the helm of the Red Army Air Force, it is worth saying about the really repressed. And for what reason.

Jacob Smushkevich.

He was arrested by the NKVD of the USSR on charges of participating in a military conspiratorial organization, which, among other detainees, carried out “enemy work aimed at reducing the combat training of the Red Army air forces and increasing the accident rate in the Air Force”.

From November 19 1939 - Head of the Red Army Air Force, in August 1940 was transferred to the position of Inspector-General of the Red Army Air Force, and in December of the same year - Assistant Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army on Aviation. A dizzying career for the 39-year-old.

Pavel Rychagov.

From June 1940 of the year - Deputy Head of the Red Army Air Force, from July - 1-th Deputy GUVVS RKKA, from August 1940 (aged 29 years) appointed Head of the Main Directorate of the Air Force of the Red Army.

From February to April 1941 - at the same time - Deputy People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR for Aviation.

I will not go into the details of whether or not these people were rightly accused of atrocities and shot, the court of history acquitted them and rehabilitated them. However, it is their age and hints that the frames were not very ...

There was not really the Luftwaffe such an overwhelming force. Yes, in terms of training pilots and tactics of application, they were stronger. But we knew how to learn, albeit from our own mistakes. And studied.

From time immemorial, by the way. From Poltava to Berlin.

But the fact that, in the tragedy of our 22 air force on June 1941, our commanders played an unquestionable role, which simply should not have been in these posts, as well as the fact that there were no lovers of slaughter divisions in the high command today is in doubt.

As one historical character said, “cadres decide everything”. Frames, more precisely, their lack of preparation, and all decided.

Moreover, honor and glory to those who survived, who learned to beat the enemy not only personally, but also directing others.

Honor, glory and our eternal appreciation and gratitude.

And the lessons of that war are relevant today. Because such hats and conversations that, “if anything, we are all in the dust,” are quite similar to “we will beat the enemy with little blood and in its territory” of the 30-40-s of the last century.

History lessons should not be forgotten.

Sources:
Russian archive. The Great Patriotic War: orders of the People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR, volume 13.
Drabkin. A. I fought a fighter. Take the first blow. 1941-1942.
Drabkin A., Isaev A. 22 June: the rainy day of the calendar.
All references to the cited documents are given according to the classification of TsAMO RF.
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  1. antivirus
    antivirus 13 July 2017 05: 32
    +4
    able to study all the weaknesses of the Red Army Air Force and take advantage of them, but also frankly insufficient training of flight personnel.

    This is the usual inheritance of serfdom and isolated life in remote villages. HUMAN LIFE- 60 YEARS BEFORE PENSION- LIVING AND ONLY THE NEXT GENERATION WITHOUT KNOWING THE OLD LIFE, IN A NEW (CITY LIFE) WILL BUILD RELATIONS (AND WORK + REST)
    1. Monarchist
      Monarchist 13 July 2017 06: 51
      +25
      What kind of serfdom in FIG? In the face of elementary irresponsibility, and irresponsibility it is always the same everywhere
      1. Nicholas C.
        Nicholas C. 13 July 2017 07: 04
        +10
        Quote: Roman Skomorokhov
        here, perhaps the repressions are to blame 1933-1935 [!!] years

        At the January joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the CPSU (B.) 1933 Stalin gave a list of those subject to arrest and physical destruction: “private industrialists and their servants, private merchants and their minions, former nobles and priests, fists and podkulakniks, former white officers and police officers, former policemen and gendarmes, all kinds of bourgeois intellectuals of a chauvinistic nature and all other anti-Soviet elements. ” Those losses for the army were more significant than from the repressions of the 1937 Tukhachevsky military conspiracy. And then the grant-eaters turned 1937 into a fetish. In the latter case, the shooting of some army did not weaken, but strengthened.
        The officer corps, like the elite of any profession, has been growing for generations. Great-grandfather, grandfather, father ... And an elite education. That Russian officer corps stopped German troops on the borders of the empire (as if, according to some statements, things were not bad in the empire). Of those who did not leave after the coup and / or civil war, tens of thousands were shot immediately. And then in the process. In 1933-1935 they finished.
        Before the war, in two years, the army grew three times. The number of regiments in the Air Force doubled in a year! Those. commanders grew very quickly, staying in positions from several months to a year. And half (on average in the Red Army) do not even have a pre-war secondary, but the so-called “accelerated secondary” education. What is fighting coordination here. Plus a new technique.
        Here it is necessary to understand who is personally to blame at the General Staff, in the Ministry of Defense in this state of affairs and in the disaster in the war. And then they are used to blaming everything on Stalin. And Stalin himself, as I understand it, recognized the role of the General Staff only during the course of the war as a result of joint work with Vasilevsky.
        1. Hantengri
          Hantengri 13 July 2017 08: 24
          +19
          Quote: Nikolai S.
          At the January joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the CPSU (B.) 1933 Stalin gave a list of those subject to arrest and physical destruction: “Private industrialists and their servants, private merchants and their henchmen, former nobles and priests, fists and podkulakniks, former white officers and officers, former policemen and gendarmes, all kinds of bourgeois intellectuals of a chauvinistic nature and all other anti-Soviet elements”

          To lie like that, insolent, why? Consider your quote in context:
          VII. Four-year five-year results in the fight against the remnants of hostile classes
          As a result of the implementation of the five-year plan in the fields of industry, agriculture and trade, we approved the principle of socialism in all spheres of the national economy, having expelled the capitalist elements from there.

          What was this supposed to lead to in relation to the capitalist elements, and to what did it actually lead?

          This led to the fact that the last remnants of the dying classes were knocked out of their ruts: private industrialists and their servants, private merchants and their minions, former nobles and priests, fists and armpits, former white officers and officers, former policemen and gendarmes, all kinds of bourgeois chauvinistic intellectuals and all other anti-Soviet elements.

          Having been knocked out of a rut and scattered across the face of the entire USSR, these former people crawled through our factories and factories, our institutions and trade organizations, railway and water transport enterprises, and mainly on collective farms and state farms. They crawled and took refuge there, having thrown on a mask of “workers” and “peasants”, and some of them even crept into the party.

          What did they come there with? Of course, with a feeling of hatred for Soviet power, with a feeling of fierce hostility towards new forms of economy, life, and culture.

          These gentlemen are no longer able to launch a direct attack against the Soviet regime. They and their classes several times already conducted such attacks, but were defeated and scattered. Therefore, the only thing left for them to do is to harm and harm the workers, collective farmers, the Soviet government, the party. And they are dirty as soon as they can, acting in a quiet glanders. Set fire to warehouses and break down cars. Organize sabotage. They organize wrecking on collective farms, on state farms, and some of them, including some professors, in their wrecking impulse reach the point of instilling cattle on collective farms and state farms with plague, anthrax, and the spread of meningitis among horses, etc. . d.

          But this is not the main thing. The main thing in the “activities” of these former people is that they organize mass theft and theft of state property, cooperative property, collective farm property. Theft and theft in factories, theft and theft of railway cargo, theft and theft in warehouses and trading enterprises - especially theft and theft on state farms and collective farms - this is the main form of “activity” of these former people. They sense, as it were, a class instinct, that the basis of the Soviet economy is public property, that it is this foundation that must be shattered in order to spoil the Soviet regime, and they really try to shake public property by organizing mass theft and theft.

          To organize the theft, they use the private ownership skills and remnants of collective farmers, yesterday's individual farmers, and now members of collective farms. You, as Marxists, should know that the consciousness of people lags behind in their development from their actual position. The collective farmers, by their position, are no longer single-handed, but collectivists, but their consciousness is still old, privately owned. And so, former people from the ranks of the exploiting classes use the collective property habits of collective farmers to organize the theft of public property and thereby shake the basis of the Soviet system - public property.........
          ........... The revolutionary legitimacy of the first period of NEP turned its edge mainly against the extremes of war communism, against “illegal” confiscations and requisitions. It guaranteed to the private owner, the sole individual, the capitalist the safety of their property, subject to the strictest compliance with Soviet laws. The situation with revolutionary legitimacy in our time is completely different. The revolutionary legitimacy of our time is aimed not at the extremes of war communism, which have long been absent in nature, but against thieves and wreckers in the public economy, against hooligans and robbers of public property. The main concern of revolutionary legality in our time consists, therefore, in the protection of public property, and not in anything else. https://litlife.club/br/?b=102962&p=37
          The meaning is somewhat different, is not it? Can show the lines in which it is proposed to shoot all the "former", indiscriminately?
          1. Nicholas C.
            Nicholas C. 13 July 2017 09: 04
            +5
            Quote: HanTengri
            The meaning is somewhat different, is not it? Can show the lines in which it is proposed to shoot all the "former", indiscriminately?

            Do you really want to distort? They didn’t notice my “arrest” and “invented” it and attributed it to me “indiscriminately”. So I see the former white dirty tricks officers quietly plunder stealing socialist property. In essence, the repressions of 1933-1935 among the former white officers have something to say? It was? How many? Or do all the enemies slander?

            To the next place, as I understand it, you have not finished reading, you could not stand to speak out: "Some comrades understood the thesis of the abolition of classes, the creation of a classless society and the withering away of the state as an excuse for laziness and complacency, an excuse for the counter-revolutionary theory of the extinction of the class struggle and the weakening of state power. Needless to say, such people can have nothing to do with our party. This is degenerates, or double-dealing, who must be driven out of the party. The destruction of classes is achieved not by extinguishing the class struggle, but by strengthening it. The withering away of the state will come not through the weakening of state power, but through its maximum strengthening necessary to finish off the remnants of the dying classes and organize a defense against the capitalist encirclement, which is far from destroyed and will not be destroyed soon. "
            1. Hantengri
              Hantengri 13 July 2017 10: 16
              +9
              Quote: Nikolai S.
              They didn’t notice my “arrest and”

              I noticed from you:
              Quote: Nikolai S.
              arrests and physical destruction

              Where is the distortion?
              Quote: Nikolai S.
              finish off the remnants of the dying classes

              Yes, yes, of course, this is a direct appeal to “arrests and physical destruction” all the "former"! Never! Just like that, following the natural "vampirism" and "bloodiness" of Bolshevism! (Especially if you do not pay attention to everything Stalin said above ...) laughing
            2. avt
              avt 13 July 2017 10: 34
              +6
              Quote: Nikolai S.
              In essence, the repressions of 1933-1935 among the former white officers have something to say? It was?

              And the same Tukhachevsky then repressed? Or was he not an officer? What about Shaposhnikov? And if it’s just not for
              Quote: Nikolai S.
              It was?

              And specifically about
              Quote: Nikolai S.
              How many?

              and specifically for what articles. Here on the 58th, or the same for a specific criminal offense and just moral decay, to say commonplace drunkenness. Next, we look at a specific showdown with Trotsky and his real supporters in the USSR, then the passage about
              Quote: Nikolai S.
              These are degenerates, or double-deceivers, who must be driven out of the party.

              it is quite understandable in the logic of the inter-party struggle between Stalin and Trotsky, especially if we take into account the CTO and HOW the Red Army itself was created. Then wring your hands
              Quote: Nikolai S.
              Or do all the enemies slander?

              not have to.
              1. Nicholas C.
                Nicholas C. 13 July 2017 12: 01
                +2
                Quote: avt
                Tukhachevsky ... Or was he not an officer? And what about Shaposhnikov

                Quote: Moore
                Karbysheva, Brusilova

                For people, the existence of exceptions confirms the rule, but for you the opposite is true.
                Brusilov died in 1926 (be aware). Then even Lieutenant General Y. Slaschev still served in the Red Army.
                ____________
                Question to a number of respondents. So what did Comrade Stalin mean when he demanded that the class struggle be intensified as much as possible in order to finish off the remnants of the dying classes if they were not executions, prisons, deportations to a settlement, etc.? Comrade Stalin believed that all Russian officers would be amazed and that they would cease to be officers, and would degenerate into collective farmers?
          2. DimerVladimer
            DimerVladimer 13 July 2017 13: 34
            +6
            Quote: HanTengri
            The revolutionary legitimacy of our time is aimed not at the extremes of war communism, which have long been absent in nature, but against thieves and wreckers in the public economy, against hooligans and robbers of public property


            Here it is your "revolutionary legality" - shot or stabbed and dumped in the mines:


            The Golden Mountain - a complex of 9 mines 9-15 meters wide and up to 100 meters deep - is filled with the remains of executed USSR citizens.

            According to the memoirs of Alexander Vlasov, during excavations, people with gunshot and bayonet injuries were discovered, there was a child of 10-12 years old, who was killed by a blow to the head with a blunt object. The bulk are men and women of working age. Also, according to him, then control drills were made to determine whether the mines were filled to the full depth. It turned out that to the bottom they are full of remains. “Andrei Sakharov believed that 300 thousand people were buried there, according to my calculations, the figure can reach up to 500 thousand. The academician was based on nine well-known mines, and I relied on the fact that there are 15 of them,” Vlasov added

            According to the famous Chelyabinsk local historian Yuri Latyshev, the “Golden Mountain” is an identified object of cultural heritage - the mass grave of the victims of Stalinist repressions.
            https://dostup1.ru/society/Do-500-tys-repressirov
            annyh-mogli-ubit-na-Zolotoy-gore-v-Chelyabinske_9
            8283.html
            1. kvaker
              kvaker 13 July 2017 14: 04
              +7
              You are not here .... Here the aviation is being dismantled ...
              1. avva2012
                avva2012 13 July 2017 14: 27
                +10
                It doesn’t matter to him what they take apart, he only knows one thing. 500 million buried in the head hang, poisoned by radiation of the river, land, fields, meadows ...... Dead people with braids stand and silence ...
                1. DimerVladimer
                  DimerVladimer 14 July 2017 08: 20
                  +2
                  Quote: avva2012
                  It doesn’t matter to him what they take apart, he only knows one thing. 500 million buried in the head hang, poisoned by radiation of the river, land, fields, meadows ...... Dead people with braids stand and silence ...


                  Did you somehow quickly forget?
                  Well, come, let’s remind you
                2. DimerVladimer
                  DimerVladimer 14 July 2017 08: 33
                  +2
                  Quote: avva2012
                  mu no matter what they disassemble, he only understands one thing. In my head hang 500 million buried, poisoned by radiation of the river, land, fields, meadows ..


