Stories about weapons. Tank T-26

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We continue our series of materials from the museum of military stories in Padikovo. Today, our hero will be the Soviet light tank T-26. The car is unique and controversial, but nevertheless, the tank went through more than one war and is worthy of the most detailed disassembly, both from the outside and from the inside.



Combat path T-26 was very long and difficult. The Spanish Civil War, Hassan, Khalkhin Gol, the war with Finland, the Great Patriotic War. The final place of application of the T-26 was the field of the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army in the Far East.

The predecessor of the T-26 was the T-18 tank, which was a copy of the French Renault FT-17. By the year 1929 came the understanding of the need to create a more modern machine and the general lag of Soviet tank building.

In 1930, a procurement commission was created under the leadership of I. Khalepsky and the head of the engineering design bureau for tanks S. Ginzburg, whose task was the selection and purchase of samples of tanks, tractors and cars suitable for adoption by the Red Army.

In the spring of 1930, the commission visited the UK, which in those years was considered the world leader in the production of armored vehicles. The commission's attention was attracted by the light tank Mk.E, created by Vikkers-Armstrong in 1928 — 1929 and offered for export.

Vickers Armstrong offered several variants of the tank, in particular the Model A with two single turrets with the Vickers 7,7-mm machine gun and the Model B with a twin-turret with a 37-mm short-barreled gun and the 7,7-mm machine gun. Only a double-turbo tank, designated B-26, was purchased.

For the production of T-26, in the absence of alternatives, the Leningrad plant Bolshevik was chosen, previously engaged in the release of T-18. In the spring of 1931, the department of the plant, which consisted only of 5 people, prepared for production and manufactured two standard tank specimens. By 1 May, working drawings were completed, and 16 June was approved a manufacturing process and production of equipment for mass production began.

The design of the tank during the production has been constantly improved. In addition to introducing new towers, in 1931, the engine was relegated to the stern to provide better working conditions, and from the beginning of 1932, new fuel and oil tanks were introduced, and from 1 in March of the same year, the T-26 began to install a box above the grille air outlet, protecting the engine from precipitation.

At the same time, two versions of tanks were produced - with machine-gun armament and with machine-gun and cannon, consisting of a DT-29 machine gun in the left turret and an 37-mm gun in the right one. The machine gun tanks at the end of 1932 began to be produced with ball mounts for the new DTU machine guns, but since the latter were soon discontinued, the tanks of these series were unarmed and they later had to replace the front plates of the towers with suitable ones for the old DT-29.



The guns tanks were installed 37-mm gun Hotchkiss or its modified Soviet version of "Hotchkiss-PS."

Stories about weapons. Tank T-26


In reality, the work on the single-turbo T-26 began only in 1932. Mastering the assembly of a conical tower of curvilinear armor plates presented difficulties for the Soviet industry, therefore the first tower of this type, created by the Izhora plant by the spring 1932 of the year and intended for the BT-2 tank, had a cylindrical shape. At the tests of the riveted and welded versions of the tower, preference was given to the first one, which was recommended for use after the refinement of the identified deficiencies and adding a niche for the installation of the radio station in the rear part.

While we were working on the tower, the question of the arming of the tank was also resolved. In May 1932 of the year for the replacement of 37-mm anti-tank guns was adopted 45-mm gun mod. 1932, who also became a candidate for tank armament. Compared to the 37-mm gun, the 45-mm gun had about the same armor penetration, but the fragmentation shell was more effective because it was equipped with a large explosive charge.

At the beginning of 1933, the design bureau of the plant No. 174 developed a paired installation of the 45-mm cannon and machine gun, which successfully passed factory tests in March 1933. At the same time, it was decided to adopt the one-towered T-26 with the 45-mm gun.

It is this tank that is currently under consideration.



The main armament of single-turret modifications was 45-mm rifled semi-automatic gun mod. 1932 (20-K), and since 1934 of the year - its modified version of the sample 1932 / 34. Semi-automatic tool implements 1932 / 34's. It worked only when firing armor-piercing shells, whereas when firing fragmentation, due to the shorter recoil length, it worked, providing only automatic shutter closure when the cartridge was inserted into it, while the shutter was opened and the liner was extracted manually. The practical rate of fire of the gun was 7 — 12 rounds per minute.



The gun was housed in a machine coupled to the machine gun, on the axles in the frontal part of the tower. Guidance in the horizontal plane was carried out by turning the tower with the help of a screw turning mechanism. The mechanism had two gears, the speed of rotation of the tower on which in one revolution of the flywheel of the gunner was 2 or 4 °. The guidance in the vertical plane, with maximum angles from −6 to + 22 °, was carried out using a sector mechanism.



Guided twin installation was carried out using a panoramic periscopic optical sight PT-1 arr. 1932 g. And telescopic TOP arr. The 1930 PT-1 had an increase in x2,5 and 26 ° field of view, and its aiming grid was designed to fire at a range of 3,6 km with armor-piercing shells, 2,7 km with fragmentation and up to 1,6 km from a paired machine gun.

For shooting at night and in low light conditions, the sight was provided with an illumination of scales and crosshairs of the sight. The TOP had an x2,5 magnification, 15 ° field of view, and an aiming net designed for firing at a range of, respectively, 6, 4, 3 and 1 km. From the 1938 of the year, a TOP-1 telescopic sight (TOC-1), stabilized in the vertical plane, was installed on the part of the tanks, with the same TOP optical characteristics. The sight was supplied with a collimator device, when the cannon oscillated in a vertical plane, it automatically fired a shot when the position of the gun coincided with the aiming line. Gun arr. 1934 G., adapted for use with a stabilized sight, was designated as arr. 1938. Due to the complexity of the use and training of the gunners, by the beginning of World War II, the stabilized sight was removed from service.

Tower T-26 inside:










The basic means of external communication on the T-26 served as a flag alarm system and all two-turreted tanks had only it. On the part of the produced single-turret tanks that received the designation T-26РТ, a radio station of the 1933-TK-71 model was installed in the fall of 1. The share of the RT-26 was determined only by the volume of deliveries of radio stations, which were primarily equipped with vehicles of the commanders of the units, as well as part of the line tanks. The maximum range of communication in the telephone mode was 15 — 18 km in motion and 25 — 30 km from the spot, in telegraph, up to 40 km; in the presence of interference from the simultaneous operation of many radio stations, the communication range could be reduced by half.

For the internal communication between the tank commander and the driver-mechanic on the tanks of earlier releases, a negotiation tube was used, later replaced by a light-signaling device. On tanks equipped with a radio station from 1937, a tank intercom TPU-3 was installed on all crew members.



On the basis of the T-26 was developed a large number of machines for various purposes and ACS.


76,2-mm gun escort, intended for artillery preparation and support of tanks and as anti-tank weapons.


76-mm (in the picture) and 37-mm anti-aircraft automatic gun to provide air defense of mechanized units on the march.






TR-4 - TR-4 and TR-26 armored personnel carriers, TR-4-1 and TP-26 ammunition transporters, fuel and lubricants ТЦ-26 transporter.


T-26-T - armored artillery tractor based on the chassis T-26. The early version was with an unprotected turret, the later T-26-T2 was fully armored. A small number of tanks were produced in 1933 for a motorized artillery battery, for towing divisional 76,2-mm guns. Some of them remained up to the 1945 year.


CT-26 - a sapper tank (bridge laying). Produced from 1933 to 1935 year. Total collected 65 machines.

Along with BT, the T-26 tanks formed the basis of the Soviet tank park before the start of the Great Patriotic War and in its initial period.

It should be noted that the T-26 type tanks were popular at one time, but the lack of coordination in tank units (lack of a walkie-talkie) and the low speed T-26 made it easy prey for enemy tanks. But the light tank does not fight with tanks according to the military doctrine of that time.

Components on the principle of "all my carry with me."













Light tank supports infantry, destroys enemy guns and machine guns, these are its main objectives. Although for the 45-mm cannon T-26 was not a problem of the armor of the main German tanks T-1 and T-2 and the Czech T-38.

Yes, booking a tank was bulletproof. Despite the weak armor, the tank was tenacious due to the fact that the engine and tanks were located in the aft compartment behind the fence.

The armor protection of the T-26 was designed for a maximum of resistance to rifle bullets and shell fragments. At the same time, the armor T-26 was easily penetrated by armor-piercing rifle bullets from a distance of 50-100 m.

On 22 June, 1941 in the Red Army numbered about 10 thousand T-26. But not bulletproof booking and low mobility of the tank were one of the factors that led to the low effectiveness of the use of these tanks in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War. Reservations of most German tanks and self-propelled guns of that time were not invulnerable to T-45 26-mm guns. The majority of the T-26 tanks were lost by the Soviet side in the first six months of the war, far from collisions with German tanks.

Today it is known that a significant part of the losses of the Red Army Tank Forces in the summer of 1941 had a non-combat character. The maintenance engineering personnel, due to the sudden start of the war, was not called up in terms of the material support of tank units. Nor were transferred to the Red Army of the tractor for the evacuation of equipment and tankers. Tanks during forced marches broke and rushed, were left due to lack of fuel.

The main cause of losses for the T-26 was the lack of proper management and supply. Where there were no supply issues, the T-26 proved to be a completely worthy opponent to German light tanks. T-1 and T-2 didn’t exceed T-26 in terms of booking and speed, and T-26 definitely exceeded them.





Alas, but the human factor caused the large losses of this tank.

In conclusion, we want to offer you a short video story of Maxim Ryabokon, a researcher at the Museum of Military History. Although the video on our site is not popular, but the story is worth it.



Sources:
Kolomiets M.V. T-26. The fate of a light tank.
Svirin M.N., Beskurnikov A.A. First Soviet Tanks.
Baryatinsky M. B. Light tank T-26.
115 comments
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  1. +5
    31 May 2017 06: 09
    Spanish Civil War, Hassan, Khalkhin-Gol, War with Finland, World War II
    And also in the war between China and Japan, in the arsenal of the Kuomintang

    And at its base there were several modifications of flamethrower tanks
    1. +3
      1 June 2017 16: 45

      Heard! But I did not see information about their use in battles! It was transferred 82 pieces of the T-26's.
      1. +3
        1 June 2017 17: 10
        Quote: hohol95
        But I did not see information about their use in battles!

