Military industry needs clear benchmarks

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Military industry needs clear benchmarksRecently, the editorial board of the Independent Military Review held a traditional expert round table organized by the independent expert-analytical center Epoch. This time the focus of the discussion of specialists was the topic: “The military-industrial complex of the state: problems of the present, the contours of the future.” And the conversation turned out very sharp.

The military-industrial complex (MIC) can be safely attributed to the industry, which in the last century had a significant impact on the development of economically developed countries. However, at present, the fundamentals of the construction and operation of the military industrial complex, laid down in the mid-twentieth century, cease to give the effect that is expected of them. Around the world, an active search began for further paths for the development of national defense-industrial complexes (DIC). The domestic expert community is also concerned about this problem: the cost of an error in this matter can not only lead the state to technological dependence on other countries, but in some circumstances can also become a threat to its very existence. After all, it is no secret that with the modern level of computerization of industrial production, hostile interference in the management of defense enterprises is possible. Yes, and our own miscalculations are fraught with serious consequences.



We bring to the attention of our readers the main points of the speeches of the participants of the round table on this topic.

MEANS OF ENSURING THE STATE INDEPENDENCE

Yury Nikolayevich Baluevsky - Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Guard, Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces (2004 – 2008), Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation (2008 – 2012), Army General

The topic of our round table, with all its clarity, is extremely complex. It is not a secret for anyone that the existence of a developed military-industrial complex (MIC) that is independent of external supplies is one of the main conditions for achieving and ensuring the political and technological independence of the state. And the development of the armed forces based on the own capabilities of the military-industrial complex is one of the main necessities for any state.

The question arises: what is needed for this? Probably at least two main components: quite a lot of money and qualified personnel. Do we have it today? Does Russia today have an independent national military-industrial complex based on national personnel and a scientific design school? And what is “independent national military industrial complex” in the context of globalization? Under conditions when the foundations of the creation and functioning of the military industrial complex are changing in the widest sense of its understanding.

A simple example: the absence of a direct connection between the geographical location of an enterprise and the respective nationality of the owner (s) is considered absolutely normal in the world today. The company is in one state, the owners are in the other, the main suppliers of raw materials and components are from third countries, loans are from the fourth, consumers are from the fifth. What national MIC is such an enterprise? What state body will be able to carry out long-term planning and the production of necessary products by such an enterprise during the endangered period and in wartime?

How such a system of economic relations will function not only under the conditions of military actions, but also in today's “peaceful sanctions”. This problem requires detailed study.

Another important problem in the military-industrial complex is the creation of an effective system for managing defense industries in both peacetime and wartime.

Ensuring the sustainable functioning of the military industrial complex requires detailed coordination of very important and very complex documents: the state armament program, the state defense order, development programs for various priority areas of industry, personnel training, development of research activities in order to ensure strategic military-technical and defense parity with potential aggressors.

In this area, in my opinion, it is necessary to take into account three main factors that negatively affect the development of the military-industrial complex of any state.

First, the problems at the stage of developing the state armament program or its analogues: certain secrecy and secrecy of the work of the “circle of limited persons” without taking into account a clear and understandable strategy for which war and with which opponent to prepare. As a result, the state defense order (GOZ) has not yet become an effective tool for equipping a state’s military organization with the necessary type and quantity of weapons and military equipment. I believe that, in fact, it continues to be a means of keeping the Russian defense industry complex and the social infrastructure of its city-forming cities and centers afloat. Hence lobbying, group interests and as a result:

- Difficulties in the optimal choice on the basis of the cost-effectiveness ratio of what the military organization of the state really needs;

- “smearing” of material assets across a variety of programs, projects, types of weapons and military equipment. There are significant additional costs for their operation and staff training, etc .;

- a large type in the procurement of weapons and military equipment (especially in the SNF, VKS and VKO, SON).

Secondly, the realism of the HPV-2020 financially: after all, the main expenditures on the development of the defense industry were planned after the 2013 year. According to the results, an increase in the production of weapons and military equipment was put at times, and for some positions even by an order of magnitude! What is real today? I dont know. But I admit that the sanctions of Western "partners" may affect these plans. In addition, one cannot disregard the “field of corruption” in the state defense order. According to the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office, the number of kickbacks has not decreased. It is likely that they automatically appear in the price of weapons and military equipment.

Thirdly, the realizability of the HPV-2025 in macroeconomic terms. I can only say one thing: the growth rate of the economy for its implementation, according to many reputable economists, should be higher.

There are hundreds of such nuances today. There are too many changes in the world, both technological and social. And how to take into account and interconnect their decision in the interests of the development of the military-industrial complex of tomorrow is an issue that requires a priority decision.

