Russian rut - the factor of victory in the Great War

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Russian rut - the factor of victory in the Great War

Railway transport played a huge role in ensuring the victory of the Soviet Union over the Third Reich. From the first days of hostilities, it was necessary for railroad workers to ensure fast and uninterrupted delivery to the front of a huge number of troops, military equipment, weapons and at the same time to evacuate the population, the wounded, equipment and various materials to the rear.

Formally, the first railway line opened in Russia in 1837 year. In reality, the pioneers of this new type of transport, which were several years ahead of the states of Western Europe, were P. P. Frolov and the father and son Cherepanov in Russia. Back in 1806-1809. Frolov built the world's first cast-iron railroad with a horse-drawn rail between the Zmeinogorsky mine and the Korbalikhinsky ore transportation plant. She has worked successfully for decades. In 1833-1834 In Nizhny Tagil, the first locomotive was built by talented Russian mechanics E. A. and M. Ye. Cherepanovs. In 1835, the Mining Journal wrote about this: “... at the Nizhny Tagil plant, Cherepanov mechanics staged a land ship that was tested many times, and it turned out that he could carry more than 200 pounds of gravity at a speed of twelve to fifteen versts per hour . Now, the Cherepanovs made another larger ship, so that he can carry around a thousand pounds of gravity with him. According to the tests of this steamer, it is proposed to lay the cast-iron wheel lines from the Nizhny Tagil plant to the copper mine now and use the ship to transport copper ore from the mine to the factories.



However, later in the construction of the first railways in Russia, this domestic experience was ignored. Unfortunately, the ruling elite of Russia of the Romanovs treated their domestic inventions with distrust and disdain and admired all foreigners. It should be noted that this social disease prevails in modern Russia.

It is not surprising that the builder of the first railway line in Russia, Tsarskoye Selo, was a foreigner, and all the equipment for it was purchased abroad. In 1835, an Austrian engineer and entrepreneur Gerstner, during a personal meeting with Russian Tsar Nicholas I, persuaded him to link Petersburg with Moscow by rail. In order to evaluate the efficiency of the new type of transport in Russian conditions, especially in the winter period, they first decided to build a small branch. This is how the Tsarskoye Selo road appeared, connecting Petersburg with the country residence of the emperor. In 1837, it was launched, officially becoming the first railway in Russia and the sixth in the world.

1 February 1842. The emperor signed a decree, according to which it was supposed to begin construction of the St. Petersburg-Moscow railway. This time the initiator of the construction of this paramount highway was the government, which put the financing of this enterprise on the treasury. 11 August 1842 was formed by the Department of Railways, which concentrated all the orders on the construction of a new line, and subsequently of other rail tracks.

The railway Petersburg-Moscow opened in 1851 year. The Nikolaev Railway (up to 1855 of the year - Petersburg-Moscow, from 1923 - Oktyabrskaya) is the first double-track track in the Russian Empire. From it began to form a railway network of national importance. Soon other branches were attached to the Nikolaev railway. As a result, the network covered the Petersburg, Moscow, Novgorod, Tver, Pskov, Vitebsk and Smolensk provinces. The most ambitious railway project of Tsarist Russia was Transsib, which connected the European part of Russia with the Far East. The pace (12 years), length (7,5 thousands of kilometers) and the severity of climatic conditions, he was not equal throughout the world. No wonder the Trans-Siberian Railway is considered the most outstanding technical achievement of the turn of the century.

In Russia, there was also its own track - 1524 mm. The formerly built Tsarskoye Selo railway had a gauge width of 1829 mm. The most common gauge width in the world is 1435 mm (4 English feet and 8,5 inches). This track has the railways of North America, China and most of Europe. This is the width of the gauge was adopted for the construction of the first passenger railway line Liverpool - Manchester by engineer George Stephenson. From the middle of the 19th century, the standard gauge on the railways of the Russian Empire, later the USSR, was the gauge width 1524 mm (5 English feet). That was until 1970, when the Soviet railways were transferred to a gauge of 1520 millimeters.

