Badly written ending

Meanwhile, in the south of Germany, 3-I and 7-I American
and the 1-i French armies persevered on
east in the direction of the so-called "National Citadel" ...
The American 3 Army entered the territory
Czechoslovakia and to 6 May captured the cities of Pilsen
and Carlsbad and continued the offensive in the direction of Prague.
F. Lee Benns.
Europe in the world environment
since 1914 year

The end of the Second World War in Europe, at least in the form in which it is usually described, seems to be absolutely meaningless, for what is written in textbooks stories, resembles nothing more than a poorly written ending to one of Wagner's melodramatic operas.

In October, a German pilot and missile technician named Hans Zinsser flew 1944 in the gathering twilight of a twin-engined Heinkel-111 bomber over Mecklenburg province, located in northern Germany on the Baltic coast. He flew out in the evening to avoid meeting the Allied fighters, who by this time had taken complete domination of the skies of Germany. Zinsser could not have known that what he saw that night would be hidden for decades after the war in the top secret state archives of the United States. And he certainly could not have imagined that his testimony, eventually declassified at the very turn of the millennium, would be an occasion to rewrite or at least meticulously review the history of the Second World War. Zinsser’s story of what he saw on that night’s flight, in one fell swoop, resolves one of the greatest mysteries connected with the end of the war.

At the same time, he poses new riddles, raises new questions, allowing for a moment to look into the frightening, tangled world of the secret weaponswhich was developed by the Nazis. The testimony of Zinsser opens the real Pandora's box with information about the work on the creation of a terrible weapon in the Third Reich, in scope and possible horrendous consequences of using much more than ordinary atomic bombs. More importantly, his testimony also gives rise to a very unpleasant question: why did the governments of the allied countries and America in particular keep it all secret for so long? What did we actually get from the Nazis at the end of the war?

But what is this poorly written end of world war?

In order to fully appreciate how poorly written this ending is, it is best to start from the most logical place: Berlin, a bunker hidden deep under the ground, the last weeks of the war. It was there, in a bizarre surrealistic little world, cut off from the outside world, the Nazi dictator, suffering from delusions of grandeur, hiding with his generals, not paying attention to the hail of American and Soviet bombs that turn the beautiful city of Berlin into a pile of ruins. The Great German Reich holds a meeting. His left hand involuntarily twitches, from time to time he has to interrupt in order to get wet with the saliva flowing from his mouth. His face is deathly pale, his health is undermined by medicines that doctors constantly inject him. Having put the glasses on his nose, the Fuhrer is squinting at the map spread out on the table.

Colonel-General Gotthard Heinrici, commander of the Vistula Army Group, which has to withstand many times the superior armies of Marshal Zhukov, who approached Berlin already closer than sixty kilometers, implores the Fuhrer to provide him with reinforcements. Heinrici is perplexed about the disposition of the German troops, which he sees on the map, the most selective and combat-ready units are located far to the south, reflecting the onslaught of the forces of Marshal Konev in Silesia. Thus, these troops, which are completely inexplicable, are defending Breslau and Prague, not Berlin. The general pleads with Hitler to transfer part of these troops to the north, but in vain.
"It is Prague, - the Fuhrer responds with mystical stubbornness, - is the key to winning the war. " The troops of Colonel-General Heinrici, exhausted by the onslaught of the superior forces of the enemy, will have to "do without reinforcements."

It can also be assumed how Heinrici and the other generals present looked longingly at the map of Norway, where tens of thousands of German soldiers still remained, although this country had long since lost all strategic and operational importance for the defense of the Reich. And really, why did Hitler keep so many German troops in Norway until the very end of the war?

Some historians offer another addition to the legend of the last days of the war, explaining Hitler's manic insanity: the doctors allegedly diagnosed Parkinson's disease, complicated by heart failure, but the request of Messrs. Bormann, Goebbels, Himmler and others fed the Nazi dictator, trying to ask for the Nazi dictator. .

Such a paradoxical dislocation of German troops is the first secret of a poorly written finale of war in the European theater. Both the German generals and the allied generals pondered a lot about this mystery after the war; in the end, they both blamed everything on Hitler’s madness — this conclusion became part of the “Allied Legend” telling of the end of the war. Such an interpretation really has its own meaning, for if we assume that Hitler gave orders to deploy troops in Norway and Silesia during one of the rare periods of clearing the mind, what considerations could he have guided? Prague? Norway? There were no military grounds for such a deployment. In other words, by itself, the direction of the troops to Norway and Czechoslovakia suggests that Hitler completely lost touch with reality. Therefore, he was really crazy.

