The alarms of the “Syrian denouement”: “Super Hornet” has worked, HIMARS in the queue. Ways of counteraction
As we have already managed to observe, the military-strategic situation in the European, Middle Eastern and Persian-Asian conventional theaters continues to evolve according to the most complex pre-escalation scenario, with a lot of unpredictable details and moments. Nevertheless, the main operational directions, the alignment of forces of the parties, as well as their technological equipment can be partially determined and analyzed. Against the background of the upcoming active phase of the confrontation in the Donbass theater of operations, where the people's corps of the LDNR militia will have to restrain the onslaught of the Ukrainian military formations, and then begin the counter-offensive breakthrough of the only line of defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the southern front with the liberation of Mariupol and Volnovakhi occur in a multilateral military conflict on the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic.
Syrian government troops currently have significant tactical advantages in almost all operational areas. In particular, when aviation support of tactical fighters of the Russian Aerospace Forces and the MTR, the successful offensive of the Syrian Armed Forces continues along the Palmira-Deir-ez-Zor highway, where the settlement of Arak, which was previously a temporary near rear fortified area and operational logistics support point for the caliph, is completely liberated for units controlling the western approaches to the captured Palmyra. While maintaining the current pace of the offensive operation in the eastern operational direction, the Syrian Arab Army (SAA, Syrian Ground Forces) in a few weeks will be able to begin artillery preparation and cleansing from ISIS of the rather large city of Es Sukhne. Thus, under the control of government forces will be the central part of Syria (northeastern territory of the province of Homs).
9 of June 2017 of the year can be considered as a date strategically important for the NEs of Syria and VKS of Russia. It was then that the government forces were able to squeeze through the Iraqi-Syrian border. This cast instantly foiled Washington's 2 strategic plan. The first envisaged the establishment of a powerful buffer zone (consisting of militant opposition VTS and American instructors, covered by the USMC) between the CAA and Iraqi militia units to prevent their cooperation and the inability to further advance in the direction of Deir ez-Zor from the south-west. The second plan was to come into force immediately after the creation of a "tactical buffer" between the Syrian army and the Iraqi mobilization detachments.
He envisioned a lightning “march” of pro-American VTS and the USMC at Deir ez-Zor. The Americans and their Syrian satellite militants from the VTS planned to seize the city immediately after the ISIL militants began to “soften” the defense of the CAA. As you know, our overseas "friends" could move much faster to Deir ez-Zor thanks to all the known "tools" of influencing the caliphate, both directly and through Israeli channels. But that's bad luck! As a result, all the strongholds and garrisons of the VTS and the US Marine Corps near the military base recently erected near At-Tanf were held up in a huge tactical cauldron, which was limited to the village of Al-Zukuf in the north-east and the environs of Essaouida - in the south-west.
At the moment, such a picture is taking shape that all pro-American units of the VTS, including the assault backbone of the US KMP in At-Tanf, are in a “cauldron” surrounded mainly by Syrian government forces, Hezbollah and the Force of the Tiger special forces division. The ground component of the coalition forces now does not have any serious strategic moves, but all this is only for the time being, because mobile launchers of the high-precision MLRS M142 HIMARS were completely randomly transferred from Jordan to the At-Tanfa region.
Starting around June 13, the disappointing information about the preparation of the IG Caliphate units continues to come to the assault on two fortified regions of the NE of Syria, located south of and west of the city of Deir-ez-Zor. An attempt to suppress the data of the CAA enclaves under this strategically important city may begin long before the arrival of units of the regular Syrian army, and therefore the Russian attack aviation will have to work very hard in this sector. There is absolutely no doubt that experts from the Pentagon have very high hopes for the destruction of the above fortified government forces in Syria by ISIS. And it is clear to the layman that the caliphate will not be able to oppose the defensive Deir ez-Zor aviation of the HKS of Russia to the defensive; Here, the HIMARS KMP US operators can help the militants very well by opening fire on the large-caliber Syrian army’s enclaves - MGM-140 / 164B ATACMS Block IA / IIA tactical ballistic missiles. The combat radius of these missiles is 300 km, which allows "reach" to Deir ez-Zor even from the southern At-Tanfa. The use of M142 HIMARS with ATACMS OTBR can be expected at the moment when the Syrian army units reach the intersection of the “Palmyra - Deir-ez-Zor” highway from the Meyedin tou Deir-ez-Zor Highway (8 km from the city).