                  It makes a difference to me - when they don’t remember kinship, they begin to rehabilitate the beria of Stalin and other trash.
                  You should have a bag with plutonium on your back (as Beria ordered in Chelyabinsk 40) - so that you would feel all the “charm” of sensations from radioactive re-irradiation - you would see.
                  Or you’ll pour highly radioactive waste into the yard - justifying yourself with “state necessity” and observing how your relatives are sick and dying from constant exposure ...

                  Come brother - I will organize a "swim" for you along the Techa River - then you will ring luminous eggs and you can safely tryndet that nothing - everything is fine, everything is correct comrade. Beria did - you can live, sorry not for long ...
            2. Letnab
              Letnab 13 July 2017 14: 58
              +9
              about this photo, and 500 thousand killed, not so long ago there was an article on the Internet where Sakharov’s “investigation” is debunked ... There are significantly different numbers and other causes of death ...
              1. avva2012
                avva2012 13 July 2017 15: 07
                +15
                This is all "for the sake of ..." calculated, suddenly they will believe. The corpses decompose, from there the stench goes for five kilometers, and there the nkvdshniki vomiting and falling dead from poisonous fumes, driven and driven, driven and driven ... It makes no difference what kind of nonsense for the Novodvorskaya just to rave.
            3. WUA 518
              WUA 518 13 July 2017 15: 28
              +2
              Quote: DimerVladimer
              “Andrei Sakharov believed that 300 thousand were buried there.


              GOLDEN MOUNTAIN, the burial place of victims of Stalinist repression in the north. the outskirts of the village Hornets. Discovered in 1989. The original name. - Bald Mountain. In 1843, prospectors from Vyatka in the Lysa Gora region discovered gold, hence the name. - Gold. Up until 1935, gold was mined in the mines. Then the mines were closed. In 1989, Yu. L. Gerasimov, ex. prospector reported to gas. The "Chelyabinsk Worker" about the discovery by him as early as 1946 is human. the remains in one of the mines. At the initiative of Chel. historical enlightenment. The human rights obv “Memorial” on the west side of the city was excavated. Work to elucidate the history of the burial was carried out by a commission specially created by the city executive committee, which was headed by the deputy. Pres Executive Committee of the Executive Committee L. A. Ivanov and D. A. Anoshin. The commission included representatives of the public. Organizations: G. Ya. Malamud, S.I. Mironova, L. A. Subbotina, etc. On June 14, a group of archaeologists began excavating one of the entrances to the mine. In tech. in the summer, the remains of 350 people were recovered. Experts determined the time of burial - 1936–39. Set the names of the dead failed. In total, according to the KGB, to the south. Urals in the 1930s was repressed by watered. motives 37 041 people, of which 11 592 were shot. The reburial of the remains on the west side took place on September 9. 1989. approx. 6 thousand people from Chel., Moscow, Kurgan, Sverdlovsk, Kamensk, Ural, Rostov Region. took part in a mourning rally. Also present were A. D. Sakharov with his wife E. G. Bonner, G. V. Starovoitova, pilot-cosmonaut G. T. Beregovoi and others. Time was set in the west. monument. In 1992, the mass grave of the victims of Stalinist repressions was registered as a historical monument to the preservation of the ist. and cult. Heritage Administration reg. In the area of ​​the west on the terr. area approx. 15 hectares were discovered 11 mines with the remains of the shot. In 1994, Ch. Department of Architecture and Urban Planning of the 32nd microdistrict of Chel. due to the fact that on his terr. there are mine burials of the 30s. The status of historically valuable mountain environment was assigned. values. In the west, the construction of a memorial to the victims of Stalinist repressions is supposed.

              E. B. Druzhinin
            4. avt
              avt 13 July 2017 15: 32
              +8
              Quote: DimerVladimer
              “Andrei Sakharov believed that 300 thousand people were buried there, according to my calculations, the figure can reach up to 500 thousand. The academician was based on nine well-known mines, and I relied on the fact that there are 15 of them,” Vlasov added

              Why not 300 million? Why so little? Well, even Albats cite for the sake of happiness.
              Quote: Letnab
              about this photo, and 500 thousand killed, not so long ago there was an article on the Internet where Sakharov’s “investigation” is debunked ...

              And liberal evidence is not fluttered by any evidence base at all. Here their head of the sect said - that’s all, the rest are the machinations of the Stalinists. Even if you tell them about the GULAG archive that was declassified a long time ago, they’ll go all the same - “Open the archives!
              1. DimerVladimer
                DimerVladimer 14 July 2017 08: 18
                +2
                This is the opinion of Sakharov.
                And my opinion - you and other Stalinist sloths - should be driven into camps for a couple of years - for denying the destruction of Soviet citizens and aimed at excavating the burial places of the repressed - so for a common understanding.
                I have these graves near the house.
                And it will be useful for you - so that before you die, you see in real life the work of your "idols".
                1. Mordvin 3
                  Mordvin 3 14 July 2017 08: 26
                  +6
                  Quote: DimerVladimer
                  And it will be useful for you - so that before you die, you see in real life the work of your "idols".

                  Don’t you interrupt, marama?
                  1. DimerVladimer
                    DimerVladimer 14 July 2017 09: 57
                    +1
                    Quote: Mordvin 3
                    Don’t you interrupt?


                    And you come - I will show you who is who - I will show you the burial ground, take a swim in the radioactive river ...
                    1. trahterist
                      trahterist 16 July 2017 21: 11
                      +1
                      wasn’t there a better place to live?
                2. marder7
                  marder7 14 July 2017 10: 16
                  +6
                  are we Stalin’s hangers-on? then you are american licking.
              2. DimerVladimer
                DimerVladimer 14 July 2017 09: 56
                +1
                Quote: avt
                But no evidence base at all


                Evidence base - 9 mines filled with bones - in the city limits
                seventeen thousand executed in the region (as regards declassified cases) - is that too small?
                What kind of power is this that kills its citizens with a 3-person trial, without granting the right to defense and quietly dumps them into a mine outside the city at night?
                1. marder7
                  marder7 14 July 2017 10: 24
                  +3
                  "trial of 3 people" is the trial of:
                  1) judge
                  2) the prosecutor (prosecutor)
                  3) defense counsel (lawyer).
                  Does this mean that all over the world like under Stalin?
                2. buzzilio
                  buzzilio 15 July 2017 23: 26
                  +3
                  Firstly, it refers to the remains of 350 people, and not "17 thousand."
                  Secondly, the total number of 11 thousand is written about the executed, but this is executed by the region, but not found in the mine.
                  Thirdly, what is the problem? There were laws, there were articles for crimes on which the "tower" was supposed.
                  It was after Khrushchev’s lies that everyone began to say that he was “sitting behind a joke,” for it is embarrassing to admit to posterity that he was behind robbery, or for murder.
                  Or did you get the idea that Stalin such and such, a "bloody maniac", every morning began with the thought "who would you shoot today," and you believe the last wordless talk of this theologian? But did you try to turn your brains on and logically think?
        2. Moore
          Moore 13 July 2017 10: 49
          +12
          Quote: Nikolai S.
          At the January joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the CPSU (B.) 1933 Stalin gave a list of those subject to arrest and physical destruction

          Do you think it’s hard to read now what Stalin actually said on 07.01.1933/XNUMX/XNUMX? Yes, he listed all these social groups. Find in his speech a requirement to physically destroy them. He is simply not there. There is a call for vigilance and the direction of "revolutionary legality" to "protect public property." "Congratulations, citizen, you are a lie!" (C)
          Many in the Red Army were white (not tsarist, namely the White Guards) officers? Slashchev, killed back in 1929? But the tsar’s - Shaposhnikov, Karbyshev, Brusilov - were all destroyed?
          1. Okolotochny
            Okolotochny 13 July 2017 13: 35
            +13
            Congratulations, citizen, you are a lie! "

            Not for the first time. smile
            1. Nicholas C.
              Nicholas C. 13 July 2017 14: 55
              +4
              So says the troll Okolotochnylying that he works in agriculture. In the very strada in the village, he wrote 4 messages in 1234 and a half months. I was caught lying in this thread: https://topwar.ru/119693-osobennosti-nauki-v-sssr
              -ili-aspiranty-na-kartoshke.html

              Allegedly, the "rural specialist" was not aware that fodder wheat now has a separate GOST in the Russian Federation, which requires "improvers" in flour, that cows need to harvest hay, silage ..., and much more. Now resentful shouts: "hold the thief." Judge there yourself.
              1. Okolotochny
                Okolotochny 13 July 2017 14: 58
                +8
                Why rush in big words? You yourself are not in the subject, ANYWHERE. We saw the document, read the first lines, it is not enough to comprehend its mind, and you are making “profound expert conclusions”. What on the topic of agriculture, what is on this thread. There I dunked you in ignorance, here Moore put you in your place. Continue in the same spirit. EXPERD.
                1. Nicholas C.
                  Nicholas C. 13 July 2017 16: 02
                  +2
                  My difference from you and Moore is that I can poke you in your lies, and you have unfounded demagogy and "the fool himself." In response to his statement to Muro, I asked a question above, but he does not answer and will not answer, because there is nothing to answer.
                  Well, you, "farmer", continue to lie. In addition to the above, yours: "Durum wheat, SPRING". It was, apparently, your "dipping"? You do not know that such wheat and winter also happen? You have too many lies.
                  1. Okolotochny
                    Okolotochny 14 July 2017 09: 09
                    +6
                    Go to the collective farm first work, and then clever. I repeat - you are a natural EXPERD.
          2. unknown
            unknown 13 July 2017 14: 54
            0
            According to researchers, there were more tsarist officers in the Red Army than in the White.
            Another question is that there was no real continuity. Most officers dropped out for various reasons, including age. And there was no one to replace them.
            An interesting question is about Stalin. There are several conspiracy theories. According to one of them, Stalin-Felix Yusupov-Sumarokov, Tsarist General.
            1. stalkerwalker
              stalkerwalker 13 July 2017 15: 02
              +12
              Quote: ignoto
              An interesting question is about Stalin. There are several conspiracy theories. According to one of them, Stalin-Felix Yusupov-Sumarokov, Tsarist General.

              Finally... wassat
              And then the forum was very sad .....
              good
            2. Hantengri
              Hantengri 13 July 2017 20: 33
              +7
              Quote: ignoto
              An interesting question is about Stalin. There are several conspiracy theories. According to one of them, Stalin-Felix Yusupov-Sumarokov, Tsarist General.

              Yes sir! He is Ivan the Terrible, he is Emir Temur (Tamerlan), he is Timudzhin Esugeevich Bordzhiginov (well, you, me, understood laughing ), he is Yaroslav the Wise, he is also Julius Caesar, he is also Sanek of Macedon and Cleopatra is also he. And yet, yes! - Carpenter Joseph, again He! Only shhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh ... this is a BIG SECRET! wassat
            3. moskowit
              moskowit 13 July 2017 21: 00
              +3
              Quote: ignoto
              According to one of them, Stalin-Felix Yusupov-Sumarokov, Tsarist General.

              You, apparently, read about it in the book of F. Yusupov.


              "..." Tall, thin, slender, with an icon-painted face of Byzantine writing "(description by A. Vertinsky [5]), Prince Felix Yusupov Jr., with the consent of the emperor 22 on February 1914, was married to the princely imperial blood Irina Alexandrovna, daughter of the great Prince Alexander Mikhailovich and Grand Duchess Ksenia Alexandrovna, sister of Nicholas II ... "
              A surprising resemblance to Joseph Vissarionovich ... Is not it ???
              And here is Felix Stalin himself ..

              Friends, a huge request. Tell me what kind of shoulder straps Felix has ... The first time I see such. Especially, what kind of element is in the lower part of the epaulettes ... Doesn’t look like a reserve officer’s gallon patch or retired ... Monogram is like an adjutant’s outhouse ...
              1. moskowit
                moskowit 13 July 2017 21: 05
                +2
                It looks like a Page Corps insignia .... Felix studied in accelerated military classes ... "..I think so ..."
                1. moskowit
                  moskowit 13 July 2017 21: 27
                  +3
                  I apologize ... In the officer classes ....
              2. iouris
                iouris 13 July 2017 22: 39
                +3
                Ah, what a man was ... - a pederast and an agent of the British special services. Participate in the torture and political assassination of Rasputin - this is not for you to eat Lobio.
              3. Alex
                Alex 15 September 2017 20: 32
                +2
                A surprising resemblance to Joseph Vissarionovich ... Is not it ???
                Well, more likely with N.M. Przhevalsky ...
      2. vladimirZ
        vladimirZ 13 July 2017 07: 09
        +10
        The average air raid per pilot for the entire winter period was 6 hours in the KOVO Air Force, and 2 hours 12 minutes in the OrVO, with the average air raid per one pilot in the Red Army more than 16 hours. - from article

        The winter training period, at least 4-5 months, and such a meager raid ?! What flying skills can we talk about? How can there be no high accident rate ?!
        Who is to blame? The command of regiments, divisions, brigades, the entire vertical aviation command of the Red Army. The lack of elementary training and combat work of entrusted units and formations. Is Stalin to blame? It seems that he even demanded and punished a little, more and tougher was needed.
        For comparison, in the 70s in our regiment only a monthly pilots raid was 20-25 hours, and some had more.
        1. nizhegorodec
          nizhegorodec 13 July 2017 07: 32
          +9
          Quote: vladimirZ
          The winter training period, at least 4-5 months, and such a meager raid ?!

          They were afraid of high accident rate, and, consequently, accusations of sabotage. That replaced the practice of theoretical training.
          Quote: vladimirZ
          It seems that he even demanded and punished a little, more and tougher was needed.

          here and got scared
          1. vladimirZ
            vladimirZ 13 July 2017 07: 48
            +10
            - they were afraid of high accident rate and, consequently, accusations of sabotage. That replaced the practice of theoretical training.
            Quote: vladimirZ:
            "It seems that even a little demanded and punished, more and tougher it was necessary."

            - they got scared - nizhegorodec

            Are you serious? Army, what do you think of kindergarten, where to persuade?
            No. The army is, above all, strict discipline and order, where everything should be aimed at ensuring constant high combat readiness.
            In aviation, in our years, there was the following order: the plane must be ready at any time of the day or night, you won’t leave the airport, you won’t be let go until the aircraft is ready. A tough plan for the flight training of pilots, not theoretical study in books, namely a raid - only it determines the ability of pilots to fly.
            And if there is such a commander that being frightened "for a high accident rate" limits the pilots' flying time, then at least he does not correspond to his position, as a maximum is the enemy of combat readiness, with all the consequences for him.
            1. nizhegorodec
              nizhegorodec 13 July 2017 08: 06
              +5
              Quote: vladimirZ
              In aviation, in our years, there was the following order: the plane must be ready at any time of the day or night, you won’t leave the airport, you won’t be let go until the aircraft is ready. A tough plan for the flight training of pilots, not theoretical study in books, namely a raid - only it determines the ability of pilots to fly.

