Military Review

About the future of underwater robotics

23 March 2017 at the Patriot Convention and Exhibition Center (Kubinka, Moscow region) will host the 2nd Military Scientific Conference "Robotization of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation".

In the run-up to the event, the AST Center proposes to get acquainted with the translation of the article “Waiting for breakthrough technologies? Underwater autonomous systems and the difficulties of naval innovation ", published by the School of International Studies. S. Rajaratnam at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore (Waiting for Disruption ?! Undersea Autonomy and Heiko Borchert, Tim Kraemer, Daniel Mahon). The article talks about the development of unmanned underwater vehicles and robotic systems in the United States, Russia, China, Norway and Singapore.

About the future of underwater robotics

Uninhabited underwater vehicle "Marlin-350" manufactured by Tethys Pro

Waiting for breakthrough technology?

Underwater Autonomous Systems and the Challenges of Naval Innovation

In October 2016, more than 40 organizations from 20 countries gathered on the west coast of Scotland at an event called “Unmanned Warrior”, the first large-scale demonstration of more than 50 aerial, ground and naval unmanned systems organized by the Royal Naval fleet Great Britain. This event allowed us to assess the current state of the ultramodern systems of the British Navy, as well as gain an idea of ​​the battlefield of the future. [1]

The “UnmannedWarrior” event was evidence of the growing military significance of unmanned systems. The most common is their use in the airspace - around 90 countries and non-state actors around the world use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). [2] The sharp increase in demand creates the impression that remote-controlled, automated and autonomous systems are becoming widespread in the armed forces. [3] However, caution must be exercised, since events in the air, land and sea spheres develop at different speeds (see Table No. XXUMX). It is important to take into account these differences when assessing the possible strategic effect of the above systems on regional stability and the future nature of hostilities. This prevents hasty conclusions arising, in particular, in the course of ongoing political discussions, which may lead to premature decisions to ban the development, acquisition and use of relevant systems before their full potential is revealed. [1]

Given the somewhat exaggerated nature of today's discussion on unmanned systems, this paper examines the mechanisms of military innovation in order to serve as a kind of cautionary note on the current and future use of autonomous underwater systems. The article begins with the premise that underwater autonomous systems cannot be considered an inevitable and breakthrough technology, as many believe. [5] In particular, this is due to the nature of the existing threats, a limited set of missions for unmanned underwater vehicles, and technical capabilities . [6] In order for underwater autonomous systems to become breakthrough technology, the naval forces need to understand how to translate technological capabilities into operational advantages. This will require representatives of the Navy, industry and science to better understand the relationship between operational necessity, cultural factors, organizational and resource needs, as well as technological capabilities.

Table No. 1

This argument in the article develops in several stages. First, a description is given of current and potential future operations using the unit in various countries. After a brief discussion of the perspective picture of naval conflicts, which is necessary for understanding the possible increase in the importance of underwater unmanned systems, the article discusses the key motives and driving forces for the development of underwater autonomous systems, and provides a review of the literature on naval innovation. The final part contains the main conclusions and recommendations for the promotion of underwater autonomous systems in the future.

Present and future missions using underwater autonomous systems

NATO and non-organization naval forces use unmanned underwater vehicles for various but limited missions. In order to illustrate existing practices, this chapter talks about the USA, Russia, China, Singapore and Norway, since in each of these countries we can identify specific features that justify the use of BPA. A discussion will show that mine action and intelligence (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, ISR) are standard practices. Anti-submarine warfare, fighting against surface ships, as well as providing underwater and coastal defenses arise as additional missions.


Fear of losing technological superiority over the likely adversary is a key element of the discussion on US military strategy. This problem comes from the current geostrategic and geo-economic environment, the growing risk of global technology diffusion, and the increasing importance of commercial technology to the military. Against this background, competitors capable of organizing reliable A2 / AD zones (anti-access / area denial - restriction of access / constraint of enemy forces in the territory) represent the most serious challenge to US military planning. [7] These competitors restrict the freedom of action of the United States in strategically important regions, increase the cost of military intervention, call into question US deterrence potential and thus undermine solidarity with the allies, as doubts about readiness arise and decide United States to provide security assurances. [8]

According to the US naval strategy for 2015, the maritime services must provide access, guarantee strategic containment and control of the sea space by organizing local superiority, projecting power (in a broad sense) and ensuring maritime security. [9] These strategic goals also form tasks for the submarine fleet, which is crucial for strategic deterrence. Despite the fact that the US Navy continues to strive to achieve supremacy in the underwater sphere, those responsible for military planning take into account the fact that ambitious regional powers are aiming to create А2 / AD zones that could undermine the US strategic advantage. [10] In addition, there is a significant gap in capabilities, since “the underwater strike power of the fleet will fall by more than 60 percent by year’s 2028 compared to current figures.” [11] The negative consequences of this trend are exacerbated by “gaps in Volodnochnoy Defense ", due to the fact that the US Navy and the Coast Guard" are not yet ready to respond to the use of unmanned underwater and ground vehicles by enemy forces, terrorist and criminal organizations "in US waters. [12]

Considering the central role of technology in American strategic thinking, innovations such as the “Third Offset strategy” and other concepts serve as a response to the trends described above. [13] The main goal is to provide advanced technological solutions to the troops as soon as possible. use in training purposes and combat operations. This influences the United States’s approach to underwater autonomous systems from 1994, when the US Navy published the “Master Plan for Unmanned Underwater Vehicles” (UUV Master Plan), which included the use of underwater autonomous systems for mine action, information gathering and oceanographic tasks. The first operational deployment of these systems occurred in 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom. In 2004, the US Navy published a new BPA plan that had a global impact on naval thinking on the issue of underwater autonomy. In particular, the updated version of the document described a number of possible missions, such as reconnaissance, anti-mine and anti-submarine warfare, oceanography, communications and navigation, information operations, immediate strike, patrol and support of naval bases. [14]

However, this plan was ahead of its time and was not properly implemented due to the lack of determination on the part of the naval leadership, resources and adequate procedures to promote underwater autonomous systems. [15]

Since then, however, the situation has changed dramatically. According to the United States Department of Defense roadmap of Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038, the Department of Defense Financial Planning provides for total expenditures on unmanned underwater systems in the amount of $ 1,92 billion, 352 million of which will be spent on research and technology, 708 million on purchases and about 900 million for operation and maintenance. [16] In addition to allocating significant funds to underwater autonomous systems, certain changes were made to the structure of the Navy. In May, 2015, Rear Admiral Robert Girrier, was appointed first director of unmanned weapon systems. This was followed by the appointment of a brigadier general (retired) as deputy assistant secretary of the US Navy for unmanned systems in October 2015. [17]

Despite a broad approach to the subject of underwater autonomy in general, the US Navy narrowed the range of possible missions with the use of underwater vehicles, focusing on mine action. To this end, several national systems were developed, such as the Battlespace Preparation Autonomous Undersea Vehicle (autonomous underwater training apparatus for the battlefield), various anti-mine control modules for ships of the coastal zone, autonomous underwater vehicles (APA) of anti-mine warfare. The second direction of the use of APA is intelligence, for which several platforms were also developed, the most famous of which is Boeing's Echo Ranger. In addition to these specially developed systems, the US Navy also uses off-the-shelf solutions, such as the REMUS system manufactured by Hydroid (a subsidiary of Kongsberg Maritime) mainly for intelligence purposes, and SeaFox, the anti-mine system manufactured by Atlas Elektronik, Germany. Anti-submarine warfare with the use of autonomous systems is the third, slowly developing direction. For these missions, the US Navy is considering the use of large underwater autonomous systems, such as the Echo Ranger and unmanned surface vehicles (BNA).

