F-35A and the new look of Hel Haavir. Netanyahu's loud statement "stumbles" about the power of modern Iranian air defense
More and more News comes about the promotion of stealth multi-functional fighter aircraft of the F-35A / B / C family in the US and Eurasian arms markets, as well as in the arms market of the Asia-Pacific region. Despite all the known tactical and technical shortcomings of these machines (among them there is a low angular turning speed, a small combat radius of 800-1100 km, a maximum speed of 1,65M and a supersonic cruising speed of only 1300 km / h), “Lightning- II ”continue to confidently occupy the most important operational-tactical sectors in the air forces of countries friendly to the American regime. For example, the British division of MBDA, with the support of Lockheed Martin, is carrying out work to integrate the Meteor Air Defense Forces and other promising missile and bomb weapons into Block 4 software, which by 2024 will receive the Royal Navy's F-35B deployed on aircraft carrier Queen Elizabeth.
In the United States, the bulk of the F-35A / B test activities have already been completed, and the Navy has focused on perfecting the main deck version of the F-35C, which has a large wing area, maneuverability, range, but worse speed performance. F-35C is exclusively for fleet and the United States Marine Corps and are not exported. For example, at the end of April of this year, the destruction of a moving car by the 500-pound guided bomb bomb GBU-12 Paveway II was worked out. The tests will continue.
Such customers as the Defense Ministry of Australia, Japan, Turkey, the Netherlands, Denmark, etc., just wait for the fulfillment of the contracts for the supply of Lightning modification F-35A, counting on the repeated strengthening of the combat potential of its Air Force. The exception is Italy, where the F-35A / B is mass-produced for both the national air force and the air force of the Netherlands. The assembly facilities of the Leonardo / Lockheed Martin joint unit are located at the Italian Defense Ministry’s facility in Cameri.
As early as the middle and the end of the first decade of the 21st century, interest in cars of this type was caused by the powerful American lobby through the defense ministries of the Washington allies, while at the same time this interest was further reinforced by the reduced cost of F-35A. The cheapening of these fighters was caused by harsh criticism from the newly elected US President Donald Trump regarding the “uncontrollability” of unit prices, which significantly reduced the competitiveness of the entire Lightning family. After the statements of the head of the White House, the value of the shares of Lockheed Martin fell by 4,2%, which, according to the company's headquarters, will bring the value of F-35A to the mark of 85 million.
Well, it’s quite acceptable that experts, as a carbon copy, polled by Gazeta.Ru, would thoughtlessly predict a decline in the competitiveness of our multipurpose 4 ++ fighter Su-35С and MiG-35С against the background of “cheap and cool” F-35A. But not everything is so simple here: F-35A is not at all as fierce as they want to be, and this is not the same amount of freedom to 85 millions of dollars. This is seen very well by the example of the replenishment of the Israeli Air Force (Hel Haavir) with F-35A “Adir” fighters. The first pair of machines for training pilots and maintenance personnel was transferred from the USA to the Israeli Nevatim airbase even on December 12 of 2016. Then, on April 23 of 2017, the Adir 3, which increased the Israeli Lightning-II fleet to 5 units, was transferred to the same Avb. In total, under the terms of the three contracts with a total value of 8,5 billion, concluded from October 2010 of the year to November 2016, by the 2021 year, the Nevatim airbase will be equipped with an air wing from 50 F-35A.
F-35A "Adir" and F-16I "Sufa"
During the December ceremonial meeting of the first two “Adirovs”, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hurried to raise the significance of adopting the F-35A to the level of strategic victory, stating that “Israel will gain supremacy in all without exception theaters of operations, including the maritime, ground and air. Against the background of a radically modernizing anti-aircraft / anti-missile defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran, this statement looks not only unconvincing, but akin to the real "fables" of the Israeli leadership. It is quite easy to justify by comparing the tactical and technical characteristics of the F-35A with the geographical features of Asia Minor and the parameters of Iran’s air defense and RTR equipment, as well as based on the fact that the current Israeli air force personnel (in accordance with the costs of the Big Game and the agreement with In the Russian Federation, it has not yet been possible to converge in real combat with the newest means of air defense against the Concern VKO Almaz-Antey, which cover our facilities in Tartus and Khmeimim. The only most successful military action of Hel Haavir can be considered only a long-standing operation called “Opera”. 6 June 1981 The Israeli F-8A "Netz" was destroyed by the Iraqi Ozirak nuclear reactor, located in 16 km southeast of Baghdad. The operation was thought out to the smallest detail, and the flight of the X-NUMX-x links of the F-19A sometimes took place at the height of the 2-16 m.