              I don’t need to tell me about our time, I myself know how it was then, am I talking about the time about which the article or you did not read it? Then pay attention to the DIRECTIVE ON THE TASKS OF THE BATTLE PREPARATION OF THE RED ARMY Air Force FOR THE SUMMER PERIOD OF 1941. No. 34677 dated May 17, 1941 in this article, I quote:
              The main drawbacks of combat training for the winter.
              Retraining of flight personnel to new types of aircraft was carried out at a slow pace. Operation of the new material part of the flight-technical structure is poorly mastered.
              Training in a dive on the aircraft SB and AP-2 was deployed lightly. No dive bombing training was performed on AP-2 and PE-2 aircraft.
              The flight personnel of combat applications — bombing, air firing, high-altitude and route flights — were trained completely unsatisfactory.
              In the KOVO, ORVO, and Moscow Military District air forces, each crew has less than one flight for bombing, air firing, air combat, and route flight.
              The average flight time per pilot over the entire winter period was in the KOVO Air Force 6 hours, and in the OrVO - 2 hours 12 minutes with an average raid on one pilot on the Red Army Air Force more than 16 hours.
              Independent release on combat aircraft of young flight crews was unacceptably long and was not completed by the end of the winter period.
              The training of flight personnel for blind and night flights in all parts of the Red Army Air Force was poorly deployed. Blind flight accounted for 5,2% of the total flight time, night flight - 4,6%.
              Well, where am I wrong?
              1. vladimirZ
                vladimirZ 13 July 2017 08: 22
                +8
                Well, where am I wrong? - nizhegorodec

                You are wrong in the main thing - the pilots must be able to fly, the better the pilot, the more he has a raid. And this rule applies at all times, what then, what now. And all the activities of the top aviation leadership should be directed to this. Who does not do this, that does not correspond to the official position with all the ensuing consequences for him.
                Everything else is secondary and not so important. Only for such a scanty raid of the Red Army flight personnel, leading to the combat failure of aviation units, it was necessary to remove the entire top aviation leadership, which I.V. Stalin did.
                1. nizhegorodec
                  nizhegorodec 13 July 2017 08: 27
                  +7
                  Quote: vladimirZ
                  You are wrong in the main thing - pilots must be able to fly

                  again you are for yours, no need to drum common truths. And then the commanders were slaughtered for high accident rate, and not for low preparedness of personnel. Low preparedness is detected only during inspections, and you know very well how the inspections were carried out, you could always cover your eyes with inspectors (including left entries in flight books and training logs, an example is given in the article), but if an airplane crashes, not one , you don’t have to take their heads off, and veterans write like they’re in the shade under the wing of an airplane, they studied the materiel using secret notebooks, which were immediately taken to the secret parts after classes.
                  1. vladimirZ
                    vladimirZ 13 July 2017 08: 37
                    +4
                    again you are for yours, no need to drum common truths. And then the commanders were slaughtered for high accident rate, and not for low preparedness of personnel. - nizhegorodec

                    nizhegorodec, did you yourself even serve in aviation, do you know the traditions and orders that exist there?
                    Before arguing that the "commanders" were commanded, you need to know what was always asked first of all for combat readiness in the aviation units, and in peacetime it is determined only by flying personnel.
                    The raid of pilots determines not only the combat readiness, but also reduces the accident rate in aviation. Small raid - high accident rate, large raid decreases accident rate on perfect sorties.
                    1. nizhegorodec
                      nizhegorodec 13 July 2017 08: 44
                      +7
                      Quote: vladimirZ
                      nizhegorodec, did you yourself even serve in aviation, do you know the traditions and orders that exist there?

                      yes, but not in the 30s, if you are so old that you were an eyewitness of those events, then my respect for your age, but it seems to me that you are just trying to put on the tracing paper of our day at that time. And at that time there was no objective control and every kompolka and above, first of all, sought to hide the accident rate by any means (up to hiding these facts), I am silent about postscripts and reinsurance, examples of which have no numbers in this and similar articles. How can you understand this, I don’t know
                      1. vladimirZ
                        vladimirZ 13 July 2017 09: 11
                        +5
                        at that time there was no means of objective control, and each kompolk and above, first of all, sought to hide accident rate by any means - nizhegorodec

                        Few people manage to hide the accident rate in aviation committed in flights, so if it had no visible material losses, it could be possible, but nothing more. Well, disasters with casualties are simply impossible.
                        You understand that accident rate is primarily determined by perfect sorties. There is no accident where they do not fly, that no one will allow, and where the accident rate is higher for those who fly a little, and no individual "high-skill aces" will cover the lack of air raid of other pilots during any checks.
                        A raid of 6 hours during the winter training period of several months is a signal for any thinking aviation leader that this regiment, brigade, division is not operational, that urgent measures must be taken to guide it. If this is not done and covered by higher aviation commanders, as was the case with the leadership of the Red Army Air Force, in the prewar years, then this is sabotage and wrecking on their part, for which they were seriously asked. And they did the right thing, because on their conscience the blood of thousands of dead, untrained pilots with a small touch.
                2. Nehist
                  Nehist 13 July 2017 17: 05
                  +2
                  Dear vladimirZ !!! Who told you that the more plaque he has, the better? In the recent 90, the pilot of civil aviation flew much higher than the military !!! And flying in a circle on which the clock was stuffed with the same Rechkalov did not give pilots skill
                  1. vladimirZ
                    vladimirZ 13 July 2017 18: 37
                    +3
                    Nehist, do you have anything to do with aviation?
                    Yes, experience, the ability of a pilot to fly, depends on his raid. In civil aviation, this is a general raid, a raid as a PIC (commander), in the Air Force both a general raid and a raid on various exercises, in difficult weather conditions, night flights, combat use, etc.
                    The small raid of the Red Army Air Force pilots was a disaster for our aviation, both before the war and in the early years of the war. Hence the elementary inability to fly, the great losses of aircraft and pilots.
                    To make sure of this, read about military aviation, or at least watch some movies. For example, the classic "Only Old Men Go to Battle", there it is well reflected.
                    1. Nehist
                      Nehist 14 July 2017 02: 56
                      +3
                      Respected!!! Better read the documents for 38-40 years !!! Where are the flight plans not just fulfilled but overfulfilled !!! What in fact turned out to be a complete lie !!! Or doesn’t you say something on foot by machine? You can certainly fly and 400 hours in a circle, but you can 40 but aerobatics !!! You probably do not know that some hand drivers directly forbade turns with a turn saying that the technician was crushed and performed them with a so-called pancake. Unfortunately, before the war in the Air Force of the Red Army there were a lot of postscripts. In the period from 36 to 38, there was a good one just as they flew this other conversation about the higher I wrote to you
      3. antivirus
        antivirus 13 July 2017 08: 38
        +1
        “I agree” - only ITT is to blame
        hahaha
      4. Alekseev
        Alekseev 13 July 2017 10: 06
        +4
        Quote: Monarchist
        On the face of elementary irresponsibility

        On the face, on the face ...
        And the people's commissars issued orders, fought, not sparing the stomach ...
        I was somehow flipping through a book of orders in one of not at all exemplary organizations, I was already surprised myself: how everything is "smoothly on paper."
        And the reason is that "the airfields were sleeping peacefully" and, in general, overslept the beginning of the war, and the huge losses, although there were orders and instructions, were well formulated by G.K. Zhukov in one famous interview (they didn’t miss this in his memoirs): "We must not forget that we entered the war, while still continuing to be a backward country ..... compared to Germany."
        That is, without taking into account the big problems, if not in quantity, then in the quality of many types of weapons, we have in the Red Army, headquarters, government agencies. the management lacked competent personnel, early huts were often in positions and the working environment was difficult, many were constrained by initiative - everyone was afraid to "go and drink coffee to Beria."
        Here are the results ...
        In general, a victory in the WWII is a miracle possible only in Russia.
        The descendants of the unfinished Nazis are still surprised ... wink
        1. avva2012
          avva2012 13 July 2017 10: 28
          +8
          Quote: Alekseev well formulated G.K. Zhukov in one famous interview (they didn’t miss this in his memoirs): "We must not forget that we entered the war, while still continuing to be a backward country ..... compared to Germany."

          The Germans at one time created a powerful reconnaissance aircraft even before the war, which included units at all levels of command, starting from the Wehrmacht supreme command, which had eyes in the form of a specialized unit, or rather, a unit, Rover’s ober group, which included reconnaissance aviation units as well as infrastructure, laboratories, airfields, which allowed them to conduct intelligence at the highest level. The Germans began preparations for military operations against the Soviet Union immediately after the final approval of the Barbarossa plan, which was adopted in December 1940, respectively, and the Germans began preparations from the beginning of January. Aircraft were specially built, or rather, altered from existing models: they were equipped with high-altitude engines, they received camouflage in the form of civilian identification marks, and all weapons were removed from them. In addition, several U-86 aircraft were designed with pressurized cabins that allowed them to operate from heights 12 – 13 km. At that time, for interceptors, this was the maximum height, and it was difficult to use fighter interceptors effectively. Plus, the fact that there was no radar field over the Soviet-German border did not play a role. The Soviet Union had several radars, but they were all located in the region of Leningrad and Moscow, so the activities of German intelligence officers were absolutely unpunished.
          One of the squadrons, based in the Königsberg area, the 2 I squadron of the Rover Ober Group, carried out reconnaissance flights along the route: they took off from the Seerappen airfield along the Königsberg, then they went over the Baltic Sea, went around in the region of Libava, further in the reconnaissance, we made over the entire territory of the Baltic States, Belarus and went to their territory in the Brest region, boarded the airfield in the Warsaw region, refueled and carried out a reconnaissance flight on the same route in the opposite direction . Soviet VNSS posts, that is, observations and discoveries, very rarely recorded these flights, because they were carried out at high altitude. Unfortunately, we do not know how many such flights were made. Soviet data speaks of 200 flights, but in reality there were much more. There is no German data, but there is factual confirmation of these German actions: the Germans at one time were able to shoot almost all the main Soviet airfields, railway stations, and troop concentrations.
          The Soviet Air Force could rely on intelligence information collected, as a rule, in the 30 years, because permission for intelligence activity was not obtained, at least until the beginning of June. There are several notes that were written by the chiefs of the Air Force Directorate of the Red Army - first Rychagov, then Zhigarev, who asked Tymoshenko and Stalin to begin reconnaissance over German territory, but until mid-June there was no such decision. Soviet pilots were forced to rely on less relevant data, which were collected back in the 30 years. For some objects, they were quite high-quality - for example, Konigsberg’s plan is pretty good, there are map materials, even some photographic materials that mark the Devau airfield. Soviet pilots were forced to act in such situations, often at random. The difference in intelligence, which the Germans and the Air Force of the Red Army had, is approximately understandable. According to the plans (we do not take political issues, who was going to attack first, who was not going to), the Soviet Red Army cover plans had to act aggressively, inflicting a number of attacks on German airfields. But the problem was that due to the lack of up-to-date intelligence information, part of the attacks even against these plans would be carried out on empty airfields where there were no combat units, and vice versa, those airfields where the military units were located should not have been attacked according to the plan . lecture by Mikhail Timin
          1. avva2012
            avva2012 13 July 2017 10: 33
            +4
            Aerial photography. Kaunas, April 10 1941

            Aerial photography. 9 June 1941

            And so it was with us:

            http://warspot.ru/2227-22-iyunya-1941-goda-srazhe
            nie-za-nebo
          2. stalkerwalker
            stalkerwalker 13 July 2017 10: 47
            +4
            Quote: avva2012
            The Germans at one time created powerful intelligence aircraft before the war .... The Soviet Air Force could count on intelligence information collected, as a rule, in the 30 years, because permission for intelligence activities was not obtained, at least before June

            Do not think that the USSR and the Red Army acted as a rabbit, mesmerized by a boa constrictor, regarding the issue of intelligence. The question of whether there were such violations of German airspace on the Soviet side was clearly hushed up. Soviet planes repeatedly flew over the territory of the governor general, of which there is evidence. The essence of the problem is that the flights of the Red Army Air Force were carried out on such types of aircraft, and with such equipment (more precisely, its absence) that could give a complete picture of what was happening within a radius of 30-50 km from the border. And our pilots saw exactly what the Germans allowed.
            1. avva2012
              avva2012 13 July 2017 10: 51
              +3
              The essence of the problem is that the Red Army Air Force flights were carried out on these types of aircraft, and with such equipment (more precisely, its absence) that could give a complete picture of what was happening within a radius of 30-50 km from the border.

              What M.V. Timin writes, “Aircraft were specially built, or rather, altered from existing models: they were equipped with high-altitude engines, they received camouflage in the form of civilian identification marks, all weapons were removed from them. In addition, several U-86 aircraft were designed with pressurized cabins that allowed them to operate from the heights of 12 – 13 km. "
          3. Mikado
            Mikado 13 July 2017 10: 59
            +5
            Doctor, good afternoon!
            In the same Pokryshkin, who served far from the worst regiment, there are words in the “Heaven of War” that somewhere in June 20-21 began to bury the benzos into the earth. About disguise - not a word.

