Repair "Kuznetsova"
On the one hand, it’s still too early to talk about the coming medium repair of the TAVKR Admiral Kuznetsov (too little information), on the other, I really want to (the aircraft carrier is one of the central themes of my blog and the object of my hot attachment). Therefore, I still dare to take a risk and summarize the existing messages, opinions and assumptions, adding to them, as usual, my own vision of what fate is preparing for the system-forming ship of the Russian Navy.
Kuznetsov arrives at a permanent station (35 SRZ) after military service in the Mediterranean, 10.02.2017 (photo by the press service of 35 SRZ)
Puddle for Rakhmanov
Not even two years have passed since A. Rakhmanov was appointed head of USC, as a former official of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, who was already somehow getting used to the new place, allowed himself a public statement that once and for all put an end to his reputation:
"For us, the existing approach to the repair of large-capacity ships - Admiral Kuznetsov, Peter the Great - is not something unambiguous and optimal for one simple reason - the size of the costs for repairing ships that are already 30-35 years, is approaching the cost of construction A new ship, and their lifespan will be much less than that of a ship built ... But is it necessary to do this, and if so, under what conditions? This is a question of the general concept of the life cycle - if the life span of the 30 ship is years, then whether to prolong his life What is a ship repair issue for us, especially large, technically complex ships, is not obvious. Therefore, before talking about where to do it, you need to ask - why do it? " (1 link).
After the triumphant Mediterranean military campaign of the 25-year-old Kuznetsov and the 18-year-old Peter, who, with bated breath, were watched by the whole world (in particular, viewers of Russian television channels - thanks to the seconded film crews working on the ships of our KAG, in fact, without sleep and rest), the words of A. Rakhmanov sound absolutely ridiculous and unprofessional *. For reasons that are not completely understood (most likely, for the sake of some kind of internal corporate redistribution of funds), the government official, the chief shipbuilder of Russia, did not give a damn about the interests of the country and its Navy, having forgotten that we would only go to serial construction of a first-class BNK after 1 years, and until then, the main priority of the USC will be VTG and repairs with the modernization of existing first ranks. Offering to put beauty, pride and the foundation of the military power of our military on scrap metal fleet, AR got into such a puddle that until the end of his career he would have to walk in wet pants.
* Moreover, the statement on the 1 link is dated to 08.04.2016, i.e. when the decision on combat service was already taken and both of the above ships were actively preparing for the hike that began six months later (15.10.2016). Given that the president of the USC could not have been unaware of this, Rakhmanov’s slogan is perceived as a frank sabotage, which characterizes its author from the most unattractive side.
Term and price
According to the general director of Nevsky PKB, who has already completed the technical project of medium repair with modernization of 11435, S. Vlasov. The work may take from 2's to 3,5 years - everything will depend on the decision of the Ministry of Defense, which should approve the amount of funding and, as a result, the list of performance of work (reference 2). Rakhmanov, whose attitude to the credibility of the messages I have already expressed earlier, names the term in 2 of the year (reference 3), anonymous from the defense industry and the Navy - around 2-x and 2,5 (reference 4) (reference 5). There is more confidence in S. Vlasov, of course, but here we must bear in mind the amendment to the realities of our shipbuilding industry, namely: the deadlines for the repair of Nakhimov, Ustinov and Chabanenko were shifted to the right strictly on 2 of the year (from 2018 to 2020, from 2014 to 2016 and from 2016 to 2018, respectively).
According to various sources, the repair of Kuznetsov may occur at the end of May 2017 (reference 4), before July 2017 (reference 5) and in 2018 (reference 6) (reference 7). The transfer of the beginning of the average repair to 2018 is expedient for at least three reasons: 1) after a thoroughly carried out pre-advance repair (01-10.2016) the combat ship is capable of combat service; 2) before the adoption of a new weapons program on 2018-2025. (HPV-2025) in 2017, there may be problems with financing repair work; 3) the "won" year can be used to train the under-trained pilots of the MiG-29K (UB) 100 oxip (the original).
Taking into account the above, the most optimistic (but unrealistic) deadline for repairing a TAVKR is 2019, the most pessimistic (but most reliable) is 2023-2024. with an extension of service life of at least 20 years (reference 8), just before the moment when the aircraft carrier of new projects established in 2025-2035 will appear in the Russian Navy. As for the cost of work indicated in the material at 8 (65 billion rubles), it seems to be quite adequate, except for the share of OCD (30 billion rubles or 46%), although the latter is due to quite reasonable reasons - the need to redevelop nodes and units that are no longer produced in our country.
Scene
Soon after the completion of the long-distance campaign of the CAG SF, there appeared reports in the media that the Zvezdochka Ship Repair Center was ready to carry out repairs with the modernization of Kuznetsov, and from the context it followed that this significant event would take place at the actual address of the head center of the central secured service center, i.e. in Severodvinsk (reference 9), which is hampered by two important circumstances. First, the head "Star", regularly repairing nuclear submarine cruisers and not only, is overloaded with orders. Instead of "Tula", the plant will come "Bryansk", instead of "Eagle" - most likely, "Voronezh", instead of "Ustinov" - "Moscow". In addition, the Leopard is in operation; the Wolf, Samara and Bratsk of the same type, Yaroslavl diesel-electric submarines, and Karp in a suspended state are waiting for their turn. What is another TAVKR ?!
Secondly, despite the impressive dimensions of the loading dock (205х130 = 26650 sq. M - two football fields), the aircraft carrier will not fit there even diagonally (Lвл = 270 m against 243 m), moreover - it cannot even enter too Narrow gates (in the 4 photo you can see the APKR of 949A Smolensk with BNB = 18,2 m against BVL = 33,4 m of TAVKR Ave 11435; the RCN of 1164 AH, also docked at CSH, BNB, enters the dock camera; = 20,8 m).
Everything rises to its place if we recall that 35 SRZ is a Murmansk branch of the CS Zvezdochka, where Kuznetsov is based, and one of the messages says that “35 or 82 ship repair factories can get a large order (both in Murmansk) "(link 4). The fact is that the 35 SRZ docks (North and South) cannot yet accommodate an aircraft carrier, although the corresponding project for their reconstruction has already been developed by Soyuzproektverf, and one of the options, which means combining both docks into one, 27.04.2016 is approved for the further implementation of scientific Technical Council, consisting of representatives of KGNTS, Nevsky PKB, CA "Zvezdochka" and 35 SRZ (Fig. 8).
Of course, such a large-scale event as the reconstruction of the dock complex, which will be able to docking not only 11435, but also 11442, will not be able to be carried out quickly, and this time (as in the past) you will have to use the floating unit PD-50 82 SRZ in Roslyakovo (unavailability Sevmash accept now 11435 to explain unnecessarily).
Aircraft radland
The most serious flaw in the 11435 Ave. aircraft carrier, without a doubt, is the absence of an aircraft of the radar patrol and guidance (РЛДН, more familiar abbreviation - ARLO). At the same time, there is still the opinion that to take off heavy aircraft with turboprop-fan engines (TVVD) and maximum take-off weight in 40 000 kg (in Su-33 - 33 000 kg) a catapult is required, but this is not so. Probably, few people remember that in the original version of the Yak-44 (RLD), in addition to two turboprop engines under the wing, four lifting TRDs were provided in the fuselage, but later a new design-layout scheme of the RLDN trampoline-ejection takeoff aircraft was used, in which a high take-off body and blowing the upper surface of the wing to increase its lift to a level sufficient to take off from the springboard, provided two TVWD D-27.
The main highlight of the Yak-44 - the D-27 engines, which have no analogues in the world, were developed by the Zaporozhye MKB (ZMKB) Progress, i.e., in a hostile state, however, both of the key elements of the TVWD determine its high technological level and reducer) were produced in Russia - by Stupinsky KBM (at present - NPP "Aerosila") and Moscow SFP "Salyut" (now SPT of the gas turbine industry "Salyut"), which means we have all the technical documentation, skills and at any time we can renew them production (4 D-27 used on one ohm An experienced two-70 Ukrainian Air Force).
Technical offer on Yak-44 (2 TVD plus 4 TRD) based on the task received earlier (TTZ?) Yakovlev Design Bureau prepared 1979 for November, designing according to the new scheme continued only in October of 1984 (2 TVVD). In January, 1990 took place the protection of the draft technical design and layout of the Yak-44 aircraft. In terms of the main LTX, it significantly surpassed the E-2C “Hokai” with an ejection takeoff. In the same year began the construction of the first flight model. In August, the refinement of the constructive-technological layout (which they decided to use as a GWM) was completed, it was dismantled, loaded onto a barge, delivered by river routes to the Black Sea on board the Kuznetsov and assembled again.
Performance evaluation of the Yak-44 when basing aboard the TAVKR was carried out in a short time during the first half of September. The possibility of towing and mooring the aircraft on the flight deck and in the hangar, rolling onto the platform of the lift and climbing onto the flight deck, descending into the hangar and installing it in a regular place, pairing the aircraft with technical support posts in the hangar and on the deck were checked. The work was carried out by an integrated team of employees OKB im. Yakovlev, NPKB, plant "Universal", CSY, representatives of the Air Force and Navy.
Due to some oversizing, which was the price for a springboard take-off, as well as a multifunctional radio engineering complex (RTC), working not only on air and surface, but also on ground targets, the Yak-44 had somewhat larger dimensions than the Hokai, but it was quite good fit into the flight and hangar decks of the ship and did not require a noticeable (in terms of the effectiveness of the entire naval air group) reducing the number of fighters. On the other hand, it is necessary to recognize the positive qualities of the springboard take-off, due to the relatively high reliability of the springboard as a take-off device, especially in the northern latitudes characteristic of the combat activities of the Russian Navy.
It was assumed that the Kuznetsov and Varyag will be based before the 3-4 of the RLDN Yak-44 aircraft, on board the 11437 was to accommodate an enlarged fleet of shipboard aircraft, including 6 of the RLDN aircraft. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, due to cuts in funding, further work on the Yak-44 aircraft slowed down, and in 1992, after the construction of the TAVKR avenue 11437 was stopped, they were stopped at the stage of building test aircraft for flight testing **.
** Facts and quotations from V. Abidin’s article “Eagle Eye of the Fleet. Aircraft of the Yak-44 ради radar patrol and targeting”, Wings of the Motherland, No. XXUMX / 10 (p. 2009-30) were used.
Thus, to date, we have an approved preliminary design of the Yak-44, the design and technological layout of the aircraft "tested" on the Kuznetsov, and, most importantly, the technical documentation on the TV-VDD D-27 (or, at least, its most important components). In addition, we have time (up to 3,5-5,5 years) and, according to the media, 30 billion rubles. on OCD. Why not assume that all this will give us to 2023-2024. deck plane РЛДН?
