The Black Sea Fleet, for example, received the new 636.3 project boats in an obsolete form, since they do not have flexible extended towed antennas (GPBA) of the hydroacoustic complex (GAK), GAK on-board antennas, and anti-torpedoes.
Probably, drift interference devices “Vist” from obsolete launchers of type VIPS (developed by 50's) are used as self-defense devices. The submarine torpedo armament complex of this project is obsolete. It has high noise and a number of design flaws. But the most important thing is that salvo firing of remote-controlled torpedoes is not assured.
Lag more than half a century
The use of the latest torpedoes with a towing bobbin reel instead of a hose coil (used in the West since the end of 60-x) shows a serious backlog of naval underwater weapons of the Russian Navy.
Effective telecontrol (TU) allows reliable and covert destruction of targets from large distances, a sharp increase in noise immunity of the volley. Modern Western (hose) systems practically do not limit the maneuvering of non-nuclear submarines when firing from TU.
Negative attitude towards him in our navy it was formed because the technical specifications are not reliable enough, the submarine crews are poorly prepared for its use, and the technical characteristics of domestic systems (including the latest torpedoes) are very low. However, for all the shortcomings, the commanders and crews of the submarines that mastered it became ardent supporters of the method.
More than a decade and a half ago, the specialists of the Gidropribor concern handed over a torpedo with hose telecontrol (211ТТ1) to the customer - the PRC Navy, which is superior to what the St. Petersburg people today are delivering to the Russian Navy and for export. The then-created remote-controlled torpedoes, commonly referred to as “Chinese physicist” (211ТТ1 and their development - Yu-6), are many times superior in characteristics to the naval underwater weapon that the Russian submarine has. A fact demonstrating the depth of the IGO crisis and the level (“compliance” with the positions held) by responsible military officials.
Happen at the end of 2015, the battle clash between the newest submarines of the Black Sea Fleet and the Turkish submarines, the chances of our sailors would be slim ... In fact, Russian submarines will be shot. From the moment the first torpedo comes out, the low-noise factor ceases to be decisive in the underwater battle, the capabilities of the weapon complex, the means of illumination of the situation, and hydroacoustic counteraction (SGPD) come to the fore.
Unlike our submarines, Turkey had the possibility of salvo firing with more sophisticated torpedoes, from large effective distances, carried by modern SGPD (with outdated “Whists” with us).
It is worth noting that according to some characteristics, 211TT1 torpedoes are superior to Turkish ones, but the question is: has anyone bothered to analyze the real combat capabilities of submarines and develop the most effective tactics of the battlefield?
Where to put the "sample"
"It is proposed to equip the submarines of the Ash and Borey projects being built with PTZ systems, the development specifications of which were compiled as early as the 80 years of the last century, the results of studies of the effectiveness of these means against modern torpedoes testify to an exceptionally low probability of nondefeating submarine submarines", Rear Admiral Anatoly Lutsky wrote in the Sea Collection back in 2010 year.
How did it happen that one of the leading specialists is forced to sound the alarm? It is very simple - OCD topics are passing through, allocations allotted for their implementation are mastered even when there is a clear impasse. A number of specialists and their supervisors are tied (from reports to money), they have no courage to admit failure. And the outdated MPO managed to push the fleet. Paths were found, for example, with the exception of the participation of new torpedoes in testing. It comes to anecdotal situations, when the developers of the SFDS require to test exactly that torpedo and in no case the other. I do not even mention the fact that the SCPD are deliberately placed aside so as not to interfere with torpedoes being aimed at the target.
Obviously, the key issue here is a comprehensive and objective joint development, testing of new FGPDs and homing systems (CLS) torpedoes. But this is precisely what some “specialists” and their superiors shy away from.
It is appropriate to recall the fate of the onboard complex GPA "Proba", developed, manufactured and installed on board the Black Sea Fleet S-37 submarine on the initiative of its commander Victor Proskurin. The author made a conclusion about this device (the only onboard complex of the GPD PL of the USSR Navy) and was struck by the depth of development, the adaptive, very flexible and effective logic of setting various interferences, and this was done in the second half of the 80's. The self-made device included both means of the spectral analysis, and an electronic synthesizer of noise.
