What is more important in war - military equipment or fighting spirit
For a long time there has been a dispute over what is more important in a war - military equipment or fighting spirit. In the course of the First World War, the predominant importance of the first one seemed to be revealed - the powerful equipment allegedly received priority over the moral component, which relegated to second place. But is it?
P. von Hindenburg loved to say that the one who has stronger nerves (that is, who is stronger in spirit) will win the war - and the events of World War fully confirmed his words.
In our opinion, the grand First World War not only did not destroy, but also confirmed the old truth that the main factor in the war as a whole (in battle in particular) always was and always will be man - in the complex of his spiritual and physical nature. Man is the root of all phenomena, and technology is only a tool in his hands, often grazing in front of the fighting spirit of a fighter.
Let us take two combat operations to illustrate this thesis.
In the course of the Warsaw-Ivangorod strategic operation 15 of September - 26 of October 1914, the strike group of the German 9 army under the command of A. von Mackensen (17-th army corps, parts of the 20-th Army Corps and the combined body of Frommel) attacked Warsaw, and from September 24 she led heavy battles on the outskirts of the city with the Siberian corps of the Russian 2 Army.
September 26 The 2 and 3 Siberian infantry regiments, which had just disembarked from the wagons, were pushed through Warsaw onto the Vladislav-Piaseczno line to cover the deployment of the main forces of the 1 Siberian Army Corps (which included) still on the way.
1. From the car - a fight. Siberian shooters are moving forward.
Siberians came to the specified milestone on the morning of September 27.
They had not yet managed to navigate the new positions, as the battle broke out - the first battle of the Great War for them. The Germans bombarded the Siberian shooters with a hail of bullets and shells — the latter were forced to withstand this fire hell, almost without having full-fledged defensive positions. Moreover, they did not have the opportunity to fully repay the enemy with the same coin - they had nothing but rifles and a small number of machine guns: the Siberian artillery was still on the way, and for some reason they did not allocate other artillery.
The opponent was technically very strong.
He felt it and boldly rolled his artillery into open positions, pushing the advancing infantry forward — but Siberians got in the way of the Germans. And they turned out to be even stronger, but not by technique, but by their spirit - the desire to conquer or die.
An eyewitness noted that “it was necessary to see people who, in spite of everything, were striving forward in order to come together chest with chest with the enemy. The companies melted. Silently died; the losses speak for them, but they have withstood, making it possible for the troops to come from the rear and thereby save Warsaw. ”
The operation historian G. Korolkov, speaking of the German strike of A. von Mackensen’s group on September 9 on Warsaw, noted: “The Germans met with such a strong rebuff and ... suffered significant losses, which made the gene. Mackensen to stop further advance and wait for reinforcements. This stop of the Germans in one transition from the goal of action after the success achieved in battle is the strategic victory of the gene. Scheidemann (cavalry general S. M. Scheideman - commander of the 28 Army of the North-Western Front - A. O.) ... ”[Warsaw-Ivangorod operation. M., 2. C. 1923].
And then the 2 Army (1 and 2 Siberian Army, 1 and 4 Army Corps) on September 29 launched a strong counter-strike. The Russian counterattack ended in a serious tactical success and secured Warsaw from the most long-range artillery of the Germans.
We see in this episode, on the one hand, the superiority of the German technology, on the other, the power of the Siberian shooters who did not even have time to orient themselves on unknown terrain, newcomers to a firing battle that found himself in it with one small weapons, but with high morale - and Siberians defeated the deadly technique of the enemy.
During the summer offensive of 1917, Russian troops were preparing to attack Vilna.
From 6-th to 9-July, Russian artillery of all calibers methodologically smashed the enemy.
2. Camouflaged guns on the position.
For three days, the fortified positions of the Germans were plowed far and wide, and by 7 o'clock in the morning of 9 on July, puffs of smoke and dust in an impenetrable veil covered the entire field ahead of the infantry regiments waiting for the attack signal at the initial line.
