The defeat of the 2 th Russian army in Prussia

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One of the most famous episodes of the First World War was the defeat of the 2 units of the Russian army during the East Prussian operation. This battle went into history like the battle of Tannenberg (26 - 30 August 1914 of the year).

20 August The 8-I German army under the command of Colonel-General Pritvits was defeated in the battle of Gumbin from the 1 of the Russian army. On August 21, the main parts of the 2 of the Russian army under the command of General Alexander Vasilievich Samsonov crossed the German border. It should be noted that the headquarters of the army was assembled “with peace of mind”, since the headquarters of the Warsaw District became the headquarters of the North-Western Front, and the headquarters of the Vilna District — the headquarters of the 1 Army. The commander appointed A. V. Samsonov (1859 - 30 August 1914). Samsonov was a member of the Russian-Turkish war 1877-1878, he showed himself well in the Japanese campaign, commanding the Ussurian cavalry brigade and the Siberian Cossack division. But most of his career was associated with staff and administrative posts, so, from 1896, he was head of the Elisavetgrad cavalry cadet school, from 1906 - head of the Warsaw military district, from 1907 was the ataman of the Don Army, with 1909 - - Governor-General and Commander of the Turkestan Military District. In addition, since March 1909, he was also the ataman of the Semirechensky Cossack Army. Samsonov had asthma and was treated in Pyatigorsk in 1914. In the process of mobilization activities, they recalled that Samsonov was the head of the headquarters of the Warsaw District, and he was assigned command of the army. Although his "ceiling" was the command of the cavalry division. He could not help him, adjust the activities and the commander of the front - Yakov Grigorievich Zhilinsky, who before the war held headquarters and administrative posts, was engaged in military research activities, was a military diplomat.

In the second army there were 5 corps (1 st army corps, 6 st AK, 13 st AK, 15 st AK, 23 st AK), they had 12,5 infantry and 3 cavalry divisions. Army units were deployed from left to right along the Mlava-Myshinets line: 1 Corps, 15 and Part of the 23 Corps, 13, 6 Corps. It must be said that initially the army was stronger - it had 7 corps (14,5 infantry and 4 cavalry divisions), but a number of units were recalled to form the 9 army, and the 2 AK transferred the 1 army. This weakened the strike power of the 2 Army. In addition, it was difficult to redeploy subunits to this sector of the front — the railroad approached only the left flank of the army, units had to make long marches before the outbreak of war.

According to the plans of command, the 2-I army was to cut off the troops of the 8-th German army from the Vistula, the Germans wanted to take to the "boiler". Rennenkampf’s 1 Army was doing well, so that the defeated German army did not run away at all, he was ordered to stop. And 2 th army customized. The parts walked along the 12 clock, farther and farther from the rear. By 23 August 1 AK General Leonid Konstantinovich Artamonov occupied the border town of Zoldau. As already mentioned, there was a railway on the left flank, and other units were gathered here - the infantry division from the 23 corps, two cavalry divisions, and artillery. Samsonov reassigned them to Artamonov, as a result, the left flank was strengthened, while other directions were weakened. To the right of the 1 AK, the 2 Infantry Division of I. Mingin from the 23 AK attacked, it lagged behind the main forces, but overtook the 1 AK. The 15 Army Corps of Nikolai Nikolaevich Martos penetrated into the center, deep into enemy territory. The 15 Corps defeated the German division 37 in the border battle and occupied the city of Neidenburg. Then the 13 AK under the command of Nikolay Nikolayevich Klyuev moved, he advanced in the direction of Allenstein. On the right flank, an Alexander Alexandrovich Blagoveshchensky 6 corps advanced. Army headquarters lagged behind the advancing formations on 120 km, while in Ostrolenka, where there was a telephone line connecting the headquarters with Belostok (front headquarters).

Not all corps commanders were "combat officers." Artamonov was more of a military diplomat, intelligence officer, “general for errands”; during the Russian-Japanese war, Kuropatkin tried to remove him from office for panic and retreat when the enemy attacked. Klyuev was the “general for instructions”, Blagoveshchensky was also considered a “civilian”. The real battle commander was Martos. The 15 and 13 corps that advanced in the center were considered well-prepared combat units. 6-th corps (right flank) was a "team", created from spare parts.

