Military Review

Romania’s interest in the Patriot air defense system and HIMARS complexes is a dangerous double bottom game

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Launcher SAM "Patriot PAC-3MSE"



Having entered the list of the 5th stage of the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance to the east in 2004, Romania opened for Washington a unique range of operational and strategic advantages of an offensive and defensive nature in the East European theater of operations. In particular, after Bulgaria and Romania enter NATO, the total length of the Black Sea coast of the countries of the enemy military alliance and its allies (Georgia and Ukraine) continues to be almost 2,8 times the length of the Black Sea coast of Russia even after the accession of the Republic of Crimea. And in case of an aggravation of the regional military-strategic situation, this entire huge coastal stretch can be used at any time for the construction of the NATO naval infrastructure, the operations of the United States Naval Forces, as well as the deployment of batteries of the MM-40 Block III “Exocet” coastal anti-ship systems. But if, to quickly fend off this threat, the Black Sea fleet there is a powerful coastal and aviation components in the form of mobile Bastion-P missile launchers with 3M55 Onyx missiles, IL-38N anti-submarine patrol aircraft with Novella-P-38 search systems and Su-30SM multi-purpose super-maneuverable fighters with a rich range of high-precision weapons and air combat missiles to create an access restriction zone and an A2 / AD maneuver over the northern part of the Black Sea, then with the elimination of strategic threats deep in the Black Sea states, difficulties may arise.

What threats are we talking about? Firstly, this is the second most important Europro missile object in the Eastern European theater of America - the NSF Aegis Ashore anti-missile complex, represented by ground modifications of the universal Mk 41 launchers with the 24 transport-launch containers Mk 21 mod 2. Containers include RIM-161C anti-missiles (SM-3 Block IB) with exoatmospheric Mk 142 interceptors designed to intercept ICBMs and MRBDs on the ascending, marching and descending segments of the trajectory, as well as low-orbit military satellites. The anti-missile missiles are controlled by the improved AEgis BMD 4.0.1 PIC and the AN / SPY-1D multi-function radar, located on the ground-based antenna post-analogue of the Ticonderog class missile cruiser.

Depending on the situation, the Mk 41 launchers can be converted into a strike version using the MK 14 TPK equipment designed to launch ground-based BGM-109E Tomahawks, or the AGM-158C LRASM multi-purpose anti-ship missiles. The former can reach strategically important facilities near Samara, Kazan and Yaroslavl, the latter pose a threat to the surface ships of the Black Sea Fleet in the sea, and coastal naval facilities in the Crimea. If we are talking about 24 missiles, then, naturally, they will be intercepted by the powerful missile defense of the Crimea, based on the C-300B4, C-300PM1 and C-400 complexes. The same is waiting shtatovskie "Topors" in the case of the passage of their trajectory to the Krasnodar Territory. But who said that Washington will limit itself to the presence of only 1x24 PU Deck Mk 41. The militarization trend in Eastern Europe will continue, which is why the Romanian Ashor is more likely to relocate several more launchers (24 cells in each), bringing the general arsenal of transport and launch containers to the level of one or several UCO cruisers Tikonderoga. Such a strategy is fully consistent with the American concept of “Fast Global Strike” (BSU). After another decade or two, the Romanian Aegis Ashor could turn into the largest attack and defense complex directed against any attempts to dominate the Black Sea Fleet and Russia's VKS on the Black Sea coast, as well as an anti-ballistic missile with an arsenal of a hundred or more RIM-161B or more technological RIM-161E (SM-3 Block IIB). The range of the latter can be 800 — 1000 and more than kilometers, which will allow the US Navy to cover the main flight paths of our ICBMs in the West European direction. There is also a more “weighty” theory about giving the RIM-161E the capabilities of medium-range ballistic missiles. Prospects to get "at the gate" such ammunition is not encouraging.