However, apparently, on this “manic madness” of the Fuhrer does not end. At meetings of the highest military command in the last weeks of the war, Hitler repeatedly repeated the boastful assertions that Germany would soon possess such a weapon that would snatch victory from the jaws of defeat at “five minutes to midnight”. Wehrmacht only need to hold on a little bit more. And first of all you need to keep Prague and Lower Silesia.

Of course, the standard interpretation of history explains (more precisely, tries to get rid of a superficial explanation) these and other similar statements of the Nazi leaders in the last days of the war in one of two ways.

Of course, a common explanation says that he wanted to keep the way of transporting iron ore from Sweden to Germany, and also tried to continue to use Norway as a base to counteract the supply of military goods to the Soviet Union in the framework of Lend-Lease. However, since the end of 1944 due to the huge losses of the German naval fleet these tasks ceased to be feasible and, therefore, lost their military meaning. Here it is necessary to look for other reasons, unless, of course, you try to blame everything on Adolf Hitler's delusional illusions.

One school perceives them as references to more advanced modifications of the V-1 and V-2, or on the A-9 and A-10 intercontinental ballistic missiles, jet fighters, anti-aircraft missiles with a thermal head of guidance and other weapons that Germans developed. The conclusion of Sir Roy Fedden, one of the British specialists who, after the end of the war, studied the Nazi secret weapon, leaves no doubt about the deadly potential of such research:
In these respects, they (the Nazis) partly told the truth. During two recent visits to Germany as head of the technical commission of the Ministry aviation I saw a lot of industry developments and production plans, and came to the conclusion that if Germany had managed to drag out the war for several more months, we would have to deal with a whole arsenal of completely new and deadly warfare in the air.

Another school of historians refers to such statements by the Nazi leaders as delirious lunatics, who are desperately seeking to prolong the war and thereby prolong their lives, raising the morale of armies exhausted in battles. So, for example, to complete the picture of the general insanity that engulfed the leadership of the Third Reich, the words of Hitler's faithful minion, propaganda minister Dr. Goebbels, are quoted, who in one of the speeches at the end of the war boasted that he saw “a weapon so frightening that one kind of heart stops ". Well, foolish another crazy Nazi.

However, on the other side of the "legends of the allies" no less mysterious and inexplicable events take place. In March and April 1945, the 3-I American army under the command of General George S. Patton rushes through southern Bavaria, to the extent possible in operational terms, heading along the shortest path to:
1) the huge military factories "Skoda" near Pilsen, by that time literally wiped off the face of the earth by allied aviation;
2) Prague;
3) the Harz mountains in Thuringia, known in Germany as "Dreiecks" or "Three Corners", the area between the ancient medieval cities of Arnstadt, Jonaschtal, Weimar and Ohrdruf.

Countless historical works stubbornly assert that the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Forces (HSE) insisted on this maneuver. The headquarters considered this maneuver necessary due to reports that the Nazis intend to give a last battle in the Alpine National Citadel, a network of mountain fortifications stretching from the Alps to the Harz Mountains. Therefore, as the official story goes, the actions of the 3 Army were aimed at cutting off the retreat paths of the Nazi forces fleeing the meat grinder near Berlin. There are maps that in some cases are accompanied by declassified German plans - sometimes from the era of the Weimar Republic! - confirming the existence of such a citadel. The issue is resolved.

However, there is one catch in this explanation. The Allied air reconnaissance had to report to Eisenhower and the HSE where it was necessary to keep the fortified strongholds in the notorious “national citadel”. Moreover, intelligence would report that this “stronghold” is in fact no stronghold. Undoubtedly, General Patton and the divisional commanders of his army had at least partial access to this information. In this case, why did we need this incredibly swift and, in general, reckless offensive, which, as the post-war “Allied Legend” tries to convince us, was designed to cut off the retreat paths of the Nazis fleeing Berlin, who in fact did not run anywhere, Fortified area, which actually did not exist? The puzzle is becoming more confusing.

Then, remarkably, by a strange whim of fate, General Patton, the most prominent American commander of World War II, suddenly dies - some believe, under very suspicious circumstances, from complications of injuries resulting from a minor car accident soon after the war ended, at the very beginning military occupation of Germany by the victorious powers. For many, there is no doubt that Patton’s death was highly suspicious.