In general, the US Department of Defense "aggressively" invested in the development of unmanned systems. In addition to investing in autonomous platforms and payloads for them, the US Navy finances technologies that make the underwater space more suitable for the use of autonomous systems. For example, submarine navigation, positioning and communications networks, submarine power systems for advanced deployment were created. [18] In addition, the US Navy uses a family-of-systems approach that allows you to develop the required size of the unit with different payloads. [19] BPA launches from surface and underwater platforms [20], and the possibility of launching them from fighters is also being considered. [21] Different launch options are important, since the US Navy is not only interested in using single B And, but deploying them in a coordinated groups ( "swarm") in various fields.

Existing submarine concepts have a strong impact on the US approach to underwater autonomous systems. In this regard, the unit is considered mainly as separate multi-purpose systems that expand the possibilities of using submarines and surface ships. Best of all, this approach is personified in the current Large Displacement Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (LDUUV) American Vision, which can not only carry out its own missions, but also launch smaller apparatuses. As the US Navy seeks multitasking, their attention is gradually shifting from autonomous platforms to payloads they can carry. It is expected that the payload will be compact and flexible enough to simultaneously meet the requirements of various missions, such as intelligence, anti-mine and anti-submarine warfare. Consequently, the US Navy also attaches more importance to the integration of the unit in the launch platforms, which is emphasized by recent trials with coast guard ships and Virginia-type submarines.


At present, Russia is carrying out a fundamental transformation in the field of foreign and security policy. The new national security strategy and the country's military doctrine portray the West as a key strategic rival, while the countries of Central and East Asia are viewed as partners and allies. The new maritime doctrine, adopted in July 2015, follows the logic of these arguments and departs from the regional balance, which was observed earlier. In the future, this will probably lead to more persistent actions by Russia in the High North and in the Atlantic. [22]

All this also affects the direction of the development of the Navy of Russia. The Navy is a key strategic deterrence tool that was largely neglected in the 1990s. The 2014 modernization program has helped stop the steady decline of the Russian fleet. [23] This program, among other things, introduces new weapons systems, a command and control system, and also underlines the growing role of unmanned systems. In addition, great importance is attached to the modernization of the submarine fleet, which is in dire need of increased attention. This is due to the fact that about two thirds of Russia's nuclear submarines are inaccessible due to ongoing repair and modernization work. [24]

Russia's armed forces gained insight into the benefits of using unmanned systems in recent conflicts, for example, in Georgia in the 2008 year. Since then, Russia has stepped up efforts to develop and implement such systems in all areas, since they allow to avoid human losses, and also illustrate the high technological level of the armed forces. Against this background, unmanned underwater vehicles [25] are part of the state procurement program, as well as the program of modernization and scientific and technological development of the Navy. In addition, the military recently adopted a development plan for robotic and unmanned systems. [26]

Russia is one of the few countries emphasizing protection as a key factor in the development of BPA. In particular, the Russian Navy uses autonomous systems in search and rescue operations, as well as to enhance the protection of harbors. Anti-mine and anti-submarine warfare are additional missions for BPA. In the future, Russia plans to expand the range of use of underwater robots to conduct reconnaissance missions, combat surface ships and enemy BPA, anti-mine warfare, coordinated launch of BPA groups against especially important enemy targets, and detect and destroy maritime infrastructure (for example, power cables). The Russian fleet, like the US Navy, considers the integration of FPA into fifth-generation nuclear and non-nuclear submarines a priority. [27]

Current assessments of Russia's interest in underwater autonomous systems, as a rule, overlook the fact that the country looks back on almost five decades of traditions and experience in developing such technologies. The Soviet Union had the opportunity to supply scientific BPA for export to China and the United States. 1990's internal turmoil led to the near-total collapse of this technological area. However, thanks to export projects, Russian developers managed to survive. At the beginning of the 2000-s of the Russian Navy, it was necessary to turn to foreign suppliers in order to acquire new BPA, as a result of which Saab, Teledyne Gavia and ECA got access to the Russian market. However, today the country seeks to notice foreign systems with models developed and produced in Russia, such as the Obzor-600 control unit developed by Tetis Pro or with mine-control solutions from the SNNP Region. In addition, Russia has launched several research projects that focus on, in particular, underwater communications and the detection of surface objects.

In general, the Russian experience in the field of BPA is based on scientific organizations in the structure of the Russian Academy of Sciences, while industrial enterprises still play a supporting role. Russia is currently working to bring its own technologies back to the export market. Local observers suggest that when delivering an anti-mine defense ship, Alexander Obukhov will be equipped with the autonomous underwater systems GNPP Region. [28]


How China is gradually integrating into the international system is not only related to the country's internal stability and prosperity, but also to the response of neighboring countries to the growing influence of Beijing. Although China probably accepts the fact that Washington is still a key player in the world, Beijing is ready to offer itself as an alternative to the United States. [29] Chinese President Xi Jinping seems more prepared than his predecessors to pay for the country's internal growth by the need to cope with international tensions. [30] This is also reflected in the growing leadership confidence that China is beginning to have more opportunities to maintain its persistent actions with responsible military and non-military means. [31]

The People’s Liberation Army of China (PLA) is central to the Chinese view of the fundamental elements of a powerful state. [32] The tasks of national defense and the possible battle for Taiwan still play an important role in PLA’s military planning, but China’s dependence on land and sea transport Pathways represents an additional factor in the strategy of using the armed forces. This goes hand in hand with the willingness of the Middle Kingdom to project force in strategically important regions and direct investments to strengthen the capabilities of A2 / AD to protect these regions. [33]