There are several versions of why the Russian Empire adopted such a rut. Perhaps this was due to the work on the construction of the Nikolaev railway by consultants from the United States, in particular, J. V. Whistler (at that time this gauge was popular in the southern states of the United States). It is also possible that Russian engineers P. P. Melnikov and N. O. Kraft, who visited America before the construction of the Nikolaev Railway, suggested using this gauge. In addition, this gauge was convenient in that it was expressed by a round number - 5 feet.

Another version is military. Custom gauge makes it difficult for the enemy to supply troops in the event of an invasion of Russia. Indeed, during the Great Patriotic War, the Germans had to “change” the gauge in the occupied Soviet territories, which slowed down and hampered the supply of troops, and this affected the course of military operations. The German High Command, planning an attack on the USSR, made a number of serious mistakes. Arrogantly hoping to smash the Red Army in frontier battles and to capture Kiev, Leningrad and Moscow with a rapid blitzkrieg, the Germans did not plan to conduct a long-term military campaign. Therefore, in the winter of 1940-1941. Wehrmacht’s railroad troops, instead of preparing for a large-scale rewrite of the Russian to European track, were engaged in the expansion of the Polish railway network. Hitler was more concerned about the concentration of forces on the border, rather than supplying his troops during a long campaign. The Germans were counting on a “blitzkrieg”. At the same time, in accordance with the German military plans, the Russian (Soviet) railways were to become the main communications providing the German army on the territory of the USSR.

Even after the beginning of the invasion and occupation of vast Soviet territories, the Germans did not pay enough attention to the remaking of the Russian rut. The equipment of the German railway troops left much to be desired. Moreover, they even cut off the supply of fuel in favor of front-line parts. When the German command came to their senses and threw all the available forces on the track gauging, they managed to change an average of only 20 km per day. So, for 10 July, 1941 managed to prepare 480 km of the way. But such a number of ways provided only a tenth of the volume of supplies required by the German troops. English historian Robert Kershaw in his book “1941 year through the eyes of the Germans. Birch crosses instead of Zheleznykh ”, noted that the German Army Group“ Center ”daily needed supply of 34 trains. However, she got the maximum 18, and then at best. The lack of supplies, the shortage of manpower and the short supply of equipment held back the onslaught of the German army, and did not give the Nazis how to prepare for an attack on Moscow. Thus, the Russian rut, along with other factors, played a role in the defeat of the German troops near Moscow.

It is believed that such a width of the track was chosen personally by Emperor Nicholas I, who had a military education and understood the strategic importance of railways for Russia. Nicholas was not specifically trained to rule Russia. He was interested primarily in military affairs. However, it should be noted that his natural mind, iron will, love of discipline gave him the opportunity to effectively manage such a huge state. The Russian Tsar was able to appreciate the great importance of military roads for the armed forces and the country as a whole.

In the conditions of continuous numerical growth of the armies of the capitalist states and equipping the troops with new weapons and military equipment, rail transport opened up the possibility of providing corps and even whole armies with operational-strategic mobility in a theater of military operations and resolving in a new way supplying them with everything necessary. Despite the technical imperfections of the first railways, these possibilities for their military use were immediately noted by such prominent representatives of the advanced Russian military technical thought of the time, as N. S. Mordvinov and P. A. Yazykov. Back in 1841, N. S. Mordvinov wrote that railways would in the future widely maneuver troops "from one to the other edge of Russia," that is, for the first time he suggested that it was possible to maneuver troops in the country using internal strategic forces. directions. PA Yazykov, following him, raised the question of the possibility of using railways not only during the outbreak of the war, but also for strategic concentration of troops during the “pre-preparatory beginning of military action” period. These and a number of other statements already testified to the maturity of advanced Russian thought in matters of evaluating a new vehicle from a military point of view.