        Find net book
        All Chinese tanks. "Armored dragons" of the Middle Kingdom
        There is not much information
        1. +4
          1 June 2017 23: 00
          Here is the Naryl - in your photo, the evacuation to Taiwan (Formosa) in 1949
          In 1938 General Du Euming, a graduate of the Wampu Military Academy (organized with the help of our military experts in the 20s), “struck” the creation of the first mechanized division in China (he also became its first commander), where these tanks got (along with Italian tankettes, armored vehicles BA and other equipment).
          According to Du Huming's plan, the division was to consist of 2 tank regiments, one armored car regiment, a mechanized infantry regiment, and an artillery regiment — a completely logical composition, especially for that time!
          Already in May, an incompletely formed division (1 tank battalion, 1 infantry battalion, 1 battalion of armored vehicles, a battalion of anti-tank equipment and a company of air defense - the de facto brigade) took part in a battle that was successful for the Chinese with the Japanese 14th division ("the battle for Lanfeng" )
          But then the views of the command changed - all divisional units with armored vehicles were transferred directly to the level of the corps / army, and the division itself was reorganized into a motorized one from 3 motorized infantry battalions (on cars, of course, not on armored personnel carriers, although there were not enough cars) ...
          Well, the T-26 tanks continued to take part in battles with the Japanese (incl. North Burma), then - in the civil war, and the remaining (oddly enough and there were!) In 1949. Chiang Kai-shekists evacuated to Taiwan!
          And this photo is signed - Tank T-26 of the Army of the Republic of China in Taiwan. 1951 year !!!
        2. +6
          1 June 2017 23: 05
          Soviet tanks, German helmets, American submachine gun, Czech submachine gun - Army of the Republic of China! 1951 year.
  2. +19
    31 May 2017 06: 30
    The car is interesting and well-deserved, but the article has a number of annoying "mistakes".
    For example:
    On cannon tanks mounted 37-mm gun Hotchkiss or its modified Soviet version of "Hotchkiss-PS" ... Compared to the 37-mm gun, 45-mm gun had about the same armor penetration.
    Armor penetration tables are publicly available and before writing an article, you could probably study them.

    76,2-mm gun escort, intended for artillery preparation and support of tanks and as anti-tank weapons.

    Experienced in this picture anti-aircraft SPG SU-6 with 76-mm gun 3K sample 1931g.
    At the same time, the T-26 armor was easily penetrated by armor-piercing rifle bullets from a distance of 50-100 m.
    Truly an armor-piercing rifle bullet could penetrate 10 mm roof tower or xnumx mm bottom tank.

    With all due respect to the author, many Russian Internet resources are guided and copyed from here by Military Review, and is it worth it to prepare the material better?
    1. +5
      31 May 2017 08: 03
      I would focus more on the history of a particular exhibit, if this, of course, is possible.
      And the reader can look at the technical side of the issue on specialized sites. All the same, this is not the strongest side of the author.
      1. +2
        31 May 2017 08: 59
        I agree TTX is certainly good, but the history of a particular exhibit is more interesting
        1. 0
          1 June 2017 09: 58
          The crew of this tank was killed. Presumably they burned him in battle.
    2. +1
      31 May 2017 11: 42
      Quote: Bongo
      In this image, an experimental anti-aircraft self-propelled gun SU-6 with a 76mm 3K gun of 1931 model.

      There simply photos are mixed up - under the photo of SU-6 there is a signature from SU-5-1, and under the photo of SU-5-1 there is a signature from SU-6.
  3. +5
    31 May 2017 06: 54
    Yes, the tank was not bad, in capable hands it could have shown itself worthy of the beginning of the war. The same American “Stuart” or English “Tetrarch” in armor did not differ much from the T-26, but in terms of armament they were clearly weaker, however, they fought and continued to be issued during the war.
    The human factor and the concept of “eyes are large in fear” led to huge losses of technology, including and T-26.
    The 45-mm gun made it possible to fight not only with the German TI, T-II, but also with the T-III at the initial stage.
    1. +6
      31 May 2017 11: 04
      Quote: inkass_98
      The same American “Stuart” or English “Tetrarch” in armor did not differ much from the T-26, and in terms of armament they were clearly weaker, however, they fought and continued to be issued during the war.

      The problem is that the “Stuart” and “Tetrarch” were the tanks of the next generation - new platforms with still unexhausted modernization potential.
      And the T-26 by 1939 was already the ultimate tank, from the construction of which everything possible and impossible was squeezed out. Let me remind you that initially the suspension and transmission of the T-26 were designed for a tank weight of 6 tons. T-26 model 39 weighed more than 10 tons.
      Not for nothing that already in 1937 old Vickers began to look for a replacement.
      Quote: inkass_98
      The 45-mm gun made it possible to fight not only with the German TI, T-II, but also with the T-III at the initial stage.

      The armor penetration of 45-mm standard armor-piercing shells of release until November 1941 was 30 mm from 150-200 m.
      Can the T-26 get close to the “three” on the side at 200 meters? Because the forehead of the modernized "three" (and in the "barbarossa" were exactly the modernized cars - according to the results of France), its 45 mm does not penetrate in any way.
      Yes, and with the forehead "kopeck piece" there will be the same problems - she had there by 1941, too, about 30 mm.
      1. +8
        31 May 2017 11: 57
        I would not like to fan the discussion, but: with the T-26 tanks saturated with the Red Army, which was on the 1941, German tanks were not only close to the side, but from the stern there was no particular problem for the simple reason that the mass of tanks remained in the rear of advancing Germans.
        About the fact that the Vickers platform 6 tons was not the most successful in our conditions, we can’t even say, but we have what we have. The British did not take it into service, left as a purely export option.
        About the gun:
        The armament consisted of an 45-mm semi-automatic tank gun located in the mask of the turret and a DT 7,62-mm tank machine gun paired with it. The gun was intended for firing on armored vehicles, artillery, openly located firepower and enemy manpower, both armor-piercing and fragmentation shells. In her time, she had good tactical and technical indicators. Direct fire range was Z600 m, and the largest - 4800 m. Armor-piercing projectile weight 1.435 kg, initial speed 760 m / s. He pierced tank armor with a thickness of 43 mm at a distance of 500 m at a meeting angle of 90 °.
        http://vspomniv.ru/t26.htm
        1. +2
          31 May 2017 13: 16
          Quote: inkass_98
          I would not like to fan the discussion, but: with the T-26 tanks saturated with the Red Army, which was on the 1941, German tanks were not only close to the side, but from the stern there was no particular problem for the simple reason that the mass of tanks remained in the rear of advancing Germans.

          Ahem ... in 1941, the Germans were often unable to shoot on board even from an ambush. “An ambushed tank was hit by an anti-tank gun discreetly pulled by the enemy” - this is a description of a real episode of that war.
          The problem is that the German commander will find our tank earlier. And will be able to hit him earlier.
          Quote: inkass_98
          The mass of armor-piercing projectile 1.435 kg, the initial speed of 760 m / s. He pierced tank armor 43 mm thick at a distance of 500 m at a 90 ° meeting angle.

          So this is Jacob de Mar. Theoretical armor penetration value perfect AP shell on ideal medium-hard armor.
          And in the real life of 1941, we have a Soviet shell against German cemented armor (the Germans began to refuse cementation only in 1942):
          As you should know, the tests of shelling a new German tank in the autumn of 1940 showed that a 45-mm anti-tank gun mod. 1937 is unsuitable, as it is capable of breaking through its armor at a distance of no further than 150-300 m
          © Kulik
          The report of E. Satel on February 11, 1942 "On the quality of domestic anti-tank shells" and the protocol of the conclusion of the commission for the study of the quality of domestic armor-piercing shells.
          I quote the commission’s conclusion: all Soviet-made 45-mm armor-piercing shells released before November 1941 were not able to penetrate the armored cemented plate of German tanks more than 18-23 mm thick at 400-500 m, or 30 mm at 150-200 m thick .
          © LitlBro AKA Dmitry Shein
          1. +3
            1 June 2017 15: 39
            IN THE WAR, AS IN THE WAR - BA - 10 IN THE ambush!
            At 5.00 on June 22, 1941, the commander of the tank regiment of the 5th Panzer Division of the 3rd Mechanized Corps, Colonel Bogdanov set the task of reconnaissance of a platoon of 6 BA-10 armored vehicles of senior lieutenant Surovtsev. Cars left the location of the unit at 6.25. When approaching the town of L., the platoon commander organized an ambush in the forest, on both sides of the highway. The cars are disguised so that from a distance of 200 meters they were difficult to notice.
            At 10.00 it seemed to a platoon of German motorcyclists who were destroyed by BA-10 fire from a distance of 200-300 m. After 40 minutes a light tank appeared on the road, moving at high speed. The commander of one of the armored vehicles with the first shot from the gun set it on fire. After 7 minutes, two more tanks approached the ambush, which were also destroyed by BA-10 fire. Ten minutes later, a convoy of 15 tanks and motorcyclists approached the place where the tanks and motorcycles were wrecked. With their sudden fire, the BA-10 disabled 3 tanks and a large number of motorcycles, which forced the rest of the German cars to turn back. With the approach to the small town of L. of the main forces of the 7th Panzer Division of the 39th Panzer Corps of the Germans, the platoon of Senior Lieutenant Surovtsev withdrew to his own. Thus, as a result of a well-organized ambush, 6 BA-10 armored vehicles shot down and destroyed 6 German tanks and a large number of motorcycles.
            1. +2
              1 June 2017 16: 20
              Duc ... with a large sample there will always be successful examples.
              With the same success we can talk about high efficiency 2,8 cm schwere Panzerbüchse 41, focusing on the case of penetration of the IC-2 from his forehead.
              1. 0
                1 June 2017 16: 41
                This is the issue of camouflage on the ground! But that T-26 was probably still without infantry cover!
            2. 0
              1 June 2017 17: 41
              everything would be fine, but according to the text - "Colonel Bogdanov set the task of reconnaissance", and the starley of the order disobeyed and organized an ambush ....
        2. 0
          1 June 2017 15: 20
          Just the T-26 platform was very successful. The problems arose due to the poor quality of materials for the engine valves and overload of the chassis after numerous upgrades with increasing weight of the tank. And so, a cheap, easy to learn and operate tank is an excellent option for the organizational level of the Red Army of that time.
          1. +3
            1 June 2017 16: 41
            Quote: mkpda
            And so, a cheap, easy to learn and operate tank is an excellent option for the organizational level of the Red Army of that time.