The big mistake of the Russian command was the fact that intelligence was not organized at all. They used the data that were transmitted from the headquarters of the North-Western Front (and the headquarters of Zhilinsky himself did not know much). Samsonov aggravated the situation by deciding to turn troops to the north-west, fearing that the Germans would leave. And the front headquarters ordered the advance to the northeast, towards Rennenkampf's army. There was no telephone connection with the corps, the Germans destroyed the lines. Communication was held by radio (the Germans intercepted these messages), and more often by horse races, this led to a great delay in information. As a result, the corps were left to their own devices, having lost their unified command.

It should be noted that the Germans had a good intelligence situation, often local residents reported about Russian troops, it happened just by phone. As a result, the German command was well represented picture of the movement of the Russian army. In addition, the Germans were well prepared for the invasion - the supplies were removed, the hay burned, set fire to warehouses in Neidenburg.

First clash

23 August 15-th intelligence AK Martos found north of Neidenburg, near the villages of Orlau and Frankenau, German positions. There occupied the defense of 20 corps of General Scholz, reinforced landvernymi parts. In terms of numbers, it corresponded to two Russian corps: two infantry divisions, 1 reserve division, 1 landver division, 1 cavalry division, 2 landver brigades.

Orlau and Frankenau held two divisions with 16 artillery batteries. Martos deployed his units and, after the artillery preparation, attacked. Russian units broke into Orlau, but the Germans counterattacked and put a reserve into battle. The battle was fierce, one regiment was surrounded, but was able to break through to its own. In the morning, Martos regrouped his forces and resumed the offensive, according to the German positions identified, an artillery strike was inflicted. The infantry, still in the dark, crept up to the German positions and attacked in unison. The Germans could not stand it and fled. The 37 Infantry Division was completely defeated. About the fierceness of the battle they say the loss of 15 AK: 2,5 thousand people killed and wounded, including the 2 kombrig and 3 regiment.

Reports of defeats at Gumbinnen and Orlau caused panic in Germany. It was the result of an information campaign, which was carried out before the war, talking about the "Russian barbarians". Newspapers and other propaganda materials told about universal rape, murder of babies, etc. Berlin decided to transfer two and a half corps to the Eastern Front (Moltke originally thought even about 6 corps), replacing the command of the 8 Army with Hindenburg and Ludendorff.

At this time, the Russian command makes fatal mistakes. The command of the North-Western Front, having learned of the rapid retreat of the German troops in front of the front of the 1 Army, decided that the German command was withdrawing troops beyond the Vistula, and considered the operation completed. The main tasks for the 1 army were changed: the main forces of the Rennenkampf army were sent not to meet the 2 army, but to cut off Koenigsberg, where, according to Zhilinsky, a part of the 8 German army hid, and to pursue "retreating to the Vistula" the Germans. The commander of the 2 Army also decided to intercept the Germans "retreating to the Vistula" and insisted on shifting the main attack from the north-east to the north-west. As a result, the 1-I and 2-I armies began to attack in divergent directions, and a large gap was formed between them in 125 km. The headquarters also considered the operation in East Prussia to be largely completed and began to work out a plan for the offensive deep into Germany, so Zhilinsky was denied the reinforcement of the 2 Army by the Guards Corps.



German command plan, regrouping forces

After the initial plan failed (defeat the 1 army first, and then 2), the command of the 8 army before the arrival of Ludendorff and Hindenburg began to implement the new plan: break away from the 1 army and smash 2. In principle, this plan was worked out before the war.

For this there were infrastructure prerequisites. Three parallel railways passed through Prussia: along the sea through Marienburg and Königsberg, to the south, the road went through Osterode and Allenstein, and the third was at the border - passing through Zoldau and Neidenburg. The roads were connected by transverse branches.

Against the 1 Army, the 1,5 divisions of the Königsberg garrison, the 1 Cavalry Division, and the Landwehr Brigade left behind. All other troops - 11,5 divisions, concentrated against the 2-th Army of Samsonov. 1-th AK Francois sent to Königsberg, put in trains, and roundabout transferred to Marienburg, and from there to Soldold, on the left flank of the 2-th army. 1-th reserve AK Belova and 17-th AK Mackensen was taken to the right flank of the 2-th Russian army.

