Military Review

Kursk Bulge and Prokhorovka - Where Historians are Wrong

101
For reasons that are not completely clear, a number of researchers studying the events on the Kursk Bulge, for some reason, attach great importance to the battle of Prokhorovka. As if this battle was the culmination of the battle, and everything that happened in other parts of the arc was almost secondary. Although the battle of Prokhorov, with all its heat and drama, was only one of the episodes of the great battle of Kursk.
For example, the battles in the Oboyansky direction deserve no less attention, but many historians go so far as narrowing the battle to Prokhorov to the framework of a single day - July 12, 1943. Although it lasted at least a week. Of course, such a narrowly focused approach leads to a distorted understanding of what happened at the Kursk Bulge. Not surprisingly, some researchers, according to the results of the July 12 battles, generally agreed to the point that the Soviet troops were defeated near Prokhorovka and, they say, only a miracle did not allow the Wehrmacht to defeat the Red Army.


But was it really? Especially if we consider the whole battle of Kursk, and not just one counterstrike under Prokhorovka on July 12?

As you know, at the initial stage of the battle, the Germans succeeded, who managed to break through the defense, which had been preparing for three months, in two days of fighting. In the evening of July 6, the German advanced units were only 10 kilometers from the Prokhorovka station, however, encountering fierce resistance of the 1st tank army, could not immediately capture it.

Since July 6, the fiercest battles unfolded on Prokhorovka’s direction, which lasted until the July 16. They achieved particular bitterness by July 10. It is this day that can be considered the official start date of the Prokhorov battle.

On July 11, the Soviet command, seeing that the pace of the German offensive was decreasing, decided to launch a counterstrike, in which P. Rotmistrov was assigned the main role in the 5 Guards Tank Army. In its composition, the army had about 860 tanks and self-propelled units. The counter-attack was scheduled for 10.00 12 July, but the Germans 11 July broke through the defenses of the 69-th army and began to threaten the flanks of the 5-th tank army. Therefore, the start of the counter attack was decided to be transferred to 8.30.

Rotmistrov's army was a reserve and had not participated in the battles at the Kursk Bulge before. However, the deployment of 5 –th Guards. TA Germans carefully monitored. Moreover, they knew in advance the direction of the strike and were able to organize a tight line of defense.

We have to admit that the direction of the main attack was chosen extremely unfortunate, since 5-th Guards. TAs were opposed by the strongest parts of the 2 of the SS SS tank corps. And when the first echelon consisting of two tank corps (300 tanks and SAU) in the morning of July 12 went on the attack, it did not come as a surprise to the Germans. Our tanks immediately came under heavy fire.

The situation was aggravated by the fact that the tanks were going to a frontal attack on a very limited space width of 4-5 kilometers. The Germans, using superiority in artillery, shot Rotmistrov's tanks almost with impunity. The T-34 was struck by the 88-mm “tiger” cannon at a distance of up to two kilometers, and the 75-mm cannon of an average T-IV - up to 1,5 kilometers.

Kursk Bulge and Prokhorovka - Where Historians are Wrong

German tank column (PzKpfw III), June 1943 of the year. Photo from wikimedia.org

Light tanks T-70, which also took part in the 12 battles of July, did not pose a threat to the Germans at all, since they practically couldn’t cause even the slightest damage to the German middle, not to mention heavy ones. To do this, they had to get close to them literally at a distance of a pistol shot, but the Germans, using the advantages of their artillery, preferred to shoot them from afar.

In addition to tanks, the Germans had anti-tank batteries, which also chalked up a lot of Soviet tanks. These batteries were not timely suppressed, which led to very sad consequences. Of course, the German was not inactive either aviation.

Soviet tanks had to fight in very unfavorable conditions. It was almost impossible to hit a “tiger” or a T-IV immediately, and the tank stopped for an aimed shot immediately became an excellent target. In addition, with the German tanks it was necessary to get close to about 500-600 meters. That is why the battle immediately began to take shape not in favor of our tank crews.

By 11.00 it became clear that the offensive was exhausted. However, the tankers continued to perform the task and in some areas they managed to penetrate the German defense. But these were very minor successes, for which, moreover, had to pay a very high price. The main objective of the counterstrike was not achieved, moreover, Rotmistrov’s army virtually ceased to exist as a full-fledged combat unit.

From 670 tanks and self-propelled guns that took part in the battles of 12 in July, 5-I guv TA lost more than 450 machines. That is almost three-quarters of its composition. Irrecoverable losses reached about three hundred tanks. The Germans also suffered losses, which are estimated at about 150 tanks, but no more than three dozen of them were irretrievably lost. And Stalin's fury is quite understandable when he found out what price he had to pay for the so-called “defeat” of the Germans.

In addition, we had to urgently make adjustments to further offensive plans, where the 5 of the TA was assigned a prominent role. However, in just one battle, even taking into account the restored and repaired equipment, Rotmistrov’s army more than half lost its combat capability and, accordingly, could henceforth solve only limited tasks.

It was not necessary to expect any other result from a frontal attack on the unsuppressed German defense. The Soviet tank crews initially had to act in an extremely difficult situation, where the chances of success were zero.

The saddest thing that happened was not at the end of June 1941 of the year under Dubno, where a tank slaughter of a truly unprecedented scale broke out, but two years after the start of the war. When the Soviet generals, it would seem, gained considerable experience and learned to fight. But for some reason, the Mortarists threw tanks into a frontal attack, trying to get out the German wedge with a tank wedge.

Not quite true and common version of the "oncoming tank" battle. " The Germans for the whole day 12 of July more than once went over to counterattacks and then a duel confrontation between Soviet and German tanks really took place. But there was no question of any tank avalanche rushing towards each other. The Germans were not so stupid as to allow themselves to be crushed by numerically superior Soviet tanks. Or at least to let them into the distance of an effective shot, which they were strictly forbidden by an order. "Unseen in stories»A tank battle is an obvious embellishment of events, designed to somehow cover up the blunders and smooth the impression of serious losses 5 Guards. TA

The number of tanks participating in the battle was also contrived. The figure of one and a half thousand is overestimated by about two times, and again it is designed to hide Rotmistrov’s mistakes. After all, he had to explain how nearly half a thousand cars were out of action, most of which were lost irretrievably. Therefore, hundreds of battles and destroyed “panthers”, “tigers” and “Ferdinands” were invented.

Loss of people 5-th Guards. TA for 12 July amounted to about 6000 people, of whom about 2000 soldiers and officers died or were missing. All in all, from July 12 and until the end of active hostilities near Prokhorovka (July 18), the army lost almost 10 000 people, of whom about five thousand are irrevocable.


Monument Tankist and infantryman on Prokhorovsky field. Photo Chumakov Andrey from wikimedia.org

The fact that 12 July was not reached a decisive change is also indicated by the fact that 16 July is the commander of the Voronezh Front N.F. Vatutin ordered the troops to go on the defensive. Although at this very moment the Germans, due to the changed situation on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front, began to withdraw their formations. And July 16 can be considered the day of the end of the Prokhorovsky battle.

As for the July 12 counterstrike, it was just one of the episodes of the seven-day battle of Prokhorovka. Which, despite the loss figures unpleasant for us, ended in favor of the Red Army. The Germans did not manage to break through to the rear of our troops and go to the operating room. But for this it was necessary to pay a high price.

The fact that the price was paid high, shows this fact. After receiving updated information about what exactly happened under Prokhorovka on July 12, Stalin, what happened to him extremely rarely, became enraged for the commander 5 of the Guards. TA PA Rothmistrov case almost ended the tribunal. At the direction of Stalin, a commission was created under the chairmanship of G. M. Malenkov, who, after a long trial, described the actions of the 5 gd. TA 12 July as a "pattern of unsuccessful operation."

How unsuccessfully this operation was carried out, indirectly testifies to the plan of Manstein, who immediately after the “oncoming tank battle” planned to do a lot… to surround Rotmistrov. In the evening of July 12, the headquarters of the 2 SS Panzer Corps was oriented on July 13. The corps was ordered to go "to the covering offensive ... against enemy tank units stationed in the Prokhorovka area." That is, surround parts of the 5 st Guards. TA Rotmistrova.

The fact that the Germans quietly evacuated the damaged tanks from the battlefield during the 13 and 14 July leads to sad reflections. In total, they managed to take out about 200 machines. Both his and Soviet. Those Soviet tanks that, for one reason or another, could not be evacuated, the Germans blow up. 24 July this fact is recognized and a member of the Military Council of the Voronezh Front N.S. Khrushchev: "The battlefield was left for the enemy - almost all damaged Soviet tanks were blown up and burned by the Germans, while the German vehicles were evacuated."

But if, under Prokhorovka, they did not succeed, then the Germans exhausted themselves in other parts of the Kursk Bulge, began to retreat to their original positions, and then left them. And then, without stopping, they rolled westward until they reached Berlin, where the war ended. And Prokhorovka field will forever remain the field of Russian military glory. And although the official version does not quite correctly reflect what was actually happening there, the feat of Soviet soldiers will never be forgotten. With their massive heroism and at the cost of their lives, they thwarted the Wehrmacht’s offensive plans and contributed to the victory in the Kursk Bulge.

A good lesson in the Battle of Prokhorovka was for Rotmistrov. Later he planned the operations more carefully and soon his army distinguished itself in the battles on the Dnieper and in the Pyatikhatsky operation. Already in October, the unsuccessful counterattack near Prokhorovka was forgotten and Rotmistrov was promoted to colonel-general. And on February 21, 1944, after the brilliant Korsun-Shevchenko operation, Rotmistrov became a marshal of the armored forces. Although, apparently, he could not forget the counterstrike under Prokhorovka until the end of his life ...
Author:
Originator:
http://www.km.ru/science-tech/2017/07/05/istoriya-velikoi-otechestvennoi-voiny/806271-kurskaya-duga-i-prokhorovka-v-c
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  1. Same lech
    Same lech 7 July 2017 15: 25
    +20
    In one day, on a narrow section of the front, 6000 of our soldiers died ... fuck ...
    the population of a small Russian city ... such losses have cost dearly to our families, our people ... damn the war.
    1. avt
      avt 7 July 2017 17: 06
      +6
      Quote: The same LYOKHA
      In one day, on a narrow section of the front, 6000 of our soldiers died ... fuck ...