Dock camera of the Zvezdochka head office enterprise (satellite image from zvezdochka-ru)
Stargaz dock camera, view of the gate. The water level corresponds to the sea level (photo from zvezdochka-ru)
APKR pr. 949А "Smolensk" enters the "Stars" dock camera (photo from zvezdochka-ru)
RKR pr. 1164 "Marshal Ustinov" in the "Stars" dock-camera during the docking operation (photo from zvezdochka-ru)
Diagram of the available dry docks 35 SRZ (Ill. From the article by A. Dunaev and A. Nazarov in the “Bulletin of Shipbuilding and Ship Repair Technology” №24 / 2016 from Curious from forums.airbase.ru)
The first version of the reconstruction of dry docks 35 SRZ (Ill. From the article A. Dunaev and A. Nazarov in the VTSS No. 24 / 2016 from Curious from forums.airbase.ru)
The second version of the reconstruction of dry docks 35 SRZ (ill. From the article by A. Dunaev and A. Nazarov in the VTSS No. 24 / 2016 from Curious from forums.airbase.ru)
"Kuznetsov" in PD-50 82 SRZ, Roslyakovo (Murmansk), 08.07.2015 (photo from sam7 from forums.airbase.ru)
Deck aircraft of the radar patrol and guidance Yak-44РЛД (Wings of the Motherland, №10 / 2009)
Deck plane of the radar patrol and guidance of the Yak-44РЛД (Fig. V. Pogodin, Aviko Press from the site "Sky Corner" - airwar.ru)
Kuznetsov arrives at a permanent station (35 SRZ) after military service in the Mediterranean, 10.02.2017 (photo by the press service of 35 SRZ)
Catapult
Regardless of the presence or absence of the need for an ejection takeoff for an RLDN aircraft, the catapult has three indisputable advantages over the springboard, one minor and one controversial:
1) a significant increase in the take-off mass of the aircraft with almost the same length of takeoff (the upper deck of the flight deck) - 90 m for the steam catapult and 105 m for takeoff from the main launch positions No.1 and #2 Ave. 11435 (Su-33 loses seven tons or XNX % - 21 26 versus 000 33 kg; when taking off only from the starting position No. 000, the rise time of the air group is multiplied;
2) unmanned take-off and, as a result, a noticeable increase in the range of deck aircraft with an equal combat load and fuel capacity (for TRD AL-31F, fuel consumption for the vigorous full afterburner compared to the unformed maximum mode increases 2,56 times - from 0,75 to 1,92 kg / kgf / hour);
3) the absence of a "non-working" period of time after separation (the first seconds of the flight), during which the aircraft flies along a ballistic trajectory at a speed below sufficient for regular aerodynamic control surfaces (of the order of 180 km / h at the springboard against 300 km / h at the catapult), cannot be effectively controlled and proceed with the flight mission - besides the loss of time when collecting a link, squadron, wave, and building a battle formation, under unfavorable circumstances (anything can happen in a war) this can lead to beating airplanes taking off planes of the enemy;
4) expanding the range of use of deck aviation according to wind power, side and keel pitching - it’s clear that a slowly accelerating aircraft, not attached to the pulling shoe of the shuttle-piston group of the catapult, is easier to blow off or drop from the deck (this advantage is attributed to the category of secondary, since ships of large displacement are not too suffer greatly from excitement, and a heavy aircraft with low sailing is hardly worth the fear of wind exposure within the seaworthiness of the carrier for the use of aviation);
5) the rise time of the modern aircraft carrier (which is ours or that of a foreign one) into the air, namely the time from “all airplanes in the hangar” to “all airplanes in the air”, is wrapped in a veil of secrecy, and due to the lack of reliable data cannot be taken into account, despite the claim that the presence of two catapults on the 11437 made it possible to reduce the group take-off time to the “Nimitz” level [4] (for example, one of the sources gives 5- 6 minutes to take off a group of 20 aircraft when using sun ex four catapults [6], which is doubtful not only by the author of the blog, but also by some of his readers - reference 2).
As for the advantages of the springboard, then opinions differ greatly. So, the author of the remarkable book about Su-33 and the editor-in-chief of the magazine "Takeoff" A. Fomin argues that one of the unrecoverable shortcomings of a steam catapult is the inevitable etching of steam from the trunk of the booster track, which can result at low temperatures (in high latitudes) ice causing piston seizure and failure of the entire device [1]. However, profile specialists very emotionally object to him, saying that the catapult has a regular system of heating the channel before flying (to 180-200 degrees Celsius) and, despite a reliable thermal insulation system, the temperature of the external surfaces reaches 50 degrees, due to Of which the problem of “frost” is pure fudge [8].
In terms of resistance to combat damage, the springboard is, of course, more reliable than a single catapult, since the piston (shuttle-piston group) can jam even with a slight deformation of the flight deck as a result of an explosion of an aerial bomb or a cruise missile on it. On the other hand, in the presence of four catapults, four arresting gears and an emergency barrier, the likelihood of the aircraft carrier completely losing its combat capability (at least as a result of one attack and several direct hits) seems not too high. At the same time, the springboard is also not a panacea, since it can also be damaged by the enemy’s air attacks.
Based on the above, the conclusion is that the full-fledged aircraft carrier catapults are definitely needed, but in the case of the Kuznetsov their absence is classified as unrecoverable flaws, which are prevented by three circumstances:
1) a steam catapult С1-М [8] for the aircraft carrier 11437 ave. In the Soviet Union succeeded in creating - designed it in the Central Research Institute of Ship Mechanical Engineering (Central Research Institute SM or just Sudmash, formerly the Scientific Research Institute "Compass") in St. Petersburg, built in the Proletarsky plant , tested on the Crimean "Nitka" (not on real aircraft of the ejection take-off, which then simply did not exist yet, but as an accelerating device for carriages loading, depicting deck-mounted aircraft during tests of aerofinishers), where the starting characteristics of the catapult reached the design level of thrust and to The speeds were carried out by the MVI (1987-1988), completed to fully comply with the requirements of the TK (1989), and its nodes for the 25.11.1988 TAVKR pledged. 11437 pr. could be delivered according to the construction schedule [8], however, to recreate С1-M today seems unreasonable because of its hopeless obsolescence and limited capabilities of the Proletarsky plant, regularly disrupting the delivery dates of even such generally ordinary items as steering gears or devices for transporting a helicopter (according to the claims of PSZ Yantar );
2) obsolescence of steam catapults caused by the emergence of an electromagnetic catapult (EMALS - Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System), which is akin to changing a horse tram or a locomotive with an electric locomotive (many successful launches of both the US Navy bogies and deck carrier planes have already been made: first) both from the onshore test facility and from the CVN 78 deck, in the second - so far only from the shore, reference 3) - the launch energy limit (90-95 MJ) was the decisive constraint for the further use of steam ejection the capacity of the working fluid (steam) and efficiency, comparable with the locomotive (no more than 6%), which, in turn, leads to a large consumption of steam (more than 600 kg per launch), to compensate for which, 88 tons of double distilled distilled water that is comparable in price to the best grades of gasoline [7];
Other major advantages of electromagnetic catapults over steam ones are, as you know, the possibility of launching both heavier aircraft (with energy up to 120 MJ) and lighter ones (including UAVs); ensuring greater smoothness of take-off (with less overload), which has a beneficial effect on both the health of pilots and the aircraft resource; they charge faster, have a smaller mass, require less volume and maintenance personnel, however, for obvious reasons, they consume much more electricity and are therefore unavailable even for Nimitz type AVs;
unlike the Yak-44, which does not have a special alternative, the resumption of work on the steam catapult would be a step backwards with respect to the global technical progress - except for the United States, Britain, China and India are looking at the development of electromagnetic catapults; According to available information, under the program of military shipbuilding up to 2050, involving the construction of new aircraft carriers, an electromagnetic catapult is being developed in Russia (reference 4), most likely by the Trinity Institute for Innovation and Thermonuclear Research (TRINITI) [7], and in view of the American of experience (contract - 20.12.1999, first take-off of F / A-18 - 18.12.2010) these works will take approximately 10-15 years, i.e. taking into account the developments, today should have time to bookmark the main AB for the Russian Navy (2025);
3) even if the development and manufacture of a steam or, more accurately, the electromagnetic catapult, were at the final stage, they could not be installed on Kuznetsov during repairs without a radical re-arrangement of the general arrangement, since in the first case it would be necessary to squeeze into the ship :
the main KVG-2 steam boiler, two M-3 desalination plants with 100 performance t / h of double distillate distillate for the main boiler, four titanium alloy vapor-accumulators for pre-accumulation of 600 kg of steam (one start), increased capacity steam condensers, finally steam engine itself with two power cylinders with a length of 90 m and a diameter of more than half a meter, a shuttle-piston group with a pulling shoe and hydraulic brake at the end of the track of the catapult [8] (original);
in the second: equipment and equipment of six subsystems, including input transformers (connecting the catapult with the ship's power grid), electric motors, flywheels-accumulators of kinetic energy of more than 3 tons, pulse excitation generators (converting the kinetic energy accumulated by the flywheels into electrical voltage), the accelerator unit itself ( linear motor with an active rotor-shuttle), control equipment for the thrust of the shuttle and the distribution of electricity between the catapults [7], and finally nuclear powerplant (!) instead of the existing power befitting of boiler-turbine that goes far beyond common sense.
Hangar
The Kuznetsova hangar is not too small, but still too small - its area is only 57% of the Nimitz hangar area (153х26 = 3980 sq. M [5-6] against 209х33,6 [6-15] = 7020 X. m), while the total displacement is 67% (59 000 [5-10] vs. 88 000 tons - reference 5). For clarity, it makes sense to give a few more numbers: on 11435 on 1000 tons of total displacement accounts for 67,5 square. m hangar on the "Nimitz" - 79,8 square. m (on 18,2% more); The hangar of our aircraft carrier takes 57% length and 74% ship width KWL, American - 66% and 82%.
Of course, I would like to have a bigger hangar on the Kuznetsov, especially given the fact that American aircraft carriers operate mainly in the “resort zone” of the World Ocean, and ours are based beyond the Arctic Circle. However, as in the case of a catapult, it is not possible to do this in a reasonable time for reasonable money. To understand this, it is enough to look at the 11435 longitudinal section below and, in the absence of a tolerance form, a theoretical drawing of the 11434 — a ship whose hull, I am sure, should be geometrically similar to the five.
To get real dividends from an increase in the size of the hangar, you need to extend it at least 20 meters, or better on 40 - to place one or two more MiG-29K (UB) links in it (reference 6, ill. 7). Behind the stern bulkhead of the hangar, most likely, there is equipment and apparatus towed by GAS GAK Polinom, and it is extremely undesirable to touch it (especially taking into account the acute shortage of escort ships). The nasal bulkhead is located somewhere on the 7 (7 and 1 / 3) theoretical frame (13,5 space) and its body starts to taper like a bottleneck, so you don’t have much trouble. When trying to lengthen the hangar in the nose (after having removed the SCRC), it will, firstly, lose its rectangular shape, and secondly, it will have to squeeze in rooms with all its combat posts located in a smaller volume, which is unlikely to benefit. to business Conclusion: it is better to forget about the expansion of the hangar.
Aero Finisher
There is still no end in the case of the loss of two deck-based aircraft during Kuznetsov’s extreme combat service (Su-33 03.12.2016 and MiG-29K 13.11.2016), since there are sources claiming that experts have not yet confirmed the opinion that the crash of the aircraft was the fault of the arresting vehicle (7 link). The Defense Ministry, as is often the case, prefers to keep silent, without mentioning either the on-board numbers of the lost aircraft, or the official cause of the flight accidents, the causes of which should have been clarified and made public a long time ago.
