Military Review

Artillery density of the First World

44
A positional war established on the French front at the end of the autumn 1914, and on the Russian front at the end of the autumn 1915. Under current conditions, the main form of operational maneuver was the breakthrough of the enemy’s position front, and the main tool in this matter was artillery. And in these conditions, artillery densities — the number of guns per 1 km of the front of a combat operation — were of immense importance for high-quality artillery work.


Allied experience.
In September, during the operation in Champagne, the French concentrated on the 1915-km front for artillery preparation of 35 1100-mm light field guns and 75 heavy guns. Thus, on the 872 km of the front accounted for up to 1 guns. Artillery preparation lasted 57 day. During this time, 3 light and 1387370 heavy shells were fired - which accounted for 295800 projectiles per meter of front.

In the summer of 1916, during the preparation of the Somme breakthrough, the French conducted artillery preparation for 7 days, concentrating on the 15-km front of the 1449 guns, of which 645 are heavy. In this operation, density was achieved in 100 guns on 1 km of front. The consumption of shells surpassed all previous standards. From 24 June to 10 July, 2532649 shells were fired, of which only on the day of the attack (July 1) - 380000. In total, 166 shells per meter of front (26 shells per meter per day of attack) were expended during this operation.

But, despite such a rich front, the French still came to the conclusion that they ... did not have enough artillery for success.

Therefore, in April 1917 in the battle on the river. Enna they focus on 40-km front 5597 guns or near 140 guns on 1 km front. Artillery preparation was supposed to last 5 days (in fact, it lasted 8 days).

In the rest of the operations “with limited targets” 1917, the French had: on Ypres (July 31) 153 guns and near Verdun (August 20 26) 157 guns on the 1 km of the front. Artillery training continued: on Ypres 16 days, under Verdun 7 days.

Finally, in the last similar operation of 1917 of the year - in October, near La Malmaison, the French had 160 guns on 1 km of front, and the artillery preparation, which lasted 6 days, leveled off most of the enemy fortifications. After such training, the French managed to advance a little more than 4 km on the 10 day of the fighting on the 6-km front. Moreover, General F. Err described this operation as follows: "This brilliant victory remained a model of the offensive with a limited goal."

But who will now call a “brilliant victory” an operation in which troops advance at a speed of 1500 meters per day, while having 160 guns per kilometer of the front?

Under the Malmaison, the French spent 6 tons of shells for 68500 days of artillery preparation - more than 6 tons per meter of front (for comparison - at Somme in 1916 about 1 tons per meter).

1918 was a turning point for massaging artillery and the consumption of shells. Having reached 160 guns per kilometer and 6 tons of shells per meter of front, the allied artillery densities in 1918 show a significant decrease in these indicators. The French took into account the experience of German offensive operations in the first half of 1918. In addition, the possibility of mass application appeared tanks.

In July - August 1918, for an offensive in the Chateau-Thierry-Soissons area, the French concentrated on an 18-km front 40 aviation squadrons, 375 tanks and 1620 guns (90 guns per 1 km of the front). Artillery preparation in the main direction was not carried out, and in the secondary direction it lasted only an hour and a half.

In subsequent operations, the French had: near Amiens 45 guns on 1 km, between the RR. Oise and En - about 104 guns on 1 km, in the battle between Reims and Argonnes (September — October) - about 102 guns on 1 km front.

Thus, by the end of the war, the French returned to the norms of the 1916 of the year and finally abandoned their multi-day artillery preparation, limiting its duration to hours, and in some cases not practicing it at all.


French battery during the attack in Champagne.

Germanic density.
Already in the first half of the war, the Germans took into account the negative consequences of multi-day artillery preparation and did not even attempt to impose on artillery the task of completely eliminating the enemy’s defensive line. They limited themselves to short artillery preparation, measured by hours, which was supposed to temporarily neutralize the enemy’s main combat resources at the front line.

In operations on the Russian front, the artillery preparation of which was led by the famous artillery authority G. Bruchmüller, the Germans usually conducted 4 - 6-hour artillery preparation.