      Fuck when you don’t read the text
      of which about 2000 soldiers and officers died or went missing.
      Another thing is how many of the wounded (sanitary losses) really returned to duty without going into the category - "irretrievable losses."
      Quote: super.ufu
      and, all, Zamulin can be thrown out?

      Well, yes bully However, it is more likely for those who can not master the book of Zamulin in principle.
      Quote: hohol95
      Throwing stones at Rotmistrov we forget about who "craved a counterattack" - about Vatutin! He "broke"

      Quote: Sivasa
      The role of Rotmistrov on the one hand is obvious - he is the commander and is responsible for the army, on the other hand ... He did not decide where and when to introduce the army.

      Well, yes, yes ... actually
      Quote: hohol95
      we forget about who "craved a counterattack" - about Vatutin!

      We even remember the name of the member of the military council under Vatutin. And you? wassat Was it weak to add?
      Quote: Sivasa
      I recommend everyone to read Rotmistrov’s letter to Zhukov based on the results of the Kursk battle.

      Nlyalnik, mana, and precisely Zhukov ?? wassat Or maybe comrade ,, Uvasyliev? "
      Quote: Alexey RA
      This, by the way, is not the letter in which Rotmistrov transfers all responsibility to the designers?

      It, it is darling. bully
      Quote: Sivasa
      The role of Rotmistrov on the one hand is obvious - he is the commander and is responsible for the army, on the other hand ...

      А
      Quote: Sivasa
      on the other hand.

      In the same place and under the same circumstances, Katukov picked up the HF receiver and argued his disagreement with comrade Uvasyliev over the heads of Vatutin and a member of the military council ... AH! Which person to report directly. And ..... 1 The tank army did not cover themselves unfading laurels ,, oncoming tank battle ", although the one who
      "craved a counterattack"
      in fact, it was Katukov who first sent the counterattack on the 2nd Panzer Corps of SS Hauser.
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 7 July 2017 18: 29
        +4
        Quote: avt
        And ..... 1 The tank army did not cover itself with unfading laurels, the oncoming tank battle, "

        Heh heh heh ... the wind of history still took the garbage - and now 1 TA is considered one of the creators of victory in the operation. Including for the fact that Katukov pulled over and held one of the divisions. originally intended to strike at the Russian counterattack reserve. Perhaps her Germans did not have enough ...
        1. avt
          avt 7 July 2017 19: 32
          +4
          Quote: Alexey RA
          Heh heh heh ... the wind of history still took the garbage - and now 1 TA is considered one of the creators of victory in the operation.

          recourse To be honest - and hell knows. The fact that the Germans probably took into account the fact that Katukov successfully portrayed the mountain in that proverb and did not go anywhere is a fact. However, again, the role of that Magee, who was supposed to go to the Mountain himself, the Germans for some reason got a little sick and did, and they went on the heels from the mountain. bully My understand this - the GENERAL move ,, Citadels "went on the heels of the Mountain. And the question arose the way: rest on the Hans further, like in Typhoon, and how they ended there they remembered, or repaired the panzervagenes and regrouped to give out second hit. I think so - they slowed down and ours seized the initiative, did not give them the opportunity to repair and put in order the tank units. I think that the counterattack - promotion of Kutuzov "was carried out extremely on time, or in a timely manner.
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 10 July 2017 10: 14
            0
            Quote: avt
            The fact that the Germans probably took into account the fact that Katukov successfully portrayed the mountain in that proverb and did not go anywhere is a fact.

            Considered. But already - after the start of the operation.
            But Rotmistrov’s blow was calculated by them even before the operation began. And forces were allocated in advance for its reflection. But something went wrong - and one of the panzerdivisions, which according to the plan by 11.07.43 should have already been freed up and take part in repelling the counterattack, in fact got bogged down with 1 TA.
    2. antivirus
      antivirus 8 July 2017 00: 36
      0
      With their massive heroism and the price of their lives, they foiled the Wehrmacht's offensive plans and contributed to the victory on the Kursk Bulge.
      ----- for most of them it was enough to see (to get angry for the rest of their life - for 2-3 days) women with children at the ashes of houses and households of yards
    3. Alekseev
      Alekseev 8 July 2017 07: 48
      +3
      Quote: The same LYOKHA
      In one day, on a narrow section of the front, 6000 of our soldiers died ... fuck ...

      2000, it is necessary to read carefully, we don’t really listen and read, and then they crap, and the site was, although narrow, but still very famous ...
      Quote: super.ufu
      opened my eyes to the truth

      Yes, eyes have long been open - the counterattack under Prokhorovka was really unsuccessful. Both the losses and the battlefield behind the Germans are true.
      By the way, the materials of the work of the Malenkov commission are still secret, except for the phrase about “a sample of an unsuccessful operation”.
      The question why Stalin did not take drastic measures to P. A. Rotmistrov is much more interesting.
      I think that by the summer of 1943 he began to understand quite well the whole complexity of warfare ...
      After all, Rotmistrov was in the strict framework of the order from above, he did not have time for thorough reconnaissance and preparation of military operations. He himself was not a stupid general, but by no means Bonaparte.
      If less trained troops were in place of the SS tank corps and a counterattack could well end in success.
      So, for example, G.K.Zhukov crushed the Japanese tanks in Khalkhin Gol.
      In general, not only its commander is to blame for the losses of the 5th Guards TA.
      The army itself was recently formed, its formations were still not well coordinated, at least for use in such a difficult confrontation.
      1. ARES623
        ARES623 8 July 2017 10: 38
        0
        Quote: Alekseev
        The question why Stalin did not take drastic measures to P. A. Rotmistrov is much more interesting.

        Vasilevsky defended it, and he had considerable authority in the Headquarters, especially after Stalingrad.
      2. Pancir026
        Pancir026 9 July 2017 18: 45
        +1
        Quote: Alekseev
        Yes, eyes have long been open - the counterattack under Prokhorovka was really unsuccessful. Both the losses and the battlefield behind the Germans are true.
        By the way, the materials of the work of the Malenkov commission are still secret, except for the phrase about “a sample of an unsuccessful operation”

        Oh .. okay secret .. you want to find it. Look at the map. Where Rotmistrov acted, you will understand the reason for the heavy losses. And yet. Even taking into account the losses. It’s impossible to call a “failed” counterattack, the German got up. And got up. Then and rolled back. As a result, as you can tell you the name, Kursk battle was the operation of KUTUZOV. where did the German turn out to be?
        Here is a look
        http://www.proza.ru/2014/11/19/1659
        Or
        http://www.e-reading.club/bookreader.php/1013389/
        Zamulin _-_ Zasekrechennaya_Kurskaya_bitva.html
        1. OlegDL
          OlegDL 17 July 2019 15: 49
          0
          As a result, a difficult situation developed under Prokhorovka. The Germans faced our almost open front. There was no disaster. Because there was a steppe front. And in its composition - a mobile tank powerful fist - the 5th Guards Army. The headquarters accepted the offer of its representative Vasilevsky not to risk trying to keep Kempf’s group behind the forces of the Voronezh Front, take Rotmistrov’s army from Stepnoy and throw it into a counterattack on the Germans, who were concentrating at Prokhorovka for a further throw ...
          Kempf's erupted group, they did not give time to concentrate for a blow. Kempf had only one time - one night, in fact.
          No wonder the 5th tank was guards and not without reason Rotmistrov became a marshal. As soon as possible, the army, under its own power, secretly rushed towards the troops of Manstein, on the move, without delay, marched from the march into battle formation and launched a counterattack with almost no reconnaissance.
          After Prokhorovka, the SS division “Leibstandart SS Adolf Hitler” left for Italy. Against the British and Americans to fight. Only without tanks. With some flags left.
          And in the 6th tank division of the Wehrmacht, which was part of Kempf's group, as a result of the mark of firing at Russian tanks on Prokhorovsky Field there were 6 of their tanks left. That division was simply crossed out, they didn’t even begin to recruit it.
          Pavel Alekseevich wrote in his memoirs that the loss of armored vehicles in this battle was about 30% for the army, and human losses were insignificant. For some reason, I want to believe him, because already five days after Prokhorovka the 5th Guards went on the offensive. And attacked successfully. Because the vaunted German tankers left for Italy ... without tanks. And our advancing troops, throwing the Germans right behind the Dnieper, did not observe these tanks point-blank. Where did that indestructible armada go that burned our 5th Guards in 15 minutes on the Prokhorov field?
      3. Captain Pushkin
        Captain Pushkin 10 July 2017 13: 37
        +1
        Quote: Alekseev
        In general, not only its commander is to blame for the losses of the 5th Guards TA.

