Viktor Murakhovsky on the main operational tactical tasks in Syria

7
Since 30 September 2015, the Syrian theme has consistently occupied one of the first places on the pages of domestic media. The initial expectations of a quick victory over the Islamic radicals soon enough were replaced by an understanding that Syria is “seriously and for a long time”. However, the successful liberation of Aleppo and the victory in the US presidential election of Donald Trump instilled confidence in many in Russia that, finally, the final victory over the jihadists in Syria was finally within reach. Is this true? For an answer to this question, our correspondent turned to the colonel in the reserve, the chief editor of the magazine Arsenal of the Fatherland, Viktor Murakhovsky.


- Viktor Ivanovich, is it worth waiting for the victorious advance of Bashar Assad’s army on Rakka and Palmyra in the near future?



- I think that the attack on Rakku is not a short-term perspective. Although, of course, I hope that such an attack will take place at a certain moment. In turn, the 3 Army Corps of the Syrian Army is still operating in the Palmyra area ...

- Whole body?

“At the very least, the Syrians call this compound the hull.” So, 3-i Army Corps among other connections CAA is considered, to put it mildly, not the best. After the loss of Palmyra in December, 2016 had to make great efforts to stabilize the situation in the area between Tiyas and Palmyra, to strengthen the Syrian command and some parts there. At present, the 3 corps has nevertheless switched to offensive operations from the T4 air base in the direction of Palmyra and heights to the north of it. But the promotion of the Syrians there is slow enough. Some quick breakthrough and development of success in depth, the release of Palmyra, a throw in the direction of Deir-ez-Zor and the like should not be expected. In general, it seems to me, now the CAA has other basic operational and tactical tasks. It is necessary to have a planned and slow advance on a broad front, avoiding narrow wedges as a potential trap. In this way, control over the north of the province of Aleppo can be achieved and progress can be made in the direction of Al-Bab.

“And if the Rakks are taken by the Kurds?”

- I don’t think that Kurdish formations will be able to independently take Rakka. They still need a joint operation. It is necessary to wait until the combat-ready CAA military units, as well as their allies, are released in the northern part of Aleppo, and only then think about Raqqah.

- So, the CAA simply does not have enough strength to conduct offensive operations simultaneously in all key areas?

- It is no secret that the government army is experiencing a great lack of combat-ready formations. Under such circumstances, the CAA is indeed not capable of conducting offensive operations simultaneously in several operational areas.

- In other words, there is no need to hurry with a decisive offensive against the IS *?

- No, not worth it. When it comes to Syria, one should proceed from real opportunities and real local conditions. In particular, we must understand that the formation of the “Islamic State” (a terrorist organization banned in the Russian Federation) is a very serious motivated and fanatical opponent who has learned to fight well in specific Syrian conditions. No caps should be. I repeat - to expect rapid breakthroughs and victories over jihadists due to the concentration of troops on the main line and there is no good maneuver. Such expectations do not correspond to what is actually happening on the Syrian fronts.

- Indeed, in the Syrian theater there is no solid front line, on both sides there is focal defense and offensive in certain areas. When you look at the map of Syria and you see there is a clear boundary between red and black, you need to understand that such a clear demarcation of the sides and the designation of their positions are present only on the map. In fact, the parties mainly control not so much the territory as the key strongholds at the intersections of roads, in populated areas or in industrial buildings. The rest of the terrain remains free for movement. At best, there is some kind of fire cover and occasional minefields ... But the question is not that the Syrians are not enough forces to protect the flanks, but that the Syrians still have not been able to outrun their opponent in battle control cycles.

“Since the maneuver was mentioned, then allow the question.” The current campaign against jihadists in Syria is characterized not only by focal defense, but also by quite active maneuverable actions of the parties. More than once or twice, the latter circumstance led the Syrian government army to defeat, caused by the strikes of militants on the bare flanks of the advancing army groups and their extended communications. Has the CAA, at the present time, learned to parry the enemy's strikes against the flanks and communications of their armed formations?