The Chinese Navy clearly reflects this paradigm shift. Traditionally organized to protect the coastal and territorial waters of China, the Navy intends to expand its presence in international waters by conducting increasingly demanding sea operations. [34] These two development vectors are closely interrelated, since the large international role of the Chinese Navy depends on the protection of national sovereignty in territorial waters. This requires close cooperation between the Navy and the Chinese coast guard. [35] Growing international ambitions also highlight the role of the submarine fleet, whose nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines are a key element of Chinese nuclear deterrence. China is investing heavily in strengthening its submarine fleet and, for the same purpose, has resumed cooperation with Russia. Despite the progress made, China demonstrates strategic vulnerability in the submarine sector, especially with regard to anti-submarine warfare. This explains the new Chinese initiatives, such as the “underwater great wall,” resembling the US hydro-acoustic antisubmarine system in the Atlantic Ocean. [36]

Against this background, China understands the strategic importance of unmanned systems in all areas. As Michael Chace notes, the Chinese vision of unmanned systems not only follows the American, but also largely imitates it. [37] From a Chinese point of view, unmanned systems increase existing capabilities as operations that are not suitable for manned platforms have become more controlled [38] In addition, the avoidance of human loss is important because of the interconnectedness of the one-child policy, the possible loss of these children in battle and the consequences this may have for internal stability. Regional features, such as the lack of opportunities in the underwater area of ​​China's southern neighbors, may prompt Beijing to take more audacious actions — testing innovative concepts for using unmanned underwater systems. [39]

The use of BPA by China deliberately enters a “gray zone” between commercial, scientific, and naval operations. Three broad areas of application appear: protection of the country's coastal zone and military infrastructure, in particular, submarine bases and sea communications; mine control using autonomous systems; exploration of resources on the shelf. Chinese experts are also discussing additional missions, such as anti-submarine warfare, the use of BPA against military and commercial underwater infrastructure, hydrography, search and rescue operations and the protection of artificial islands. Sometimes, Chinese experts also consider the options for equipping the unit with weapons. [40]

China’s defense industry complex is opaque, but it seems that around the 15 development and research teams are working on BPA. It is important to note that all major institutions are part of the key shipbuilding conglomerates - China State Shipbuilding Corporation and China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation. The Navy is believed to be the main sponsor of most projects, but Chinese energy companies interested in offshore research can also provide support. The Navy uses Zhsihui-3 - BPA, developed in China for search and rescue and mine action. In addition, various systems were imported from abroad or produced in conjunction with partners. BPA cooperation with Russia is focused on research projects, but it can be assumed that these projects were useful for the Navy. [41]


Due to the small area of ​​the territory, Singapore’s geo-strategic position is unsustainable. Consequently, the city-state combines deterrence and active diplomacy with maintaining a balance in relations with China and the United States. Regional prosperity and integration into the global economy are the two main strategic factors affecting Singapore’s national security and military development. Naval forces of the country are a key tool to ensure the safety and stability of maritime communications. In this context, the underwater area has a special meaning. Singapore is investing in the submarine fleet, but it is also concerned that the growing number of submarines in the region could jeopardize regional shipping and maritime infrastructure. Therefore, the Singapore Navy recently launched an initiative to exchange information regarding submarine operations. [42]

Singapore is a high-tech country, advanced technologies are embedded in the DNA of its armed forces. Since staffing is limited, autonomous systems increase the existing capabilities of the armed forces. However, the country's culture, associated with geostrategic isolation, limits the technological “appetite” of the armed forces, thereby departing from the development of systems that could jeopardize the regional balance of power. Thus, the use of autonomous systems for offensive purposes is not on the agenda. [43]

Technological maturity and operational advantages are two key parameters used by the Singapore armed forces to assess the readiness of new technologies. Therefore, the use of the Singapore Navy unmanned underwater vehicles is currently focused on mine action. Singapore is considering additional missions such as anti-submarine warfare, hydrography and the protection of maritime infrastructure. Using intelligence for intelligence may look like a deterrent to neighboring states, so Singapore only considers defensive targets. [44]

Singapore's defense ecosystem consists of high-performance government institutions, research institutions in local universities and the defense industry, the main player of which is ST Electronics. DSO National Laboratories has developed the Meredith autonomous underwater vehicle, and ST Electronics has developed the AUV-3. ST Electronics also collaborates with the National University of Singapore in developing the STARFISH system. For reasons not publicized, the Singapore Navy did not procure nationally developed systems. [45] In contrast, the anti-mine ships in the Singapore Navy were equipped with import systems such as Hydroid's REMUS and K-STER I and K- STER C from the French company ECA. [46]


Norway’s foreign and security policy is based on a culture of peaceful conflict resolution and emphasizes the strategic role of the United States as Oslo’s irreplaceable partner. [47] The country's geo-strategic position, its dependence on the maritime economy and its common border with Russia influence defense policy. Great importance is attached to national and collective defense. Although recent developments in Europe further reinforce these strategic priorities, the Norwegian armed forces do not meet the new requirements for combat readiness. This prompted the head of the Norwegian Ministry of Defense to demand large-scale structural changes that would lead to a significant redistribution of personnel, increased readiness of troops for combat deployment and a significant increase in the defense budget, which is provided for in the long-term defense plan adopted in July 2016. [48]

Against this background, coastal and open sea operations were two key parameters for the development of the Norwegian Navy. Today, the Norwegian fleet is still ready to conduct operations on the high seas, but the current focus on national and collective defense sets somewhat different priorities. It also affects the future size of the fleet, which will be much smaller than today. It will include, among other things, five frigates, three logistics and logistics ships, four submarines. The main task of submarines, in this case, is deterrence in the waters of Norway. 3 February 2017 Norway selected Germany as a strategic partner for the purpose of signing an agreement on new submarines in the 2019 year. This will allow Norway to replace six Ula-type submarines with four new U212NGs, built by the German company ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems. [49]

At the current transitional stage, the military leadership focuses on introducing new large weapons systems and maintaining the internal balance of the Norwegian armed forces. In this regard, autonomous systems are considered from the point of reducing costs and risks for the armed forces. However, until now the Norwegian troops lack a unified approach to the issue of the influence of autonomous systems on existing military concepts, tactics and procedures. Among all types of the Norwegian Armed Forces, the Navy is the most advanced user of autonomous systems, acting in collaboration with local industry and the research institute of the Ministry of Defense FFI. Key technologies are being developed by FFI and will be commercialized by Kongsberg. In addition, the oil and gas industry in Norway supports the improvement of underwater autonomous systems by providing funds for the development of appropriate technologies. [50]

Today, mine action is the main type of mission for autonomous underwater systems in Norway. The Navy is convinced of the value of such systems as REMUS manufactured by Hydroid and HUGIN, developed by FFI. Representatives of the submarine fleet, by contrast, are less interested in autonomous vehicles. Based on existing experience, the FFI is considering additional possibilities for the use of APA in the future, for example, for intelligence gathering, anti-submarine warfare, underwater camouflage. By the year 2025, the mine action service of the Norwegian Navy will gradually decommission specialized surface ships and replace them with mobile groups of autonomous vehicles ready to launch from various platforms. It is currently under discussion whether submarines should be equipped with built-in modules with autonomous vehicles. [51]