The question was whether it was worth taking a flank attack and simply pushing the Russian troops back or it was necessary to decide to arrange Cannes - to crush the flanks and surround the Russian army. The command of the 8 Army doubted that the encircling operation was very risky. If the 1 Army continued to move west, the German 8 Army faced the threat of total defeat. The head of the operations department of the headquarters, Max Hoffman, argued that there was no need to be afraid, it was necessary to act more decisively. Between the 1 and 2 armies there were 125 km, and the Rennenkampf army would not have been able to intervene with a quick strike. He even launched a bike saying that Rennenkampf would not help Samsonov, because he insulted him during the Japanese campaign - hit the face. So this myth began to walk in literature. But the decisive argument was the intercepted radiograms (they were not encrypted then). In them, the commander of the 1 Army notified Samsonov of his position, and spoke of the order of the commander of the 2 Army to continue the offensive.

The Germans decided to push back the flanking corps of the 2 Army and surround the units located in the center. In the center, in order to prevent Martos’s body from breaking through, they decided to reinforce 20 AK Scholz. He was assisted by the 1 backup and 1,5 landver divisions.

The defeat of the 2 th Russian army in Prussia

Max Hoffman.

On the way to defeat

Samsonov received news of the battle of Orlau only 24 August. At the same time, information came from 1 AK, that the enemy was accumulating on the left flank (trains with parts of Francois's 1 corps began to approach). The commander suggested that the front headquarters stop, tighten the rear, conduct additional reconnaissance. The front commander not only refused to do this, but also accused Samsonov of cowardice: “To see the enemy where there is none is cowardice, and I will not allow General Samsonov to be afraid. The commander of the 2 Army did not insist and discarded any caution. He confirmed the order to the troops - “forward” and decided to move the headquarters to Neidenburg. On the left flank, 15-I Cavalry Division of Lyubomirov, attached to 1 AK, captured the city of Uzdau. The 15 Corps, chasing the Germans, turned to the west, 13 AK, meeting no resistance, walked onto Allenstein. On the left flank, the 6 AK took Bischofsburg and wrapped it northeast. The corps continued to fan out on the 200 km front.

The position of the Scholz Corps, reinforced by the reserve and landwehr connections, was followed by the 2-I Mingen Infantry Division of the 23 AK. The division commander decided to attack the Germans on the move. The right wing of the division came successfully and wedged in the position of the enemy, but the left flank was defeated. The commander of 15 AK Martos learned about the battle and the appearance of the enemy and at the same time received an order to move to the northeast, to Hochstein. Thus, the corps substituted the rear of the enemy. Based on the situation, he ordered the main forces to turn to the west, he sent two regiments to Hochstein. Martos asked the commander of 13 AK Klyuev to help, and Samsonov offered to send the entire 13 corps to him in order to defeat the enemy. When fulfilling this plan, the enemy’s plan would have collapsed - the defeat of the Scholz corps could lead to the very difficult situation of the two German corps. Klyuev singled out Martos for one brigade.

Defeat 6 enclosure. At this time, the command of the front remembered and decided to assemble the corps. Oriented to the 13 AK, which had broken out ahead. He was ordered to move the 15 AK attacking from the left and 6 AK from the right. Then they realized that the eastern flank would remain uncovered and 6 AK left the same task, to be at Bischofsburg. But the order was late, 26 August 6 AK has already acted on Allenstein. They were walking in two columns - the divisions of Komarov and Richter. Intelligence 4-th Infantry Division Komarov said that the enemy forces are moving in the rear. The divisional commander decided that it was the Germans who were fleeing after the rout from the 1 army and decided to strike. And it was 17 AK Mackensen, who was preparing for a flank attack. At the village of Gross-Bessau there was a head-on battle. Komarov, fighting off the attacks of the enemy corps, called the Richter 16 Infantry Division for help, he had already left for 14 km. Richter turned and, on the way to Komarov, ran into X-NUMX-th backup AK Belov. At this time, Komarov’s division lost 1 thousand dead and wounded and began to retreat, Richter units also began to retreat.