Today, the trend in the military is quite obvious: the creation, maintenance and preservation of weapons and military equipment even in peacetime costs a lot of money. In addition, with each new generation of weapons and military equipment, it is becoming increasingly difficult to repurpose enterprises producing one equipment to another. In my opinion, it will be very, very difficult to repeat the feat of our people in the Great Patriotic War, when hundreds of factories were transferred from the western regions of the state to the Urals and to Siberia and in a short time they mastered military production! But rather, it is even impossible, more precisely, it is inexpedient! The war has become another!

The connection of the front with the rear today has become much closer, more direct and decisive for victory. The functioning and effectiveness of modern military technology, I will not be afraid to say this - in something already fantastic, more and more determined by the work and the state of the rear. In this sense, the center of gravity of warfare has finally moved from the front to the rear. The violation by the adversary of the stability of the functioning of the military-industrial complex will have an effect on the troops much faster than it has ever been before. stories humanity.

Undoubtedly, the question of the development of the Russian defense industry in view of the dynamic change in the world is very complex. The simplest solution is to have many, many military factories, which is unacceptable for several reasons. And the financial component here is not the most important, albeit substantial. It is necessary to think about the harmonious development of all social state institutions. In order not to work out according to Arkady Raikin, if anyone remembers his miniature about a sewn jacket: there are no complaints about buttons or sleeves individually, but you cannot wear a jacket!

It is important today to lay the foundation for the development of the national defense industry complex so that tomorrow it will continue to be an organic tool to ensure our national security.

MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX OF THE STATE: CHALLENGES OF THE PRESENT

Igor M. Popov - Scientific Director of the independent expert-analytical center "EPOHA"

A state pursuing its national interests, aimed at ensuring its defense and security, is forced to allocate a certain part of its intellectual, organizational, managerial, economic, financial, social and other resources to military-technical development, to equip national armed forces with modern and advanced systems and armament and military equipment complexes (IWT). As a result, a military-industrial complex (MIC) of the state is being formed, which is understood as an integral, interconnected three-component system of bodies and structures of military production, technical equipment of the armed forces and state management and coordination.

“To teach troops what is needed in a war,” Generalissimo Alexander Suvorov bequeathed. Paraphrasing the words of the great commander in relation to the military-industrial complex of the state, it is quite reasonable to set the task like this: “Arm the troops with what you need in a war!”

The key word in the quotation by A. Suvorov and in our interpretation is “war”. It is irresponsible and senseless to organize the training of troops in peacetime, not understanding what the next war will be. This fully applies to the fact that armies are armed in peacetime. What enemy will the army face on the battlefield of the future? What weapons systems and military equipment will it need for successful actions not only today and tomorrow, but also in the long term?

These are not idle questions. Ultimately, not just the appearance of the armed forces depends on them, but their combat capabilities and ability to guarantee the defense and security of the Fatherland, to defend its territorial integrity and sovereignty. The financial and economic state of the state, the well-being of its citizens depends on the answers to these questions. You can save on the army, its weapons and the needs of their troops in peacetime and then "feed someone else's army." Another extreme is possible: to invest huge amounts of money in the maintenance and arming of the army in peacetime, until the finally exhausted economy collapses and buries the state itself and its citizens under its wreckage. The maintenance of the armed forces and the provision of them with everything necessary - and above all IWT - require enormous expenditures from the state.

That is why it is so important to have a clear understanding of the role and place, purpose and capabilities of the military-industrial complex in the general economic, political and military system of the state. That is why it is so important to determine what problems the Russian defense industry is facing today and how to ensure the leading positions of our country in the military-technical sphere in the future.

The complex of problems facing the national defense industry complex is distinguished by high diversity and diversity. It includes problems of improving management efficiency and coordination, financial support, import substitution, staffing, the material base of production, etc. These problems are obvious and are in the center of constant attention of the leadership of the defense industry complex of the country.

But there are problems that do not lie on the surface. These include the development and creation of new types, systems and complexes of weapons and military equipment. Everything is important here: the organization of R & D and R & D, the definition of tactical and technical requirements for future weapons, and the possibility of introducing advanced achievements of science and technology in the development of new weapons. You need to know that in this area occurs in other countries, the armies of the likely enemy. It is necessary to understand for what kind of military conflicts are certain IWT systems being created and whether they will meet the needs of the troops in the future.

The designer of weapons systems today must be the real creator of science fiction of tomorrow. And it is very difficult. He creates what the military does not even dream of. The armed forces of the state are called upon to fight here and now, that is, those weaponsthat they have in their arsenal, and not the one that is born in the brain of the designer. Accordingly, the question arises: how much will the miracles of design thought that are being developed today be in demand in a future war? The Soviet "Buran" ahead of its time by many years, if not decades, to become an exhibit in the Park. M. Gorky. How effective are precision munitions, the latest air defense systems, the most advanced in the world Tanks in the fight against militants whose price of life is a bottle of drinking water, aviation which is represented by cheap commercial quadrocopters, and anti-tank weapons - guided land mines?