Future sea conflicts

In the context of the redistribution of the world order, competition in the field of freedom of navigation and access to strategically important territories is growing. Countries such as Russia, China and Iran are responding to the almost unlimited possibilities of the United States to project force around the globe by building on the capabilities of A2 / AD, as well as advancing narratives that legitimize their actions in the public field. As a result, the nature of marine areas changes as systemic risks increase — ideas about basic rules, norms and principles begin to diverge, leading to a “balkanization” of the marine environment, while various zones of influence in the sea expand to the detriment of the global nature of water areas. This is important because the marine environment is an important artery of the global economy, facilitating international trade. In addition, the strategic importance of coastal zones is growing due to trends such as a changing demographic environment and growing urbanization — all of which are taking place against the backdrop of the need for global interconnections in these important, but vulnerable areas. Thus, the image of new conflicts at sea appears:

The marine environment is becoming increasingly congested as coastal urbanization is expanding, and the number of state and non-state actors is increasing, using the sea for various purposes. Water congestion means that it will be difficult for the armed forces to avoid collisions with the enemy, especially when they expand the buffer zones through the implementation of the A2 / AD concept. Consequently, operations become more risky. This increases the need for new weapons systems such as unmanned, which can be taken on these risks, in order to avoid contact with the enemy and go to another area.
Overloaded seaways also mean a growing randomness of movement, which plays into the hands of those who want to escape. This, in turn, requires a clear distinction between those who use identification systems (“transponders”) and those who deliberately avoid detection. Consequently, there is a growing need for data sharing and cooperation between countries and various departments. This should be developed at the inter-regional level, as well as include various media - thus, it will be possible to resist the enemy’s hybrid actions.

Digital interconnection also reinforces the effects of congested and chaotic water areas. Communication is an important factor for sea and submarine forces united into a single network, since the value of each sensor or reconnaissance equipment is determined by its degree of integration into the C4ISR common network — command, control, communications, computers, reconnaissance, surveillance, and reconnaissance. However, it is also the Achilles heel of network-centric forces, since the lack of interconnection can significantly reduce the effectiveness of the operation or even lead to its collapse. This is very important, since non-state actors have recently demonstrated the successful use of low-cost technologies and independently developed methods in order to qualitatively increase their interconnection capabilities.
All this implies that in the future the marine environment will become a place of even greater rivalry. According to researcher Krepinevich, the arms race in the field of powerful radar and sensors will lead to the emergence of “neutral territories”, where only “opportunities for long-range reconnaissance and long-range strikes of the two countries will intersect”. As the facts show, this process is already taking place, as the advanced A2 / AD systems combine underwater sensors, underwater platforms, as well as surface ships with air defense, coastal, space-based systems, as well as operations in cyberspace. This combination increases the risk of loss during a potential intrusion. However, it can also provoke the frequent use of unmanned weapon systems in order to overcome the problem of high losses.

Finally, the naval forces of NATO and European Union member states will have to follow the rules of combat, which are subject to close political control. The proportionality of the means used and the need to publicly justify every action may create more restrictions for these naval forces than for actors who are not limited to such things. In the conditions of increasing chaos and congestion of water areas, new job descriptions will be required, which will help to avoid collateral damage in the sea and under water. In addition, it is necessary to introduce requirements for control by personnel over unmanned and autonomous systems, as well as to control the interaction at the level of "machine-machine".
All of these trends will change future requirements for maritime weapons systems. Due to the future ubiquity of new types of sensors in the maritime field, secrecy, cyber security, disguise and deception will become important. An increasing number of free-floating smart sensors and autonomous platforms will need to be integrated into the common maritime architecture of C4ISR, which, in turn, should be easily connected to similar systems in other water areas. If you do not use new methods of protection and defense, A2 / AD will increase the risk for today's high-value infrastructure, ships and ships, which is likely to lead to the need to use the concept of "distributed capabilities" (when platform X has limited capabilities and to perform the task platform Y, which is capable of this). It can also reduce today's focus on multi-purpose platforms on highly specialized platforms that can operate in “smart swarms”. Therefore, all elements of the future network naval surface forces and submarine forces must be more flexible, easily integrated and ready to be connected to each other even when they are in different environments.

For autonomous systems, this is a kind of litmus paper - or the waters of the future will be too difficult a threat, especially if opponents use the interconnectedness of systems as a digital “Achilles heel”; or it will be the main driver for the development of autonomous systems. In any case, it appears that autonomous systems of the future will have to become much more flexible, respond to unforeseen situations more quickly and without prior approval, have improved self-defense capabilities and be able to withstand enemy unmanned systems. All this greatly increases the requirements for future autonomous devices.

Underwater autonomous vehicles: motives, drivers and value added

The future of maritime conflicts, which was described above, is likely to change how we see the underwater environment, which is already seen today as a three-dimensional battlefield. Currently, the underwater waters are saturated in terms of weapons systems used. Therefore, FHGs embedded in this complex environment must provide added value beyond the limits of existing systems in order to create advantages that fleets and submarines convince of the necessity and usefulness of autonomous underwater systems. This determines the main operational and strategic motives for using the unit (see the Table 2):

Operational motives

The most important operational motive is to eliminate existing gaps in capabilities with unmanned systems, as discussed above in the case of the US Navy. Secondly, operational motives also stem from the principles that embody key military paradigms of the Navy. Using BPA in accordance with key principles such as power savings, flexibility, and surprise will multiply the navy. [52] As discussed in the next section on military innovation, using BPA will also require the naval forces to rethink how they prepare and conduct missions with autonomous vehicles. The third group of motives is a consequence of the specifics of underwater operations. As the initial concepts of the US Navy show, sensors installed on the FHG that will interact with submarines can significantly increase existing capabilities, since it will be possible to monitor events in the submarine of interest without the presence of the submarine itself. In addition, individual BPA sensors can approach the target without endangering the mother platform. In the future concept of the underwater A2 / AD, proximity to the target should be considered as the main requirement for the unit.

2 table. Primary and secondary motives for the development of underwater autonomous systems in various countries

Strategic motives

First of all, the key is the concept of risk. In this regard, the BAS has both advantages and disadvantages, since they can both reduce the risks and take them upon themselves. It is not yet clear whether state and non-state actors will interpret the use of autonomous vehicles as a danger, which may worsen geostrategic stability. Secondly, given the limited financial resources of most Western naval forces, cost reduction is another strategic motive. However, it is a double-edged sword. For example, China takes a different approach to costs: for it, low costs are considered to be a competitive advantage over various players, including in terms of supply to export markets. [53] Thirdly, the increase in strength is the main strategic incentive for actors who have a shortage of staff. Fourthly, the armed forces believe in the value of comparative analysis and therefore want to follow "best in class" examples. But, as will be shown below, this can also impair strategic freedom of action. Fifthly, the reverse side of the comparative analysis is a general concern about lagging behind others, defeat in technological advances. It can also provoke naval forces in various countries to explore the benefits of autonomous underwater vehicles. Finally, developing countries are showing growing interest in building powerful national defense industries and entering international defense markets. [54] In this respect, autonomous vehicles operating in different environments are very attractive because barriers to entry into this segment tend to be lower than other, more difficult segments.

