Eurasia remains in the nuclear plans of the United States
Created in the United States during the Second World War, nuclear weapon intended for use in the Axis countries (in Germany and Japan) with the prospect of its further use against the USSR. Already in July, 1944, in Germany, were afraid of the atomic bombing of Dresden, and in September of the same year, the United States decided to use nuclear weapons in Japan. However, immediately after the end of the war, the United States began to assess the possibility of using nuclear weapons against the cities of the USSR, and in 1946, the first plan of the atomic bombing of our country appeared.ENEMIES OF AMERICA
With the formation of the camps of people's democracy in 1945 – 1949 (China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Mongolia, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania), all these countries automatically became enemies of the United States and were later included in strategic plans for the destruction of American nuclear weapons. In the future, US nuclear weapons were aimed at regional plans for Algeria, Libya and Egypt in Africa, Syria, Iraq and Iran in Asia. Objects for offensive or defensive strikes by the Americans were located both on the territory of the Warsaw Pact (ATS) and NATO countries, as well as within neutral states, for example, in Finland and Austria. After the end of the Cold War, the United States carried out nuclear planning for the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, excluded Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus from nuclear plans that became nuclear-free countries, resumed planning on the use of nuclear weapons against North Korea, Iran and Libya, began planning the use of nuclear weapons against countries possessing or seeking possess weapons of mass destruction.
The main goal of the United States during the Cold War was to destroy in the USSR the social system operating there as a threat to the very existence of the United States, targeting the Soviet Union at an early stage of confrontation of the entire nuclear arsenal of strategic nuclear forces (SNF) of this country. In the 21st century, according to media estimates, the targets of the Russian Federation were from 80 to 63% of US nuclear weapons, and only 16 – 28% to China. Consequently, the United States regards the Russian Federation as the main "existential" military-political adversary, impeding the establishment of world domination of the United States.
The first plans of a US nuclear war in 1946 – 1950 included nuclear strikes, first on 20, then on 70, then on 104 cities of the Soviet Union. In the 60s, the implementation of nuclear plans would mean the destruction of 50 – 75% of industry and 25 – 33% of the population of the USSR. The American SIOP-1A 1961 plan of the year, which provided for the use of 3423 nuclear warheads (YABZ) with 7817 megatons (Mt) to destroy 1483 objects grouped into 1077 epicenters, was aimed at bringing the population loss rate of the Soviet and Chinese units to 54 and 16%, respectively guaranteed to destroy 74 and 59% of industrial areas, 295 and 78 of urban industrial complexes from the Soviet and Chinese blocks, respectively, with the complete destruction of the planned nuclear facilities threatening the United States. The creators of this plan clearly envisaged the transformation of the territory of the two blocks, and especially the USSR, into radioactive ruins, unaware that the use of the US even 5 gigatons of nuclear explosives would have led to a disastrous "nuclear winter" for the whole world and for America itself.
MORE, POWERFUL, ACCURATE
The foundation of the insane nuclear arms race launched by the United States during the Cold War years was the desire to have the ability to destroy or neutralize as many potential enemy targets as possible by first increasing the power and number of nuclear weapons and then delivering them to the targets of destruction.
In 1946 – 1960, the US nuclear arsenal grew from 9 to 18 638 YABZ. Only in 1960 was the 7178 YABZ produced. In 1956 – 1962, the needs of the U.S. Armed Forces were estimated at more than 160 th. YABZ. In 1967, the US nuclear weapon reached its ceiling in the 31 255 YABZ. In 1968 – 1990, the arsenal gradually declined from 29,6 to 21,4 ths. YABZ, in 1993 – 2003 declined from 11,5 to 10 ths (in 2010, reached 5 ths, and in January 2017 was brought to 4018 YABZ YABZ waited for recycling in the next decade). In total, more than 2800 ths. YABZ were produced in the USA. According to the 70 of the year, it was planned to bring the nuclear weapons of the country's Armed Forces to 2011 to 2022 – 3000 YABZ, and according to 3500 – 2005, to 2006 to YNZ.
The total capacity of nuclear warheads in the active ammunition was increased to the maximum value in 20,5 thousand megatons in the 1960 year, then dropped sharply, then gradually decreased to the current level of approximately 1 thousand megatons. If the average power of one YABZ increased from 25 kilotons (kt) in 1948 to 200 kt in 1954, then already in 1955 – 1960 it ranged from 1 to 3 megatons. Currently, the average power of a single American YABZ is less than 250 kt.
