Iranian ballistic missiles of the Hormuz-2 family: big ambitions and dubious opportunities
Many years of military-political pressure on Tehran from Washington, expressed in the regular presence in the Arabian Sea of naval and carrier strike forces of the US Navy, as well as in turning the entire western coast of the Arabian Peninsula into an air / missile anti-missile and at the same time outpost of the US Armed Forces at the maritime border of Iran, forced the military industrial complex of this powerful state to concentrate on large-scale development programs for high-precision strike and defensive weapons. Ambitious projects and contracts for the re-equipment of outdated air defense systems, as well as the upgrade of radio equipment attached to it, were taken as the basis for shaping the country's effective defense capability.
As a result, we were able to observe the birth of the strongest air defense in the region, comparable in capabilities to those of Saudi Arabia and Israel. At the same time, in this direction, Tehran was able to achieve relative self-sufficiency, as indicated by the recent statement by the Minister of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hussein Dehkan, about the absence of the need to purchase Russian S-400 “Triumph”. Here, the Iranian air defense system is based on the most high-tech “semi-national” project - the Bavar-373 air defense system, which embodies the element base of the Chinese HQ-9 and our C-300PT / PS. Some elements of the latter were at the disposal of the creators of the complex for one and a half to two decades.
Anti-ship capabilities of the Iranian army (against the background of the lack of the required number of carrier rocket-propelled fighter carriers and a "frail" surface component fleet) are supported by a variety of coastal SCRC batteries, which are subordinate to the Guardian Corps of the Islamic Revolution. The most common missile systems are Noor and Qader, with a range of 120 and 250-300 km, respectively. These anti-ship missiles were developed on the basis of the Chinese S-802 and have a similar speed (800 - 900 km / h), a similar flight profile (25 m on the marching section and 4-5 on the final) and an identical radar signature of the order (EPR about 0,15, 2 m1000). Two types of missiles are housed in modular-built launchers placed on the wheeled chassis of trucks like the Mercedes-Benz Axor. On the same trucks, a kung is also located with a point of combat control of the coastal SCRC battery. The IRGC and the Armed Forces of Iran are armed with several hundred similar batteries with 500 or more anti-ship missiles Noor and Qader, ready for immediate use, but their radius of action allows them to fire on enemy surface ships in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. As you know, the tactics of the AUG of the US Navy provide for the strike of the Tomahawk Special Purpose Logistic Force from a distance of 800-XNUMX km, which is carried out in parallel with the anti-radar deck operation aviation.
Since Iran does not yet have a proper airborne component of the fleet and air force, then the 3 low-noise Russian diesel-electric submarines of the 877 EKM will play a huge role here. However, in Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain there are a huge number of strategically important facilities of the US Armed Forces (including the headquarters of the US Navy's 5 operational fleet), to protect which, if necessary, Washington will definitely attract enhanced AUG from 4- 5 EM “Arleigh Burke Burke” and also 2 RKR URO “Ticonderoga” in composition (the States will never send a standard AUG to the shores of the Islamic Republic of Iran). In this situation, and you may need rockets "Noor" and "Qadir". Iranian calculations will be able to run from a few dozen to two hundred ASRs on the American group from the coastal sections of the Harmazgan, Fars and Bushehr provinces, but even this amount is hardly enough to break through the 5 - 7 "Ajis" antimissile shield ship After all, the slow subsonic Iranian RCC will be opposed not by the outdated RIM-67D or RIM-156A SAMs with PARGSN, but by two types of promising anti-missile missiles - light RIM-162 ESSM and long-range RIM-174 ERAM. The latter are equipped with active radar homing and can be guided by target designation of deck aircraft DRLOiU E-2D "Advanced Hawkeye", thanks to this, the Iranian anti-ship missiles will be successfully intercepted at the trans-horizon line from AUG in 50 - 100 km.