The Germans could not pursue them, since they met with resistance from the rearguard under the command of Nechvolodov (2 regiment, 7 hundreds of Cossacks, division mortars). They considered that the whole corps was against them. Comorus Blagoveshchensky was unable to regroup his forces in Bischofsburg and the frustrated mass continued to retreat to the border.

Bid has shown concern. On August 26, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich visited the headquarters of the North-Western Front, and ordered the 1 Army to be aimed at establishing contact with the 2 Army. The army of Rennenkampf at that time seized Insterburg and cut the railway to Memel (Klaipeda) and reached the Baltic Sea near Labiau in 50 km from Königsberg. But Zhilinsky stood on his own delusion and ordered the siege of Konigsberg to begin. The headquarters of the 2 Army, reaching Neidenburg and not presenting the general situation, refused to Martos to support 13 AK.

1 shell retreat. 27 August situation is even more complicated. German aerial reconnaissance discovered that the 6 AK retreated far to the south, a big hole was formed in the Russian front. Corps Mackensen continued to advance to the south, and the corps of Belov - to the west, to Allenstein.

1-th AK Francois struck at Uzdau. The strike was well prepared: after an hour of shelling, the German divisions went on the attack. For the encirclement of the Russian troops, a flying squadron was prepared (cavalrymen, motorcyclists, cyclists, infantry vehicles), which they planned to throw at Neidenburg. But the attack failed, the brigade commander Savitsky and the colonel of the General Staff Krymov organized a defense. German thick chains just mowed down fire of artillery, machine guns and guns. Petrovsky and Neyshlotsky regiments were hit in bayonets. The enemy was defeated, there was even a panic, one of the German units managed to retreat to 45 km.

But the human factor broke a brilliant opportunity to complete the defeat of the body of Francois. Comcorte Artamonov chickened out and ordered to retreat to Zoldau. He also lied to Samsonov: “All attacks are repelled, hold on like a rock. I will complete the task to the end. ” Francois occupied the left Uzda, but he did not believe in the retreat of the Russians and dug in, preparing for defense.

At the same time, the corps of Martos, yielding to the Germans in strength 1,5 times, led the battle by the forces of Scholz. And the battle went all day in favor of the Russians. The German defense was broken, the Germans rejected to restore the position the German command had to transfer a new division. Unable to grab the body of Martos and from the flanks, the Russians fought off all the attacks of the enemy.

Fatal error commander. Alarming messages poured in from all sides. Marked the threat of "tick". But Samsonov again ordered to attack. Only after learning of the defeat of the regiments of the division of Mingin, the commander gave the order to 13 AK to go to the aid of 15 to Martos. Random cavalrymen reported the surrender of Artamonov Uzda. Enraged, Samsonov removed Artamonov from his post and appointed Dushkevich in his place.

In principle, the situation was not yet critical. She could even be reversed in her favor. If it were possible to regroup the forces on the left flank (there were up to a third of all the forces of the army) that were inactive, it was possible to crush Francois's corps. After that, support the forces of the left flank of the center housing (15 and 13). It was possible not to risk at all and take the 15 and 13 cases back.

But truly dispose of their own forces Samsonov could not. He made the most wrong decision - he went to the front line (at 15 AK headquarters) to deal with the situation, as a result, the management of the army was completely lost. This was his last message to the front headquarters.

By the evening of the 27-th in the front headquarters realized that the Germans did not retreat beyond the Vistula, but attacked the 2-th army. The 1 Army receives orders to send cavalry units and establish contact with the 2 army. On August 28, units of the 1 Army marched, but time was lost - the gap in 100 km, they did not have time to overcome.


Nikolai Nikolayevich Martos.

28 of August

13 body. Klyuev's corps entered Allenshteyn. The corps headquarters did not know about the retreat of the 6 AK. When the air reconnaissance reported that troops were coming from the east, they thought it was part of Blagoveshchensky. Therefore, the corps calmly went to the 15 AK, leaving only two battalions in the city. The Russian units were crushed almost instantly, and besides, the townspeople struck from the rear. Belova Corps continued the pursuit.