            I have a question. I don't discuss gouging and poor training at all - yes, that was.
            I have a different question. Are there any material procurement documents anywhere? To begin with, at the beginning of the war, our mechanized corps did not have the overwhelming majority of vehicles, fuel, spare parts and personnel, as well as engineering units. And what about the supply to the Air Force? Aerodrome equipment, engineering tools, fuel, spare parts, paint, finally? Have additional forces and units been allocated for this? I think that everything was not going smoothly there, especially considering the fact that the western districts had to do colossal work in two years to “develop” the newly annexed territories - and we have always had bad logistics, the country is big. That is, perhaps, there is another reason. hi
            1. avva2012
              avva2012 13 July 2017 11: 24
              +7
              Good afternoon, Nikolai!
              There are many reasons. Unfortunately, I can’t answer your question like that, but I think with such a quantitative leap: “at the beginning of the 1939 of the year, the Red Army Air Force had about 150 air regiments, in 1940 they added another 100, in 1941 they started 100 regiments to form, "supply problems should be beaten. hi
              1. Mikado
                Mikado 13 July 2017 11: 32
                +4
                and with training; and then there’s a new material part that needs to be mastered. In the case of the T-34, they helped to master the exit brigades from the factory, but it was such a minuscule that the tanks never really mastered. I think that in aviation there was something similar. hi in general, such a diabolical solitaire came together at the same time that it only remained to study during the war, exchanging heroic lives for experience, industry and supply.
                1. avva2012
                  avva2012 13 July 2017 11: 49
                  +8
                  I do not want to offend tankers, but pilots, this is a "piece of goods." Ours was taken in quantity, and the Germans and Japanese, in quality. As a result, their quality was knocked out, and it turned out not to be replaced by anyone, but we have both quality and quantity by the 1944 year. Maybe our method will seem cruel to someone, but the war, in fact, is not at all humane. hi
                  1. Mikado
                    Mikado 13 July 2017 12: 01
                    +5
                    and Japanese, quality

                    the Japanese clashed with armies even worse prepared than ours, which suffered defeats with twice as many numbers. And with a much lower fighting spirit. At that theater of war and the Japanese, more than mediocre "armored boxes" were enough to scare away all the Papuans and the dignitaries who joined them, the Americans and the ancestors of lovers of fragrant grass - the Dutch. In the air - yes, the Japanese advantage at first was simply overwhelming quantitatively.
                    1. avva2012
                      avva2012 13 July 2017 12: 11
                      +4
                      Quote: Mikado At that theater of war and the Japanese, more than mediocre "armored boxes" were enough to scare away all the Papuans and the accused who were accused of them, Americans and Dutch.

                      Mmmm, I’m not a specialist, but it is believed that it was the Americans who found the middle ground in two approaches between ours and the same Japanese. They possessed a sufficient number of cars and well-trained pilots. Money, as always, the material and technical base. Therefore, they were able to significantly reduce the number of Japanese aces. One of the reasons for the appearance of kamikaze is the problem of trained flight personnel. And, what, the solution was found in Japanese, the main thing is to learn to take off.
                      1. Mikado
                        Mikado 13 July 2017 12: 26
                        +3
                        They possessed a sufficient number of cars and well-trained pilots.

                        as well as unrestricted resources and the absence of war on its territory.
                        One of the reasons for the appearance of kamikaze is the problem of trained flight personnel.

                        absolutely right. Plus the lag in the quantity and quality of technology. We decided in samurai!
                      2. unknown
                        unknown 13 July 2017 15: 05
                        +2
                        Another reason for the appearance of kamikaze is the peculiarity of the Japanese language, which made it difficult to quickly exchange information during air combat. This conclusion was reached by specialists in psycholinguistics.
                        Language is a verbal operating system, and the more perfect it is, the more opportunities it creates for the realization of intellectual inclinations. For example: two identical computers, but one with MS-DOS, and the other with Windows 10.
                  2. Olgovich
                    Olgovich 13 July 2017 13: 57
                    +4
                    Quote: avva2012
                    Ours was taken in quantity, and the Germans and Japanese, in quality. AT

                    4th Guards Air Regiment, fighting on I-16, for March 1942 knocked down 54 Nazi aircraft, losing only 2 of their own. Moreover, more than half of the shot-down fighters, much more perfect messers.
                    Is it not quality?
                    It was necessary to be able to manage and organize! when it was, people turned mountains ..
                    1. avva2012
                      avva2012 13 July 2017 14: 33
                      +5
                      And on what front did the 4 Guards fight, not with the Romanians, by chance? I’ve read that our Moldovans, in the first days of the war, Romanians were combed so much that it was not clear, but suddenly attacked.
                      1. Luga
                        Luga 13 July 2017 15: 57
                        +5
                        Quote: avva2012
                        And on what front did the 4 Guards fight, not with the Romanians, by chance?

                        I understand that the author had in mind the 4 GIAP Air Force KBF, the one in which V.F. Golubev fought. In March 1942, the regiment was engaged mainly in the protection of the Road of Life, and made flights for attack in the Mga-Sinyavino area.
            2. Cat
              Cat 13 July 2017 11: 48
              +8
              In the search for "scourge and zakut, for self-flagellation" perhaps it makes sense to pay attention to another problem?
              Our armed forces are faced with a mobilized, more than two years old warring enemy. Behind which almost half of Europe stood.
              Yes, the losses of our Air Force are horrifying! But according to the memoirs of German pilots, in June 1941 they suffered terrifying losses in technology and people. Many experts from Spain, the Norwegian company and the battle for Britain laid their heads on the Eastern Front and in the summer of 41.
              It is easy and simple after 3/4 centuries to poke a finger at the perpetrators who have passed away. The trouble in this is only one reversal of the story does not return.
              P.S. The article makes sense to read to our modern military personnel. So in the framework of combat and tactical-special training.
              1. avva2012
                avva2012 13 July 2017 12: 01
                +6
                Quote: Cat Our armed forces are faced with a mobilized, more than two years old warring enemy. Behind which almost half of Europe stood.

                Not only did they fight for two years, but after the approval of the Barbarossa plan in December 1940, they had been preparing to fight with us for six months.
            3. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 13 July 2017 12: 23
              +8
              Quote: Mikado
              And what about the supply to the Air Force? Aerodrome equipment, engineering tools, fuel, spare parts, paint, finally? Have additional forces and units been allocated for this?

              It was shitty in the Air Force with the rear. Especially in the summer of 1941, when the next reform of the rear and airfield support was superimposed on the shortage of personnel and equipment in the BAO.
              The rear bodies of the Air Force were in the process of reorganization, moving to a system of aviation-based areas. Moreover, in each of the regions it was planned to have an air base consisting of 4-5 battalions of airfield services. The reorganization was supposed to ensure freedom of maneuvering aviation, to free the combat air units from the rear organs. But by the beginning of the war, the reorganization of the rear organs on this principle was not completed. Of the ten districts, only eight were partially formed. As of June 22, 1941, the standard requirements for the wartime air force units for gas tankers was only 28%, for tankers - 36%. About the same situation was with other types of technical support. All this created significant difficulties in ensuring the combat operations of aviation.

              © 1941 - lessons and conclusions. - M .: Military Publishing House, 1992.

              And most importantly - with the outbreak of war, it turned out that the new structure also needs to be reorganized:
              The war caught the rear of the Air Force in the restructuring phase, which greatly complicated the management of units and institutions of the rear. There was not enough personnel and equipment for manning the newly formed units and recovering losses. As a result, as of August 1, 1941, out of the 601 airfield maintenance battalions, 343 (about 60%) were unfit and 49 (8%) were partially unfit.
              (...)
              From the very first days of World War II, not only the strengths, but also the weaknesses of the organizational structure of the aviation rear of the Air Force were revealed. Experience has shown that managing an air base is an unnecessary intermediate link between an air-based area and airfield service battalions. In fact, it did not contribute, but only hindered the management of battalions. In addition, there was an urgent need to increase the number of BAO to create a reserve of them, as well as have warehouses and motor vehicles as part of airborne-based districts to ensure the transportation of material assets. Therefore, by directive of the Deputy People’s Commissar of Defense of August 24, 1941, a new reorganization of the rear organs was carried out, according to which the base offices were disbanded and the district included: a separate communications battalion, 6-8 airfield service battalions (based on the provision of three to four air divisions two-regiment staff), 3–5 separate aerodrome-technical companies, a mobile oxygen station, a technical team for evacuating aircraft from places of emergency landing or an accident. In addition, the airborne-based area was given: the head aviation depot (GAS), the airfield engineering battalion, and mobile railway workshops. A little later, on the basis of the order of the NPO of the USSR of September 3, 1941, a separate automobile battalion was included in the district. As a result of the organizational measures, the capabilities of the military unit of the aviation rear significantly improved.

              © 1941 - experience in planning and using the air force. Lessons and conclusions (Based on materials from a military scientific conference of the senior staff of the central air force apparatus), - USSR Ministry of Defense, Air Force. - Moscow. 1989.
              Not bad, but - the rear of the SLA / airbase in the assigned states did not have their own transport and storage facilities. belay
              1. Mikado
                Mikado 13 July 2017 12: 39
                +6
                the rear of the SLA / air base in the new states did not have their own transport and storage facilities.

                before the war we had collective farms with our own transport; on MTS it was issued against receipt.
                The rest that you have cited - as they say, "h. Etc." hi the army was wildly unbalanced.
                1. Sergej1972
                  Sergej1972 14 July 2017 02: 29
                  +1
                  Regarding collective farms. And after the war it was the same. There was no direct prohibition on the purchase of tractors and trucks by collective farms. However, a small number of advanced farms could afford it.
                  1. Mikado
                    Mikado 14 July 2017 09: 21
                    0
                    There was no direct prohibition on the purchase of tractors and trucks by collective farms.

                    yes it is clear. I immediately recall the famous joke about the collective farm (already rich, the 70s):
                    - I suggest to buy a balloon!
                    - what for?
                    - what do you mean why? inflate and let go!
                    - why let it go?
                    - And to hell with us?
                    As I understand it, the regulation of life on the collective farm under Stalin and Khrushchev was different. At least the presence-absence of passports. But this has nothing to do with our branch drinks
      5. Proxima
        Proxima 13 July 2017 14: 48
        +6
        Quote: Monarchist
        What kind of serfdom in FIG? In the face of elementary irresponsibility, and irresponsibility it is always the same everywhere

        It is not a matter of irresponsibility, let alone serfdom. The most basic reason for the tragedy is that OUR AIRCRAFT has become a hostage of those events that happened at the dry theaters of military action. It is not the number of planes that wins, but the number of sorties, and there were very few of them. The reason is known - the constant change of airfields based. What kind of combat readiness of the aviation unit can be discussed if the unit changed 4-5 airfields per month. And this, because you need to relocate the entire infrastructure. And vice versa, when the front line was less or less stable, OUR AIRFORMS FACED MORE THAN DECENTLY! It is enough to mention the 55th fighter aviation regiment or naval aviation units. Accordingly, there were results. Remember the work of Pokryshkin, Rechkalov, Safonov.
        But this is still half the trouble. And without that unfortunate aviation, ground forces closed their "holes". Unsuitable aircraft were thrown at the attack on enemy tank columns. Hence such monstrous losses.

        This in the picture everything looks beautiful. In fact, BEYOND THE HANDLE - A DEATH.
        1. avva2012
          avva2012 13 July 2017 15: 22
          +1
          If I’m not mistaken, among the Germans, this was a separate branch of the army, and at the beginning of the war the Air Force was subordinate to the ground units or the Navy.
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 13 July 2017 20: 04
            +2
            Quote: avva2012
            If I’m not mistaken, among the Germans, this was a separate branch of the army, and at the beginning of the war the Air Force was subordinate to the ground units or the Navy.

            It was even worse with us: aviation in the districts was partially subordinate to the districts, and partially to the armies of these districts. It was the army mixed air divisions that accounted for the peak of losses in the first days of the war.
        2. faiver
          faiver 13 July 2017 19: 19
          +3
          attack on the "gull" is not the worst option, the day bombardment on TB-3 without cover is complete ....
          1. Proxima
            Proxima 13 July 2017 22: 34
            +3
            Quote: faiver
            attack on the "gull" is not the worst option, the day bombardment on TB-3 without cover is complete ....

            TB-3 - yes, of course. But let’s take the SU-2 front-line light bomber specially adapted for this or that case. And the less vulnerable air-cooled engine (which also protects the pilot perfectly), and the rear shooter, and the plane were already mastered, but still, the LOSSES were HUGE!

            Why is that? Yes, because aviation is not a panacea and it can only do what it can. Against tanks that broke through, the most effective means is of course IPTAPs, but they were sorely lacking,
            1. Nehist
              Nehist 14 July 2017 03: 12
              +1
              What? IPTAP? Palliative decision to have the best !!! Find information how the Wehrmacht blocked not such weak counterattacks of our fur corps !!! Strangely enough, they were dispensed with divisional means. Well, if you compare the loss of IPTAPs to the number of tanks knocked out by them, you will be horrified !!!!
              1. buzzilio
                buzzilio 16 July 2017 00: 05
                0
                The mechkorpusa of the beginning of the war is mainly BT and T-26, as well as various wedges, such as T-27, T-38, T-40. And all of them were tough for the German 37-mm "mallet" - their most massive anti-tank artillery at the beginning of the war. And when a little later they encountered the T-34 and the KV, which the more powerful 50 mm did not take, and not always 75 mm, they started scratching their turnips. They had to urgently use their anti-aircraft "aht-aht" to fight our heavy tanks.