The most reliable publication on this topic today is the material of Gazeta.ru, where the main and sole cause of the incident is the break of the airliner cables (reference 8). The only comment relates to the header, since the C-2H product (or C2-H [8]) failed the pilots for the second time, and for the third time (05.09.2005 similarly lost another Su-33, which is mentioned in article text). The third time is no longer an accident and not a coincidence, but a system, and to both the creators of the aerofinisher - the Central Research Institute of Ship Engineering (link 9) and the Proletarsky Plant (link 11) (which, by the way, recently shipped AF for the Indian "Vikrant" - link 12) , you need to think about it and do it so as not to let anyone down. They have time for that.
Basing
It is well known that the permanently stationed TAVKR Ave 11435 “Admiral Kuznetsov” 59 000’s full displacement is the 35 th ship repair plant (Murmansk), and not the naval base (PPB) located in the closed city of Severomorsk, where other ships of the 43 division of rocket ships ("Peter the Great", "Marshal Ustinov", "Admiral Ushakov"). On the one hand, as a temporary measure, this, of course, is good, because staying at the pier, and not on the roadstead, saves the resource of our precious (without irony) aircraft carrier, on the other, it looks a bit strange (as if the strategy from the Engels airbase began to be based at the Borisoglebsk airfield of the Kazan aircraft factory) and cannot last forever - the SRZ embankments are designed entirely for other (production) purposes.
The largest draft with protruding parts (bulb, etc.) at full displacement at 11435 is 10,4 m [5-10], at 11442 - 10,3 m [4-67]. The question arises: why is "Peter the Great" mooring to the pier without problems, and the "Kuznetsov" is forced to stand on the barrels at a distance from it? At the same time, by approximately 10 meters, the large width over KVL (33,4 [5] -35,0 [4] m in 11435 versus 24,0 m in 11442) should not create unnecessary difficulties during mooring. As an option - the reason is in the sponsors (parts of the flight deck, strongly protruding beyond the ship’s line), which prevent the cranes from passing along the narrow pier (photo 15-16), but in Norfolk they somehow cope with this (photo 17-18). Whatever it was, the successor of Spetsstroy of Russia will have enough time (several years) to build a berth for an aircraft carrier in the 43 drone base station.
On the left is a steam engine (two trunks of power cylinders) in the cathepte C1-M for TAVKR Ave. 11437, on the right is a shuttle carriage with a pulling boot of the shuttle-piston group (the gutter covers are removed) (Avian panorama no. 1 / 2015 [XNNXX / 8] blog author)
Fragment of a C1-M catapult steam engine, Proletarsky Zavod, 1984 (Aviation panorama No.1 / 2015)
Cross section of the C1-M catapult steam engine and piston group with a stacker (Aviation panorama No. 1 / 2015 [8], reconstruction of the author of the blog)
Truck-loader No. 2 with a carrying capacity of 30 tons for С1-М, 1986 (Air panorama №1 / 2015)
Tests of an emergency barrier by an airplane mock-up, 1986-1987 (Aviation panorama No.1 / 2015)
Diagram of the electromagnetic catapult EMALS (ill. From the site of General Atomics)
F / A-18E take off from EMALS ground test facility, Lakehurst, NJ (screenshot from General Atomics video)
EMALS Electromagnetic Catapult on CVN 78 Deck "Gerald R. Ford", 05.06.2015 (navaltoday.com)
Longitudinal section TAVKR pr. 11435 (scheme S. Balakin from the issue of the "Maritime collection" №7 / 2005 [5])
Theoretical drawing of TAVKR Ave. 11434 (from the book by A. Pavlov "The Long Hand" by Admiral Gorshkov ", 2000)
Four (cable) aerofinisers "Kuznetsova" (screenshot from the 2-th part of the "First Battle Exit" of the program "Military acceptance" TRK Zvezda)
The moment of the hook for the airfincher cable No.2 (screenshot from the 2 part of the "First Fighting Out" of the program "Military Acceptance" of TRC Zvezda)
"Kuznetsov" on the barrels in the roadstead of Severomorsk, 15.06.2016 (photo by Georgich 85 from forums.airbase.ru)
"Peter the Great" and "Marshal Ustinov" at one of the piers of Severomorsk, 23.02.2017 (photo from mil.ru)
Tavkr pr. 11436, view from the nose. Sponsons (Yu. Apalkov's scheme from the book "Ships of the Navy of the USSR" II-1)
US Navy aircraft carriers at the naval pier of Norfolk, Virginia, 20.12.2012 (photo by US Navy from blogs.defensenews.com)
US Navy aircraft carriers at the naval pier of Norfolk, Virginia, 20.12.2012 (photo by US Navy from blogs.defensenews.com)
Kuznetsov arrives at a permanent station (35 SRZ) after military service in the Mediterranean, 10.02.2017 (photo by the press service of 35 SRZ)
Boilers
Without a doubt, ensuring reliable (long-lasting and trouble-free) operation of the Kuznetsov boiler-turbine power plant is the primary task of the average repair of a ship. The aircraft carrier's power plant consists of four machine-boiler (turbo-boiler) groups (echelons) arranged in pairs in two machine-boiler compartments (MKO) - fore and aft, each of which runs its own propeller and includes two high-pressure boilers KVG- 4 with TNA-4 turbochargers and one main turbo-gear (steam turbine with gear) TV-12-4. I personally didn’t have any complaints against GTZA (although, of course, they would need a thorough restoration of technical readiness), so we will pay all the attention to the boilers.
At present, three types of high-pressure steam boilers are used on warships of the Russian Navy - KVG-2 (as part of the backup EC TARKR Ave 11442), KVG-3 (EM Ave 956) and KVG-4 (TAVKR Ave 11435). Unlike KVG-3, the principle of operation and design features of which are described in open textbooks for university students [5], very little is known about KVG-4 - mainly that with the same steam parameters (pressure 66 atm = 6,5 MPa and temperature 470 deg. Celsius), its steam output increased from 98 and 100 (KVN 98 / 64-2 and KVG-3) to 115 t / h [4], and the aggregate capacity of the GTZH compared to previous 1143 (with boilers KVN 98) / XHUMX compared to previous 64 (with boilers XVNX X XUMUMX) / 2-45) increased from 000 50 to 000 956 l. with. (like XNUMX).
On the trials of admiral V. Selivanov (Chief of the General Staff of the Navy, senior on board) and the personnel of the division of the movement of warhead-5 during the first campaign of Kuznetsov in the Mediterranean (23.12.1995-22.03.1996), is well known from the book of N. Cherkashin (reference 3), however, no other serious troubles related to boilers have been reported since. It is possible that the incidents were carefully kept silent (which is unlikely), perhaps there was a special (extremely careful) attitude to the aircraft carrier boilers, perhaps the design of the KVG-4 brought to mind after the 1995-1996 “adventure” of YG -3 for the better, but, be that as it may, the fact remains a fact - with its KVG-4 Kuznetsov regularly goes to distant waters, while two of the three destroyers of 17 remaining from 956 with KVG-3 perform the duties of ships OVR, and the campaign "Fast" in India is perceived as a flight to the moon.
However, despite the regular exits to combat service, the KON of the aircraft carrier today is very low (the coefficient of operational voltage is equal to the ratio of the total time to perform tasks on the destination to the total service life). "Kuznetsov" went to the BS eight times: 1) 23.12.1995-22.03.1996 (SPM); 2) 27.09-24.10.2004 (North-East. Atlantic); 3) 23.08-14.09.2005 (North-East. Atlantic); 4) 05.12.2007-03.02.2008 (SPM); 5) 05.12.2008-27.02.2009 (SPM); 6) 06.12.2011-17.02.2012 (SPM); 7) 17.12.2013-17.05.2014 (SPM); 8) 15.10.2016-08.02.2017 (SPM). If we count KOH from the moment of the transfer of the Navy ship (25.12.1990), we get 623 / 9612 = 0,06 (the initial data is in days). It should be borne in mind that the second BS took place only nine years later (8,76) after the first (“troubled times” were outside), after which the situation began to change for the better with GDP prayers. Recounting KOH with 01.01.2007, we get 484 / 3761 = 0,13 (!), Which, however, is also far from ideal. It is necessary to ensure that the Kuznetsov boilers make it possible to increase KOH in 2 − 2,5 times.
At the same time, even in the June issue of the National Defense magazine for 2011 a year (almost six years ago) it was told about the new development of the St. Petersburg Special Design Bureau for Boiler Construction (SKBK) - a high-pressure automated ship boiler of the new generation KVG 6M (as in the original - without a hyphen) , capable, according to the developer, to become the basis of KTU, competitive with gas turbine and diesel power plants. The perspective boiler of the SSCC differs from its predecessors by its efficiency, reliability, small weight and size characteristics and high degree of automation, its steam parameters are impressive - 8,0 MPa (around 82 atm) and 515 degrees. Celsius, an automated control system made on the basis of modern elemental base, allows for a service-free maintenance, and the total fuel consumption of the KTU is reduced somewhere by 20%.
At the same time, the prospects for the use of boiler-turbine installations on warships and naval support vessels is a big question (there were practically no publications on this topic with 2011), and production of a fundamentally new boiler is unlikely to be small-scale perceived with delight at the manufacturer. However, there are other, more practical, proposals for the SSC. So, in particular, when upgrading works on ships in service, the KVG 8М-6 with traditional steam parameters (1 MPa and 6,0 degrees) and the ability to work on diesel fuel, which increases the cruising range by about 470%, is proposed. the boiler is completely interchangeable with KVG-10 (reference 3).
In general, to improve the operational qualities of Kuznetsov KTU, we have everything we need: 1) awareness of the need to do this; 2) willingness to finance work from the state defense order; 3) the presence of a valid profile KB, specializing in particular in ship high-pressure boilers (reference 5) and having relevant developments; 4) the presence of a shipbuilding enterprise with a developed boiler production - Baltic Plant, St. Petersburg (link 6), not so long ago (already in the newest stories Russia) produced nine new boilers KVG-3D (one training) for the Indian aircraft carrier Vikramaditya (reference 7).
Given that the KVG-4 boilers were developed at least 30 years ago and are anachronism to a certain extent, I would not like them to remain in their original form on the updated aircraft carrier. The most rational option seems to be the replacement of all eight boilers with new ones - of the type KVG 6М-1, but interchangeable with KVG-4 (let's call them KVG 6М-2), which are distinguished by ultra-modern automation that would minimize the notorious human factor. According to an anonymous source in the defense industry, made, oddly enough, before the fault detection procedure (or selective fault detection was carried out in advance mode), "four out of eight of its eight power plant boilers will be repaired on the aircraft carrier" (reference 8) that makes sense only if the repaired boilers bring to the modern level, as is customary in aircraft and tank construction.
Air group
Considering an aircraft carrier in isolation from an air group is pointless - if the air group can still solve some tasks without its carrier (for example, to provide air defense systems located near the airfield of its coastal base), the carrier itself, deprived of the air group, becomes practically useless in military terms a structure suitable except for the transfer of army aircraft and helicopters from air bases in the theater or from one theater to another. Therefore, it makes sense to try to imagine what good can be done with aircrafts based on Kuznetsov while it is undergoing average repairs.
If you bring to the mind (put on the wing) an XRUM aircraft based on the Yak-44 (as was mentioned in the 1 part of the trilogy) during this time they cannot or will not, Kuznetsova will have to be content with its economy option (XRDS for the poor) - the Ka-31 helicopter, which was never used on the Navy ships regularly (as far as we know, the two sides - 90 and 91, transferred to MA in 2012, are in trial operation). Both Ka-31 and Ka-27М (supplied from the end of 2016), and MiG-29K (UB) are new machines, they have a long process of "running in" front-line pilots, eliminating comments and improvements in working order, so to speak about any modernization here is too early. Another thing is the Su-33.