In the fight against an irregular enemy, a specific set of weapons and military equipment is needed - cheap and simple defeat systems, highly mobile transport and combat platforms capable of giving the troops (forces) groups the highest mobility and sufficient fire power. Such platforms in modern conditions can only be helicopters of various types and purposes.

In a military conflict with the states that are technically developed in military terms, the domestic Armed Forces should be able to conduct completely new actions in the physical sphere, as well as in information and cyberspace, in the cognitive sphere. Traditional systems and weapons and military equipment will be added, and in some situations they will even be replaced by non-material information weapons and cyber weapons systems. Key traditional areas of activity of the state defense industry, that is, the creation and production of lethal systems of kinetic destruction, may be relegated to the background.

Future strategic operations, battles and battles will rage in the virtual space in which the destinies of states and peoples will be decided. Under these conditions, what will be the functions and tasks of the military-industrial complex of the state is an open question.

The generals are preparing for the last war. This axiom fully applies to the military-industrial complex of the state. Domestic military theory today does not provide a holistic conceptual understanding of the nature and nature of the war of the future. In this case, it is impossible to determine the appearance of the future of the Russian defense industry. The only thing that is clear today is that possible “technological surprises” on the part of potential enemies, which can manifest themselves in the war of the future, and decide its fate, should be excluded.

MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX OF THE STATE: FUTURE CONTOURS

Mussa Magometovich Khamzatov - chief analyst of the independent expert-analytical center "EPOHA"

The nature of modern warfare, more than ever, is determined by the capabilities of the military-industrial complex of the state and its allies. The thesis of the classic of domestic military science, General Alexander Svechin - “the economy will be able to subjugate the nature of military operations and impose its own seal on them”, expressed almost 100 years ago, has become an objective reality.

In this context, the problem of substantiating the directions of the development of the military-industrial complex of a state is determining ways to create the material basis for conducting successful military operations in the future. The complexity of weapons and military equipment has increased so much that it is unlikely anyone will be able to start production of modern and advanced weapons systems in a short time of the first strategic operations (1 – 3 of the month) “from scratch”.

No less critical for the sustainable provision of the military organization of the IWT state in wartime conditions is the fact that the number of technical elements in modern military equipment of collective use is measured in millions. On the one hand, it is necessary to organize the production of components and final samples of weapons and military equipment so as to simplify logistics. On the other hand, it is not always economically feasible. It is unlikely that there will be states in the world that are ready to create new “production valleys” for the release of each new type of weapons and military equipment. We need to look for a "middle ground".

No less difficult problem for the organization of the activities of the military-industrial complex is that the number of critical elements in the military-industrial complex as a system increases as the products become more complex. To organize their reliable cover and defense is becoming increasingly difficult. For example, how to protect all elements of energy, directly or indirectly working on the defense industry? How is guaranteed to cover the critical elements of the infrastructure of road or rail transport, to ensure the smooth operation of logistics centers? There are many such “thin spots” today. And the more developed the industry of the state, the more critical points.

The world is undergoing significant changes in the content and nature of war. The military organization of the state is changing: functions, tasks, mentality, means, organizational forms, etc. The main thing - the concept of "front and strategic rear" is gone. Military operations are initially conducted throughout the state of the victim of aggression. It means that the military industrial complex must be built on new principles, new approaches to its improvement and functioning should be laid. It is naive to hope in modern conditions for the sustainable functioning of the defense industry, built on the principles of 40's. Then the main axiom was the presence of a deep rear, in which the industry could work relatively calmly. In modern conditions of the transition of the aggressor in the war to a systemic effect on all elements of the state, the military-industrial complex, built on the old principles, will not function.

When thinking about the contours of the military-industrial complex of the future, it is necessary to remember that war is almost always a difficult and long-term test for any state. First of all for people. This is not only a personnel problem. It is important to create the conditions for specialists to be able to work effectively and as long as possible. Such measures are practiced for a long time. For example, in the First World War for such purposes they began to introduce free food at work, issue food rations for family members, create nursery rooms and kindergartens for working women. The costs of these activities were considered economically justified. It is difficult to expect effective labor from a person when he is physically or psychologically weakened. Repression gives a short-term effect.

The problem in this area today is that with each round of scientific and technological progress, the task of caring for a specialist of the required level of competence and his family members is becoming more difficult and more costly. According to some experts, mass robotization of the industry can become a way out. Today the number of industrial robots growing rapidly throughout the world. There are over two million of them. It seems to be good.

Another aspect of this problem. Intellectual stuffing of weapons and military equipment came to the leading role - it became much dependent on the quality of the electronic component base. For example, on the performance of integrated circuits. At the same time, their production is difficult and expensive. Crystals need a long (several months) "grow." Whether any of the parties will have this time is an open question. It is economically inexpedient to have several duplicate plants scattered throughout the country.

