Chernobyl notebook. Part of 1
About the Author:
Grigory Medvedev - an atomic specialist who worked at the Chernobyl NPP at one time and who knows it well, personally acquainted with all the main participants in the events. By office, he attended many responsible meetings on nuclear construction. Immediately after the accident, Medvedev was sent to Chernobyl and had the opportunity to learn a lot on fresh tracks, to see with his own eyes.
1
The death of the Challenger crew and the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant heightened the alarm, they harshly reminded that people are just accustomed to those fantastic powerful forces that they themselves had brought to life, are just learning to put them in the service of progress, ”said Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in his a speech on Central Television 18 August 1986 of the year.
Such an extremely sober assessment of the peace atom was given for the first time in thirty-five years of nuclear power development in the USSR. There is no doubt that these words feel the spirit of time, the wind of purifying truth and perestroika, which has gripped our whole country with a powerful breath.
And yet, in order to draw lessons from the past, it should be remembered that for three and a half decades, our scientists repeatedly in the press, on the radio and television informed the wide public about something quite the opposite. The peaceful atom was presented to wide circles of the public as almost a panacea for all ills, as the height of genuine security, environmental cleanliness and reliability. It came almost to veal delight when it came to the safety of nuclear power plants.
“NPPs are the cleanest, the safest of the existing stations! - Academician M.A. Styrikovich exclaimed in 1980 in the magazine Ogonyok. - Sometimes, however, you hear fears that an explosion may occur at a nuclear power plant ... It is simply physically impossible ... Nuclear fuel at nuclear power plants cannot be detonated by any forces - neither earthly nor celestial ... I think that the creation of serial "earth stars" will become a reality ... "
"Earthly stars" really became a harsh reality, threateningly opposing wildlife and man.
“Nuclear reactors are ordinary fireboxes, and the operators that control them are firemen ...” the deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee on the Use of Atomic Energy, N. M. Sinev, popularly explained to the general reader, thereby placing the nuclear reactor next to an ordinary steam boiler. the atomic operators, on the same level as the stokers, shuruyuschim coal in the furnace.
It was in every respect a convenient position. Firstly, public opinion calmed down, secondly, the remuneration of labor at nuclear power plants could be equated to payment at thermal power plants, and in some cases to make it even lower. Once safely and simply, you can pay less. And by the beginning of the eighties, the wage at the block heating plants exceeded the wages of operators at nuclear power plants.
But let's continue cheerfully optimistic evidence of complete safety of nuclear power plants.
“Atomic energy waste, potentially very dangerous, is so compact that it can be stored in places isolated from the external environment,” wrote O. D. Kazachkovsky, Director of the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering on June 10, 25, in Pravda. We note that when the Chernobyl explosion slammed, there were no such places to unload the spent nuclear fuel. Over the past decades, a repository of spent nuclear fuel (abbreviated as SNFS) was not built, and it had to be built next to the emergency unit under conditions of hard radiation fields, overexposing builders and installers.
“We live in the atomic era. NPPs were convenient and reliable in operation. Nuclear reactors are preparing to take on the heating of cities and towns ... "- wrote O. D. Kazachkovsky in the same issue of Pravda, forgetting to say that nuclear heating plants will be built near major cities.
A month later, Academician A. E. Sheydlin said in the Literary Gazette: “It was with great satisfaction that the report on a remarkable achievement was received - the commissioning of the fourth power unit with a capacity of one million kilowatts at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant named after V. I. Lenin”.
Did the academician miss his heart when he wrote these lines? After all, it was precisely the fourth power unit that was destined to thunder with a nuclear thunder among the clear sky of guaranteed NPP safety ...
In another speech, to the remark of the correspondent that the expanded construction of nuclear power plants might alarm the population, the academician replied: “There is a lot of emotion. Nuclear power plants of our country are completely safe for the population of the surrounding areas. There is simply no cause for concern. ”
A. M. Petrosyants, Chairman of the USSR State Atomic Energy Committee, made an especially great contribution to promoting safety of nuclear power plants. “It’s impossible not to admit,” he wrote fourteen years before the Chernobyl explosion, “that nuclear power has a bright future ... Nuclear power has certain advantages over classical. NPPs are completely independent of the sources of raw materials (uranium mines) due to the compactness of nuclear fuel and the duration of its use. NPPs are very promising in relation to the use of powerful power units ... - And he made such a calming conclusion: - NPPs as energy producers are clean sources of energy that do not increase environmental pollution. ”
Considering further the issue of the scale of nuclear energy development and its place beyond the two-thousand year, A. Petrosyants thinks first of all whether there are enough uranium ore reserves and completely eliminates the safety of such a wide network of nuclear power plants in the most densely populated areas of the European part of the USSR. "The question of the most rational use of the wonderful properties of nuclear fuel is the main issue of nuclear energy ..." - he stressed in the same book. Nor was the safety of the nuclear power plant, but the rational use of nuclear fuel, above all, worried him. Further, the author continues: “Some skepticism and mistrust of nuclear power plants that still exist are caused by an exaggerated fear of radiation danger for the station’s personnel and, most importantly, for the population living in its area of location ...