But what explanations are offered by those who do not consider it accidental? Some believe that the general was eliminated for his statements that it was necessary to "deploy the German armies around" and move them to the first echelon of the invasion of the allied forces in the Soviet Union. Others claim that Patton was eliminated because he knew that the allies knew about the massacre of the Soviets over British, American and French prisoners of war, and threatened to make this information public. In any case, although Patton’s sharp tongue and angry outbursts are well known, a sense of military duty was too great for the general to really seriously nurture such thoughts. Such versions are good for discussions on the Internet and for movie plots, and none of them provides enough motivation to kill the most famous American general. On the other hand, if Patton was indeed killed, what exactly was the sufficient motive?

And here the lonely German pilot Hans Zinsser and his observations offer the key to the riddle, why it was necessary to silence General Patton. Let us turn to another, less widespread explanation of the lightning shot of the Third Army in the southern regions of Germany and in Bohemia, made at the very end of the war.

In his book, Top Secret, Ralph Ingersoll, an American liaison officer who worked at the HUS, offers the following version of events, which is much more in line with the real intentions of the Germans:
“(General Omar) Bradley was completely in control of the situation ... he had three armies at his disposal who broke through the defense line on the Rhine and were ready to reap the fruits of their victory. After analyzing the situation as a whole, Bradley came to the conclusion that the seizure of destroyed Berlin from a military point of view does not make any sense ... The German military ministry left the capital a long time ago, leaving only the rearguard. The main part of the military ministry, including the priceless archives, was transferred to the Thuringian Forest ... "

General George Smith Patton

But what exactly did Patton's divisions discover at Pilsen and in the forests of Thuringia? Only after the recent unification of Germany and the declassification of East German, British and American documents did enough information appear to outline this fantastic story, give answers to questions — and explain the reasons for the emergence of the post-war Allied Legend.

Finally, we come to the main theme of the post-war "Allied Legends". As the Allied forces went deeper and deeper into German territory, more and more numerous teams of scientists and experts and their intelligence coordinators scoured the Reich, looking for German patents and secret weapons developments, first of all trying to determine the state of work on the creation of German atomic energy. bombs. Allies sucked from Germany all any significant scientific and technical achievements. This operation has become the most significant movement of new technologies in history. Even at the very last stage of the war, when the Allied armies were advancing across Western Europe, there was a fear from the Allies that Germany was dangerously close to creating an atomic bomb and could use one or more nuclear devices to strike London or other targets. And Dr. Goebbels, in his speeches about frightening weapons, from which the heart stops, only strengthened these fears.

And here the “legend of the allies” becomes only more confusing. It is here that a poorly written ending would become truly comic if there were not so much human suffering associated with it. For the facts are fairly obvious if we study them in isolation from the usual explanations. In fact, the question arises: have we not been forced to think about these facts in a certain way? As the Allied armies penetrated deeper and deeper into the territory of the Reich, more and more famous German scientists and engineers were captured by the Allies or surrendered themselves. And among them were first-class physicists, including several Nobel Prize winners. And most of them in one form or another related to various Nazi atomic bomb projects.

These searches were conducted under the code name "Alsos". In Greek, "alsos" means "grove" - ​​an undoubted play on words, an attack on General Leslie Groves, the head of the "Manhattan Project" (in English "grove" grove). The same title has a book about the “Manhattan Project” written by the Dutch physicist Samuel Goodsmith.

These scientists included Werner Heisenberg, one of the founders of quantum mechanics, Kurt Dibner, a nuclear physicist, and Paul Hartek, a nuclear chemist, and Otto Hahn, a chemist who discovered nuclear fission, and, oddly enough, Walter Gerlach, whose specialty was not nuclear, but gravitational physics. Before the war, Gerlach wrote a few understandable only selected works on such unintelligible topics as spin polarization and twist physics, which can hardly be considered the basis of nuclear physics. And it certainly could not have been expected to meet such a scientist among those who worked on the creation of the atomic bomb.

Cook notes that these areas of research have nothing to do with nuclear physics, and even more so with the creation of the atomic bomb, but “are connected with the mysterious properties of gravity. A certain O. K Gilgenberg, who studied with Gerlach at the University of Munich, published a work in 1931 entitled “On Gravity, Twists and Waves in a Rotating Environment” ... However, after the war, Gerlach, who died in 1979, apparently I have never returned to these topics and never mentioned them; it feels as if it is strictly forbidden to him. Or what he saw ... shocked him so much that he didn’t want to even think about it anymore. ”

Much to the surprise of the allies, the research teams found nothing but Heisenberg’s rude attempts to create a functioning atomic reactor, attempts that were completely unsatisfactory, unsuccessful, and startlingly inept. And this "German inability" in the basic questions of nuclear bomb physics became the main element of the "Allied Legend" and remains so to this day. However, this raises another mysterious question regarding the poorly written finale.