Artillery density of the First World
Col. G. Bruchmüller.

So, for example, in November 1916, when the Germans broke through Vitonezh, had 80 guns on the 1 km of front. The artillery preparation lasted 5 hours 15 minutes. When attacking a bridgehead at the village. Tobolye, the Germans had up to 50 guns and mortars on the 1 km front - with artillery preparation of 5 hours 45 minutes.

In 1917, at the breakthrough on r. Ceret (Eastern Galicia) Germans concentrated 138 batteries (552 guns) plus 176 medium and heavy mortars on the 8-km front - which amounted to 90 guns and mortars per kilometer of the front. The artillery preparation continued for 5 hours. In August of the same year, during the Riga operation, the Germans had about 95 guns and mortars on the 1 km of the front. The duration of the artillery training is also about 5 hours.

It is interesting to note that the Bruchmüller experience was moved by the Germans from the Eastern Front to the Western - and in the spring of 1918 in France brought brilliant results. At the same time, the Germans went on further reducing the duration of artillery preparation, limiting its 27 on May 2 to 40 hours by minutes, and concentrating 1100 batteries on the 38-km front - that is, about 30 batteries (120 guns) on the 1 km front.


Germanic 210-mm howitzers on the position.

Artillery density of the Russian army.

What kind of artillery density used by the Russian army?

In the Battle of Galicia 1914, the artillery densities were 6 - 7 guns per kilometer of the front. And with such miserable densities, Russian troops captured up to 100 thousands of prisoners and 400 guns, advancing on 85-240 (for different armies) kilometers.

In the course of the Brusilovsky 1916 breakout, the artillery densities for the 8 Army amounted to only 20 guns per kilometer of the front. The flagship of the front was the 9-I army - with the breakthrough of the Austrian position at der. Dobronouc in the area of ​​the main attack of the 11 Army Corps on the 3,5-km front was concentrated 159 guns - 45 guns on 1 km front. The duration of the artillery preparation is 5 hours 15 minutes. In this operation, the actions of the artillery were led by a well-known specialist, the “Russian Bruchmuller,” Colonel V.F. Kirey.


Col. V.F. Kirei.

And with such densities - what is the result!
. Capturing the 408 thousand prisoners, 581 weapon, 1795 guns, 448 mortars and mortars of the enemy, but in the first 13 days of the onset of South-Western Front advanced 8-th army - on 75 km and 9-th army - on 50 - 60 km the depth. Moreover, the Austro-German troops were shot down from their long-echelled positions on the front 200-kilometer length.

The operation became one of the most successful offensive operations in the domestic military stories. And the Russian army showed high combat effectiveness at low artillery densities.