Having found out the Germans in the rear, Klyuev decided that these were small auxiliary detachments and put one regiment in the rearguard - the Dorogobuzh 143 Infantry Regiment (weakened, one of its battalions was left in Allenstein). Moreover, without artillery and with a limited supply of ammunition. Kompolka Vladimir Kabanov took a position between the lakes and fought off attacks of the enemy's division. It helped that the Germans could not bypass the regiment. The cartridges soon ran out, the Germans were rejected with bayonet attacks. The boars died, the battalions were bleeding, but lasted until nightfall. At night, the remains of the regiment took off, taking the body of the commander.

15 and 13 enclosures. 28 August is already the Russian corps beat off the attacks of the Germans. The battle was especially fierce at the positions of the 13 AK brigade - at Hochstein, which Klyuev sent to help the first. The Narva 3 Infantry Regiment and the Koporsky 4 Infantry Regiment were in a semi-circle, but they stood firmly, rejecting the Germans time after time. The ammunition of the corps came to an end, and it was no longer possible to continue the fight.

Klyuev's corps went out to Hochstein that day, but the commander did not dare to attack without the order of the army commander and missed the opportunity to strike the Germans with a strong blow. Only one regiment (the Nevsky 1 Infantry Regiment) was sent forward, and its sudden blow put the whole German division to flight. But success did not develop, Klyuev ordered to retreat.

Samsonov arrived in the evening. Having discussed the situation, they understood that they had to retreat. A “sliding shield” plan was developed: first the wagons departed, then the 13 AK connections, then the 15 AKs and the last parts of the 23 AKs. Planned to retreat to Neidenburg. Martos was instructed to equip positions at Neidenburg, removing the most militant commander from the front line — he was captured by German cavalry that had left to the rear. Samsonov also went to the rear, his illness worsened. As a result, the retreating troops were virtually decapitated. Klyuev, who was assigned to lead the retreat, was unable to organize it. Parts departed by themselves.

True, the Germans in the center could not organize the persecution. So, advancing behind the corps of Martos, they ran into an ambush at night, which was organized by the Alexopol 31 Infantry Regiment and Kremenchug 32 Infantry Regiment. The enemy convoy was shot. Hindenburg, having learned about the movement of the 1 Army, ordered the Belov and Mackensen corps to unfold. But Mackensen did not comply with it, angry with conflicting instructions, and led the corps towards Francois, who, seeing that he was not in danger, resumed the offensive. The center of the 2 of the Russian army was surrounded.

Defeat

On August 29, Zhilinsky was informed about the withdrawal of the headquarters of the 2 Army, and he decided that the army was retreating, so there was no need to move units of the 1 Army. Rennenkampfu ordered to stop the movement. But he refuses, giving his troops the order to go to the aid of the 2-th army.

The Russian rearguard - the Kashirsky 144 Infantry Regiment of Kakhovsky and a unit of the Narva 3 Infantry Regiment 13 AK - took the battle from Hochstein. Against 16 Russian guns was 86 German, the regiment fought until 14 hours in full surroundings. Kompovka Kakhovsky fell in hand-to-hand combat at the banner of the regiment. The remnants of the regiment fought until the evening. The Sofia 2 Infantry Regiment covering the 13 AK retreat, fought until the 15 watch, then withdrew.

Although in general there was no dense environment - outposts, traveling, armored vehicles on the roads. With good organization, it was possible to break through with a concentrated blow. But at night the retreating mingled, people were tired - a few days of fighting, constant marches, food ran out, ammunition was running out. There was no high command. Klyuev decided to surrender - part of the corps followed him, the majority refused and broke through to their own. Martos ran into the Germans and was captured. Samsonov tried to command the retreating, then fell into prostration, he was tormented by asthma and conscience. With a small group, he was almost out of the encirclement, but his conscience was finished off: “The king trusted me. How will I meet him after such a rout? ”He shot himself. A few hours later his companions went out to their own.

The main reasons for the defeat

- Major miscalculations and mistakes of command. First of all, the commander of the North-Western Front of илиilina, his headquarters, Samsonov and the headquarters of the 2 Army. Mistakes and incompetence of most corps commanders of the 2 Army.

- Operational actions of the German command, well-placed intelligence, speed of movement of troops (developed road infrastructure of the country).

