USA: a course for global missile defense

However, Russia is still capable of delivering guaranteed unacceptable damage to any aggressor.

8 April this year in Prague, the presidents of Russia and the United States Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama signed a new Treaty on measures to further reduce and limit strategic offensive arms (the START-3 Treaty). In drafting this document, the Russian side until the last moment made persistent diplomatic efforts to link agreements on the reduction of strategic offensive arms with the obligations of the parties to limit strategic defensive weapons. At the same time, of course, it was not about reanimation of the 1972 ABM Treaty of the year, but still set a certain framework for the deployment of strategic missile defense systems in order to give practical significance to the negotiation understanding of the relationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive weapons the increasing importance of this relationship in the process of reducing nuclear weapons.

In reality, it was possible to include in the START-3 Treaty only a single essential limitation on missile defense systems concerning the placement of antimissiles. According to paragraph 3 of Article V of the treaty, “each of the parties does not re-equip and does not use launchers of ICBMs and launchers of SLBMs to accommodate anti-missile systems”. The above-mentioned presence of the relationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms, declared in the preamble of the document, in no way violates the US plans to deploy a global missile defense system. That is why, despite the opposition of the American side, Russia was forced to accompany the signing of the START-3 Treaty with a statement regarding missile defense. It stresses that the treaty "can act and be viable only in conditions where there is no qualitative and quantitative increase in the capabilities of the United States of America missile defense system." And further: "Consequently, the exceptional circumstances mentioned in Article XIV of the treaty (the right to withdraw from the treaty) also include the building up of capabilities of the United States of America missile defense systems that would threaten the potential of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation."

Could Moscow, in the current situation in the negotiations, get Washington more on missile defense? It seems that this was impossible. The only alternative could be the breakdown of negotiations and as a result not only the absence of new Russian-American agreements on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms, but also an end to the process of “reset” in relations between the two powers. This development of events did not meet either the national interests of Russia, nor the preservation of strategic stability in the world and even the aspirations of all sensible humanity. Therefore, Moscow chose the option of concluding the START-3 Treaty, honestly warning about the possibility of withdrawing from it in case of a threat to the potential of the Russian strategic nuclear forces.

Now, many Russian critics of the START-3 Treaty, using the actual absence of restrictions on missile defense systems in it, have argued that after its implementation, Russia's strategic nuclear forces will lose their potential for reliable nuclear deterrence.

Is it really so? To answer this question, we should assess, firstly, the intentions and plans of Washington to create a global missile defense system, and secondly, the effectiveness of measures taken by Moscow to increase the antimissile potential of Russian ICBMs and SLBMs.

PROJECTS AND INTENTIONS OF THE PENTAGON

In February of this year, the US Department of Defense published a review of the missile defense program (Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report). It argues that, given the uncertainties of a future missile threat, including the likely options for its escalation, the United States intends to:

- to maintain combat readiness and continue R & D in the interests of improving the ground component of GMD (Ground-based Midcourse Defense) with the GBI (Ground-Based Interceptor) anti-ballistic missiles in Fort Grills (Alaska) and Vandenberg (California);

- complete the preparation of the second launch position at Fort Greely for insurance in case of the need for additional deployment of GBI interceptors;

- to place new information tools in Europe for issuing target indications for missiles launched across the territory of the United States by Iran or another potential enemy in the Middle East;

- to invest in the development of next generations of Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) family interceptors, including for their potential ground deployment;

- to increase funding for R & D on information assets and anti-missile systems of the earliest possible interception, especially when the enemy uses means to overcome missile defense;

- continue to improve the ground component of GMD, create the next generation of missile defense technology, explore alternative options, including developing and evaluating the capabilities of the GBI two-stage antimissile.

At the same time, the Pentagon announced that it was discontinuing the MKV (Multiple Kill Vehicle) interception project with split striking elements and KEI (Kinetic Energy Interceptor) missile interceptors to intercept ballistic missiles on the active trajectory, as well as the return of the laser weapon system project, as part of the 2010 budget. ABL (Airborne Laser) from the R & D phase “system development and demonstration” to the previous one - “concept and technology development”. According to the available information, the application for the 2011 fiscal year does not provide for the financing of MKV and KEI projects - the limited resources allocated to the Pentagon for the needs of missile defense affect. However, this does not mean that a cross is put on these projects. The Review Report proclaimed one of the priorities to be the creation of promising anti-missile systems intended for the earliest possible interception of ballistic missiles, so it is expected that with an increase in funding for the PRO program, the MKV and KEI projects are likely to be reanimated in a modified form.

To ensure proper control over the implementation of the missile defense program, the Pentagon raised the status and responsibility of the executive bureau of the MDEB (Missile Defense Executive Board). Established in March of 2007, this bureau in a collegial mode oversees and coordinates all organizations of the US Department of Defense and some other federal agencies involved in the missile defense program. The work of MDEB in terms of requirements analysis is complemented by the work of the US strategic command body on the use of combat experience. The Bureau also oversees the process of managing the life cycle of anti-missile systems.