Of course, the technical part of the Sample complex is already outdated, but its ideology remains breakthrough today. Because it was developed by an intelligent commander and one of the best torpedo riflemen of the Navy (from personal achievements of Viktor Vladimirovich Proskurin, successful firing of the torpedo 53-65K, torpedoing of high-speed MPK on hydrofoils Kunakhovich and a number of others).
Proskurinskaya C-37 of the 633 project was already “aged”, but it was simply well-groomed and modernized from the end of 80-s to 1992, all Black Sea submarines (including the 877 project) in duels with bilateral use of weapons and CRCS. By participating in the combat training activities of the Black Sea Fleet, the C-37 successfully evaded all the anti-submarine forces and withdrew about two dozen torpedoes from itself, not having received a single defeat.
The question arises: why is this experience firmly forgotten, why is there no such thing, for example, on new submarines of the Black Sea Fleet?
The answer is simple: almost no one needed it. Captain Proskurin was supported by admirals Igor Kasatonov and Viktor Kravchenko, but Proba provoked a sharply negative reaction from a number of officials, such as the then head of the UPV Navy, G. Emelin, for "discrediting the torpedo weapon of the Navy." There are no comments ...
Today it is important that the development of new SSN and SGPD was carried out in conjunction with the integrated research and experimental work of "SNG-GPD." It is necessary both to identify and verify promising directions for the development of CLS and SGPD, as well as to obtain a real picture of the state of the MPS of the domestic sub-melt.
The transition in the West to ultra-wideband CLS torpedoes sharply reduced the effectiveness of countermeasures, which raised the question of the fundamental possibility of their effective use. Today, the development of new CGDs is not completed anywhere. Therefore, in a submarine war, the means of attack (torpedoes and their CLO) are clearly ahead of the means of defense (SGPD PTZ).
In these conditions, a huge role is played by anti-torpedoes.
Why throw flippers?
And we have them? How to say ... Everything that happened on this topic in the last decade can be described as conscious sabotage. And there is no exaggeration. The first real targeting of anti-torpedo prototypes was carried out in Russia in 1998 year. And with high accuracy and in difficult conditions. But they repeated it only after a decade and a half. "So they worked." Although with the adoption of the Mk48 mod.7 torpedoes in the US Navy, due to the reduction in the effectiveness of the SFGS (including the Vist PTZ devices) against it, an emergency modernization of the MPO was needed to virtually zero. Instead, not just delaying the process by all means, but even attempts to open those OCDs, the real purpose of which was to throw antitrust off the submarine.
Considering the fact that work on them for our submarines was started much earlier than for surface ships, in the second half of 80's, their use from the submarine is much simpler, the problem of detection and accurate targeting of torpedoes was successfully solved even in 70 – 80 years (GAS mine searching "Harp", GAS "Polynom-AT"), there are questions.
Why is there not a single message about the successful use of anti-torpedoes from the submarine, despite the fact that they are fired quite often from surface ships?
Why is no antiporped ammunition in the new submarines of the project 636.3? Why did the anti-torpedo "Lasta" declared at the Army-2015 forum as part of the Borei SSBN ammunition, even though the fleet on the submarines of this project could have more advanced products?
Yes, today the reactive M-15 is more likely than any other anti-torpedoes (including the United States Navy's Tripwayr) to solve the problem, but its considerable weight and dimensions sharply limit the ammunition load (on the Borey only the 6 Pull Last).
The main reason for this is the officials tied up with both mistaken decisions and the use of budget funds.
Separately talk about the reports to the leadership. To justify OCD and the need for the Navy to completely outdated torpedoes TTX of the latest modifications of the western Mk48 mod.7 and DM2A4 were deliberately and significantly underestimated. For example, the range of DM2A4, which has the highest transport characteristics, has been reduced several times.