        Undoubtedly. Stalin doubted the feasibility of a frontal counterattack on a strong tank group of the Germans, but Comrade Vasilevsky convinced that it would be easy to throw adversary hats ....
        (De ... or b ... d, as one of our classics rated such.)
        Although in the memoirs of the seventies and eighties, it was Stalin who forbade our glorious generals to inflict flanking strikes, covers and encirclements and ordered to push enemies directly in the forehead!
    4. WapentakeLokki
      WapentakeLokki 8 July 2017 18: 49
      0
      That is not war, it’s damned, but comrade generals for whom a Russian soldier - Maso and women still give birth and do not bear responsibility for loss of responsibility, unlike fulfilling orders such as occupying the village of Durnoye on May 1st or the village of Beshtannoye on November 7th from then yes Horror and Fear. And after when the wave of memory will subside how all Generals and Palkovniki will write memoirs and they will be in shekolada and the men will remain in the ground. However, it’s a victory
  2. super.ufu
    super.ufu 7 July 2017 15: 31
    +3
    and, all, Zamulin can be thrown out?
    The great Alexander Plekhanov himself opened our eyes to the truth, yes, only one question, in what archive did he work? "nivkakom", well, nothing, nothing, Wikipedia is fine too!
  3. hohol95
    hohol95 7 July 2017 15: 34
    +6
    Throwing stones at Rotmistrov we forget about who "craved a counterattack" - about Vatutin! He "broke" the Bet on offensive action! He certainly had his own thoughts, but apparently they turned out to be wrong ...
    1. Sivasa
      Sivasa 7 July 2017 16: 11
      +2
      The role of Rotmistrov on the one hand is obvious - he is the commander and is responsible for the army, on the other hand ... He did not decide where and when to introduce the army. I recommend everyone to read Rotmistrov’s letter to Zhukov based on the results of the Kursk battle. There, the picture of our tank troops at the time of the 43rd year is described very realistically.
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 7 July 2017 16: 33
        +5
        Quote: Sivasa
        I recommend everyone to read Rotmistrov’s letter to Zhukov based on the results of the Kursk battle. There, the picture of our tank troops at the time of the 43rd year is described very realistically.

        This, by the way, is not the letter in which Rotmistrov transfers all responsibility to the designers?
        I, as an ardent patriot of tank troops, I ask you, Comrade Marshal of the Soviet Union, to break the conservatism and arrogance of our tank designers and manufacturers and with all severity to raise the question of the mass production of new tanks by the winter of 1943, superior in their combat qualities and constructive the design of the existing types of German tanks.

        At the same time, the question of entering the tank corps into battle without reconnaissance and artillery preparation, and even on the terrain where even brigades are forced to go into battle in battalion - this question was tactfully omitted.
        Rotmistrov also mentions in this letter a wonderful German instruction: they said that our T-1941s and KVs were so superior to German tanks in 1942-34 that the Germans forbade their tankers to engage in battle with them.
        Back in December 1941, I seized a secret instruction from the German command, which was written on the basis of the German field tests of our KV and T-34 tanks.
        As a result of these tests, approximately the following was written in the instructions: German tanks cannot fight with Russian KV and T-34 tanks and must avoid tank combat. When meeting with Russian tanks, it was recommended to hide behind artillery and transfer the actions of tank units to another section of the front.

        Moreover, the exact same Order of the NPO of the USSR 325 by Rotmistrov is again tactfully omitted:
        Tanks do not fulfill their main task of destroying enemy infantry, but are distracted by the battle with enemy tanks and artillery. The established practice of opposing our enemy’s tank attacks and getting involved in tank battles is wrong and harmful.
        The corps should not get involved in tank battles with enemy tanks, unless there is a clear superiority over the enemy. In the event of encountering large enemy tank units, the corps detaches anti-tank artillery and part of the tanks against the enemy tanks, the infantry, in turn, puts forward its anti-tank artillery, and the corps, obscured by all these means, bypasses the enemy tanks with its main forces and hits the enemy infantry with the aim of tear it from enemy tanks and paralyze the actions of enemy tanks. The main task of the tank corps is the destruction of enemy infantry.
      2. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 7 July 2017 16: 35
        +6
        However, Order No. 325 of 1942 by Rotmistrov is omitted for obvious reasons - for it is written as if about the battle near Prokhorovka:
        1. Our tanks, when attacking enemy defenses, break away from the infantry and, breaking away, lose interaction with it. Infantry, being cut off from tanks by enemy fire, does not support our tanks with its artillery fire. Tanks, breaking away from the infantry, fight in combat with artillery, tanks and infantry of the enemy, while suffering heavy losses.
        2. Tanks rush to the enemy’s defenses without proper artillery support. Artillery before the start of a tank attack does not suppress anti-tank weapons at the front line of the enemy’s defense, tank support guns are not always used. When approaching the front edge of the enemy, tanks are met by enemy anti-tank artillery fire and suffer heavy losses.
        Tank and artillery commanders do not coordinate their actions on the ground in local subjects and at the borders, do not establish signals to call and ceasefire artillery.
        Artillery commanders supporting a tank attack control artillery fire from remote observation posts and do not use radium tanks as mobile forward artillery observation posts.
        3. Tanks are hastily entered into battle without reconnaissance of the area adjacent to the front edge of the enemy’s defense, without studying the terrain in the depths of the enemy’s position, without carefully studying the enemy’s fire system.
        Tank commanders, having no time to organize a tank attack, do not bring the task to tank crews, as a result of ignorance of the enemy and the terrain, tanks attack uncertainly and at low speeds. No firing is carried out, limited to firing from a place, and even then only with guns.
        As a rule, tanks on the battlefield do not maneuver, do not use the terrain for a covert approach and a sudden blow to the flank and rear, and most often attack the enemy in the forehead.
        Combined-arms commanders do not devote the necessary time for the technical preparation of tanks for battle, nor do they prepare the terrain in engineering terms for the direction of action of the tanks. Minefields are poorly explored and not cleared. In anti-tank obstacles, passages are not made and proper assistance is not provided in overcoming difficult terrain. Sappers for escorting tanks are not always allocated.
        This leads to the fact that tanks are blown up on mines, stuck in swamps, on anti-tank obstacles and do not participate in battle.
        4. Tanks do not fulfill their main task of destroying enemy infantry, but are distracted by the battle with enemy tanks and artillery. The established practice of opposing our enemy’s tank attacks and getting involved in tank battles is wrong and harmful.
        5. The fighting of the tanks is not provided with sufficient air cover, air reconnaissance and aircraft guidance. Aviation, as a rule, does not accompany tank formations in the depths of the enemy’s defenses, and aviation combat operations are not linked to tank attacks.
        6. Control of tanks on the battlefield is poorly organized. Radio as a means of control is underutilized. The commanders of tank units and formations, being at command posts, break away from battle formations and do not observe the action of tanks in battle and do not affect the course of battle of tanks.
        The company and battalion commanders, moving ahead of the battle formations, are not able to follow the tanks and control the battle of their units and turn into ordinary tank commanders, and the units, having no control, lose their orientation and wander around the battlefield, suffering unnecessary losses.
        1. Sivasa
          Sivasa 7 July 2017 16: 56
          +7
          That's right. It. That is why I am talking about the twofold role of Rotmistrov. You understand that it was not he who made the decision on which section and when to introduce the army. There is an example of Katukov, who managed to prove the inexpediency of a frontal impact. Well, Rotmistrov ... let's say no luck.

          Judging by how quickly you reacted according to Rotmistrov’s letter, can you also find a report on the fighting of the corps? Everything is unadorned there. Very impressive documents.
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 7 July 2017 17: 08
            +4
            Quote: Sivasa
            Judging by how quickly you reacted according to Rotmistrov’s letter, can you also find a report on the fighting of the corps? Everything is unadorned there. Very impressive documents.

            I read Zamulin. Everything is also unadorned there, especially in terms of interaction.
  4. svp67
    svp67 7 July 2017 15: 44
    +6
    Not quite true is the widespread version of the “oncoming tank” battle. ”
    The author does not understand the meaning of the concept of "oncoming battle." Both sides tried to solve their problems by the offensive and the battle near Prokhorovka is a typical example of an MEETING battle.
    It is not surprising that some researchers, according to the results of the July 12 fighting, generally agreed that Soviet troops were defeated near Prokhorovka and, they say, only a miracle did not allow the Wehrmacht to defeat the Red Army
    The results of this battle can be regarded in different ways. On the one hand, our troops failed to fulfill the task of defeating the enemy’s strike forces, our 5th Panzer lost combat effectiveness, which thwarted the fulfillment of previously planned plans for encircling the enemy’s troops. We left the battlefield to the enemy. And all this may give rise to talk about our defeat. But in general, after this success, the Germans were no longer able to launch an offensive and began to withdraw beyond the Dnieper, and this already suggests that we still won.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 7 July 2017 16: 40
      +15
      Quote: svp67
      The author does not understand the meaning of the concept of "oncoming battle." Both sides tried to solve their problems by the offensive and the battle near Prokhorovka is a typical example of an MEETING battle.

      There is a subtle moment. Operationally, the battle was really oncoming. But tactically, on July 12, 1943, ours were advancing, and the Germans, for the most part, were sitting on the defensive, which they had been building since the evening of July 11.
      Quote: svp67
      On the one hand, our troops failed to fulfill the task of defeating the enemy’s strike forces, our 5th Panzer lost combat effectiveness, which thwarted the fulfillment of previously planned plans for encircling the enemy’s troops. We left the battlefield to the enemy. And all this may give rise to talk about our defeat. But in general, after this success, the Germans were no longer able to launch an offensive and began to withdraw beyond the Dnieper, and this already suggests that we still won.

      Duc ... the standard picture is an operational victory with a tactical loss.
      By the way, the favorite keynote of the memoirs of the losing side is we won battle after battle, but for some reason they retreated and retreated ... it’s all Hitler's fault - he did not let us take advantage of the victories. smile
      1. svp67
        svp67 7 July 2017 18: 05
        +4
        Quote: Alexey RA
        There is a subtle moment. Operationally, the battle was really oncoming. But tactically, on July 12, 1943, ours were advancing, and the Germans, for the most part, were sitting on the defensive, which they had been building since the evening of July 11.

        The Germans simply decided to play on defense. If the defensive battle were completely successful for them, then having defeated the 5th tank, they would have quickly consolidated their success by going on the offensive and going to Kursk. But the state of their shock groups, after “successful” battles was such that they considered it best to “consolidate” their “success” by rolling back to the Dnieper.
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 7 July 2017 18: 35
          +3
          Quote: svp67
          The Germans simply decided to play on defense. If the defensive battle were completely successful for them, then having defeated the 5th tank, they would have quickly consolidated their success by going on the offensive and going to Kursk.