First of all, it should be said that it would be unwise to refuse these remarkable (the best in the world) deck fighters in favor of MiG-29K (UB) alone, and, apparently, they are not going to do this two years ago Navy I. Kozhin (“Su-33 will be ... operated together with MiG-29K”: the Su-33 will close the middle air defense zone, the MiG-29K medium will close, naval air defense will be referred to as 9 link) in the military-industrial complex (it is not planned to change the aircraft composition of the mixed air wing on the Kuznetsov yet - link 8). Moreover, in 2015, a green light was given to the process of modernizing the Su-33 fleet with an extension of its service life to at least 2025 (reference 7). Explicitly, the details of the project were not disclosed, so I venture to speculate about it.
1. What I dreamed about long before Kuznetsov was released at the BS (reference 10) was confirmed by sources close to the official ones - part of the Su-33 was equipped with the specialized computing subsystem SVP-24, which allows to bring the accuracy of free-falling bombs to almost the same level as high precision weapons (by collecting and processing an array of information regarding the location of the carrier and the target, the parameters of the carrier movement and atmospheric conditions). First, a month and a half before the march, Izvestia reported this with reference to the Ministry of Defense (link 11), and after that the TV channel T24 - the link 12, 10: 01). It should be equipped with a miracle system all sides 279 Okozhap.
2. Another reliable fact is the resumption of production of engines for Su-33 in the Ufa Motor-Building Association (UMPO), which is part of the UEC. It is about TRD AL-31F 3 series (AL-31F3), which is more powerful base on 300 kgf (12 800 against 12 500) and differs from it an additional "special mode", used during takeoff from the springboard with full operational load or emergency go-around in case of a failed landing. According to the press service of the UEC, "new engines ... will be produced with the introduction of improvements that have already been applied to the engines of the AL-31F family of a modern serial appearance" (reference 13). It is hoped that the message says about the 42 series (AL-31-М1) with 13 500 kgf (reference 14), or the decision will be revised in favor of this model. The extra 700 kgf will be very useful for increasing the Su-33 combat load with a short take-off from the starting positions No. XXUMX and No. XXUMX.
3. In the comments to the previous entries, not once or twice had heard about the superiority of the “Super Hornet” over the Su-33, mainly because of the equipment of the first ultra-modern on-board radar with AFAR and medium-range AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles active radar seeker (ARGSN). Comparison of F / A-18E / F with Su-33 (more precisely, proof of the opposite) was started on this blog (15 link, 16 link), but was interrupted due to my departure to Donbass, and then due to data loss on two hard drives (mainly and backup) - it happens. I hope it will continue, but not now.
Let me just say that there were no reliable data on the AN / APG-79 radar and on AIM-120 radar - the military-industrial complex and the US Navy occupied defensive and secret everything, it is known only that: 1) AN / APG-79 much weaker than AN / APG-77 F-22 (every two), which is understandable, given the difference in thrust-to-weight ratio; 2) the detection range of typical air targets, by analogy with F-15E, is estimated at 150-180 km (reference 17); 3) The Super Hornet radar with AFAR is very good for working on ground targets and jamming (which, in fact, it was sharpened), but its merits in aerial combat with a strong and skillful opponent raise doubts; 4) 8 (!) Simultaneously fired at actively maneuvering targets, taking into account the need to actively maneuver yourself - this is generally beyond reality (the plot for a computer game for geeks).
Therefore, without asking the question “why is all this necessary?”, We simply consider possible options for improving the avionics (radar as part of SUV - weapons control system) Su-33, which could be implemented in a reasonably short time comparable to the average repair "Kuznetsova". Theoretically, on the "thirty-third" you can install any of the three new radars with headlights used on the Su-27 and MiG-29: 1) H010? “Zhuk-A” with AFAR, one of the ancestors of which (“Zhuk-M” with a slit antenna array) is reportedly installed on a single two-seater Su-33UB (Su-27KUB) (reference 18), the developer is Fazotron-NIIR (KRET); 2) Н011М "Bars" with a passive HEADLIGHT (PFAR) developed by the Research Institute of Instrument Engineering (NIIP) and produced by the Ryazan Instrument Plant (GRPZ), which, apparently, is installed on the Su-30СМ (19 link, text after the 18 photo); 3) Н035 "Irbis (PFAR, Su-35, NIIP, GRPZ).
All of these radars are the basis of the CWS, allowing the use of the latest air-to-air missiles (RVV-SD, RVV-BD - reference 20) and air-to-surface (X-31AD, etc.), must not yield to the detection range and the launch of the overblown "Super Hornet" and, in the case of the introduction of one of them on the Su-33, will multiply its combat capabilities by making it the real king of the air above the expanses of the World Ocean before the appearance of the T-50K.
As an economy-express version, an advanced good old Mech Sword with H001 radar (H001М?) Proposed by NIIP as early as 2011 (of course, exported) and suggesting an increase in the range of detection of a fighter-type air target ( ESR = 3 sq. M, with probability 0,5) to the forward hemisphere from 100 to 150 km, the number of simultaneously attacked targets - from one to two (I am sure that the pilot will not be able to attack more targets at once), the use of air missiles air mid-range TI P-77 (RVV-AE), PKR X-31A (D), etc. (reference 21). Of course, not the ultimate dream, but at least something.
4. As is known, the Su-33 is equipped with an in-flight hose refueling system. Refueling can be done from the same type of machines equipped with a unified overhead unit refueling UPAZ-1 at a rate of up to 2000 l / min (according to other sources, up to 1100 l / min - reference 22). Extendable fuel receiving rod with GPT-1 head is located in front of the cockpit on the left side of the fuselage, UPZ-1 is suspended on the 1-th suspension point between the refueling engine nacelles [7-206-207].
In the 1 part of the three-part Military Acceptance issue about the Kuznetsov march (22: 57), the famous test pilot S. Bogdan described the tactics of using the Su-33 with refueling in the air (edited by the author of the blog): a group takes off from an aircraft carrier refueling workers (several tankers), followed by a group that will perform a combat mission, reaches the refueling area (having spent, for example, a third or half of the fuel supply) and refuels from tankers, as a result of which its flight range is increased by the passed value (not counting fuel spend Foot on the rise).
At the same time, in my opinion, the efficiency of tanker aircraft could be increased by using outboard fuel tanks, which are not provided for in the Su-33 nominally (“not installed” - reference 23). When taking off from the starting position No.3 (195-meter long run), the aircraft can take off with a full supply of fuel in the internal tanks (9 500 kg) and maximum air-to-air reserve (8 P-27 and 4) P-73), take-off weight will be (according to different data) 32 200 - 32 450 kg (reference 24). However, for a "tanker" such combat load seems redundant - probably 2 Р-27 and 2-Р73 probably would be enough, and instead of the rest you can hang two suspended fuel tanks PTB-1500 with a capacity of 1500 l (1170 kg) of aviation kerosene TC-1, due to which the fuel reserve of the tanker will increase by 25%.
Shock complex
If criticism about the placement of anti-ship missile systems (SCRC) on the first four domestic TAVKR is appropriate (they occupied the entire nose of the upper deck, largely devaluing the aircraft carrier function of cruisers), then Kuznetsova is criticized by inertia rather than justice - 12 its UVP SCRK "Granit" removed under the deck, occupy not too large volume, located between the tracks of the starting positions No. 1 and No. XXUMX (the track of the 2-th position coincides with the 3-th, if I correctly understand its number) and absolutely no They are hovering off deck aircraft from a springboard. The dimensions of the missile compartment occupied by the CWP are approximately 2x25,5x9,5 m (LхBхH, length - in the middle of the height of the compartment, height - with a double-decker "), 10,5 square meter, 240 cubic meter volume
This volume is not enough even for minimally expedient lengthening of the hangar on the 4 MiG-29K (26х20х7,2 = 3740 cubic meters), apart from the fact that the redesign of the premises will be associated with significant design and technological difficulties. Dismantling of the SCRC may be useful except for placement in the released volume of additional aircraft ammunition, but there is a suspicion that there is no special need for this. TAVKR Ave. 11435 was designed to base a large number of anti-submarine helicopters on it (about 18 machines), and since the PLO function is unlikely to be a priority for it in the near future, the cellars of aircraft torpedoes, depth bombs and sonar buoys can be used for free-fall air bombs and precision weapons (plus some unknown hidden reserves).
The reluctance to abandon the strike complex (more precisely, the "need to restore the strike armament system") was voiced recently by D. Rogozin (reference 25). It’s hard not to agree - four UKKS cells (3С14) with a height of 9,58 m (at the height of the 11435 missile compartment near 10,5 m) can be placed on the site of a single Granit security unit, that is, the total ammunition of the same 3X14 can reach 48 missiles (three times more than on 22350), which, if necessary, will be a very solid contribution to the salvo of any ship group led by TAVKR.
Conclusion
By and large, even if within a reasonable time (for 2-3 of the year), the GEM alone was modernized at Kuznetsov, giving the aircraft carrier the opportunity to go to the BS annually (and not once every two years, as it was before) and staff the air group according to the proposed new state (8 Su-33, 16 MiG-29K, 4 Ka-31, 4 Ka-27, total 32 LA in the hangar plus, if possible, also 14 on the flight deck - reference 26), this will be a great happiness for the VMF and all those who support his soul. If you manage to do something else, we will consider it a bonus or a gift of fate. ■
Scheme KTU TAVKR pr. 1143 (from the book by V. Kuzin and V. Nikolsky "Navy of the USSR 1945-1991" [4-420])
Boiler diagrams KVG-3 [5-16-17] (left) and KVG 6М (KVG 6М-1, THA not shown, SKBK, National Defense No. 6 / 2011)
TRD AL-31F-M1 (AL-31F 42 series) 13 500 kgf (photo from the Salyut gas turbine-building site)
The standard Su-33 Н001 radar, which is part of the Sword SLE (photo from the NIIP website)
Radar with a slot antenna "Zhuk-M" installed on the Su-27KUB (photo A. Karpenko)
Radar with AFU "Zhuk-A" (photo A. Karpenko)
UPAZ-1 refueling unit, front view (photo from the book by A. Fomin [7], p. 207)
UPAZ-1, rear view: refueling cone and refueling alarm (source is the same)
Refueling bar in the released position (photo from the book by A. Fomin [7], p. 206)
UVP PKRK "Granit" TAVKR pr. 11435, 1991 (photo from the work of V. Zablotsky [1] from Petrovich-2 from forums.airbase.ru)
Fragment of longitudinal section of TAVKR pr. 11435 (scheme S. Balakin from the issue of the Maritime collection №7 / 2005 [1])
Fragment of the top view of the TAVKR pr. 11435 (diagram from the book of Yu. Apalkov "Ships of the Navy of the USSR", volume II, part 1) Dimensions (LхB) of the missile compartment by hatches on the flight deck - 22,5х7,0 m
Rocket compartment (green) and hangar (yellow) TAVKR Ave 11435, inscribed in a theoretical drawing TAVKR Ave 11434 (from the book of A. Pavlov), characterized by a smaller breakdown of the sides (frames) in the nose (along the length of the rocket compartment is approximately between 2 and 4 plus 1 / 3 theoretical frames)
Rocket compartment (green) and hangar (yellow) TAVKR Ave 11435, inscribed in the front view TAVKR Ave 11436 (from the book of Y. Apalkov "Ships of the Navy of the USSR", Volume II, part 1)
Kuznetsov arrives at a permanent station (35 SRZ) after military service in the Mediterranean, 10.02.2017 (photo by the press service of 35 SRZ)
Puddle for Rakhmanov
Not even two years have passed since A. Rakhmanov was appointed head of USC, as a former official of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, who was already somehow getting used to the new place, allowed himself a public statement that once and for all put an end to his reputation:
"For us, the existing approach to the repair of large-capacity ships - Admiral Kuznetsov, Peter the Great - is not something unambiguous and optimal for one simple reason - the size of the costs for repairing ships that are already 30-35 years, is approaching the cost of construction A new ship, and their lifespan will be much less than that of a ship built ... But is it necessary to do this, and if so, under what conditions? This is a question of the general concept of the life cycle - if the life span of the 30 ship is years, then whether to prolong his life What is a ship repair issue for us, especially large, technically complex ships, is not obvious. Therefore, before talking about where to do it, you need to ask - why do it? " (1 link).