The operation of nuclear power plants in the USSR and abroad, including the United States, Britain, France, Canada, Italy, Japan, the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany, shows the complete safety of their work while observing the established regimes and the necessary rules. Moreover, it is possible to argue which power plants are more harmful to the human body and the environment — nuclear or coal-fired ... ”
For some reason, A. Petrosyants was silent here that thermal power plants can work not only on coal and oil (by the way, these contaminants are local and not at all deadly), but also on gaseous fuel, which is produced in the USSR in large quantities and, as is known It is also transported to Western Europe. The conversion of thermal stations in the European part of our country to gaseous fuel could completely eliminate the problem of environmental pollution by ash and sulfuric anhydride. However, A. Petrosyants put this problem on its head, devoting a whole chapter of his book to the issue of environmental pollution from coal-fired power plants, and keeping silent about, of course, the facts of habitat contaminated by radioactive emissions from nuclear power plants. This was done not by chance, but in order to lead the reader to an optimistic conclusion: “The above data on the favorable radiation situation in the areas of the Novovoronezh and Beloyarsk nuclear power plants are typical for all NPPs of the Soviet Union. The same favorable radiation situation is characteristic of nuclear power plants in other countries ... ”he concludes, showing corporate solidarity with foreign atomic firms.
Meanwhile, A. Petrosyants could not be unaware that the entire period of operation, starting from 1964, the first double-circuit unit of the Beloyarsk NPP was constantly breaking down: the uranium fuel assemblies were “resentful”, which were repaired under conditions of a strong overexposure of operating personnel. Lasted this radioactive story almost without a break for fifteen years. It is appropriate to say that at the second, already single-loop, block of the same station, in 1977, fifty percent of the fuel assemblies of the atomic reactor were melted. Repair lasted about a year. The personnel of the Beloyarsk NPP was overexposed quite quickly, and it was necessary to send people to the dirty repair work to send people from other nuclear power plants. He could not but know that in the city of Melekess of the Ulyanovsk region high-level waste was pumped into deep wells under the ground, that British nuclear reactors in Windscale, Winfrith and Dounry were dumping radioactive waters into the Irish Sea from the fifties to the present. The list of such facts could be continued, but ...
Without making premature conclusions, I will only say that it was A. Petrosyants at a press conference in Moscow 6 in May 1986, commenting on the Chernobyl tragedy, said the words that struck many: “Science demands sacrifices”. This must not be forgotten. But continue the testimony.
Naturally, there were obstacles to the development of a new industry. The companion of I. V. Kurchatov, Yu. V. Sivintsev, cites in his book “I. V. Kurchatov and Nuclear Power Engineering [2] interesting memories of the period of introducing into the public consciousness the ideas of the “peaceful atom” and the difficulties that had to be encountered along this path.
“Opponents of the development of nuclear energy abroad and in our country sometimes gain“ success ”in the fight against the new. The most famous of them is the ban on the launch of a nuclear power plant in Austria, adopted recently after a noisy anti-nuclear campaign. Western journalists have already dubbed this nuclear power plant a “one billion dollar mausoleum”. (It is appropriate to say that Yu. Sivintsev omitted one detail: the Austrian population voluntarily paid the cost of the nuclear power plant, depositing money into the treasury, after which the government, having paid with the businessmen, mothballed the station. - G. M.) The development of nuclear energy in our country also took place not without overcoming difficulties, ”continues Yu. V. Sivintsev. - At the end of the fifties, supporters of traditional energy prepared and almost implemented the decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers to suspend the construction of the Novovoronezh NPP and construct a conventional thermal power station instead. The main argument is the inefficiency of nuclear power plants in those days. Kurchatov, having learned about this, put off all matters, went to the Kremlin, managed to convene a new meeting of senior employees and, in a heated discussion with the little believers, achieved confirmation of previous decisions on the construction of a nuclear power plant. One of the secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee asked him then: “What will we have?” Kurchatov answered: “Nothing! About thirty years it will be an expensive experiment. " And yet he got his way. Not without reason many of us called Igor Vasilievich “atomic reactor”, “man-a tank“And even a“ bomb ”..."