Results

- The Germans inflated the scale of victory. They talked about 70-90 thousand prisoners, 20 thousand killed, 300-600 captured guns. In reality, 5 was surrounded by part-time divisions - at the time of the beginning of the offensive, they numbered up to 80 thousand men and 200 guns. In battles, up to 6 thousand people died, about 20 thousand were injured, more than 20 thousand were able to break through or leave the encirclement. Therefore, it was captivated, along with thousands of wounded up to 50. Yes, and guns, less 200 was captured - a part was damaged in battle, a part was destroyed by gunners.

8-I German army also suffered serious losses: up to 30 thousands killed and wounded. The 4 infantry, the 1 landwehr divisions, the 2 landwehr brigades were crushed or severely drained of blood.

- The Germans managed to prevent the fall of East Prussia and defeat the 2,5 case. But this success was achieved due to a strategic defeat on the Western Front.

- Contrary to the German propaganda, the Russian 2-I army was not completely defeated and destroyed. Most of it simply retreated. The army was led by an energetic and experienced combat officer — S. M. Scheideman. He quickly brought the army in order, and in early September she led active hostilities.

- As a result of the investigation, the attempt of Zhilinsky to shift his blame on Rennenkampf failed. From their posts were removed Zhilinsky, Artamonov. Kondratovich, Blagoveshchensky. The actions of the commanders and soldiers of 15 Corps Martos and division commander Mingin (2-Infantry), who “fought with heroes, bravely and steadfastly withstood the fire and the onslaught of superior enemy forces,” were highly appreciated, and retreated only after complete exhaustion of their reserves.
History Twentieth Century: Tannenberg (16 series documentary series).

The director of the project is Nikolai Mikhailovich Smirnov, a military expert-journalist, the author of the project "Our Strategy" and the series of programs "Our Look. Russian Frontier".
Who and why repeatedly exaggerated the scale of the catastrophe of the army of General Samsonov. Who and who really saved in August 1914 of the year. Why, contrary to the opinion of Soviet historians, the Russians had to save Paris, and how the French soldiers saved the Eastern Front.

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  1. +3
    11 February 2012 17: 27
    in fact, as now, "parquet" colonels and generals from the Arbat Military District make their careers, and then they command the troops in such a way that the soldiers are bravo children, they wash themselves in blood, defending their country ... And the military officers from the majors are sent into retirement ...
  2. +1
    11 February 2012 20: 33
    Interesting article. World War I remains one of the white pages in our history. She almost never received attention, and it was mainly always studied from the standpoint of the technological and military backwardness of tsarist Russia, and the military successes of the Russian army were either hushed up or retouched by some accident.
    1. 0
      12 February 2012 11: 07
      http://lib.rus.ec/b/199101/read достаточно подробное описание
  3. +1
    11 February 2012 20: 40
    Yes guys ...
    The failure of the High Command - Samsonov drank a full bowl ...
    Before him ... after him ... constantly it was ...
    And even more - they forgot to say - all this was done at the request of the Allies ..
    Eternal memory - to Russian warriors ....
  4. Tyumen
    +1
    11 February 2012 21: 12
    The widow of Samsonov in 1918 with the help of the Germans, tracked down the remains of her husband, and transported to Russia.
  5. 0
    12 February 2012 15: 03
    We almost always have communication problems. recourse
  6. Alexander M.
    +1
    13 February 2012 15: 56
    The other day I read Pikul's story "But Paris was saved." So it is told differently: Rennenkampf, a traitor, deliberately lagged behind Samsonov's army by more than 100 miles, although it was planned to unite 2 armies. According to one version, Samsonov shot himself, according to the other died from a shell, his body was not found. For some reason, Renenkampf escaped later and hid under the name of Smokovnikov. He was arrested already under Soviet rule.
  7. Rodver
    +1
    26 February 2012 01: 33
    It’s just that the heart aches when two great nations fight in essence in a fratricidal war for the interests of the Anglo-American-French and their masters.
  8. Rodver
    +1
    26 February 2012 13: 00
    The picture of the military operations of the Russian Army is completely different than by Soviet school textbooks. A true manifestation of courage and heroism and soldiers. and officers. True, the top command was heterogeneous. Obviously lacked Suvorov or Skobelev.

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