The leading German scientists - Werner Heisenberg, Paul Hartek, Kurt Dibner, Erich Bagge, Otto Gan, Karl-Friedrich von Weizsäcker, Karl Wirtz, Horst Korsing and Walter Gerlach - were transported to the English town Farm Hall, where they were kept completely isolated all their conversations were tapped and recorded.

Decryption of these conversations, the famous “Farm Hall Decryption”, were declassified by the UK government only in 1992 year! If the Germans were so incompetent and so behind the Allies, why did it take so long to keep these documents secret? Is bureaucratic oversight and inertia to blame? Or did these documents contain something that the Allies did not want to disclose until very recently?

Superficial familiarization with the transcripts of conversations only further confuses the secret. In them, Heisenberg and the company, having learned about the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, are endlessly debating about the moral aspects of their own participation in the work on creating the atomic bomb, conducted in Nazi Germany.

The fact that the conversations of German scientists were recorded by the British was first revealed by the head of the Manhattan Project, General Leslie Groves, in his book Now You Can Tell About It, published in 1962 year and dedicated to the creation of an atomic bomb. However, apparently, in 1962, it was still possible to tell far from everything.

But that's not all.

Judging by these transcripts, Heisenberg and the company, who for six years of war suffered from inexplicable scientific illiteracy, have not been able to develop and build a functioning nuclear reactor to produce the plutonium necessary to create a bomb, after the end of the war they suddenly become first-class physicists and Nobel laureates. And indeed, none other than Heisenberg himself, within a few days after the bombing of Hiroshima, delivered to the assembled German scientists a lecture on the basic principles of the construction of the atomic bomb. In this lecture, he defends his initial assessment that a bomb should be pine-sized, and not be a huge monster weighing a ton or even two, which he insisted on for most of the war. And, as we learn from these transcripts, nuclear chemist Paul Hartek came close - threateningly close - to assessing the correct critical mass of uranium in a bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

Thomas Powere remarks about Heisenberg’s lecture that “it was something of a scientific focus — to give out the theory of a workable bomb in such a short time, after many years of vain labor based on fundamental errors”.

Werner Heisenberg

Such scientific prowess raises another question that directly disproves the "Allied Legend", because some versions of this legend claim that the Germans never seriously dealt with the creation of an atomic bomb, because they - in the person of Heisenberg - were mistaken in assessing the critical mass by several orders of magnitude , thereby depriving the project of practical feasibility. However, there is no doubt that Hartek made his calculations much earlier, so that the Heisenberg estimates were not the only ones from which the Germans were repelled. And from a small critical mass follows the practical feasibility of creating an atomic bomb.

Of course, Samuel Gadsmith used these decrypts to create his own version of the “Allied Legend”: “(Gudsmith concluded) that German scientists could not agree that they did not understand nuclear bomb physics, they invented a false story about their moral principles in order to explain their failures ... The sources of Hudsmith’s conclusions are obvious, but now the attentive reader will not hide the many statements that Hudsmith didn’t notice, forget, or deliberately omit. ”

In his lecture given by 14 on August 1945 of the year before German scientists gathered at Farm Hall, Heisenberg, according to Paul Lawrence Rose, used tone and expressions that indicated that "he had just understood the right solution" of a relatively small critical mass, necessary to create an atomic bombNUMX, since others estimated the critical mass in the region of four kilograms. It also only thickens the secret. For Rose, a supporter of the “Allied Legends” - but only now the version substantially reworked in the light of “Farm-Hall transcripts” - the “others” are most likely allied journalists themselves.

In the early postwar years, the Dutch physicist Samuel Gudsmit, a Jew by nationality, a member of the Manhattan Project, explains this riddle, as well as many others, that the Allies scientists and engineers were simply better than the Germans who created the new discipline of quantum mechanics and nuclear physics. . And this explanation, combined with the obviously awkward attempts of Heisenberg himself to create a functioning nuclear reactor, performed its task quite well until the conversations of German scientists were deciphered.

After removing the secrecy neck from the transcripts with their startling revelations that Heisenberg actually correctly imagined the atomic bomb design, and some scientists were well aware of the possibility of obtaining enriched uranium in sufficient quantities to create a bomb without having to have a working nuclear reactor, “ the legend of the Allies "had a little touch up. A book appeared on Thomas Powers' The War of Heisenberg, quite convincingly proving that Heisenberg actually sabotaged the German atomic program. However, this book was hardly published, as Lawrence Rose responded to it with his work "Heisenberg and the Nazi Atomic Bomb Project", proving even more convincingly that Heisenberg remained faithful to his homeland until the very end, but all his activities were based on a fundamentally wrong understanding the nature of nuclear fission, as a result of which it overestimated by several orders of magnitude the critical mass necessary to create an atomic bomb. The Germans could not get a bomb, according to a new version of the legend, because they did not have a working reactor to turn the enriched uranium into plutonium, which is necessary for the creation of a bomb. Moreover, grossly mistaken in assessing the critical mass, they had no incentive to continue working. Everything is quite simple, and the question is again closed.