          That is - success or failure depends on the time period during which we are considering a particular battle. If you take July 12, then yes, on this day the Germans won. But if you stretch the gap for another couple of days, then in the long term the victory turns into a draw first (the Russian reserve is broken, but the breakthrough of defense and closing of ticks of the 1941-1942 type did not work out), and then into defeat.
        2. avt
          avt 7 July 2017 19: 36
          0
          Quote: svp67
          The Germans simply decided to play on defense.

          what Sinful sinner supports the version that the Germans deployed the Loeb Standart and their 2 SS tanks in order to actually continue the offensive. But Vatutin and Khrushchev threw Rotmistrov themselves and gave them the opportunity
          Quote: svp67
          play off defense

          Well, Hauser don’t - take it and play. As a result, the battlefield remained behind him. request
          1. svp67
            svp67 7 July 2017 19: 58
            +2
            Quote: avt
            Well, Hauser don’t - take it and play. As a result, the battlefield remained behind him.

            At the first, and at the second stages of the war in Russia, the Germans were very good at predicting our counterattacks, and while planning operations they chose the best lines for their reflection, which was very helpful for their reconnaissance, especially the aerial and stereotyped actions of our commanders. So, the "game of defense", and the military "reflection of the enemy’s counterattack from advantageous lines" is a common thing for the Germans.
          2. stalkerwalker
            stalkerwalker 7 July 2017 23: 27
            +4
            Quote: avt
            As a result, the battlefield remained behind him.

            Rotmistrov could not afford such liberties as Katukov could - refuse to comply with the order given by the Comfront. And it should .... Because The task of the 5th GVTA (in collaboration with Zhadov’s 5A) was not so much to destroy, but how to stop the Hausser tank rink. The latter took a break, waiting for the reaction of the Soviet command. Moreover, the operation "Kutuzov" began. But in a hurry, everyone and everyone. Errors and miscalculations also affected the high losses of the 3GvTA and Gorbatov's army. But that's another story...
  5. Gardamir
    Gardamir 7 July 2017 15: 50
    +1
    Or maybe stop looking for mistakes, rewrite, prove something?
    1. Sivasa
      Sivasa 7 July 2017 16: 05
      +5
      Yes, you don’t need to look for errors. The next time we also crash 2 more tank corps.
      1. Gardamir
        Gardamir 7 July 2017 16: 18
        +5
        I meant a little more. Let the headquarters take stock. But in journalism !. Either Sailors slipped, then with Panfilov’s it is not clear. Let it be as recorded. We lived with the knowledge that the battle of Prokhorovka is one of the great, leave us ours.
        1. Barbulator
          Barbulator 7 July 2017 16: 42
          +9
          Quote: Gardamir
          Either Sailors slipped, then with Panfilov’s it is not clear.

          During the Great Patriotic War, 403 soldiers and commanders, political workers and partisans, repeated the feat of Matrosov. 167 of them were posthumously awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union, the rest were awarded various state awards.
          Has everyone slipped?
          1. yehat
            yehat 7 July 2017 16: 55
            +3
            you know, in the USA they teach how to argue. All that you say, they can ignore
            Therefore, any inconvenient fact can be answered like "this information requires verification" and this information in their understanding is no longer there. It’s so easy to erase 167 and leave one that slipped. And then, according to the Epic and their beloved legal rule of precedent, it is the slipped that will call the rest.
            This is such a tricky kind of sophistry. And there are other tricks. Therefore, it is useless to prove something logically or argue. Just disagree.
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 7 July 2017 17: 24
              +4
              After the end of the war, the United States still knows how to separate history and propaganda - and to cast unconfirmed myths into the shadows.
              The very Colin Kelly in the war was appointed a hero, about his feat - the battering ram ram on the B-17 - was trumpeted everywhere. At the end of the war, it turned out that no one was ramming, the battleship Kelly did not attack, but died when he returned to the base - he pulled the car until the last, allowing the crew to jump out. As a result, Colin Kelly’s story was transferred to the category of “military propaganda” and is now remembered precisely as an example of how to raise the spirit in war. Like, in that confusion of the beginning of the war, it was difficult to understand what really happened, and morale after Pearl Harbor had to be raised.
              And no one breaks the spears and does not tear the vest on his chest in an attempt to prove the reality of the feat written by the propagandist. smile
          2. WapentakeLokki
            WapentakeLokki 8 July 2017 18: 56
            0
            But doesn’t it seem to you that a feat in a war is when the boys are forced to cover their bloopers with their lives and the stupid person of the Commanders and in general when they start talking about heroism in orders, then they screwed up again and someone has to take everything upon himself but the soldier eats porridge and sleeps overcoats and the commander in the headquarters with the woman-telephone operator under 7 thrusts in my opinion there is no equality
        2. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 7 July 2017 16: 49
          +14
          Quote: Gardamir
          Let it be as recorded. We lived with the knowledge that the battle of Prokhorovka is one of the great, leave us ours.

          You see what’s the matter ... if our historians don’t do it, then someone else will do it.
          GlavPUR Episheva just tried to implement the principle of "Let it be as recorded". As a result, it was on this basis that Rezun, Solonin, and other revisionists appeared. Who, going from the particular to the general and pulling out into the white light cases of official propaganda lies, concluded: since they lied once, it means they always lied, nothing can be trusted, the USSR wanted to attack Germany, the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army did not want to fight for the Stalinist regime, everywhere there were postscripts and bullshit ...
          As a result, instead of neatly separating truth from myth bricks and propaganda from the bricks of the foundation of the official history (and removing the latter - sending unconfirmed myths into oblivion), we waited for the revisionist with a sledgehammer to demolish the whole official history. And there could be no other - the foundation that had not been cleaned out was too shaky in time.
          1. creak
            creak 7 July 2017 17: 36
            +4
            Quote: Alexey RA
            GlavPUR Episheva was just trying to realize the principle of "Let it be written down

            The head of Glavpur Epishev owns another masterpiece: "Why the hell do we need the truth that discredits us .." - in response to proposals to more objectively reflect the events of the Second World War. It seems that the Obkomovsk school and the experience of fluctuations together with the general line of the CPSU affected ....
          2. Love is
            Love is 7 July 2017 18: 15
            +1
            Thank! You expressed a very accurate, very important point! good
        3. Sivasa
          Sivasa 7 July 2017 16: 50
          +9
          You see ... a tank battle near Prokhorovka, this is a small and not even the most important episode of the greatest battle. With beautiful phrases and lies about "tank avalanches rushing towards each other," we only dishonor the memory of those who died in that battle. With their lives, they showed what happens when the situation is assessed incorrectly by the command. 2 corps 5 TA went into an unprepared attack, suffered enormous losses and did not complete the task. This does not diminish the heroism of the tankers. But to be held captive by a heroic myth, it means dooming yourself to a repetition.
        4. ARES623
          ARES623 8 July 2017 10: 50
          0
          Quote: Gardamir
          We lived with the knowledge that the battle of Prokhorovka is one of the great, leave us ours.

          And where to put the truth? A small lie gives rise to great distrust. And this distrust is used by those who want to rob us of ALL Victory. We can forgive the inaccuracies of front-line correspondents, but having time and opportunities for analysis, we must disclose the picture as objectively as possible. To make a conclusion for the future, do not give cause for speculation. Moreover, the outcome of the war is known, and revealed shortcomings will not change it.
  6. Razvedka_Boem
    Razvedka_Boem 7 July 2017 16: 07
    +2
    And I like the official version. Because the History is written by the Winners.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 7 July 2017 17: 06
      +8
      Quote: Razvedka_Boem
      And I like the official version. Because the History is written by the Winners.

      They write.
      Then comes the revisionist or Western historian - and draws an apocalyptic picture of the defeat of the 5th Guards. TA battered German parts. According to the documents, the dog draws.
      And our historians have nothing to answer - just repeat the mantras about the greatest tank battle, the overwhelming superiority of the enemy in technology (inflating the unfortunate dozen “tigers” to the regiments and inventing the “panthers” that were absent in the south) and the oncoming tank battle on July 12.
      1. Razvedka_Boem
        Razvedka_Boem 7 July 2017 18: 28
        +5
        For me, the battle on the Kursk Bulge will be the same as it was once told and shown to me in Soviet films and books.
        And no revisionists will make me doubt or ashamed of my ancestors.
        If only we were worthy of our fathers and grandfathers. That's all that excites me.
  7. yehat
    yehat 7 July 2017 16: 25
    +1
    as far as I know, the fact that many tanks of the first wave fell into our same anti-tank moat is hushed up
    this is what angered Stalin, who first wanted to give Rotmistrov to the tribunal.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 7 July 2017 18: 01
      +2
      Quote: yehat
      as far as I know, the fact that many tanks of the first wave fell into our same anti-tank moat is hushed up

      Plus a short artillery bombardment across the squares, only warning the Germans. Plus, the ruggedness of the terrain in the direction of the main strike with beams, as a result of which normally no more than a battalion could turn around.
  8. Monster_Fat
    Monster_Fat 7 July 2017 17: 09
    +1
    Here someone wrote correctly about the role of Vatutin, who persuaded the doubting Rotmistrov to start the attack as his headquarters made incorrect conclusions from intelligence data, which either screwed up or brought knowingly false data that there was a junction of German advancing units and Germans in this place they’re already exhausted and their tanks are already without fuel and ammunition ....
    1. turbris
      turbris 7 July 2017 17: 48
      +2
      Why even try to revise the history of the war when the front-line soldiers were alive, they did not try to do this, and much more is unknown to us. The commanders at the time of the decision did not have the information that we now have. The war, unfortunately, is not only continuous victories, but also the bitter mistakes that led to defeat. Yes, our tanks at the time of the battle near Prokhorovka did not have a gun comparable to the German 88-mm, hence the loss, but this does not detract from the heroism of those who died following the order.
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 7 July 2017 18: 21
        +3
        Quote: turbris
        Why even try to revise the history of the war when the front-line soldiers were alive, they did not try to do this, and much more is unknown to us.