Obviously, Nikolai was also familiar with the advanced military-technical thought of his era. Thus, in the 1847 year, the Tsar was presented a “Note”, in which it was noted that the railway would allow, if necessary, for 60 hours, or 2½ days, to transfer from St. Petersburg to Moscow or from Moscow to St. Petersburg to 61 200 infantry men or 6840 man cavalry with horses. It was for that time extremely bold calculations, far exceeding all that was done in this regard abroad. Already in 1852, a draft of a unified railway network was drawn up in Russia. An explanatory note was attached to the project, which pointed to the great defensive importance of building railways in the country, as it would provide "the earliest recruiting of the army for martial law", provide an opportunity to speed up its transfer to the western border and concentrate reserves on the Dvina and Dnieper. Interesting that For the first time, advanced ideas in Russia about the enormous military significance of railways and the need to build a single railway network in the state were subsequently assigned to the Prussian General Staff.

Russia at that time was called the “gendarme of Europe”. In Western Europe, they were afraid and disliked Russia and, in their opinion, the reactionary tsar was glad to take advantage of the first occasion to destroy Russia's power and influence in European affairs. Kings and governments changed, and the opposition between the West and Russia was unchanged. Not surprisingly, Nikolai tried in every way to strengthen the defense of the Russian state.

The creation of railway units in Russia was closely connected with the system of protection of land and water routes existing in the country by that time. In the late forties of the XIX century, the Ministry of Railways, which was led by the "Main Directorate of Railways and Public Buildings", along with various chancelleries and departments, had at its disposal a number of military units and headquarters. Military engineers were reduced to the Corps of Railway Engineers and the Building Squad. There were also military schools, including the Institute of Railways. 52 separate military-working companies were subordinated to the Main Directorate of Railways and Public Buildings. They carried out guard duty on land and waterways, supervised the order during their operation, and also observed the repair of existing roads and the construction of new ones. He served on the Volga, Oka, Sura, Kama and Vyatka rivers naval detachment, and shipping channels and other similar structures were served by special military teams.

6 August 1851, Tsar Nicholas I signs a decree according to which so-called “railway troops” appeared in Russia. Their duties included ensuring the functioning of the entire complex of railways in Russia. At the initial stage, the 14 separate companies of the military workers, as well as two companies of the conductor and telegraph personnel, became part of the railway troops. For the protection of the road and the constant supervision of it, a “special road guard” was created as part of 1200 people. In addition to the road guards, “special mobile teams” were formed, one for each 10 version of the road. The responsibility of these teams was to repair the damage and to produce in general all the work necessary for the proper maintenance of the road. The military-working companies were also responsible for ensuring the work of the stations, guarding bridges, crossings, etc. The first conductor company consisted of machinists, their assistants and firemen, and the second - the conductor and conductor. The telegraph company, which included non-commissioned officers and ordinary signalmen, was obliged to ensure the uninterrupted operation of the "electromagnetic telegraph" on the whole road. 14 consisted of 3500 men, 2 conduit companies 550 and telegraph companies 290. The company was supposed to wear military uniforms with light-blue bullets and a shako with the emblem of the Department of Railways in the form of a crossed ax and anchor.

The military workers, conductors and telegraph companies, intended to operate the Petersburg-Moscow railway, were special-purpose military units and were the initial core of the railway troops in Russia - the first military-railway formations in the world. August 6 date 1851 of the year was the day of the creation of the “Railway Troops of Russia”.

Because of the Eastern (Crimean War), the construction of railways in Russia was carried out very slowly, and during the Crimean War itself 1853 — 1856. stopped completely. It is worth noting that the lack of railways to the south from the center of the country was one of the reasons for the defeat of Russia. The Russian army could not quickly maneuver its forces, promptly transferring troops, supplies and military materials. After the war, the situation with the construction of railways left much to be desired. The large-scale construction of railways was a tasty feeding trough for various Russian and foreign social parasites. Therefore, speculation and embezzlement have developed around the construction of railway lines. Numerous representatives of foreign capital, businessmen and speculators were striving for personal gain, the national interests of Russia were an empty sound for them. On the sweat and blood of the workers, they made up for themselves huge states. As for the construction, it moved extremely slowly (and the quality left much to be desired). In the summer of 1860, the Main Society of Russian Railways was forced to declare its inability to fulfill its own proposed plan for railway construction.