Secondly, Aegis Ashore cannot be considered the only strategic threat to us in the Romanian operational direction. As you remember, 25 on April 2016, at the Romanian coastal airbase “Mikhail Koghelnichanu” as a “show of force”, Moscow sent two subtle F-5A “Raptor” fighter jets to Moscow. Of course, such an action may at first seem to us just a ridiculous “muscle game”, but this is a real foreshadowing of more serious steps to strategically oppress the actions of our anti-submarine and fighter aircraft over the Black Sea. To fully cover what is happening, it is enough to get acquainted with history and the possibilities of this Romanian Avb, located in 10 km from the Black Sea coast. Until 2004, the Mikhail Kogelnichanu airfield was a large air harbor for passenger airliners, as well as the 57 Air Force Base of the Romanian Air Force, with which MiG-29А, MiG-29С and MiG-29UB fighters operated.

Even then, by agreement between the ministries of defense of the United States and Romania, this object was used as a transit point for the material and technical support of the American contingent in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001-2003. The infrastructure of the air base was also used as a secret prison by the CIA, in which about three dozen Afghans and Iraqis were interrogated. About this in 2006 year, it became known from the Swiss special services, intercepted a secret message sent by Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Abdul Gheit to the British Embassy. Three years after the decommissioning of the Romanian MiG-29 (in the 2004 year), the American military contingent arrived at the Mikhail Mikhail Koghelnichan Aviation Station in 2007, together with the Bulgarian and Romanian units armies, formed there the task force East Task Force, designed to work out the tactics of modern network-centric hostilities with its Eastern European allies. This event marked a new stage in the establishment of operational and strategic control over the western approaches to Russia in the Black Sea region: the US armed forces were stationed on a rotating basis.

The Mikhail Kogalnichanu airbase has one wide airstrip, the technical advantage of which is its length in 3470 m. This makes it possible to take practically existing medium and heavy military transport aircraft, including the C-5 "Globemaster -III "and" Airbas A17M ", thanks to which the necessary tactical missile systems, ammunition for armored vehicles, repair equipment and much more can be quickly delivered to the Black Sea coast. This airbase has already managed to become the center of attention of 400 on September 14, when an impressive military cargo was delivered to it by a military transport plane for the 2016 battalion of the 1 armored regiment of the US Armed Forces deployed to Romania as part of the strategic operation Atlantic Resolve ". At that time, the American land force was represented by about 64 BBM and several thousand personnel who took part in the Saber Guardian-500 July-August military exercise at the Chinku range in Romania. But by the day of delivery of the above-mentioned military cargo to the Avb “Mikhail Kogalnichanu”, most of the 2016-th battalion was sent to the eastern part of Romania, densely to the borders of Moldova, Transnistria and Ukraine. This created a huge resonance against the background of the situation in the Donbass theater of military operations and on the Crimean-Ukrainian border, where the situation continued to lean towards the next escalation.

As you can see, the coastal Romanian airbase “Mikhail Koghelnichanu” continues to be the main “artery” of supply for the American group of troops near the Russian zone of responsibility in the Black Sea and on its coast. This airstrip can also be used to accommodate powerful backbones of tactical aviation, which will include components for winning air supremacy (F-22A, F-35A, Typhoons, etc.) and the strike component Presented by the multi-purpose fighter F-15E "Strike Eagle" and F-16C / D Block 52. But how will they cover the air base itself Aegis Ashor? After all, the 43-th separate naval assault air regiment has at its disposal a fighter squadron from the 12 Su-30CM multi-purpose fighters capable of taking the X-72MK59 / МNNXX long-range tactical missiles capable of wiping out the surface of the body of the body to be wiped from the ground to remove the infrastructure of the above area. The Ashora, located in 2 km from the Black Sea coast, is easily reached by several dozen “Calibers” in the strategic performance of 2М350К / Т. There are also "trump" tactical low-profile cruise missiles of long range 3М14 (Р-9), used by the Iskander-K operational tactical complexes with a range of about 728 km. There are more than a dozen of such complexes on the west coast of the Republic of Crimea, and on each launcher of the SPN 500P500-9 through the 78 transport-launch container, so it’s not difficult to estimate the possibility of a massive rocket attack.