Nevertheless, it is not at all necessary to consider the outcome of this operation to be something super-unique. The reactor was covered: the Pechora C-125 anti-aircraft missile system (3 batteries), the XRUMN Kvadrat 5 batteries, several Roland FRSs, as well as the C-60 and ZN-23-2 batteries. Self-propelled aerial positions reconnaissance and guidance 1S91 complexes "square" and CHP-125 guidance station complexes "Pechora" have low noise immunity and absolutely could not work in a jamming environment, which was set up stations of electronic warfare fighter F-15A, included in 133-Squadron . This is confirmed by the information from the Soviet officer Valery Eremenko who was present at the Kvadrat PBU, who later said that when the Needles squadron approached, the indicator of the surveillance radar began to display only a white veil of interference. Obviously, because of the suddenness of the strike, the operators of Quadrats and Pechora did not have time to use the auxiliary optical-electronic sights with a TV-channel tracking. Moreover, the setting sun from the approach of the Israeli attack wing, which complicated the work of television and optical systems, was not playing into the hands of the Iraqi ZRDN calculations. It was such a situation that the high-tech Hel Haavir air group was opposed to the obsolete Iraqi air defense system on the Soviet element base of the early 70's. A similar trick of the Israeli Air Force against Iranian strategic facilities will turn for the first into a real nightmare. And F-35A are no exception. There can be no talk of any "total superiority" Hel Haavir in the airspace of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
All the strategically important military-industrial facilities of Iran, the port cities on the Persian Gulf coast, research centers, including the nuclear research center in Esfahan, are now hiding behind the recently delivered Russian S-300PMU-2 “Favorit” air defense missile systems in the 4 divisions. The divisions are optimally distributed to protect the airspace over Bandar Abbas, Bushehr, Esfahan and Tehran. They are also integrated into the developed and modernized automated control system (ACS) of the Iranian air defense system, which through the tropospheric radio communication provides the exchange of information about the tactical air situation between 5 known air defense centers, including a total of 28 air defense groups. Encrypted radio channels of communication with the FHR provide more or less adequate security in data transmission both between the air defense defense system and the central headquarters of the Iranian air defense forces.
96L6E all-altitude detector, attached to one of the Iranian-purchased C-300PMU-2 anti-aircraft missiles
Sources of radar information for this automated control system are both dozens of separate radio intelligence reconnaissance systems of various classes operating in different wavelengths, as well as radar detectors attached to anti-aircraft missile systems. All of these funds are mostly located on the hills and southern highlands of Iran’s most powerful mountain system, Zagros, and the radii and sectors of their review often “overlap”, and far from the maximum range. It forms in the airspace of Iran (including low-altitude rocket-hazardous areas in the mountains) a reliable radar field that does not let even the smallest high-precision weapons weaponsnot to mention such objects as F-35A "Adir", F-16I "Sufa" and "strategic asset" Hel Haavir - tactical fighter F-15I "Ra'am". An arsenal of modern anti-aircraft guided missiles 48N6E2, SD2M and Bavar-373 is enough to destroy a decent number of Israeli fighters.
So, in service with the radio engineering units of the Iranian air defense system are meter radar long-range radar detection 1L119 "Sky-SVU". With round-robin in standby mode, this radar can detect an F-35A target (EPR 0,2-0,3 м2) at a distance to 120-150 km at medium and high altitude, the standard F-16I target can be detected at a distance 330-340 km (flight altitude about 15000 m). The altitude of the detection reaches 40 km. In the “trail targets” (tracking) mode, the altitude of work can reach low-orbit plots in 140 km, and the beam elevation angle to 45 degrees, thanks to which Sky-SVU can participate in the territorial anti-missile defense system as an early warning device.