            Duc ... for the first half of the 30s - it’s quite a normal tank. But already by 1936-1937. T-26 required replacement - the modernization potential was selected. A new base was needed.
            It was not for nothing that ours were interested in the future Pz.35 (t).
            Another problem was that the chassis and engine of the original machine-gun tank were weak. Already a 45-mm gun for the T-26 was the ultimate. They tried to put in the PS-3 tower - shoulder strap deformation, spring mounting, tank roof deflection.
            They removed the tower - so a similar problem to the self-propelled guns: you can’t put anything larger than the 76-mm division. We tried to make the SU-5-2, SU-5-3 and SU-6 - insufficient engine power T-26, low strength rollers of the chassis and suspension springs. Moreover, it was on the SU-5-2 with almost a "native" chassis, and on the SU-6 with an elongated reinforced chassis.
            1. 0
              5 June 2017 13: 24
              The LT-35 interested our military as a prototype for the modernization of the T-26, because with a similar layout and similar weight, it was better booked. As a replacement for the T-26, the T-46 and then the T-111 were considered
      2. +1
        1 June 2017 17: 43
        already tired of these nonsense about super-powerful 45mm shells, and super-armored Wehrmacht tanks ...
        1. +1
          2 June 2017 10: 44
          Quote: faiver
          already tired of these nonsense about super-powerful 45mm shells, and super-armored Wehrmacht tanks ...

          So do not read the documents of that time. Do not believe the results of firing our shells on real German armor at our firing ranges. Do not believe the GAU reports and reports of its chief.
          Believe the armor penetration tables, which contain the calculated theoretical values ​​for ideal shells. smile
        2. 0
          7 June 2017 00: 16
          not special, of course, but when reading military stories, the topic of unfinished shells sometimes slipped through. Tsushima, for example, when part of the shells burst after breaking through both sides of the enemy cruiser. And in general, the main losses of the Red Army during the initial period of the Second World War are related to sudden attack and inexperience of command personnel ...
        3. +1
          19 February 2018 17: 11
          Quote: faiver
          already tired of these nonsense about super-powerful 45mm shells, and super-armored Wehrmacht tanks ...

          Yes, the matter is not so much in shells and not in armor - although of course in them too. (Even if the angle of meeting is 30 degrees, 37 mm KwK 35 / 36 L / 45 will penetrate 15 mm armor from a kilometer. Zeiss optics and radio communications will allow you to see the enemy from that kilometer.)
          I repeat, the Germans on each, on EVERY tank had a walkie-talkie and Zeiss optics. Further - the “armor” of the T-26 really had almost decisive significance - after all, even the 37-mm anti-tank “beater” penetrated the T-26 from a kilometer distance.
          But the worst thing is of course our T-26 counterattacks on anti-tank defense at the beginning of the war. To send tanks with bulletproof armor to the anti-tank defense was such a brilliant decision that if I were a tanker, I probably would have also thrown the tank on the road - if only that weren’t.
          And he would be right - after suffering huge losses, these tanks did not achieve anything, and this is not the fault of the tankmen (yes, for the storming of German positions on the T-26 you must give the order of courage) - but this is not even the fault of the tanks, this is a tactical, commander’s mistake .
  4. 0
    31 May 2017 07: 06
    Roma, great article!
  5. +7
    31 May 2017 07: 25
    Thanks to the authors for the article and the interesting video. Once again I was convinced that most of the Soviet soldiers fought to the end, shot from the loopholes at the enemy with personal weapons, but did not surrender to the prisoner, even in the disorganization and confusion of the outbreak of war. Reproach to both the upper command of the Red Army and the middle (from the commanders of the corps, divisions and brigades). But with so many armored vehicles available, German advancing troops could not only be detained, but also defeated, with skillful organization. This once again reminds us that there are no trifles in military affairs and the rear services and engineering support are also very important. Shells on the gun barrel and armor, even on the sapper shovel (BSL), also testify to the combat past of the tank. Obviously, it stood for several decades somewhere in the forest.
    It would be interesting to know the history of this museum, who organized it, what funds it contains, to get acquainted with its other exhibits, their history.
    From the comments, the storyteller in the film was well dressed in the form of the Red Army, for greater credibility. Once again, thanks to the authors for your work. The article put a plus.
    1. 0
      31 May 2017 09: 16
      I also drew attention to the shovel and gun barrel. Traces of scum and rust are also visible in the tower.
    2. +2
      31 May 2017 14: 02
      Reproach to both the upper command of the Red Army and the middle (from the commanders of the corps, divisions and brigades).
      there are grounds for reproach, but not everything depended on the Red Army commanders.
      Just look at the veterans of Spain, as they tried to implement the experience gained. The number of qualified mechanics, spare parts, warehouses and gas stations, a set of vehicles, tractors, charter, organizational structures, lack of high-quality radio communications, the preparation of new mechanized corps and much, much more contributed to the devastating losses of 41 years.
      1. 0
        1 June 2017 15: 27
        We must first look at organizational throwing in the Red Army. The second half of the 30s and the beginning of the 40s - constant organizational throwing. The full impression is that these events were carried out by NGO officials or outspoken saboteurs who were very far from using any types of troops.
    3. 0
      20 February 2018 16: 49
      Quote: bistrov.
      Reproach to both the upper command of the Red Army and the middle (from the commanders of the corps, divisions and brigades). But with so many armored vehicles available, the German advancing troops could not only be detained, but also defeated, with skillful organization.

      Well, it’s unlikely to defeat it, the enemy had complete dominance in the air, and it was possible to reverse this only in the 42 year, closer to the end.
      The main reasons for the defeats of the Red Army in the first year, you are right, are associated with high ranks. Yes
      Regarding, as the fellow thrower said, maybe the Red Army was looking for the best form of organization? After all, the army developed rapidly in those years, ideas about the war also changed rapidly ...
  6. 0
    31 May 2017 07: 52
    But overall a great article
  7. +5
    31 May 2017 08: 03
    Well-preserved T-26 tanks are in the Finnish Tank Museum in Parola. There are also those wounded during the winter war - from them one can well judge the subtlety of the armor and what damage was inflicted by armor-piercing bullets, anti-tank rifles and small-caliber artillery of the anti-aircraft defense of that time.
  8. +3
    31 May 2017 08: 06
    Here is a book about the fate of the T-26! The appearance, production!
  9. +1
    31 May 2017 08: 10
    Was it a licensed tank? Or a pirated copy, disassembled, measured and began to produce?
    1. +8
      31 May 2017 08: 25
      Of course, Vickers offered a license to his armed forces, but in the end they started selling licenses. Our T-26 and Polish 7TP.
  10. +5
    31 May 2017 08: 14
    “T-26 - showed themselves exclusively on the good side, walked along the dunes very well, the tank was very durable. In the 82nd Infantry Division there was a case when the T-26 had five hits from a 37-mm gun, spread the armor, but the tank did not catch fire and after the battle came to SPAM under its own power (assembly point of emergency vehicles. - Approx. Author) " . After such a flattering assessment, a much less flattering conclusion follows, concerning the T-26 armor protection (by the way, our other tanks as well): “the Japanese 37-mm gun penetrates the armor of any of our tanks freely”.
    “By the beginning of hostilities, the 57th Special Corps had only 11 chemical tanks (KhT-26) as part of the combat support company of the 11th tank brigade (two platoons of 5 tanks and a company commander tank). The flamethrower mixture had 3 charges in parts and 4 in stock.
    On July 20, the 2nd company of chemical tanks from the 2nd tank chemical brigade arrived in the war zone. She had 18 HT-130 and 10 charges of the flamethrower mixture. However, it turned out that the personnel of the company was very poorly prepared for flamethrowing. Therefore, before the company went directly to the combat area with them, practical exercises were conducted on flame throwing and the combat experience that was already available for chemical tankers of the 11th tank brigade was studied.
    In addition, as part of the 6th tank brigade that arrived at the front, there were 9 KhT-26. In total, by the beginning of August the troops of the 1st Army Group had KhT-26 - 19, LHT-130 - 18.
    During the period of the August operation (August 20–29), all chemical tanks took part in the battle. They were especially active during the period of August 23–26, and these days LHT-130 went on the attack 6–11 times.
    In total, during the period of the conflict, the chemical units consumed 32 tons of the flamethrower mixture. Losses in people amounted to 19 people (9 killed and 10 wounded), irretrievable losses in tanks - 12 vehicles, of which ХТ-26 - 10 (of which the 11th tank brigade - 7 and the 6th tank brigade - 3), ХТ -130 - 2.
    The weak point of the use of flamethrower tanks was poor reconnaissance and preparation of vehicles for attack. As a result, there was a large expenditure of flammable mixtures in minor areas and excessive losses.
    During the first battles, it was found that the Japanese infantry could not withstand flamethrowing and was afraid of a chemical tank. This showed the defeat of the Azum detachment on May 28–29, in which 5 HT-26s were actively used.
    In subsequent battles, where flamethrower tanks were used, the Japanese invariably left their shelters, not showing resistance. For example, on July 12, a Japanese detachment as part of a reinforced company with 4 anti-tank guns penetrated the depths of our location and, despite repeated attacks, offered stubborn resistance. Only one chemical tank, which gave a stream of fire at the center of resistance, caused panic in the enemy ranks, the Japanese fled from the front line of the trenches into the depths of the foundation pit and our infantry, which had arrived on the crest of the foundation pit, was finally destroyed. ”
    1. +2
      31 May 2017 09: 24
      Hohol, I am a curious person and therefore I ask: indicate the source of information
      1. +4
        31 May 2017 16: 48


        I do not think that the authors of these books wrote about their "fantasies"!
  11. +3
    31 May 2017 08: 17
    Writing about the human factor and technical problems, as the main reason for the large losses of T-26 tanks in the 1941 year, is probably not entirely true. It seems to me that with the advent of quick-firing small-caliber anti-tank guns, all tanks with bulletproof armor are outdated. And it became clear back in Spain. There was no possibility to somehow strengthen the armor of the T-26 (the suspension could not withstand and the engine power was not enough). Therefore, I had to fight on what was ... You can imagine what the Soviet tankers felt and thought about before the attack, knowing that the armor would not protect them ...