In the current situation, the military department and the railway department took joint steps to create special railway construction units: the so-called military workers brigades, as well as for use in railway construction field troops. The first railway military workers brigade was formed in 1858, consisting of about 3500 people and used to build the St. Petersburg-Warsaw railway. In the future, such teams were used in the construction of railways in various regions of Russia. They were formed, as a rule, at the time of work on a particular construction, and after its completion they were disbanded. For example, in the spring of 1863, on the construction of the Odessa-Parkan railway, 4 working companies were formed, headed by a staff officer with the rights of the commander of a separate battalion. Under him there were two officers for errands, a treasurer, an auditor and an official who was in charge of the office and reporting. Each company was also headed by an officer. The company had 550 privates, 12 non-commissioned officers, Kaptenarmus, paramedic and Feldwebel. The structure of the organization in its organization was close to the structure of the later created railway battalions.

The practice of applying to the construction of temporary formations soon showed their inexpediency. Therefore, from 1864, the military department switched to the creation of permanent military working brigades that could be transferred from one railway construction to another. So 2-I was first formed, and then 1-I construction workers for the construction of railways in the Novorossiysk Territory. Each brigade, according to the order of the military department No. 25 of January 31, 1864, consisted of seven mouths of ordinary 650. Thus, as the military working brigades in Russia, the first construction railway units appeared in 1858. The use of field troops, mainly infantry divisions in railway construction, as was the case, for example, at the construction of the Moscow-Nizhny Novgorod railroad, was not widely spread due to the difficulty of combining construction work with combat training of troops.

Interestingly, in the West it is believed that railway troops were first established in the United States during the civil war 1861-1865. and that only after this, the European countries, borrowing the American experience, began to form such troops in themselves. In fact, the North American command in the years preceding the civil war, and at the beginning of the war, underestimated the military significance of the railways and took no measures to protect them. Only in the course of the war, when the poor condition of dirt roads, which became completely impassable during rainy periods, and the limited possibilities of using river communications, did the North American command understand the importance of railways for supporting the actions of its army. This circumstance, as well as a number of cavalry raids by the Southerners to the rear of the North American troops, in which the railways were destroyed and the warehouses with food and military equipment were stored there, put the United States government to take decisive measures to ensure the operation of its railways. Chief among these measures was the formation of railway operational and construction parts. As a result, the railway units were able to restore the destroyed sections of the railways and organize the operation of the railway network in the theater of military operations.

Thus, the experience of the formation and use of railway parts was advertised after the war by the Americans and picked up by the press in Western Europe. Although in reality, the first railway troops in Russia were created in the autumn of 1851 on the St. Petersburg-Moscow railway, and the first railway-construction units were built in 1858 during the construction of the St. Petersburg-Warsaw railway.
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  1. +3
    28 February 2017 07: 31
    However, in the future, during the construction of the first railways in Russia, this domestic experience was ignored.
    .. Despite the quite successful designs, the Cherepanovs steam locomotives did not receive distribution. One of the reasons is opposition from equestrian contractors who did not want to lose their income. But besides this, there were some objective reasons. Firewood was used as fuel in the Cherepanov locomotives. The engine consumed them in such quantities that very soon a problem arose with their transportation. The entire forest in the vicinity of the railway was cut down, and firewood had to be transported from afar. This also greatly influenced the fate of the engine. For example, the first Stephenson steam locomotives worked on the transport of coal from coal mines, which was used as fuel.
    1. jjj
      +2
      28 February 2017 11: 50
      In fact, the British had the first track wide, under two meters - 1829 mm. Modeling nowadays has shown that this was correct in terms of engineering. So from St. Petersburg to Tsarskoye Selo such a track was built.
      However, in the West they later adopted a narrow -1435 mm, which was dictated by the desire to reduce costs and increase profitability. Because locomotives under such a rut have become the most preferred. A curious legend goes about the appearance of a gauge in Russia - 1524 mm. The emperor ordered that the Russian gauge was "polomneny" wider than the European. There, of course, it was referred to as another, more expressive word. They lined up the guards, measured their virtues. Derived the average value. It turned out 89 mm. And its size made the track wider. It turns out that the member of medium size was - 178 mm
      1. +1
        28 February 2017 19: 42
        jJj, There is another version of this joke: when Nicholas1 was asked to make the English gauge wider, the tsar didn’t understand “*** wider?” the translator conscientiously translated “add organ” to the veil.
  2. The comment was deleted.
  3. +11
    28 February 2017 07: 43
    Interesting article, thanks to the author.