The existing plans of the Pentagon provide for the deployment of a two-element missile defense system for the nearest (up to 2015 year) and long-term perspective. The first element is the defense of the American territory from missile threats, the second is the protection of US troops, allies and partners from regional missile threats.

As part of protecting the US territory from a limited missile strike, it is envisaged to complete the deployment of 2010 GBI antimissiles in two positional areas in 30: 26 in Fort Grills and 4 in Vandenberg. In order for these anti-missiles to successfully intercept ballistic targets in the middle segment of their trajectory, early warning radars are used in Alaska, California, Greenland and the United Kingdom, as well as AN / SPY-1 radar on destroyers and cruisers equipped with the Aegis air defense / missile defense system, and X-band radar SBX (Sea-Based X-Band Radar), which is deployed on a mobile naval platform in the Pacific Ocean. To enable the deployment of an additional number of GBI antimissiles in Fort Grills, work will be carried out on equipping the already mentioned second launch position from the 14 silo launchers.

In the long-term, in addition to improving the ground component of GMD, the US Agency for Missile Defense provides for the development of next-generation anti-missile defense technologies, including the possibility of intercepting ICBMs and SLBMs in the upstream part of their trajectory integration of heterogeneous information intelligence systems in the network of a new architecture.

As for the protection of US troops, allies and partners from regional missile threats, over the past decade, Americans have made significant progress in developing and deploying missile defense systems to intercept short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles. These include the Patriot anti-aircraft missile system upgraded to the PAC-3 level, the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) anti-missile system and the Aegis shipboard system with the SM-3 Block 1A antimissiles, as well as powerful mobile radar AN / TPY-2 of three centimeter detection range and tracking ballistic targets. It is believed that so far these funds are available in quantities that are clearly insufficient in the context of increasing regional missile threats. Therefore, within the budget for 2010, the US administration has taken steps to allocate additional targeted allocations for the purchase of THAAD and SM-3 Block 1A interceptors, the development of SM-3 Block 1B antimissiles, and the equipment of a larger number of Navy ships with the Aegis system, adapted for the missile defense system. In the budget application for the 2011 fiscal year, these opportunities are further expanded. It is expected that a ground-based SM-2015 Block 3A anti-rocket modification will appear by 1. This will increase the capabilities of future regional missile defense systems against medium and intermediate range missiles (up to 5000 km).

Another tool scheduled for development in the period up to 2015 of the year is an infrared optical-electronic air-based system. The goal of the project is to provide simultaneous detection and tracking of a large number of ballistic missiles using unmanned aerial vehicles. These spatially distributed airborne platforms should significantly increase the depth of the regional missile defense system.

As the director of the Institute for US and Canadian Studies Sergei Rogov, in 2015, the Pentagon could buy 436 missiles SM-3 Block 1A and Block 1B, which will be placed on 9 cruisers "Ticonderoga" and 28 destroyers type "Arleigh Burke", equipped with the Aegis system, and also deploy 6 batteries of the THAAD anti-missile complex, for which 431 will buy an interceptor missile. In addition, the military will have approximately 900 Patriot PAC-3 interceptor missiles. The number of mobile radars AN / TPY-2 will be brought to 14 units. This will allow the United States to create the necessary grouping for regional missile defense against ballistic missiles of Iran and the DPRK.

For the long term, by 2020, America’s plan is to develop more advanced fire and information systems for regional missile defense. The SM-3 Block 2A, developed in conjunction with Japan, will have a greater acceleration rate and a more efficient homing head, which will allow you to exceed the capabilities of the SM-3 Block 1A and Block 1B missiles and expand the defense zone. The next anti-rocket SM-3 Block 2B, which is now at the initial stage of development, will become even more advanced than the 2A modification. Possessing high accelerating speed and maneuverability characteristics, it will also have certain capabilities for early interception of ICBMs, as well as SLBMs.

Allocations are also planned for the development of the “firing at a remote target” technology, which provides not only the launch of anti-missiles according to external target designation from a remote source, but also the possibility of transferring commands to its board from information means other than the Aegis shipborne radar. This should allow the anti-missile to intercept an attacking ballistic target at long ranges.

For Russia, US plans to deploy a regional missile defense system in Europe are of particular importance. According to the new approach announced by US President Obama in September 2009, a phased - in four phases - deployment of this anti-missile system is envisaged.

In the 1 phase (until the end of 2011 of the year), several areas in the south of Europe should be covered with ships equipped with the Aegis system with the SM-3 Block 1A antimissile.

In the 2 phase (up to 2015 of the year), the capabilities created by the missile defense will be enhanced by the improved SM-3 Block 1B, which will be equipped not only with ships, but also with ground-based systems deployed in southern Europe (in particular, the United States has reached agreements with Romania on the deployment in this country of an antimissile base as part of 24 interceptor missiles). The cover zone will include the territories of the US southeast European allies in NATO.