After the triumphant Mediterranean military campaign of the 25-year-old Kuznetsov and the 18-year-old Peter, who, with bated breath, were watched by the whole world (in particular, viewers of Russian television channels - thanks to the seconded film crews working on the ships of our KAG, in fact, without sleep and rest), the words of A. Rakhmanov sound absolutely ridiculous and unprofessional *. For reasons that are not completely understood (most likely, for the sake of some kind of internal corporate redistribution of funds), the government official, the chief shipbuilder of Russia, did not give a damn about the interests of the country and its Navy, having forgotten that we would only go to serial construction of a first-class BNK after 1 years, and until then, the main priority of the USC will be VTG and repairs with the modernization of existing first ranks. Offering to put beauty, pride and the foundation of the military power of our military on scrap metal fleet, AR got into such a puddle that until the end of his career he would have to walk in wet pants.
* Moreover, the statement on the 1 link is dated to 08.04.2016, i.e. when the decision on combat service was already taken and both of the above ships were actively preparing for the hike that began six months later (15.10.2016). Given that the president of the USC could not have been unaware of this, Rakhmanov’s slogan is perceived as a frank sabotage, which characterizes its author from the most unattractive side.
Term and price
According to the general director of Nevsky PKB, who has already completed the technical project of medium repair with modernization of 11435, S. Vlasov. The work may take from 2's to 3,5 years - everything will depend on the decision of the Ministry of Defense, which should approve the amount of funding and, as a result, the list of performance of work (reference 2). Rakhmanov, whose attitude to the credibility of the messages I have already expressed earlier, names the term in 2 of the year (reference 3), anonymous from the defense industry and the Navy - around 2-x and 2,5 (reference 4) (reference 5). There is more confidence in S. Vlasov, of course, but here we must bear in mind the amendment to the realities of our shipbuilding industry, namely: the deadlines for the repair of Nakhimov, Ustinov and Chabanenko were shifted to the right strictly on 2 of the year (from 2018 to 2020, from 2014 to 2016 and from 2016 to 2018, respectively).
According to various sources, the repair of Kuznetsov may occur at the end of May 2017 (reference 4), before July 2017 (reference 5) and in 2018 (reference 6) (reference 7). The transfer of the beginning of the average repair to 2018 is expedient for at least three reasons: 1) after a thoroughly carried out pre-advance repair (01-10.2016) the combat ship is capable of combat service; 2) before the adoption of a new weapons program on 2018-2025. (HPV-2025) in 2017, there may be problems with financing repair work; 3) the "won" year can be used to train the under-trained pilots of the MiG-29K (UB) 100 oxip (the original).
Taking into account the above, the most optimistic (but unrealistic) deadline for repairing a TAVKR is 2019, the most pessimistic (but most reliable) is 2023-2024. with an extension of service life of at least 20 years (reference 8), just before the moment when the aircraft carrier of new projects established in 2025-2035 will appear in the Russian Navy. As for the cost of work indicated in the material at 8 (65 billion rubles), it seems to be quite adequate, except for the share of OCD (30 billion rubles or 46%), although the latter is due to quite reasonable reasons - the need to redevelop nodes and units that are no longer produced in our country.
Scene
Soon after the completion of the long-distance campaign of the CAG SF, there appeared reports in the media that the Zvezdochka Ship Repair Center was ready to carry out repairs with the modernization of Kuznetsov, and from the context it followed that this significant event would take place at the actual address of the head center of the central secured service center, i.e. in Severodvinsk (reference 9), which is hampered by two important circumstances. First, the head "Star", regularly repairing nuclear submarine cruisers and not only, is overloaded with orders. Instead of "Tula", the plant will come "Bryansk", instead of "Eagle" - most likely, "Voronezh", instead of "Ustinov" - "Moscow". In addition, the Leopard is in operation; the Wolf, Samara and Bratsk of the same type, Yaroslavl diesel-electric submarines, and Karp in a suspended state are waiting for their turn. What is another TAVKR ?!
Secondly, despite the impressive dimensions of the loading dock (205х130 = 26650 sq. M - two football fields), the aircraft carrier will not fit there even diagonally (Lвл = 270 m against 243 m), moreover - it cannot even enter too Narrow gates (in the 4 photo you can see the APKR of 949A Smolensk with BNB = 18,2 m against BVL = 33,4 m of TAVKR Ave 11435; the RCN of 1164 AH, also docked at CSH, BNB, enters the dock camera; = 20,8 m).
Everything rises to its place if we recall that 35 SRZ is a Murmansk branch of the CS Zvezdochka, where Kuznetsov is based, and one of the messages says that “35 or 82 ship repair factories can get a large order (both in Murmansk) "(link 4). The fact is that the 35 SRZ docks (North and South) cannot yet accommodate an aircraft carrier, although the corresponding project for their reconstruction has already been developed by Soyuzproektverf, and one of the options, which means combining both docks into one, 27.04.2016 is approved for the further implementation of scientific Technical Council, consisting of representatives of KGNTS, Nevsky PKB, CA "Zvezdochka" and 35 SRZ (Fig. 8).
Of course, such a large-scale event as the reconstruction of the dock complex, which will be able to docking not only 11435, but also 11442, will not be able to be carried out quickly, and this time (as in the past) you will have to use the floating unit PD-50 82 SRZ in Roslyakovo (unavailability Sevmash accept now 11435 to explain unnecessarily).
Aircraft radland
The most serious flaw in the 11435 Ave. aircraft carrier, without a doubt, is the absence of an aircraft of the radar patrol and guidance (РЛДН, more familiar abbreviation - ARLO). At the same time, there is still the opinion that to take off heavy aircraft with turboprop-fan engines (TVVD) and maximum take-off weight in 40 000 kg (in Su-33 - 33 000 kg) a catapult is required, but this is not so. Probably, few people remember that in the original version of the Yak-44 (RLD), in addition to two turboprop engines under the wing, four lifting TRDs were provided in the fuselage, but later a new design-layout scheme of the RLDN trampoline-ejection takeoff aircraft was used, in which a high take-off body and blowing the upper surface of the wing to increase its lift to a level sufficient to take off from the springboard, provided two TVWD D-27.
The main highlight of the Yak-44 - the D-27 engines, which have no analogues in the world, were developed by the Zaporozhye MKB (ZMKB) Progress, i.e., in a hostile state, however, both of the key elements of the TVWD determine its high technological level and reducer) were produced in Russia - by Stupinsky KBM (at present - NPP "Aerosila") and Moscow SFP "Salyut" (now SPT of the gas turbine industry "Salyut"), which means we have all the technical documentation, skills and at any time we can renew them production (4 D-27 used on one ohm An experienced two-70 Ukrainian Air Force).
Technical offer on Yak-44 (2 TVD plus 4 TRD) based on the task received earlier (TTZ?) Yakovlev Design Bureau prepared 1979 for November, designing according to the new scheme continued only in October of 1984 (2 TVVD). In January, 1990 took place the protection of the draft technical design and layout of the Yak-44 aircraft. In terms of the main LTX, it significantly surpassed the E-2C “Hokai” with an ejection takeoff. In the same year began the construction of the first flight model. In August, the refinement of the constructive-technological layout (which they decided to use as a GWM) was completed, it was dismantled, loaded onto a barge, delivered by river routes to the Black Sea on board the Kuznetsov and assembled again.
Performance evaluation of the Yak-44 when basing aboard the TAVKR was carried out in a short time during the first half of September. The possibility of towing and mooring the aircraft on the flight deck and in the hangar, rolling onto the platform of the lift and climbing onto the flight deck, descending into the hangar and installing it in a regular place, pairing the aircraft with technical support posts in the hangar and on the deck were checked. The work was carried out by an integrated team of employees OKB im. Yakovlev, NPKB, plant "Universal", CSY, representatives of the Air Force and Navy.
Due to some oversizing, which was the price for a springboard take-off, as well as a multifunctional radio engineering complex (RTC), working not only on air and surface, but also on ground targets, the Yak-44 had somewhat larger dimensions than the Hokai, but it was quite good fit into the flight and hangar decks of the ship and did not require a noticeable (in terms of the effectiveness of the entire naval air group) reducing the number of fighters. On the other hand, it is necessary to recognize the positive qualities of the springboard take-off, due to the relatively high reliability of the springboard as a take-off device, especially in the northern latitudes characteristic of the combat activities of the Russian Navy.
It was assumed that the Kuznetsov and Varyag will be based before the 3-4 of the RLDN Yak-44 aircraft, on board the 11437 was to accommodate an enlarged fleet of shipboard aircraft, including 6 of the RLDN aircraft. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, due to cuts in funding, further work on the Yak-44 aircraft slowed down, and in 1992, after the construction of the TAVKR avenue 11437 was stopped, they were stopped at the stage of building test aircraft for flight testing **.
** Facts and quotations from V. Abidin’s article “Eagle Eye of the Fleet. Aircraft of the Yak-44 ради radar patrol and targeting”, Wings of the Motherland, No. XXUMX / 10 (p. 2009-30) were used.
Thus, to date, we have an approved preliminary design of the Yak-44, the design and technological layout of the aircraft "tested" on the Kuznetsov, and, most importantly, the technical documentation on the TV-VDD D-27 (or, at least, its most important components). In addition, we have time (up to 3,5-5,5 years) and, according to the media, 30 billion rubles. on OCD. Why not assume that all this will give us to 2023-2024. deck plane РЛДН?