There was not a centimeter in the defense of the enemy, where Russian large-caliber “suitcases” would not be torn with a wild roar, and Russian shrapnel would not fly away with a piercing squeal. Blocks of earth, logs, pieces of concrete, stakes from obstacles flew in all directions; perennial trees were mowed like blades of grass, pulled out along with the roots. The defeated, flattened German positions in the full sense of the word were seething in raging fire.
The shocked Germans reacted poorly, confusedly and haphazardly firing back insignificant force. Sometimes their artillery suddenly fell on some combat area, but the Russian counter-battery group was alert - and instantly crushed the enemy's batteries, falling asleep with a hail of shells.
It is the fateful minute of July 9, the day of the attack.
Calm - and again a hurricane fire, but deep into the enemy's defense, to cut off his reserves, hurrying to the front line.
The chains of Russian infantry rushed forward.
Three rows of German trenches and the forest lying behind them were quickly occupied, but further ... then it was also possible to move forward swiftly: the demoralized enemy was running away, his batteries were removed from positions.
And what happened?
Germans and Russians ran in different directions.
The withdrawal of the Germans was a consequence of the fire defeat, and the leak of the Russian infantry to the rear was a consequence of the disintegration of the revolutionary army of “free” “democratic” Russia.
The technical operation of July 1917 was brilliantly prepared from the technical side - but the equipment could not give victory. The operation ended in vain solely because the morale of the troops experiencing the turbulent stage of the “deepening of the revolution” was not taken into account when preparing the offensive, despite instructions from military commanders and staffs.
Moral decomposition affected especially strongly as soon as the infantry units hit the forest and mixed there.
In this case, the Russian equipment was superior to the German one, preparing its infantry the easy way forward - to victory. But the morale of the Russian infantry was broken and corrupted before the battle, and the offensive turned out to be unsuccessful.
Through the whole military history the rule that the other side is defeated, which considers itself defeated, that is, when it loses faith in its strength and morally breaks, runs through the red thread.
Opponents fall asleep to each other with a hail of steel — primarily to break the spirit of the enemy troops, to inflict moral defeat on them. A technique is only an instrument of influence (that is, a means) in the hands of a person - and, of course, a means cannot take precedence over those who use it.
It is always worth remembering that an ax cuts a tree only when it is in the hands of a person.
But, of course, ideally there should be a reasonable balance between the spirit and the technique of warfare.
P. von Hindenburg loved to say that the one who has stronger nerves (that is, who is stronger in spirit) will win the war - and the events of World War fully confirmed his words.
In our opinion, the grand First World War not only did not destroy, but also confirmed the old truth that the main factor in the war as a whole (in battle in particular) always was and always will be man - in the complex of his spiritual and physical nature. Man is the root of all phenomena, and technology is only a tool in his hands, often grazing in front of the fighting spirit of a fighter.
Let us take two combat operations to illustrate this thesis.
In the course of the Warsaw-Ivangorod strategic operation 15 of September - 26 of October 1914, the strike group of the German 9 army under the command of A. von Mackensen (17-th army corps, parts of the 20-th Army Corps and the combined body of Frommel) attacked Warsaw, and from September 24 she led heavy battles on the outskirts of the city with the Siberian corps of the Russian 2 Army.
September 26 The 2 and 3 Siberian infantry regiments, which had just disembarked from the wagons, were pushed through Warsaw onto the Vladislav-Piaseczno line to cover the deployment of the main forces of the 1 Siberian Army Corps (which included) still on the way.
1. From the car - a fight. Siberian shooters are moving forward.
Siberians came to the specified milestone on the morning of September 27.
They had not yet managed to navigate the new positions, as the battle broke out - the first battle of the Great War for them. The Germans bombarded the Siberian shooters with a hail of bullets and shells — the latter were forced to withstand this fire hell, almost without having full-fledged defensive positions. Moreover, they did not have the opportunity to fully repay the enemy with the same coin - they had nothing but rifles and a small number of machine guns: the Siberian artillery was still on the way, and for some reason they did not allocate other artillery.
The opponent was technically very strong.
He felt it and boldly rolled his artillery into open positions, pushing the advancing infantry forward — but Siberians got in the way of the Germans. And they turned out to be even stronger, but not by technique, but by their spirit - the desire to conquer or die.