In practice, the answers to all these motifs are strongly intertwined with two key questions: “What do the naval forces want to do with BPA?” And “how do they intend to perform the corresponding tasks?”. In view of the potentially breakthrough BPA character, the second question is more important, because it is here that the naval forces need to invent new conceptual approaches. Today, most Western fleets and military forces are generally focused on using autonomous systems in “dirty, routine and / or dangerous” missions. Although this is reasonable from the point of view of risk reduction, such an approach deprives the autonomy of its full potential, since existing concepts and tactics remain largely unchallenged. To go beyond the usual thinking about underwater autonomy, various ways of using autonomous systems are needed: [55]

Autonomous systems, which can be deployed around the clock to patrol large areas of water areas, increase the range of naval forces. The same applies to advanced deployed weapons systems that will be activated upon request in the future, for example, by DARPA's Upward Falling Payload program. [56] If autonomous systems could help deploy such weapon systems behind the enemy’s A2 / AD wall, they could would allow allied forces to use the effect of surprise and thereby neutralize enemy defenses.
It is expected that future Navy will correspond to other types of armed forces in respect of long-range sensors. Therefore, it becomes more important to take risks. Unmanned systems could help the Allied naval forces to take greater risks by suppressing, deceiving and destroying enemy intelligence systems, thereby increasing their maneuvering capabilities.
If the naval forces are ready for greater risk, they will most likely not want to put their most expensive weapons systems at risk. The naval forces need systems that they are willing to lose. Therefore, cheap, single-purpose, autonomous systems that can be used in groups are likely to lead to the fact that the mass character will again become an important characteristic of future naval forces. [57] This can lead to ideas such as creating a “barrier from sensors” on large surface and submarine areas, which will help deter enemy submarines from entering strategic areas by setting up noise interference, improving underwater detection, and providing localization data for anti-submarine control oh borboyrazmeschennyh in other environments.
Swarms can also lead to a new division of labor. The distribution of opportunities in the swarm may mean that some elements are responsible for the observation, while others provide protection, and another group focuses on the performance of the main task of the swarm. At the same time, the naval forces will deviate from the traditional approach to the use of multipurpose platforms, which is becoming increasingly risky given the threat of A2 / AD.

Military Innovation: What Literature Says

The extent to which the use of unmanned and autonomous underwater vehicles changes the nature of underwater combat operations is of great importance for the future picture of the maritime conflict. The mere fact that these devices are available is not yet a military innovation. [58] Military innovations are the result of a complex interaction between operational needs and conceptual, cultural, organizational and technological changes. This interaction is the concept of a revolution in military affairs (WFD), which describes various innovations, such as the new land war during the French and Industrial revolutions (for example, telegraph communication, railway transport and artillery weapon), tactics of general arms and operations in the First World War; or Blitzkrieg in World War II. [59] Digital technologies and network-centricity, caused by the emergence of new information and communication technologies, formed the basis of the network war, which, in turn, set the stage for today's discussion of the unhindered integration of various types of armed forces in all relevant areas. [60]

Figure 1. Elements of military innovation.

In fig. 1 summarizes the factors discussed in the literature that help to understand military innovations in the context of underwater autonomy — the interaction between threats, safety culture and operating experience describes the “humanitarian” aspects of military innovation, while the interactions between technologies, organizational complexity and the need for resources constitute “technical” Aspects. True military innovations require both dimensions, since conceptual, cultural, organizational, and technical progress does not develop at the same pace. [61]

“Humanitarian” innovations

As Adamski notes, “the relationship between technology and military innovation ... lies on the social plane,” which means that “the weapons that are being developed, and the kind of armed forces that foresees it, are cultural products in the deepest sense.” [62 ] The American concept of LDUUV, which imitates the role and functions of an aircraft carrier, perfectly illustrates the point of view of Adamsky. In addition, social values ​​are important determinants of the types of wars that the state leads, and the concepts and technologies that it uses to do this. [63] Together, these elements constitute a military culture that is defined as “the identity, norms and values ​​that are accepted by the military organization and reflect how the organization sees the world, as well as its role and functions in the world. ”[64] The military organizational culture formed in peacetime, Murray argues,“ determines how effectively [armed ly] ​​will adapt to real hostilities. ”[65] In this regard, military organizations are mostly conservative in nature, protecting the status quo from changes in how they are formed and what their tasks are, as well as how financial resources are distributed. [66] All these aspects may be required in order to fully utilize the advantages of unmanned systems.

Reflections on the role of culture should also take into account the perception of threats and combat experience, but the impact of these two additional aspects on innovation is ambiguous. In general, the extent of the required changes in the armed forces depends on: (i) the scale of changes in the relevant conditions; (ii) the impact of these changes on military objectives and capabilities; and (iii) the willingness of the armed forces to cope with these changes and as a result of changing tasks and capabilities. Geostrategic changes can spur military innovation because they can induce countries to change their values ​​if the stakes are high enough. [67] However, additional aspects such as age of the organization, which is a critical factor, affect the willingness to change, as older organizations resist change. [68] In addition, combat experience can increase cultural resistance, since the military is “more committed to the ideas of the past than preparing for the future.” [69] This is about snyaet why the armed forces tend to use unmanned systems in the same way as the manned platform, existing in service, because the same military and develop tactics, techniques and procedures for their use.