However, neither Power nor Rose in their books really do not come close to the heart of the riddle, for the legend still requires to believe that “talented nuclear physicists who were in the pre-war years, including Nobel laureates ... during the war some mysterious illness seemed to strike at them, turning them into stupid fools. ”1 was suddenly and completely inexplicably cured within a matter of days after the bombing of Hiroshima! Moreover, the two modern interpretations of the same material, so strongly diverged from each other, proposed by Rose and Paers only emphasize its ambiguity in general and doubts about whether Heisenberg knew the truth in particular.

The situation is not at all improved by the events in the opposite end of the globe, in the Pacific theater of military operations, because there, after the end of the war, American researchers had to discover equally strange facts.

So, after the atomic bombing of Nagasaki, Emperor Hirohito, overcoming the resistance of ministers who demanded to continue the war, decided to unconditionally surrender to Japan. But why did the Japanese ministers insist on continuing the war, despite the overwhelming superiority of the Allies in conventional weapons and, moreover, the potential downpour of atomic bombs? In the end, two bombs could easily have stopped at twenty. Of course, one can write off ministers ’objections to the emperor’s intentions on“ proud samurai traditions, ”on the“ Japanese notion of honor, ”and so on. And such an explanation would be quite acceptable.

However, another explanation is that members of the Japanese cabinet knew something secret.

And they probably knew that soon American intelligence was to find out: the Japanese “shortly before the capitulation they created and successfully tested an atomic bomb. The work was carried out in the Korean city of Conan (the Japanese name of the city of Xinnam) in the north of the peninsula. ”1. This bomb was detonated, according to the author, a day after the American plutonium bomb “Fat Man” exploded over Nagasaki, that is, 10 August 1945 of the year. In other words, war, depending on the decision Hirohito could become nuclear. Of course, by that time, further delaying the war of Japan did not promise anything good, since it did not have effective means of delivering nuclear weapons to any meaningful American target. The emperor cooled the fervor of his ministers.

These unverified assertions deal another blow to the “Allied legend,” for where did the Japanese manage to extract the uranium needed to build an atomic bomb (which they supposedly had)? And, more importantly, the technology of its enrichment? Where did they make and assemble such a device? Who was responsible for the work? The answers to these questions, as will be seen in the future, may also explain other events that took place already many years after the end of the war, perhaps, up to our days.

In fact, the Japanese were developing large transport submarines that could deliver a bomb to port cities on the West Coast of the United States, as Einstein warned about in his famous letter to President Roosevelt, which was the impetus for the beginning of the Manhattan Project. Of course, Einstein was much more worried that the Germans would use not the Japanese, but the Japanese.

However, even now we are just starting to get into the essence of this “poorly written final”. There are still many strange little-known details to which attention should be paid.

Why, for example, in 1944, a lone Junkers-390 bomber, a huge six-engine heavy ultra-long transport aircraft capable of making a non-stop intercontinental flight from Europe to North America and back, flew less than twenty miles from New York, photographed the silhouettes of skyscrapers Manhatte and returned to Europe? In the course of the war, German aviation made several similar ultra-long flights in the strictest secrecy using such other heavy ultra-long aircraft. But for what purpose and, most importantly, what was the purpose of this unprecedented flight? The fact that such a flight was extremely dangerous, backwards without words. Why did the Germans need to create this huge plane and why did they take a huge risk just to take photographs, although only two such giant six-engine wonder food were built?

To finish with the “legend of the allies,” let us recall some strange details of the surrender of Germany. Why was the SS Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler, a mass murderer, one of the bloodiest criminals in the history of mankind, trying to negotiate a separate peace with the Western powers? Of course, all this can be considered a delirium of a madman, and Himmler definitely suffered a mental disorder. But what could he offer to the allies in return for a separate peace and salvation for his pitiful life?

Well, the strangeness of the Nuremberg Tribunal? The legend is well known: such undoubted war criminals as Reichsmarshal Marsh Goering, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel and the head of the operational headquarters, Colonel-General Jodl were upturned on the gallows (Goering, however, deceived the executioner, even before execution, having swallowed cyanide). Other major Nazi bigwigs like Grossadmirel Karl Doenitz, the godfather of a devastating submarine war against allied shipping, Minister of Weapons Albert Speer, or Minister of Finance and Reichsbank President Gelmar Schacht went to jail.