    I would like more photos of the internal equipment of the tank.
    1. +5
      31 May 2017 08: 57
      Probably the same as the German tankers who also knew that their armor would not protect them. KV and T-34 were also lost on the marches, the site already had articles about the critical shortage of spare parts, fuel, etc.
    2. avt
      +3
      31 May 2017 09: 02
      Quote: tasha
      Writing about the human factor and technical problems, as the main reason for the large losses of T-26 tanks in 1941, is probably not entirely true.

      That sho-o-o-o-o !? Does iron itself fight? And the fact that there were cases before the war, when 34s were stolen up, filling them out with gasoline as a matter of habit, didn’t taste? Losses, and colossal ones in tanks, were often simply thrown out of fuel, they were just because
      Quote: tasha
      human factor

      from top to bottom . Starting from the bulky structures of mechanized corps, difficult to manage, ending with the banal uncoordinated combat units. A year or two it was necessary for the preparation and running-in of the newly created units, and the Germans ALREADY run-in their battles, and not lower than the tank division.
      Quote: tasha
      It seems to me that with the advent of quick-firing small-caliber anti-tank guns, all tanks with bulletproof armor are outdated.

      It doesn’t seem to be exact, but just like that. Marshal Misha’s favorite car, and in the two-tower version, which, in his opinion, should have been climbing over the trench with lead in different directions, in practice had no modernization potential. Just managed to pile one tower and that's it. There was simply nothing more to squeeze out of it. The tank by 1941 became hopelessly outdated. But the fact that they fought on it .... well, from that side, almost from the First World War were Renault. request
      1. +1
        31 May 2017 09: 27
        Quote: avt
        Marshal Misha’s favorite car, moreover, in a two-tower version, which, in his opinion, should have been climbing over the trench with lead in different directions ..:

        The repetition of another "fairy tale" ... Where did you see or in which textbooks on fortification did you read about straight field fortifications. Each sergeant is aware of the correct construction of the position. Even the trench of the rifle compartment will have three to four fractures ...
        "... The outline of the message paths in the plan can be a snake, kinks or ledges. The length of the straight faces of 12-15 is m ...."
        1. avt
          +5
          31 May 2017 09: 44
          Quote: moskowit
          The repetition of another "fairy tale" ...

          Yeah - exclusively from Marshal Misha .- ,, .... The location of the side-by-side towers of the tank allows the tank to develop side-by-side fire when crossing the trench and trenches ...... from which the parapet does not hide ... " bully
          Quote: moskowit
          "... The outline of the message paths in the plan can be a snake, kinks or ledges. The length of the straight faces of 12-15 is m ...."

          And the width of the tank? In general, Ginzburg lost with his project T-19 to the Aglitsky V-26
        2. +3
          31 May 2017 16: 55

          The Vickers designers were the first to decide this by creating a "trench cleaner"! And not climbing, but stopping over the trench! And shooting sideways along the trench!
      2. 0
        31 May 2017 09: 35
        Quote: avt
        Starting from the bulky structures of mechanical cases,


        Yes, the MK structure was normal, at the level of union-connection, but in parts it really needed to be changed.
        5 battalion TP, 3 battalion (heavy and chemical to throw). And not 5 tank platoons, but 3. (Almost the structure of a modern TS). And from the chemical (just T-26 at the base) make an armored personnel carrier. A KV-1 separate battalion (and then in the motorized division).

        Quote: avt
        A year or two was necessary for the preparation and running-in of the newly created parts,


        Here I agree completely. In general, it was necessary to create only 9 MK. Then in the western theater of war they could bring down: 22.06.41MK by 6.
        1. +2
          31 May 2017 11: 18
          Quote: chenia
          Here I agree completely. In general, it was necessary to create only 9 MK. Then in the western theater of war they could bring down: 22.06.41MK by 6.

          Did not have time. The beginning of the formation of the first stage MK is October 1940. Divisions - from brigades, corps ... corps from scratch.
          Moreover, do not forget that the 30s-type armored personnel carriers are actually tank units of infantry support. There is no artillery of its own, not everyone has its own infantry, the rear is minimal. That is - naked tanks. And on the basis of this brigade, a full-fledged division is formed with motorized rifles, artillery, reconnaissance, and rear services. And he does it at the point of permanent deployment, designed for the brigade. smile
          And on top of that is the lack of technology. No, everything was relatively normal with tanks. There were not enough 3 trucks, tractors and special vehicles. And they weren’t enough even in case of refusal from MK of the “second wave”.
          If you take the reports on the state of MK in the spring of 1941 and collect all the MK equipment of the "second wave" - ​​then it will not be enough to plug holes in the remaining 9 MK. If only because the most necessary equipment in these "fresh" MKs simply did not exist - for example, the same Voroshilovites for REMBATs or PARM for them.
          1. 0
            31 May 2017 14: 15
            Quote: Alexey RA
            There were not enough 3 trucks, tractors and special vehicles.


            I agree, but you should carefully look at the proposed state change (it ultimately became established in the future).

            TP-3 battalion with 3 tank platoons is 94-96 main tanks (plus a dozen of the T-37 type for reconnaissance units) - this is MK in 600-650 tanks (and not for a thousand), in principle the most frequent composition (tanks) of our TA in the war.
            Then the load for techies and the rear will fall by a third.
            It would not completely cover the demand even then, but not so wretchedly and mediocre (the problems of planning and control were imposed there), such tank power was poked at the beginning of the war.
            1. +1
              31 May 2017 16: 52
              Quote: chenia
              TP-3 battalion with 3 tank platoons is 94-96 main tanks (plus a dozen of the T-37 type for reconnaissance units) - this is MK in 600-650 tanks (and not for a thousand), in principle the most frequent composition (tanks) of our TA in the war.
              Then the load for techies and the rear will fall by a third.

              The ambush is that the OSH of the pre-war mechanized corps, especially in terms of logistics and supplies, did not pass the test even at the training grounds. They didn’t do it trite - the first fully equipped MK was to be tested at the exercises in September 1941 (by the way, on the issue of combat readiness). It would not have turned out so that the OSh of the rear of the MK-40 (in 1000 tanks) in fact would be able to ensure the work of only those same 600-650 tanks.
              OShS of the rear of MK and TK of the sample 1944-1945 will not work - because under them you have to redo the entire rear of the BTV-41, condensing from liquefied vacuum the same trains and field repair factories.

              In general, if you know for sure that the war will begin in the summer of 1941, then it was necessary to do what was done in the summer of 1941: not to divide organizational and tactical structures, but to create mechanized corps from ready-made cubes-brigades (all the more so since it would be easier to form tank and mechanized brigades of model 42-43 from old brigades).
              In our country, believing that there will be no war in the coming year, we went along the German path - created organizational structures "division-regiment-battalion", "regiment-division", etc., from which in wartime tactical groups were to form specific tasks. Yes, formally, such a structure is more flexible (a group can be recruited from battalions / batteries) than a brigade corps (in which tactical groups are formed by giving different options for reinforcing to indivisible brigades), but it requires a completely different level of training of personnel, coordination of units within and with each other and the organization of the same connection - and their Red Army in 1941 did not have them.
              1. 0
                31 May 2017 19: 22
                Quote: Alexey RA
                create a mechanized corps from finished cubes-brigades (


                Then it was necessary to create another link tank armies (groups). Although the main reason is the brigade itself (they are bulky to form part of the next structure) - 4 tank battalions. 4-5 tanks per platoon.

                The main thing here is not to confuse the armored brigade after the outbreak of the war (where they first became tri-battalion with 3 tanks / platoon each (and entered the tank corps of the TA, generally double-battalion) i.e. formations that did not correspond to their rank (essentially less than a regiment).

                But the creation on the basis of the TBR (at 4 TB) of two regiments - only 6 TB (94-96 tanks each), increases the data of (tank) formations only by a third, and by a quarter by tanks. In principle, there would be a place for basing in the places of the brigade’s deployment (in the past) .. (Moto) the rifle regiment, and the artillery regiment could be in the places of their previous deployment (before the infusion).

                But alas, it was 4TB with a bunch of tanks.
                Consolidation of TPs created a poorly managed structure.
                1. 0
                  1 June 2017 17: 05
                  Quote: chenia
                  Although the main reason is the brigade itself (they are bulky to form part of the next structure) - 4 tank battalions. 4-5 tanks per platoon.

                  Taking into account the afterglow, it was necessary to immediately form homogeneous infantry battalions of 1943 (3 tank battalions + normal motorized rifle battalion, not “machine gunners”). But here is where to find commanders for them ... and ordinary soldiers with a junior command staff too.
                  1. 0
                    1 June 2017 19: 21
                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    In view of the afterlife


                    Well, this is in the sense of knowing that, with little blood and in someone else's territory it will not work, and you can not think about the offensive for several months.

                    I'm talking about the obvious- 5 tank platoon poorly controlled even with a radio station. It was possible to notice this at the level of battalion exercises.

                    Chemical tanks in such quantities (the legacy of Tukhachevsky is visible)?

                    Heavy tanks in MK are also not very needed.

                    Creation of 30 MK, well, I'm just not able to digest the scope of this event. This is obviously an impossible task for 3 or even five years (peacetime naturally).
                    And when conducting operational games, they do not fit on the map lol





                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    it was necessary to immediately form homogeneous infantry battalions of 1943 (3 tank battalions + normal motorized rifle battalion,


                    Typical TP SA until the 80s (at the end of 70 there also shoved SADN).
                    1. +2
                      2 June 2017 11: 02
                      Quote: chenia
                      Creation of 30 MK, well, I'm just not able to digest the scope of this event. This is obviously an impossible task for 3 or even five years (peacetime naturally).