It is time to say that the above optimistic forecasts and assurances of the scientists never shared the operators of nuclear power plants, that is, those who dealt with the peaceful atom directly daily in their workplace, and not in the cozy quiet of offices and laboratories. In those years, information on accidents and malfunctions at nuclear power plants was filtered in every possible way on the ministerial sieve of caution, only what was considered necessary at the highest levels to publish was made public. I remember well the landmark event of those years - the accident at the American nuclear power plant Trimile Island 28 in March 1979, which dealt the first serious blow to the nuclear power industry and dispelled the illusion of safety of nuclear power plants for many. However, not all.
At that time, I worked as a department head in the union of Soyuzatomenergo of the USSR Ministry of Energy and I remember my and my colleagues' reaction to this sad event.
Having worked many years before on installing, repairing and operating a nuclear power plant and knowing their degree of reliability, which can be stated briefly: “on the blade,” “in the balance from an accident or catastrophe,” we said then: “This is what it should have been Sooner or later to happen ... This can happen to us ... "
But neither I nor those who had previously worked on the operation of nuclear power plants had complete information about this accident. Detailed information about the events in Pennsylvania was given in the “Information Sheet” for official use distributed to the heads of the main directorates and their deputies. The question is, why was it necessary to direct a secret to an accident known to the whole world? After all, timely consideration of negative experience is a guarantee of non-repetition of this in the future. But ... at that time it was the case: negative information - only for top management, and reduced information on the lower floors. However, even this reduced information gave rise to sad reflections on the cunning of radiation, if it, God forbid, breaks out, about the need to educate the public at large about these issues. But in those years it was simply impossible to organize such training. Such a move would be contrary to the official installation of complete safety of nuclear power plants.
Then I decided to go it alone and wrote four stories about the life and work of people at nuclear power plants. The stories were called: “Operators”, “Examination”, “Power Unit” and “Nuclear Tanning”. However, in response to my proposal to print these things in the editorial offices, they answered me: “It cannot be like this! Academics write everywhere that everything is safe at Soviet NPPs. Academician Kirillin is even going to take the garden plot near the nuclear power plant, and you have written all sorts of things ... In the West, it may be, we have not! ”
The editor-in-chief of a fat magazine, praising the story, even told me then: "If it were for them, then they would have printed it."
Nevertheless, one of the stories - “Operators” - was able to be published in 1981 year. And I am glad that people, having read it, I think, understood that atomic energy is a difficult and highly responsible business.
However, the era has gone its course, and we will not rush things. After all, everything that should have happened has happened. In academic circles continued to reign serenity. Sober voices about the possible danger of nuclear power plants to the environment were perceived as an attempt on the authority of science ...
In the year 1974, at the general annual meeting of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician A. P. Alexandrov, in particular, said:
“We are accused of the fact that nuclear power engineering is dangerous and fraught with radioactive environmental pollution ... But what, comrades, if a nuclear war happens? What pollution then? ”
Amazing logic! Is not it?
Ten years later, on the steam action of the USSR Ministry of Energy (a year before Chernobyl), the same A. P. Aleksandrov noted with sadness:
“We still, comrades, God have mercy that Pennsylvania did not happen here. Yes Yes…"
A noticeable evolution in the mind of the President of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Of course, ten years is a considerable time. And in anticipation of the misfortune A. P. Alexandrov cannot be denied. Indeed, during this time, much has happened in the nuclear power industry: serious malfunctions and accidents have happened, power has grown unprecedentedly, the rush of prestige has been exaggerated, but the responsibility of nuclear scientists, one might say, has diminished. And where did she come from, this heightened responsibility, if at a nuclear power plant, it turns out, everything is so simple and safe? ..
In the same, approximately, years, the personnel corps of nuclear power plant operators began to change, with a sharply increased deficit of atomic operators. If earlier there were mainly nuclear energy enthusiasts who were deeply in love with this business, now the people and the casual ones rushed. Of course, first of all attracted not so much money, and prestige. Everything seems to be already with a person, he has earned in another field, but he is still not an atomic scientist. How many years had it been said: safe! So go ahead! Get out of the way, experts! Give in to the governing atomic pie to the mother-in-law and godfathers! And they pushed the same experts ... However, let's return to this. And now in detail about Pennsylvania, the forerunner of Chernobyl. Here is an excerpt from the American magazine "Nukler News" from 6 April 1979:
"... 28 March 1979 of the year early in the morning there was a major accident of the 2 880 reactor unit with a capacity of XNUMX MW (electric) at Trimile Island NPP, located twenty kilometers from Harrisburg, Pa., And owned by Metropolitan Edison."