To date, the Aegis Ashore facility in Deveselu and the Mikhail Kogalnichanu airbase have no effective echeloned antimissile defense from hundreds of high-precision missile systems of the Russian Navy and the Russian space forces. A couple of batteries of “Patriots”, thrown by the Americans to cover their facilities in “peacetime”, will not change the balance of forces, while the Romanian air defense forces have absolutely nothing to cover the main base of the “European missile defense” transferred to the Americans because of their weapons of old complexes, among which are marked the Hawk PIP-3R medium-range air defense missile systems, Volkhov С-75М. These complexes do not have the ability to effectively repel a massive strike by low-altitude cruise missiles with a small effective reflecting surface. Even the fact that the upgraded Romanian SAM “Hawk PIP-3R” is equipped with new multi-channel high-sensitivity MRLS AN / MPQ-61 HIPIR (“High Power Illuminator Radar”) does not cancel the low-speed and maneuverable capabilities of anti-aircraft missiles of the MIM-23K family during intercept. maneuvering cruise missiles. The maximum constructive overload of the MIM-23K SAM is in the range from 16 to 20 units, which allows you to confidently shoot down only direct-flying air assault weapons, including outdated tactical ballistic missiles. Not provided for radar AN / MPQ-61 illumination and such an option as a universal tower to intercept low-altitude targets (with a significant increase in radio horizon), and therefore the ability to repel our missiles at the Hawk PIP-3R complex is far from impressive.


Loading launcher M192 Romanian upgraded SAM "Hawk PIP-3R"


This situation did not suit either the Romanians or the Americans, and at the end of April Bucharest, not without instructions from Washington, initiated a very serious modernization of its air defense forces and the Ground Forces. In particular, according to information from the Polish resource defense24.pl, Romania announced the need to purchase high-precision mobile tactical missile and artillery systems HIMARS, as well as long-range anti-aircraft missile systems "Patriot". At the same time, neither the head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Romania Nicolae-Ionel Chuke, nor the representatives of the department provided information regarding the number and modifications of the weapons being purchased. Considering that at the base of “Mikhail Kogalnichan”, in the near future, it is planned to deploy a number of British “Typhoons”, as well as an armored battalion of the US Army, armed with several dozen M1A2 (possibly in TUSK modification), similar to the number of BMP “Bradley” and 1000 people of LS , the acquired complex will be the newest and most expensive anti-missile version of the “Patriot PAC-3MSE”, capable of withstanding both tactical ballistic missiles and low-altitude cruise missiles (hardly for covering The objects of NATO favorites will use the standard version of "PAC-2").

The new Patriot PAC-3MSE modification complex uses advanced ERINT anti-missiles under the MIM-104F index. They are equipped with a more powerful dual-mode solid-fuel rocket engine, which accelerates anti-missiles to 5M, as well as a more developed tail aerodynamic control system that allows you to realize high overloads (more than 30 units) and without activating the “belt” of gas-dynamic rudders, with them the calculated overloads increase to 62G . It will be very difficult for the new Patriot to successfully intercept the ISK 9M723 of the Iskander-M complex, which is carrying out anti-aircraft maneuvers with overloading of 30 units. But this complex cannot be completely underestimated: the flight performance of the MIM-104F rocket, as well as its ultra-high-precision millimeter active radar homing, make it possible to work excellently on unobtrusive cruise missiles and other WTO, including Calibers, X-59MK and X-XNXHM anti-radar missiles and X-31USHKE.

Moreover, with a sufficient number of divisions, the PAC-3MSE will be able to effectively counter several dozen approaching low-altitude missiles and enemy tactical fighters. For many, a seemingly urgent question can arise: how can the PAC-3 easily withstand numerous low-flying elements of high-precision weapons when it does not have towers for raising the multifunctional radar to the appropriate height? The answer lies in the guidance system of the complex, as well as in the advanced network-centric abilities of the modernized command and control center “Patriot” - AN / MSQ-104. Thanks to its equipping with a terminal for the exchange of tactical information via a secure radio channel "Link-16" ("JTIDS"), it is possible to obtain the coordinates of low-altitude air targets, which are far beyond the limits of the radio horizon.