                      So ... features of Soviet planning - to give an unrealistic plan, and then adjust it in the process of execution. Just in this case they did not have time to adjust. smile
                      For even theoretically, taking into account 100% of the industry’s fulfillment of plans for the supply of equipment and the construction of new tank, tractor and engine-building plants, it was possible to equip all MK only in 1943.
                      It seems to me that if the war would waitthen the GABTU would either cut the number of corps (at the same time taking them from the border armies and transferring them exclusively to the front level), or, according to the results of the September 1941 exercises, would change the staff in the direction of reducing the equipment in the corps.
                      Quote: chenia
                      And when conducting operational games, they do not fit on the map

                      Oh yes ... according to the states of the new mechanized corps, Khatskilevich at the Meeting of the senior management of the Red Army on December 23-31, 1940, went through:
                      First of all, the question relates to the fact that the corps management staff must be immediately reviewed. The control of the corps is very cumbersome and motionless, it needs to be bolderly reduced, mainly due to technical and supplying bodies, and therefore, first of all, increase the operational and intelligence departments of the corps headquarters.
                      (...)
                      ... the current situation often puts the mechanized corps in a difficult position due to the absence of a common view among combined arms chiefs on the necessary front width for entering a breakthrough. Here, Colonel General Comrade Pavlov, with convincing numbers, indicated on the diagrams the need to have a front width of 15 - 20 km, considering the guarantee strip of 5 km to the right and left, and the rest remains to be entered into the breakthrough. And we have facts when sometimes they are forced to go into a breakthrough in a strip 5 to 6 km wide. How can such a mass of tanks enter a breakthrough? We counted on our exercises (we even threw out 2500 vehicles from combat personnel, took the most necessary for life and battle), and then we have 6800 vehicles, almost 7000, in the breakthrough. How can such a mass of cars be squeezed into such a narrow front?
                      (...)
                      I believe that this issue is fundamentally important and guidance is required on your part. One ammunition tank tank is about 100 wagons. Marshal of the Soviet Union, Comrade Budyonny, spoke of the correspondence of ammunition and fuel that must be had in a breakthrough. One ammunition approximately, as I said, is 100 wagons. Imagine what kind of rear is needed to pull it all along, especially if you have three and a half ammunition.

                      Quote: chenia
                      Typical TP SA until the 80s (at the end of 70 there also shoved SADN).

                      So ... two years of war created this structure - by trial and error. And two more years were polished, removing, adding and replacing means of supporting tanks.
                      Works? Works. Don’t touch it! smile
          2. 0
            1 June 2017 16: 49
            If you just take the staffing of MK for tanks, then each required 420 T-34 and 126 KV. On 01.06.1941/1225/34, 1875 T-3s from 28 issued were delivered in the unit, which was enough to equip 4 MKs. Another MK was enough T-26 - there were no more medium tanks in the country. HF was enough to equip 5 MK. The replacement of medium and heavy tanks with the T-7 and BT-7/4 / XNUMXM was acceptable for training purposes, in combat conditions they lost the ability to perform typical tasks in full. Approximately on the XNUMXth MK it was possible to scrape together motor vehicles, special equipment and tractors.

            In addition to more or less combat-ready mechanized brigades, separate tank battalions of infantry divisions, which were in poor condition, went to pick up the MK.

            But in general, the Red Army lacked a clear understanding of how to actually use tank formations. There was a theory, but the realization remained at the level of Tukhachevsky's fantasies (who honestly earned his bullet).
        2. avt
          0
          31 May 2017 13: 58
          Quote: chenia
          Yes, the MK structure was normal,

          bully That sho-o-o-o-o !? So Marshal Shaposhnikov, who wrote a report on this topic to Stalin before the war, was a natural pest ?? bully How did his nemnozhechko ne shot? bully
      3. 0
        31 May 2017 10: 38
        Quote: avt
        That sho-o-o-o-o !? Does iron itself fight?


        The authors of the article write:
        But not bulletproof armor and low mobility of the tank were some of the factors that led to the low efficiency of the use of these tanks in the initial period of World War II. ... Most of the T-26 tanks were lost by the Soviet side in the first six months of the war far from collisions with German tanks .... Today it is known that a significant part of the losses of the armored forces of the Red Army in the summer of 1941 was non-combatant. ...
        The main reason for the losses for the T-26 was the lack of proper leadership and supply ....
        Alas, but the human factor caused the large losses of this tank.


        All this was. But there was another ... What the authors did not notice or chose not to notice.
    3. +1
      31 May 2017 14: 31
      It seems to me that with the advent of quick-firing small-caliber anti-tank guns, all tanks with bulletproof armor are outdated. And it became clear back in Spain. It was not possible to somehow strengthen the armor of the T-26 (the suspension could not withstand and did not have enough engine power).

      it only seems to you. In fact, a line of light tanks T40, T60, T70, T45 was created on the basis of the Vickers
      so, t45 was quite sane protected
      Reservations: the front of the tower - 35 mm, the front of the case - 25 mm.
      at the same time, the armor angles were such that the security of the upper part of the silhouette of this prototype was
      no worse than pz-IIIh and such tanks, our industry could stamp tens of thousands before the war.
      the mass of the car is 7 tons
      1. +2
        31 May 2017 14: 51
        In fact, on the basis of the Vickers, a line of light tanks T40, T60, T70, T45 was created


        Very controversial statement
        1. +1
          31 May 2017 14: 52
          just look at them from the side. in addition to the shape of the armored plates on the edges of the difference, it will be difficult to find. The layout is also the same
          1. 0
            31 May 2017 14: 57
            just look at them from the side. in addition to the shape of the armored plates on the edges of the difference it will be difficult to find.

            Convinced. The arguments are more than weighty. wink
            The layout is also the same

            Very controversial statement ...
          2. +3
            31 May 2017 17: 13
            Quote: yehat
            The layout is also the same

            Are you serious? belay
            The T-26 fighting compartment is located in front of the MTO. MTO - in the stern.
            The T-60 has a fighting compartment left from MTO. The engine of the T-60 is located not in the stern, but in the middle of the hull, on the starboard side.
            1. 0
              31 May 2017 17: 18
              It has become more crowded, but in general everything has remained in place
              Only the engine was swollen and took 1 place for a crew member.
              no need to engage in verbiage, because the old place of the MTO has not gone away,
              only has grown.
      2. avt
        +2
        31 May 2017 18: 36
        Quote: yehat
        it only seems to you. In fact, a line of light tanks T40, T60, T70, T45 was created on the basis of the Vickers

        wassat bully Not ! Well, it’s concrete fool Brad fighter World of the same Tanks! Turn off the computer and to fresh air. Then to the library - to learn the materiel.
        Quote: yehat
        just look at them from the side. in addition to the shape of the armored plates on the edges of the difference, it will be difficult to find. The layout is also the same

        bully Wheels ... everyone still has wheels and a ribbon around them bully YES ! They are ALL iron! bully
        1. 0
          1 June 2017 10: 22
          What does the "World of Tanks" have to do with it? By the way, do they say so?
          look at the layout and learn the story.
          there were vickers with a suspension popular in his time, the same one stood on the Sherman and t-28.
          then they made a t26 copy, then a slightly modified similar suspension, but in the Red Army they seriously thought that the torsion suspension could provide a resource for improving the required performance characteristics. If you look ATTENTIVELY, then on t60, remaining in the same dimensions, put a torsion bar suspension, which was then used in t45 and t70.
          This is a DEVELOPMENT design. and not stupid copying, which for some reason you assume is the only way to develop.
          If you still cannot accept the fact that t60 had an ancestor - vickers and t26,
          you might wonder why they replaced the suspension on the t-44. You’ll wonder how it turned out from the BT-7 T34, which (oh my God!) Has a different gun, and, as it were, the dimensions are different.
      3. Alf
        +1
        31 May 2017 19: 02
        Quote: yehat
        In fact, on the basis of the Vickers, a line of light tanks T40, T60, T70, T45 was created

        They had different all-weapons, reservations, chassis, engines.
        1. 0
          1 June 2017 10: 23
          look at t4. how the version of Pz-IVa differs from PZ-IVh - they have just dofig differences.
          and nothing, like no one is protesting that the tanks have something in common.
      4. +1
        1 June 2017 16: 54
        The T-40/30/60/70/80 family left the T-37A and has no relation to the T-26.
    4. +1
      1 June 2017 16: 05
      In besieged Leningrad, T-26s were armored up to 60 mm in frontal projection and quite successfully used. And the losses of the summer of 1941 are mostly organizational in nature. At that time, the Red Army could form only 3 or 4 mechanized corps (when using the T-28 instead of the T-34) according to the approved states. An attempt to form 29 mechanized corps led to the transition from well-coordinated and staffed mechanized brigades to partially equipped and uncoordinated mechanized corps. By the way, 8 MK looked relatively good compared to others due to the organization of coordination activities. As a result, there are a lot of tanks, but they aren’t enough anywhere, the supply is broken, the training of personnel was disrupted, the new equipment was not mastered. As a result, the complete defeat of the mechanized corps, sometimes without clashes.
  12. +2
    31 May 2017 08: 53
    You can watch online or download the movie "T-26 Light Tank". This film is in two parts. The second part is the training film of the 1937 of the year, "the teachings of the tank battalion." Well, very interesting ...
    Light Soviet tank T-26


    Translation: Not Required, Subtitles: None
    Format: DVDRip, AVI, DivX, MP3
    Country: Russia

    Genre: Documentary
    Duration: 02: 09: 29
    YOM: 2008

    Description: The film "Light Soviet Tank T-26" refers to one of the most popular Soviet tanks - T-26. The second part of the film shows the 1937 full-length educational film about the tactical use of the T-26 as part of a tank battalion.