Two circumstances are interesting regarding the reduction in the power of some types of YBZ. Since 2020, tactical and strategic aviation The US Air Force will begin to receive a modernized B61-12 nuclear bomb with medium-sized nuclear warheads (that is, with a range of 10-50 kt) with a variable TNT equivalent that will replace all other nuclear air bombs. In December 2016, the Scientific Council of the United States Department of Defense recommended having a larger number of “low” capacity nuclear explosives (that is, with a range of 1–10 kt) for limited use on selected options.
By the end of the US and USSR nuclear confrontation, it was believed that 80 – 90% US BR and US 72 – 77% bomber aircraft missiles reached targets, the chances of delivering nuclear bombs by various types of bombers were 27 – 60%. By the same time, the accuracy of the delivery of the YABZ to the planned aiming points improved to several tens of meters in new aircraft missiles and to several hundred meters in new ballistic missiles from the US strategic nuclear forces.
In 1954 – 2002, the number of full-time strategic bombers, ICBMs and SLBMs in the US strategic nuclear forces did not fall below 1 thousand, and in some periods exceeded the level of 2 thousand. In 2018, the US strategic nuclear forces intend to have 800 counted under the 2010 agreement of the nuclear weapon carrier ( 66 bombers, 454 silos, MBNS, 280 PU SLBMs), the delivery vehicles of which will be able to carry 1550 countable YABZs (actually more than 2 thousand YABZs). In the coming 8 – 25 years, the United States strategic nuclear forces are expected to receive 12 new SSBNs of the Columbia type with 192 SLBMs (more than 1 thou. Modernized YABZs), 100 new strategic bombers B-21 Reider (with 500 new Reder bombers nuclear ALCM with upgraded YABZ and several hundreds of nuclear bombs B61-12), 400 new ICBMs (with 400 modernized YABZ).
WIDE SPECTRUM OF GOALS
Now let's talk more about the objects. There are two types of targeting: counter-force targeting to facilities for the destruction (neutralization) of the enemy’s direct military capabilities (from nuclear forces to groups of troops (forces) and counter-interest targeting to destroy (neutralize) those facilities that ensure the country's ability to wage war (economy, including military industry). Objects were divided into proactively planned and identified during the operation. Previously planned facilities, in turn, were divided into affected Parts Required upon request and stricken in strict accordance with the schedule up to a minute in relation to the designated reference time. Now Targeting objects stricken after detection or upon request, made under the direction of, or adaptive planning planning.If in 50 the number of possible objects increased from hundreds to several thousand, in 1974, the list of enemy strategic objects increased to 25 thousand and reached the level of 40 thousand in 1980. In each Eurasian country chosen for defeat by US offensive nuclear weapons, there were from less than 10 objects to more than 10 thousand objects. Before the collapse and after the collapse of the USSR, the number of strategic objects destined for defeat under the SIOP plan began to decline sharply: from 12 500 in 1987, by the year 1994, 2500 remained. During the Cold War, the United States assigned an 2,5 YABZ average to each designated epicenter of the US Strategic Nuclear Forces, and NATO’s 1 – 1,6 and more YABZ NATO strike forces, after it ended, due to the abandonment of outdated nuclear weapons The epicenter, uniting one or more objects, on average 1,4 JABZ SNF. Objects are usually divided into four main categories: nuclear forces, other military facilities, government and military authorities, the economy.
The content of a nuclear war for the US strategic nuclear forces would be the destruction (neutralization) of a certain number of objects of one or several categories, so that after its completion it will be in a comparatively better position relative to the enemy. With the appearance of nuclear weapons by the USSR, the United States planned to wage a nuclear war of two types: with a mutual exchange of nuclear strikes (the US launches nuclear strikes at the Soviet Union, and the USSR - at the continental United States) and with the use of nuclear weapons at the United States Eurasia (the continental part of the USA would then be immune from nuclear strikes of the enemy). In the first case, a nuclear war would be called "strategic" in the United States, and in NATO, "universal nuclear war" or "universal nuclear response." In the second case, in the United States, it would be called a “nuclear war in the theater,” and according to NATO terminology, “a war that does not reach the scale of a general nuclear war,” that is, it would be a “limited nuclear war.” With the advent of the Russian Federation, the US strategic nuclear war gradually gave way to "strategic nuclear operations", and the nuclear war in the theater of war became the "nuclear operations in the theater"; in NATO, the place of general nuclear war and limited nuclear war was taken by a “strategic response” with plans for the main emergency types of nuclear strikes and a “sub-strategic response” with plans for selective emergency types of nuclear strikes in the Russian Federation.
