Belarusian Civil War - Grodno operation 1920
After the unsuccessful for the Red Army, the Warsaw operation of the army of the Western Front by the end of August 1920 retired to the line Lipsk, Kuznitsa, Krynka, Pruzhany and Vladimir-Volynsky.
The 3 Army remained on the right flank of the front, west of Grodno. The 15 Army, being, after the internment of units of the 4 Army in East Prussia, on the right flank of the front, was transferred to the front of Krynka, r. Svisloch - to the left of the 3-th army. To the right of the Prussian border and through Suwalki to Lipsk was the Lithuanian army.
In previous battles and during withdrawal, Soviet troops suffered significant losses and were unable to take action without replenishment and restoration of material support. The Polish armies participating in the Warsaw battle, moving north, stretched along the Prussian border and could not continue their further offensive without regrouping.
These circumstances caused an almost one-month lull on the right flank of the Western Front. A break in the fighting was used by the 3 Army to restore the combat capability of its units. Divisions, numbering only about one and a half thousand bayonets each, were brought up to more than four thousand bayonets. The command of the four divisions that had been in the army managed to withdraw half of its forces to the reserve. Regular tactical exercises were organized in reserve divisions, and even shooting was conducted.
The supply of ammunition left much to be desired, but still there were no problems with rifle cartridges.
The Allied Lithuanian Command sought to force the Soviet units to leave the territory recognized by Lithuania along the Sidr line (30 km west of Grodno) and further along the Neman. The question of the operational interaction of the armies was not settled.
The ratio of the forces of the Soviet 3 Army and the units of the Polish 2 acting against it illustrated that the number of bayonets was about the same (21081 for the Reds and 21283 for the Poles); in the number of machine guns and guns - in one and a half (respectively 3993 to 1626 and 557 to 363).
And on the Polish side, the 3 division of legionaries (7260 bayonets, 208 machine guns, 35 guns), which operated at the beginning of the operation with its left flank against the Soviet 5 rifle division, was not taken into account. In addition, the 2 Army had 2 Division Legionnaires in reserve in Bialystok, with 7038 bayonets, 171 machine guns and 23 guns.
Warsaw victory inspired the Polish troops.
The area of operation was a lowland covered with forests and marshes, and was difficult for maneuvering large military masses. Within the 8 - 10 radius of km from Grodno, the forts that were destroyed during World War I were scattered with a preserved system of artificial obstacles (mostly wire barriers). By the beginning of the operation, the forts were adapted to defense and represented serious defensive lines.
The Grodno bridgehead could serve as a starting position for the offensive, but in combination with the belt of the Grodno forts and the r. Neman, was an excellent area for defense. But he could be bypassed from the north.
After the defeat of the Red Army near Warsaw, Poland, on the eve of the conclusion of a peace treaty, decided to seize as much territory as possible. The Polish 2 Army, with the assistance of the 4 Army operating to the south, was to defeat the Soviet troops, concentrated in the triangle Grodno-Volkovysk-Lida. For this purpose, it was planned to bypass this area in Lithuanian territory and break through in the m. Mosty. The suddenness of the strike was achieved by the fact that it was applied around the territory of Lithuania. The success of the Polish strike group was based on mastering the Neman crossings.
On September 20, the shock group of the 2 Army went over to the offensive - it had to throw away the opposing Soviet units beyond the Neman and seize river ferries. In the evening, the group pushed the Soviet 6 Infantry Division into the fort zone, going along the line Ballya Solo, Labno Ogorodniki, Tomashi, Kulivetsy.
In the evening, the 6 Brigade of the 166 Rifle Division was moved to the left flank of the 56 Division, and on September 21 the 56 Division received the task of restoring the position and occupying New. Yard, Forge. The 16 Division was pushed aside by M. Berestovits.
On the Lithuanian front of September 23, several squadrons of the Polish 4 Cavalry Brigade captured a bridge over the Neman near Druskieniki, and by the 20 watch the 1 division of the legionnaires, easily rejected the Lithuanians, captured this little town. The Lithuanian army began to withdraw to the line Merech, Martsykantsev, Dubichi. Thus, the right flank of the 3 Army was threatened by the enemy’s flank group.