Complete robotization of the industry is effective only in peacetime. Any defeat by the enemy of the pipeline / process chain, whether it is physical disruption or destructive actions at the software level, can instantly stop all production. People in the same conditions, unlike robots, can be redirected to other tasks or regroup to continue production of the main products. This circumstance is crucial. After all, the military-industrial complex should function stably in conditions when the war is fought throughout the state. When fire or information destruction of industrial objects is not an exception, but a well-established practice.

When planning the development of the military-industrial complex for the medium and long-term periods, it is important to consider the following.

Firstly, there will be no strategic rear on its territory. In this capacity, it is necessary to prepare in advance the territory and the MIC of an ally state that is not formally a party to the conflict. It is there that it will be possible to produce the necessary military products and deliver them in finished form to the combat area.

Many economically developed countries are already doing this, encouraging their businessmen to buy enterprises and entire production chains from the military-industrial complex on the territory of other states. Globalization is actively promoting this.

Secondly, the conduct of hostilities with the use of high-tech weapons is possible only during the first strategic operation. After it, the economy and the military industrial complex of at least one of the parties to the conflict will suffer such losses that in the future they will have to switch to the mass use of traditional means of destruction. In this case, the lack of high-tech weapons will be widely replaced by suicide bombers. What we observe in all conflicts of the 21st century.

MILITARY-ECONOMIC STRATEGY: WHAT TO BE IT?

Stanislav Stefanovich Chebotarev - Doctor of Economics, Professor, Director of the Department of Economic Problems of Development of the Central Research Institute EISU

Over the years since the transition to market relations, the Russian defense industry has undergone many changes, both organizational and economic, the main content of which was the transformation of defense enterprises into independent commercial entities. At the same time, the high dependence of defense enterprises on the state (through various forms of support, state defense orders, etc.) led to the emergence of specific economic relations in the defense industry that created dualism in its operation: on the one hand, it represents the economic sector in which the share of state regulation is high (due to the specifics of the products produced and the high proportion of federal budget funds transferred to its enterprises), on the other hand, most of its enterprises belong to ommercheskim businesses, the aim of functioning of which is profit.

Today, defense enterprises are in a complex system of problems. Many of them have practically exhausted all reserves and remain very “vulnerable” from destabilizing factors. The main ones today are:

- development of the financial and economic crisis;

- financial and economic instability of defense enterprises;

- forced import substitution;

- lag with the transition to 6-th technological way;

- legislative restrictions providing for strict regulation of the procedure for using funds held in special accounts (including the purchase of equipment, repayment of loans, etc.), which complicates the operational management of resources.

A significant negative impact on the functioning of the military-industrial complex is imposed by the imbalance in the military science-military-industrial complex system. In our opinion, the existing interrelationships of military science and the country's defense-industrial complex in today's structural structure are not capable of ensuring the necessary efficiency of military construction, since they do not resolve the systemic contradiction between military science, politics and economics (the defense-industrial complex).

Because of this, it is proposed that by joint efforts of representatives of the military, economic and other sciences begin to develop the state’s military-economic strategy for the period up to 2030 as a priority scientific and practical task. In this case, the main objects of study should be: the total national power and the factors for its implementation, as well as the mechanism of state-market modernization of the defense-industrial complex, the economy and the Armed Forces of the country as a whole.

The feasibility of developing such a mechanism is due to the fact that the country's economic system is stuck halfway from plan to market. This left a negative imprint on politics, economics, military affairs, science and technology, which gave rise to a steady tendency to reduce Russia's aggregate national power.

In this state of affairs, it is necessary from the position of system analysis to revise the organizational and ideological attitudes in the organization of the defense construction of the state and ensure:

- recognition of military and economic security as the core of the entire national security system of the country;

- the presence of a statutory and mandatory for all federal executive bodies engaged in military construction issues and especially military technology policy, the planning period - 5 years.

This approach stems from the interrelationships of military science - politics - economics. We give priority to military science, which implements the policy guidelines and acts as the “master generator” for the scientific complex of the defense industry and the entire system of sciences studying the war.

The recognition of military-economic security as the core of the entire national security system of a country allows, through successive approximations, to organizationally streamline the procedure for coordinating resources planned for the maintenance and development of all elements of military construction.

In this case, the most important role is acquired by the Message of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly. It can become a specific program document of ensuring military-economic security for the planned period. In this case, you must give this document the status of a federal law.

In addition, in the interests of forming the defense industry of tomorrow, systematic work is needed at all levels of government in the state, including the following actions (measures).

At the level of federal legislative bodies:

- to adopt a system of program-target development planning for the defense-industrial complex in conjunction with all objects of the military organization of society;

- develop and adopt the Federal Law “On Military Production”.