- Indeed, in the Syrian theater there is no solid front line, on both sides there is focal defense and offensive in certain areas. When you look at the map of Syria and you see there is a clear boundary between red and black, you need to understand that such a clear demarcation of the sides and the designation of their positions are present only on the map. In fact, the parties mainly control not so much the territory as the key strongholds at the intersections of roads, in populated areas or in industrial buildings. The rest of the terrain remains free for movement. At best, there is some kind of fire cover and occasional minefields ... But the question is not that the Syrians are not enough forces to protect the flanks, but that the Syrians still have not been able to outrun their opponent in battle control cycles.

Viktor Murakhovsky on the main operational tactical tasks in Syria


- Explain your thought, please.

- The Syrians later discovered the actions of the militant raids. The reaction time to the appearance of such units was too long. Significantly reduced efficiency and time-consuming organization of interaction with artillery and aviation. As a result of this, the enemy, who acted in small mobile formations, was simply ahead of the Syrians.

- Jihadists were often one step ahead of government troops and owned the initiative?

- In fact, yes. Due to the loss of the initiative, reactive actions began on the part of the Syrians. First of all, the Syrians, of course, sought to get out of the blow, which they did not always get organized ... I note that our military advisers in Syria are making tremendous efforts to improve the management of parts of the CAA. Vigorous work is underway to identify among the Syrian government forces truly combat-ready units. I think that there is no talk about the unions yet ... As the practice of military operations in Syria shows, the most combat-ready parts of the CAA, headed by talented commanders who receive support in matters of command, recruitment, supply of weapons and military equipment, do their job well.

- Apparently, there are not so many such units in the CAA.

“Usually such units create the shock core of the CAA grouping. The same troops, which in theory should advance after the advancing and consolidate the territory, as well as retain important objects and cover the flanks, while in the sense of combat capability are significantly inferior to the attack core of the advancing groups. The entire modern Syrian army to bring to the level of combat effectiveness of a few attack units - the task is almost impossible. Therefore, in occupied territories it is necessary to carefully fix, dig in, control heights, conduct reconnaissance. In other words, I repeat - you need not hurry.

- Accordingly, the danger of the CAA groups falling under the painful flank attack from the jihadists will remain. Nothing can be done about it. It remains only to try to minimize the damage from such actions of the enemy, which directly rests on the problems of improving the professionalism of the Syrian command personnel and the combat capability of the Syrian parts of the second echelon?

- Absolutely. It must be understood that these problems cannot be solved quickly. Increasing the combat capability of the CAA requires considerable time. On the other hand, this does not mean that no one deals with the problems of the Syrian army. Just the opposite. Over the past months, the Russian group has fully accustomed to the Syrian realities. As they say the military - "has grown into a situation." The Russian command already knows the real capabilities of the Syrian government forces and their allies. Based on these data, and also with an eye on the negative experience of the CAA fighting, now our help is being provided to the Syrians.

- Referring to the negative experience of the CAA fighting, did you mean the unsuccessful attack of the Syrian government army on Tabka and the loss of Palmyra?

- And this too. It should be remembered that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Syria do not have a large ground contingent, and we are forced, as they say, to work with the material that is. That is, to raise the combat qualities of the CAA to an acceptable level, and this, once again, the process is not fast. Russia has no other course of action in the present circumstances. This, in turn, once again proves that a quick final victory over IS in Syria should not be expected.

Recall the armed conflict in Syria has been going on since March 2011. Militants of various armed formations recognized as terrorist in many countries around the world are opposing government forces. Since 30 September 2015, Russia, at the request of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, has provided Syria with technical and military support. By order of the Supreme Commander Vladimir Putin, parts of the Russian Aerospace Forces of the Russian Federation are deployed in Syria, which inflict pinpoint strikes on the positions of the militants. The control over the work of the Russian Federation Air Force is carried out by Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov and other military leaders.

In total, with 30 September 2015, with the support of the Russian military, more than 12,5 thousand square meters were liberated. km of territory: more than 500 settlements and 425 key heights. Among the militants killed are at least 360 field commanders and more 2,5 thousand citizens of Russia and the CIS countries.