Dock camera of the Zvezdochka head office enterprise (satellite image from zvezdochka-ru)
Stargaz dock camera, view of the gate. The water level corresponds to the sea level (photo from zvezdochka-ru)
APKR pr. 949А "Smolensk" enters the "Stars" dock camera (photo from zvezdochka-ru)
RKR pr. 1164 "Marshal Ustinov" in the "Stars" dock-camera during the docking operation (photo from zvezdochka-ru)
Diagram of the available dry docks 35 SRZ (Ill. From the article by A. Dunaev and A. Nazarov in the “Bulletin of Shipbuilding and Ship Repair Technology” №24 / 2016 from Curious from forums.airbase.ru)
The first version of the reconstruction of dry docks 35 SRZ (Ill. From the article A. Dunaev and A. Nazarov in the VTSS No. 24 / 2016 from Curious from forums.airbase.ru)
The second version of the reconstruction of dry docks 35 SRZ (ill. From the article by A. Dunaev and A. Nazarov in the VTSS No. 24 / 2016 from Curious from forums.airbase.ru)
"Kuznetsov" in PD-50 82 SRZ, Roslyakovo (Murmansk), 08.07.2015 (photo from sam7 from forums.airbase.ru)
Deck aircraft of the radar patrol and guidance Yak-44РЛД (Wings of the Motherland, №10 / 2009)
Deck plane of the radar patrol and guidance of the Yak-44РЛД (Fig. V. Pogodin, Aviko Press from the site "Sky Corner" - airwar.ru)
Kuznetsov arrives at a permanent station (35 SRZ) after military service in the Mediterranean, 10.02.2017 (photo by the press service of 35 SRZ)
Catapult
Regardless of the presence or absence of the need for an ejection takeoff for an RLDN aircraft, the catapult has three indisputable advantages over the springboard, one minor and one controversial:
1) a significant increase in the take-off mass of the aircraft with almost the same length of takeoff (the upper deck of the flight deck) - 90 m for the steam catapult and 105 m for takeoff from the main launch positions No.1 and #2 Ave. 11435 (Su-33 loses seven tons or XNX % - 21 26 versus 000 33 kg; when taking off only from the starting position No. 000, the rise time of the air group is multiplied;
2) unmanned take-off and, as a result, a noticeable increase in the range of deck aircraft with an equal combat load and fuel capacity (for TRD AL-31F, fuel consumption for the vigorous full afterburner compared to the unformed maximum mode increases 2,56 times - from 0,75 to 1,92 kg / kgf / hour);
3) the absence of a "non-working" period of time after separation (the first seconds of the flight), during which the aircraft flies along a ballistic trajectory at a speed below sufficient for regular aerodynamic control surfaces (of the order of 180 km / h at the springboard against 300 km / h at the catapult), cannot be effectively controlled and proceed with the flight mission - besides the loss of time when collecting a link, squadron, wave, and building a battle formation, under unfavorable circumstances (anything can happen in a war) this can lead to beating airplanes taking off planes of the enemy;
4) expanding the range of use of deck aviation according to wind power, side and keel pitching - it’s clear that a slowly accelerating aircraft, not attached to the pulling shoe of the shuttle-piston group of the catapult, is easier to blow off or drop from the deck (this advantage is attributed to the category of secondary, since ships of large displacement are not too suffer greatly from excitement, and a heavy aircraft with low sailing is hardly worth the fear of wind exposure within the seaworthiness of the carrier for the use of aviation);
5) the rise time of the modern aircraft carrier (which is ours or that of a foreign one) into the air, namely the time from “all airplanes in the hangar” to “all airplanes in the air”, is wrapped in a veil of secrecy, and due to the lack of reliable data cannot be taken into account, despite the claim that the presence of two catapults on the 11437 made it possible to reduce the group take-off time to the “Nimitz” level [4] (for example, one of the sources gives 5- 6 minutes to take off a group of 20 aircraft when using sun ex four catapults [6], which is doubtful not only by the author of the blog, but also by some of his readers - reference 2).
As for the advantages of the springboard, then opinions differ greatly. So, the author of the remarkable book about Su-33 and the editor-in-chief of the magazine "Takeoff" A. Fomin argues that one of the unrecoverable shortcomings of a steam catapult is the inevitable etching of steam from the trunk of the booster track, which can result at low temperatures (in high latitudes) ice causing piston seizure and failure of the entire device [1]. However, profile specialists very emotionally object to him, saying that the catapult has a regular system of heating the channel before flying (to 180-200 degrees Celsius) and, despite a reliable thermal insulation system, the temperature of the external surfaces reaches 50 degrees, due to Of which the problem of “frost” is pure fudge [8].
In terms of resistance to combat damage, the springboard is, of course, more reliable than a single catapult, since the piston (shuttle-piston group) can jam even with a slight deformation of the flight deck as a result of an explosion of an aerial bomb or a cruise missile on it. On the other hand, in the presence of four catapults, four arresting gears and an emergency barrier, the likelihood of the aircraft carrier completely losing its combat capability (at least as a result of one attack and several direct hits) seems not too high. At the same time, the springboard is also not a panacea, since it can also be damaged by the enemy’s air attacks.
Based on the above, the conclusion is that the full-fledged aircraft carrier catapults are definitely needed, but in the case of the Kuznetsov their absence is classified as unrecoverable flaws, which are prevented by three circumstances:
1) a steam catapult С1-М [8] for the aircraft carrier 11437 ave. In the Soviet Union succeeded in creating - designed it in the Central Research Institute of Ship Mechanical Engineering (Central Research Institute SM or just Sudmash, formerly the Scientific Research Institute "Compass") in St. Petersburg, built in the Proletarsky plant , tested on the Crimean "Nitka" (not on real aircraft of the ejection take-off, which then simply did not exist yet, but as an accelerating device for carriages loading, depicting deck-mounted aircraft during tests of aerofinishers), where the starting characteristics of the catapult reached the design level of thrust and to The speeds were carried out by the MVI (1987-1988), completed to fully comply with the requirements of the TK (1989), and its nodes for the 25.11.1988 TAVKR pledged. 11437 pr. could be delivered according to the construction schedule [8], however, to recreate С1-M today seems unreasonable because of its hopeless obsolescence and limited capabilities of the Proletarsky plant, regularly disrupting the delivery dates of even such generally ordinary items as steering gears or devices for transporting a helicopter (according to the claims of PSZ Yantar );
2) obsolescence of steam catapults caused by the emergence of an electromagnetic catapult (EMALS - Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System), which is akin to changing a horse tram or a locomotive with an electric locomotive (many successful launches of both the US Navy bogies and deck carrier planes have already been made: first) both from the onshore test facility and from the CVN 78 deck, in the second - so far only from the shore, reference 3) - the launch energy limit (90-95 MJ) was the decisive constraint for the further use of steam ejection the capacity of the working fluid (steam) and efficiency, comparable with the locomotive (no more than 6%), which, in turn, leads to a large consumption of steam (more than 600 kg per launch), to compensate for which, 88 tons of double distilled distilled water that is comparable in price to the best grades of gasoline [7];
Other major advantages of electromagnetic catapults over steam ones are, as you know, the possibility of launching both heavier aircraft (with energy up to 120 MJ) and lighter ones (including UAVs); ensuring greater smoothness of take-off (with less overload), which has a beneficial effect on both the health of pilots and the aircraft resource; they charge faster, have a smaller mass, require less volume and maintenance personnel, however, for obvious reasons, they consume much more electricity and are therefore unavailable even for Nimitz type AVs;
unlike the Yak-44, which does not have a special alternative, the resumption of work on the steam catapult would be a step backwards with respect to the global technical progress - except for the United States, Britain, China and India are looking at the development of electromagnetic catapults; According to available information, under the program of military shipbuilding up to 2050, involving the construction of new aircraft carriers, an electromagnetic catapult is being developed in Russia (reference 4), most likely by the Trinity Institute for Innovation and Thermonuclear Research (TRINITI) [7], and in view of the American of experience (contract - 20.12.1999, first take-off of F / A-18 - 18.12.2010) these works will take approximately 10-15 years, i.e. taking into account the developments, today should have time to bookmark the main AB for the Russian Navy (2025);
3) even if the development and manufacture of a steam or, more accurately, the electromagnetic catapult, were at the final stage, they could not be installed on Kuznetsov during repairs without a radical re-arrangement of the general arrangement, since in the first case it would be necessary to squeeze into the ship :
the main KVG-2 steam boiler, two M-3 desalination plants with 100 performance t / h of double distillate distillate for the main boiler, four titanium alloy vapor-accumulators for pre-accumulation of 600 kg of steam (one start), increased capacity steam condensers, finally steam engine itself with two power cylinders with a length of 90 m and a diameter of more than half a meter, a shuttle-piston group with a pulling shoe and hydraulic brake at the end of the track of the catapult [8] (original);
in the second: equipment and equipment of six subsystems, including input transformers (connecting the catapult with the ship's power grid), electric motors, flywheels-accumulators of kinetic energy of more than 3 tons, pulse excitation generators (converting the kinetic energy accumulated by the flywheels into electrical voltage), the accelerator unit itself ( linear motor with an active rotor-shuttle), control equipment for the thrust of the shuttle and the distribution of electricity between the catapults [7], and finally nuclear powerplant (!) instead of the existing power befitting of boiler-turbine that goes far beyond common sense.
Hangar
The Kuznetsova hangar is not too small, but still too small - its area is only 57% of the Nimitz hangar area (153х26 = 3980 sq. M [5-6] against 209х33,6 [6-15] = 7020 X. m), while the total displacement is 67% (59 000 [5-10] vs. 88 000 tons - reference 5). For clarity, it makes sense to give a few more numbers: on 11435 on 1000 tons of total displacement accounts for 67,5 square. m hangar on the "Nimitz" - 79,8 square. m (on 18,2% more); The hangar of our aircraft carrier takes 57% length and 74% ship width KWL, American - 66% and 82%.
Of course, I would like to have a bigger hangar on the Kuznetsov, especially given the fact that American aircraft carriers operate mainly in the “resort zone” of the World Ocean, and ours are based beyond the Arctic Circle. However, as in the case of a catapult, it is not possible to do this in a reasonable time for reasonable money. To understand this, it is enough to look at the 11435 longitudinal section below and, in the absence of a tolerance form, a theoretical drawing of the 11434 — a ship whose hull, I am sure, should be geometrically similar to the five.
To get real dividends from an increase in the size of the hangar, you need to extend it at least 20 meters, or better on 40 - to place one or two more MiG-29K (UB) links in it (reference 6, ill. 7). Behind the stern bulkhead of the hangar, most likely, there is equipment and apparatus towed by GAS GAK Polinom, and it is extremely undesirable to touch it (especially taking into account the acute shortage of escort ships). The nasal bulkhead is located somewhere on the 7 (7 and 1 / 3) theoretical frame (13,5 space) and its body starts to taper like a bottleneck, so you don’t have much trouble. When trying to lengthen the hangar in the nose (after having removed the SCRC), it will, firstly, lose its rectangular shape, and secondly, it will have to squeeze in rooms with all its combat posts located in a smaller volume, which is unlikely to benefit. to business Conclusion: it is better to forget about the expansion of the hangar.
Aero Finisher
There is still no end in the case of the loss of two deck-based aircraft during Kuznetsov’s extreme combat service (Su-33 03.12.2016 and MiG-29K 13.11.2016), since there are sources claiming that experts have not yet confirmed the opinion that the crash of the aircraft was the fault of the arresting vehicle (7 link). The Defense Ministry, as is often the case, prefers to keep silent, without mentioning either the on-board numbers of the lost aircraft, or the official cause of the flight accidents, the causes of which should have been clarified and made public a long time ago.
The most reliable publication on this topic today is the material of Gazeta.ru, where the main and sole cause of the incident is the break of the airliner cables (reference 8). The only comment relates to the header, since the C-2H product (or C2-H [8]) failed the pilots for the second time, and for the third time (05.09.2005 similarly lost another Su-33, which is mentioned in article text). The third time is no longer an accident and not a coincidence, but a system, and to both the creators of the aerofinisher - the Central Research Institute of Ship Engineering (link 9) and the Proletarsky Plant (link 11) (which, by the way, recently shipped AF for the Indian "Vikrant" - link 12) , you need to think about it and do it so as not to let anyone down. They have time for that.