At the level of federal executive bodies:

- to raise the question of creating a structure in the Russian Academy of Sciences for the study of modern war, which would include representatives of military science and scientists - representatives of other sciences;

- to consider the issue of the compliance of the organizational and legal forms of defense industry enterprises with the modern and prospective needs of the state in the field of defense;

- to clarify the procedure (mechanism) for determining the state's military expenditures corresponding to its real needs;

- to determine the amount of deferred demand for technical modernization of the military-industrial complex and the Armed Forces and to develop a mechanism for its satisfaction;

- to initiate the issue of evaluating the effectiveness of the management system of the defense-industrial complex, and first of all, regarding the implementation of the military-technical policy of the state;

- to complete the work on the formation of a mechanism of public-private partnership in the interests of military construction;

- to initiate research work on the formation of Russia's military-economic strategy for the period up to 2030.

At the level of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation:

- analyze the effectiveness of the interaction of the military-scientific complex and scientific organizations of defense industries and make a number of necessary decisions;

- to ensure organizational and methodological consistency in the development of operational-strategic, technical and economic requirements for weapons systems;

- to harmonize relations between representatives of industry and the Ministry of Defense of Russia at the stage of developing tactical and technical characteristics of weapons models and their military-industrial implementation.

THE RUSSIAN DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX AT THE PRESENT STAGE: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

Anatoly Mikhailovich Nikonov - Major General, Doctor of Economics, Professor

The development of the military-industrial complex is constrained by a number of problems: the rapid growth of prices for energy resources, raw materials, materials, semi-finished products and purchased products while curbing the growth of prices for its own products in order to maintain positions in the domestic and foreign markets; unpredictable growth of currencies (dollar and euro), in which payments are made for the supply of imported raw materials, materials and components; the lack of accounting in the current pricing system of the peculiarities of production of products supplied by the state defense order; the continued dependence of the production of a number of the most important types of weapons and military equipment on the supply of components for imports; non-rhythmic financing of R & D performed within the framework of the state defense order; small-scale production and low capacity utilization; low availability of credit funds and high interest rates on loans and borrowings; high physical wear of the active part of fixed assets of most industrial enterprises of the military-industrial complex.

Under these conditions, analysis, systematization and revision of certain aspects of the current state policy in the field of pricing for defense products seem extremely relevant. Actual and amending the federal law of December 29 2012 275-FZ: its individual provisions create problems in the work of the defense industry, and in particular the industry of conventional weapons.

So, in the presence of a large range of components produced, which are used at once in several head products for different government contracts, with a new payment mechanism from a special account in the bank only for products on a specific order, difficulties arise in paying for materials and components due to small application rates in a particular product and large shipments shipment supplier. As a rule, the head enterprises of the conventional armaments industry note the unreadiness of most enterprises - suppliers of raw materials and materials to produce products in small batches due to the lack of appropriate equipment, which entails an increase in consumer spending. This leads to the freezing of working capital and an increase in stocks. In this case, the law proposes to grant the right to the principal executor (executors) to form some stocks of products for the performance of the state defense order and to reimburse the justified expenses on the formation of the stock with the consent of the state customer. But the mechanism is not clear how, who and when will reimburse these costs.

Next moment. According to the existing legislation, the cost of production for the state defense order includes the interest rate on loans in an amount not exceeding the refinancing rate of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation plus 1,5%. In fact, industrial enterprises have to take loans from commercial banks with a much higher interest rate. This difference is paid by the enterprise industry at the expense of profits. It requires a change in the given rule “20 + 1”, which allows you to earn 20% profits in your own production and only 1% in cooperation. That is, there is a stimulation of the creation of full-cycle production, which excludes all the advantages of production, which widely use outsourcing.

A separate problem is the opening of accounts for each government contract and co-execution contract in an authorized bank. The number of accounts with one artist can be several hundred. At the same time, enterprises have problems associated with a significant increase in accounting work and a rapid increase in workflow, which leads to an increase in the staff of administrative and management personnel (financial, economic planning departments, accounting). All this increases the overhead costs and, accordingly, the increase in prices of products for the state defense order.

It is proposed to open a single special account at the enterprise within the framework of the state defense order and to enable the enterprise to enter into an agreement between the enterprises of cooperation for several tasks of the state defense authority. Do not extend the operation of the law No. 275-Ф3 to enterprises of cooperation with the supply of components up to 5 million rubles. in year. Within the framework of the execution of the state defense order, it is necessary to adopt a single standard contract form for all levels of cooperation, which will significantly simplify and, most importantly, shorten the procedure for concluding contracts between enterprises.

It should also be noted that the law directly prohibits the purchase of foreign currency or the transfer of money abroad from a special account. However, the purchase of imported equipment, for example, in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Baltic States is still a necessity.

It is necessary to simplify the coordination of the application of the import element base, to revise the permits, placing greater responsibility for the use of imported IET on enterprises - developers and general designers.

A separate layer of problems in the development of the defense industry complex is associated with the need for scientific, methodological and informational and analytical support for the development and introduction of industrial technologies to ensure the production of the most important types of weapons and military equipment. There are still no approved methodologies and economic-mathematical models for evaluating the effectiveness of new industrial technologies, forecasting and estimating the cost of developing industrial technologies (critical and basic) envisaged for inclusion in state defense orders, evaluating scientific-technological, industrial and personnel potential of organizations - potential performers of tasks GOZ.