By the evening of September 21, the flank group had reached the Marcikans area (1-division of legionnaires), Porechye (1-I Lithuanian-Belarusian division and 2-I cavalry brigade).
The command of the 3 Army learned about the crossing of the Poles through the Neman in Druskiniki by the 23 of September in 22 hours of 45 minutes. To parry the enemy's strike from the front north of the Forge, the 166 brigade of the 56 division was withdrawn and sent to occupy the forts north of Grodno - along the line of Cheschevlyany, Grandichi.
By the evening of September 24, the right flank of the army was held at the Grodno forts. The center (56-division) was pushed aside to the forts, and then redeployed to the area north of Grodno, and the left flank (5-division) retired to the front of Senklichi, Kuntsevschina.
The calculation of the Polish command on the rapid mastery of the river. Neman was unsuccessful. Convinced of the resilience of the Soviet units on the outskirts of Grodno, the Polish command of 24 September gives the order to suspend the offensive of its flank group. To assist the group are allocated infantry and cavalry brigades with the task of advancing in a southerly direction.
The Lithuanian army, without providing resistance to the Poles, continues to withdraw to the northeast.
On the 15 Army Section, September 20 began fighting with the 3 Division of Legionnaires and the left flank of the 4 Army. By September 24, the left flank of the 15 Army and units of the 16 Army were pushed as far as Volkovysk, and the front stabilized along the line of M. Berestovits, Kuzmichi, and Volkovysk.
On September 25, the right flank of the 15 Army begins to withdraw beyond the r. Neman and Ros.
Thus, the first period of the operation was marked by the struggle for the Grodno bridgehead. To keep a bridgehead, “by all means”, “to restore the situation” - this is the leitmotif that guided the command of the 3 Army, directing the 56 Division to the west bank of the r. Neman.
Speaking about the danger on the right, it should be noted that the Soviet command took into account the possibility of bypassing the army in Lithuanian territory. But it did not react to this danger by the corresponding grouping of its reserves. So, 21-division was located in three transitions from the front of the army, and 56-I was drawn into the struggle for the "restoration of the situation" on the Grodno bridgehead. The headquarters of the 3 Army regarded the movement of Polish units to the north as actions against the Lithuanians, forgetting that the failure on the Lithuanian front exposes the flank of the army.
The crossing of the enemy through the Neman at Druskiniki was a surprise for the command of the army, and it was in a difficult situation: the 21-division was far away, and the 56-I was dragged into the battle south-west of Grodno. And the 56-division is pulled out of the battle in parts and moves closer to the front of the 21.
At the same time, the hopes of the Polish command for the rapid mastery of the Grodno bridgehead and the crossings over the Neman were not crowned with success. The resilience of the Soviet units on the approaches to Grodno shook his confidence, and it stops the advance of the flank group and crushes it.
The command of the Western Front, having received information about the appearance of the enemy on the flank of the 3 Army, September 24 set the army the task: "smash the enemy in the Druskiniki area, Martikanians and throw him behind the Neman." For this, the 3 Army was assigned to the 2 Division of the 15 Army, located in the Shchuchin area.
On September 25, the tasks for the shock divisions were refined: for the 21, to go to the area of Morgevichi, Shklyary, Males, and the 2, to strike in the direction of the metro station Druskeniki and capture the area of Likhachi, Porechye, Art. Druskiniki, 56-th - by the same time to seize the front of the Sables, Verkhopole, Gozha, and 6-th and 5-th - to defend the line r. Neman.
But the order was given without regard to whether the previous one was completed, and the right-flank divisions (21-I and 2-I) acted with great delay. Only the 56 Division was able to concentrate in a timely manner north of Grodno. In the evening of September 25, she launched an offensive, but could not develop it.
The enemy flanking group was inactive at that time, and only two brigades launched an offensive to the south. Only September 25th, when aviation reported the withdrawal of the 15th army, the Polish command ordered the group to continue the offensive.
All three commanders of the 3 Army's strike group, due to the appearance of enemy cavalry in the Radun area, received orders to stop the offensive and then retreat.