Russian howitzer battery in battle.
Author:
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  1. tasha
    tasha 9 June 2017 07: 36
    +3
    About the density of artillery during the Brusilov breakthrough and the time of artillery preparation, I need to clarify. A.I. Denikin writes that for 36 hours the batteries of the 4th Infantry Division fired 27 700 shells.
    Well, "Until the end of the year, according to the daily reports of the headquarters of the Stavka front, the losses as a result of the attack amounted to: killed - 2930 officers and 199 836 soldiers, wounded —14 932 officers and 1 075 959 soldiers — 928 officers and 151 749 , all 18 006 officers and 1 436 134 soldiers. According to S. G. Nelipovich, by the fall of 1916, Austro-Hungarian troops lost from Pripyat to the Romanian border 30 245 people killed, 327 388 153 613 102 341 sick: May – December Austro-Hungarian Northern Front (including actions for Mr. Baranavichy and in Romania) lost 1294 officers and 43 764 soldiers wounded, 4769 officers and 211 705 soldiers wounded and 5981 officers and 371 818 soldiers missing. As a result, the ratio of the losses of the Russian troops to the losses of the enemy was 140: 000, although the Russian troops captured 2 1 prisoners, 417 machine guns, 000 mortars and bomb mortars, 1745 guns and other military equipment. But casualties, especially those killed, were much harder, and of the million wounded in May-October of 448, only 581 1916 returned to service, every second returned from the Germans. "
    1. Uncle Murzik
      Uncle Murzik 9 June 2017 10: 50
      0
      Nelepovich’s tasch and other venerable historians do not have access to the German archives, like Oleinikov’s! laughing
    2. soldier
      soldier 9 June 2017 12: 44
      +16
      Here, by the way, you can also clarify a few points.
      The first one. What should be the balance of forces between the defending and the advancing - moreover, breaking through the layered defense of the enemy. And what was the correlation of the forces of the Southwest Federal District and the Austro-German armies at the same time.
      The second one. What should be the losses of the advancing and defending in the conditions of positional war. And what they were during the Brusilovsky breakthrough.
      Third - what losses the parties suffered on the French front - advancing hundreds of meters, and what were the results. With huge resources, I emphasize.
      And then compare with the offensive of the Southwest Front in 1916
      Everything is very clear - and in favor of Russian weapons
    3. NIKNN
      NIKNN 9 June 2017 22: 50
      +9
      I agree, but the article is cool \, at least because it didn’t occur to anyone to analyze at the moment ... thanks to the article, I rummaged through it .. and came to a certain conclusion (this is with our knowledge) ... a meaningless waste of ammunition. ..That when they arrived (WWII) to escort the offensive (shaft of fire before the advancing) then yes, and so for 7 days to iron the wasteland ??? well, not a camillefo ..
      1. tasha
        tasha 10 June 2017 05: 12
        +1
        The topic is interesting, but the author hurried with conclusions ... I think it’s incorrect to compare the density of art. fire on the Western Front and on the Eastern and, moreover, somehow oppose them, they say that they are so stupid, and we won’t ....
        The onset of May 1916. of course is an outstanding success. Here, and preliminary preparation, target adjustment, transfer of fire, the use of tools of direct support ..
        And all the more it is not clear why, after such a start in July-August, the same A.A. Brusilov attacked the Kovel fortified area with huge losses in the forehead ...
        1. soldier
          soldier 10 June 2017 05: 35
          +18
          In my opinion, the comparison is absolutely correct and the conclusions are justified.
          On the French and Russian fronts there was a positional war. That is, the situation is the same.
          In Galicia, German troops were present - for example, the whole German Southern Army. That is, the enemy is the same.
          Strengthened positions in Galicia were stronger than in France - Kaiser Wilhelm himself spoke about this, as I wrote below.
          And about the Kovel swotting - the question is very interesting. However, the war on the French front in 1915-1917. this is one continuous swotting.
          1. tasha
            tasha 10 June 2017 06: 45
            +2
            In my opinion, the comparison is absolutely correct and the conclusions are justified.

            And what are these conclusions? What can be achieved outstanding success with careful preparation of the operation and lower density of artillery per kilometer of the front? So who is arguing with this? But if you compare, then compare to the end. Then you need to compare the losses ... That's what I mean ...

            Well, a piece from the sketch of L. Vetoshnikov
            The command of the Southwestern Front, organizing the front-line operation, conducted a lengthy and thorough preparation of the breakthrough. Such training, along with the high combat qualities of the Russian troops, on the one hand, and the very weak fighting efficiency of the Austrian units (Austrian losses by some prisoners accounted for 28% of the total number of losses), on the other hand, brought the Russian army initially great success ....
            A tactical defense breakthrough in the direction of the main strike was carried out at operational density in 3-6 battalions (3000-5000 bayonets) and 15-20 guns on the 1 km of the front with the expense of 10000-15000 shells. In some areas of the breakthrough, it was possible to bring the total number of light and heavy guns to 45-50 on the 1 km of the front. The enemy’s operational density ranged from 4 to 10 km per infantry division, i.e. 2 battalion on the 1 km front and 10-12 guns. This gave the Russians a double and even greater superiority of forces over the Austrians. But this increase in density, as noted above, was achieved by the Russian command due to the extreme and completely unacceptable reduction in the width of the front of the main attack.
            Therefore, it must be admitted that if the operational density was perhaps (given the combat readiness of the Austrian forces) sufficient for tactical success, then these forces were completely insufficient to turn tactical success into operational ....
            1. soldier
              soldier 10 June 2017 08: 43
              +16
              So here I am about the same.
              If we compare these densities with the Anglo-French, as well as with the Anglo-French losses in similar operations, and most importantly with the results, the difference is obvious
              1. tasha
                tasha 11 June 2017 06: 45
                0
                If we compare these densities with the Anglo-French, as well as with the Anglo-French losses in similar operations, and most importantly with the results, the difference is obvious