NUCLEAR WAR FOR TWO YEARS
The duration of the US nuclear war against the USSR at various times was estimated from several days to two years, from 80-s to two to six months (until the cancellation of the protracted nuclear war in 1997). In one of the teachings of 1979, the scenario of a strategic nuclear war called for a half-day nuclear “spasm” in the form of the implementation of the SIOP plan on duty by the US forces (the result was the loss of 400 million people in the USA and the USSR) with the maintenance of a guaranteed US nuclear reserve for five months on the destruction of the remaining unaffected and newly identified objects in the USSR.
The US strategic nuclear war against the countries of Eurasia and above all against the USSR was to be carried out according to the EWP plans of the Air Force Strategic Command (SAC) in 40 – 50-s, according to the plans of the SIOP SNF in 60 – 90-s (this name of the plan is formal maintained by 2003 year), according to the numbering plans of the 80XX-type SNF from 90's. Strategic objects were divided into categories corresponding to the objectives; Category objects were distributed according to the types and variants of strikes.
There were several types of nuclear strikes: main (MAO), selective (SAO), limited (LAO), regional, by forces of a guaranteed nuclear reserve. The main attacks were designed to destroy as quickly as possible the objects of the given categories using several thousand YaBZ. Selective strikes were part of the main. For a limited strike would be used from a few units to hundreds of YaBZ. Regional strikes would use forces in advanced areas (for example, during the US-Iranian crisis at the beginning of the 80s, it was planned to launch nuclear strikes on Iran using X-NUMX ALCM B-bombers). The guaranteed nuclear reserve included 19% of all US SSBNs, its forces could be used sometimes before and mainly after the implementation of the SIOP plan. In our century, the strategic nuclear forces planned to deliver “emergency response” (ERO), selective (SAO), “main” (BAO) and “as directed” / “according to adaptive plans” (DPO / APO) attacks.
SIOP plans, as a rule, were drawn up for the possibility of using any of the four options for strikes: a sudden, unexpected for the enemy; forward on the alert to the enemy; reciprocating when a launch is detected (LOW) and after confirmation of the adversary’s nuclear missiles to facilities in the United States (LUA); reciprocal (LOA) after the first nuclear explosions in the United States.
The full implementation of the SIOP plan depended on the duration of the introduction of all the bombers, ICBMs and SSBNs into the duty forces, and ranged from one to one and a half weeks to one to two days. The launch time of the BR or the take-off of bombers and tanker aircraft was strictly regulated in relation to the reference time in order to ensure that the means of destruction would arrive at their facilities without any conflict at exactly the appointed time. Under normal circumstances, the SIOP duty forces (and they had 35 – 55%, on average 40% YABZ SNF) were kept ready to start the launch of the BR (take-off aircraft) after 5 – 15 minutes after receiving the order. With a maximum increase of duty forces in their composition would be at least 85% of full-time ICBMs, bombers, SLBMs.
In the last decade of the Cold War, the US strategic nuclear forces on duty were in excess of 5 thousand YABZs, in 1997, their number decreased to 2300, and now it is clearly less than 700 YABZ ICBMs and SLBMs. Strategic aviation, which in the 1957 year allocated 33% as part of the duty force, 1961% in 50, 1991% in its bombers in 14, after the end of the Cold War, it was no longer in combat duty on nuclear bases with nuclear weapons on board. At the beginning of 1968 (then the US strategic nuclear forces had 4200 active YABZ), it was officially stated that as a result of the first nuclear strike by all Soviet strategic nuclear forces in the United States, 50% of the strategic nuclear forces would survive and that three-quarters of the surviving forces (duty forces) meant their own objects and destroy more than 75% of the population and over 40% of the industrial capacity of the enemy.
EUROPEAN THEATER
In a nuclear war at the European Theater of War, NATO’s nuclear attack forces in Europe could use American nuclear weapons for limited nuclear strikes (LNOs) to destroy several dozen military and industrial facilities in each, such as air bases in Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria; regional strikes (RNO) in one or more theaters, for example, to defeat the troops of the first echelon of the advancing enemy; strikes to the entire depth of the theater (NOP) on stationary objects and concentration of enemy troops / forces.
The basis of the actions throughout the depth of the theater of war (to the Urals) was the SSP plan of the Allied Command Supreme Command in Europe, which was reduced in 4 – 5 once a copy of the American plan SIOP, with which it was fully coordinated on the objects and time of their defeat, and intended for destruction those objects that threatened the US Euro-Asian allies in NATO. The proactive actions of the NATO SNF in 1969 for the year were planned by this plan either for facilities of ATS countries, excluding the USSR, or only for facilities of the USSR, or for all facilities of ATS. Judging by the list of high-priority facilities for this plan in 1978, of the 2500 facilities, one third were in the USSR and two thirds in the territory of its allies in Eastern Europe. In 1983, NATO could apply, without carrying out additional build-up of forces and means, to deliver nuclear strikes on the entire depth of the NATO nuclear infrastructure, up to 1700 air force tactical aviation bombs, more than 150 tactical aviation bombs, Navy 300 YBZ BRMD, 400 YBZ USB SLPS and about 100 YBZ YBZ Great Britain SLBM.