Taking into account the stability of the front on the Neman, and more than double the superiority in forces at this moment, it is obvious that the outcome of the battle would be favorable for the Reds. But the command of the army, not having even an approximate data on the composition and strength of the enemy’s flank group, could not come to these conclusions.
In the evening, like a bolt from the blue, a report was received about a collision in the area of Ozhelyshki of the Special Brigade of the 15 Army with the enemy's cavalry — units of the 4 Cavalry Brigade. The army command finds out that infantry is moving behind cavalry. This was reported to the front headquarters, and in 20 hours 45 minutes 25 September was followed by the order of the front command to withdraw.
The 3 Army was tasked to concentrate in the area of ирirmuna, Myto, Lupenica. 15-I army was assigned to the front Goldov, Eagle and then along the river. Schara.
The departure began on the night of September 26.
21-division by the evening of September 26 went into the area Vasilishki, 2-division, not having time to go to a given area before the enemy, retreated under his pressure. The 5 Division began withdrawing its units from the p. The Neman is not connected with the actions of the 56 division, but to prevent the withdrawal of the 6 and 56 divisions.
The Poles at this time did not yawn.
At Komatov on boats and pontoons 4-th Podhalyansky regiment began to cross and move north - on Obukhov - Zidomlya. As a result, the column of the 6 division held at Obukhov in the morning along the highway was cut in half. The 16 brigade was able to break through with energetic but isolated actions of the regiment, but the 48 th regiment was particularly hard hit (including the one who lost the regimental regimental prisoner).
The 168 Brigade and the Cavalry Regiment of the 56 Division approached the area of Zhidoml. Having found the enemy, the brigade turned around and, together with the cavalry commander, rushed at the enemy, destroying two Polish battalions. In this battle, the commander of the Podhalyansky regiment was killed, 2 guns, 6 machine guns were captured, officer 2 and 150 soldiers were captured, many Red Army prisoners were released and guns of the Bashkir artillery brigade were repulsed.
15-I army at this time retreated to the river. Goldov, Orla, p. Schara.
On September 27, the enemy captured the area of ирrmuny. Attempt of the Kuban brigade to reject the Poles for r. Dzitva, success is not maimed.
The retreating units of the 2, 56 and 5 divisions were fighting backward on this day. The 56 Division was particularly hard hit. In a battle with her, the Poles lost 130 dead, 230 wounded, 410 prisoners and several machine guns. The Red 166 Brigade lost about 400 people killed and wounded.
The Soviet divisions made their way one by one, acting at their own peril and risk. But by the end of the operation, the Polish 2 Army was also scattered to a depth of 80 km.
The choice of the direction of the main strike on the Lithuanian territory bypassing the red group in the absence of interaction between it and the Lithuanian armies was successful. The suddenness of the blow is one of the positive aspects of this plan. But the group of forces did not fit the plan of the operation. The flank group was weak in composition. The success of the group advancing from the front was based on the capture of the Neman crossings.
Without understanding the meaning of the Grodno bridgehead, the command of the Soviet 3 Army used it incorrectly. Instead of letting the enemy hurt his forehead on these lines, it spends strength to keep the bridgehead for the sake of the bridgehead. Fearing for their right flank, the army command did not provide it with the appropriate grouping of reserves. The appearance of the Polish cavalry in the Radun area broke the will of the army command - as a result, it presented to the front command information about the unreasonableness of continuing the attack on Druskiniki and received an order to withdraw.
The initiative turned out to be in Polish hands - and this despite the fact that the Soviet command was given the opportunity to beat the enemy’s flank group on those lines that he would have liked.
However, during the operation, the Polish command, despite the presence of powerful radio communications and active aviation, did not have sufficient information about the actions of its divisions. It did not cope with the control of the flank group, nor with forcing the r. Neman.
During the operation, the Soviet 3-I army came out from under the blow.
The real threat to the right flank of the 15 Army and the imaginary 3 Army forced the Soviet command to move farther than those lines that were the limits of the withdrawal. And by the time peace was concluded, the Poles had achieved their main goal — the seizure of a large territory of Belarus, although there were chances for a favorable outcome for the Soviet troops.