This raises the following question: can state (or non-state) actors gain operational benefits from the use of unmanned and autonomous systems of strategic importance? Again, the literature speaks of the predominance of conservative forces. First, those who use innovation first can take advantage of their rivals, but according to Horowitz, the relative benefits are “inversely proportional to the rate of diffusion of innovations.” [70] This suggests that waiting can benefit latecomers , as the availability of additional information shows what the risk associated with military innovation is worth. As a result, this leads to the appearance of similar counterparts, since competitors analyze the choice of their opponents and use similar weapons systems. [71] This suggests, firstly, that "dominant actors receive less relative benefits from new technologies." [72] What, in turn, may affect their willingness to adopt new technologies. Secondly, developing countries are also not at risk. When it comes to adopting new, untested technologies, they are likely to imitate their rivals if “the search for their innovations turns out to be costly compared to imitations, there is little information about the effectiveness of alternative innovations; and if the estimated risks of failing to imitate another state outweigh the tangible benefits of using new, but risky technology. ”[73]

"Technological" innovation

Technology is an important driver for military organizations. The main problem today is that key technologies no longer arise in the traditional military-industrial complex, but rather in commercial ecosystems. This raises the question of the integration of commercially developed technologies into the military sphere. In this regard, military innovation depends on three different aspects: (i) organizations, (ii) resources, and (iii) concepts. Organizations and resources are directly related. Based on Horowitz’s ideas, military innovations spread less quickly if they require intensive organizational changes and consume large resources. [74] This has at least two consequences for the use of unmanned and autonomous systems:

First, the introduction of unmanned and autonomous systems, similar to those already in operation, for example, using similar concepts of operations, will reduce the barriers to acceptance. However, this may be detrimental to innovation, since the armed forces will continue to do the same, only by other means.
Secondly, unmanned and autonomous systems that violate the status quo are likely to lead to changes on the battlefield. This can lead to operational advantages, but also risks not cope with the adoption of armed forces. [75]

The extent to which military organizations will take innovation depends on how they think about them. Their way of thinking, in turn, depends on several factors, such as the access of relevant actors to sources of power in the political and military establishment, the way these actors use their institutional weight to promote their own ideas in innovation and the degree of cooperation or competition between various military departments. [76] In addition, aspects of career growth are important. Effective military organizations encourage people based on individual effectiveness and merit. Thus, it is important how much the soldier’s ability to handle unmanned and autonomous systems is considered as a special skill that needs to be rewarded, as it sends positive signals to the troops. [77]

Finally, all this suggests that in order for technology to have a long-term impact on military and naval innovations, it must be properly integrated into military concepts and regulations. It is relatively easy to acquire technology, but much more difficult to adapt accordingly. Decision makers need to be careful to balance urgent requirements with long-term needs, so that the military develops a balanced “portfolio of capabilities”, complemented by the advantages of autonomous and unmanned systems.


Military innovations resulting from the interaction between operational needs, concepts, cultural and institutional frameworks and technological progress are very resource intensive. Autonomous systems can contribute to innovation in submarine warfare, as they allow fleets to overcome potential lag, expand the range of tasks and act more boldly. The extent to which the FHG will change the pace and dynamics of the submarine warfare and, thus, affect regional stability depends on the concepts that the naval forces use to operate these devices. So far, there has been no progress, since conservative forces prevail.

None of the countries analyzed in this article was able to develop innovations in three areas - conceptual, cultural and organizational changes. Consequently, today there are first-degree innovations that have been achieved with underwater autonomy - they closely reflect existing concepts and existing platforms. Thus, the FHG initially replaced the manned platforms, but traditional tactics, methods and procedures remain largely unchanged. Innovations of the second degree would mean that the naval forces began to use BPA in a way that would be different from the current use of underwater platforms, or that BPA would be entrusted with tasks that are not currently intended for manned platforms. This can lead to serious innovations that will make changes to existing tasks, platforms or technologies. However, this will require that the naval forces embark on radical conceptual and organizational changes that currently do not exist. Instead, the current tasks of the FPA are developed in accordance with the literature on military innovations. Mine action was a key challenge, since the operational requirements of the Navy are reduced to reducing risk (for example, protecting the divers of the demining group) and increasing efficiency (for example, regarding the search for marine minefields). As a result, special operations concepts (CONOPS) emerged, which, in turn, prompted suppliers to develop individual technologies.

If fleets want to innovate underwater operations using autonomous systems, you need to go further. Three aspects are of particular importance:

First, if the Navy wants to expand the range of use of the unit, they need to develop new tasks that serve as role models. This requires that they replace today's technological advances with a much stronger focus on concepts that illustrate how to gain operational advantages through submarine autonomy. This will require fleets, industry and scientists to develop a more modular approach to understanding the combat system. This approach will define different modules, ready for use in specific tasks. The approach also illustrates the conceptual, cultural, organizational and technological changes that are necessary to perform the relevant tasks. The iterative approach [78] to development can also help overcome barriers to the adoption of the FHP, as this will help mitigate the effects of marine threats.

Three major geopolitical players, namely the United States, Russia and China, are going to develop and deploy BPA. This suggests that different role models may arise: each country tries to back up its ideas with concepts, compatibility requirements, and BPA exports. In the long run, this could lead to the collapse of the current, mainly underwater combat regime in the United States, if Russia and China develop elements that match their specific concepts of submarine warfare.

Secondly, it is necessary to get a better understanding of the situation, since underwater autonomy is not just the use of a standalone platform. Rather, it reinforces the need for a network approach that integrates all platforms and sensors operating in the underwater environment, and for their integration with platforms operating in other environments. Multi-media autonomy as one of the key ideas for future military action will reinforce the need for modular and scalable approaches based on open architecture and open standards rather than final solutions. To this end, naval and other types of forces should create expert groups that will jointly consider the implications of using autonomous systems to address such key issues as concept development, research and development, procurement and operational deployment.
Finally, unlike autonomous air systems, the unit must be delivered to the area where the operations are carried out. As long as the unit is dependent on submarines or surface platforms, platform-oriented thinking is likely to dominate other concepts using the unit. A key question arises: do BPA adapt to submarines and land platforms, or do these platforms adapt to deploy BPA? [79] The naval and industry must come together to address this issue, since tomorrow’s platforms will have to offer much more options for deployment . This, in turn, will determine the design beyond existing solutions, such as torpedo tubes or payload modules for submarines.

[1] For details, see:

[2] Kelley Sayler, A World of Proliferated Drones: A Technology Primer (Washington, DC: CNAS, 2015), p. 5.

[3] In this paper, autonomous systems are defined as systems capable of selecting and performing tasks without prior installation by a human operator. This understanding is somewhat different from the definition proposed by Paul Scharre and Michael C. Horowitz, Anon in Weapon Systems (Washington, DC: CNAS, 2015), p. 16.

[4] Marcel Dickow, Robotik: ein Game-Changer für Militär und Sicherheitspolitik (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2015), p. 23 – 24; Scharre and Horowitz, Weapon Systems, p. 3.

[5] Breakthrough innovations are related to accomplished conceptual, organizational, and technological changes that can drastically change the nature of submarine warfare. See also: Tai Ming Cheung, Thomas G. Mahnken, and Andre L. Ross, "Frameworks for Analyzing Chinese Defense and Military Innovation", in Tai Ming Cheung (ed.), Forging China's Military Might. A New Framework for Assessing Innovation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), p. Xnumx

[6] We use the term “unmanned underwater vehicles” (BPA) as an umbrella definition for autonomous underwater vehicles (APA) and remotely operated underwater vehicles (DPA).