                What is the difference? The author himself writes that the French "Thus, by the end of the war, the French returned to the norms of the 1916 of the year and finally abandoned the many-day artillery preparation, limiting its duration to hours, and in some cases not practicing it at all." And they won the war.
                Describing the same artillery densities of the Russian army, the author considers two disputed isolated cases and at the same time draws dubious conclusions, whose approach is better. I am sure that A.A. Brusilov would not refuse 100 guns at 1km. If he had such an opportunity. He didn’t have such an opportunity, so he had to invent, try in some areas to achieve superiority in strength ... And it’s good that the Austrians were not very active, hoping for their positions ...

                So we, as it seems to me, talk about different things ..
                1. soldier
                  soldier 11 June 2017 08: 12
                  +16
                  What is the difference? The author himself writes that the French "Thus, by the end of the war, the French returned to the norms of the 1916 of the year and finally abandoned the many-day artillery preparation, limiting its duration to hours, and in some cases not practicing it at all." And they won the war.
                  Describing the same artillery densities of the Russian army, the author considers two disputed isolated cases and at the same time draws dubious conclusions, whose approach is better. I am sure that A.A. Brusilov would not refuse 100 guns at 1km. If he had such an opportunity. He didn’t have such an opportunity, so he had to invent, try in some areas to achieve superiority in strength ... And it’s good that the Austrians were not very active, hoping for their positions ...
                  So we, as it seems to me, talk about different things ..

                  We really talk about different things.
                  The French returned to the norms of 16 in 18.
                  And what were the densities of the French and Russian in 16? The war was won not by the French alone, but by the totality of common efforts.
                  Not very active Austrians - again you forget about the 2 German armies in Galicia. They are probably also not active, like the Austrians
            2. soldier
              soldier 10 June 2017 12: 52
              +16
              tasha
              ... But if you compare, then compare to the end. Then you need to compare the losses ... That's what I mean ...
              Well, a piece from the sketch of L. Vetoshnikov
              The command of the Southwestern Front, organizing the front-line operation, conducted a lengthy and thorough preparation of the breakthrough. Such training, along with the high combat qualities of the Russian troops, on the one hand, and the very weak combat capability of the Austrian units (Austrian losses by prisoners alone accounted for 28% of the total number of losses) ...

              28% of losses - by prisoners, does not indicate weak combat effectiveness of the troops. Or, then, in 1941, the Red Army will also be classified as weakly combat-ready?
              The reason for taking a large number of prisoners lies in a whole complex of factors - both operational-strategic and tactical.
              A. A. Brusilov himself saw the reason for the use of new tactics - assault (grenadier) platoons and companies. He wrote:
              “Many shelters were not destroyed, but the parts of the garrison who were sitting there had to lay down their arms and surrender, because as soon as one grenadier with a bomb in his hands stood at the exit, there was no escape anymore, because in case of refusal to surrender, the shelter would rush about a grenade, and those who hid inevitably perished without use for the cause; getting out of shelters in a timely manner is extremely difficult and it is impossible to guess the time. Thus, the number of prisoners that invariably fell into our hands is quite understandable. ”