                And if you compare the loss of mechanized corps from anti-tank artillery with non-combat losses due to breakdowns, or lack of supply - you will come to even greater horror))
                How many tanks that left the permanent deployment site crawled as a result before a military collision with the enemy? And how much equipment was with a worked out resource and requiring repair? And how much is left to stand on the roads due to lack of gasoline or broken engines? And add here endless air raids and the absence of anti-aircraft guns. I think that 30% of those who entered the battle of the total number of vehicles in mechanized corps will be very optimistic. And these that crawled as a result were for one battle. Because you can take away only 1-2 ammunition with you, but you could not expect the delivery of ammunition, due to the large shortage of vehicles.
                Now imagine the picture: the whole armada of 2000 tanks near Senno, in good condition, regularly receives fuel and shells, and German aviation does not dominate the sky. Strongly save the Germans their full-time VET?
                So do not exaggerate about anti-tank artillery)
                And don't underestimate our IPTAPs. In the end, by December 1941, they then destroyed the tanks and near Moscow the Wehrmacht ran out of steam ...
                1. Nehist
                  Nehist 16 July 2017 01: 17
                  0
                  Gg and no one begs IPTAPs !!! The Wehrmacht experienced supply problems in the same way as the Red Army after the first two weeks of the war !!! Our 45mm guns also sewed their T-3 and T-4 into any projection, and by the way our divisions by the number of guns almost twice exceeded the Wehrmacht’s division !!! Well, about the comparison of losses of the fur hulls from non-combat losses, you should contact the organizers of this mess because it doesn’t belong to the objective ratio of combat losses !!! And yet, yes, you can view the documents, how many tanks in the Wehrmacht for August 41 remained, as well as the reasons for the failure, the documents have long been in the public domain
    2. nizhegorodec
      nizhegorodec 13 July 2017 07: 07
      +7
      Quote: antivirus
      This is the usual inheritance of serfdom and isolated life in remote villages. HUMAN LIFE- 60 YEARS BEFORE PENSION- LIVING AND ONLY THE NEXT GENERATION

      1861 + 60 years + 20 years = 1941 - it turns out that just a new generation came to war, well, what does serfdom have to do with it?
      1. antivirus
        antivirus 13 July 2017 08: 42
        +1
        in 1913, only 15% of the population of the Republic of Ingushetia lived in cities (with equipment and social networks - “citizen”). These were mainly St. Petersburg, Moscow, Poland, and few Baltic states, Finns, and South RI.
        the rest is the village (post serfdom)
        -30% in the USSR lived in cities in WWII, but they also came from the village ("serfdom") - as parents taught to live. and lost the west of RI - the most educated part of RI
        1. Monarchist
          Monarchist 13 July 2017 09: 56
          +2
          Antivirus, but what about Yekaterinburg, Novonikolaevsky, Perm, they are also west of RI?
          1. antivirus
            antivirus 13 July 2017 10: 44
            0
            15% then 30% enter
            and lived with gardens. in the suburbs.
            Bourgeois- this is called. not a citizen"
            DO NOT REALLY NEED TO LEARN ALL? narrow specialization-- a turner - grinds a bar, receives money, buys food and ties, does not plant potatoes and tomatoes.
            So in western Europe, and we still have cottages at the dachas, we don’t plant flowers on weekends
        2. Sergej1972
          Sergej1972 14 July 2017 02: 33
          0
          In the village by 1861, less than half of the peasants were landowner peasants. In total, there were already more state and specific peasants. In addition, part of the landlord peasants belonged to the so-called obligated peasants.
    3. Finches
      Finches 13 July 2017 07: 58
      +11
      The natural state of Russia, regardless of the political system, era ..., this is a pathological unpreparedness for war ...
      1. Victor N
        Victor N 13 July 2017 09: 10
        +3
        We have already noted above that the Russian army did not allow the breakthrough of Germany and Austria-Hungary into the interior of the country at the first stage.
        1. Finches
          Finches 13 July 2017 09: 23
          +5
          And here it is? Germany's declaration of war found Russia in the process of rearmament, which was planned to be completed by 1917. This partly explains the persistence of William II in unleashing aggression precisely in the 14th. In addition to military-technical weaknesses, we add to this the population of Russia did not understand and was not mentally prepared for war (in this, by the way, there is the only difference between the 14th year and the 41st), unlike, for example, the French, who were humiliated by Prussia. And besides, the first offensive operations with crossing the state border in the year 14 were carried out by the Russian army and therefore speaks of a breakthrough in Germany and Austria-Hungary not correctly and historically not! But Turkey really attacked us first.
          1. Olgovich
            Olgovich 13 July 2017 14: 34
            +4
            Quote: Finches
            . Yes, and besides the first offensive operations with crossing the state border in the year 14 were carried out by the Russian army and therefore speaks about the breakthrough of Germany and Austria-Hungary is not correct and historically wrong

            I greet you, Eugene and - with a return! hi
            But you are wrong:
            2 of August 1914, the day after the declaration of war, German troops FIRST crossed the border and occupied the Russian city of Kalisz.
            And WHAT was going on there: the shelling of the windows of houses, some open shops and the shooting of people who accidentally walked along the streets began. They fired machine guns all over the city. Soldiers burst into houses and shops, robbed, set fire to and whole families — women, children, and elders — were slaughtered. Several hundred people were killed and wounded. In the building of the magistrate, where, on the order of the commandant, the city servants gathered, the city cashier Pashkevich and three watchmen were hacked to death with an ax. On Babinaya and Broclavskaya streets lay the mass of corpses of people, children and even horses.

            Hostages were also taken, who were stabbed with bayonets, and the city was subjected to massive shelling, again many victims.
            Then he would be burned.
            Some of the inhabitants were taken to a concentration camp, with hunger, execution, etc.

            And you say that there was nothing to fight for? Were these animals not to be stopped?
            Read the docs: http: //www.hrono.info/dokum/191_dok/191
            4nem001.php
            1. Finches
              Finches 14 July 2017 09: 06
              +1
              And all the best to you! hi

              I agree with you, but partially, since it was the Russian armies of Samsonov and Rennenkampf that started the major strategic operation with crossing the border to save the unfortunate French, and you are talking about a local German attack! And, as we recall, this was an imperialist war far from the true interests of the Russian people! That was the fundamental mistake of the autocracy!
        2. Diana Ilyina
          Diana Ilyina 13 July 2017 09: 37
          +14
          victor n Today, 09:10 ↑ New
          We have already noted above that the Russian army did not allow the breakthrough of Germany and Austria-Hungary into the interior of the country at the first stage.
          Sorry, but your comment is mildly superficial. The fact that the imperial army did not let the Germans into the interior of the country does not mean that it was ready for war, this is firstly. Secondly, for the Germans the eastern front was secondary and they did not hold the main forces here, so no one set the task for them to reach Moscow. So the fact that the Germans did not occupy half the country is not the merit of the imperial army. Do not confuse WWII and WWII, completely different conditions, goals and objectives.
          Please do a situation analysis in accordance with the realities ...!
          Zyablitsov Today, 07: 58 ↑ New
          The natural state of Russia, regardless of the political system, era ..., this is a pathological unpreparedness for war ...
          Eugene hi love ! I totally agree. I do not recall a single war for which we would be fully prepared. request
          1. Finches
            Finches 13 July 2017 09: 56
            +8
            Diana! hi love

            I see this only one reason - we never and were not going to attack anyone on that scale, setting global strategic goals that the West always intended against us! That is why the eternal unpreparedness for war! And since we ourselves are not the first to attack ourselves in general, we don’t know how to prepare for war and what kind of war ... As a result, we are not really ready for any war, and only in the process we begin to wake up ...
            1. Hantengri
              Hantengri 13 July 2017 22: 57
              +1
              Quote: Finches
              And since we ourselves are the first to attack, in general, we are not able to

              Yeah! And all 1/6 of the land, completely voluntarily, with songs, flowers and screams: “We’ll sell, white hujain!”, With tears in her eyes, sprinkling ash on her head, begged us to conquer it, in the name of TNB? wassat Are you all right with logic?
          2. Monarchist
            Monarchist 13 July 2017 10: 06
            +3
            Diana, you are right about this: traditionally, it depends on us during the period of rearmament.
            Perhaps this is due to the historical well-established tradition: we DO NOT AIM to conquer.
          3. unknown
            unknown 13 July 2017 15: 08
            +1
            No one is ever fully prepared for war.
          4. Hantengri
            Hantengri 13 July 2017 22: 42
            +1
            Quote: Diana Ilyina
            I do not recall a single war for which we would be fully prepared.

            Diana, my respect! love hi Do not be so categorical. Offhand, a few examples when we were, very thoroughly, ready. Let's go: the Don battle (Battle of Kulikovo), the capture of Kazan, the Polotsk capture, Narva No. 2, Poltava, the Russian-Turkish 1787-1791 (the conquest of Crimea), the conquest of Central Asia ... etc, etc.
        3. avt
          avt 13 July 2017 10: 42
          +5
          Quote: Victor N
          We have already noted above that the Russian army did not allow the breakthrough of Germany and Austria-Hungary into the interior of the country at the first stage.

          bully Did you actually see the map of the Empire? Nothing comes to mind for promotion in Poland? This despite the fact that in fact the advancing party was the Imperial Army under the leadership of Nick. Nika: What is it right to point out
          Quote: Finches
          And besides, the first offensive operations with crossing the state border in the year 14 were carried out by the Russian army and therefore speaks of a breakthrough in Germany and Austria-Hungary not correctly and historically not! But Turkey really attacked us first.

          As amended, the Germans attacked in fact, starting with shelling the coastline from Geben and Breslau, putting the Turks in front of the fact of entering the war on their side. And the Turks, by the way, until the very end were negotiating entry into the Entente, but with the condition that they regain their lost positions on the Beams in the war of 1912, in one form or another
    4. stalkerwalker
      stalkerwalker 13 July 2017 10: 35
      +4
      Quote: article
      I will not go into the details of whether or not these people were rightly accused of atrocities and shot, the court of history acquitted them and rehabilitated them. However, it is their age and hints that the frames were not very ...

      And how many years was the Red Army Air Force? Where did venerable and experienced fathers-commanders come from? And if we add to this the addiction to the "green serpent" not just by individual, but by many Air Force commanders, then the picture will be an oil.
  2. Basil50
    Basil50 13 July 2017 06: 05
    +7
    The author clearly traces * no one is to blame * just sloppiness and especially some later * history justified *.
    I will never believe that the failure to comply with a direct order is sloppiness.
    Orders for aviation were also about dispersal across field airfields and about painting in a protective color and much more. But in Belarus, none of this was done, moreover, there are recollections about the fact that the planes were disarmed and even the gas tanks were removed for * steaming * and about building planes at airfields * under the ruler *.
    Such * oddities * were in almost all military branches and as the apotheosis of leave to commanders on the eve of the German attack.
    A ban on the evacuation of families of border guards. How can all this be explained? Sloppiness does not fit. No way. Too everything was * one to one *. Or stories with warehouses that were deployed and completely packed and that went to the Germans like trophies?
    1. 210ox
      210ox 13 July 2017 06: 31
      +1
      One grandfather, a veteran of the Great Patriotic War, told me. He met the gunner in the war on June 22 in Belarus. He was lucky to survive .. They raised the alarm, took the guns to the positions, rushed to load .. And in the drawers, soap ... Well, they threw everything and run along forests ..
      1. nizhegorodec
        nizhegorodec 13 July 2017 06: 53
        +7
        Quote: 210ox
        rushed to charge .. And in the soap boxes ...

        well ... it's, to put it mildly, a soldier's bike. Got boxes with shells from the art warehouse, and did someone put soap in there? Well, how much soap does it take to fill a box?
        1. 210ox
          210ox 13 July 2017 06: 57
          +3
          For what I bought, for that I am selling. Maybe a bike. Although I looked at him as a hero. Actually, he was a hero. He went out to his own people, fought. Three wounds and shell shock ..
        2. unknown
          unknown 13 July 2017 15: 17
          0
          And the story is that for the execution of Polish officers in Katyn brought two suitcases of Walters.
          Of course, two suitcases of pistols will be enough, but will they get cartridges in place?
          And the scene from the movie "The meeting place cannot be changed"? The Bayard cartridges are in place, and a random cartridge was used for the shot.
    2. Monarchist
      Monarchist 13 July 2017 07: 08
      +4
      Vasily, how can you explain all this sloppiness?
      It seems to me that there are several reasons: 1) the air command command elementary "put a bolt" on their duties; 2) "hatred" our propaganda said: "The Red Army is stronger than all, and who doubts a coward or a wrecker" 3. Hidden sabotage when the commander of a military district “forgets” to withdraw units to summer camps. The removal of fuel tanks from aircraft was in the West during Pavlovsky
    3. Nikolay K
      Nikolay K 13 July 2017 08: 20
      +5
      The main idea of ​​the article: Stalin is not to blame, subordinates who did not follow smart orders and who committed the disaster of 1941 of the year with their general slovenliness are to blame.
      I would like to ask, but is it not the leader who is ultimately to blame if his subordinates do not follow orders everywhere? Maybe they didn’t fight that before the war, it was not necessary to look for spies, but to impose elementary discipline, not to waste time on political rants, but to learn to fly?
      1. Monarchist
        Monarchist 13 July 2017 10: 49
        +2
        I agree: Stalin had to control the execution of orders more often, otherwise Voroshilov issued the correct order and reported to Stalin: this and that I ordered this and that, and then both are happy. Then a new check and again the correct order, and control over the implementation is the tenth matter.
        And the Military Responses had a gorgeous go-ahead: this was allowed by the accursed conspirators Gamarnik, Tukhachevsky, etc., and now we have exposed the pests and the order
  3. Vladimirets
    Vladimirets 13 July 2017 06: 17
    +4
    I think such a disdainful attitude of the command of the Air Force units to their duties was connected, inter alia, with full confidence in their superiority over the enemy, based on propaganda: "beat the enemy on its territory and with little blood." The high command understood that not everything was so rosy, there weren’t.
    1. Amurets
      Amurets 13 July 2017 07: 37
      +5
      Quote: Vladimirets
      I think such a disdainful attitude of the command of the Air Force units to their duties was connected, inter alia, with full confidence in their superiority over the enemy, based on propaganda: "beat the enemy on its territory and with little blood."

      Yes, such a mess was not only in the Air Force, the army was about the same. Vivid examples of squandering folk remedies was in the construction of URov cited in his book "The battlefield-shore." S.I. Kabanov, and in what condition was the "Stalin Line" Svirin "Why did Stalin destroy the Stalin line." Only one report from the reports of Beria to Voroshilov:
      13 February 1939 city
      Despite the long construction and additional equipment of the Pskov and Ostrovsky SD, they cannot be considered combatable at the present time. Due to the inadequately designed and built in-house equipment of most DOTs, they cannot be occupied by troops ... up to half of the structures on the 20-40 cm are filled with water caused by an incorrect assessment of the groundwater depth. At the same time, the water supply system is not working ... There is no electrical equipment in the fortified areas ... In the living rooms of the UR there is high humidity and stale air ...

      UR supply centers are not built ... There are no food warehouses ...

      Due to illiterate planning of SD, their fire installations cannot fire at a distance of more than 50-100 m, so the terrain has hillocks, ravines and non-cut forests. DOS number 3, is installed on the slope of a ravine and cannot be masked due to permanent landslides, and the gun-half canopy in it is useless, as it is located below the level of the surrounding terrain ... To expand the shelling sectors, you need to remove about 120 cubic meters of land, and also cut down to 000 hectares of forests and bushes ...

      The bunker's bunks are designed for the use of Maxim machine guns, but they are equipped with machines of unknown design ... most likely designed for the Hotchkiss machine gun, which had been removed from service for a long time. Cannon polukaponiry are not equipped with armor valves and serve as a source of penetration into the bunker of melt water and precipitation ...