Direct nuclear support (NSP) of the ground forces in Europe was to be carried out partly during a limited nuclear war and in full in an all-out nuclear war by conventional nuclear weapons with tactical aviation. In the 70 – 80-ies, plans for direct nuclear support in the form of constantly updated “nuclear packages” of corps and “nuclear subpackages” of divisions, which provided for the use of nuclear SD, NUR, atomic artillery, missiles and land mines in the near zone, operated in the USA NW. In the 70s, it was believed that one US field army would spend every day on 400 YABZ. In 70 – 80-ies, the US Army Corps could be used during an operation in its combat zone up to 450 YABZ with a total capacity of up to one and a half megatons. In 1983, of the then existing US NF 3330 YABZ for shells and tactical missiles in Europe, there was 2565 (77%) of such YABZ. In 1991, the US Armed Forces abandoned tactical nuclear weapons of the SV, Navy and Marines, and in 2012, the Tomahawk nuclear SLCM.
By the end of the Cold War, NATO's only NATO 5% dual-purpose fighter-bombers were part of the NATO NSC air force, and the combat duty of these aircraft with nuclear bombs aboard 15-minute readiness for take-off was soon discontinued. In the European zone, non-strategic (“tactical”) USBs for the CB and Air Force were significantly more than in the Pacific zone: for example, in 1967, this nuclear weapon in Europe was approaching 7 thousand YaBZ, and in the Pacific zone it counted more than 3 thousand, although there was a war against the United States North Vietnam. If in Western Europe the main “nuclear cellar” was Germany, then in the Far East then it was Okinawa island. By 2010, out of about 500 of US nuclear bombs intended for use by tactical air force aircraft, up to 40% were in Europe. Nuclear support for NATO countries and other US allies is provided for using American "non-strategic nuclear weapons" and with the participation of the US strategic nuclear forces.
Significant are the provisions set out in the communique on the NATO Summit in Warsaw 8 – 9 July 2016. "Any use of nuclear weapons against NATO would fundamentally change the nature of the conflict." "... NATO has the capacity and determination to impose such a price on the enemy, which would be unacceptable and would significantly exceed the benefits that the enemy hoped to get." It is known that NATO has never abandoned the use of nuclear weapons first, at its discretion. The communique does not say a word about NATO’s pre-emptive strategic and strategic response, as if all this is implied, but it is announced that “any” use of nuclear weapons by the enemy changes the nature of the conflict “fundamentally” and that now the price of such use of nuclear weapons by the adversary is compared to previous rates, it will increase “significantly” for him. Compare this with the provision on the use of nuclear weapons by NATO forces from the 1991 year (any use of nuclear weapons, especially at the initial stage, should be viewed as intentionally limited, selective, restrained) and feel the difference.
CONTRACTION TARGETING
In 1979, the president of the United States claimed that every American submarine with the Poseidon submarine-launched submarine carried enough YABZ to destroy the large and medium-sized cities of the Soviet Union. At that time, the USA had 21 SSBNs with SLBMs of this type, each SSBN carried up to 160 YABZ with 40 CT capacity, and in the USSR there were 139 cities with a population of 200 thousand or more. Now the US has 14 SSBNs, on each such SSBNs with the Trident SLBM around 100 YABZ, but already with 100 or 475 CT, and there are approximately 75 cities in the Russian Federation with a population of more than 250 thousand people. In 1992, the NATO secretary general announced the end of missile targeting at major cities. Consequently, the "taboo" of NATO on the application of nuclear strikes did not apply to the medium and small cities of the USSR. In accordance with 2013's nuclear strategy, the United States does not rely on a counter-value strategy, will not deliberately target civilians and civilian objects, and will seek to minimize the collateral damage to civilians and civilian objects.
The instruction on the laws of war, amended by the Pentagon in December 2016, contains a requirement to observe five principles: military necessity, humanity (prohibition to cause suffering, injury or destruction unnecessary for achieving a military goal), proportionality (refraining from unreasonable or excessive force, refusing from threats to civilians and civilian objects), distinctions (introducing differences between military and civilian objects, military personnel and civilians) and honor. This instruction prohibits an attack using any means against unarmed small, medium and large cities. But pay attention to the main circumstance: in these documents there is not a word about the United States refusing nuclear targeting at military facilities and military resources in enemy cities. And the declaration of an emphasis on the counter-force component of the SNF means that the US intends to use nuclear weapons first, when and where it will be profitable for them.