              My Memoirs, 1983. S. 199
              Austrian troops (German and Hungarian units above all) were a serious adversary - they beat the Italians and periodically other allies throughout the war. By the way, the Germans used several Austrian divisions in France in 1918.
              But the Germans in vain write off the disaster in Galicia in 1916 only to the Austrians. They had 2 of their armies there. In addition to the South German Army - the army of A. von Linzingen. The latter only in May 1916 lost over 82 thousand people or 51% of the initial composition (10th Corps - over 80% of the number).
              And more about the losses.
              Losses of the Southwestern Front from May 22 to June 30 amounted to 62 thousand killed and died from wounds, 377 thousand wounded and sick, about 60 thousand missing (Strategic essay on the war of 1914-1918. Part 5. S. 73). Or about 500 thousand people.
              According to their data, the Austrians (Wagner A. Der Erste Weltkrieg, 1993. S. 194.) lost 475 thousand people in July (226 thousand of them prisoners).
              This is without the Germans.
              So it turns out that during the breakthrough and its development (May-June), the losses of the South-Western Front and the Austro-German troops were 1 to 1.
              This is the offensive in a positional war!
              And what territorial acquisitions.
              For comparison, during the French offensive in April-May 1917, nearly 200 thousand French and 160 thousand British were out of order. The enemy lost 190 thousand people. That is 2 to 1. The result is zero.
              We will not even compare the density of artillery
              1. Uncle Murzik
                Uncle Murzik 10 June 2017 17: 09
                0
                the army soldier will soon issue stories as historical documents! belay Yes, as always, Oleinikov in shock! laughing
                1. soldier
                  soldier 10 June 2017 17: 45
                  +16
                  the army soldier will soon issue stories as historical documents!

                  You always saw something uncle. First of all, I do not give anything away.
                  Secondly, if for you the Strategic essay of the Soviet era is a story, then I am silent.
                  You are probably one of those venerable historians mentioned above. wink
                  Not otherwise - Shirokorad (Samsonov).
                  For such (such) unless some army soldier is stealing there laughing
                  1. Uncle Murzik
                    Uncle Murzik 10 June 2017 18: 02
                    0
                    Well, Oleinikov to Shirokorad (Samsonov) and even to the same Nelepovich as to China on foot! They at least do not speculate with facts, and does not lead delusional sources! lol
                    1. The comment was deleted.
                    2. soldier
                      soldier 10 June 2017 18: 34
                      +16
                      What kind of chatter is Uncle Murzik and unworthy attacks against the author.
                      Although - if in essence there is nothing to say in the article, this will come down ...
                      By the way - about some venerable historians wink To begin with - study what are the chronological framework of Ancient Russia. And then - about artillery.
                      And as for the sources - do you know what it is?
                      By the way - about the admission to the German archives lol
                      If you are talking about the Reichsarchive, then admission is not needed. This is a multivolume edition published in Germany in the 30-40's. So just go to the library. Although you are all the same
                      1. Uncle Murzik
                        Uncle Murzik 10 June 2017 18: 41
                        0
                        army soldier but actually everything is said in a comment by tasch, data of Nelepovich! apparently he did not use the Reichsarchive, unlike you "historian" laughing let's drive strategic sketches further! lol
              2. tasha
                tasha 11 June 2017 07: 18
                +1
                We will not even compare the density of artillery


                Let me remind you of an article with VO.
                https://topwar.ru/57946-gibel-russkoy-gvardii.htm
                l

                So the author did not take this case as an example?
                1. soldier
                  soldier 11 June 2017 08: 32
                  +16
                  Let me remind you of an article with VO.
                  https://topwar.ru/57946-gibel-russkoy-gvardii.htm
                  l
                  So the author did not take this case as an example?

                  Maybe because artillery densities were considered in completed breakthroughs?
                  After all, the allies on the Western Front had their own Kovels
                  1. tasha
                    tasha 11 June 2017 09: 11
                    +1
                    May be. What does the battle of Galicia have to do with it? Where, then, is Samsonov’s offensive?
                    Let us agree that the article on artillery density on the fields of the First World War could be more elaborate ...
                    1. soldier
                      soldier 11 June 2017 09: 22
                      +16
                      As I understand it, these are just examples. The battle of Galicia - the era of maneuver warfare, the offensive of the South Front - the era of positional warfare.
                      Well (in both cases) - confirmation of how much can be achieved with a little.
                      Well, as for the elaboration: not only the articles, monographs and encyclopedias can be more elaborate. You can develop this topic if you have such a desire.
  2. chenia
    chenia 9 June 2017 07: 50
    +2
    Yes, get to the point that the artillery preparation should be intense, and not long, time was needed.