Especially anecdotal situation has developed on the performance characteristics of telecontrol systems. When discussing the article “Modern submarine torpedoes” at the beginning of 2015, the author, despite the cited references, expressed claims about the allegedly unrealism of such TTX: they said that the fifth generation Lomonos was going to lay the fifth generation torpedo. But how did our “specialists” turn out that the TU of Supertorpedo XXI was worse planned than it was in the ROC “Shturval” ten years earlier. Recall that the "Shuttle wheel" - the development of the beginning of the 2000-x at the level of the best world samples. The design and development works were successfully completed with the creation of technology and the production of a special cable, but the “Steering Wheel” was not needed, it was put on the shelf.
Something "Physics" in the pen
On the Innovation Day of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation 5 October 2015, the author spoke about the existing problems. If we talk about the timing of OCD, in some cases they are obviously unreal - and all those involved are perfectly aware of this. Nevertheless, deadlines are set, and this leads not only to the disruption of the program, but also to the adoption of non-optimal technical decisions.
The second problem: without comprehensive research, we will not get a modern IGO. Today we do not have a full-fledged scientific and technical reserve even to write a reasonable TTZ OKR. Example: the project "Lomonos" was supposed to be the base in the adopted "Concept of the development of sea underwater weapons." The forum "Army-2015" sounded that the ROC "Lomonos" are closed. The reasons were clear, and they were called - unrealistic terms and requirements, the absence of a normal scientific and technical reserve. Another example: we didn’t have any objective tests of modern SSN torpedoes against the same countermeasures.
We are approaching the next problem - an imperfect testing system; for a number of OCDs, it is necessary to objectively review the results obtained.
Separately, it should be said about the level of scientific and technical support of work performed by industry. There are three components here: research organizations (NIO MO), the Department of the RF Ministry of State Order Ensuring (DOGOZ), military acceptance.
In the NIO Navy, where they developed the TTZ of the ROC Lomonos, they knew very well the unreality of the work being done, nevertheless they continued.
DOGOZ is actually responsible for the line in the plan, for the cause - no.
The institution of customers that existed in Soviet times had a lot of flaws, but in it the resources were in the hands of the boss in charge of solving the problem. In order for the system that we have today to work effectively, it is necessary to introduce double subordination to the Office of Military Missions (OHR) and DOGOZ, which should be confined to the deputy chief commanders for armament of the Armed Forces (with the formation of a corresponding apparatus).
But the main question is the formation of a scientific and technical reserve, for which comprehensive research and development is needed. If there is no money for them, it means that we will have to reduce the number of ships, because without scientific research we will not be able to ensure their real combat effectiveness in the future.
After the next meeting, the representative of DOGOZ stated that the author would report on the issues raised to the director of DOGOZ RF Ministry of Defense. However, later in the department did everything to disrupt the report. And this was done under the pretext that supposedly not everything is so bad with us.
The same persons who submitted false reports to management about the alleged well-being, under the pretext of a lack of money, simply strangled all R & D on the subject. The wildness of the situation is that even in difficult 90s, the Defense Ministry tried to preserve as much as possible critical R & D (and preserved), because there was an understanding: there is no future without them.
Characterized by the discussion that unfolded at the conference on the IGO Forum "Army-2015" on one of the "innovative detection systems", which the Central Research Institute of the VK (Navy of the Russian Federation) "prescribed" in almost all current R & D. The head of the developer organization acknowledged that of the real groundwork there are only the results of mathematical modeling, and the range of the equipment is very small. At the same time, its implementation was “justified” by the termination of promising R & D on the subject of acoustic homing systems (CLS). As they say, the mistake became worse than the crime. Maybe the fact is that the head of the torpedo department of the Central Research Institute of VK the dissertation was just about this “innovation theme”?
In my opinion, what happens to the series and the perspective of the torpedo "1 Physicist" requires special attention, because it borders on sabotage:
the discovery of the ROC “Lomonos” on “super torpedoes of the 21st century” without any scientific and technical groundwork, with fantastic performance characteristics and unrealistically short terms (discontinued on 2015);
the continuation of OCD on a deliberately antique item with TTX is much worse than that of the American Mk48 mod.1 (1971), and attempts to impose it on the fleet without the necessary tests;
long absence (actually deliberate sabotage) of any serious modernization works on the most promising domestic model - the torpedo “Physicist-1”.