The achievement of this goal should be based on:

- development and coordination in the prescribed manner of methods for evaluating the effectiveness of industrial technologies in the interest of ensuring the production of the most important types of WWTE, including a list of criteria for assessing the effectiveness of the use of allocated funds, taking into account the development of integration and innovation processes in the defense industry, and developing on this basis relevant indicators

- development of economic and mathematical models for estimating the cost of work on the development of industrial technologies to be included in the state defense order;

- development of methods and assessment of scientific and technological, industrial and personnel potential of organizations - potential performers of the tasks of the state defense order for the development of industrial technologies.

THE DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX IS NOT A LOCOMOTIVE, BUT THE GENERATOR OF THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY

Vladimir Vladimirovich Pimenov - Doctor of Economics, Advisor to the General Director of JSC “TSNII EISU”, Professor of the PRUE. G.V. Plekhanov

Considering the problems of the modern military-industrial complex, I would begin with the concept of its inherent duality. On the one hand, in accordance with the military doctrine of the state, the main task of the defense industrial complex is to ensure the defense capability and security of the state. On the other hand, the defense industry is an accumulator of advanced technologies, a concentration of the country's intellectual potential, and this potential should be effectively used in the interests of developing and creating high-tech civilian products and thereby enhancing the competitiveness of the entire domestic economy. This immanently inherent DIC "duality" imposes certain requirements (conditions) when choosing a strategy and ways of its development, which were almost very poorly taken into account in the course of its reform, especially in the early stages.

First, it is necessary to consider the defense industry as a basis for ensuring and strengthening the national security of the state. The main provisions of this basis are defined in the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (Presidential Decree No. 683 of December 31 of 2015 of the Year). The Strategy itself is a basic strategic planning document where national interests and priorities of the country are defined. And now we need the tools and models of interaction between the military and civilian sectors of the economy for the implementation of this Strategy.

It should be a systemic approach to the development of the entire policy of the country, bearing in mind the adoption of coordinated tools, mechanisms and actions both in the development of the military-technical policy and the strengthening of the defense-industrial complex, and the development of the entire economic potential of the country based on further structural changes in interests of the individual, society and the state. Innovative technologies developed in defense industry organizations should be directed towards the development of this economic potential. At the same time, the defense industry should not remain the locomotive that drags the country's economy, as it did in the Soviet Union and continued during the conversion period in the 90-s in Russia. The defense industry should become a generator of the domestic economy and charge it with the latest technologies to create competitive civilian products.

Hence, the second group of issues: the need to develop technology transfer from the DIC to the civilian sector of the economy. The technology transfer tools should be small venture capital companies as high-tech guides, which are still extremely underdeveloped in the field of industrial production.

From today's perspective, we should talk not so much about conversion as a direct replacement of defense orders with orders for civilian products, but about a well-thought-out diversification strategy based on flexible and lean manufacturing, on modern marketing technologies and on the organizational principles of the National Technology Matrix. programs of measures to modernize the economy and support innovative development of promising industries in Russia and facilitate expansion in various markets Oh).

The prerequisite for such development is the fact that in most defense enterprises, over the past 3 – 4, the modernization of production has been completed, and the latest technologies have been mastered. Gradually, the issue of staffing of defense organizations is resolved both in terms of a wide recruitment to universities in engineering and technical specialties, and in terms of higher (substantially higher than average) wages.

The third group of questions is the implementation of the Strategy of Economic Security of the Russian Federation for the period up to 13 approved by a presidential decree of 2017 in May 208 of the year No. 2030. 25 challenges and threats will require a systematic approach to neutralizing them and ensuring the strategic national priorities identified in the above strategy. And here we need, in our opinion, preventive measures, systemic in nature, which should be based on program planning.

The modern development of the defense industry complex faces a number of objective difficulties caused by the negative macroeconomic and foreign policy conditions, with economic sanctions against high-tech sectors of the Russian defense industry. The current situation requires quantitative and qualitative assessments of such an impact, including through infrastructure and financial market instruments.

In the Economic Security Strategy of Russia (Art. 12), among the main ones, such threats and threats as “5) increase the fluctuations in the global commodity and financial markets” and “8) susceptibility of the financial system of the Russian Federation to global risks (including as a result of the influence of speculative foreign capital ...) ".

For most of the strategic projects implemented by enterprises that execute the state defense order, there is a high dependence on imported components (in some branches of the defense industry - up to 70 – 80%). And in these conditions, the solution of the problem of import substitution becomes extremely urgent, which cannot be implemented in the shortest possible time. Foreign exchange risks associated with the negative dynamics of the ruble exchange rate remain high, which leads to higher prices for consumed foreign-made components.

When making effective management decisions that contribute to the further development of the defense industry, it is necessary to conduct an adequate and economically sound assessment of the impact of the monetary and stock market on the conditions and results of the economic activities of defense enterprises.