The Iranian Armed Forces also have a number of simpler medium-range anti-ship missiles, among which are noted such products as the C-801K subsonic (50 km range, the 7-20 m flight altitude, and the F-4E tactical fighters, Su-24M and etc.), “Raad” (3-hthon RCC with a range of 350 km and speed of 900 km / h, has a large EPR around 0,3-0,5 м2, designed on the basis of the Chinese C-201), the family “Nasr” and “Kowsar "(Range to 35 km and speed ≥1М, mass of warheads 29-130 kg, etc. But operational and tactical missions continue to cause the greatest interest Khalij-e-Fars (Persian Gulf) and Hormuz-2 tivocate ballistic missiles. The Raad missile, for example, can be attributed to the Iranian technological concept of a transition generation, on which Iranian specialists could “stretch their hands” in the development of long-range anti-ship missiles The product is present in the armament of coastal batteries in very small quantities, not widely used due to various tactical and technological deficiencies that are characteristic of anti-ship missiles 60-x. XX century.
The most significant of them are considered subsonic speed and low thrust-to-weight ratio with a large radar signature. Not less unpleasant is the fact that the launch of the 3-htonnoy anti-ship missile "Raad" uses a powerful suspended solid-fuel rocket booster with a thrust from 29 to 33 tons, creating a huge infrared radiation. As a consequence: the launch site of the rocket can easily fix the infrared complexes of high-resolution high-altitude UAVs and tactical aircraft at a distance of 150 and more than a km. For comparison: the thrust of the accelerator PKR "Harpoon" is only 6,6 tons.
The Raad long-range anti-ship missile (not to be confused with the Pakistani strategic Ra'ad missile) is a radically modernized version of the Chinese HY-2 anti-ship missile and our P-15M Termit. Instead of a liquid propellant rocket engine, an economical turbojet is installed. According to the Iranian Defense Ministry, the missile range has been increased from 100 to 300-350 km
As it became known on March 9, 2017 from the informationnews platform rbase.new-factoria.ru with reference to the Iranian news agency Tasnim, the commander of the Air Force and the Military Space Forces of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, Brigadier General Amir-Ali Hajizadeh made a successful training launch of the ballistic anti-ship missile system “Hormuz-2” in early March. The missile was able to hit the training target at a distance of 250 km, which is already a very good result for the IRI, because achieving the minimum indicator of circular probable deviation (CVO) for a high-speed ballistic missile is a very delicate matter, providing for high performance of its on-board computing facilities, as well as speed data transmission from the homing head to the aerodynamic control module. With a high degree of probability it can be assumed that the element base of this missile, like most types of Iranian precision weapons, is of Chinese origin. For obvious reasons, the statement of the IRGC command makes one feel real pride in the Iranian military-industrial complex, but how effective is the new concept of high-precision weapons against the above described AUG of the United States Navy or the air defense system of missile defense, created by the American army in the countries of the "Arabian coalition"?
To answer this question, you need to familiarize yourself with the tactical and technical characteristics of this rocket, as well as the principle of its use, which is radically different from other (low-altitude and subsonic) anti-ship missiles of the Iranian Armed Forces. No matter how much the Iranian media claims about the uniqueness of the new missile, it is a “thoroughbred” conceptual counterpart of the earlier Khalij-e-Fars ballistic anti-ship missile. Both rockets have a range of 300 km and a speed of about 3200 km / h. Considering the circular probable deviation of the first Khalij-e-Fars modification, they were able to reduce from 30 to 8,5 m, the Hormuz-2 indicator can reach 5 m. This opportunity appeared due to the equipment of the rocket with modern high-resolution television or infrared. Due to the modular type of the targeting compartment, centimeter / millimeter active radar homing can also be installed. With a weight of 650 kg warhead, the error (QUO) in 5-7 m is not a significant drawback, and the enemy’s surface watercraft suffers serious damage.
Moreover, the Hormuz-2 has the ability to destroy mobile / stationary ground targets, and therefore can be used not only to destroy US Navy warships and the Arabian Coalition fleets, but also to attack the most powerful and most dangerous bridgeheads of the US Air Force near the western coast of the Persian Gulf, which include the air base: Al-Dafra (UAE), Al-Udeid (Qatar) and Al Salem (Kuwait). At the same time, Avb El-Udeid will very soon become the front line of the regional aerospace defense system of the United States in the Persian region (here the decimeter radar station ANR / XPS 132 Block-5 with 5500 km will be deployed, and it will cover its powerful air fleet of Qatar Air Force, presented by 72 tactical fighter F-15QA). It was vital for the Iranian armed forces to design a multi-purpose operational-tactical missile system capable of striking in a matter of minutes both the AUG ships of the American fleet and the above-mentioned ground targets. Ormuz-2 has such capabilities. True, for this there are serious technical obstacles.