Trimail Island NPP, USA
The US government immediately began to analyze all the circumstances of the accident. On March 29, the leaders of the Nuclear Energy Regulatory Commission (NSC) were invited to attend a subcommittee of the House of Representatives on Energy and Environment at the House of Representatives to review the causes of the accident and develop measures to eliminate its consequences and prevent similar incidents in the future. At the same time, an order was issued to thoroughly check the operability of the eight reactor units at Okony NPP, Crystal River, Rancho Seco, Arkansas-One and Davis-Bess. The equipment for these units, as well as for the Tri-Mile Island NPP units, was manufactured by Babcock & Wilcox. Currently (that is, on April 1979) of the eight blocks (almost identical in construction), only five are operating, the rest are in scheduled preventive maintenance.
Unit No. 2 at Tri-Mile Island NPP, as it turned out, was not equipped with an additional safety system, although similar systems are available on some units of this NPP.
NRC demanded to check all equipment and operating modes on all the reactor units manufactured by Babcock and Wilcox, without exception. An employee of the NRC, who is responsible for issuing licenses for the construction and operation of nuclear facilities, told 4 on April at a press conference that all necessary safety measures would be taken immediately at all NPPs in the country.
The accident had a great social and political resonance. It caused great concern not only in Pennsylvania, but also in many other states. The California Governor asked that the Rancho Seco 913 MW (e) nuclear power plant, located near the city of Sacramento, be stopped until all the causes of the accident at the Trimile Island NPP are finally clarified and measures taken to prevent such accidents.
The official position of the US Department of Energy was to calm public opinion. Two days after the accident, the Minister of Energy Schlesinger stated that for the entire period of operation of industrial nuclear reactors this happened for the first time and events at Trimile Island NPP should be treated objectively, without undue emotion and early conclusions. He stressed that the implementation of the program for the development of nuclear energy will be continued in order to ensure the speedy achievement of energy independence by the United States.
According to Schlesinger, the radioactive contamination of the area around the NPP is “extremely limited” in size and scale, and the population has no reason to be concerned. Meanwhile, only for 31 in March and 1 in April, out of 200, thousands of people living within 35 radius from the station, about 80 thousands left their homes. People refused to believe the representatives of the Metropolitan Edison company, who tried to convince them that nothing terrible had happened. By order of the state governor, an emergency evacuation plan was drawn up for the entire population of the county. In the area of the location of the nuclear power plant was closed seven schools. The governor ordered the evacuation of all pregnant women and children of preschool age living within 8 radius from the station, and recommended that people living within 16 radius not go outside. These actions were taken at the direction of the representative of the NRK J. Hendry after the leak of radioactive gases into the atmosphere was detected. The most critical situation was 30 – 31 in March and 1 in April, when a huge hydrogen bubble was formed in the reactor vessel, which threatened to explode the shell of the reactor. In this case, the whole surrounding area would be subjected to the strongest radioactive contamination.
A division of the American Society for Insurance against Nuclear Catastrophe was urgently created in Harrisburg, which paid 3 thousand dollars in insurance indemnity by April 200.
1 April, President Carter visited the power plant. He appealed to the population with a request to “calmly and accurately” observe all evacuation rules, if necessary.
Speaking to 5 on April about energy issues, the president elaborated on alternative methods such as using solar energy, processing bituminous shale, coal gasification, etc., but did not mention nuclear energy at all, whether nuclear fission or controlled thermonuclear fusion.
Many senators declare that the accident may entail a “painful reassessment” of attitudes toward nuclear energy, however, according to them, the country will have to continue to produce electricity at nuclear power plants, since there is no other way out for the United States. The dual position of senators in this matter clearly demonstrates the predicament in which the US government found itself after the accident.
DESCRIPTION OF THE ACCIDENT
“The first signs of the accident were detected in 4 in the morning when, for unknown reasons, the feedwater from the main pumps to the steam generator was cut off. All three emergency pumps, designed specifically for the uninterrupted supply of feed water, had been under repair for two weeks already, which was a gross violation of NPP operating rules.
As a result, the steam generator was left without feed water and could not remove heat generated by the reactor from the primary circuit. Turbine automatically shut down due to a violation of steam parameters. In the primary circuit of the reactor block, the temperature and pressure of water have dramatically increased. Through the safety valve of the volume compensator, the mixture of superheated water and steam began to be discharged into a special tank (barbather). However, after the water pressure in the primary circuit had decreased to a normal level (160 at), the valve did not sit in place, as a result of which the pressure in the bubbler also increased above the allowable one. The barrier membrane on the Barbater collapsed, and about 370 cubic meters of hot radioactive water spilled onto the floor of the concrete reactor containment shell (into the central hall).