    Video: 400x304 (1.32: 1), 25 fps, DivX Codec 6.8.5 / 6.9.1 ~ 1385 kbps avg, 0.46 bit / pixel
    Audio: 48 kHz, MPEG Layer 3, 2 ch, ~ 112.78 kbps avg
  13. 0
    31 May 2017 09: 09
    "" "" "" "" Under the conditions of the Finnish theater of operations, only T-26s could act in battle; T-37 / 38s could not move in the snow and on the road could not. Part of the tanks were withdrawn from the front by the division command or higher headquarters to protect the rear (for example, the 436th separate tank battalion of the 138th infantry division was forced to give five T-7s to guard the headquarters of the 26th Army. As a result, on paper the tank battalion was a formidable force - up to 40 combat vehicles, but in battle Rifle regiments could only support 5-10 T-26 vehicles, some of them double-turret tanks armed only with machine guns. "" "" "" ""
    1. 0
      1 June 2017 16: 58
      In fact, there is a sequel about the T-28, which surpassed all domestic types of tanks in patency and speed in such conditions.
  14. +3
    31 May 2017 09: 54
    Below comrade Curious expressed a wish: to learn the history of a particular exhibit. Given the shells on the tank, it can be assumed that he was not in the hangar for a long time.
    Once at school we were taken to a museum. I remember the barrel of a company mortar: like the peel of an unpeeled banana. Some guy was telling us: apparently, the mine exploded in the barrel, given that such a modification was produced before 1942, this happened in the autumn of 1941 ... We stood with open mouths.
    So with this tank: when and in what place they found, some numbers were preserved - this all gives information
  15. +4
    31 May 2017 10: 07
    It was such a T-26 with a conical tower as a monument that he saw in the early 1990s near the village of Korovitichino, behind a highway bridge on the Lovat River on the eastern side. Attempts now to find a photo of the monument were unsuccessful. But, a little later I found out that the tank was transported to Staraya Russa, the museum of the North-Western Front, in 2004.
    The tank was found in 1981 in the bed of the Lovat river near Korovitichino.
    1. +3
      31 May 2017 11: 37
      Quote: Potter
      Attempts now to find a photo of the monument were unsuccessful.

      Tank T-26 mod. 1933 Installed on a pedestal in the village of Korovchino, Novgorod Region.
  16. +3
    31 May 2017 10: 18
    I’ll supplement Korovitichino - next to it is a grave and a monument to the Heroes of the Soviet Union, snipers of the 130th SD Natalya Kovshova and Maria Polivanova, surrounded by Nazis and firing all ammunition, they blew themselves up with grenades. On account of Kovshova more than 200 Nazis. She volunteered for the front as part of the 3rd Moscow Communist Division.
  17. +2
    31 May 2017 11: 05
    I began to read with interest. Read to "The predecessor of the T-26 was the T-18, which was a copy of the French Renault FT-17." and interest is gone. The author at least compared the FT-17 and T-18 photos. Similar? Yes, but not a copy. Or the author has the concept of "copy" is very extended.
    In general, such blunders spoil good material.
    1. +2
      31 May 2017 13: 21
      Heh heh heh ... the most interesting thing is that the basis of the T-18 was not at all the original Renault FT-17, but its Italian "son" - the Fiat 3000. So the FT-17 our T-18 has a grandfather. smile
      1. 0
        1 June 2017 15: 56
        But the predecessor of the T-26 was MS-1 (T-18), as the T-62 was the predecessor of the T-72. Here the author refers to the chronology, and not the development of one tank from another. It would be better to read. Moreover, the Italian was the development of the Frenchman, and by and large, the Italian tank did not produce a revolution in tank building, unlike Renault, which in 1918 was a masterpiece.
        1. 0
          2 June 2017 23: 43
          So you read it ... I don’t know how otherwise it can be interpreted "..T-18, which was a copy of the French Renault FT-17," as a statement of the identity of T-18 and FT-17.
          And the phrase "The predecessor of the T-26 was the T-18 tank .." has a lot of interpretations: by design, by the date of adoption, by numbers, etc. T.ch. if the authors have a mistake, you don’t need to sign up to them as lawyers and try to pass black on white: he’s a mistake.
  18. +1
    31 May 2017 11: 56
    Quote: tolancop
    In general, such blunders spoil good material.

    Speaking of mistakes.
    In my favorite movie "Officers", Yegor Trofimov talks about the BT tank, and in the hands of the T-26 model.
    1. +3
      31 May 2017 12: 28
      May be. It seemed to me that we were talking about a tank designed by Yegor Trofimov


      - And this is a combat tracked vehicle. New model. The thickness of the armor - so that no shell takes ....
      A machine gun and cannon armament is a cannon and two machine guns, but I haven’t finished them yet ...
      - Yeah. Here are the tracks and wheels ... But the most important thing is that it can move on tracks and on wheels ...
      On tracks it will give about 70 km / h, and on wheels as much as 110. Can you imagine? He will have power such that if he develops full, then he will jump over the hole in 3 meter easily
      and nothing will happen to him
      1. +3
        31 May 2017 12: 51
        Quote: tasha
        that we are talking about a tank designed by Yegor Trofimov

        Yes sir! good
      2. +1
        31 May 2017 14: 31
        I did not see where in this episode he says that the tank is of his design. "New model"? So BT and, in fact, was a new model, compared with the T-26. The described characteristics just allow us to judge that we are talking about BT, except for the thickness of the armor, of course.
        1. +1
          1 June 2017 16: 24
          The thickness of the armor! The Germans then Guderian went on plywood tanks. And we already had a T-26 and BT-2 did. Everyone then dreamed of a blitzkrieg. The apotheosis was on the Kiev maneuvers of 1935. And it is good that Stalin got rid of Tukhachevsky, otherwise the T-34 remained in the form of the dopped A-20, and the T-100 or SMK would not go into the series. It is possible in Pavlova D.F. and now throw feces, but he formulated the TTZ on the T-34, and almost nobody knows the name of the military envoy Dick, who directed the construction of the “thirty-four” in the right direction.
          So is the T-26. At the beginning of the 1930s, this was the maximum that gave mass character in that technological order in the USSR. This was the result of the rezun BT-7 more than all the tanks combined in the world. And for a huge country, only the T-26 allowed it to go through the stages of industrialization, because everyone saw that tanks to repel aggression would be enough in all directions. And the fact that they were made by about 12000 allowed to create many training units during the war, and they fought on it with the Germans back in 1942, while they were setting up graduation on evacuated sites. A low bow to the creators of the T-26 and the soldiers who fought on them.
          1. 0
            1 June 2017 21: 24
            In the Red Army on 1.06.41, the actual BT tanks of all types were smaller than the T-26. 7500 versus 8700, though the 1st and 2nd categories: 6200 and 7300 (figures are rounded). There were 12700 tanks in the Western direction, of which the 1st and 2nd categories - 10500. And of them T-26 - of which the 1st and 2nd categories - 3500.
  19. 0
    31 May 2017 12: 22
    Quote: Potter
    It was such a T-26 with a conical tower as a monument that he saw in the early 1990s near the village of Korovitichino, behind a highway bridge on the Lovat River on the eastern side. Attempts now to find a photo of the monument were unsuccessful. But, a little later I found out that the tank was transported to Staraya Russa, the museum of the North-Western Front, in 2004.
    The tank was found in 1981 in the bed of the Lovat river near Korovitichino.

    With a cylindrical tower, of course, described.
  20. +1
    31 May 2017 14: 46
    after Spain, it was already necessary to get rid of these tanks by selling abroad. alteration in ZSU, tractors, self-propelled guns, about engineering I doubt the weakness of the engine and the width of the tracks, maybe BTR-BMP as ersatz
    1. +1
      1 June 2017 16: 29
      Now it’s good to talk about what is needed and what is not needed. In those years, advice had to be given.
  21. 0
    31 May 2017 14: 49
    In Bullfinches near Moscow there is such a tank. Until all the holes were welded up, I climbed in there as a child. I even brought a piece of armor back to my house. My mother threw it away. I saw a report in the news a long time ago. There’s more than one tank. They dragged the technicians. So the correspondent told me that he was delivered from places of terrible battles. But I don’t remember the city .. Although I kill the photo somewhere but I have to look. An interesting feeling is when you are sitting inside the IS and then inside the can. I apologize. Such here were children's impressions.
  22. 0
    31 May 2017 15: 51
    Quote from the article:
    “Alas, the reason for the large losses of this tank was human factor. "


    Here it would be necessary to write not the “human factor”, but "General factor."
    From the memoirs of Ryabyshev:
    At this time (evening of June 22), Lieutenant Colonel A.K. Blazhey from the headquarters of the 26th Army hastily approached me. We stepped aside, and he handed me the order of the commander of the Southwestern Front Colonel General M.P. Kirponos. The corps troops were to make a return night march along the same broken road, by dawn on June 23 to reach the area east of Lviv and put at the disposal of the commander of the 6th Army, Lieutenant General I.N. Muzychenko. So, after a 70-80-kilometer march west, without rest, we had to make a 120-kilometer march east.
    As a result of such marches "west-east" by the 2nd decade of July 1941, the 8th Ryabyshev mechanized corps ceased to exist.
    Our generals drove the mechanized corps single useless marches "Back and forth", which knocked out the armored vehicles of the Red Army. And by the end of July, almost all the buildings were destroyed mainly due to general factor.
    1. +2
      31 May 2017 17: 46
      Quote: Ivan Tartugay
      Our generals drove the mechanized corps with blank, useless back-and-forth marches, which knocked out the Red Army armored vehicles out of order. And by the end of July, almost all the corps were destroyed mainly due to the general factor.

      But only by the standards of 1943, a march of 150-200 km was not considered out of the ordinary. Remember how they drove 3 Guards TA from the Bukrinsky bridgehead to the Lyutezhsky bridgehead. So it's not just about the generals.

      As for the 1941 marches, everyone was good there. For the organization of the march is entirely on the conscience of the commanders of the corps, divisions and regiments. In the LVO, the division on old tanks (half of the tanks - the release of the first half of the 30s, including the twin-turret T-26) after the march in a couple of days collected all the abandoned equipment. And it was a division from the MK formation of the spring of 1941, whose rear was like skeletons.
      And on the other hand, in the same LVO, the march of 1 MK (without the 1st TD) from St. Petersburg to Luga (only 100 km) lasted 2 days and completely blocked all roads in this direction. In this case, all parts of the body were mixed "into a homogeneous mass." Plan for the march, closure service - no, not heard. And it was MK formation in the autumn of 1940, which had both PARM and Voroshilov’s.
      1. +2
        31 May 2017 19: 35
        Quote: Alexey RA
        As for the 1941 marches, everyone was good there.