Further development of the military-industrial complex should be directed both at strengthening the state’s defense capability and at increasing the efficiency of the entire economy and its competitiveness, based on a high scientific and technological basis for the defense industry.

QUESTIONS OF DEVELOPMENT OF ENTERPRISES OF THE DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

Irina Skorobogatova - Senior Researcher of the Military Institute (DNA) VAGSH RF Armed Forces

The rationale for rational volumes of military spending in the state budget is based on a balance between defense needs and economic capabilities of the country. This leads to the need to consider the following prerequisites:

- consideration of military expenditures and the formation of the defense order on the basis of an assessment of their impact on both ensuring foreign policy sustainability and internal socio-economic stability and economic security;

- transition to the use of the concept of risk management in the context of multiple uncertainties and resource constraints;

- the need to create scientific and technical groundwork in the development of new types of weapons;

- the use of the capabilities of defense enterprises for the development of knowledge-intensive high-tech industries.

The changing nature of military threats, economic instability, a high level of competition in modern conditions lead to the need to diversify production activities in order to minimize risks for defense enterprises. The sustainability of multidisciplinary enterprises (associations) is based on the possibility of moving production resources to more promising activities, compensating for losses in one area of ​​activity at the expense of others, as well as sharing common infrastructure facilities. For companies specializing in innovative activities, similar benefits are provided in the case of their participation in the work of technology parks.

Many researchers believe that in the near future, traditional enterprises will be crowded out by enterprises focused on networking, in which the structure of an organization may change depending on the requirements of the interaction participants. In modern Russian conditions, this is hampered by the following factors:

- insufficient development of competitive markets, which means that when looking for options for cooperation there is a lack of objective information about the activities of enterprises operating in the market;

- lack of opportunities to apply modern methods of assessing the quality of enterprise management and interaction with contractors;

- insufficiently developed culture of cooperation associated with numerous violations of the commitments made;

- the complexity of the implementation of infrastructure projects, due to their high capital intensity and long payback period.

For defense enterprises, the distinctive features of activity are:

- monopoly position in the supply of finished products and the results of their activities;

- a high proportion of government orders in the portfolio of orders (from 70 to 100%), the almost complete absence of private investment;

- high technology and manufacturability of the processes of development and production;

- the duration of the production cycle;

- high capital intensity and long-term investment projects;

- high consumption of materials and capital intensity of production;

- the need to maintain mobilization capacity;

- high quality requirements, controlled by representatives of military departments;

- secrecy of information about the results of scientific work;

- high qualification requirements for personnel.

Due to the above features of the production activities, the concept of bankruptcy is not applicable to defense enterprises. It is clear that an enterprise that produces unique types of equipment, weapons, and is wholly dependent on government orders, is counting on state support because of its importance for ensuring national security. Therefore, indicators such as solvency, financial stability, are entirely dependent on the actions of the state as a customer. If we evaluate the capabilities of the enterprise for further development, the indicator that assesses the ratio of capital costs to value added is much more applicable. The tendency of its decline for a particular enterprise or relative to other enterprises of the industry may indicate that the enterprise is losing dynamism in development. Another indicator that also characterizes the quality of growth of an enterprise is the ratio of capital costs to the number of employees.

Given the complex structure of high-tech defense companies and the need to take into account the contribution of each unit to the creation of the finished product, an approach that assumes taking into account the work of each participant, bypassing the sale and purchase relations, which would reduce taxation, is promising. Taking into account the features of the production activities of the MIC that were listed above, such an approach (close to the type of contracts for tolling raw materials) would avoid unnecessary document flow and enable the units involved in the production of the finished product to determine their profit shares in proportion to the contribution made.

MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX OF THE STATE: IMPULSE PULSED MOBILIZATION IS NECESSARY

Alexander Andreevich Korabelnikov - Colonel, Doctor of Military Sciences, Professor, Honored Scientist of the Russian Federation

In my opinion, success in implementing a set of measures to bring the DIC in line with the requirements of the new time is unthinkable without mobilizing the economy. The priority task is the formation of new military-technical and functional specialization of the military-industrial complex with the reconstruction of the collapsed and the creation of new production cycles of military equipment and weapons in the framework of special state programs and the transformation of the system of specialized training and specialization, starting with the system of secondary professional military education.

Changing the content and nature of modern warfare requires complex and painstaking work not only to ensure the deployment and use of the Armed Forces, but also to organize production for state needs, and not least for the needs of the population. After all, it is no secret that with the aggravation of the situation with respect to Russia, an economic blockade will be organized. This will necessitate the deployment of food production and organization of tight control over its consumption. The solution to the identified systemic problem as applied to the special situation regime is seen through the implementation of impulse mobilization measures.

Under the impulse mobilization it is proposed to understand the mobilization deployment of the production of certain types of weapons and military equipment, food and other products, with the involvement of the manufacture of part of the military and civilian enterprises, as well as the most important commercial enterprises.