Of course, there were no missile specialists from Peenemünde led by Dr. Werner von Braun and General Walter Dornberger in the dock who, in the framework of the top-secret project "Clip" together with other scientists, engineers and technicians, were already transferred to America to lead the program the creation of ballistic and space rockets. All these specialists, like their colleagues, German nuclear physicists, seem to have suffered from the same “disease nedotep”, because, having created successful prototypes “V-1” and “V-2” at the beginning of the war, they were stunned by the similar dull ingenuity and inspiration and (as legend has it) produced only “paper rockets” and theoretical works.

But probably the most remarkable is the fact that at the Nuremberg process, by mutual consent of prosecutors from both the Western powers and the Soviet Union, the abundance of documents testifying to the close attention of the Nazi regime to occult beliefs and sciences3 was excluded from the materials; This circumstance gave rise to a whole mythology, since these documents did not receive careful study for their possible influence on the development of secret weapons in Nazi Germany during the war years.

And, finally, a very curious fact, one of those obvious things that is usually overlooked if you do not draw attention to it: on the tests of the atomic bomb, held at the Trinity test site in the state of New Mexico, the American nuclear device was detonated the principle of compression of plutonium by the energy of an implosive explosion. This test was required in order to verify the correctness of the concept. The result exceeded all expectations. But what is extremely important - this circumstance is bypassed in almost all post-war official writings devoted to this topic: the uranium bomb, based on the principle of attaining a critical mass due to “firing”, the same bomb that was first used in a combat situation, the bomb, dumped on Hiroshima, has not been tested even once. As the German author Friedrich Georg notes, this makes a gaping gap in the "Allied legend":
Another very important question: why the American uranium bomb, unlike the plutonium bomb, was not tested before it was dropped on Hiroshima? From a military point of view, it looks unusually dangerous ... Did the Americans simply forget to test the bomb, or has someone already done it for them?

The Allied Legend explains it differently; some versions are ingenious, others are more straightforward, but basically everything comes down to the statement that the uranium bomb was never tested because there was no need for it: its creators were sure that everything would go as it should. Thus, we are asked to believe that the US military dropped an atomic bomb, which had never before been used, based on completely new and untested physical principles, on the enemy city, and this enemy, as it was known, is also working to create a similar bombs!

This is truly a poorly written, simply incredible finale of the most terrible war in the history of mankind.

So what did the German pilot Hans Zinsser see on that October night 1944 of the year, flying on the Henkel bomber to the gathering twilight over the northern regions of Germany? Something like this (Zinsser himself didn’t guess about this), which requires an almost complete revision of a poorly written Wagnerian libretto.

A record of his testimony is included in the military intelligence report of 19 August 1945, roll number A-1007, in 1973, re-filmed at the Air Force base in Maxwell, Alabama. Zinsser’s testimony is given on the last page of the report:

47. A man named Zinsser, an anti-aircraft missile specialist, spoke about what he witnessed: “In early October 1944, I flew out of Ludwigslust (south of Lübeck), located from 12 to 15 kilometers from an atomic test site, and suddenly I saw a strong bright glow that lit up the whole atmosphere, which lasted about two seconds.

48. A clearly visible shock wave erupted from the explosion cloud. By the time it became visible, it had a diameter of about one kilometer, and the color of the cloud often changed. After a short period of darkness, it was covered with a lot of bright spots, which, unlike the usual explosion, had a pale blue color.

49. Approximately ten seconds after the explosion, the distinct outlines of the explosive cloud disappeared, then the cloud itself began to lighten against a dark gray sky covered with solid clouds. The diameter of the shock wave still visible to the naked eye was at least 9000 meters; visible it remained at least 15 seconds

50. My personal sensation from observing the color of the explosive cloud: it took on a blue-and-purple hue. Throughout this phenomenon, reddish-colored rings were visible, very quickly changing color to dirty shades.

51. From my observation plane, I felt a mild impact in the form of light shocks and jerks.

52. About an hour later, I flew out to the Heh-111 from the Ludwigslust airfield and headed east. Shortly after takeoff, I flew through a zone of overcast (at a height of from three to four thousand meters). Above the place where the explosion occurred, there was a mushroom cloud with turbulent, vortex layers (at a height of approximately 7000 meters), with no visible connections. Strong electromagnetic disturbance manifested itself in the inability to continue radio communication.