1. The course of the Grodno operation from 20 to 25 September 1920
2. Polish volunteers in Grodno.
The 3 Army remained on the right flank of the front, west of Grodno. The 15 Army, being, after the internment of units of the 4 Army in East Prussia, on the right flank of the front, was transferred to the front of Krynka, r. Svisloch - to the left of the 3-th army. To the right of the Prussian border and through Suwalki to Lipsk was the Lithuanian army.
In previous battles and during withdrawal, Soviet troops suffered significant losses and were unable to take action without replenishment and restoration of material support. The Polish armies participating in the Warsaw battle, moving north, stretched along the Prussian border and could not continue their further offensive without regrouping.
These circumstances caused an almost one-month lull on the right flank of the Western Front. A break in the fighting was used by the 3 Army to restore the combat capability of its units. Divisions, numbering only about one and a half thousand bayonets each, were brought up to more than four thousand bayonets. The command of the four divisions that had been in the army managed to withdraw half of its forces to the reserve. Regular tactical exercises were organized in reserve divisions, and even shooting was conducted.
The supply of ammunition left much to be desired, but still there were no problems with rifle cartridges.
The Allied Lithuanian Command sought to force the Soviet units to leave the territory recognized by Lithuania along the Sidr line (30 km west of Grodno) and further along the Neman. The question of the operational interaction of the armies was not settled.
The ratio of the forces of the Soviet 3 Army and the units of the Polish 2 acting against it illustrated that the number of bayonets was about the same (21081 for the Reds and 21283 for the Poles); in the number of machine guns and guns - in one and a half (respectively 3993 to 1626 and 557 to 363).
And on the Polish side, the 3 division of legionaries (7260 bayonets, 208 machine guns, 35 guns), which operated at the beginning of the operation with its left flank against the Soviet 5 rifle division, was not taken into account. In addition, the 2 Army had 2 Division Legionnaires in reserve in Bialystok, with 7038 bayonets, 171 machine guns and 23 guns.
Warsaw victory inspired the Polish troops.
The area of operation was a lowland covered with forests and marshes, and was difficult for maneuvering large military masses. Within the 8 - 10 radius of km from Grodno, the forts that were destroyed during World War I were scattered with a preserved system of artificial obstacles (mostly wire barriers). By the beginning of the operation, the forts were adapted to defense and represented serious defensive lines.
The Grodno bridgehead could serve as a starting position for the offensive, but in combination with the belt of the Grodno forts and the r. Neman, was an excellent area for defense. But he could be bypassed from the north.
After the defeat of the Red Army near Warsaw, Poland, on the eve of the conclusion of a peace treaty, decided to seize as much territory as possible. The Polish 2 Army, with the assistance of the 4 Army operating to the south, was to defeat the Soviet troops, concentrated in the triangle Grodno-Volkovysk-Lida. For this purpose, it was planned to bypass this area in Lithuanian territory and break through in the m. Mosty. The suddenness of the strike was achieved by the fact that it was applied around the territory of Lithuania. The success of the Polish strike group was based on mastering the Neman crossings.
On September 20, the shock group of the 2 Army went over to the offensive - it had to throw away the opposing Soviet units beyond the Neman and seize river ferries. In the evening, the group pushed the Soviet 6 Infantry Division into the fort zone, going along the line Ballya Solo, Labno Ogorodniki, Tomashi, Kulivetsy.
In the evening, the 6 Brigade of the 166 Rifle Division was moved to the left flank of the 56 Division, and on September 21 the 56 Division received the task of restoring the position and occupying New. Yard, Forge. The 16 Division was pushed aside by M. Berestovits.
On the Lithuanian front of September 23, several squadrons of the Polish 4 Cavalry Brigade captured a bridge over the Neman near Druskieniki, and by the 20 watch the 1 division of the legionnaires, easily rejected the Lithuanians, captured this little town. The Lithuanian army began to withdraw to the line Merech, Martsykantsev, Dubichi. Thus, the right flank of the 3 Army was threatened by the enemy’s flank group.