        In fact, when the front-line soldiers were alive, they tried to rewrite the official history closer to the facts. But since they saw in the unfolding discussions assassination attempt (because the subordinates were reckless to discuss the decisions of their superiors - who had already become pretty bronzed by that time), then in the 60s this discussion was turned off.
        Quote: turbris
        Yes, our tanks at the time of the battle near Prokhorovka did not have a gun comparable to the German 88-mm, hence the loss, but this does not detract from the heroism of those who died following the order.

        Yeah ... and our tankers did not find our anti-tank ditch before the attack, simply because they didn’t have a gun comparable to the German 88 mm. And because of this, they could not establish interaction with the art group allocated for them (and there were already 203 mm B-4). And they chose the least suitable direction for the attack, too, just because didn't have guns.
        If you enter the battle brigade corps battalion, throwing them at the prepared defense of the enemy tank division - then do not then write off everything to technology inferior to the enemy.
      2. captain
        captain 7 July 2017 21: 07
        0
        And in the article there is nothing that can detract from the dignity of our soldiers, sergeants, platoon and company commanders. In the article, the author tried very carefully to hint at the weak competence of some of our generals. And if our generals did not know that German tank guns could hit our tanks with a direct shot from 1,5-2 km, and ours with 800, then why the hell to put such generals in command posts. Behind the rear and the editors of Red Star.
        1. Love is
          Love is 7 July 2017 22: 13
          0
          So Stalin is not a genius? belay
        2. Love is
          Love is 7 July 2017 22: 13
          0
          So Stalin is not a genius? belay
        3. ARES623
          ARES623 8 July 2017 11: 02
          0
          Quote: captain
          And if our generals did not know that German tank guns could hit our tanks with a direct shot from 1,5-2 km, and ours from 800, then why the hell put such generals in command posts. Behind the rear and the editors of Red Star.

          Such a very correct sofa point of view. Approximately, Emelianenko blew Mitrione, to get him to hell into the ring, even comment from the audience? 1943 was the same training for our generals as 1941-42. The results are not the same, although the costs are significant. But without them, there would have been no 1944 and 1945. The dialectic could not be reached. Every great commander is first a green rookie. Unequal technical conditions near Kursk everyone knew perfectly, and therefore by 44 they gave birth to T-34-85 and BS-3. Such is war ...
        4. yehat
          yehat 11 July 2017 15: 55
          0
          Yes, everyone knew everything - at the training ground the tiger was closely studied, the panther’s gun was also known by its analogues Pak40, Pak42, by modification PzIV F2 (or V2)
          And they prepared the defense very well.
          problems arose at the operational command level. Particularly serious problems were in organizing the work of aviation - they mobilized quite a bit and there were normal fighters, but they couldn’t use them intelligently. Could not well organize ground service.
          Separate claims to those who "executed the order." Repeatedly, on the Kursk Bulge, orders were carried out in a straightforward and thoughtless manner (at the level of major-general), which constantly resulted in forehead movement without preparation with consequent losses.
          In this style, about 800 tanks were lost.
    2. yehat
      yehat 11 July 2017 11: 05
      0
      the role of Vatutin is overestimated.
      Prokhorovka is a typical example of the amount of flaws. Underestimated the Germans. Defended in defense.
      They began to liquidate the breakthrough - under-explored, under-planned, under-supplied with information about fortifications, etc. Do not forget about aviation - having a twice-threefold larger fleet,
      the sky over the Kursk Bulge was heavily ceded, due to which there was a well-known massive strike by the hs-129 regiment, reconnaissance and artillery adjustment was poor.
      Thanks Voronov on the Kursk Bulge was not adequately adequate VET.
      And they blame one Vatutin. He is a man who proceeds from what he knows.
      Yes, he was mistaken, but a bunch of people were not working so that Vatutin was mistaken.
  9. Dzafdet
    Dzafdet 7 July 2017 17: 40
    +2
    Rotmistrov had to be publicly shot before the formation and the order was announced on all fronts. because of such warriors, our losses amounted to 9 million people .. am
    1. yehat
      yehat 7 July 2017 17: 48
      +2
      not everything is so clearly bad. The problem was different - in peacetime officers - business executives served. Mehlis, Rotmistrov, Voroshilov, etc. But in wartime, others are needed, especially at the front. While they realized that without this in any way, the end of the 43rd year came.
      And captains, and others were talented suppliers. They just needed to be left to do this. And others had to lead the battle.
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 7 July 2017 18: 25
        +4
        Quote: yehat
        not everything is so clearly bad. The problem was different - in peacetime officers - business executives served. Mehlis, Rotmistrov, Voroshilov, etc. But in wartime, others are needed, especially at the front. While they realized that without this in any way, the end of the 43rd year came.

        Simply put, due to lack of frames, holes were plugged not by ability, but by rank.
        As a result, the talented techie Kulik, being appointed in the field, overwhelmed everything. The same happened with the "father" T-34 Pavlov. Zhukov - commander to the bone - was appointed chief of staff (despite the known "He is not capable of staff and teaching work, as he organically hates them")
        1. yehat
          yehat 7 July 2017 18: 43
          +1
          Eyewitnesses said that Zhukov was far from the best in the General Staff. Cope at the level of local management of 2-3 divisions, no more. His hobby was precisely the organization of the work of troops in the local direction, tough self-discipline in providing troops and assessing the potential for combat effectiveness.
  10. Dart2027
    Dart2027 7 July 2017 17: 43
    +1
    Opinion of Air Marshal A.E. Golovanov:
    In general, it must be said that in this battle the command of the Voronezh Front showed themselves poorly, and its commander General Vatutin showed his unpreparedness to conduct military defensive operations in the new, modern conditions of warfare. It was not the Voronezh Front that restored the situation, that is, it eliminated the enemy’s breakthrough, but this situation was restored by two fronts - Stepnoy, under the command of General I. S. Konev, and Voronezh.
    The Battle of Kursk was a classic example of how to organize a defense in depth in anticipation of an enemy attack and how not to do it. On the example of the battle on the Kursk Bulge, a modern defense organization and outdated, not suitable in the new conditions of war is shown. The situation was saved by the presence of the Steppe Front located behind.
    And what could have happened if General Konev and his troops had not been behind?
    And at the same time, in the battle of Kursk, we have an example of the organization of defense corresponding to the modern war, where masses of tanks are used. Such a defense was organized by the commander of the Central Front, General K.K. Rokossovsky.
    We are talking about the fact that the enemy had the main forces against the Voronezh Front, and smaller ones, that is, not the main ones, against the Central Front. However, a comparison of these forces suggests that if there were two more enemy tank divisions against Vatutin’s troops, then there were three less infantry divisions than against Rokossovsky’s. This ratio does not give the right to speak of any substantial superiority, especially in order to justify the introduction of a whole other front with a huge number of troops to eliminate the breakthrough.
    The point here is completely different, namely, that General Vatutin distributed all his forces and assets almost equally, sprayed them across the entire front-line, and therefore could not resist the concentrated enemy forces in a narrow section of the front convenient for operations tank masses. Having, in fact, equal forces with his neighbor to the right, General Rokossovsky, Vatutin was not only unable to successfully repel the enemy’s onslaught due to improper defense organization, but he also pulled all the forces of the Steppe Front, designed to ensure that after repelling the strike enemy and the transition of the troops of the fronts in a counterattack to develop it by the introduction of fresh forces. Such an opportunity was missed due to the unsuccessful organization of defense on the Voronezh Front.
    1. yehat
      yehat 7 July 2017 17: 57
      +2
      I partially disagree with Golovanov. Vatutin had a flat relief and opposed the enemy, which had almost twice as much maneuvering forces in comparison with the forces attacking Rokosovsky, and Vatutin had mostly sedentary units. Manstein simply competently disposed of his advantage in maneuverability and concentration of fire weapons, why Vatutin's forces began to seem "dispersed." It seems to me that the problem was different - Vatutin was too aggressive in defense, trying to counterattack where he did not have a decisive superiority in forces, not trying to exhaust the enemy enough. Instead of preparing defense and traps, Vatutin prepared counterattacks. I consider this a minus - he sought to do only what he understood well, and circumstances required another.
      1. ARES623
        ARES623 8 July 2017 11: 24
        +1
        Quote: yehat
        I partially disagree with Golovanov.

        Absolutely right! In general, after the Victory, high-ranking military leaders at times very critically evaluated each other. Including for reasons far from professional activities. Zhukov himself was very dismissive of Vatutin’s abilities and didn’t like Vatutin himself. The commanders and staffs have different views on the practice of work, a different temperament, and therefore personal conflicts are inevitable. Especially when there is no one to force them to stay within the bounds of decency. And how can an aviator evaluate land explorers?
        However with
        Quote: yehat
        Instead of preparing defense and traps, Vatutin prepared counterattacks. I consider this a minus - he sought to do only what he understood well, and circumstances required another.

        I do not agree. The Germans GA "South" - too. They repeatedly wrote that the defense of the WF was organized in a rich and in depth. TVETs were detected only when they started shooting. The German 10th tank brigade lost almost a third of its composition on mines on the outskirts of the front line of defense of the WF. It’s another matter that a wider section of tank-hazardous directions than that of the Central Fleet implied a lower density of anti-tank vehicles. And Manstein is a serious adversary. Zamulin has described everything in great detail. Probably the best analysis of WF actions. Unfortunately, I have never seen anything like this on the CF.
        1. yehat
          yehat 11 July 2017 11: 12
          0
          land mines, etc. - This is the standard tactic throughout the Kursk Bulge. There is no personal role of Vatutin. But there is a role in untimely prepared reserves in hazardous areas. For example, Vatutin poorly used howitzer artillery.
          It was at Vatutin's on the site that the troops suffered the most severe losses during the rearrangement in the rear, especially tanks. Rokosovsky, for example, paid great attention to the safety of such maneuvers.
          1. ARES623
            ARES623 11 July 2017 12: 11
            0
            Quote: yehat
            land mines, etc. - This is the standard tactic throughout the Kursk Bulge. There is no personal role of Vatutin. But there is a role in untimely prepared reserves in hazardous areas. For example, Vatutin poorly used howitzer artillery.