      The artillery armament of the UR consists of 6 obsolete 1877 field guns of the year, to which there are no projectiles ...
      The territory is not protected by SD. In the course of the work, the commission repeatedly met local residents passing in the immediate vicinity of the firing facilities to shorten the path between the settlements ...
      L. Beria "
      1. Amurets
        Amurets 13 July 2017 08: 00
        +4
        Quote: Amurets
        "Stalin's line" Svirin "Why did Stalin destroy the Stalin line." Only one report from the reports of Beria to Voroshilov:

        And there are not one such reports.
        “Like Comrade Rezun, I asked myself,“ Why was it necessary to blow up the fortifications? ”, But unlike the latter, I didn’t look for the answer in the excuses of the people responsible for its construction, and then engage in science fiction. I just tried to find the answer to this question in archives, access to which, in the opinion of other “truth seekers,” was blocked tightly. Nevertheless, for some reason I was allowed into the archives and issued all the documents of the period 1936-41 that were available on this issue. I was surprised to find that the inaccessibility of the “Stalin Line” in the post-war period was, to put it mildly, exaggerated, and no one had ever destroyed any fortifications on the old state border!
        *** PS. I read the article and the first thought - few comrade. Stalin sent to the Gulag all the bastards who stole, plundered the people's good, undermined the defense of our country ...., and which now yells about "unjust repression" ...! *** Comment marked with asterisks is not mine, but from the article link. "All quotes from an article by M. Svirin
        http://tsar-ivan.livejournal.com/26293.html
        1. igordok
          igordok 13 July 2017 13: 51
          +1
          Quote: Amurets
          And here I was surprised to find that the inaccessibility of the “Stalin Line” in the post-war period was, to put it mildly, exaggerated, and no one ever destroyed the fortifications on the old state border!

          I won’t say for the entire “Stalin Line”, but the bunkers of the Pskov and Ostrovsky SDs were destroyed by the Germans in 1943-44. somehow selectively. Presumably, those bunkers exploded in 1941. rendered more or less cruel defense.
          The "old" bunkers of 1936, were completely combat ready. The only thing is that the armored valves on the embrasures, due to short deliveries, were made at local factories. But the “new” 1938-39 of the bunker are just walls. Absolutely not equipped. This is due to the accession of the Baltic states, which made these bunkers "unnecessary."
          A high level of groundwater is a disaster, and without concern leads to depressing events. But when leaving this problem could be solved.

          It should be KNP, with a tower from the tank. But due to abandonment, it was under water.
  4. nizhegorodec
    nizhegorodec 13 July 2017 06: 43
    +4
    That is, drunkenness and other violations were known at the very top, and, obviously, took on such a scale that the drug addict had to fight this.
    and what you wanted, as they say, will be recruited into the army "by announcement." The slogan "Give 100000 pilots and paratroopers!" bore fruit, there was no professional selection, only a characteristic from the Komsomol organization and health, so the lumpen children went to aviation, they didn’t require much knowledge, but the popular saying is “oranges will not be born from aspen”. The result - drunkenness and slackness, a typical picture of the yards and backyards of Russian cities and villages of that time.
  5. nizhegorodec
    nizhegorodec 13 July 2017 06: 46
    +9
    And the lessons of that war are relevant today. Because such hatred and talk that “if anything - we are the whole world in ruins” are quite similar to “we will beat the enemy with little blood and on its territory” of the sample of the 30-40s of the last century.
    a wonderful conclusion, all the "stuff" local print and hang on the monitor!
    1. tomket
      tomket 13 July 2017 08: 10
      +2
      Quote: nizhegorodec
      a wonderful conclusion, all the "stuff" local print and hang on the monitor!

      Should have said "wash ourselves with blood, move to the Urals" ???
      1. nizhegorodec
        nizhegorodec 13 July 2017 08: 31
        +2
        Quote: tomket
        Should have said "wash ourselves with blood, move to the Urals" ???

        but they moved to Moscow and the Volga precisely under the slogans about little blood and foreign territory. Grandfather Lenin, I remember, said: "He studies military affairs in the present way!" "Not for fear, but for conscience ...", but not in style: "The Red Army is all redder!"
      2. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 13 July 2017 20: 08
        +3
        Quote: tomket
        Should have said "wash ourselves with blood, move to the Urals" ???

        Organized retreat, organized retreat in certain areas began to be considered a shame. The infantry combat charter directly directs the commanders to meaningless casualties, indicating that "no losses can force the company to stop performing the combat mission, even if only a few people remain in it" (BUP-40, part II, p. 7).
        Obviously, the theory of indiscriminate offensives must be resolutely and quickly put to an end, because it leads to arrogance, cap-hatred and one-sidedness in the preparation of the army.

        War is an equation with many unknowns; this alone refutes the thesis of invincibility. The army, of course, needs to be educated so that it is confident in its abilities. The army needs to instill a spirit of confidence in its power, but not in the sense of boasting. Bragging about invincibility harms the army. Meanwhile, in the conditions of the Red Army and in the entire system of propaganda and agitation, a false understanding of the invincibility of the Red Army was most widely reflected. So, the draft field Charter of 1939 directly indicates that the Red Army "... exists as an invincible, all-destructive force. It is such, it will always be like that" (Art. I).
        These harmful trends manifested themselves quite widely during the battles near Lake Khasan and on the Khalkhin Gol River. They were especially acute in the first period of the war in Finland, and we had to pay extra blood for them.
        Talk of invincibility leads people to arrogance, pride and neglect of military art, as well as individual defeats and temporary setbacks ...

        Guess the author of these words without Google? wink
        1. stalkerwalker
          stalkerwalker 13 July 2017 20: 44
          +3
          Quote: Alexey RA
          Guess the author of these words without Google?

          "... He broke all brains into pieces,
          He crept all the gyrus
          And the rope authorities
          Prick us a second injection ... "(c)
          lol
  6. avia12005
    avia12005 13 July 2017 07: 18
    +8
    The foregoing strongly suggests that the so-called "mass repression" is a liberal lie, generously paid from foreign sources. If they really took place, then any commander of the link, not to mention the commanders of regiments and divisions, being afraid of being shot, would have got out of the skin, following the orders of the People's Commissar of Defense. And then the whole picture is the opposite.

    Conclusion: the leadership of the Red Army knew about the situation, but did not organize control over the implementation of their instructions. They did not show due demanding of the subordinate bodies of military control.
    1. nizhegorodec
      nizhegorodec 13 July 2017 07: 29
      +2
      Quote: avia12005
      If they really took place, then any commander of the link, not to mention the commanders of regiments and divisions, being afraid of being shot, would have got out of the skin, following the orders of the People's Commissar of Defense.

      the flight commander carries out the orders of the komeski, not the level for the orders of the People's Commissar, but fearing accusations of high accidents, very many regiments forbade the pilots aerobatics and often did not allow the “youngsters” to fly, replacing the practice with theoretical training, especially on new aircraft and released in the sky is only veterans, hence the low level of pilots training.
    2. DimerVladimer
      DimerVladimer 13 July 2017 14: 01
      +3
      Quote: avia12005
      The above categorically testifies to the fact that the so-called "mass repressions" are a liberal lie generously paid from foreign sources



      Golden Mountain Chelyabinsk
      There are a lot of traces left from repressions - in our city there are 9 mines 100 m deep filled with bones of executed Soviet citizens
  7. Monster_Fat
    Monster_Fat 13 July 2017 07: 39
    +2
    I don’t understand why, again, write what has already been written in the book of Mark Solonin, "At peacefully sleeping airfields. The rout of 1941." ..... http://www.urantia-s.com/library/solonin/peace_sl
    eep / full
    1. tomket
      tomket 13 July 2017 08: 12
      +10
      Quote: Monster_Fat
      I don’t understand why, again, write what has already been written in the book of Mark Solonin, "At peacefully sleeping airfields. The defeat of the 1941 of the year"

      Actually Comrade Corned beef read about like Joseph Goebbels. In general, as soon as a person begins to refer to Solonin, then it becomes clear that there is nothing to talk about with him ....
      1. Monster_Fat
        Monster_Fat 13 July 2017 08: 19
        +3
        Well, so everything that the author of the article cites is written in the book of Solonin (link above). Findings? The article under discussion was also written by Goebbels? wink
        1. Boris55
          Boris55 13 July 2017 09: 57
          +1
          Quote: Monster_Fat
          The article under discussion was also written by Goebbels?

          How did you guess? belay
      2. unknown
        unknown 13 July 2017 15: 22
        +1
        Opponents also need to be studied, otherwise it turns out that "I didn’t read, but I strongly disagree."
  8. parusnik
    parusnik 13 July 2017 07: 40
    +7
    History lessons should not be forgotten
    ... Nobody teaches history, history does not teach anything ... Especially in Russia (RI-USSR-RF) .. They study, but no more ... Remembering the classics: there are two troubles in Russia ... why in Russia gunpowder did not come up with? There was no indication, etc ...
  9. avia12005
    avia12005 13 July 2017 08: 14
    +3
    Quote: nizhegorodec
    Quote: avia12005
    If they really took place, then any commander of the link, not to mention the commanders of regiments and divisions, being afraid of being shot, would have got out of the skin, following the orders of the People's Commissar of Defense.

    the flight commander carries out the orders of the komeski, not the level for the orders of the People's Commissar, but fearing accusations of high accidents, very many regiments forbade the pilots aerobatics and often did not allow the “youngsters” to fly, replacing the practice with theoretical training, especially on new aircraft and released in the sky is only veterans, hence the low level of pilots training.

    I am not talking about flight training, but about elementary performing discipline. The commander of the air division, having received the order of the Commissar of Defense from the headquarters of the military district with the appropriate resolution, is obliged to lower it below. The commander of the aviation regiment, in turn, having received this instruction, is obliged to organize its implementation on time. Komeski and commanders of the links in the same way. But this was not.
    1. nizhegorodec
      nizhegorodec 13 July 2017 08: 35
      +2
      Quote: avia12005
      The commander of the aviation regiment, in turn, having received this instruction, is obliged to organize its implementation on time. Komeski and commanders of the links in the same way. But this was not.

      The commandos and the flight commander can only execute the order of the regiment on combat training, and also monitor the appearance of the subordinates and their presence in the classes organized by the order of the regiment. Their commanding initiative extends only to the action of a subordinate unit in an air battle, and then, as part of the overall plan of the higher commander. Simply put, a commander cannot organize squadron flights when the regiment appointed a theoretical training regiment, or the regiment could not lift the regiment into the air if flights are forbidden by the division commander. Nor can a komeska disguise its planes in the bushes if the regiment stands "in a ticker"
    2. nizhegorodec
      nizhegorodec 13 July 2017 11: 26
      +2
      Quote: avia12005
      The commander of the aviation regiment, in turn, having received this instruction, is obliged to organize its implementation on time. Komeski and commanders of the links in the same way. But this was not.

      You do not find that the BAO is engaged in camouflage of the airdrome, but certainly the flight and handling personnel. I to this
  10. vladimirvn
    vladimirvn 13 July 2017 08: 46
    +1
    On June 22, 1941 the country, the army and the people, were not ready for war. And who is to blame can talk for a long time. The price of this non-readiness is monstrous. We were on the verge of losing statehood and the extinction of subsequent generations.
    1. EvilLion
      EvilLion 13 July 2017 09: 21
      0
      Are you a specialist to assess readiness? And then I have doubts.
      1. vladimirvn
        vladimirvn 13 July 2017 09: 36
        0
        Score by result, and the result is known.
  11. EvilLion
    EvilLion 13 July 2017 09: 20
    +6
    Like who? Comrade Pavlov, innocently shot. All cases of a particularly outstanding madhouse, including the arrival of German infantry on our airfield on foot, there were only 30 km to the border, are in its district. No one else slept in other places. This also includes the disgrace of the Brest Fortress in which 11 battalions were to remain from 2, but everyone was trapped, and despite the heroism of individual fighters, thousands of 7 simply surrendered without doing anything useful, and other objects in which the garrison was in shorts fled to rifles not according to Solzhetsnitsinsky, etc., but according to German sources. After all, the directive from June 18 is garbage, it does not need to be implemented. But rather, generally outright betrayal.

    On the ground, it is supplemented, and if the commander of the district is a traitor, then he will put the same people on the ground.
    1. Operator
      Operator 13 July 2017 10: 11
      +3
      Yes, there were no traitors in the command staff of the Red Army on the 22 of July 1941 of the year - there was a negative professional selection for the command staff on the principle of class affinity. And the closest at that time were the townspeople in the first generation of peasant families with a low level of education of parents and low-quality education of the cadres of the command staff themselves.

      This moment was perfectly understood by the military-political leadership of the USSR. Therefore, the wildest orders of the NCO and the General Staff were issued one after another, in which the same egregious facts of the total collapse of military discipline among the command staff of the Red Army and the Air Force in particular were cited.

      But the leadership of the USSR was even afraid to touch a finger of heroes such as Chkalov and Raskova, who were role models for the rest of the peasant freemen in the ranks of the Red Army Air Force, since there were simply no other personnel at the disposal of the USSR leadership.

      Only the Germans were able to discipline the Red Army command personnel from top to bottom by the method of ruthless shooting of those who disagree.
      1. unknown
        unknown 13 July 2017 15: 26
        +1
        The conspiracy really existed, but the stupidity and mess of the events of the outbreak of war cannot be explained.
        The problem is deeper: the civil war continued, but in different forms, and it ended with the assassination of Stalin.
      2. EvilLion
        EvilLion 13 July 2017 19: 12
        0
        But there is no need to star about the class affinity, Shaposhnikov, which colonel went to the Reds which class was? And in the 1945, he died, you already know the age, and in the Second World War he was already very sick. Between 1917 and 1941, as it were, 24 of the year, during this time the generation is replaced. The Tsar’s regiments of the Red Army, who won the civilian against the Tsar’s generals, are either retired or have died. Zhukov, and others who, as a result of the baron’s backdrops, bent, had experience and PMV as lieutenants and academic education.