By the evening of September 21, the flank group had reached the Marcikans area (1-division of legionnaires), Porechye (1-I Lithuanian-Belarusian division and 2-I cavalry brigade).
The command of the 3 Army learned about the crossing of the Poles through the Neman in Druskiniki by the 23 of September in 22 hours of 45 minutes. To parry the enemy's strike from the front north of the Forge, the 166 brigade of the 56 division was withdrawn and sent to occupy the forts north of Grodno - along the line of Cheschevlyany, Grandichi.
By the evening of September 24, the right flank of the army was held at the Grodno forts. The center (56-division) was pushed aside to the forts, and then redeployed to the area north of Grodno, and the left flank (5-division) retired to the front of Senklichi, Kuntsevschina.
The calculation of the Polish command on the rapid mastery of the river. Neman was unsuccessful. Convinced of the resilience of the Soviet units on the outskirts of Grodno, the Polish command of 24 September gives the order to suspend the offensive of its flank group. To assist the group are allocated infantry and cavalry brigades with the task of advancing in a southerly direction.
The Lithuanian army, without providing resistance to the Poles, continues to withdraw to the northeast.
On the 15 Army Section, September 20 began fighting with the 3 Division of Legionnaires and the left flank of the 4 Army. By September 24, the left flank of the 15 Army and units of the 16 Army were pushed as far as Volkovysk, and the front stabilized along the line of M. Berestovits, Kuzmichi, and Volkovysk.
On September 25, the right flank of the 15 Army begins to withdraw beyond the r. Neman and Ros.
Thus, the first period of the operation was marked by the struggle for the Grodno bridgehead. To keep a bridgehead, “by all means”, “to restore the situation” - this is the leitmotif that guided the command of the 3 Army, directing the 56 Division to the west bank of the r. Neman.
Speaking about the danger on the right, it should be noted that the Soviet command took into account the possibility of bypassing the army in Lithuanian territory. But it did not react to this danger by the corresponding grouping of its reserves. So, 21-division was located in three transitions from the front of the army, and 56-I was drawn into the struggle for the "restoration of the situation" on the Grodno bridgehead. The headquarters of the 3 Army regarded the movement of Polish units to the north as actions against the Lithuanians, forgetting that the failure on the Lithuanian front exposes the flank of the army.
The crossing of the enemy through the Neman at Druskiniki was a surprise for the command of the army, and it was in a difficult situation: the 21-division was far away, and the 56-I was dragged into the battle south-west of Grodno. And the 56-division is pulled out of the battle in parts and moves closer to the front of the 21.
At the same time, the hopes of the Polish command for the rapid mastery of the Grodno bridgehead and the crossings over the Neman were not crowned with success. The resilience of the Soviet units on the approaches to Grodno shook his confidence, and it stops the advance of the flank group and crushes it.
The command of the Western Front, having received information about the appearance of the enemy on the flank of the 3 Army, September 24 set the army the task: "smash the enemy in the Druskiniki area, Martikanians and throw him behind the Neman." For this, the 3 Army was assigned to the 2 Division of the 15 Army, located in the Shchuchin area.
On September 25, the tasks for the shock divisions were refined: for the 21, to go to the area of Morgevichi, Shklyary, Males, and the 2, to strike in the direction of the metro station Druskeniki and capture the area of Likhachi, Porechye, Art. Druskiniki, 56-th - by the same time to seize the front of the Sables, Verkhopole, Gozha, and 6-th and 5-th - to defend the line r. Neman.
But the order was given without regard to whether the previous one was completed, and the right-flank divisions (21-I and 2-I) acted with great delay. Only the 56 Division was able to concentrate in a timely manner north of Grodno. In the evening of September 25, she launched an offensive, but could not develop it.
The enemy flanking group was inactive at that time, and only two brigades launched an offensive to the south. Only September 25th, when aviation reported the withdrawal of the 15th army, the Polish command ordered the group to continue the offensive.
All three commanders of the 3 Army's strike group, due to the appearance of enemy cavalry in the Radun area, received orders to stop the offensive and then retreat.
Taking into account the stability of the front on the Neman, and more than double the superiority in forces at this moment, it is obvious that the outcome of the battle would be favorable for the Reds. But the command of the army, not having even an approximate data on the composition and strength of the enemy’s flank group, could not come to these conclusions.