53- Since the American F-38 fighters were operating in the Wittenberg-Bersburg region, I had to turn north, but then I could see better the lower part of the cloud above the explosion site. The comment is not very clear to me why these tests were carried out in such a densely populated area. ”

This report is titled: "Research, exploration, development and practical use of the German atomic bomb, intelligence department of the Ninth Air Force, 96 / 1945 APO 696, US Armed Forces, 19 August 1945." This report has been classified. Let us pay attention to the fact that at the very beginning of the report all kinds of uncertainties are excluded: “the following information was received from four German scientists: one chemist, two specialists in physical chemistry and one specialist in missiles. All four of them spoke briefly about what they knew about the creation of the atomic bomb. ”

In other words, a certain German pilot observed the testing of a weapon possessing all the signs of a nuclear bomb: an electromagnetic impulse that disabled a radio, a mushroom cloud, a prolonged burning of a nuclear material in a cloud, and so on. And all this happened on the territory, which was undoubtedly under German control, in October 1944 of the year, as much as eight months before the test of the first American atomic bomb in the state of New Mexico! Pay attention to the curious fact that, according to Zinsser, the test was conducted in a densely populated area.

In the testimony of Zinsser, you can find another interesting fact, which the American investigators did not pay attention to, and if they did, the data on a more detailed investigation remain secret until now, how did Zinsser know that it was a test? The answer is obvious: he knew, because he had something to do with it, because undoubtedly the allies could not control the test site, located in the depths of Nazi Germany.
Above in the same report there are some tips that allow to reveal the secret:

14. When Germany was at this stage of the game, war broke out in Europe. At first, the division studies were not given due attention, because the practical implementation of this seemed too distant. However, later these studies were continued, especially with regard to finding methods for the separation of isotopes. It may not be added that the center of gravity of the German military efforts by this time was already in other areas.


15. Nevertheless, the atomic bomb was expected to be ready by the end of 1944. And this would have happened if not for the effective strikes of the allied aviation on the laboratories occupied. the study of uranium, especially in Rjukan, Norway, where heavy water was produced. It is mainly for this reason that Germany was never able to use the atomic bomb in this war.

These two paragraphs reveal many interesting things.

First, based on what sources it is claimed that Germany expected to receive the atom 1 bomb at the end of 1944, far ahead of the Manhattan Project (this statement openly contradicts the post-war legend that the Germans were far behind in developing nuclear weapons)? Indeed, during the war, according to experts of the “Manhattan

The testimony of Hans Zinsser

The head of the Manhattan Project is General Leslie Groves.

project, the Germans were all the time ahead of the Allies, and the project leader General Leslie Groves adhered to the same opinion. However, after the war, everything suddenly changed. America was not only ahead, but according to legend, it went ahead of the war throughout the war.

The story of Zinsser, in addition to completely refuting the "Allied Legend", raises a frightening question - did the Allies know even before the end of the war that Germany had tested the atomic bomb? If so, you can look for evidence of this, for the rest of the testimony contained in that post-war report, along with Zinsser’s story, indicates that the legend was beginning to take shape even then. For example, the report mentions only the laboratories in which uranium enrichment and isotope separation were studied. However, laboratories alone are not enough to create a real, workable nuclear device. Therefore, already in this early report one component of the legend is visible: the efforts of the Germans were sluggish, since they were limited only to laboratory research.

Secondly, pay attention to the transparent statement that Germany was never able to "use the bomb in this war." The language of the report is very clear. However, it seems that the words were chosen deliberately in order to fill the fog and help the legend that had already arisen, since the tie report says that the Germans did not test the atomic bomb - it is stated only that they did not use it. The language of the report is strikingly neat, verified, and this can not be thought-provoking.

Thirdly, pay attention to how much information is being disclosed - apparently, unintentionally - regarding German research in the field of atomic bomb creation, because it clearly follows from the document that Germany was dealing with a uranium bomb.

Plutonium bomb is not mentioned even once. At the same time, the theoretical principles of plutonium production and the possibility of creating an atomic bomb based on plutonium were undoubtedly known to the Germans, as eloquently shown by the top secret memorandum of the Arms and Ammunition Directorate prepared at the beginning of 1942.

This memorandum undeniably breaks another gap in the “Allied legend” that emerged after the war, namely, it was argued that the Germans could not calculate the exact value of the critical uranium mass to start the chain division reaction, overestimating the estimate by several orders of magnitude and therefore turning the project into “not feasible in practice” in the foreseeable future. The problem is that this memorandum unconditionally shows that as early as January - February 1942, the Germans already had fairly accurate estimates. And if they knew that the bomb could be made small, the decision of the German top leadership on the inexpediency of continuing work becomes very problematic. On the contrary, the memorandum - most likely, prepared by Dr. Kurt Dibner and Dr. Fritz Houtermans - suggests that the Germans considered this task not only practical, but feasible over the next few years.