            Well you give !!! NF Vatutin, for reference, was an extremely competent staff officer. The entire defense configuration of the Voronezh Front was designed by himself, personally. What, however, provoked the reproach of Vasilevsky for the insufficient delegation of authority to the chief of his staff and to the chiefs of the armed forces. It is very difficult to build a defense of a front-line scale in such difficult conditions as near Kursk and requires the highest class of qualifications. Today, everyone can afford to appreciate people whom they themselves cannot reach. As in the famous film - “Zhores didn’t take into account, Herzen did not succeed, Tolstoy misunderstood“ ... It’s as if a company of losers had acted in history! ” a strong blow was expected in the CF zone, and therefore it was strengthened to a greater extent than the VF. I would even say that all the front commanders were outstanding people, talented military leaders, not without flaws, but certainly with the highest professional qualifications, hard work, and focus on fulfillment of assigned tasks.To say that Vatutin is weak in some ways, you need to be stronger than him. and situational in the entirety of decisions made in a specific period of time .. Maybe you are a graduate of the General Staff Academy? Have you studied the situation more deeply than Zamulin? Well, write a book with a comparative analysis of actions Wii two fronts. It will be interesting...
  11. The comment was deleted.
  12. Gardamir
    Gardamir 7 July 2017 18: 26
    +3
    Revisionists themselves do not come. They are led by the authorities, which for themselves revised the results of that war.
  13. perm23
    perm23 7 July 2017 19: 02
    +3
    Actually, this is a war. And excellent soldiers and generals fought against us.
  14. captain
    captain 7 July 2017 20: 55
    +1
    An interesting fact from the counterattack of 5TA. The engine life of our engines on the T-34 was 100 hours in factory conditions and 50 hours in combat. The engine life of our T-26 and BT-7 engines was 400 hours. The Germans have 500. So the perfect 5 TA march towards the turn of the counterattack cost a very large outage of equipment. I think Stalin knew about this, so Rotmistrov was not injured during the debriefing of flights. He complied with someone's order. History is silent about who gave it, but apparently someone is very important and big. The author slightly touched on the history of the largest tank battle of 2 World near Dubno, but it's a pity that I just remembered. The request to write about this, the people should know the truth about the Great Patriotic War. And then we are increasingly studying the history of myths.
    1. BAI
      BAI 8 July 2017 00: 15
      0
      touched on the history of the largest tank battle of World War 2 near Dubno, but it’s a pity that I just remembered

      This is to Poppel's memoirs.
  15. Yuri Guliy
    Yuri Guliy 7 July 2017 21: 13
    +1
    I am inclined to believe that those who offer to leave everything in history are right as they already fantasized about the Second World War in literature and cinema. To give some truth only in military schools in the senior years, and liberal attempts to delve into victories and defeats do not stop ceremoniously. At the same time, 41-42 may repeat, but it may also be May 45.
    1. yehat
      yehat 11 July 2017 11: 16
      0
      May 45

      understand the simple thing. Regardless of the result of WW2, the USSR lost - too large losses were suffered.
      May 45th only put an end to, not allowing to lose too much.
      Therefore, the real victory must be considered the successful suppression of June 41st, and not May 45th.
  16. iouris
    iouris 7 July 2017 21: 24
    +3
    It seems that the history of the Battle of Kursk was written under "our dear N. Khrushchev." On the other hand, tank armies were armed with tanks that could not be adversaries for the latest German tanks. The obvious miscalculation of the Supreme High Command Headquarters is obvious here. In addition, there were serious miscalculations with aviation support. This battle was won by the Russian infantryman. My grandfather, a machine gunner, died of wounds on 15.07.1943/XNUMX/XNUMX somewhere in the Ponyray area after severe wounds received in the second battle. Until now, this combat loss has been accounted for under the recorded surname (an error in the first letter, and all other data coincide).
    1. yehat
      yehat 11 July 2017 11: 22
      0
      there were no bet miscalculations. the defense industry gave the maximum of what it could.
      for example, industry could produce t43 instead of t34, but 2 times less in number.
      miscalculations with air support - lack of experience and time for restructuring. This is a consequence of the confusion of war and miscalculations of the pre-war. Do not forget that aviation lost a lot of experienced pilots of strike aircraft in the first year of the war. The Kuban experience has not yet been implemented in fighter aircraft. However, the defeat of aviation in the year 43 was gone, which is also an achievement.
  17. Ivan Tartugai
    Ivan Tartugai 7 July 2017 21: 36
    +3
    Quote from the article:
    Good lesson the battle of Prokhorovka became for Rotmistrov


    And later, troops under the command of Rotmistrov suffered meaningless losses, until finally, after the Vilnius offensive operation, the commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, for senselessly large losses, General Chernyakhovsky ID demanded that Rotmistrov be removed from the post of army commander. And more than Rotmistrov did not participate in the hostilities.
    However, his career growth continued, so under Khrushchev in 1962 he became Chief Marshal of the armored forces (level of the Marshal of the Soviet Union), and under Brezhnev in 1965 he became a Hero of the Soviet Union, allegedly for skillful leadership of the troops, personal courage and courage shown in battles with the German invaders.
    Pleased everyone.
  18. BAI
    BAI 8 July 2017 00: 12
    +2
    What struck me at one time was that Colonel General Goth, commander of the 4th Panzer Army, PLANNED to destroy the Soviet tank reserves near Prokhorovka on July 10-12 when drawing up a plan of action for 4 TA in Operation Citadel. For the Germans, it was a pre-planned battle in a given place at a given time!
    1. stalkerwalker
      stalkerwalker 8 July 2017 00: 23
      +4
      Quote: BAI
      For the Germans, it was a pre-planned battle in a given place at a given time!

      According to A. Isaev's fair remark, while in the USSR they were engaged in social experiments, in Germany in the 20s and 30s, theoretical thought continued to work under the wing of von Sect. The backbone of the army has been preserved. Our country had to run 50 years in 5, not only in industry, but also in the minds of the generals, both in theory and in practice. The heads were bright, but failed to pass an external exam.
    2. Ivan Tartugai
      Ivan Tartugai 8 July 2017 08: 24
      0
      Quote: BAI
      Commander of the 4th Panzer Army, Colonel General Goth PLANNED destruction of Soviet tank reserves near Prokhorovka July 10-12


      If so, then Colonel General Goth had his own man in the high command of the Red Army. And not just an informant, but a person who had the ability to influence the final decision of the high command of the Red Army, i.e. level of deputies of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, chief of staff of the Red Army, his first deputies, commander of the front, chief of staff of the front.
      For example, Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasilevsky, the more he had already helped the Germans once in the defeat of the 5th tank army, still under the command of AI Lizyukov in July 1942 near Voronezh. Rotmistrov again “distinguished himself” there, as the commander of the 7th tank corps of the 5th TA, which again suffered heavy losses.
      There are also Germans too prepared in advance and met the 7th tank corps Rotmistrova, and inflicted a crushing defeat on him. Rotmistrov’s commander himself was 10 km from the battlefield and practically didn’t control the battle, he was seated on the checkpoint.
      1. stalkerwalker
        stalkerwalker 8 July 2017 09: 58
        +2
        Quote: Ivan Tartugay
        If so, then Colonel General Goth had his own man in the high command of the Red Army. And not just an informant, but a person who had the ability to influence the final decision of the high command of the Red Army, i.e. level of deputies of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, chief of staff of the Red Army, his first deputies, commander of the front, chief of staff of the front.

        No need to exaggerate so much the intelligence capabilities of the Abwehr .....
        1. German Goth (like many other Wehrmacht commanders) belongs to the old school of the generals, who began their careers before or during the First World War.
        2. Both sides of the battle on the Oryol-Kursk Bulge prepared in advance for Operation Citadel. The construction of fortifications on the northern and southern faces of the arc was continuously monitored by German reconnaissance aircraft. So it’s not surprising that in the Voronezh Front, a blow was inflicted on the weakest armies of Vatutin.
        3. From July 5 to July 7, German aviation had an overwhelming advantage in the air on the Central Front. According to the results of the first day, the score was 98:21 not in favor of the 16th VA Rudenko. On July 6, the rout took on more vivid outlines - 91:6. And only on the 7th situation began to break out - 37:13. I do not think that the situation was different on the southern front.
        4. The advantage of German artillery of special power was undeniable, especially in areas of breakthrough of the Soviet defense.
        All together folded, gives the answer - why the SS Hausser corps was able to achieve such impressive successes in the Prokhorov direction: the outfit of forces from the Soviet side presented Gotu with air reconnaissance, the Wehrmacht operations planning school lasted several decades. Those. access to the border of the Psel River was not planned.
        1. Ivan Tartugai
          Ivan Tartugai 8 July 2017 13: 16
          0
          Quote: stalkerwalker
          Wehrmacht operations planning school totaled several decades.