As a result, the Patriot PAC-3MSE battery can begin to fire targets at a distance more than 25-30 km from the battery (targeting sources are airborne airplanes E-3D and tactical aircraft equipped with a Link-16 interface). The “Patriot PAC-2” variant did not have the possibility of hitting beyond-the-horizon targets in the “let-forget” mode, since the MIM-104B / C missiles were equipped with PARGSN, requiring MPQ-53 illumination. It is known that for the "Patriot" a more advanced MRLS based on a flat AFAR with transmitting and receiving modules, made on the basis of gallium nitride, is being developed. The station will be able to detect, track and capture a larger number of enemy air objects at a longer range.

Romanian mountainous terrain will enhance the efficiency of the Patriot PAC-3 deployable batteries. The southern elevations in the Machinsky Mountains region in the Dobruja region will allow covering the significant low-altitude flying areas to the Mikhail Kogalnichanu airbase without the support of DRLO aviation. From this area it is very easy to maintain radio control over the coastal zone of Romania. The observation of the low-altitude section of the Romanian airspace in the direction of the missile defense system in Deveselu can be carried out from the heights above the Southern Carpathians. All the advanced American facilities of Romania are located in parts of the Balkan state that are quite acceptable for building air defense, which must be taken into account when developing an asymmetric response from the Russian Navy and the Russian space forces.

As we managed to make sure at the beginning of 2016, Romania, unlike such passive NATO members as Slovakia or the Czech Republic, takes a very strong anti-Russian position on the geopolitical scene. Thus, in the previous year, official Bucharest proposed the creation of a joint international shipboard “shock” grouping in the Black Sea to counter the Black Sea Fleet of Russia. To present this motley warrant was planned by surface combatant ships and submarines of the Turkish, Romanian and Bulgarian fleets. According to some media reports, a naval compound may receive a symbolic abbreviation “BRUT” (translated as “dirty”), although it is formed from the capital letters of the participating countries.

Only the ships of the Turkish Navy and the Romanian Navy can become the most combat-ready fleets in this grouping. The Turkish Navy currently has 13 diesel-electric submarines of the 209 type, as well as 8 rocket control missiles and 16 frigates of similar designation. But you can temporarily exclude Turkey from the list of the “naval club of losers” “BRUT” from the list, because for Ankara today a much more pressing issue is a successful deal with Moscow for the acquisition of Triumph C-400 anti-aircraft missile systems. The Bulgarian fleet also does not shine with modern naval personnel, having armed outdated Belgian frigates of the “Villingen” type (3 unit), 1 patrol ship of 1159, 2 IPC 12412 and only 1 Soviet-made missile boat of XRUMXT ave. "Termite" on board. The Ukrainian fleet, fortunately, does not possess shock and defensive potentials at all. So, on the frigate “Hetman Sagaidachny” there is no anti-ship armament at all, and individual anti-aircraft / anti-missile defense is built on one Osa-MA1241.1 CPCR. Consequently, only the Romanian fleet, several times inferior to our Black Sea Fleet in terms of numbers and technical capabilities, is seriously opposed to our warships.

With the aim of expanding its combat capabilities, the Romanian Ministry of Defense launched the 2016 year, the 4 program of building multi-purpose corvettes “SIGMA”, developed by Damen Schelde Shipbuilding (Netherlands). It is reported that the ships of modular type will be built at the shipyard of the Dutch company, located on the Romanian coast. Among the main combat assets of this class of NK, it is worth noting the shipborne air defense system VL-MICA, presented by 16 SAM “MICA-IR” (with IKGSN) and “MICA-EM” (with ARGSN), 8 long-range anti-ship missile MBDA MM-40 “Exocet” »And 2 torpedo tubes B515 using light torpedoes A244 / S Mod.3 (their range at low speed is 13,5 km, maximum speed - 38 nodes, hydroacoustic homing system has a range of 2100 m). For Russian low-noise diesel-electric submarines of the 877 Ave. “Halibut” and 636.3 “Varshavyanka”, this weapon will not pose a serious threat, just as the subsonic anti-ship missiles “Exoset” will not be able to overcome the air defense of the missile cruiser “Moscow”. On the other hand, the VL-MICA KZRK, in spite of the entire 64 SAMs in service with the 4 corvettes, has decent defensive qualities. Highly maneuverable anti-aircraft missiles of the MICA-IR / EM family, equipped with a thrust vector deflection system, can work well both with Calibram and high-speed anti-ship and anti-radar missiles that are in service with the fleet and the Russian space forces. Sigma-class corvettes can also participate in the construction of the external missile defense of the Mikhail Kogalnichenu airbase, and all this must be calculated in the course of responding to the militarization of Romania.

