"Iron dome" over the CIS: with whom and from whom?
Немного stories: The CIS Air Defense System was created on the basis of an agreement of ten Commonwealth countries signed on February 10 in Almaty by Almaty 1995. The 22 of the year is a hefty time, so it’s not surprising that by now the 6 member countries are actually in the contract:
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan.
Plus, Uzbekistan, which left the CSTO in 2012, but continues to take part in joint exercises of the CIS air defense forces and maintains bilateral cooperation with Russia on air defense issues.
To date, the air defense system has proven to be robust and sustainable. And so, recently, high-level conversations began about the need to strengthen the possibilities and modernize the existing one.
Not for nothing.
Moreover, if one glance at the documents, it means that in the event of a threat of military conflict, the air defense forces are coordinated from Moscow.
This is logical. But: the coordinator and the commander are positions somewhat different from each other. Especially when it comes to such serious things. Actually, it turns out that the air defense system of the CIS simply does not have a single command. And each “in which case” will decide with his head. Which, I recall, six.
Naturally, no one encroaches on the independence of the air defense forces of each of the participating countries, but precisely in the case of repelling a threat, orders must come from one place and be carried out without question. This is the army after all, not the parliament ...
At present, Russia is intensively implementing the idea of “integrated regional air defense systems” or LFSs again within the framework of the CIS air defense system. What is the point?
The essence is in bilateral direct agreements with the member countries of the air defense system and the creation on their basis of these same air defense systems. In the East European, Caucasus and Central Asian regions of collective security. As an example, I will give the LFS of the air defense of Russia and Belarus, which is already working.
In April, 2016, Russia and Belarus completed the formation of the first unified system of this type in the Eastern European region. Everything is transparent here, Belarus is of strategic importance for Russia not without purpose. Near Poland and the Baltic states with NATO bases and airfields with American aircraft. Therefore, Minsk after Moscow has the most significant air defense forces in the Commonwealth, here Lukashenka doesn’t regret money, and Russia helps as much as it can. Including the upgraded MiG-29, the C-400 SAM and the Opponent-GE radar.
The meaning of the EPC air defense lies in the fact that in peacetime, the air defense systems of states operate in the normal mode, separately from each other. But in the event of a “threatened period”, a joint command is urgently created to control the EPC. Coordination is carried out from the Central command post of the commander of the Russian HQ.
And immediately the question arises: what is the "threatened period"? According to the text, this is the period of time that precedes the outbreak of war and is characterized by an extreme aggravation of the international situation. Vague, and if you look at the summaries News today, so we have almost this "threatened period" in the yard.
It turns out that the Russian VKS take command immediately before the outbreak of hostilities. And when we have enough time, if you look into the history, in such situations? Yes, never to anyone.
But the logic of reason still won, and 14 of March of this year, Lukashenko approved the changes and additions to the agreement on the EPC air defense. The “threatened period” was replaced by the “period of immediate threat of aggression”. This is a more accurate concept.
As an example, one can interpret the threat to the Russian contingent in Syria. Both military and civil.
It seems to be all fine. Of course, the dances of Lukashenka with a tambourine around a possible exit from the CSTO are a little strained, but even in this case, the EPC Treaty of Air Defense is valid. For this is a direct bilateral interstate agreement.
In addition to the East European system, two more EPCs are being created: the Caucasus and the Central Asian. Documents with Armenia and Kazakhstan have already been signed, negotiations are underway with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
From whom are the defense forces of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan protected? From China? It is doubtful, to be honest.
Kazakhstan’s air defenses are C-300, C-200 and C-75, which, to put it mildly, are not the first freshness. Kyrgyz air defense is even more modest - mainly C-75, C-125, and the Krug air defense system. The situation is similar in Tajikistan - С-75 and С-125.
But Russia and China have no differences, such as with the West. And the sale of new C-400 and Su-35 fighters would hardly have taken place, if it were otherwise.
So it’s not about China, and certainly not about India. The question arises: against whom, in fact, are friends?
And it turns out there is against whom. In the region there are two states. One of which is the generally accepted Central Asian hotbed of Wahhabism and other pleasures under the banner of pseudo-Islam. And the second, albeit not so radical, but at one time expressing protests against the launches of the "Calibrov" from the Caspian Sea.
So, there is against whom. Considering that air defense is absolutely defensive weaponthere can be no complaints from the former Soviet republics or states. And since we are talking about creating a system to counter the threat from the air, then we, that is, Russia, will have to seriously take care of this.
As for the Caucasian EPC, everything is clear there. He is still a boiler. And taking into account the water area of the Black Sea, and the presence of Turkey, where Erdogan apparently never understands whose friend he is and how much in the time interval, then the need for the same actions is obvious.
Although work in this direction has been going on for years. Yes, the air defense of the participating countries has somewhat progressed, thanks to the Russian side. It is especially worth considering that the military budgets of the participating countries are far from the world tops.
Nevertheless, the acquisitions were made largely due to the ability (and desire) of Russia to provide weapons at reasonable prices.
In the 2015-2016 years, Kazakhstan received the 5 divisions of the C-300PS complexes, and Belarus the 4 divisions. The complexes were not new, but derived from the Russian air defense system when replaced with C-400. But they were provided free of charge.
Special financial conditions allowed Belarus and Armenia to acquire several new short-range systems Tor-M2 and medium-range Buk-M2.
Of course, first of all everyone is interested in C-400. But the new (and expensive) complex is the subject of a separate topic of conversation. The fact that C-400 as a skyguard in these regions is necessary is not discussed. Only the price for its use is discussed.
Buy in their full disposal C-400 countries are unlikely to be able to. To place on its territory Russian air defense systems under Russian control is a matter of diplomacy. And again, money.
Meanwhile, air defense is not only air defense missile systems, it is also airplanes. And here, too, the process goes.
Kazakhstan received the first batch of four Su-30CM in April 2015, and then another two fighters in December 2016. It is likely that Belarus will also receive these aircraft.
In general, the air defense system of the CIS may well become an effective military tool. The limited capabilities of Russia's allies in air defense (and even much more than modest within the framework of missile defense) can become an obstacle to the creation of an effective unified regional air defense system. Or delay the creation of the air defense system, which is aimed at repelling attacks from the air. Unfortunately, money here is the most fundamental factor.
However, the rather unstable political situation in the world, when, as practice shows, not a single country that has chosen an independent path of development can be insured against “restoring order” and “solving crises” by “peacekeepers” from NATO in general and the United States in particular shows that it is better to be not fully prepared than to be completely unprepared for such actions.
For Russia, closer interaction with the network of allied air defense systems and the creation of joint regional systems will provide their own air defense / missile defense forces with more opportunities to organize response measures, thanks to earlier information on threats.
Doubts about how realistic it is in the near future to create truly effective systems exist, and they are justified. Yes, and the Allied Air Force and Air Defense are much inferior to the Russian, if not more. But the first steps in this direction have been made, and as you know, only the walking will master the road.
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