          No need to exaggerate so much the possibilities of the old school generals, the Wehrmacht planning school. Do not so bow to the brilliant German generals.
          Without the help of our family, blood traitors The German school of military planning in the war against the USSR was worth little. Starting from the Barbarossa plan, a masterpiece of the school of German military planning, before surrender in Berlin.
          Yes, both sides of the battle on the Oryol-Kursk arc prepared well for battle in advance. The Germans to the operation "Citadel", and ours to the Kursk strategic defensive operation. Indeed, the construction of fortifications on the northern and southern faces of the arc was continuously monitored by German reconnaissance aircraft. However, surprisingly, on the Voronezh Front (Vatutin Commander, Ivanov Chief of Staff, PMC Khrushchev, representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasilevsky) German reconnaissance aircraft detected weak armies, weaknesses on which the Wehrmacht was hit.
          But on the Central Front (the Rokossovsky KK commander’s headquarters, MS Malinin’s chief of staff, Telegin, the representative of the Supreme Command Headquarters, Marshal of the Soviet Union Zhukov, but he was practically not at the Central Fleet), despite the fact that, as you write, from 5th to 7th On July e, German aviation had on the Central Front overwhelming advantage in the airnevertheless, by German reconnaissance aircraft, again, in a most surprising way, neither weak armies nor weak spots in the defense of the Central Fleet were found and the Wehrmacht struck where it was expected by the troops of the Rokossovsky KK. Perhaps the Wehrmacht did this out of hopelessness, just to strike.
          1. stalkerwalker
            stalkerwalker 8 July 2017 13: 18
            +2
            Quote: Ivan Tartugay
            nevertheless, by German reconnaissance aircraft, again in a most surprising way, neither weak armies nor weak spots in the defense of the Central Fleet were found and the Wehrmacht struck where it was expected by the troops of the Rokossovsky KK

            You are clearly mistaken ....
        2. Ivan Tartugai
          Ivan Tartugai 8 July 2017 13: 21
          0
          Quote: stalkerwalker
          Advantage German artillery of special power was undeniable

          Artillery Advantages the Wehrmacht didn't have at all and moreover, from the very beginning of the war, and in the Battle of Kursk, it didn’t even have, where there was a ratio of one German gun to two Soviet ones. And this is not counting the gun reserve of the Red Army, about 8 thousand guns.
          About German artillery of special power, whose weapons would be used by the Wehrmacht in the Battle of Kursk, they could not throw off the link, if possible, in order to get acquainted with this issue, about German artillery of special power in the Battle of Kursk (operation "Citadel") in more detail.
          1. stalkerwalker
            stalkerwalker 8 July 2017 13: 24
            +2
            Quote: Ivan Tartugay
            The Wehrmacht had no advantages in artillery, and from the very beginning of the war

            Yes, my friend, are you writing a new history of the Second World War?
            Quote: Ivan Tartugay
            could you throw off the link, if possible, to get acquainted with this issue, about the German artillery of special power in the Battle of Kursk (operation "Citadel") in more detail.

            Only in exchange for your link
            Quote: Ivan Tartugay
            Wehrmacht struck where it was expected by the troops of the Rokossovsky KK
            1. Ivan Tartugai
              Ivan Tartugai 8 July 2017 16: 09
              0
              Quote: stalkerwalker
              Only in exchange for your link

              From the memoirs of the Rokossovsky KK:
              How we tried to create a high density of troops in the threatened direction, you can judge at least by such numbers. Here, in a 95-kilometer-long strip, we concentrated 58 percent of all our rifle divisions, 70 percent of artillery and 87 percent of tanks and self-propelled artillery. In the same direction were the troops of the second echelon and front reserve (tank army and two separate tank corps). The remaining 211 kilometers of the front accounted for less than half of our infantry, a third of artillery and less than one fifth of the tanks.
              It was decided to attract all the artillery of the front, including anti-aircraft, to repel enemy tanks, concentrating its main forces in the defense bands of the 13th, partially 48th and 70th armies [b] in the direction of the expected main attack of the enemy [/ b].

              On the likely directions of the enemy’s actions we concentrated powerful artillery groups. The total density of artillery in us was 35 barrels, including more than 10 anti-tank guns, per kilometer of the front, but in the defense zone of the 13th army this density was much higher.

              At 5 hours 30 minutes, the Oryol group of Nazi troops went on the offensive on the 40-kilometer front of the entire defense line of the 13th army and on the flanks of the 48th and 70th armies adjacent to it.
              On the first day of the offensive, the enemy brought in a mass of tanks, including tigers, and heavy ferdinand artillery mounts.
              The offensive was supported by strong artillery fire and air strikes from the air. Up to 300 bombers, operating in groups of 50–100 aircraft, bombed the entire tactical depth of our defense, and mainly artillery firing positions. Fierce battles unfolded on Olkhov direction, on the site of the 81st and 15th rifle divisions of the 13th army. Here the enemy delivered the main blow forces of three infantry and two tank divisions. The attack was supported by a large number of aircraft.

              The Wehrmacht struck where it was expected by the troops of the Rokossovsky KK
              1. stalkerwalker
                stalkerwalker 8 July 2017 17: 14
                +2
                Quote: Ivan Tartugay
                The Wehrmacht struck where it was expected by the troops of the Rokossovsky KK

                Is this visible from the text? Do not make me laugh....
                ... Summing up the first day of the "Citadel" on the northern front, it should be noted that even on a relatively narrow corridor in the forests on the Central Front failed to accurately determine the direction of the enemy’s strike. He did not follow where expected. K.K. Rokossovsky wrote in his memoirs: “On the first day of the battle, the direction of the enemy’s main strike was clearly defined on our front. He directed the main efforts not along the railway, as provided for in the second option (assumption) of our defense plan, but somewhat to the west, to Olkhovatka]. We are talking about the railway passing through Maloarkhangelsk to Ponyri through the defense center of the 13th Army. Contrary to the expectations of Rokossovsky, only an auxiliary blow was inflicted here by the infantry of the XXIII corps ...
                A. Isaev. Exemption. Tipping battles
                It seems that Comrade Epishev is your ideal, and in trying to write an alternative story.
                wassat
          2. stalkerwalker
            stalkerwalker 8 July 2017 13: 36
            +2
            Quote: Ivan Tartugay
            The Wehrmacht had no advantages in artillery, and from the very beginning of the war

            Here you go
            ... The strip of the VIII Army Corps of the German 3th Army was directly adjacent to the offensive zone of the 9rd Panzer Group. This building aimed at the city of Grodno from the very beginning had one important advantage. Unlike its neighbor, the XX Corps, for the most part it was located in the ledge of the border on the southern shore of the Augustow Canal. The left-flank 256th Infantry Division of the 14th Corps extended the same winning ticket. Three German divisions did not need to force the canal under fire and spend time building a bridge (we already know what this is fraught with in the example of the Guderian group). At the same time, Grodno was literally at hand. The report of the headquarters of the VIII Corps, written on the basis of the fighting, said: "The long-range flat fire of the corps artillery produced a successful awakening in the Grodno barracks." A powerful artillery fist was in general an important advantage of the VIII Corps: 150 divisions of heavy and super-heavy artillery were given to it, as well as a regiment of rocket mortars. These included: the XNUMX mm Pushee division], four divisions 210 mm howitzers, division 240-mm guns and two divisions 305 mm guns. VIII and neighboring XX corps were the only formations on the eastern front on June 22, 1941, which had 12-inch (305 mm) artillery.
            While long-range guns arranged a "wake-up" in the Grodno barracks, 240 mm and 305 mm shells hit the frontier fortifications. Thanks to the terrifying power of fire, the border fortifications were quickly overcome and already at 5.15 the 8th Infantry Division reported their breakthrough. On the way of the VIII corps there were only some centers of resistance in the pillboxes of the Grodno fortified area ...

            A. Isaev. Unknown 41st.
            I talked about guns special powercaliber above 150 mm.
            And if we are talking about the first day of the Great Patriotic War, then try to independently find information about the series of unsuccessful offensive operations in Belarus from the autumn of 1943 until the spring of the 44th year, when the western direction was a positional Verdun for the Red Army, so the Supreme The Commander-in-Chief even had to authorize an investigation of the GKO commission, take the most stringent measures and make unflattering "organizational conclusions."
            1. Ivan Tartugai
              Ivan Tartugai 8 July 2017 15: 46
              0
              Quote: stalkerwalker
              And if we are talking about the first day of World War II,

              You do not get distracted on the first day of the war. You can argue about it, but the article is dedicated to one of the battles of the Battle of Kursk.
              And your comment clearly says:
              4. The advantage of the German artillery of special power was undeniable, especially in areas of breakthrough of Soviet defense.
              All together folded (those. taking into account the undeniable advantages of the German artillery of special power), gives the answer - why the SS Hausser corps was able to achieve such impressive successes on the prokhorovsky direction

              So I had a question about the use by the Wehrmacht of the German artillery of special power in the Battle of Kursk, and even with an undeniable advantage.
              Well, if you do not have the opportunity to give a link, without any conditions like, I - you, you - me, then there is no special power in the Battle of Kursk and there is no demand for the German artillery.
              Information about the use of German artillery of special power in the Battle of Kursk would be of interest to many.
              1. stalkerwalker
                stalkerwalker 8 July 2017 17: 46
                +2
                Quote: Ivan Tartugay
                Information about the use of German artillery of special power in the Battle of Kursk would be of interest to many.

                Yes, you understand that we have that artillery of high power and could not be in excess due to its minimum quantity both in warehouses and in the Reserve of the High Command.
                ... In total, 507 guns of 76 mm caliber and above, 460 mortars of 82– and 120 mm caliber and 100 M-13 rocket launchers were involved in counter-training on the Central Front.

                In our country, the notion of "and higher" for almost the entire war meant 150 mm guns, howitzers and howitzer guns. I hope it makes no sense to talk about the large number of such weapons captured by Germany in the first (and second, too) year of the war, and adopted by the Wehrmacht.
                Quote: Ivan Tartugay
                So I had a question about the use by the Wehrmacht of the German artillery of special power in the Battle of Kursk, and even with an undeniable advantage.