Impulse mobilization as a concept has not yet received recognition, but this particular type of mobilization deployment concerns not only military production, it has recently acquired an increasingly relevant and distinct character.

As applied to the current state of Russia, primarily in the socio-economic field, it is advisable to carry out measures for impulsive mobilization of key sectors of the national economy not only in the territory adjacent to the area of ​​the alleged conflict, but also throughout the country. The mobilization deployment of military production in the case of impulse mobilization should differ from the partial and full forms of the mobilization deployment of military production according to: the nomenclature and size of supplies of weapons and military equipment, property, food and meet the most diverse applications of military units (allocation of premises for personnel, organization of repair works, in the preparation of premises adapted for hospitals, the provision of fuel, baked bread, hot food, buffet Tami, stalls, repair of shoes and clothes, temporary transport, maintenance of spectacular events, movies, periodicals, etc.), as well as the time of deployment.

The main measures of impulse mobilization can be attributed to: the call up of military units and, in the first place, military formations and units of permanent combat readiness; finding human resources, especially specialists in the above-mentioned industries, sending them to work in industry; accounting and booking of persons liable for the national economy; the deployment of training activities for reserves in the system of universal military training and specialists of the training network of civilian agencies; accounting and control over the accumulation and expenditure of food stocks; carrying out comprehensive measures to control the crime situation in human settlements, especially in enclave labor markets that are emerging on a migration basis.

The implementation of pulse mobilization measures will also require titanic efforts by the administration of the subject of the Federation, the leadership of the military commissariats, enterprises, and public organizations. Success in its implementation is possible only with skilful advocacy work among the population.

Industrial enterprises participating in the impulse mobilization deployment must meet a number of stringent requirements: first, the rapid development and deployment of the production of the latest high-tech weapons, and enterprises of a different profile and form of ownership - the development of production that requires high expenditure during combat operations; the second is the speed and large scale of increasing production; the third is a flexible and short time transition from the production of some products to the production of more efficient ones. To ensure these requirements, it is necessary to create a flexible, quickly re-adjustable production.

In the period of growing threat of aggression, there will be an urgent need for the effective use of available research and production, teaching and combat potential of the Armed Forces and other components of the state’s military organization, restoration of production cycles, special educational programs and the whole system of recruiting and intelligence work. However, the principle of defensive sufficiency is crucial in utilizing all unclaimed reserves for the country's defense. Its implementation is in a wide range of social, as well as in sections and special areas of general state scientific and technical programs, qualified personnel support systems for the protection of equipment, technology and safety of personnel.

The development of the country's military-industrial complex should be considered as an engine for the modernization of the country's industrial production. From the production base of organizations of the military-industrial complex will hang the state of national security, as well as the integrated and systemic development of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, the expansion and strengthening of economic ties between them.
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  1. Alf
    +2
    1 July 2017 19: 57
    Industrial enterprises participating in the impulse mobilization deployment must meet a number of stringent requirements: first, the rapid development and deployment of the production of the latest high-tech weapons, and enterprises of a different profile and form of ownership - the development of production that requires high expenditure during combat operations; the second is the speed and large scale of increasing production; the third is a flexible and short time transition from the production of some products to the production of more efficient ones. To ensure these requirements, it is necessary to create a flexible, quickly re-adjustable production.

    And such production should be only state-owned. For a private trader at a crucial moment can say, It’s not profitable for me, I have a contract for pans or too cheap, not profitable.
  2. 0
    1 July 2017 20: 22
    The military industry is a state industry. If the military industry still needs guidance, then it’s time for some to take care of attaching the steering wheel and sails to the state.
  3. 0
    1 July 2017 21: 33
    It is very good that a traditional expert round table was organized by the Epoch independent expert and analytical center. And the problems raised by the participants are very relevant, and all these problems require in-depth and comprehensive discussion and, most importantly, decision-making on these problems.
    True, I would very much like for, in addition to the speakers, the presence of government representatives who make decisions at this round table would be added. At the same time, specific people should be appointed to perform tasks, so that they have the authority, but also demand for responsibility for the results.
    And the fulfillment of the tasks of restoring the military-industrial complex in our country in conditions of political and economic isolation is possible only with a planned economy, the market does not need this in FIG.
    1. 0
      4 July 2017 08: 17
      Quote: andr327
      government decision makers

      The representative of the government, Shoigu, has long made a decision - instead of many military depots, 24 large logistics centers are being built (one in the Moscow region) - that is, in the event of a war, the calculation of land lease in a new form. China and America will send cartridges, just fight ... Gunpowder is already coming from Serbia.
      We have democracy, and the female majority of the electorate will fuse their drunkards to war, receive a pink certificate or SMS, and can rely on a non-drinking Chinese or someone else.
      The result of the reign of Raisa Maximovna is known, but is Nabiulina or Yarovaya less active?

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