Drainage pumps automatically started and started pumping the accumulated water into tanks located in the auxiliary building of the nuclear power plant. The staff had to immediately turn off the drainage pumps so that all the radioactive water remained inside the containment shell, but this was not done.
In the auxiliary building of the nuclear power plant there were three tanks, but all the radioactive water entered only one of them. The tank overflowed, and the water flooded the floor with a layer of several inches. The water began to evaporate, and the radioactive gases along with the steam entered the atmosphere through the ventilation pipe of the auxiliary building, which was one of the main reasons for the subsequent radioactive contamination of the area.
At the moment of opening the safety valve, the emergency protection system of the reactor was triggered with a reset of the absorber rods, as a result of which the chain reaction stopped and the reactor was practically stopped. The process of nuclear fission of uranium in the fuel rods stopped, however, the nuclear disintegration of the fragments continued with the release of heat in the amount of about 10 percent of the nominal electric power, or about 250 MW of heat.
As the safety valve remained open, the cooling water pressure in the reactor vessel dropped rapidly and the water evaporated rapidly. The water level in the reactor vessel decreased, and the temperature quickly increased. Apparently, this led to the formation of a steam-water mixture, as a result of which a breakdown of the main circulation pumps occurred and they stopped.
As soon as the pressure dropped to 11,2 atm, the emergency core cooling system automatically worked, and the fuel assemblies began to cool. This happened two minutes after the start of the accident. (Here the situation is similar to Chernobyl for 20 seconds before the explosion. But in Chernobyl, the emergency core cooling system was turned off by personnel in advance. - G.M.)
The policeman and the guards of the nuclear power plant are on duty at the gates of the station.
Night shift workers in protective suits enter the station to continue working to turn off the station during an accident. 29 March 1977 of the year
Workers enter the airlock of the disabled emergency reactor for the next technical examination. 11 February 1982 of the year.
General view of the Three Mile Island NPP. 30 March 1979 of the year. The power unit No. 2, on which the accident 28 took place in March 1979, is located in the center under the dome.
Julie Sipling walks with her one-year-old daughter Debbie at her home, which is located in close proximity to the Three Mile Island NPP. The picture was taken on the day of the accident, 29 March 1979 of the year. The authorities decided that large-scale evacuation of the population was not needed, but the governor of Pennsylvania still recommended pregnant women and children of pre-school age to leave the 8-kilometer zone around the emergency reactor.
For reasons not yet clear, the operator turned off the two pumps that activated the emergency cooling system, 4,5 minutes after the start of the accident. Obviously, he believed that the entire upper part of the core was under water. Probably, the operator incorrectly counted the pressure of water inside the primary circuit on the pressure gauge and decided that there was no need for emergency core cooling. Meanwhile, the water still evaporated from the reactor. The safety valve seems to be jammed, and the operators could not close it with the remote control. Since the valve is located at the top of the volume compensator under the containment shell, it is almost impossible to close or open it manually.
The valve remained open so long that the water level in the reactor fell, and one third of the core was left without cooling.
According to experts, shortly before the emergency cooling system was turned on or shortly after it was turned on, at least twenty thousand fuel rods out of a total of thirty-six thousand (177 fuel assemblies for 208 rods in each) turned out to be without cooling. The protective zirconium shells of the fuel rods began to crack and crumble. Highly active fission products began to emerge from the damaged fuel elements. Primary water has become even more radioactive.
When the upper parts of the fuel rods were exposed, the temperature inside the reactor vessel exceeded 400 degrees and the indicators on the control panel went off scale. The computer, which monitored the temperature in the core, began to give out continuous question marks and gave them out over the next eleven hours ...
After 11 minutes after the start of the accident, the operator again turned on the emergency core cooling system, which he had previously turned off by mistake.
In the subsequent 50 minutes, the pressure drop in the reactor stopped, but the temperature continued to rise. The pumps that pumped water for emergency core cooling began to vibrate strongly, and the operator turned off all four pumps — two of them through 1 hour 15 minutes, the other two through 1 hour 40 minutes after the start of the accident. Apparently, he feared that the pumps would be damaged.
In 17 hours, the 30 minute was finally started up again with the main feedwater pump, which turned off at the very beginning of the accident. The circulation of water in the core has resumed. The water again covered the tops of the fuel rods, which were without cooling and collapsed for almost eleven hours.