An eyewitness noted that “it was necessary to see people who, in spite of everything, were striving forward in order to come together chest with chest with the enemy. The companies melted. Silently died; the losses speak for them, but they have withstood, making it possible for the troops to come from the rear and thereby save Warsaw. ”
The operation historian G. Korolkov, speaking of the German strike of A. von Mackensen’s group on September 9 on Warsaw, noted: “The Germans met with such a strong rebuff and ... suffered significant losses, which made the gene. Mackensen to stop further advance and wait for reinforcements. This stop of the Germans in one transition from the goal of action after the success achieved in battle is the strategic victory of the gene. Scheidemann (cavalry general S. M. Scheideman - commander of the 28 Army of the North-Western Front - A. O.) ... ”[Warsaw-Ivangorod operation. M., 2. C. 1923].
And then the 2 Army (1 and 2 Siberian Army, 1 and 4 Army Corps) on September 29 launched a strong counter-strike. The Russian counterattack ended in a serious tactical success and secured Warsaw from the most long-range artillery of the Germans.
We see in this episode, on the one hand, the superiority of the German technology, on the other, the power of the Siberian shooters who did not even have time to orient themselves on unknown terrain, newcomers to a firing battle that found himself in it with one small weapons, but with high morale - and Siberians defeated the deadly technique of the enemy.
During the summer offensive of 1917, Russian troops were preparing to attack Vilna.
From 6-th to 9-July, Russian artillery of all calibers methodologically smashed the enemy.
2. Camouflaged guns on the position.
For three days, the fortified positions of the Germans were plowed far and wide, and by 7 o'clock in the morning of 9 on July, puffs of smoke and dust in an impenetrable veil covered the entire field ahead of the infantry regiments waiting for the attack signal at the initial line.
There was not a centimeter in the defense of the enemy, where Russian large-caliber “suitcases” would not be torn with a wild roar, and Russian shrapnel would not fly away with a piercing squeal. Blocks of earth, logs, pieces of concrete, stakes from obstacles flew in all directions; perennial trees were mowed like blades of grass, pulled out along with the roots. The defeated, flattened German positions in the full sense of the word were seething in raging fire.
The shocked Germans reacted poorly, confusedly and haphazardly firing back insignificant force. Sometimes their artillery suddenly fell on some combat area, but the Russian counter-battery group was alert - and instantly crushed the enemy's batteries, falling asleep with a hail of shells.
It is the fateful minute of July 9, the day of the attack.
Calm - and again a hurricane fire, but deep into the enemy's defense, to cut off his reserves, hurrying to the front line.
The chains of Russian infantry rushed forward.
Three rows of German trenches and the forest lying behind them were quickly occupied, but further ... then it was also possible to move forward swiftly: the demoralized enemy was running away, his batteries were removed from positions.
And what happened?
Germans and Russians ran in different directions.
The withdrawal of the Germans was a consequence of the fire defeat, and the leak of the Russian infantry to the rear was a consequence of the disintegration of the revolutionary army of “free” “democratic” Russia.
The technical operation of July 1917 was brilliantly prepared from the technical side - but the equipment could not give victory. The operation ended in vain solely because the morale of the troops experiencing the turbulent stage of the “deepening of the revolution” was not taken into account when preparing the offensive, despite instructions from military commanders and staffs.
Moral decomposition affected especially strongly as soon as the infantry units hit the forest and mixed there.
In this case, the Russian equipment was superior to the German one, preparing its infantry the easy way forward - to victory. But the morale of the Russian infantry was broken and corrupted before the battle, and the offensive turned out to be unsuccessful.
Through the whole military history the rule that the other side is defeated, which considers itself defeated, that is, when it loses faith in its strength and morally breaks, runs through the red thread.
Opponents fall asleep to each other with a hail of steel — primarily to break the spirit of the enemy troops, to inflict moral defeat on them. A technique is only an instrument of influence (that is, a means) in the hands of a person - and, of course, a means cannot take precedence over those who use it.
It is always worth remembering that an ax cuts a tree only when it is in the hands of a person.
But, of course, ideally there should be a reasonable balance between the spirit and the technique of warfare.
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