But for what purpose does Bucharest so eagerly seek to acquire American operational-tactical missile systems / MLRS HIMARS? Here only the most disturbing thoughts come to mind regarding the development of the situation in Eastern Europe. Considering that the logical chain of events in the Donbass theater (provocative undermining of the OSCE car by Ukrainian DRGs, transfer of the remaining railway trains from ACS Acacia and Gradami to the contact line, as well as the junta's planned detonations of the Donbass power supply facilities) slowly leads us to an escalation junction, then it is quite plausible that a possible intervention in the conflict of Eastern European countries participating in the NATO bloc looks, and Romania is no exception.


The ammunition set of the M142 machine-launcher of the HIMARS complex, in addition to the standard 6 TPK for the NURS M26 / 28 and guided projectiles such as XM30 GUMLRS, provides for the 1 TPK for the MGM-140 / 164B operational tactical ballistic missile with a range of up to 300


It is this country, in line with Poland, is now a transit point for the supply to Ukraine of weapons and militants-mercenaries from the Middle East and Western Europe, and this is only the tip of the iceberg. We will consider the situation around Novorossia in our next works, but for now pay attention to a curious touch: simultaneously with Romania, a large-scale militarization program is taking place in Poland. Warsaw intends to use the Patriot 8 batteries before the 2018 of the year, and all this against the background of the approach date of the Ajis Ashhor anti-missile complex near Redzikowo (in the summer and autumn of the 2018). If we estimate in more detail, then with the help of the “Patriots” of the armies of Romania and Poland using “pumping”, Washington in advance builds a powerful defensive groundwork from the retaliatory strike of the Russian Armed Forces in case of escalation, while the probability of the latter inexorably increases ...

Information sources:
http://forum.militaryparitet.com/viewtopic.php?id=16825
http://www.jpost.com/Breaking-News/Poland-expects-to-sign-deal-for-8-Patriot-missile-defense-systems-by-end-2017-485745
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/erint/erint.shtml
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/himars/himars.shtml
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  1. Vladimirets
    Vladimirets April 26 2017 17: 26
    +1
    Firstly, thanks to the author for a clearly logically verified article. Secondly, some allegations are quite controversial, armament weapons, but the Romanians have never been known as great warriors. Thirdly, the author, IMHO, overestimates the role of Romania in the role of a dangerous springboard for us, as he correctly noted, we have so many problem areas that Romania does not look supernatural. request Fourth, it has been said many times already whether there is Romania, whether there is Romania, in conventional weapons we are losing our pack of NATO, our TNW and NW forces, which is why we have not yet been torn.
    1. cost
      cost April 26 2017 17: 44
      +2
      but romanians have never been known as great warriors

      "better to be than to seem"
      1. Pete mitchell
        Pete mitchell April 27 2017 20: 19
        +6
        You know, if you look back then the Romanians are pulled into the "dance" since the collapse of the Union. American women promise them nishtyaki at the expense of Europe mainly. Somewhere after '95, they were first dragged into the Regional Airspace Initiative's airspace control program: they acquired Lockheed -117 radars and drive information to NATO air defense centers. Quietly and confidently master the territory, very businesslike, located for a long time.
        A fool Europe pays: before the abolition of the visa regime, a survey showed that more than 75% are ready to get out of the country. The month of begging at Piccadilly gives you the opportunity to live 11 months at home. The most protected European village shape began to close the doors after the Romanians appeared there.
        Everything is as always: the elite was played as they wanted, but the people just do not care
  2. krops777
    krops777 April 26 2017 19: 04
    +1
    Romanian mountainous terrain will enhance the efficiency of deployed Patriot PAC-3 batteries.