        Betrayal is far less common than people talk about it, but in this case, ignoring the directive and the instant loss of command and control, so everything went to the ZVO for the female genital organ on a scale incompatible with other places and required the transfer of significant reserves there.
        1. Operator
          Operator 13 July 2017 21: 26
          +1
          You sound like breathing: the instant loss of command and control of the troops took place on their own or were there objective reasons for this, such as the unpreparedness for the overwhelming majority of the Red Army commanding staff with a low educational level and performing discipline, but with a true class origin?
    2. Monarchist
      Monarchist 13 July 2017 11: 00
      +1
      Moreover, everyone was sure that Stalin was wiser and smarter than everyone, which means you can "sleep soundly"
  12. Thompson
    Thompson 13 July 2017 09: 39
    +3
    I heard more nonsense only from dill.
    Well, naturally our russoliberals and russovsepropalschiki immediately flew here!
  13. nizhegorodec
    nizhegorodec 13 July 2017 11: 23
    +1
    vladimirZ,
    Quote: vladimirZ
    You understand that accident rate is primarily determined by perfect sorties. There is no accident rate where they do not fly, that no one will allow, and where the accident rate is higher for those who fly a little,

    I understand that, but at that time we were looking at the facts, and it was easier for any commander to play it safe than to explain to zealous investigators about the dependence of disasters on the number of flights. These are the facts set forth, including in this article. Do not fight against windmills
    1. EvilLion
      EvilLion 13 July 2017 19: 13
      0
      Do not think that the Red Army Air Force and the Kremlin did not understand this.
  14. avia12005
    avia12005 13 July 2017 11: 24
    +1
    Quote: nizhegorodec
    Quote: avia12005
    The commander of the aviation regiment, in turn, having received this instruction, is obliged to organize its implementation on time. Komeski and commanders of the links in the same way. But this was not.

    The commandos and the flight commander can only execute the order of the regiment on combat training, and also monitor the appearance of the subordinates and their presence in the classes organized by the order of the regiment. Their commanding initiative extends only to the action of a subordinate unit in an air battle, and then, as part of the overall plan of the higher commander. Simply put, a commander cannot organize squadron flights when the regiment appointed a theoretical training regiment, or the regiment could not lift the regiment into the air if flights are forbidden by the division commander. Nor can a komeska disguise its planes in the bushes if the regiment stands "in a ticker"

    Did you serve in aviation? And generally served? The statutes of the internal service, as well as other statutes on the Air Force also apply. And about the fact that each commander is responsible for discipline, etc., I will not say anything. That is, in your opinion, it turns out that the commander of the air regiment is responsible only for combat training? And for the discipline, the state of military equipment - no? And for the execution of orders from above - also not? Laughter, and only.
    1. bober1982
      bober1982 13 July 2017 11: 40
      +2
      You say everything correctly, I agree, as with nizhgorodec, I also agree with him.
      But these words .......
      Quote: avia12005
      The statutes of the internal service, as well as other statutes on the Air Force also apply.

      .... I do not agree, except that it applies to the company protecting the airfield. Hearing the guard dog barking ..... (I don’t remember further) .....password is a secret word (I don’t remember further) - the very knowledge of the Charter of the internal service is not rich.
      There are quite a lot of combat regulations, manuals, instructions in the Air Force, which affect the combat and flight training.
    2. nizhegorodec
      nizhegorodec 13 July 2017 11: 41
      +1
      Quote: avia12005
      And for the discipline, the state of military equipment - no? And for the execution of orders from above - also not?

      And where do I have about the lack of responsibility for discipline, more precisely, for its absence? Just the appearance and attendance of classes are part of it. It's just that now we are talking about combat readiness and combat training. Please read carefully before writing
  15. Taoist
    Taoist 13 July 2017 12: 20
    +5
    Well, this is already “closer to the truth” .... Actually, it was extremely difficult to overcome the legacy of the civil war with its “Makhnovism” and “come on, come on” in the Red Army. The concept of "discipline and order" was generally perceived for a very long time as the "legacy of the tsarist regime." By the way, it is quite possible that the repressions were largely due to the need to at least somehow curb the "partisan" in the units. I am already silent about the fact that, by and large, the supply, planning and logistics issues in the units were at an embryonic level. Stupidly there were no specialists. There was no one to teach, and there was no particular desire to learn. So the Germans eventually became teachers and dearly took for their lessons.
  16. nivander
    nivander 13 July 2017 12: 26
    +3
    "..there where aviation begins order ends, for when God established order on the earth, aviation was in the air" - army wisdom
    1. Freeman
      Freeman 14 July 2017 01: 03
      +1
      Quote: nivasander
      "..there where aviation begins order ends, for when God established order on the earth, aviation was in the air" - army wisdom

      laughing Yeah, army "wisdom" - it is like this:
      Who does not smoke and does not drink, does not swear - he will not get into the Air Force, even if he does not try!
      The pilot is not the one who drinks between flights, but who flies between drunkards.
      He doesn’t drink in aviation, only “autopilot”; and then not always.

      And the “most important” one probably went from the times described in the article -
      Drink it
  17. Curious
    Curious 13 July 2017 13: 38
    +2
    The topic for organizing a debate massacre is a win-win. The History magazine provides data on losses in the early days of the war. The material is recommended for study in history lessons.
    Losses of the Red Army and the Wehrmacht from June 22 to July 10

    Red Army Wehrmacht
    Personnel 815 700 79 058
    Guns and mortars 21 500 1061
    Planes 4013 826
    Tanks 12 249 350
    Therefore, based on the losses, we should expect a series of articles on June 22, 1941. Whose fault is “peacefully sleeping tankmen, artillerymen, infantrymen”?
    And only the Navy, commanded by the People's Commissar of the Navy of the USSR N.G. Kuznetsov at his own risk put the fleet ships on alert and successfully repulsed all the attacks of the Luftwaffe aircraft.
    Only now will we find out the truth, while history buffs and history buffs will deal with the issue.
    After all, there is the Institute of History of the RAS. And for sure there are documents that contain the very main "military secret" of June 22, 1941. Maybe it's time to open?
    1. stalkerwalker
      stalkerwalker 13 July 2017 13: 49
      +3
      Quote: Curious
      And only the Navy, commanded by the People's Commissar of the Navy of the USSR N.G. Kuznetsov at his own risk put the fleet ships on alert and successfully repulsed all the attacks of the Luftwaffe aircraft.

      Here it is! What a brave commissar! But in Sevastopol they didn’t even know that someone was putting something on alert there. The whole city was in illumination on the occasion of the end of the "big maneuvers." And only when the Germans laid mines on the fairway from the first call did they come to their senses.
      The story of the "undeservedly forgotten and bypassed in awards" red People's Commissar has already become a byword .....
      Quote: Curious
      Only now will we find out the truth, while history buffs and history buffs will deal with the issue

      Search and find ....
      You just need to look where it’s not light, but where you’ve lost ....
      1. Curious
        Curious 13 July 2017 13: 51
        +1
        Whose parable and whose pagan?
  18. brn521
    brn521 13 July 2017 13: 54
    +3
    In 1937, the number of emergency incidents in the Air Force increased compared with 1936: a) for accidents by 80%, b) for accidents by 70%

    This is not enough. At the same time, data should be provided on the strength of the Air Force in 1936 and 1937.
    in the Red Army Air Force reigned, to put it mildly, a mess

    If the army is growing rapidly, a mess is inevitable. Both in people and in technology. Here are just a mess mess. The Germans also believed that they had a mess and blamed the failure of the blitzkrieg on him.
    then Drabkin and Krivenets

    Well remembered Drabkin. What was postponed according to his books. The Red Army Air Force is the first example in history when pilots were recruited by conscription. We expanded the staff of the Air Force, gathered suitable people on a team basis. Those. for example, there is a person with certain experience flying on training or civilian planes, or even gliders. This person is a member of the party, has no penalties. And that's all, this character, regardless of his intentions, inclinations and marital status, receives an order to join the ranks of professional military pilots.
    I also remember that. The necessary colors were not at all, in the sense of not produced. Lime and whitewash were widely available, so winter camouflage was applied to ground equipment without any problems. But paint to the color of the area at that time is something on the verge of fantasy. This despite the fact that camouflage must be changed every season. Perhaps that’s why they didn’t even apply winter, so as not to repaint it in summer.
    The next moment. Willingness to repel the attack. 1. Personnel pilots. They have families. Not somewhere in military towns, but in rented apartments in the nearest settlements. Firstly, sergeants are not supposed to, and secondly, we did not have enough building capabilities to even solve more important tasks, for example, the equipment of backup runways. As a result, when at the last moment they received a specific order to prepare for the repulsion of the attack, the nose was already on June 22, a day off. Many ran into families. 2. The alarm was considered training. Well, see for yourself. I always thought that training anxiety should be different from the real one. People should clearly understand that at the moment this is no longer a routine, but a matter of survival. 3. The Germans came to the suppression of our Air Force in the direction of the main attacks very thoroughly. Some aerodromes on the first day grabbed several dozen air raids at once. Neither reserves, nor the organization of airfields were originally designed to counter such a massive attack. Therefore, even where the fighters survived, they carried out their third or fourth take-off already without ammunition and on the remaining fuel. Again, the planes are different. The very same instant-3, and even with unprocessed, constantly failing weapons, were practically useless. In the Air Force of some of the districts at this time, exercises were generally going on. The aircraft were deployed in a military manner. As a result, losses from raids were single. But they were not in the direction of the main blows, otherwise they would have dared. However, this only applies to border airfields, which are suicide bombers in any situation. Second-tier airfields, as far as I remember. the Germans had time to thoroughly pat, before they shared the fate of the border. And then suddenly it turned out that we had neither airplanes, nor airfields, nor supplies. And experienced pilots who are in captivity, who are surrounded, who even donkey in non-core troops.
  19. avva2012
    avva2012 13 July 2017 15: 59
    0
    unknown,
    Sorry, but didn’t understand what the connection is belay In 41-42 years, Japanese pilots fought on equal terms with the Americans and their own language did not bother them.
  20. avva2012
    avva2012 13 July 2017 16: 18
    0
    Luga,
    Thank you, but if for the attack, how did you manage to shoot down the enemy aircraft 54?
  21. Karelian
    Karelian 13 July 2017 18: 25
    +2
    All the same, there were exceptions to the prevailing rules in the training of flight personnel if there were competent, initiative commanders. Here are two memorials from the GSS, the Baltic pilot V.I. Rakov;
    [/ quote] The next day we were already the whole squadron at the new airfield. They began to fly intensely.
    A week later, from the brigade, where they learned that the squadron flies every day, a ban came:
    - Give us applications for flights every other day.
    Then it was believed that flying every day should not be, but we treasured time, knowing that we could not be at the field airfield for a long time. And we began to submit applications to the brigade every other day and every other day to the regiment. For another week there they could not understand why, after all, the squadron flies every day.
    It was inclement autumn weather, and we could make blind flights not only under the hood, that is, artificially depriving the pilot of the opportunity to see the horizon, but also in real clouds. However, in the Baltic there was never a lack of clouds even in the middle of summer.
    In flight in formation, the squadron achieved accuracy, as in a parade. Most pilots mastered night flights. The flight commanders completed their training completely.
    - Yes, here we have done almost as much as in the whole summer! - pilots, navigators, and technicians quite spoke. Never before have we flown so much and freely.
    One day, returning from a flight along a route in a southerly direction, I was convinced that the cyclone, which meteorologists had scared us in the morning, was approaching the airfield,
    “I would not have to sit by the sea and wait for the weather,” I thought during the landing. Neither shooting nor bombing at low cloudiness was possible.
    Near my parking lot, I found Captain Savin, chief of the operational department of the brigade headquarters.
    - Hello, Vasily Ivanovich! He brought an invitation to return home. - Savin handed me the order of the brigade commander to complete camp training and relocation to Kotly. - So get ready, but for now, maybe let's go for a snack?
    I replied that I had breakfast before the flights and wait for dinner.
    “I think we’ll have lunch in Boilers.”
    - Is it really fast? Maybe you’ll declare an expense? On the topic of consumption, the military liked to joke. An expense is an application to the canteen so that they leave lunch for a delayed business team. This was recalled by the way and inappropriately. For example, during sports in rowing or running a tail-weaving team, disgruntled fans shouted: “Do not rush! Expense claimed! " Link commanders came up with a report.
    “Tell all crews to take seats on the planes and take the rocket to the start,” I said.
    The car transported the flight commanders to the parking lots, where they were awaited by pilots who had just returned from flights. Gas tankers were filling up fuel on airplanes. It just so happened that we were refueling immediately after landing the aircraft at the airport. I remember that I first met this order in Staraya Russa. I was still taxiing to the parking lot when I saw a gas tanker rushing towards me at full speed. As soon as I turned off the engines, he pulled up and stopped in front of my plane.
    - Do not! We have fuel, ”the aircraft technician told him.
    A young colonel, the commander of an aviation unit standing there, approached. Two brand new battle orders glittered on his chest. Introducing myself, I thanked him for the proposed fuel.
    - This is the rule of war! The plane has landed — refuel it immediately so that it is ready, ”said the colonel, smiling.
    We accepted this rule with pleasure. In general, the squadron was already ready for departure. Personal belongings of the pilots fit in a small suitcase. They were taken with them on a plane.
    Seventeen to eighteen minutes after talking with Savin, I got on a plane and ordered a rocket to be given. Savin was only halfway to the dining room: you can’t walk straight through the airdrome, and you had to make more than one kilometer bypassing it.
    - What kind of rocket? - He asked the political officer Polyakov, who was walking with him. Polyakov was to return to Kotly later with headquarters.
    - Now they will fly out.
    - Oh hell! I didn’t tell everything to Rakov! - Savin slapped his forehead and turned to run to the planes. But they already taxied out.
    “What did you not say?” - worried Polyakov.
    - Departure is allowed with cloud cover not lower than two hundred meters.
    “Well, she’s not lower, indeed,” answered Polyakov, pointing to the sky.
    - Yes, here, but in Kotly?
    - I watched the weather report, that's okay. Will pass! - assured Polyakov.
    Savin had some restless breakfast. After half an hour I asked the duty officer:
    - Are there any of the Boilers?
    - All planes have already landed.
    “Now I would have breakfast again,” Savin smiled with joy. He did not know that forgetfulness would still cause him trouble.
    Our flight turned out to be really difficult. Having done halfway, the squadron was forced to switch to a low-level flight. The cloudiness from three hundred meters dropped to one hundred fifty - one hundred, and yet the Boilers almost so much rise above the bay.
    “Perhaps, it will probably not be any worse,” I thought, continuing to lead the squadron. “And for us this is a useful training.”
    It remained to fly quite a bit.
    “Now the railway will go to the right, and the water tower will be to the left, and then the airfield,” I wondered and did a few swings on the right wing. This meant that the squadron, marching in a wedge of links, should be rebuilt in the right bearing.
    Almost cutting the tops of the trees, the first link of the village immediately with a turn of 270 degrees. The second and third links are only slightly behind the first and also almost from one circle went to the landing. Then the fourth link sat down.
    When the brigade commander A.N. Sukhanov and A.A. Kuznetsov, commander of the Baltic Fleet air force, jumped out of the headquarters, shaking everything around the engines, the last two aircraft entered the landing area.
    Sukhanov was pleased with the successful flight of the squadron and landing in the fog. But Kuznetsov did not share his opinion:
    “We must recover from the squadron commander for flying in such weather!”
    “The rebase order has been executed!” I reported.
    “I see what is done,” Sukhanov answered, trying to speak strictly. “But you violated my instructions.”
    - What kind? - I was surprised.
    - I didn’t allow a flight with cloudiness below two hundred meters!
    I had to deploy the tablet and take out the order sent to me by Savin. Running the order a second time, I handed it to Sukhanov:
    - Comrade brigade commander! There is no limitation.
    - I handed it to Savin in words. But you yourself must know that you cannot fly below two hundred meters. That is what the instruction says.
    - This is a limitation for pilots who have not completed preparations for blind flights. For the past - the conditions are different.
    - And when did you go through it?
    - During the weeks that were in the camps. Sukhanov was clearly pleased. But what about the demand of Kuznetsov?
    “Leave the conversation until tomorrow,” he said. The next day, Savin arrived by train.
    - Why didn’t you warn Rakov about limiting the flight conditions? - Sukhanov asked him the first question.
    - Did not have time.
    His situation was not pleasant ... Soon, the commander of naval aviation S.F. Zhavoronkov came to our garrison.
    - How many crews have you prepared for combat sortie? - He asked me at the general meeting.
    - Squadron in full force.
    - In what conditions?
    - In difficult.
    - What do you call difficult conditions?
    - According to the instruction, the cloudiness is one hundred meters and visibility is half a kilometer.
    - You flew in these conditions?
    Sukhanov answered me smiling, smiling:
    - From the camps he led the squadron into a continuous fog and put it in six minutes ...
    And this is from the memoirs of the GSS Zholudev, who fought in the regiment of the famous Polbin;
    We flew a lot and especially intensively with departure in the spring of 1940 to camps at field airfields. The participation of the regiment in a number of exercises allowed the young flight crew to get acquainted with the sparsely populated spaces between Lake Baikal and Nerchinsk, with the impenetrable swampy taiga of the Vitim river basin, and the waterless steppes of Mongolia. Landing at other airfields, bombing at unfamiliar and completely unfamiliar training grounds have become commonplace. Sometimes we barely had time to change flight maps, draw new routes on them, and memorize not always well-remembered names of Yakut and especially Mongolian settlements, rivers and rivulets. But all these difficulties of hard work and nomadic life, constant updating of tasks to be solved, flights over deserted and non-reference areas have become a true school of combat skill, a school for improving one's professional skills. Not even six months had passed, and young crews could already independently carry out bombing from medium and high heights. [Quote]
    1. Monarchist
      Monarchist 13 July 2017 19: 45
      0
      Thanks for the quote.
    2. BAI
      BAI 14 July 2017 20: 29
      0
      Now there will be a warning for long quotes.
  22. avia12005
    avia12005 13 July 2017 18: 43
    0
    Quote: nizhegorodec
    Quote: avia12005
    And for the discipline, the state of military equipment - no? And for the execution of orders from above - also not?