One of the most important details pointing to the highest information illumination of the Iranian operational air defense centers is the assignment of long-range X-NXXL300 radar complexes to anti-aircraft missile systems C-2PMU-96 Favorit. 6 March 4 of this year became known about this, when photos of the first “Favorite” tests in the structure of the Iranian air defense system were distributed on the Middle East and Russian Internet with a link to www.iribnews. The technical feature of the BBO 2017L96E, which is clearly not in favor of the Israeli F-6A and the managed Spice-35 planning bombs, is centimeter C-band operation (from 250 to 4 GHz with a wavelength range from 8 to 7,5 cm). At these frequencies, high-precision multifunctional radars for illumination and targeting of air defense systems, for example, AN / MPQ-3,75 of the Patriot complexes, usually work with high accuracy, determine the location of the target and highlight it with rockets from PARGSN. 53Л96Е is capable of detecting aerospace attack weapons at altitudes up to 6 km and has 100 basic operating modes.
The first, in fact, is all-altitude detection. In this mode, the directivity pattern covers an elevated sector from -3 to 20º, while small targets that are moving at a speed of 4320 km / h can be detected. A negative beam downgrade angle of -3º indicates excellent opportunities for tracking low-altitude targets from high elevations as an IEE (the distance of the radio horizon along low-flying tactical aviation and cruise missiles). The second mode includes sector detection. In this case, the airspace scan area is limited to an azimuthal sector of 120º and an elevation sector from 0 to 60º. Hypersonic RS, aeroballistic and ballistic objects with speeds of up to 10100 km / h can be detected; in the list of targets: anti-radar missiles, air-to-air missiles, SAM, guided bombs, stealth tactical aviation, UAVs. The third mode is low altitude. With the help of it, most of the known STS are discovered, “creeping” towards targets in the mode of enveloping the terrain. The high-speed detection limit here is 4320 km / h, and the scanning sector is from 0 to 1,5 degrees. The advantage of this mode is a faster update rate of 6 seconds. The target detection range with an EPR of 0,1 m2 for the BBO is approximately 125 km, with an EPR of 3 m2 - about 300 km.
In the C-300PMU-2 complex architecture, the 96Л6Е high-altitude detector minimizes the response time for small targets in a difficult jamming environment, its main purpose is similar to the 9X19XXUMUMX Ginger, a radar station of the X-ray-Zn-9N review of the X-Zn-XN-2 300 4 96 6. Moreover, if Iran acquires the Baikal ACS and the ranzhir unified battery command posts, it will be possible to issue target designations with 1ЛXNUMXЕ to the Tor-MXNUMX in service, which will increase the survivability of the entire Iranian air defense system. For the plans of Tel Aviv, the “all-highs” in the “Favorites” can be considered a real headache.
Radar complex "Najm 802"
Radar with solid-state active phased array “Naj 802” is considered to be no less perfect radar. The design of its canvas AFAR has a great similarity with the radar 67H6E "Gamma-DE." Visually, you can count approximately 4608 transceiver modules (2304 MRP in each segment of a folding book-type design), which is 3,6 times more than in Gamma-DE, which may indicate a better resolution of Naj 802. The frequency of its work can vary from 1 to 2-4 GHz (L - S-bands), due to which the station is able to provide target designation for anti-aircraft missiles with active radar homing heads, naturally, with appropriate hardware and software support for synchronizing with the air defense missile system . Interference immunity of this product is also at a decent level, since AFAR can form “dips” in the radiation pattern in a narrow or wide sector of the work of the source of jamming. As you know, this is an ideal method of protection against the most modern EW products, which carriers are F-35A and F / A-18G “Growler”. Great assistance to Iranian specialists in designing “Najr 802” could be made by the Chinese, with the help of whom the Bavar-373, Sayyad-2 complexes as well as the improved Hawk air defense systems appeared in Iran’s air defense system.
But not only due to the above-mentioned means of radio-technical support of the active type of Iranian air defense has an excellent potential in detecting and destroying Israeli tactical aviation (including the advertised "Adir") and high-precision weapons. For these purposes, the Iranian Air Defense Forces have at their disposal the radioactive electronic reconnaissance systems of the passive type 1L222 “Avtobaz” purchased from the Russian Federation. They work on the principle of direction finding radio-emitting air targets at a distance depending on the power of the transmitting device on the enemy’s air carrier (be it a radar or a radio altimeter). Instrumental range is limited to 150 km.