    In some ways, but rather minus, this mountain range can be successfully used for covert rocket launch, respectively, the reaction time will be significantly reduced, and having an ABM at altitudes is also a very good target.
    1. Zaurbek
      Zaurbek April 27 2017 10: 25
      +1
      When did this mountainous terrain help the station’s radar survey?
  3. Alekspel
    Alekspel April 28 2017 16: 30
    0
    Romanians have never been reliable allies. It seems that now they have found, in their opinion, reliable owners in the person of the Americans. True, do they really not understand that they have become one of the first targets for our strike on Europe. They understand, of course, but apparently think that after the preemptive strike of the West we will not be able to retaliate. And they don’t think about our preemptive strike. And it would be nice for our leaders to announce that we can deliver a preemptive strike both in America and Europe, they will not like it much, because they did not try all the "charms" of the great war, as our grandfathers did, but also parents. And we will soon be able to see a demonstration of this blow, there is no doubt about it. And the West will apply it.
  4. Old26
    Old26 April 29 2017 00: 06
    +1
    Until the author began to write about EUROPRO - it was possible to read it. As soon as I started to write, I carried a blizzard
    What is the habit of others to consider the IDDOTT.A.M.I.? Or thinks that everyone will take his word for it?

    NSF Aegis Ashore anti-missile system, presented by ground-based modifications of the Mk 41 universal launchers with 24 Mk 21 mod 2 transport and launch containers for intercepting ICBMs and SLBMs on the ascending, marching and descending sections of the trajectory

    Wow, it turns out SM-3 Block 1B interceptors can already intercept ICBMs on everyone on the ascending, "marching" (and what, the ascending "section is no longer marching?), Descending sections of the trajectory? Russian? How interesting. Is this at a range of 700 km and interceptor speeds of 3 km / s? And, probably, Russian missiles will go from Iran ... laughing And how will it detect Russian missiles with a radar range of 700-900 km, especially when you consider that the radar is oriented in the southeast direction ...

    But who said that Washington will limit itself to the availability of only 1x24 PU Mk 41 in Devessela. The trend of militarization of Eastern Europe will continue, which is why several launchers (24 cells each) will most likely be relocated to the Romanian Ashor, bringing the total Arsenal of transport and launch containers to the level of one or more cruisers URO "Ticonderoga".

    Probably the author himself said, he himself develops the idea. And the fact that there is no one launcher with 24 cells on the basis, but there are three installations of 8 cells each? Nothing that exists in the nature of the 41-cell Mk-24 launcher. There are sizes - 4 cells, 8 cells, 16 cells. So whatever the author writes, there is no one launcher on 24. There are 3 on 8
    And in general, what is he talking about? About the hypothetical placement of "axes" and anti-ship missiles AGM-158C there? Or about missile defense? something pulls him from side to side. If shock missiles, then they can really be increased to ... Ticonderoga ammunition or even more. Although there is not much space there to increase the number of PUs hundreds of others. If he squeaks about missile defense missiles, then why should they increase their number of missiles by how many instead of 24 with one radar that can direct a certain number of interceptors to the target?

    After another one or two decades, the Romanian Aegis Ashor could turn into the largest strike and defense complex against any attempts to dominate the Black Sea Fleet and Russian Aerospace Forces in the Black Sea coast, as well as an anti-missile unit with an arsenal of hundreds or more missile defense systems RIM-161B or more technological RIM-161E (SM-3 Block IIB). The range of the latter can be 800-1000 or more kilometers, which will allow the US Navy to block the main flight paths of our ICBMs in the West European direction. There is also a more “weighty” theory regarding giving the RIM-161E the capabilities of medium-range ballistic missiles. The prospects of getting "at the gates" are not encouraging.

    But no. It turns out all the same about the "missile defense". A hundred or more missiles? Enchanting. And how many radars do we deliver? Ten. Block-2B Range predicted somewhere around 2500 km (the author should at least know the range and speed of interceptor models). But even let it be a thousand kilometers. Block-2B interceptor having a speed of about 5,6 km / s (they plan such, it is not known whether this interceptor model will be at all) will cover a distance of 1000 km in about 180 seconds. In the same 180 seconds, ICBMs (and this is approximately the size of its active section) will take several hundred kilometers and reach a speed of 7-7,5 km / s.
    Given the fact that the launch of an ICBM and an interceptor will not be oncoming, let the missile at a speed of 5,5 km catch up with another at a speed of 7,5 km. I'm not talking about how the target will generally keep the firing radar