        And what is the regiment commander to blame for - major or lieutenant colonel, or even colonel, if there is an order from the commander of the SWF, Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel General Kirponos to make a 120-kilometer march in the opposite direction, already to the east. Moreover, at the time of the return and execution of this order at the headquarters the victory marshal himself was present, Chief of Staff of the Red Army, Hero of the Soviet Union, Army General Zhukov.
        But that is not all. By the morning of June 23, 1941, the troops of the 8th mechanized corps arrived at a concentration site east of Lviv, as commander Muzychenko redirected to another placesupposedly to help the 6th Rifle Corps, so that with it, "On the morning of June 24, go on the offensive and with common efforts push the enemy beyond the state border."
        Finally, in the evening of June 23, the 8th mechanized corps arrived at a new concentration site, as came a new order from the comfront of the SWF, Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel General Kirponos.
        From the memoirs of Ryabyshev:
        “I remember that I involuntarily looked at my watch. They showed 22.00.
        Losev (lieutenant colonel chief of intelligence corps) reported that he had brought a package from the front headquarters.
        This was new order of the commander of the Southwestern Frontaccording to which by the end of the day on June 24 the troops of the 8th Mechanized Corps were to concentrate in the Brody areaand strike in the morning of June 25 Nazi tank group in the direction of Brody, Berestechko. ”
        And one more day of continuous intense march. In total, by the morning of June 25, 1941, the 8th mechanized corps passed about 500 km.
        And most importantly, in Brody, where they went to strike at the Panzerwaffe tank group, there was no enemy at all and tanks by June 25, the 8th mechanized corps left crumbs. But they didn’t even fight, not a single battle, they just drove back and forth.
        And what are the commanders of the tank regiments to blame for?
        1. 0
          1 June 2017 09: 53
          Quote: Ivan Tartugay
          And what is the regiment commander to blame for - major or lieutenant colonel, or even colonel, if there is an order from the commander of the SWF, Hero of the Soviet Union, Colonel General Kirponos to make a 120-kilometer march in the opposite direction, already to the east.

          The fact that he did not organize the march properly. For some reason, 21 TD 10 MK was able to cover the same distance from St. Petersburg to Vyborg, without losing all its equipment irrevocably along the way. And the equipment in this division was valid, yes ...
          121 T-26 with a 45-mm gun, 22 flamethrower HT, 39 machine-gun two-turret T-26, 6 T-26 two-turret with a 37-mm gun, 2 ST-26, 8 tractor conveyors T-26, 3 T-38

          Museum on the caterpillars. smile
          The reason is simple: all lagging equipment was immediately repaired by a specially designed closure service.
          1. +1
            1 June 2017 14: 21
            Quote: Alexey RA
            For some reason, 21 TD 10 MK was able to get through the same distance from St. Petersburg to Vyborg, without losing all your equipment irrevocably on the road.


            The 10th mechanized corps passed to the northern outskirts of the region from Leningrad to Vyborg about 100 km The 8th mechanized corps passed about 500 km. So the distance is not the same.
            However, after arriving in the Vyborg region, the 10th mechanized corps was ordered by the marshal of victory, the chief of staff of the Red Army, Hero of the Soviet Union, Army General Zhukov was sent back to the southern outskirts of the Leningrad region in the Luga region. I didn’t really participate in the battles and, like the 8th mechanized corps, lost all the equipment mainly on marches and transfers and was disbanded on July 20, 1941.
            The commanders of tank companies, battalions, regiments are not to blame. And here again the general factor, the generals are to blame.
            1. +1
              1 June 2017 18: 22
              Quote: Ivan Tartugay
              I didn’t really participate in the battles and, like the 8th mechanized corps, lost all the equipment mainly on marches and transfers and was disbanded on July 20, 1941.

              MK lost its equipment 10 when pulled away by rifle divisions. 21 TD was first attached 115 sd. But already on July 3, it took 41 TP to support 198 MD.
              And when the corps was transferred to Pskov, then 198 md and 5 tank battalions from the TD were left on the isthmus.
              The 21st Panzer Division allocated 54 T-26 tanks for this purpose, and the 24th Panzer Division - 102 tanks.
              From July 6 to 9, the main units of the 21st and 24th Panzer Divisions made the transition to the area north of Luga. The equipment was transported in echelons, and part of the personnel - in cars. Both divisions were concentrated in the area north of Luga. On July 9, 1941, parts of the tank divisions underwent reorganization: all combat-ready slippers were reduced to one tank regiment for each division. The 21nd regiment remained in the 42st Panzer Division, the 24th Regiment remained in the 49th Division (the personnel of the 20th Regiment were transferred to staff the 12th reserve tank regiment).

              That is, in TD 10 MK there is one TP left. And not only the generals are to blame for this, but also those who before the war so trained the soldiers entrusted to them that they could not even fight the enemy infantry without the support of their tanks. Those junior and mid-level commanders to whom the Charter had to be brought in the form of orders of the commander of the army or the front (in the SBD, the orders of the army and front level of 1941-1943 regarding the "measures to eliminate identified shortcomings" almost completely repeat the Charter)
              And here is how 21 APs that lost "equipment on the march" operated near Pskov:
              The 21st Panzer Division entered battle on July 11 near the village of Komario on the Luga-Pskov highway, having completed a night march of 70 kilometers. Despite the fact that the infantry of the 90th Infantry Division located in this area fled at the first volleys of battle, the tankers resolutely launched an attack. The enemy with losses retreated southward. In the first battle, the commander of the 42nd tank regiment, Colonel V.I. Zavodov, died, and the division lost 17 tanks.
              Subsequently, the division participated in the counterattack of the Soviet troops near Soltsy (abandoned by our troops on July 14, 1941), supporting parts of the 237th Infantry Division with their tanks and howitzers. The intensity of the fighting is evidenced by the following fact. On July 23, the 1st tank battalion of the 42nd tank regiment, consisting of 29 T-26 tanks, defended near the village of Mikhalkino, with the support of 50 infantry from the 252nd rifle regiment. By the morning of the next day, 20 people from the infantry remained with rattling guns with almost no shells, and by 15 hours on July 24 there was only one T-26 with faulty weapons. The village was withheld.

              So, in 1 TBN, 28 out of 29 tanks were lost in battle.
              1. +1
                2 June 2017 06: 44
                Quote: Alexey RA
                His technique 10 MK lost when pulled in rifle divisions.

                Is it the fault of the commanders of the mouth-battalions-regiments that they were taken away by rifle divisions. The generals are to blame. General factor. As for the 10th mechanized squadron, you yourself read of course that the commander of the 23rd army, Lieutenant General Pshennikov, with the full connivance, and perhaps the direct participation of the commander of the 10th mechanized corps, took an active part “in pulling out the rifle divisions” General Lazarev.
                Again, clearly the general factor. In pulling only generals are to blameand not the commanders of tank company-battalion regiments.
                1. +1
                  2 June 2017 11: 45
                  Quote: Ivan Tartugay
                  Is it the fault of the commanders of the mouth-battalions-regiments that they were taken away by rifle divisions.

                  But what about? Who is to blame, except for the commanders of those same infantry company battalions, regiments, that their infantry cannot defend themselves without tanks - and to reinforce it, you have to pull away the only mobile unit on the Karelian Isthmus? Moreover, it would be good if the enemy had mechanized units - but no, the Finnish infantry divisions were the enemy of our rifle divisions.
                  In addition, you wrote earlier that
                  Quote: Ivan Tartugay
                  I didn’t really participate in the battles and, like the 8th mechanized corps, lost all the equipment mainly on marches and transfers and was disbanded on July 20, 1941.

                  So I show that this is not so. If in the tank division there are normal commanders of mouth-battalions-regiments, then even with antique equipment you can make marches without the technical losses that were in KOVO.
                  And suddenly it turns out that the orders of the generals are actually feasible - if there are junior and middle commanders who have read the charter and instructions and are able to organize a march on them.
              2. +1
                2 June 2017 08: 53
                Quote: Alexey RA
                And to blame for it not only generalsbut also those who before the war so trained fighters entrusted to him,


                You know that to develop troop training programs only generals appoint performers, not commanders of mouth-battalions, regiments, and only generals give them a direction of work and then again only generals accept the work performed by the performers and again only generals with their general signatures approve training programs for troops. Junior and mid-level commanders do not have the right to independently change the training programs of troops, only after coordination, again, only with generals. Only generals direct and control the process of training troops.
                Again general factor. In troop training only generals are to blameand not the commanders of mouth-battalions-regiments.
                1. +1
                  2 June 2017 11: 28
                  Quote: Ivan Tartugay
                  Junior and mid-level commanders do not have the right to independently change the training programs of troops, only after coordination, again, only with generals.

                  It’s interesting - in what general training program was prescribed by the generals "it is forbidden to open the Charter and read it"?
                  Many of the personnel of the 12th Motorized Rifle Regiment stated that they had never read the infantry combat manual of Part II and the field manual of 36. The knowledge of the command staff of the 3rd battalion of the 24th tank regiment does not go beyond the combat charter of the tank troops, part 1. They did not read other charters. Military magazines are not read. According to the order, the 24th tank regiment received 1 copy of the Military Thought magazine and 3 copies. "Armored Journal."

                  Or "it is forbidden to clean personal weapons"? Or "when training l / s reconnaissance, I order to leave the binoculars in the arrangement"?
                  A lesson on the topic “Observation outside the tank from an observation post” was conducted by ml. Lieutenant K. No observation post was scheduled. No change of observers was made. There were no binoculars in the classroom. In general, the lesson was poorly organized.

                  When the battalion commander forgets about the presence of battalion guns and mortars and asks for hull calibers for a separate machine gun - are these also the generals to blame? Or when the same battalion commander forgets about his mortars - and they beat on the trenches already occupied by their own infantry?
                  Why, in the same 1941, following the Charter was perceived as an outstanding case, requiring a separate mention in the "Review of hostilities ..."?
                  ... the brigade took the path of firmly fulfilling the constitutional requirements, both in relation to the organization of intelligence and in relation to the organization of defense itself. The defense was resilient by [creating] tank firing points both in front and in depth. Moreover, the firing points were nomadic, which did not decipher the defense. In short, the organization of defense was carried out strictly according to the charter.

                  Quote: Ivan Tartugay
                  Only generals are to blame for the training of troops, and not commanders of mouth-battalions-regiments.