Basing
It is well known that the permanently stationed TAVKR Ave 11435 “Admiral Kuznetsov” 59 000’s full displacement is the 35 th ship repair plant (Murmansk), and not the naval base (PPB) located in the closed city of Severomorsk, where other ships of the 43 division of rocket ships ("Peter the Great", "Marshal Ustinov", "Admiral Ushakov"). On the one hand, as a temporary measure, this, of course, is good, because staying at the pier, and not on the roadstead, saves the resource of our precious (without irony) aircraft carrier, on the other, it looks a bit strange (as if the strategy from the Engels airbase began to be based at the Borisoglebsk airfield of the Kazan aircraft factory) and cannot last forever - the SRZ embankments are designed entirely for other (production) purposes.
The largest draft with protruding parts (bulb, etc.) at full displacement at 11435 is 10,4 m [5-10], at 11442 - 10,3 m [4-67]. The question arises: why is "Peter the Great" mooring to the pier without problems, and the "Kuznetsov" is forced to stand on the barrels at a distance from it? At the same time, by approximately 10 meters, the large width over KVL (33,4 [5] -35,0 [4] m in 11435 versus 24,0 m in 11442) should not create unnecessary difficulties during mooring. As an option - the reason is in the sponsors (parts of the flight deck, strongly protruding beyond the ship’s line), which prevent the cranes from passing along the narrow pier (photo 15-16), but in Norfolk they somehow cope with this (photo 17-18). Whatever it was, the successor of Spetsstroy of Russia will have enough time (several years) to build a berth for an aircraft carrier in the 43 drone base station.
On the left is a steam engine (two trunks of power cylinders) in the cathepte C1-M for TAVKR Ave. 11437, on the right is a shuttle carriage with a pulling boot of the shuttle-piston group (the gutter covers are removed) (Avian panorama no. 1 / 2015 [XNNXX / 8] blog author)
Fragment of a C1-M catapult steam engine, Proletarsky Zavod, 1984 (Aviation panorama No.1 / 2015)
Cross section of the C1-M catapult steam engine and piston group with a stacker (Aviation panorama No. 1 / 2015 [8], reconstruction of the author of the blog)
Truck-loader No. 2 with a carrying capacity of 30 tons for С1-М, 1986 (Air panorama №1 / 2015)
Tests of an emergency barrier by an airplane mock-up, 1986-1987 (Aviation panorama No.1 / 2015)
Diagram of the electromagnetic catapult EMALS (ill. From the site of General Atomics)
F / A-18E take off from EMALS ground test facility, Lakehurst, NJ (screenshot from General Atomics video)
EMALS Electromagnetic Catapult on CVN 78 Deck "Gerald R. Ford", 05.06.2015 (navaltoday.com)
Longitudinal section TAVKR pr. 11435 (scheme S. Balakin from the issue of the "Maritime collection" №7 / 2005 [5])
Theoretical drawing of TAVKR Ave. 11434 (from the book by A. Pavlov "The Long Hand" by Admiral Gorshkov ", 2000)
Four (cable) aerofinisers "Kuznetsova" (screenshot from the 2-th part of the "First Battle Exit" of the program "Military acceptance" TRK Zvezda)
The moment of the hook for the airfincher cable No.2 (screenshot from the 2 part of the "First Fighting Out" of the program "Military Acceptance" of TRC Zvezda)
"Kuznetsov" on the barrels in the roadstead of Severomorsk, 15.06.2016 (photo by Georgich 85 from forums.airbase.ru)
"Peter the Great" and "Marshal Ustinov" at one of the piers of Severomorsk, 23.02.2017 (photo from mil.ru)
Tavkr pr. 11436, view from the nose. Sponsons (Yu. Apalkov's scheme from the book "Ships of the Navy of the USSR" II-1)
US Navy aircraft carriers at the naval pier of Norfolk, Virginia, 20.12.2012 (photo by US Navy from blogs.defensenews.com)
US Navy aircraft carriers at the naval pier of Norfolk, Virginia, 20.12.2012 (photo by US Navy from blogs.defensenews.com)
Kuznetsov arrives at a permanent station (35 SRZ) after military service in the Mediterranean, 10.02.2017 (photo by the press service of 35 SRZ)
Boilers
Without a doubt, ensuring reliable (long-lasting and trouble-free) operation of the Kuznetsov boiler-turbine power plant is the primary task of the average repair of a ship. The aircraft carrier's power plant consists of four machine-boiler (turbo-boiler) groups (echelons) arranged in pairs in two machine-boiler compartments (MKO) - fore and aft, each of which runs its own propeller and includes two high-pressure boilers KVG- 4 with TNA-4 turbochargers and one main turbo-gear (steam turbine with gear) TV-12-4. I personally didn’t have any complaints against GTZA (although, of course, they would need a thorough restoration of technical readiness), so we will pay all the attention to the boilers.
At present, three types of high-pressure steam boilers are used on warships of the Russian Navy - KVG-2 (as part of the backup EC TARKR Ave 11442), KVG-3 (EM Ave 956) and KVG-4 (TAVKR Ave 11435). Unlike KVG-3, the principle of operation and design features of which are described in open textbooks for university students [5], very little is known about KVG-4 - mainly that with the same steam parameters (pressure 66 atm = 6,5 MPa and temperature 470 deg. Celsius), its steam output increased from 98 and 100 (KVN 98 / 64-2 and KVG-3) to 115 t / h [4], and the aggregate capacity of the GTZH compared to previous 1143 (with boilers KVN 98) / XHUMX compared to previous 64 (with boilers XVNX X XUMUMX) / 2-45) increased from 000 50 to 000 956 l. with. (like XNUMX).
On the trials of admiral V. Selivanov (Chief of the General Staff of the Navy, senior on board) and the personnel of the division of the movement of warhead-5 during the first campaign of Kuznetsov in the Mediterranean (23.12.1995-22.03.1996), is well known from the book of N. Cherkashin (reference 3), however, no other serious troubles related to boilers have been reported since. It is possible that the incidents were carefully kept silent (which is unlikely), perhaps there was a special (extremely careful) attitude to the aircraft carrier boilers, perhaps the design of the KVG-4 brought to mind after the 1995-1996 “adventure” of YG -3 for the better, but, be that as it may, the fact remains a fact - with its KVG-4 Kuznetsov regularly goes to distant waters, while two of the three destroyers of 17 remaining from 956 with KVG-3 perform the duties of ships OVR, and the campaign "Fast" in India is perceived as a flight to the moon.
However, despite the regular exits to combat service, the KON of the aircraft carrier today is very low (the coefficient of operational voltage is equal to the ratio of the total time to perform tasks on the destination to the total service life). "Kuznetsov" went to the BS eight times: 1) 23.12.1995-22.03.1996 (SPM); 2) 27.09-24.10.2004 (North-East. Atlantic); 3) 23.08-14.09.2005 (North-East. Atlantic); 4) 05.12.2007-03.02.2008 (SPM); 5) 05.12.2008-27.02.2009 (SPM); 6) 06.12.2011-17.02.2012 (SPM); 7) 17.12.2013-17.05.2014 (SPM); 8) 15.10.2016-08.02.2017 (SPM). If we count KOH from the moment of the transfer of the Navy ship (25.12.1990), we get 623 / 9612 = 0,06 (the initial data is in days). It should be borne in mind that the second BS took place only nine years later (8,76) after the first (“troubled times” were outside), after which the situation began to change for the better with GDP prayers. Recounting KOH with 01.01.2007, we get 484 / 3761 = 0,13 (!), Which, however, is also far from ideal. It is necessary to ensure that the Kuznetsov boilers make it possible to increase KOH in 2 − 2,5 times.
At the same time, even in the June issue of the National Defense magazine for 2011 a year (almost six years ago) it was told about the new development of the St. Petersburg Special Design Bureau for Boiler Construction (SKBK) - a high-pressure automated ship boiler of the new generation KVG 6M (as in the original - without a hyphen) , capable, according to the developer, to become the basis of KTU, competitive with gas turbine and diesel power plants. The perspective boiler of the SSCC differs from its predecessors by its efficiency, reliability, small weight and size characteristics and high degree of automation, its steam parameters are impressive - 8,0 MPa (around 82 atm) and 515 degrees. Celsius, an automated control system made on the basis of modern elemental base, allows for a service-free maintenance, and the total fuel consumption of the KTU is reduced somewhere by 20%.
At the same time, the prospects for the use of boiler-turbine installations on warships and naval support vessels is a big question (there were practically no publications on this topic with 2011), and production of a fundamentally new boiler is unlikely to be small-scale perceived with delight at the manufacturer. However, there are other, more practical, proposals for the SSC. So, in particular, when upgrading works on ships in service, the KVG 8М-6 with traditional steam parameters (1 MPa and 6,0 degrees) and the ability to work on diesel fuel, which increases the cruising range by about 470%, is proposed. the boiler is completely interchangeable with KVG-10 (reference 3).
In general, to improve the operational qualities of Kuznetsov KTU, we have everything we need: 1) awareness of the need to do this; 2) willingness to finance work from the state defense order; 3) the presence of a valid profile KB, specializing in particular in ship high-pressure boilers (reference 5) and having relevant developments; 4) the presence of a shipbuilding enterprise with a developed boiler production - Baltic Plant, St. Petersburg (link 6), not so long ago (already in the newest stories Russia) produced nine new boilers KVG-3D (one training) for the Indian aircraft carrier Vikramaditya (reference 7).
Given that the KVG-4 boilers were developed at least 30 years ago and are anachronism to a certain extent, I would not like them to remain in their original form on the updated aircraft carrier. The most rational option seems to be the replacement of all eight boilers with new ones - of the type KVG 6М-1, but interchangeable with KVG-4 (let's call them KVG 6М-2), which are distinguished by ultra-modern automation that would minimize the notorious human factor. According to an anonymous source in the defense industry, made, oddly enough, before the fault detection procedure (or selective fault detection was carried out in advance mode), "four out of eight of its eight power plant boilers will be repaired on the aircraft carrier" (reference 8) that makes sense only if the repaired boilers bring to the modern level, as is customary in aircraft and tank construction.
Air group
Considering an aircraft carrier in isolation from an air group is pointless - if the air group can still solve some tasks without its carrier (for example, to provide air defense systems located near the airfield of its coastal base), the carrier itself, deprived of the air group, becomes practically useless in military terms a structure suitable except for the transfer of army aircraft and helicopters from air bases in the theater or from one theater to another. Therefore, it makes sense to try to imagine what good can be done with aircrafts based on Kuznetsov while it is undergoing average repairs.
If you bring to the mind (put on the wing) an XRUM aircraft based on the Yak-44 (as was mentioned in the 1 part of the trilogy) during this time they cannot or will not, Kuznetsova will have to be content with its economy option (XRDS for the poor) - the Ka-31 helicopter, which was never used on the Navy ships regularly (as far as we know, the two sides - 90 and 91, transferred to MA in 2012, are in trial operation). Both Ka-31 and Ka-27М (supplied from the end of 2016), and MiG-29K (UB) are new machines, they have a long process of "running in" front-line pilots, eliminating comments and improvements in working order, so to speak about any modernization here is too early. Another thing is the Su-33.