    I allow myself to note that railway construction in Russia was one of the most advanced in the world. Russian railways were built by Russian engineers, according to unique Russian projects, according to unique technologies (for example, a heat-insulating shirt in tunnels made of permafrost, filter dams, etc.), unique materials (e.g. special cements for the Trans-Siberian Railway).

    The author does not say about the railway bridges of Russia, the most unique works of engineering Russian art. They crossed the largest rivers of the world in the most difficult natural conditions, many of which deserved admiration of the whole world, for example, the Yenisei Bridge of Lavra Proskuryakov, who received the Grand Prix in Prague from the hands of the admired Eiffel. The bridge is mentioned in the book. "Atlas of Wonders of the World. Outstanding Architectural Buildings and Monuments of All Times and Peoples ”, published in 1991 in the USA.

    The longest bridge in the world of that time -Alekseevsky bridge over the Amur (even in the USSR they could not spend longer). Bridges built-hundreds.

    The construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway by the West is called the second most important event in the world after the discovery of America. Just 11 years after the start of construction, the express train St. Petersburg-Vladivostok (which arose from nothing in just 40 years) went. And from the port of Dalniy from the train, passengers were transferred to waiting liners (according to the schedule) to continue the sea voyage.

    Steel ridge of Russia The Trans-Siberian Railway connected the country into a single whole and preserved the Far East and Eastern Siberia for Russia. Only a mighty power could build such a structure.

    In total, by 1917, 85 thousand km of tracks were built in Russia and 15 thousand were under construction, 2 place in the world after the USA ..
    1. +8
      28 February 2017 08: 50
      Quote: Olgovich
      In total, by 1917, 85 thousand km of tracks were built in Russia and 15 thousand were under construction, 2 place in the world after the USA ..

      Lapotnaya Russia, th ...
    2. The comment was deleted.
  4. +2
    28 February 2017 07: 59
    Therefore, in the winter 1940-1941 years. Wehrmacht railway troops, instead of preparing for a large-scale change of Russian gauge to European gauge, were engaged in the expansion of the Polish railway network

    Strange passage.
    I did not understand the connection between remaking and preparation.
    1. 0
      28 February 2017 08: 10
      The volume of work was large. Made it easier with a supply.
      1. +3
        28 February 2017 08: 41
        In Poland and the west of Belarus there was a European gauge.
        And west Ukraine, too.
        What for to alter it !?
        Ours did not alter the same. There was such a stripe there ...
    2. 0
      28 February 2017 11: 51
      Quote: Stas57
      Therefore, in the winter 1940-1941 years. Wehrmacht railway troops, instead of preparing for a large-scale change of Russian gauge to European gauge, were engaged in the expansion of the Polish railway network

      Strange passage.
      I did not understand the connection between remaking and preparation.