                  A very convenient position for commanders of mouth-battalions-regiments. Undoubtedly, only the generals are to blame for the fact that in the spring of 1941 in the Nagant a comrade junior lieutenant discovered 3 cartridges from firing in the autumn of 1940. And these same evil generals brought in four months 29% of brand new rifles to rust in the barrel. laughing
              3. +1
                2 June 2017 11: 02
                Quote: Alexey RA
                21st Panzer Division enters battle July 11 near the village of Komario on the highway Luga-Pskov, having done a night march with a length of 70 kilometers.


                And before this night march, about which you write, there was another day march, i.e. by order of the command, the 21st Panzer Division left Luga early on July 10. However, retreating 42 km south of Luga, the 21st Panzer Division suddenly received the order of the generals to return to the former area of ​​concentration. Tanks on the road had to be deployed 180 degrees and steer back. Upon the division's return to the area northeast of Luga, commander of the 10th mechanized corps General Lazarev, gave another order to move the 21st Panzer Division to Porkhov. Following back and forth, the division passed 95-100 kilometers of the march in a day, exhausting the personnel to the limit. The last tanks from Zapolye returned only in the evening. But already at 23 p.m. on July 10, the 21st TD received the next idiotic order of the generals on a night march of 70 km, which you write about in your comment, and after which on July 11 weakened, to the limit with tired personnel, it entered the fray as early as 1- Wow mechanized corps. Loss of personnel, the death of the regiment commander completely on the conscience of the generals.
                The complete absence of the organization of military operations, the organization of interaction between the combat arms only generals' faultand not the commanders of mouth-battalions-regiments. General factor.
                1. 0
                  2 June 2017 12: 03
                  And note - after all these marches, the battalions of the tank regiment of the division retained the equipment. Maybe such marches for tank units are not something out of the ordinary? Maybe the task of the tank units in the defense is precisely the work in the role of a fire brigade in the army strip in the conditions of fuzzy information about the place of the enemy’s strike? Maybe, including for this, mobile parts were created?
                  Quote: Ivan Tartugay
                  The complete absence of the organization of hostilities, the organization of interaction between the military branches of the armed forces is only the generals, and not the commanders of the mouth-battalion regiments. General factor.

                  That is, when the infantry 90 sd scatter on the first shots - is it only the generals' fault? And do commanders of mouth-battalion-regiments wear geometric figures in their buttonholes only to show off in front of girls in peacetime? And they went to school only for the sake of a beautiful form? But in wartime they don’t answer for anything and leave with the fighters - are the generals to blame for everything?
                  By the way, marches of 21 TD were the result of the lack of intelligible intelligence about the enemy. And this information was also missing, because no one bothered to explain to the same soldiers and sergeants what to do in intelligence. Indeed, it was precisely in those parts of the world that there was a case that fell into the order of the front-line level - when the sergeant sent for reconnaissance crawled to the enemy dugout and, not knowing what to do next, crawled back. Should the general have this task set before the sergeant? Or is it the commander of a battalion company? wink
                  1. +1
                    2 June 2017 14: 01
                    Quote: Alexey RA
                    That is, when the infantry 90 sd scatter on the first shots - it is the fault only generals?

                    Exactly only generals. But what about they and the generals so that the troops entrusted to him do not scatter at the first shots. That's why his country, the people feed, drink, dress, shoes well. Better than the generals in the country no one lived, all the best to the generals. Should generals wear stars in their lapels not only to show off in front of girls and women in peacetime, or to sit on the presidiums and shine with polished stars, and chrome boots, or go on receptions, or go fishing and hunting in reserved places?
                    In peacetime, generals must also work and train their troops with the sweat of their faces.
                    The generals were supposed to train mouth-battalion commanders how to “set this sergeant a task before going on reconnaissance.” And in peacetime in schools, in academies, in the army. Only generals should organize the training process for junior and mid-level commanders in schools, academies, and troops.
                    Generals must educate, guide, control all the people entrusted to him and ordinary, and the same commanders of junior and middle management, and not go to banquets to glisten with stars in buttonholes.
        2. 0
          1 June 2017 10: 25
          the signalmen are to blame laughing
          1. +1
            1 June 2017 17: 07
            Quote: yehat
            the signalmen are to blame

            Well this is as always. good
            The fleet has been trained.
            According to their results, navigators were awarded for precisely taking ships to a given area. Mekhannikov was awarded for the fact that the ships arrived there at all. Radiometers were awarded for discovering targets. Gunners and miners - for the fact that they hit them.
            Signalers were not punished, because there was a connection.
            ©
      2. 0
        31 May 2017 20: 23
        But only by the standards of 1943, a march of 150-200 km was not considered out of the ordinary. Remember how they drove 3 Guards TA from the Bukrinsky bridgehead to the Lyutezhsky bridgehead. So it's not just about generals


        And you do not confuse one with another. The T26 has a power reserve of about 100 km. And at T34 it is already 380 km. So if the kilometer march at thirty-four is a maneuver, then at T26 it is at best a tantrum.
  23. +3
    31 May 2017 18: 16
    A good series of articles. Just do not need to thoughtlessly squeeze into it stupid reprints of Soviet books and magazines. Here you have a tank prepared for production (and even performed in iron) a team of five snouts (I apologize to both the authors and the collective). In those years, any department consisted of a chief-party organizer-Komsomol, and there already others. A whole bureau of draftsmen drew some drawings, at least one engineer is needed, a technologist, and other parasites. I don’t even remember about hard workers. And all this was squeezed into five snouts of department employees. Some kind of satire.
    Authors, work! But watch out for the logic. After all, you ventured to show the technique from the inside, which is very interesting. If you got such a rare opportunity to climb inside the equipment and take it off, use it as productively as possible. Do not overload articles with clippings from wikis and earlier cycles of the Soviet "Model Designers" (I used to read them with pleasure). From that, your articles will not become more scientific.
    There are certain claims to the quality of photographs. Not in terms of their clarity and so on, but in the sense of choosing a perspective. I understand that when shooting in tight rooms, this requires a set of very expensive optics, but you, people, have got such a rare chance.
    And more about tactile impressions. How to sit in the car, how conveniently it is controlled ... This is much more useful than the stories about communication pipes with the driver on the bulk of tanks and TPU-3 on a small part of them (and where TPU-1 and 2) Although the telephone pipes are also about tactile. I realize that your announcements about the ideal condition of ancient military equipment are only part of the contract with the owners of museums, thanks to which you are able to convey extremely beautiful information to us (I mean that the bulk of the exhibits are conditionally valid, especially conditionally corresponding to the originals), but anyway, your feelings about using them would be extremely interesting.
    1. 0
      31 May 2017 21: 26
      And if we add to this a story about how the restoration was carried out, what condition it was, how it was restored, there will be a bomb in general.
  24. Alf
    +1
    31 May 2017 19: 06
    Many thanks to the owner of the museum! A man is really sick of the soul.
    Exhibits are beautifully restored!
    You can look inside.
  25. 0
    1 June 2017 07: 10
    Quote: Alexey RA
    Quote: yehat
    The layout is also the same

    Are you serious? belay
    The T-26 fighting compartment is located in front of the MTO. MTO - in the stern.

    Where did you find the T-26 MTO? Compared with the Vickers 6-ton tank layout remained unchanged: in front of the transmission, the fighting compartment, the engine in the stern.
    1. 0
      1 June 2017 09: 55
      Quote: Fil743
      Where did you find the T-26 MTO?

      Yes, you are right - the T-26 MO and MOT are separate.
      Quote: Fil743
      Compared with the Vickers 6-ton tank layout remained unchanged: in front of the transmission, the fighting compartment, the engine in the stern.

      Yeah ... and the T-60 has a transmission ahead, a fighting compartment and an engine in the middle, tanks and a radiator in the stern.
  26. +1
    1 June 2017 23: 00
    Tank T-26 of the Army of the Republic of China in Taiwan. 1951 year !!!
  27. 0
    3 June 2017 23: 50
    Quote: Roman Skomorokhov
    The main armament of single-turret modifications was a 45-mm rifled semi-automatic gun mod. 1932 (20-K)

    Cannon 1932 was a quarter automatic. There below, this is exactly what is written in plain text.
    Quote: Roman Skomorokhov
    A light tank supports infantry, destroys enemy guns and machine guns, these are its main goals.

    This is what you describe the tasks of NPP tanks. One of them, obsolete, was the T-26. Light tanks in the USSR in 1941. not yet been.
    Quote: Roman Skomorokhov
    Although the armor of the main German tanks T-45 and T-26 and the Czech T-1 was not a problem for the 2-mm T-38 gun.

    T-1 did not participate in battles. Because were training tanks.
    The latest T-38s were too tough for forty-five. And three-inch with them, too, had certain problems.
    Old models T-38, T-35, Pz.II, old models Pz.III and Pz.IV. This is the maximum that "shone" forty-five in the oncoming battle.
    Quote: Roman Skomorokhov
    On June 22, 1941 in the Red Army, there were about 10 thousand T-26.

    7387 in operational condition. According to the report dated 01.06.41/XNUMX/XNUMX
  28. 0
    7 June 2017 11: 12
    I with all hands and legs FOR similar videos on Military Review, and more, more.
    Believe me, sometimes it’s more convenient to watch than to read, although of course we come here to study articles.
  29. 0
    16 January 2019 21: 54
    Thank you, very informative article and video! For weapons, armor and chassis everything seems to be clear. Now there are questions for connoisseurs. How did the engine behave during air cooling at high speeds and during long work, i.e. warmed up or was it enough fan blowing? There is information on the internet that the engine was subsequently boosted to 95 hp, which implies how the transmission handled it, although judging by the tank’s speed, the gearbox and axle are designed for traction, and the 5th gear increases so that the speed is not big enough. If not right, correct, I will be grateful.
    Well, I want to say that people who fought on these machines in difficult conditions, really like steel. Eternal memory to them.
  30. 0
    7 July 2019 00: 08
    Here I found very interesting material on the topic: "Wikipedia denounces: Tukhachevsky slowed down the increase in the projectile resistance of Soviet tanks! Material evidence of the existence of a military-fascist conspiracy in the Red Army. Part 3." https://cont.ws/@darnichanin/1304292
    As for me, the author correctly revealed Tukhachevsky’s intentions - to weaken the Red Army and plan the death of a large number of Russian tankers.