It is quite logical to imagine the following situation. Sooner or later, the leadership of Israel still decides to conduct a “small and victorious” air operation to destroy the Iranian nuclear and rocket production infrastructures located far in the depths of the territory of Iran. Naturally, for conducting pinpoint strikes, Hel Haavir’s command will attract 1 or 2 squadrons (12 or 24 units) of the inconspicuous F-35A fighter jets operating under the cover of such vehicles as Sufa and Raam. The task of the latter will be reduced to air superiority over the Iranian fighter aircraft in the Persian Gulf region, as well as in suppressing the Iranian air defense borders in the western part of the Zagros mountain system with the help of dozens of HARM anti-radar missiles that are planning Spice-250 air bombs. Considering that C-300PMU-2 and Bavar-373 are deployed in Iran’s western VN, the task will be accomplished, but with decent losses for Israelis.
One of the most unpleasant technical issues for F-35A operators can be considered the circular section of the engine nozzle, which absolutely does not contribute to the reduction of the infrared signature of the engine flame when viewed from the forward hemisphere ± 20-30º from the heading direction (when the flame is not covered by the body of the fighter). The photo shows the 15-17 meter torch of the high-temperature turbojet bypass engine "Pratt & Whitney F135-100" of the F-35A fighter in afterburner mode. It is about 2 times larger than the torch coming out of the F119-PW-100 turbojet engine of the F-22A fighter equipped with flat nozzles with vertical OVT. In an air collision, even with the old Iranian MiG-29A (not to mention the new MiG-35 or Su-35S machines that will be purchased in the future), the high IR radiation from the nozzles of the Adirov engines will give out their location for the OEPrNK- 29 / OLS-UEM
At this moment, the main shock level of the barely noticeable F-35A “Adir” will most likely be able to find an “unseen” Iranian radar “loophole” between the Zagros mountain ranges, after which it will rush to the battlefield. Further 200 or more kilometers of flight in Iranian airspace will become a huge problem for Israeli pilots, because all the major military-industrial facilities will be covered by the most modern air defense systems even on long-distance approaches (there is Favorite, Tor-M1, and dozens of others complexes will meet). Adirov will not be able to pass them along tricky trajectories with rounding of the terrain due to the short range at a low altitude (less than 700 - 800 km), and therefore the vehicles will be detected and attacked by modern Iranian air defense missiles just in close proximity to the targets . In this scenario, most of the "strike fist" of the Israeli F-35A will be destroyed. At the same time, some Iranian objects may suffer partly, since part of the Adirov will still have time, before being defeated, to release deadly high-precision equipment for the intended purposes.
In the second case, the Israeli F-35A can be detected by Iranian Sky-SVU, Naj 802 or Kashef-2 RLOs long before approaching the target area. It is appropriate to assume that all the available tactical fighters of the Iranian Air Force (possibly new ones that will be purchased in the coming years) deployed at 6 air bases in the northern part of the state will be sent to intercept. “Adiram” will have to engage in medium-range air combat, which means the AN / APG-81 radar will be switched on for radiation. At this very moment, the Avtobaz 1L222 complexes can play their role. They work in the X and Ku-bands of centimeter waves (from 8 to 15,544 GHz), in which the frequencies of AN / APG-81 lie, which means that after turning on their on-board radars, the Israeli F-35A will become even more "visible" and the possibility of reaching the lines of launching rocket-bomb weapons will be reduced to a minimum. Such a scenario looks extremely plausible, and therefore we can safely say that it is impossible to apply Osirak’s tactics to a state like Iran.
Without a doubt, the deployment of two reinforced squadrons from the 50 F-35A “Adir” at the “Nevatim” airbase will greatly enhance the combat potential of the Israel Air Force. In particular, thanks to the powerful airborne radar with AF / AN / APG-81 and a small radar signature in 0,2-0,3 X 2, the Adir will provide “Hel Haavir” with some advantages in performing air superiority tasks on individual airways, as well as in sudden secretive percussion operations. At the same time, the "total domination" voiced by Netanyahu, the Israeli Air Force can not see as their ears. Moreover, for full-fledged operation in the entire Asian region, the Adirov squadron will require constant support from the Kak-707 “Saknai” air tankers, because the F-35A combat radius is 1,5 times smaller than that of the equipped F-16I “Sufa” fuel tanks ". Tel Aviv, however, has grown only to the point of air strikes on the sly by the Hezbollah units, which provide tremendous support in the destruction of ISIS on Syrian soil.
Information sources:
https://www.aerotime.aero/ru/vpk/18472-vvs-izrailya-poluchili-tri-istrebitelya-f-35a-lightning-2
http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/3863102
http://www.airwar.ru/enc/fighter/x35.html
http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-805.html
http://forum.militaryparitet.com/viewtopic.php?id=16844
Information