                An undeniable advantage was the degree of destructiveness - the ZiS-3 or even A-19 battery can never be compared with the volley power of the Mrs 18 battery, or 28 cm HL / 12. The Germans also had other weapons of great power captured and taken into service.
                And do not make a proud appearance like "Well, if you do not have the opportunity to give a link, without any conditions." If you are really keen on “growing up” history, you will find all the answers yourself.
        3. yehat
          yehat 11 July 2017 11: 32
          0
          speak BRAD about score 98:21, 91: 6, etc.
          about artillery of special power (almost all the barrels were standard field artillery)
          about the weak army of Vatutin
          As for how the Germans met Rotmistrov’s counterattack near Prokhorovka,
          so look at their pre-war teachings - they used the STANDARD tactics of the Wehrmacht, there were no ingenious plans or operations. Just acted
          competently and according to the charter.
          1. stalkerwalker
            stalkerwalker 11 July 2017 13: 27
            +2
            Quote: yehat
            speak BRAD about score 98:21, 91: 6, etc.

            For those especially raving about their own fabrications:
            The first day of the air battle was marked by heavy losses of aviation connections of the 16th Air Army. Having completed 1720 sorties per day (of which during the day), she lost 98 aircraft. About 75% of the losses were fighter jets. The combat strength of the fighter regiments was greatly thinned, some of them by the end of the day had turned into reinforced squadrons. The German 1st Air Division made 2088 sorties per day, most of which were on strike aircraft, "which had a decisive influence on the success of the offensive." The crews of dive bombers completed 647 sorties and 582 twin-engine bombers performed. Taking into account aircraft whose damage percentage exceeded 40%, the 1st Air Division lost 21 aircraft (3 Ju88, 8 Ju87,1 He-111, 7 FW190, 1 Bf110, 1 Bf109).
            Isaev, Liberation 1943. “The war brought us from Kursk and Oryol ...”, p. 145
            The results of the air battle over the northern face of the Kursk Bulge on July 6 have not yet given a decisive advantage to either side. The universal indicator in this case is the number of sorties. On the side losing the air battle, the number of aircraft flying into the air decreases markedly. In the sky above Olkhovatka and the Doners, this has not yet happened. The 16th Air Army completed 1126 sorties in the afternoon and 200 at night. Another 269 sorties were in long-range aviation. Losses of army aviation connections S.I. Rudenko remained at a high level; on July 6, 91 aircraft were lost. In contrast to the first day of the operation, most of the losses fell on the bombers and attack aircraft. Losses of the German 6th air fleet for July 6, according to the combat log of the compound, amounted to only 6 aircraft (3 Ju88, 1 Ju87, 1 Bf110 and 1 FW190).
            Isaev, Liberation 1943. “The war brought us from Kursk and Oryol ...”, p. 156
            The third day of the battle occupies a special position in the chronology of the air war over the northern face of the Kursk Bulge. In his memoirs, the commander of the 16th Air Army S.I. Rudenko wrote: “Since July 7, our aircraft dominated the air over the Central Front.” This statement can be rated as untrue. The number of sorties performed by the 6th air fleet even increased on July 7 compared to the previous day, amounting to a solid number of 1687. Of this number, 1159 sorties were made by dive bombers, twin-engine bombers and heavy fighters. Moreover, even German fighters completed part of the bombing. Accordingly, the Soviet side responded with 1185 sorties in the afternoon, 212 in the night, and 210 sorties with long-range bomber aircraft. The "turning point" on July 7 was the calculation of the losses of the 16th Air Army. During the day, the Rudenko army lost only 37 aircraft, which was significantly less than in the first two days of the battle. The losses of the German Air Force on the northern front of the Kursk Bulge on July 7 amounted to 13 aircraft, including 8 aircraft were irretrievably lost.
            Isaev, Liberation 1943. “The war brought us from Kursk and Oryol ...”, p. 161
            1. yehat
              yehat 11 July 2017 13: 57
              0
              On May 5, 20 planes were destroyed on the ground and 15 were badly damaged.
              On July 5, 4 ju-88s and 9 fv190s were shot down in only one battle. Of these, 5 are recorded on the camera. the Germans, according to documents, carried out only 2 shot down.
              somewhere someone is lying and I guess who and you are not.
              the losses of our air forces in MACHINES are true, and maybe even higher due to decommissioned ones, but in pilots they are lower. As for the German losses, here the figures are clearly left. Of course, our air forces were worse prepared on the Kursk, but not 10 times!
              1. stalkerwalker
                stalkerwalker 11 July 2017 14: 10
                +2
                Quote: yehat
                our air forces were worse prepared on the Kursk, but not 10 times!

                Remind me, please, how did the air raid on German airfields end in the early morning of July 5th on the 43rd at the Voronezh Front, by a pair of Il-2 squadrons under cover of fighters, combined in time with counter-preparation?
  19. capt_jack_1654
    capt_jack_1654 8 July 2017 03: 16
    +1
    The article raises many questions regarding objectivity. Recalls the creation of a certain "Rezun"
    1. The USSR did not have overwhelming superiority in tanks
    in the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, we have 3444 Germans 2733
    by KOSAVE we have 3306 Germans 2700
    this despite the fact that the Germans self-propelled guns did not belong to tanks, as often attached tanks.

    2. The disastrous loss figures are confirmed by many German historians, including Guderian,
    this despite the fact that the evacuated tanks, like the salvage tanks of the Germans, were not considered losses, regardless of their fate.

    3. A simple analysis of the battlefield shows that the tactics of the Soviet tank forces were chosen correctly.
    In the conditions of superiority of the enemy at long distances, get close and hit point blank.

    4. It was after the battle of Prokhorovka that the Germans began to defend themselves and then retreat.
    1. Nehist
      Nehist 8 July 2017 05: 11
      0
      Gg for the same Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the loss of Soviet tanks for the period from July 5 to August 23 amounted to 6022 vehicles !!!))) Then explain to me how 3000 turn into 6000?
      1. capt_jack_1654
        capt_jack_1654 9 July 2017 00: 45
        0
        This is another perestroika fake. Just look at the production figures of Soviet and German tanks. As well as the ratio of heavy and light tanks in the Germans and ours. Plus the ratio of losses of the defending and the advancing side. As well as the subsequent course of events. Almost a stampede, despite the strict order of Hitler. You will be very surprised.
        1. yehat
          yehat 11 July 2017 11: 37
          0
          It’s very useful to compare the amount by the mass of tanks multiplied by the number. Cleans the brain
          who was superior in strength.
          1. capt_jack_1654
            capt_jack_1654 12 July 2017 23: 51
            0
            As a result of the failure of the Citadel offensive, we suffered a decisive defeat. The armored forces, replenished with such great difficulty, were incapacitated for a long time due to large losses in people and equipment.

            - Guderian G. Memoirs of a soldier. - Smolensk: Rusich, 1999

            Think, the Germans, having lost 1000 tanks (37%), would begin to switch to strategic defense.
    2. yehat
      yehat 11 July 2017 11: 34
      0
      Germans constantly switched to defense near Kursk - under Prokhorovka there was only 1 episode out of many.
      1. capt_jack_1654
        capt_jack_1654 13 July 2017 00: 00
        0
        I wonder how the battlefield could remain with the Germans, if the Germans only defended themselves.
  20. Rusfaner
    Rusfaner 8 July 2017 12: 03
    +1
    And while our company was dying
    Gnawed at the earth, swallowed sweat,
    Harcala blood in the snow.
    Reprimanded the combat general
    And they said that now he
    To the Homeland in debt!
    ...
    Generals repaid all debts
    And put on the order and retired for a long time
    Generals roam peacefully in cities
    And do not remember our company
    And they don’t remember anything! (from)
    ... from an old cadet song

    So are Rotmistrov and many other military generals. And they could have learned something in two years.
    My uncle Nikolai (T-34-76, Order of Glory of the III st.), When Prokhorovka recalled, began to cry - after 11 months he wandered around hospitals
    Paratroopers can recall and add a story about the largest airborne operation to seize a bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnieper ...
    After that, the survivors, having met somewhere else, the transport pilots immediately began to beat them.
  21. NordUral
    NordUral 8 July 2017 16: 17
    0
    Now it’s easy to judge and row. What they could, they could, the main thing is that the war ended with Victory! And eternal gratitude to our works and fathers, as well as eternal memory to all those who died in that war. What is in Brest, what is near Kursk, what is in the den of Nazism - Berlin.
  22. alex-sherbakov48
    alex-sherbakov48 9 July 2017 07: 00
    +1
    I do not see anything surprising or new in this. Hitler Germany, crushing the whole of Europe under her control, was able to create tanks and self-propelled guns that far exceeded our T-34s in terms of their tactical and technical characteristics. My father, by the way, a participant in that battle, said that if their Tiger brought a gun to our T-34 tank , then for our tank this is the end. Our industry at that time had not yet gained that power to withstand the whole of Europe, but this does not in the least diminish the greatness of the feat of our people in the battle on the Kursk Bulge. Yes, it was hard, a lot of our fighters died, but we still won in this battle and in the whole war !!!
  23. byrnas
    byrnas 9 July 2017 16: 08
    0
    Yes, all who are interested, have long been aware of everything about Prokhorovka, about the backwardness of our BTT and about the fact that they were waiting for the main attack of the Germans in the north, and received in the south, etc. ...
  24. Konstantin Paustovsky
    Konstantin Paustovsky 9 July 2017 18: 14
    +1
    Yes, for the "price - do not stand!"
  25. 1536
    1536 13 July 2017 19: 21
    0
    After the Battle of Kursk, the existence of which no one denies, the German army began to retreat, the Red Army seized the strategic initiative and the outcome of the war was a foregone conclusion by the beginning of the 1944 year. Next went geopolitics. What is considered in the article, where there is not even a single link to the documents of the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense? Private moments, albeit bloody, scary. Ask yourself why the Germans didn’t leave Prokhorovka to avoid casualties. After all, this is not German, but Russian land. So who is to blame for our irreparable loss? Definitely that the Germans!
  26. Cer59
    Cer59 29 January 2018 17: 36
    0
    The guys wanted to whip up an answer. Did not work out.
    I am writing a vskidku about losses in the future I will post an article with my vision of the battle.
    Well, no matter how I expected such a mess ..., in the coverage of this event