The “swinging” launch module of the combat vehicle of the multipurpose M142 HIMARS MLRS is unified with the similar box-shaped launch modules of the BM M270 tracked jet propulsion system MLRS. The difference is that M142 has only one trigger module. The following can be used as “equipment”: 1х6 launch cage-blocks with 227-mm unguided missiles М26А1 / 2 or corrected high-precision missiles M30 GMLRS / XM30 GUMLRS, which have a range, with a range of M92 GMLRS / XM610 GUMLRS, with a range of precision missiles, with a range of 9ML GX / XM300 GUMLRS, which have a range of precision missiles that have a range, with a range of 9 km, GXMX / XM142 GUMLRS, with a range of precision missiles GNRSXXMLUM / XM500 and 340 GUMLRS. “Large caliber” are ATACMS OTBRs with a diameter of 350 mm and a range of up to 2 km, which are only in the amount of one unit placed in the MXNUMX launcher. The next-generation LRPF missile with XNUMX km range and XNUMX caliber - XNUMX mm will increase HIMARS ammunition to XNUMX units
After a very effective massive use of this high-precision lightning weapons (KVO does not exceed 25 m, and the missile marching speed reaches 1500 m / s) at military sites of the CAA near Deir ez-Zor, as well as the regular units of the SV Syria, official Moscow may once again accuse Washington of directly supporting the terrorist organization No. XXUMX (IG), as well as sever any bilateral "channels of communication and coordination of actions." Alas, the Pentagon from these countermeasures is neither cold nor hot. We can get a very negative result - the loss of Deir-ez-Zor, as well as all the eastern approaches to it. Believe me, the United States with the IG will always find a common language. Let's say more: Washington will very quickly find an argument in favor of using HIMARS against the Syrian army, for which the formation of allied VTS or other groups of "moderate militants" will be miraculously thrown into the confrontation between the CAA and ISIS. regime of Bashar al-Assad. You can simulate a lot of situations here, but one constant remains: the actions of the pro-Western coalition with its Arab satellites in the Syrian theater will push Moscow to more radical countermeasures than useless statements by foreign ministry representatives.
Naturally, our military contingent will not be attacking the Caliber and Iskander on the deployed HIMARS at the current stage, as the coalition OVVS did not attempt to attack our military facilities at Hmeymim airbase or on the Tartus logistics base. But to cover the units of the SAR government troops, our videoconferencing systems are obliged for a long time, otherwise, what kind of allied relations can we talk about ?! As for the threat from HIMARS, immediately after the release of Es-Sukhne, regular patrols by a MiG-31BM link of a narrow segment of airspace between Deir ez-Zor and Al-Zukuf will be required. It is this segment that will become the most rocket-dangerous approach of the American ATBMS ATBMS approach from the position at At-Tanf. Foxhounds have all the necessary tools to destroy ATACMS missiles. In particular, the long-range guided missiles of the R-33С and Р-37 air combat, adjustable airborne radar with PFAR Zaslon-AM allow to intercept air objects flying at speeds up to 6400 km / h, while the OTB MGM-140B / 168A on the cruise flight only accelerates to 5500 km / h.
A decent asymmetrical response to the deployment of the MLRS HIMARS in At-Tanf could be the placement of a pair of C-400 Triumph battalions in 40 km southeast of Palmyra. Such an arrangement would allow intercepting ATACMS launched tactical ballistic missiles using the 48H6D missile even at the launch leg of the flight. Triumph could also intercept small-sized XRS XM30 GUMLRS URS, which can be launched by HIMARS calculations for the CAA units operating north of At-Tanfa. However, “Triumphs” in missile defense on this site cannot take part, because the unpredictable situation on the ground theater in the south of the ATS does not guarantee the safety of an expensive air defense system with secret operation algorithms and radar 92H6E energy parameters
For timely notification of the launch of OTBR, the MiG-31BM link should also be given an A-50U AWSD aircraft, otherwise why was it then transferred to Syria? Watch the destruction of the Su-22 pilot of the American F / A-18E "Super Hornet"? Fortunately, after this incident, the command and command of the Russian Aerospace Forces clearly demarcated the coalition zones over the SAR allowed for tactical aviation of the OVVS and threatened to “seize on accurate auto-tracking” all aircraft crossing the Euphrates River to the west. It is understandable that the low-flying Super Hornets or the Raptor F-22A will not be detected by the 92H6Е and 9С32М C-400 and C-300В4 radar and the Euphrates west of Euphrates, which doesn’t reach more than X X-CHI-CHNUMX and CH-30-35 and the Euphrates west of Euphrates, since they get no more than X X-CHI-CHN-XN-X X-XMH-X-NNXX and X-NNXX of the Euphrates, as they are no more than X-X-CH-XN-X-XN-X-X-Xnum-X and Te-50 and X-NNXX and X-NNXX and X-NNXX and X-NNXX X-systems. It will be made specifically on fighter aircraft and long-range radar patrols and A-XNUMXU airplanes.
The first threats from Moscow have already yielded a tangible result: the coalition OVAS significantly narrowed the sector of operating their tactical aviation from the huge “triangle” “Deir ez-Zor - Abu Kamal - Raqqa” to a small section above Raqqa, where they are attacked in order to advance the VTS and the USMC in a city captured by the Caliphate. What will happen next, time will tell, as well as the sophistication and “toughness” of countermeasures undertaken by aerospace forces.
Information sources:
https://warsonline.info/siriya/blog.html
https://www.fondsk.ru/news/2017/06/10/pod-prikrytiem-shturma-rakki-terroristy-vydvigajutsja-na-palmiru-der-zor-44136.html
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/himars/himars.shtml
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/atacms/atacms.shtml
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/mlrs/mlrs.shtml
http://www.airwar.ru/enc/fighter/mig31bm.html
Information