In the night from 28 to 29 March, a gas bubble began to form at the top of the reactor vessel. The core was heated to such an extent that, due to the chemical properties of the zirconium sheath of the rods, the splitting of water molecules into hydrogen and oxygen occurred. A bubble with a volume of about 30 cubic meters, consisting mainly of hydrogen and radioactive gases - krypton, argon, xenon and others, greatly impeded the circulation of cooling water, since the pressure in the reactor increased significantly. But the main danger was that a mixture of hydrogen and oxygen could explode at any time. (What happened in Chernobyl. - G.M.) The strength of the explosion would be equivalent to the explosion of three tons of TNT, which would lead to inevitable destruction of the reactor vessel. In another case, a mixture of hydrogen and oxygen could penetrate out of the reactor and accumulate under the dome of the containment shell. If it had exploded there, all radioactive fission products would have been released into the atmosphere (as happened at Chernobyl. - G.M.). The radiation level inside the containment shell had reached 30000 rem / h by that time, which was 600 times the lethal dose. In addition, if the bubble continued to increase, it would gradually displace all the cooling water from the reactor vessel, and then the temperature would rise to the point that uranium would melt (as happened at Chernobyl. - GM).
On the night of March 30, the volume of a bubble decreased by 20 percent, and April 2 was only 1,4 cubic meters. In order to completely eliminate the bubble and eliminate the danger of an explosion, the technicians applied the method of so-called water degassing. The cooling water circulating in the primary circuit was injected into the volume compensator (by that time the safety valve did not know why it was closed). Hydrogen dissolved in it was released from the water. Then the cooling water again entered the reactor and there absorbed the next portion of hydrogen from the gas bubble. As the oxygen dissolved in the water, the volume of the bubble became smaller. Outside the containment, there was a device specially delivered to NPPs - the so-called recombinator for converting hydrogen and oxygen into water.
With the restoration of the feedwater supply to the steam generator and the resumption of circulation of the coolant (cooling water) in the primary circuit, normal heat removal from the core began.
As noted earlier, a very high radioactivity with long-lived isotopes was created under the containment shell, and the further operation of the unit would be economically unjustified. According to preliminary data, the elimination of the consequences of the accident will cost forty million dollars (in Chernobyl - eight billion rubles. - G. M.). The reactor is stopped for a long time. A commission has been created to clarify the causes of the accident.
Representatives of the public accuse the Metropolitan Edison company of being in a hurry to put the 2 power unit into operation on December 30, 25 hours before the new year, in order to win 40 millions of dollars through tax credits, although shortly before, at the end 1978 of the year, mechanical failures have already been noted, and the unit had to be stopped several times during the testing phase. However, federal inspectors still allowed its industrial operation. In January, the 1979 of the just-launched unit was stopped for two weeks, as there were leaks in the pipes and pumps.
Even after the accident, gross violations of safety rules by the Metropolitan Edison company continued. So, on Friday 30 of March, on the third day of the accident, 52000 meters of cubic radioactive water were dumped into the Sakuahana River. The company did this without first obtaining permission from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ostensibly to free tanks for more radioactive water pumped out of the reactor shell by drainage pumps ... ”
Now, having read the details of the disaster in Pennsylvania and anticipating Chernobyl, one should take a quick look at the past 35 anniversary since the early fifties. To trace whether Pennsylvania and Chernobyl were so accidental, over the past thirty-five years have there been accidents at nuclear power plants in the USA and the USSR that could serve as a lesson and warn people against a lightweight approach to the most complicated problem of our time - the development of atomic energy?
Indeed, have nuclear power plants operated in both countries well over the years? It turns out not quite. Let's look at the history of the development of nuclear energy and see that accidents at nuclear reactors began almost immediately after their appearance.
IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
1951 year. Detroit. Accident research reactor. Overheating of the fissionable material as a result of exceeding the permissible temperature. Air pollution by radioactive gases.
24 June 1959 of the year. Melt part of a fuel cell as a result of a cooling system failure at an experimental power reactor in Santa Susana, California.
3th of January 1961 A steam explosion at an experimental reactor near Idaho Falls, Idaho. Killed three.
October 5 1966 year. Partial melting of the core as a result of the failure of the cooling system at the Enrico Fermi reactor near Detroit.
19th of November 1971. Nearly 200 thousands of liters of radioactively contaminated water from an overcrowded reactor waste repository in Montzhello, Minnesota, flowed into the Mississippi River.
March 28 1979 year. The melting of the core due to loss of cooling of the reactor at the nuclear power plant Trimail Island. Release of radioactive gases into the atmosphere and liquid radioactive waste into the Sakuahana River. Evacuation of the population from the disaster area.
7 August 1979 year. About 1000 people received a dose of radiation six times higher than the norm as a result of the release of highly enriched uranium from a nuclear fuel plant near the city of Erving, Tennessee.
25th of January 1982 As a result of the rupture of the steam generator pipe at the Gene reactor, near Rochester, radioactive steam was released into the atmosphere.