Virtually all operations conducted by Syrian government forces in Aleppo, Palmyra, Mountain Latakia, the provinces of Der'a and Damascus, were planned, prepared and carried out under the guidance of Russian military advisers.
Our news channels

Subscribe and stay up to date with the latest news and the most important events of the day.

7 comments
Information
Dear reader, to leave comments on the publication, you must sign in.
  1. +1
    3 March 2017 06: 18
    Judging by the card, greetings from the past. But still interesting. It is the Kurds who are now engaged in Raqqah, although after the statement by the SSA (read Turkey) about the desire to take Manbij, the Kurds will most likely noticeably cool off to Raqqa. IG seems to give the last battle in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. And after the IG will become quite "interesting", the common enemy will disappear.
    1. 0
      3 March 2017 10: 17
      ... yes, the map is old, but by the names you can approximately guess who and where is now located ...
  2. +3
    3 March 2017 07: 27
    I note that our military advisers in Syria are making enormous efforts to improve the management of parts of the SAA.
    Syria is an excellent "training ground" not only for testing our equipment, but also for training military leaders. New times, new tactics and realities, the ability to quickly navigate all this and make the right decisions. And they will be said about them: "... he went through Syria."
  3. +3
    3 March 2017 07: 52
    . Some kind of quick breakthrough and development of success in depth, liberation of Palmyra, a throw towards Deir ez-Zor and the like should not be expected. In general, it seems to me that the main operational tactical tasks are facing the SAA now.

    Another analyte! It seems that he does not follow the news at all. Lives in its parallel reality. But simply, for his small salary, scribbles such opuses!
    1. +1
      3 March 2017 10: 00
      He proceeded from the fact that Palmyra igil would protect, and they departed.
  4. +1
    3 March 2017 13: 56
    Post an article a month ago on such a topic is simply rudeness
  5. +1
    3 March 2017 16: 34
    They stuck such a huge text twice.

    - Indeed, in the Syrian theater there is no solid front line, on both sides there is focal defense and offensive in certain areas. When you look at the map of Syria and you see there is a clear boundary between red and black, you need to understand that such a clear demarcation of the sides and the designation of their positions are present only on the map. In fact, the parties mainly control not so much the territory as the key strongholds at the intersections of roads, in populated areas or in industrial buildings. The rest of the terrain remains free for movement. At best, there is some kind of fire cover and occasional minefields ... But the question is not that the Syrians are not enough forces to protect the flanks, but that the Syrians still have not been able to outrun their opponent in battle control cycles.

"Right Sector" (banned in Russia), "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" (UPA) (banned in Russia), ISIS (banned in Russia), "Jabhat Fatah al-Sham" formerly "Jabhat al-Nusra" (banned in Russia) , Taliban (banned in Russia), Al-Qaeda (banned in Russia), Anti-Corruption Foundation (banned in Russia), Navalny Headquarters (banned in Russia), Facebook (banned in Russia), Instagram (banned in Russia), Meta (banned in Russia), Misanthropic Division (banned in Russia), Azov (banned in Russia), Muslim Brotherhood (banned in Russia), Aum Shinrikyo (banned in Russia), AUE (banned in Russia), UNA-UNSO (banned in Russia), Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People (banned in Russia), Legion “Freedom of Russia” (armed formation, recognized as terrorist in the Russian Federation and banned)

“Non-profit organizations, unregistered public associations or individuals performing the functions of a foreign agent,” as well as media outlets performing the functions of a foreign agent: “Medusa”; "Voice of America"; "Realities"; "Present time"; "Radio Freedom"; Ponomarev; Savitskaya; Markelov; Kamalyagin; Apakhonchich; Makarevich; Dud; Gordon; Zhdanov; Medvedev; Fedorov; "Owl"; "Alliance of Doctors"; "RKK" "Levada Center"; "Memorial"; "Voice"; "Person and law"; "Rain"; "Mediazone"; "Deutsche Welle"; QMS "Caucasian Knot"; "Insider"; "New Newspaper"