    Red Army artillery from the end of 1942 is an example of the best organization of an artillery attack. Planning, periods, types of fire, massaging., Intensity. The Germans, having the best artillerymen (shooters), lost in the net in organization, in the ability to concentrate large art forces in an appropriate place. The fire plan eliminated the loss of efficiency due to the low level of our firing.
    1. antivirus
      antivirus 9 June 2017 08: 20
      0
      Now you can see what they achieved from November 19, February 42 to February 2, 43 and beyond: near Kursk, etc.
      Victory in WWII is work on the mistakes of WWII
    2. Operator
      Operator 9 June 2017 15: 38
      0
      The most massive use of artillery in WWII was practiced by the US Army on the European theater of operations - during the period from June 1944 to May 1945, the Americans spent more shells than the Wehrmacht, the Red Army and the British army combined.
  3. kvs207
    kvs207 9 June 2017 10: 34
    +2
    Underestimation and, as a result, lack of artillery, especially heavy, is one of the reasons for the failures of the Russian army in the First World War.
  4. Kenxnumx
    Kenxnumx 9 June 2017 16: 14
    +1
    The author forgot what positions the Russian army ended up with as a result of neglect of the preparation of stocks of shells and large-caliber guns. And victories over the Austrians in whom everything was even worse, the argument is insufficient
    1. soldier
      soldier 9 June 2017 20: 45
      +16
      Well, that’s obvious.
      This article focuses on artillery densities, rather than ammunition supplies.
      By the way, the Russian army was not on the worst - partly on its territory (Belarus and the Baltic states), partly on the territories of other states (Galicia, Romania, Turkey).
      But I want to say about victories over the Austrians. Already in the winter of 1915, the Austrian troops were mixed with the German - performing the role of backups.
      But there were exceptions - for example, the South German Army almost entirely consisted of German troops. She during the Brusilovsky breakthrough suffered a heavy defeat from the troops of the 9th Army of the Southwestern Front.
      But even before the breakthrough, Kaiser Wilhelm visited the positions of the Southern German Army and stated that he had not seen such fortifications even on the French front. A mockup was made that was on display in Berlin.
      That the Russian troops had something to be proud of
    2. soldier
      soldier 9 June 2017 20: 46
      +16
      The French and the Belgians also fought on their territory
      1. Uncle Murzik
        Uncle Murzik 10 June 2017 17: 11
        0
        well, if you consider that the Russian army was the first to invade German soil, unlike the French! lol
        1. soldier
          soldier 10 June 2017 17: 48
          +16
          And you will study the events of the first days of the war - especially with regard to the invasion of Russian Poland and the defeat of the city of Kalisz.
          However, the question was not about who invaded where, but where whose positions were (were) during the WWII
        2. soldier
          soldier 10 June 2017 17: 51
          +16
          And also study how the French during the Border Battle invaded the territory of the German Empire - in particular, capturing the city of Mühlhausen.
          And then the whole war was fought on their own and Belgian territory
          1. Uncle Murzik
            Uncle Murzik 10 June 2017 18: 04
            0
            Well, now you will pass off all minor border clashes as strategic offensives! belay Well, you will lol
            1. soldier
              soldier 10 June 2017 18: 07
              +16
              As you like to attribute to others what they did not say, it was a question of an invasion, and not of strategic offensives.
              But, for that matter, the French invasion of Alsace-Lorraine was far from a minor skirmish.
  5. soldier
    soldier 10 June 2017 18: 48
    +16
    uncle Murzik,
    Uncle Murzik Today, 18:41 ↑
    an army soldier, but in general everything is said in a comment from Tash, the data of Nelepovich! apparently he did not use the Reichsarchive, unlike you "historian" laughing, let's continue driving strategic sketches!