30th of January 1982 A state of emergency has been imposed on a nuclear power plant near the city of Ontario, New York. As a result of the accident, radioactive substances leaked into the atmosphere in the cooling system of the reactor.
28 February 1985 year. At the NPP Samer-Plant, criticality was reached prematurely, that is, uncontrolled overclocking took place.
May 19 1985 year. At the Indian Point-2 nuclear power plant near New York, owned by Consolidated Edison, a radioactive water leak has occurred. The accident arose due to a malfunction in the valve and led to the leakage of several hundred gallons, including outside the plant.
1986 year. Webbers Falls. Explosion of a radioactive gas reservoir at a uranium enrichment plant. One person died. Eight injured ...
IN SOVIET UNION
29 September 1957 year. The accident at the reactor near Chelyabinsk. There was a spontaneous nuclear acceleration of fuel waste with a strong release of radioactivity. Extensive territory is contaminated by radiation. The contaminated area was fenced with barbed wire, ringed with a drainage channel. The population was evacuated, the ground was dug down, the cattle was destroyed and everything was piled up in the mounds.
May 7 1966 year. Acceleration on instantaneous neutrons at a nuclear power plant with a boiling nuclear reactor in the city of Melekess. The dosimetrist and the shift manager of the NPP were exposed. The reactor was extinguished by dropping two bags of boric acid into it.
1964-1979 years. Over the course of 15 years, repeated destruction (burnout) of the core fuel assemblies on the first block of the Beloyarsk NPP. Core repairs were accompanied by overexposure of operational personnel.
7th of January 1974 Explosion of a reinforced concrete gasholder of radioactive gas exposure on the first unit of the Leningrad NPP. There were no casualties.
6 February 1974 year. Intermediate circuit rupture on the first block of the Leningrad NPP as a result of water boiling up with subsequent water hammer. Three died. Highly active water with pulp filtering powder discharged into the external environment.
October 1975 year. On the first block of the Leningrad NPP, partial destruction of the core (“local goat”). The reactor was stopped and after a day it was flushed with an emergency flow rate of nitrogen into the atmosphere through the ventilation pipe. About one and a half million curies of highly active radionuclides were released into the external environment.
1977 year. Melting down half of the core fuel assemblies in the second unit of the Beloyarsk NPP. Repair with overexposure staff lasted about a year.
December 31 1978 year. The second unit of the Beloyarsk NPP burned out. The fire arose from the fall of the engine room slab on the turbine oil tank. Burned out the entire control cable. The reactor was out of control. When organizing the supply of emergency cooling water to the reactor, eight people were overexposed.
October 1982 year. Generator explosion at the first unit of the Armenian NPP. Fire in the cable industry. Loss of power supply of own needs. Operational staff organized the supply of cooling water to the reactor. To assist with the Kola and other nuclear power plants arrived a group of technologists and repairmen.
September 1982 of the year. Destruction of the central fuel assembly at the first unit of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant due to erroneous actions of operational personnel. Emission of radioactivity in the industrial zone and the city of Pripyat, as well as overexposure of maintenance personnel during the elimination of the "small goat".
27 June 1985 of the year. The accident at the first block of the Balakovo NPP. During the period of commissioning, the safety valve vomited and the three hundred degree steam began to flow into the room where people worked. 14 people died. The accident occurred as a result of an extraordinary rush and nervousness due to the erroneous actions of inexperienced operational personnel.
All accidents at nuclear power plants in the USSR were not made public, with the exception of accidents at the first units of the Armenian and Chernobyl nuclear power plants in 1982, which were mentioned in passing in Pravda’s foremost post after the election of Yu.V. Andropov as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.
In addition, an indirect mention of the accident at the first unit of the Leningrad NPP took place in March 1976 of the year on the steam action of the USSR Ministry of Energy, which was addressed by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.N. Kosygin. In particular, he said then that the governments of Sweden and Finland had made a request to the USSR Government concerning the increase of radioactivity over their countries. Kosygin also said that the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers draw the attention of power engineers to the particular importance of observing nuclear safety and the quality of nuclear power plants in the USSR.
The situation when accidents at nuclear power plants were hidden from the public has become the norm under the Minister of Energy and Electrification of the USSR, P. S. Neporozhn. But accidents were hidden not only from the public and the government, but also from the country's NPP workers, which is especially dangerous, since the lack of publicity of negative experience is always fraught with unpredictable. It creates carelessness and frivolity.
Naturally, the successor of P. S. Neporozhny as minister — A. I. Mayorets, a man in the energy, especially in atomic, matters not competent enough — continued the tradition of silence. Already six months after taking office, he signed an order of the USSR Ministry of Energy from 19 May 1985 of the year No. 391-DSP, where in paragraph 64-1 it was prescribed:
“Information on adverse effects of environmental impact on service personnel and the public, as well as on the environment of energy facilities (exposure to electromagnetic fields, radiation, pollution of the atmosphere, water bodies and land) shall not be subject to open publication in print, in radio and television programs.”