In particular, the upper parts of the ballistic flight trajectory of the Ormuz-2 rocket, exactly like Khalij-e-Fars, pass at altitudes 40-70 km in the speed range 3 - 3,2М, which turns it into the simplest target for combat information -control systems "Aegis", as well as attached to them ship-based air defense systems SM-3 and SM-6, located on American destroyers and cruisers. Considering the US E-3C / D aircraft that are in service with the US Navy deck aircraft wings, which allow the Iranian Ormuz-2 to be detected even on the overclocking trajectory, they can be intercepted over the western Persian Gulf anti-missile system as RIM-161B and RIM-174-10 as well as guided missiles of the AIM-120D long-range air combat, with which the F / A-18E / F "Super Hornet" carrier-based fighters are armed.
Moreover, due to the low speed of flying in 2300 - 2800 km / h, "Ormuzas" can be quickly detected by the airborne radar of the Emirates and Qatari "Mirage-2000-9" and "Rafale", and then easily destroyed by air-to-air missiles MICA-EM. Let's not forget about the battery of the Patriot PAC-2 / 3 air defense system on the Arabian Peninsula covering the American air bases: for them, the Ormuz-2 missiles in general pose virtually no threat. The new MIM-104C and ERINT anti-missiles have advanced semi-active and active radar homing systems with work software for ballistic objects. These interceptor missiles shoot down dozens of "Hormuz-2" with a probability of 0,8 - 0,95.
Unfortunately, even in the appearance of the Hormuz-2 missiles, the simple design of the aerodynamic controls and the absence of a block of gas-dynamic control engines are well traced. All this indicates a low maneuverability capabilities of the BR, which will not allow “to leave” even from such a rocket as the “Super-530D” or the AIM-7M “Sparrow. The Hormuz-2 is a large missile with an EPR near 0,5 - 0,7 m2, which is why not only the Arabian-NNXX Mirage-2-2000NNXXR-NNXX MiG-9 fighter radar with MiG-XNUMX fighter radar can be detected by Emirates MiG-XNUMX-XNUMX fighter jets. ".
The lack of high maneuverability qualities of the Hormuz-2 rocket, together with the use of an active radar homing head, creates another unpleasant surprise for the command of the IRGC. Its essence lies in the simplicity of intercepting the Ormuz-2 ballistic anti-ship missile with the aid of the RIM-116 Block-2 self-defense missiles used in the ASMD ("SeaRAM") anti-aircraft missile system. Even if the Hormuz-2 homing head doesn’t have the necessary temperature to capture the RIM-116 Block-2 RAM infrared-ultraviolet seeker, the RIM-116 second passive radar channel, presented by two miniature radio interferometers, placed in front of the radome of the thermal seeker on the special “antennal” rods. Interferometers provide guidance for the electromagnetic radiation of an active radar homing head of an enemy missile. Consequently, due to the impossibility of intensive anti-aircraft maneuvering of Ormuz-2 missiles, the use of active radar guidance makes them even more vulnerable to the near defensive line of American destroyers, cruisers, littoral warships of the coastal zone and aircraft carriers (all of them are equipped with ASMD).
Run the rim-xnumx block-xnumx
Based on the above parameters of the new Iranian multi-purpose OTBR, as well as the technological features of the air defense systems of the US fleet and the missile defense of strategic air bases on the western shores of the bay, it can be emphasized that even the massive use of multi-purpose Khalij-e-Fars / “ Hormuz-2 "will not allow the Iranian armed forces to cause significant damage to Washington’s advanced strike and defensive bridgehead on the Arabian Peninsula, including its supporting groups Key US Navy. For a noticeable change in the alignment of forces in Front Asia, Tehran needs to develop and mass-produce promising supersonic types of high-precision weapons with a low-altitude flight profile, as well as low radar and infrared visibility.
Information sources:
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/news/v-irane-vypolneny-uspeshnye-ispytaniya-pkr-hormuz-2
http://imp-navigator.livejournal.com/154722.html
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/missile/wobb/ram_rim116/ram_rim116.shtml
Information