In the evening, like a bolt from the blue, a report was received about a collision in the area of Ozhelyshki of the Special Brigade of the 15 Army with the enemy's cavalry — units of the 4 Cavalry Brigade. The army command finds out that infantry is moving behind cavalry. This was reported to the front headquarters, and in 20 hours 45 minutes 25 September was followed by the order of the front command to withdraw.
The 3 Army was tasked to concentrate in the area of ирirmuna, Myto, Lupenica. 15-I army was assigned to the front Goldov, Eagle and then along the river. Schara.
The departure began on the night of September 26.
21-division by the evening of September 26 went into the area Vasilishki, 2-division, not having time to go to a given area before the enemy, retreated under his pressure. The 5 Division began withdrawing its units from the p. The Neman is not connected with the actions of the 56 division, but to prevent the withdrawal of the 6 and 56 divisions.
The Poles at this time did not yawn.
At Komatov on boats and pontoons 4-th Podhalyansky regiment began to cross and move north - on Obukhov - Zidomlya. As a result, the column of the 6 division held at Obukhov in the morning along the highway was cut in half. The 16 brigade was able to break through with energetic but isolated actions of the regiment, but the 48 th regiment was particularly hard hit (including the one who lost the regimental regimental prisoner).
The 168 Brigade and the Cavalry Regiment of the 56 Division approached the area of Zhidoml. Having found the enemy, the brigade turned around and, together with the cavalry commander, rushed at the enemy, destroying two Polish battalions. In this battle, the commander of the Podhalyansky regiment was killed, 2 guns, 6 machine guns were captured, officer 2 and 150 soldiers were captured, many Red Army prisoners were released and guns of the Bashkir artillery brigade were repulsed.
15-I army at this time retreated to the river. Goldov, Orla, p. Schara.
On September 27, the enemy captured the area of ирrmuny. Attempt of the Kuban brigade to reject the Poles for r. Dzitva, success is not maimed.
The retreating units of the 2, 56 and 5 divisions were fighting backward on this day. The 56 Division was particularly hard hit. In a battle with her, the Poles lost 130 dead, 230 wounded, 410 prisoners and several machine guns. The Red 166 Brigade lost about 400 people killed and wounded.
The Soviet divisions made their way one by one, acting at their own peril and risk. But by the end of the operation, the Polish 2 Army was also scattered to a depth of 80 km.
The choice of the direction of the main strike on the Lithuanian territory bypassing the red group in the absence of interaction between it and the Lithuanian armies was successful. The suddenness of the blow is one of the positive aspects of this plan. But the group of forces did not fit the plan of the operation. The flank group was weak in composition. The success of the group advancing from the front was based on the capture of the Neman crossings.
Without understanding the meaning of the Grodno bridgehead, the command of the Soviet 3 Army used it incorrectly. Instead of letting the enemy hurt his forehead on these lines, it spends strength to keep the bridgehead for the sake of the bridgehead. Fearing for their right flank, the army command did not provide it with the appropriate grouping of reserves. The appearance of the Polish cavalry in the Radun area broke the will of the army command - as a result, it presented to the front command information about the unreasonableness of continuing the attack on Druskiniki and received an order to withdraw.
The initiative turned out to be in Polish hands - and this despite the fact that the Soviet command was given the opportunity to beat the enemy’s flank group on those lines that he would have liked.
However, during the operation, the Polish command, despite the presence of powerful radio communications and active aviation, did not have sufficient information about the actions of its divisions. It did not cope with the control of the flank group, nor with forcing the r. Neman.
During the operation, the Soviet 3-I army came out from under the blow.
The real threat to the right flank of the 15 Army and the imaginary 3 Army forced the Soviet command to move farther than those lines that were the limits of the withdrawal. And by the time peace was concluded, the Poles had achieved their main goal — the seizure of a large territory of Belarus, although there were chances for a favorable outcome for the Soviet troops.
1. The course of the Grodno operation from 20 to 25 September 1920
2. Polish volunteers in Grodno.
Information