In the 3 phase (up to 2018 of the year), the zone of protection of Europe against medium and intermediate range missiles will be increased by deploying another similar antimissile base and equipment SM-3 Block 2A in the north of the continent (in Poland) of both ships and ground complexes. This will protect all European allies of the US in NATO.

In the 4 phase (up to 2020 of the year), it is planned to achieve additional capabilities to protect the US territory from ICBMs launched from the Middle East region. During this period, anti-missiles SM-3 Block 2B should appear.

All four phases include the modernization of the combat command and control infrastructure of the missile defense system with the enhancement of its capabilities.

The foregoing indicates that the US administration is consistently pursuing a policy of creating a global missile defense system and does not intend to conclude any international agreements that would impose restrictions on missile defense facilities. The current Republican opposition in the Congress adheres to the same position, which excludes the possibility of changing this course with the coming to power of the Republican Party. In addition, there is no final configuration of the US missile defense system. Therefore, it is impossible to exclude the possibility of its escalation, up to the deployment of the shock space flight, which will significantly increase the combat potential of this system. A weighty sign of the possible appearance of a strike space train in the US missile defense system is the tough rejection of the United States, beginning in 2007, of a joint Russian-Chinese initiative to develop a treaty in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to ban the deployment of any attack systems in space.

MOSCOW POSSIBILITIES AND MEASURES TO BE TAKEN

In the current situation, the military-political leadership of the Russian Federation is taking measures to increase the anti-missile potential of domestic ICBMs and SLBMs, so that no one ever doubts that the Russian strategic nuclear forces will fulfill their task of guaranteed nuclear deterrence.

As part of the strategy of an asymmetrical response to the deployment of missile defense systems that was tested in 80-s of the last century, which is now adapted to the current and predictable situation in the confrontation of a “missile sword - anti-missile shield”, Russian combat capabilities are given to the missile systems that reduce there is no illusion of any aggressor to defend against retribution.

Already now, the Topol-M missile system of a mine and mobile ground-based missile complex is in service of the Strategic Missile Forces, whose PC-12М2 missile can reliably overcome not only existing missile defense systems, but all those that may appear in the world in the next decade. Rocket complexes of land and sea bases, which were created in Soviet times, also have considerable antimissile potential. These are missile systems with the RS-12M, RS-18 and RS-20 ICBMs and the shipborne missile system with the RSM-54 SLBMs. More recently, the RSM-54 SLBM has undergone extensive modernization within the framework of Sinev’s development work, which, along with the increased firing range, has enabled it to reliably overcome modern missile defense systems.

In the near future, the ability of groups of Russian ICBMs and SLBMs to overcome missile defense systems will be greatly enhanced by deploying a new type of multiply-charged ICBM RS-24 and adopting the latest multiply-loaded SLBM RSM-56 (Bulava-30). In the Teikov formation of the Strategic Missile Forces, the first regiment, armed with the Yars missile system with the RS-24 ICBM, is already in combat operational duty, and the difficulties encountered during the flight training of the RSM-56 SLBM will soon be overcome.

Combined with the use of hypersonic maneuvering warheads, a huge arsenal of airborne interference systems for detecting ballistic targets and targeting them with missiles and using a large number of false warheads, Russian ICBMs and SLBMs make the system of defense against a nuclear missile strike absolutely useless. It should be emphasized that the selected asymmetric option of maintaining the strategic parity of the Russian and US nuclear forces in the context of the deployment of a global missile defense system by the Americans is the most economical and effective response to attempts to break this parity.

So the fears of the Russian critics of the START-3 Treaty regarding the loss of the Russian strategic nuclear forces potential for reliable nuclear deterrence are unfounded.

Of course, Moscow will closely monitor all scientific and technological achievements in the field of missile defense and respond adequately to the threats posed by them to the potential of domestic strategic nuclear forces. Already, Russia has such “homework” that, with the most unfavorable developments, will allow it to equip its strategic nuclear forces with nuclear missiles capable of delivering guaranteed unacceptable damage to any potential aggressor. These funds will appear then and in the amount in which it will be necessary to cool the hottest heads of foreign politicians who are planning to devalue the Russian nuclear missile potential. It is possible that in order to implement a number of “home-made” our country will need to withdraw from the Russian-American agreements on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons (for example, when the United States is deploying percussion systems in space).

But such undesirable and detrimental to international security developments is not Russia's choice. Everything will be determined by the restraint of other leading powers in the world in the field of military preparations. First of all, this concerns the United States, which, with the participation of allies in Europe and Northeast Asia, is implementing a program to create a global missile defense system, as well as rampantly building up their usual military capabilities, including by deploying high-precision long-range weapons systems.

It can be said with confidence that, despite the difficulties currently experienced by Russia in reforming its military organization, including the military-industrial complex, it is able to ensure its national security in the most unfavorable developments on the world stage. The guarantor of this is its SNF.