[7] Joint Operational Access Concept (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2009)

[8] US Global Power Projection Capacity Strategy (Exploding US Long-Term Advantages for Restore) (Washington, DC: CSBA, 2014), pp. 33 – 37

[9] A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (Washington, DC: US ​​Navy, 2015), pp. 19 – 26

[10] Bryan Clark, The Emerging Era In Undersea Warfare (Washington, DC: CSBA, 2014)

[11] Martinage, Toward a New Offset Strategy, p. Xnumx

[12] William J. Rogers, “Be Prepared for Maritime Drones,” Proceedings 141: 10 (October 2015), p. Xnumx

[13] Robert O. Work, “At the CNAS Inaugural National Security Forum,“ Washington, DC, 14 December 2015,

[14] The Navy Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) Master Plan (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2004), pp. 9-15

[15] From an interview with the authors of the report, Washington, 28 April 2015

[16] Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013 – 2038 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2013), p. Xnumx

[17] Megan Eckstein and Sam LaGrone, “Retired Brig. Gen Frank Keley, NN for Unmanned Systems, US Secretary General of the United States of America, 27 October 2015, -first-ever-deputy-assistant-secretary-of-the-navy-for-unmanned-systems

[18] For more on this, see in particular the DARPA website for special projects such as Tactical Undersea Network Architectures (TUNA), Forward Deployed Energy Navigation (POSYDON), Forward Deployed Energy and Communications Outpost (FDECO), and Upward Falling Payloads (UFP),

[19] Bryan Clark, “Game Changers: Undersea Warfare,” 27, warfaregame-changers /

[20] Kris Osborn, "Navy to deploy first underwater from submarines,", 13 April 2015, -first-underwater-drones-from-submarines.html

[21] John Keller, “Raytheon and DARPA Consider Deploying Unmanned Air and Marine Vehicles from Fighter Aircraft,” Military & Aerospace, 23 April 2014,

[22] “Russian Federation Doctrine,” Press Release, 26 July 2015,; 683 December, 21,

[23] Matthew Bodner, “New Russian Naval Doctrine Enshrines Confrontation with NATO,” The Moscow Times, 27 July 2015, /526277.html

[24] Dmitry Boltenkov, “Russian Nuclear Submarine Fleet,” Moscow Defense Brief, 6 / 2014, pp. 18 – 22

[25] The Russian Navy still does not make a clear distinction between autonomous and remotely-controlled underwater vehicles

[26] Interview by Heiko Borchert, Moscow, 26; August 2015; Nikolai Novichkov, “Russian Naval Doctrine Looks to the Future,” Jane's Defense Weekly, 19 August 2015, p. 24 – 25

[27] Interview by Heiko Borchert, Moscow, 26; August 2015; “Robots, Drones to Boost Russian 5th Nuclear Nuclear Subs' Arsenal”, RT, 15 December 2014,

[28] Interview by Heiko Borchert, Moscow, 26 August 2015; Dave Majumdar, “Russia vs. America: The Race for Underwater Spy Drones, 21 January 2016,

[29] "Diplomat says China wouldn’t be world leaders if needed," Reuters, 23 Januar 2017,

[30] Julian Borger, "Chinese warship seizes US underwater drone in international waters," The Guardian, 16 December 2016

[31] Ely Ratner et. al., More Willing and Able: Charting China's International Security Activism (Washington, DC: CNAS, 2015)

[32] China's Military Strategy (Beijing: Beijing; 2015),

[33] From an interview with the authors of the report, Washington, 28 April 2015

[34] China's Military Strategy, op. cit.

[35] Ratner, More Willing and Able; Yves-Heng Lim China's Naval Power. An Offensive Realist Approach (Surrey: Ashgate, 2014, p. 165; Ronald O'Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for US Navy Capabilities - Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: CRS, 2016)

[36] Ratner, More Willing and Able; Yves-Heng Lim China's Naval Power. An Offensive Realist Approach (Surrey: Ashgate, 2014, p. 165; Ronald O'Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for US Navy Capabilities - Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: CRS, 2016)

[37] Michael S. Chase, Kristen Gunness, Lyle J. Morris, Samuel K. Berkowitz, and Benjamin Purser, Emerging Trends, Unmanned Systems (Santa Monica: RAND, 2015)

[38] This opinion was expressed by retired General Xu Guangyu in an interview with CCTV-4, 14 in March 2013. Interview with the authors of the report, Washington, April 28 2015

[39] Interview with Report Authors, Washington, April 28 2015

[40] Chase, Emerging Trends in China, Development of Unmanned Systems, pp. 2 – 3; Interview by the authors, Washington, DC, 16 July 2015; Jeffrey Lin and PW Singer, “Exhibit Shows Off Sea Drones: The Great Underwater Wallpapers”: “Eastern Arsenal, 22 June 2016, -seadrones

[41] Jeffrey Lin and PW Singer, “Not a Shark, But a Robot: Chinese University Tests Long-Range Unmanned Mini Sub,” Eastern Arsenal, 4 June 2014, eastern-arsenal / not-shark-robot-chinese-university-tests-long-range-unmannedmini-sub

[42] Interview by Heiko Borchert, Singapore, 20 May 2015; Swee Lean Collin Koh, “The Little Navy in Southeast Asia”: The Small Navies. Strategy and Policy for War and Peace, ed. Michael Mulqueen, Deborah Sanders, and Ian Speller (Surrey: Ashgate, 2014), pp. 117 – 132; “Singapore Proposes Framework for Submarine Operations Safety,” Channel News Asia, 21 May 2015,

[43] Interviews by Heiko Borchert, Singapore, 20 May 2015

[44] Ibid.

[45] Given Singapore’s general focus on technological maturity, it can be assumed that its authorities would like to closely monitor what steps are being taken by more experienced countries in developing BPA (such as the United States) before taking their own measures.

[46] Jermyn Chow, “Unmanned Systems Make a Splash at the Maritime Show,” The Straits Times, 19 May 2011, p. 4; Ridzwan Rahmat, “Singapore Unleashes Its Autonomous Underwater Platform for MCM Operations,” Jane's International Defense Review (June 2014), pp. 34 – 35; Yong Han Going and Su Ying Audrey Lam, “Delivering New Mine Countermeasures for the RSN,” DSTA Horizons (Singapore: DSTA, 2015), pp. 30 – 35

[47] Stale Ulriksen, Balancing Act: Norwegian Security Policy, Strategy and Military Posture (Stockholm: Stockholm Free World Forum, 2013)

[48] Interview by Heiko Borchert, Oslo, 27; October; 2015; Norwegian Armed Forces in Transition (Oslo: Norwegian Armed Forces, 2015), p. 19; Capable and Sustainable: Long Term Defense Plan (Oslo: Norwegian Ministry of Defense, 2016), p. Xnumx

[49] Interview by Heiko Borchert, Oslo, 27; October; 2015; Germany, Ministry of Defense Press Release No. 8 / 2017, 3 February 2017,

[50] Interviews by Heiko Borchert, Oslo, 26 – 27 October 2015

[51] Interviews by Heiko Borchert, Oslo, 26 – 27 October 2015 and 31 May 2016

[52] For example, see UK Defense Doctrine. Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01 (Shrivenham: Ministry of Defense Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Center, 2014), pp. 50 – 51.