    And where do I have about the lack of responsibility for discipline, more precisely, for its absence? Just the appearance and attendance of classes are part of it. It's just that now we are talking about combat readiness and combat training. Please read carefully before writing

    I read attentively enough, and I do not suffer from lack of attention. Read DPS. The commander answers ... And then the commander is obliged ... The very first point is responsible for the state of alert. BG aviation units - it is not only TI AT and the level of training of flight personnel. I have the honor.
  23. avia12005
    avia12005 13 July 2017 18: 46
    0
    Quote: bober1982
    You say everything correctly, I agree, as with nizhgorodec, I also agree with him.
    But these words .......
    Quote: avia12005
    The statutes of the internal service, as well as other statutes on the Air Force also apply.

    .... I do not agree, except that it applies to the company protecting the airfield. Hearing the guard dog barking ..... (I don’t remember further) .....password is a secret word (I don’t remember further) - the very knowledge of the Charter of the internal service is not rich.
    There are quite a lot of combat regulations, manuals, instructions in the Air Force, which affect the combat and flight training.

    Protection of the airfield and facilities at that time was carried out by BATO. So on the issue of barking guard dogs - this is there. BATO complied with Art. aviation chief - chief of the air garrison. Simply put, the commander of the air regiment. Conclusion: having received the order to disguise and disperse, this one had to organize its execution by the forces of the subordinate units. Point.
  24. d.gksueyjd
    d.gksueyjd 13 July 2017 19: 17
    +2
    There was open sabotage of orders for camouflage and the construction of caponiers for aircraft, the dispersal of equipment, it is more unknown where orders appeared for the disarmament of military equipment and the delivery of ammunition to warehouses - this only confirms that Abwehr did a good job of introducing its agents. Almost 2 months before the start of the war, DRGs were sent to the territory of the USSR to clarify intelligence and disrupt all types of communications, various anti-Soviet groups were activated: Bandera, forest brothers and other bastard. All these actions brought irreparable damage to the Red Army. General - did not have sufficient experience, and sometimes there was direct wrecking.
  25. Monarchist
    Monarchist 13 July 2017 19: 36
    0
    The novel and the venerable comrades about the death of Serov and Polina Osipenko: once in the newspaper (it seems “Izvestia”) there was an article about this incident and another version was given there.
    Regarding the death of Chkalov :: Klement Efremovich is cunning that an elementary violation of the instructions. On NTV there is a cycle of the d / f "Searchers" and it is proved there that this accident was planned, but who is the customer? There are publications on this subject, and again, it is not so simple there, as stated in Voroshilov’s order. I confess that I can’t provide a list of references: my memory is not perfect, but I don’t want to search for records and remember for a long time
  26. iouris
    iouris 13 July 2017 22: 50
    +1
    If the main aviation forces and the Red Army were based at a greater distance from the line of contact with German troops in the interior of the country, the effectiveness of the German military operations in the early days of the war would be substantially different.
    Conducted Tymoshenko "debriefing" is impressive. In general, sloppiness in aviation on the eve of the war is confirmed by facts. Here you can see that there were no former tsarist officers, and especially generals in the Red Army Air Force. The Red Commanders, apparently, also did not deeply understand either the specifics of aviation or the principles of its development. Methods of education and training of flight personnel and ITS were developed and implemented after the war.
  27. Nehist
    Nehist 14 July 2017 03: 14
    0
    Quote: Finches
    Germany's declaration of war found Russia in the process of rearmament, which was planned to be completed by 1917.

    Do not make me laugh!!! It was Russia's mobilization that became the occasion for Germany to declare war
    1. Scratchy doll
      Scratchy doll 14 July 2017 04: 44
      0
      The occasion was Teutonic pride.
      In response, they also could not only announce a mobilization, moreover a partial one?
      1. Nehist
        Nehist 14 July 2017 06: 59
        0
        Nda? And the fact that Wilhelm thrice asked Nicholas to curtail the mobilization does not suit you?
        1. Scratchy doll
          Scratchy doll 14 July 2017 09: 00
          0
          No, see above. Then he declared war on Russia and asked to wait with military action.
          Like inadequate or German and therefore happy?
  28. kunstkammer
    kunstkammer 14 July 2017 04: 19
    0
    I apologize for the harshness, but it’s not surprising that almost all of this ... I don’t even want to call the army ... all this multimillion-dollar gang to them. Old Man Makhno, almost in full force surrendered to the Germans prisoner.
    The pilots do not have a raid, the tankers drive, the gunners firing ... armed rabble is not an army.
    How much did Stalin “repress” there? It seems 40 thousand commanders? Few!
    The Germans captured hundreds of thousands of red “commanders” and only this apparently saved the country from complete collapse. The new bosses came in their place ... a little smarter than steel.
    It is a pity for ordinary soldiers, they have accepted an innocent fierce death.
    1. Scratchy doll
      Scratchy doll 14 July 2017 04: 59
      0
      No need to pour crocodile tears. Everything went according to plan.
      The pilots did not have any aircraft left, the tankers had fuel, the rest of the air reconnaissance and cover troops. It was all because of one unchained at the headquarters of the Western District, which two days before the Germans hit. Soviet aviation concentrated on the main airfields.
      https://youtu.be/-fpgQq9XD3k?t=1616
      Hitler was shown a photo of their aerial reconnaissance, where even runways were clogged with airplanes with no weapons and there were no anti-aircraft guns, only then in 13: 00 he ordered the attack on the USSR.
      1. Mordvin 3
        Mordvin 3 14 July 2017 05: 22
        +3
        Quote: Scratchy Doll
        Hitler was shown a photo of their aerial reconnaissance, where even runways were clogged with airplanes with no weapons and there were no anti-aircraft guns, only then in 13: 00 he ordered the attack on the USSR.
        ?
        What time! But what then did Henry show off on Nymberg? Like, we all know?
        1. Mordvin 3
          Mordvin 3 14 July 2017 05: 29
          +3
          There is a version that Hitler wanted to attack Iran, and Stalin - to Britain. Only Rudy Hess screwed up everything.
        2. Scratchy doll
          Scratchy doll 14 July 2017 05: 39
          0
          I didn’t want to shine agents, all of a sudden, as with the "forest brothers" it would come in handy yet.
          1. Mordvin 3
            Mordvin 3 14 July 2017 05: 47
            +2
            Quote: Scratchy Doll
            I didn’t want to shine agents, all of a sudden, as with the "forest brothers" it would come in handy yet.

            I don’t understand. Who are you talking about? I had a knife from these brothers, a lousy thing. I gave it without regret. negative
            1. Scratchy doll
              Scratchy doll 14 July 2017 07: 12
              0
              About this:
              Quote: Scratchy Doll
              It was all because of one unchained at the headquarters of the Western District, which two days before the Germans hit. Soviet aviation concentrated on the main airfields.
              1. Mordvin 3
                Mordvin 3 14 July 2017 07: 16
                +2
                Quote: Scratchy Doll
                About this:
                Quote: Scratchy Doll
                It was all because of one unchained at the headquarters of the Western District, which two days before the Germans hit. Soviet aviation concentrated on the main airfields.

                So this is Carbine. He was banned two hundred times.
                1. Scratchy doll
                  Scratchy doll 14 July 2017 09: 01
                  0
                  Who is carbine? The spy at Pavlov’s headquarters was never found.
      2. Monarchist
        Monarchist 15 July 2017 15: 26
        0
        In my opinion, it will be a simplification to cling to the commander of the Western Special Military District. Other comrades have "oddities" [quote] [/ quote]
        1. Scratchy doll
          Scratchy doll 15 July 2017 16: 03
          0
          Most of the disorganization was introduced by one of his subordinates.
  29. BAI
    BAI 14 July 2017 20: 26
    +1
    1. Extremely low discipline, slackness and disorganization in the Air Force units of the Red Army. As a result of poor control, orders, charters and flight operations instructions governing flight operations are not firmly and consistently carried out ...
    A large number of debuts with debauches, unauthorized absences and other immoral offenses incompatible with the rank of commander,

    As my father (front-line soldier) said: "The army ends where aviation begins."
  30. kunstkammer
    kunstkammer 15 July 2017 14: 36
    0
    Quote: iouris
    the effectiveness of the German military operations in the early days of the war would be substantially different.

    if ... if ... but let's - if:
    If all the orders of the Commander-in-Chief and the General Staff were fulfilled, then the enemy would be met by troops in the trenches, pilots (at least duty squadrons) in airplanes, artillery in the positions of fire protection of troops ... Everything is in full battlefield (at least partial !!!).
    And then it was possible, even theoretically, to deter the enemy. Prior to the approach of the mobilized main forces.
    And then, it turns out, suitable troops on the march were subjected to rout or encirclement.
    The border block did not work. Let's be honest - the Germans went practically ... without noticing him. Separate centers of resistance do not count.
  31. kunstkammer
    kunstkammer 15 July 2017 14: 48
    0
    Quote: Scratchy Doll
    Everything went according to plan

    there is no silver lining. Sometimes I think that it would be almost useless to lose almost all the equipment and weapons ... until now, industry would have stamped BT-shki and Ishachki.
    Remember how the commander of a fighter aircraft was punished for complaining - instead of airplanes, industry supplies flying coffins?
    And after the outbreak of the war, no one was silent about the obsolete even moral technique. Industrial generals bit their tongues. And production began, mainly of more modern weapons. Or all sorts of flaws in the old were eliminated faster.
  32. Monarchist
    Monarchist 15 July 2017 15: 32
    0
    Quote: Scratchy Doll
    Who is carbine? The spy at Pavlov’s headquarters was never found.

    They didn’t look there. But actually, there is too much turbidity in this matter
    1. Scratchy doll
      Scratchy doll 15 July 2017 16: 06
      0
      Where was it necessary?
  33. buzzilio
    buzzilio 15 July 2017 23: 37
    0
    For some reason, they forget that at that time technology itself, as well as the culture of production, were far from ideal.
    The resources of motors were estimated in tens of hours, well, if in hundreds. The quality of the seams, joints, materials - everything was also lame. The country has only learned to create technology. So this also contributed to the accident rate. And add training flights here - after all, students made a bunch of aerobatic errors, forcing the equipment to experience unnormal overloads.
    As far as I remember, Smushkevich just suffered for this - for the quality of the equipment.

    Another thing is that the accident rate was practically not connected with the “base” that the generals had arranged by June 22, having bored the Western OBO aviation at 2-3 central airfields, under the pretext of repairing everyone else. And the Germans clearly knew where to fly to bomb.
  34. vnord
    vnord 31 July 2017 14: 16
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    Quote: bazzilio
    It was after Khrushchev’s lies that everyone began to say that he was “sitting behind a joke,” for it is embarrassing to admit to posterity that he was behind robbery, or for murder.

    When he was a student in 1983, he was in the town of Labytnangi (Zapolyarye, Tyumen Region), he talked with former prisoners under Stalin, after his release, many remained to live there. None of them said that they were seized for business and their affairs and fate were interesting ... At that time, there were many abandoned zones in the tundra and the remains of a piece of iron. Add to dictionary- Igarka