    "Strategic outline" of the war of 1914 - 1918 in the 20s, it was created in the USSR by military specialists - participants in the war, with the wide involvement of all available materials, and a huge range of sources.
    It is based on archival data, so leave your insinuations with Uncle Murzik and steadily improve your educational level.
    1. Uncle Murzik
      Uncle Murzik 11 June 2017 10: 05
      0
      Dear Darling, I’m not surprised if you soon start to refer to fiction! laughing
      1. soldier
        soldier 11 June 2017 10: 14
        +16
        No, I will only refer to fiction from the works of Uncle Murzik wink
        1. Uncle Murzik
          Uncle Murzik 11 June 2017 10: 41
          0
          darling army man is better at Oleinikov's science fiction! wink lol
          1. soldier
            soldier 11 June 2017 11: 04
            +16
            It’s just that everything is based on facts, the figures are backed up by references to sources and literature.
            Yes, however, you will not find more fiction than yours - in the afternoon with fire. Unfortunately, the truth is not scientific.
            Okay, we will not deal with flood.
            Have a nice and wonderful day.
  6. barbiturate
    barbiturate 20 February 2018 19: 59
    0
    So, by deceiving illiterate people, we can pass off the weakness of our artillery as dignity, an excellent article)) But the comments were generally ridiculed, again the Brusilovsky breakthrough and the pulling of two ears !! defeated German armies in this breakthrough, what nonsense))
    But now I understand why one of the adherents of this nonsense recently called me Uncle Murzik, in the comments there was such a forum member and argued with this nonsense laughing
    1. denatured alcohol
      denatured alcohol 9 March 2018 19: 51
      0
      So, by deceiving illiterate people

      To myself, what?
      He himself was a man of letters, he would not have been confused with the sources and believed in the publications of the General Staff of the Red Army))
      Now I understand why one of the adherents of this nonsense recently called me Uncle Murzik.
      Because Uncle Murzik is you, in the new edition.
      and argued with this nonsense

      Yes, he himself carried such illiterate nonsense that his ears were sluggish laughing
      Nachitalsy, enough for 10 years in advance
      1. barbiturate
        barbiturate 11 March 2018 12: 02
        0
        Quote: denatured alcohol
        To myself, what?

        no, about you
        Quote: denatured alcohol
        He himself was a man of letters, he would not have been confused with the sources and believed in the publications of the General Staff of the Red Army))

        are you talking about yourself
        Quote: denatured alcohol
        Because Uncle Murzik is you, in the new edition.


        After reading the posts of Uncle Murzik - I agree to be him, in any edition laughing
        At least someone refutes your ignorant nonsense

        Quote: denatured alcohol
        Nachitalsy, enough for 10 years in advance


        Well, you sometimes refresh the sources, or 10 years is a long time, judging by your posts you already don’t remember anything and don’t know, but what will happen in the next few years?)) laughing laughing laughing Ball (denatured, bluement) - you're babbes laughing He also created a special regul for melaughing
        1. denatured alcohol
          denatured alcohol 12 March 2018 05: 59
          0
          This is me about you
          After reading the posts of Uncle Murzik - I agree to be him, in any edition

          And there’s nothing to be - just look in the mirror laughing
          A ball (denatured, bluement) - you are a babbes laughing. You also created a special regul for me.

          Well, I say wink And I didn’t specifically create anything - just a big fan of yours.
          Illiterate but cheating cheater
          1. denatured alcohol
            denatured alcohol 12 March 2018 06: 00
            0
            cheater

            you yourself admitted this somehow lol
            in one letter
            1. barbiturate
              barbiturate 17 March 2018 15: 46
              0
              Escho lies, fun laughing
  7. Bouncer
    Bouncer 9 March 2018 14: 55
    +15
    Excellent article
    Competent analysis
    Visually and interestingly - how much was achieved with less
    Thanks to the author!