PLANNING QUESTIONS
The US Armed Forces nuclear planning is guided by understandable aspirations: to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries that do not possess them; prevent the use of nuclear weapons by old and new adversary countries across the United States; reduce the level of damage and destruction on its territory in the event of a nuclear war.
The proliferation of nuclear weapons can be prevented by using conventional or nuclear weapons against the supplier and the consumer.
Preventing the use of nuclear weapons by an adversary on its territory can be a preemptive or preemptive strike if one has a reliable defense system against the BR.
To reduce damage and the level of destruction in your country from the actions of the enemy, you can either mutually agree with him about the “rules of the game” (using limited or selective types of strikes to reduce the scale of nuclear operations with the likelihood of an early mutual cessation of nuclear strikes, refraining from using high-powered nuclear weapons, refusal to use nuclear weapons at sites in cities), or by mutual reduction of nuclear weapons to a minimum acceptable to both sides. In the US, 2011 – 2012 conducted research on the possibility of reducing the JABZ of the US strategic nuclear forces first to 1000 – 1100, then to 700 – 800 and further to 300 – 400 YABZ, and in 2013, a proposal was made to reduce the YABZ of the US and Russian strategic nuclear forces to 1000. each side. The rationale is quite clear: with a mutual reduction in the number of strategic YABZs and with a unilateral sharp increase in the missile defense capabilities of the United States, this country gains an advantage in the number of YABZs that reach their targets. Obviously, it is not profitable for the Russian Federation to agree both on reducing nuclear weapons of its SNF and on reducing the number of its non-strategic nuclear weapons, compensating for the superiority of the US in high-precision weapons and in missile defense and creating a certain barrier against the nuclear-weapon countries of Europe and Asia.
Plans for the use of nuclear weapons are reflected in the regularly held in the US strategic nuclear forces "field" exercises (with forces) and command and staff exercises (marked exercises) with designated forces. For example, every year there was a large-scale field-based exercise, SAK Global Shield in 1979 – 1990, the teachings of the Joint Strategic Command (USC) Bulwark Bronze in 1994 – 1995, Global Guardian in 1996 – 2003, Global Thunder from 2005. USC KSHU with designated forces (such as Polo Hat, Global Archer, Global Storm) were held sometimes several times a year, now the annual KShU with the designated Global Lightning forces is gaining momentum. Regularity is also characteristic of the activities of the NATO forces to develop the conditional use of nuclear weapons.
In accordance with the nuclear strategy of 2013, the United States will not use nuclear weapons against countries that comply with the non-proliferation treaty without nuclear weapons. From the Pentagon’s Nuclear Survey of 2010, it can be understood that the United States intends to use nuclear weapons against states possessing nuclear weapons or not complying with the non-proliferation treaty of nuclear weapons, as well as against states of the two categories that may use conventional or chemical USA or their allies and partners. Judging by the 2017 statement made in April by the USCS Commander, the opponents of his country are Russia, China, North Korea and Iran.
What dilemmas does the United States have in planning the use of nuclear weapons? In Asia, the number of nuclear weapons in countries with nuclear weapons “legally” (China) and “illegally” (Pakistan, India, North Korea) is increasing. At the same time, the number of states whose nuclear weapons are capable of reaching the continental part of the United States is also increasing there (recall the SSBN of India and the recently shown North Korean submarine-launched ballistic missile). The American nuclear sword of Damocles hanging over Eurasia is increasingly becoming a nuclear boomerang threatening the United States itself. This requires US counter-force targeting. With the reduction of nuclear ammunition by large countries to a level of several hundred YABZ each and with the possible limitation of the TNT equivalent of the most powerful YABZs to hundreds or several tens of kilotons, the temptation of the mutual use of nuclear weapons by these countries in military facilities to achieve victory in the war will increase and the ability of the demographic and economic survival of such countries in the mutual counter-value exchange of nuclear strikes. The latter would require an enhancement of counter-targeting to the detriment of counter-force targeting.
Since there is no hope of a voluntary renunciation of nuclear weapons by those “legal” and “illegal” nuclear states of Eurasia that are not allies of the United States, the planning of the use of nuclear weapons by the United States in Eurasia will continue.
A shotgun hanging on the stage of the theater may shoot off as the play progresses.
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