Thus, the absence of references to plutonium in this report provides us with the first substantial evidence to understand the true nature of nuclear research in Nazi Germany. It explains why the Germans never focused on creating a working reactor to obtain plutonium from uranium, which was necessary for the production of an atomic bomb: they did not need it, because there were other methods of enriching uranium and isolating a pure isotope // 2 * 5 suitable for use in a nuclear device, in an amount sufficient to obtain a critical mass. In other words, the "Allied legend" of Germany’s inability to create an atomic bomb due to the absence of a workable nuclear reactor is scientifically scientifically because it only needs a reactor to produce plutonium. If we are talking about the creation of a uranium bomb, the reactor becomes an expensive and unnecessary overkill. Thus, the scientific principles behind the creation of the atomic bomb, as well as the political and military reality that emerged after the United States entered the war, make it possible to assume with great certainty that Germany decided to create only a uranium bomb, since it revealed the shortest, most direct and the least technically difficult way to possess nuclear weapons.

Let us briefly interrupt, in order to compare the German efforts to create an atomic bomb with the “Manhattan Project”, which was carried out in the United States of America, possessing considerably larger production capacities and an industrial base that was not subjected to constant bombardment by enemy aircraft, decided to focus on the development of all available methods of creating a workable nuclear device, that is, a uranium and plutonium bomb. However, the creation of a plutonium bomb could be completed only with a workable reactor. No reactor - no plutonium bomb.

But it should also be noted that within the framework of the “Manhattan Project” a giant Oak Ridge complex was also built in Tennessee to enrich weapons-grade uranium by gas diffusion and the Lawrence mass spectrometer process; and this complex at no stage of work required the presence of an operating nuclear reactor to obtain enriched uranium.

Thus, if the Germans used the same approach that was used in Oak Ridge, there must necessarily be circumstantial evidence to support this. First, in order to enrich uranium with the same or similar methods that were used in Tennessee, the Third Reich had to build the same huge complex or several smaller complexes scattered throughout Germany, and transport uranium isotopes between them, representing different degree of radiation hazard, until the required degree of purity and enrichment is achieved. Then the material will need to be collected in a bomb and tested. Therefore, first of all it is necessary to look for a complex or a group of complexes. And, given the size of Oak Ridge and the nature of its activities, we know what to look for: the enormous size, proximity to water, developed transport infrastructure, an unusually large energy consumption and, finally, two more very significant factors: a constant source of labor and a huge cost

Secondly, in order to confirm or verify Zinsser’s astounding testimony, it is necessary to look for evidence. It is necessary to look for evidence that the Germans managed to accumulate weapons-grade uranium in an amount sufficient to obtain a critical mass of the atomic bomb. And then you need to look for a landfill or landfills and find out if there are signs of a nuclear explosion on it (on them).

Fortunately, recently the UK, the United States and the former Soviet Union have declassified more and more documents, the German government is opening the archives of the former East Germany: all this provides a slow but continuous flow of information. As a result, it became possible to examine in detail all aspects of this problem, which could only be dreamed of just a few years ago. The answers, as we will see in the remaining chapters of the first part, are alarming and frightening.

References:
F. Lee Benns, Europe Since 1914 In Its World Setting (New York: FS Crofts and Co., 1946), p. Xnumx
Sir Roy Fedden, The Nazis' V Weapons Matured Too Late (London: 1945), cited in Renato Vesco and David Hatcher's Climateress, Man-Made UFOs: 1944-1994, p. Xnumx
Vesco and Childress, op. cit., p. Xnumx
Nick Cook. The Hunt for Zero Point, p. Xnumx
Paul Lawrence Rose, Heisenberg and the Nazi Atomic Bomb Project: A Study in German Culture. Berkeley: 1998, pp. 217 — 221
Thomas Powers, Heisenbergs War; The Secret History of the German Bomb (1993), pp. 439 — 440
Philip Henshall, The Nuclear Axis: Germany, Japan, and the Atom Bomb Race 1939 — 45, “Introduction.”
Robert Wilcoxjapan's Secret War, p. I 5.
Henshall, op. cit, "Introduction".
Friedrich Georg, Hitlers Siegeswaffen: Band 1: Luftwaffe und Marine: Gebeime Nuklearwaffen des Dritten Reiches & ihre Tragersysteme (Schleusingen: Amun Verlag, 200), p. Xnumx