[53] Authors Interview, Washington, 28, April 2015.

[54] Heiko Borchert, “Rising Challengers: Ambitious New Defense Exporters Are Reshaping International Defense Trade,” European Security & Defense (February 2015), pp. 61-64.

[55] Authors Interview, Washington, DC, 28 April 2015; Paul Scharre, Robotics on the Battlefield. Part I. Range, Persistence and Daring (Washington, DC: CNAS, 2014); Paul Sharre, Robotics on the Battlefield. Part II: The Coming Swarm (Washington, DC: CNAS, 2014).

[56] (12 access in January 2017).

[57] Shawn Brimley, Ben Fitzgerald and Kelley Sayler, Game Changers. Disruptive Technology and US Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: CNAS, 2013, p. 19.

[58] Like Andrew Ross, we define military innovation as “changes in how the military prepares for, leads and wars.” See Andrew L. Ross, On Military Innovation: Toward an Analytical Framework. CITC Policy Brief No. 1 (San Diego: California Institute on Conflict and Cooperation, 2010), p. 1, (access 12 January 2017).

[59] Williamson Murray and MacGregor Know, “Thinking about Revolutions in Warfare,” 1300-2000, ed. Macgregor Knox and Williamson Murray (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 13; Tai Ming Cheung, Thomas G. Mahnken, and Andrew L. Ross, China's Military Might. A New Framework for Assessing Innovation, ed. Tai Ming Cheung (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), pp. 15 – 46; Michael Raska, Military Innovation in Small States: Creating a Reverse Asymmetry (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016).

[60] David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein, Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority (Washington, DC: CCRP, 2002); Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, “Military Transformation in NATO: A Framework for Analysis,” in A Transformation Gap? American Innovations and European Military Change, ed. Terry Terriff, Frans Osinga, and Theo Farrell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), pp. 1 – 13; Raska, Military Innovation in Small States, pp. 28 – 58.

[61] Ross, On Military Innovation, p. 4.

[62] Dima Adamsky, The United States of America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), p. 10.

[63] Interview by the authors, Washington, DC, 15 July 2015; Brimley, FitzGerald and Sayler, Game Changers, p. 12; Scharre, Robotics on the Battlefield. Part I, pp. 35 – 37.

[64] Theo Farrell's definition, quoted by Raska, Military Innovation in Small States, p. 4.

[65] Williamson Murray, Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 309.

[66] Michael C. Horowitz, The Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), p. 38.

[67] Interview by the authors, Washington, DC, 15 July 2015; Raska, Military Innovation in Small States, pp. 197 – 200; Jeffrey A. Isaacson, Christopher Layne, and John Arquilla, Predicting Military Innovation (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007), pp. 4, 12 – 13.

[68] Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power, p. 38.

[69] Murray, Military Adaptation in War, p. 3.

[70] Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power, p. 50.

[71] Ibid. pp. 20 – 21.

[72] Brimley, FitzGerald, and Sayler, Game Changers, p. 11.

[73] Yu-Ming Liou, Paul Musgrave, and J. Furman Daniel, “Imitation Game: Why Militaries More ?,” The Washington Quarterly, 38: 3 (Fall 2015), p. 159.

[74] Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power, pp. 8 – 12.

[75] Interview by the authors, Washington, DC, 16 July 2015; Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power, pp. 14 – 15.

[76] Raska, Military Innovation in Small States; Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation; Thomas Jäger and Kai Opermann, “Bürokratie- und organization of theheoretische Analysen der Sicherheitspolitik: Vom 11. September zum Irakkrieg, ”in Methoden der sicherheitspolitischen Analyze, ed. Alexander Siedschlag (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006), pp. 105 – 134.

[77] Cailtin Talmadge, The Dictator's Army. Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes (Ithaca / London: Cornell University Press, 2015), p. 13 – 15; PW Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century (New York: The Penguin Press, 2009), p. 253.

[78] The iterative approach (eng. Iteration - “repetition”) is the performance of work in parallel with the continuous analysis of the results obtained and the adjustment of the previous stages of work. The project with this approach in each phase of development passes a recurring cycle: Planning - Implementation - Verification - Evaluation (approx. Lane).

[79] Also see Megan Eckstein, NNMXs, USNI, 2020 October 31, 10 / navy-seeking-uv-advances-to-field-today-to-inform-ssnx-design-in-31s (accessed by 2020 January 12).

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    CYBERNINJA 26 March 2017 16: 41
    Underwater robotics is needed. Space has been mastered, now you can tackle the oceans ...
  2. water
    water 26 March 2017 19: 09
    Good article! The modern capabilities of unmanned underwater systems, in other words uninhabited autonomous and tethered underwater vehicles, are quite intelligibly presented. It should be noted that the possibilities are not as wide as we would like. Of course, in the performance of programmable tasks, such as the protection of the water area, the study of hydrology along a given route, taking soil samples or the detonation of some well-defined object in a given search area, these uninhabited underwater vehicles are quite capable of these tasks. But imagine the situation: the open sea, bottom soil, and an optical fiber cable stretches along it. At one end of the cable sits one high-seated terrorist poise, at the other end of the cable sits a second, about the same. And they are busy with negotiations on how to do a damn thing to us! “They agree on their vile plans for place, time and forces involved.” And our uninhabited underwater vehicle is spinning over this cable. It’s spinning, but it can’t do anything! Unless this cable, its bite, which is called a monipulator, has a bite. So after all, then the adversary will suspect something was wrong, a gust of cable will begin to search - the connection will be disconnected! Another thing is if this underwater vehicle, a robot-cut, diver calls for help. A diver will come, put the boat over the cable, blow it with inert gas, remove the harness from the feed, and sing the clutch into the cable. The second cable will be connected to the coupling. And the underwater vehicle, the second end of this cable, will be delivered to the very top anti-terrorist headquarters. Here he will connect his most important anti-terrorist phone to this cable and will listen, and even see, everything that the terrorist popuites are plotting!
    What am I doing !? - Yes, all the same. Underwater uninhabited vehicle, it is something to find, something to break off, or completely break apart much. But to modernize something, or to rebuild it underwater again, here we cannot do without a deep-sea diver for another 30. But deep-water divers we just do not have. And what is, it’s only for a “tick”.
  3. Rabinowicz
    Rabinowicz 26 March 2017 20: 51
    It is necessary to study making apparatuses.
    Since the time of Jacques Yves Cousteau, no one has done so tightly with the oceans. at least I haven’t seen anything like it.