First of all, it should be said that it would be unwise to refuse these remarkable (the best in the world) deck fighters in favor of MiG-29K (UB) alone, and, apparently, they are not going to do this two years ago Navy I. Kozhin (“Su-33 will be ... operated together with MiG-29K”: the Su-33 will close the middle air defense zone, the MiG-29K medium will close, naval air defense will be referred to as 9 link) in the military-industrial complex (it is not planned to change the aircraft composition of the mixed air wing on the Kuznetsov yet - link 8). Moreover, in 2015, a green light was given to the process of modernizing the Su-33 fleet with an extension of its service life to at least 2025 (reference 7). Explicitly, the details of the project were not disclosed, so I venture to speculate about it.
1. What I dreamed about long before Kuznetsov was released at the BS (reference 10) was confirmed by sources close to the official ones - part of the Su-33 was equipped with the specialized computing subsystem SVP-24, which allows to bring the accuracy of free-falling bombs to almost the same level as high precision weapons (by collecting and processing an array of information regarding the location of the carrier and the target, the parameters of the carrier movement and atmospheric conditions). First, a month and a half before the march, Izvestia reported this with reference to the Ministry of Defense (link 11), and after that the TV channel T24 - the link 12, 10: 01). It should be equipped with a miracle system all sides 279 Okozhap.
2. Another reliable fact is the resumption of production of engines for Su-33 in the Ufa Motor-Building Association (UMPO), which is part of the UEC. It is about TRD AL-31F 3 series (AL-31F3), which is more powerful base on 300 kgf (12 800 against 12 500) and differs from it an additional "special mode", used during takeoff from the springboard with full operational load or emergency go-around in case of a failed landing. According to the press service of the UEC, "new engines ... will be produced with the introduction of improvements that have already been applied to the engines of the AL-31F family of a modern serial appearance" (reference 13). It is hoped that the message says about the 42 series (AL-31-М1) with 13 500 kgf (reference 14), or the decision will be revised in favor of this model. The extra 700 kgf will be very useful for increasing the Su-33 combat load with a short take-off from the starting positions No. XXUMX and No. XXUMX.
3. In the comments to the previous entries, not once or twice had heard about the superiority of the “Super Hornet” over the Su-33, mainly because of the equipment of the first ultra-modern on-board radar with AFAR and medium-range AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles active radar seeker (ARGSN). Comparison of F / A-18E / F with Su-33 (more precisely, proof of the opposite) was started on this blog (15 link, 16 link), but was interrupted due to my departure to Donbass, and then due to data loss on two hard drives (mainly and backup) - it happens. I hope it will continue, but not now.
Let me just say that there were no reliable data on the AN / APG-79 radar and on AIM-120 radar - the military-industrial complex and the US Navy occupied defensive and secret everything, it is known only that: 1) AN / APG-79 much weaker than AN / APG-77 F-22 (every two), which is understandable, given the difference in thrust-to-weight ratio; 2) the detection range of typical air targets, by analogy with F-15E, is estimated at 150-180 km (reference 17); 3) The Super Hornet radar with AFAR is very good for working on ground targets and jamming (which, in fact, it was sharpened), but its merits in aerial combat with a strong and skillful opponent raise doubts; 4) 8 (!) Simultaneously fired at actively maneuvering targets, taking into account the need to actively maneuver yourself - this is generally beyond reality (the plot for a computer game for geeks).
Therefore, without asking the question “why is all this necessary?”, We simply consider possible options for improving the avionics (radar as part of SUV - weapons control system) Su-33, which could be implemented in a reasonably short time comparable to the average repair "Kuznetsova". Theoretically, on the "thirty-third" you can install any of the three new radars with headlights used on the Su-27 and MiG-29: 1) H010? “Zhuk-A” with AFAR, one of the ancestors of which (“Zhuk-M” with a slit antenna array) is reportedly installed on a single two-seater Su-33UB (Su-27KUB) (reference 18), the developer is Fazotron-NIIR (KRET); 2) Н011М "Bars" with a passive HEADLIGHT (PFAR) developed by the Research Institute of Instrument Engineering (NIIP) and produced by the Ryazan Instrument Plant (GRPZ), which, apparently, is installed on the Su-30СМ (19 link, text after the 18 photo); 3) Н035 "Irbis (PFAR, Su-35, NIIP, GRPZ).
All of these radars are the basis of the CWS, allowing the use of the latest air-to-air missiles (RVV-SD, RVV-BD - reference 20) and air-to-surface (X-31AD, etc.), must not yield to the detection range and the launch of the overblown "Super Hornet" and, in the case of the introduction of one of them on the Su-33, will multiply its combat capabilities by making it the real king of the air above the expanses of the World Ocean before the appearance of the T-50K.
As an economy-express version, an advanced good old Mech Sword with H001 radar (H001М?) Proposed by NIIP as early as 2011 (of course, exported) and suggesting an increase in the range of detection of a fighter-type air target ( ESR = 3 sq. M, with probability 0,5) to the forward hemisphere from 100 to 150 km, the number of simultaneously attacked targets - from one to two (I am sure that the pilot will not be able to attack more targets at once), the use of air missiles air mid-range TI P-77 (RVV-AE), PKR X-31A (D), etc. (reference 21). Of course, not the ultimate dream, but at least something.
4. As is known, the Su-33 is equipped with an in-flight hose refueling system. Refueling can be done from the same type of machines equipped with a unified overhead unit refueling UPAZ-1 at a rate of up to 2000 l / min (according to other sources, up to 1100 l / min - reference 22). Extendable fuel receiving rod with GPT-1 head is located in front of the cockpit on the left side of the fuselage, UPZ-1 is suspended on the 1-th suspension point between the refueling engine nacelles [7-206-207].
In the 1 part of the three-part Military Acceptance issue about the Kuznetsov march (22: 57), the famous test pilot S. Bogdan described the tactics of using the Su-33 with refueling in the air (edited by the author of the blog): a group takes off from an aircraft carrier refueling workers (several tankers), followed by a group that will perform a combat mission, reaches the refueling area (having spent, for example, a third or half of the fuel supply) and refuels from tankers, as a result of which its flight range is increased by the passed value (not counting fuel spend Foot on the rise).
At the same time, in my opinion, the efficiency of tanker aircraft could be increased by using outboard fuel tanks, which are not provided for in the Su-33 nominally (“not installed” - reference 23). When taking off from the starting position No.3 (195-meter long run), the aircraft can take off with a full supply of fuel in the internal tanks (9 500 kg) and maximum air-to-air reserve (8 P-27 and 4) P-73), take-off weight will be (according to different data) 32 200 - 32 450 kg (reference 24). However, for a "tanker" such combat load seems redundant - probably 2 Р-27 and 2-Р73 probably would be enough, and instead of the rest you can hang two suspended fuel tanks PTB-1500 with a capacity of 1500 l (1170 kg) of aviation kerosene TC-1, due to which the fuel reserve of the tanker will increase by 25%.
Shock complex
If criticism about the placement of anti-ship missile systems (SCRC) on the first four domestic TAVKR is appropriate (they occupied the entire nose of the upper deck, largely devaluing the aircraft carrier function of cruisers), then Kuznetsova is criticized by inertia rather than justice - 12 its UVP SCRK "Granit" removed under the deck, occupy not too large volume, located between the tracks of the starting positions No. 1 and No. XXUMX (the track of the 2-th position coincides with the 3-th, if I correctly understand its number) and absolutely no They are hovering off deck aircraft from a springboard. The dimensions of the missile compartment occupied by the CWP are approximately 2x25,5x9,5 m (LхBхH, length - in the middle of the height of the compartment, height - with a double-decker "), 10,5 square meter, 240 cubic meter volume
This volume is not enough even for minimally expedient lengthening of the hangar on the 4 MiG-29K (26х20х7,2 = 3740 cubic meters), apart from the fact that the redesign of the premises will be associated with significant design and technological difficulties. Dismantling of the SCRC may be useful except for placement in the released volume of additional aircraft ammunition, but there is a suspicion that there is no special need for this. TAVKR Ave. 11435 was designed to base a large number of anti-submarine helicopters on it (about 18 machines), and since the PLO function is unlikely to be a priority for it in the near future, the cellars of aircraft torpedoes, depth bombs and sonar buoys can be used for free-fall air bombs and precision weapons (plus some unknown hidden reserves).
The reluctance to abandon the strike complex (more precisely, the "need to restore the strike armament system") was voiced recently by D. Rogozin (reference 25). It’s hard not to agree - four UKKS cells (3С14) with a height of 9,58 m (at the height of the 11435 missile compartment near 10,5 m) can be placed on the site of a single Granit security unit, that is, the total ammunition of the same 3X14 can reach 48 missiles (three times more than on 22350), which, if necessary, will be a very solid contribution to the salvo of any ship group led by TAVKR.
Conclusion
By and large, even if within a reasonable time (for 2-3 of the year), the GEM alone was modernized at Kuznetsov, giving the aircraft carrier the opportunity to go to the BS annually (and not once every two years, as it was before) and staff the air group according to the proposed new state (8 Su-33, 16 MiG-29K, 4 Ka-31, 4 Ka-27, total 32 LA in the hangar plus, if possible, also 14 on the flight deck - reference 26), this will be a great happiness for the VMF and all those who support his soul. If you manage to do something else, we will consider it a bonus or a gift of fate. ■
Scheme KTU TAVKR pr. 1143 (from the book by V. Kuzin and V. Nikolsky "Navy of the USSR 1945-1991" [4-420])
Boiler diagrams KVG-3 [5-16-17] (left) and KVG 6М (KVG 6М-1, THA not shown, SKBK, National Defense No. 6 / 2011)
TRD AL-31F-M1 (AL-31F 42 series) 13 500 kgf (photo from the Salyut gas turbine-building site)
The standard Su-33 Н001 radar, which is part of the Sword SLE (photo from the NIIP website)
Radar with a slot antenna "Zhuk-M" installed on the Su-27KUB (photo A. Karpenko)
Radar with AFU "Zhuk-A" (photo A. Karpenko)
UPAZ-1 refueling unit, front view (photo from the book by A. Fomin [7], p. 207)
UPAZ-1, rear view: refueling cone and refueling alarm (source is the same)
Refueling bar in the released position (photo from the book by A. Fomin [7], p. 206)
UVP PKRK "Granit" TAVKR pr. 11435, 1991 (photo from the work of V. Zablotsky [1] from Petrovich-2 from forums.airbase.ru)
Fragment of longitudinal section of TAVKR pr. 11435 (scheme S. Balakin from the issue of the Maritime collection №7 / 2005 [1])
Fragment of the top view of the TAVKR pr. 11435 (diagram from the book of Yu. Apalkov "Ships of the Navy of the USSR", volume II, part 1) Dimensions (LхB) of the missile compartment by hatches on the flight deck - 22,5х7,0 m
Rocket compartment (green) and hangar (yellow) TAVKR Ave 11435, inscribed in a theoretical drawing TAVKR Ave 11434 (from the book of A. Pavlov), characterized by a smaller breakdown of the sides (frames) in the nose (along the length of the rocket compartment is approximately between 2 and 4 plus 1 / 3 theoretical frames)
Rocket compartment (green) and hangar (yellow) TAVKR Ave 11435, inscribed in the front view TAVKR Ave 11436 (from the book of Y. Apalkov "Ships of the Navy of the USSR", Volume II, part 1)
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