The doubtful moral position was laid by Comrade Mayorets in the basis of his activities already in the first months of work in the new ministry.
It was in such an environment that the carefully thought-out “trouble-free” comrade Petrosyants wrote numerous books and, without fear of being exposed, promoted the complete safety of the nuclear power plant ...
A. I. Mayorets acted here in the framework of a long-established system. Having secured himself with the notorious “order”, he began to manage nuclear energy ...
But after all, it is necessary to competently, wisely and carefully, that is morally, mindful of the potential danger of nuclear energy, to manage such an economy as the USSR Ministry of Energy, which has penetrated its extensive power supply network. For yet Socrates said: "Everyone is wise in what he knows well."
How could a person who did not know this complicated and dangerous business manage the nuclear power industry? Of course, not the gods burn pots. But after all, there are not just pots here, but nuclear reactors, which, on occasion, can themselves be great to burn ...
But nevertheless, AI Mayorets, having rolled up his sleeves, took up this unknown business and, with a light hand, Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR B. Ye. Shcherbina, who nominated him for this post, began to “burn nuclear pots”.
Becoming a minister, MIorets first of all eliminated the USSR Ministry of Energy Glavniiproekt - Glavko, in charge of the design and research work in the Ministry of Energy, letting this important sector of engineering and scientific activity take its course.
Further, due to the reduction of repairs of equipment of power plants, it increased the utilization rate of installed capacity, sharply reducing the reserve of available capacity at power plants in the country.
The frequency in the power system has become more stable, but the risk of a major accident has increased dramatically ...
Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers B. Ye. Shcherbina from the tribune of the expanded Board of the USSR Ministry of Energy in March 1986 (a month before Chernobyl) found it possible to celebrate this achievement. Scherbina himself then headed the fuel and energy sector in the government. His praise of Mayor’s activities is understandable.
Here it is necessary to say briefly about B. Ye. Shcherbin as a person. An experienced administrator, ruthlessly demanding, automatically transferred to the energy sector management techniques from the gas industry, where he was for a long time a minister, tough and not competent in matters of energy, especially nuclear, who became the government at the head of the fuel and energy sector. But the grip of this short, puny man was truly dead. In addition, he had a truly amazing ability to impose on nuclear power plant builders his deadlines for the start-up of power units, which did not prevent him, after a while, from accusing them of disrupting the “commitments made”.
At the same time, the imposition of the start-up dates Shcherbina spent without taking into account the necessary technological time for the construction of nuclear power plants, equipment installation and commissioning.
I remember 20 February 1986 of the year at a meeting in the Kremlin of the directors of nuclear power plants and the heads of nuclear construction projects there was a kind of time limit. For no more than two minutes, the reporting director or the head of the construction site spoke, and at least thirty-five - forty minutes B. Ye. Shcherbina interrupted them.
The most interesting was the speech of the head of the construction department of the Zaporozhye NPP R. G. Henokha, who gathered courage and thick bass (the bass at such a meeting was regarded as tactlessness) stated that the 3 unit of the Zaporozhye NPP would be launched no later than August 1986 of the year ( the real launch took place on December 30 (1986 of the year) due to the late delivery of equipment and the unavailability of the computing complex, which was just being installed.
- Vidali what a hero! - outraged Shcherbina. - He sets his own deadlines! - And he raised his voice to shout: - Who gave you the right, Comrade Henoch, to set his own deadlines in return for the government ?!
“The terms are dictated by the technology of work production,” the construction manager stubbornly insisted.
- Throw! - interrupted his Shcherbina. - Do not get cancer for a stone! The government deadline is May 1986. Allow me to let in May!
“But only at the end of May they will complete the delivery of special valves,” Henoch retorted.
“Deliver earlier,” Scherbina taught. And he turned to Mayor, who was sitting next to him: “Notice, Anatoly Ivanovich, your construction supervisors hide behind the lack of equipment and disrupt deadlines ...”
“We will stop this, Boris Evdokimovich,” Mayorets promised.
“It is not clear how a nuclear power plant can be built and started up without equipment ... After all, I don’t supply equipment, but industry through a customer ...” muttered Henoch and, distressed, sat down.
After the meeting, in the lobby of the Kremlin Palace, he told me:
- This is our whole national tragedy. We lie and teach lie to subordinates. A lie, even with a noble purpose, is still a lie. And it will not bring to the good ...
We emphasize that this was said two months before the Chernobyl disaster.
To be continued ...
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