I will cite excerpts from the public discussion of “torpedo articles” (including in the “military industrial complex”) with the participation of a “representative of the Gidropribor concern in Moscow”.
Sergey, 07.05, February 21, 2014 "... the question of the timing of OCD. This term puts the customer. For this, the Customer specially held meetings with the industry and asked: I need it, precisely at such a time! Then he announced a competition. One company, realizing the importance of this request, went to the competition. ”
Maxim, 10.33, 21 February, 2014: “Another lie, because these fantastic dates did not appear this year and not last year, but in the 2009 – 2010 area, when ... Vysotsky’s former GK Navy (again) wrote a conclusion for Admiral Suchkov), in order to substantiate the destruction of "Physics", and this scam was invented with "the development of the 21st century supertorped" (without scientific and technical groundwork and research), and in absolutely unrealistic terms.
By the way, where does this rush come from, because the “Physicist”, in spite of fierce opposition, has been launched into a series? And from the fact that what is happening now with the series and the prospect of “Physics” requires special attention from the competent authorities, because what is happening borders on sabotage. ”
This was followed by the events of the end of 2014 - the beginning of 2015, when the problems of the IGOs of the Russian Navy were raised to the highest level and a number of solutions were made.
Response by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: “Your appeal from 15 of September of 2015 on the implementation of the OCR“ Case ”... has been reviewed. According to the facts stated in the appeal, verification activities are organized, the results of which will make appropriate decisions. ”
Despite statements in the media about the tests of the improved "Physics" - torpedoes "Case" in the 2017 year, it will not be handed over (subject to full and objective tests) neither in 2018, nor in 2019. This is obvious to all specialists. The normal duration of OCP torpedoes is about 6 years (the same number in the West). If OCD was preceded by NIR, perhaps 4 + 2 of the year (that is, the same 6 years). In addition, there are acute systemic problems of domestic torpedo building, calling into question these deadlines as well, for example, insufficient statistics on firing and joint development with the CGDD.
I stress: the problems with our IGOs have purely organizational reasons. Technically, we still in 2000-x had quite a decent groundwork and went on a new development at a decent level. A sharp backlog has occurred in recent years.
I would especially note the breakthrough proposals for acoustic torpedoes CLOs of the former head of the department of minor acoustics AKIN D. Frolov, who are able to increase the efficiency of our submarine forces by an order of magnitude. Their implementation allows even the old submarines of the 667BDR project to have equal chances with the newest Virginia submarines in combat. And this is quite objective, since the solutions were checked at sea by real goals, the question of their introduction into the torpedoes "Physicist" and "Case" was put by experts many times. But work on this topic was discontinued in the middle of 2000-s with the transfer of order and control functions to the ROC from the Anti-Submarine Armament Directorate, first to the Directorate of orders and deliveries of ships and armaments, then to the Department of State Defense.
The list of questions can be continued. For example: how many "Physicists" in ammunition have the latest "Boreas"? Which of them ever fired these torpedoes? How many times - with a TU and a volley, with the use of modern SGDS? Answers can be quite interesting.
The MPO is the most critical and disastrous direction of the VVST of the Russian Federation, including one that is extremely important for ensuring defense capability and strategic deterrence. The main thing here is not the flight range and the number of SLBM warheads, but the inevitability of a retaliatory strike, the basis of which is the fighting stability of the NSNF (the most important part of which is the MPO).
IGO problems need to be addressed before it’s too late. First of all it is necessary:
1. Conducting objective tests (including complex tests - SSN-GPD) and special shooting.
2. Decision-making on officials who deliberately misinformed the leadership of the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation about the real state of affairs and responsible for the situation.
3. Immediate allocation of funding to address the most critical IGO issues.
4. A rigid establishment of real terms for carrying out activities for solving IGO problems and its verification in conditions as close as possible to the combat ones.