      Probably just a joke on their actions. Let it be so.
  5. +4
    28 February 2017 08: 12
    An interesting topic, I would like more.
    The Germans, due to the mass destruction of the train, failed to massively use the trophy train. Therefore, they had to use European railway equipment. Reshape the track accordingly. However, not all. On the railway part, the Russian gauge remained. Which also made it difficult to supply the army. For example, in the Pskov region. Railway Warsaw-Leningrad and Riga-Pskov were altered, while the rocky, in essence, Pskov-Gdov, Pskov-Idritsa and many others remained with the Russian gauge. And when, due to wear and tear, the actions of partisans and aviation, railway equipment was destroyed, these railway lines practically ceased to function.
    But during the liberation, the Soviet railway troops had to alter the gauge on the Russian, even in Poland. Most likely they changed it only in “Russian Poland”, but in “German Poland”, where the infrastructure was originally geared to European tracks, they stopped changing it. Unfortunately, a large rut is easier to make small than small-large.
    1. +3
      28 February 2017 08: 52
      If you want more.
      Alexey Vulvov. The history of the railways of the Russian Empire. Available online.
  6. +3
    28 February 2017 08: 43
    The strange title of the article, well, they would simply call it "about the role of the railway" or something else. The fact is that during the retreat, the piece of iron was completely destroyed, rail shifts were out of the question. And the rails after that were only suitable for re-melting, and the sleepers for firewood. And what do you think the Nazis planned to supply their troops during the Blitzkrieg? great? or on rickshaws? No, of course, in the piece of iron, but the Germans were not ready for such great losses, although they also had good automobile troops. But the fact that the war will drag on the Germans were not ready, glory to our grandfathers and not to the piece of iron and the far-sighted king peas.
  7. +1
    28 February 2017 12: 05
    The article really liked the fact that it supplements the previous articles on railway, which were earlier. "" Russian Track ". After all, the construction of railway connections and equipping with everything necessary ----- the process is long and cannot be quickly implemented. About Nikolay. It is possible to say about positive events in this period. But are there any positive events for Russia during his namesake? Probably not at all.
    1. 0
      28 February 2017 19: 51
      Here I partially agree with you: under Nikolay2, the construction of roads and ports under the projects started under Alexander 3 continued.
      Although S.Yu. Witte was well aware of the need for industrialization of Russia
  8. +2
    28 February 2017 12: 45
    Once under Nicholas the First, the railway network developed
    So slow. Therefore, the Russian army and stuck in the Crimea without
    railroad supply.
    The jerk occurred under Alexander the Second.
  9. 0
    28 February 2017 13: 33
    Quote: Stas57
    In Poland and the west of Belarus there was a European gauge.
    And west Ukraine, too.
    What for to alter it !?
    Ours did not alter the same. There was such a stripe there ...

    They just changed it, from the summer of the 1940 year until the outbreak of the war. But they didn’t manage to change everything. On separate lines, the second paths were already beginning to be built.
    1. 0
      28 February 2017 19: 52
      That's right, this is mentioned in the memoirs of the war veterans
    2. +1
      1 March 2017 00: 31
      They just changed it, from the summer of the 1940 year until the outbreak of the war. But they didn’t manage to change everything. On separate lines, the second paths were already beginning to be built.



      by June 22, June 1941, a motley zoo of multi-gauge lines remained in those areas: months before the war, those leading to the border 2 became broad-gauge "allied" (Negoreloe - Brest, Dvinsk - Vilno - Grodno - Bialystok, Zdolbunovo - Lvov - Przemysl), and part of the rocky and secondary ones still remained "European", on 1435 mm.

      The exceptions were a) Estonia, b) partially Latvia, which are in the limiting state of 1919-40. retained the wide rut left from the king, c) Bessarabia, cross-linked to the wide rut immediately, at the end of the summer of 1940.
      Lithuania at home has everything changed to 1435 mm before the war, Poland and Romania too.


      Here I marked with red marks the border of the 1435 and 1524 mm gauges, towards the end of 1939.

      He tried an immediate flashing after joining in 1939-40 the People's Commissar of Railways L.M. Kaganovich, referring to the fact that we got from Pan Poland, boyar Romania and Limitrophs a huge fleet of rolling stock, "which must be put somewhere and used." Here is what his foe and opponent I.V. writes Kovalev, then engaged in the VOSO service:


      The three of us - Vasilevsky, chief of military communications N. I. Trubetskoy and I - came to Kaganovich, but the conversation we needed did not work out. As soon as he heard about the need to alter the Western gauge to ours, he immediately got excited and started shouting to me:

      “They don’t understand!” But you are a railwayman, do you understand what you’re saying? We got these railways with thousands of steam locomotives, with tens of thousands of wagons. We’ll cross-track, but where is the rolling stock? Throw the dog under the tail! This is ten percent of the wagon fleet of the whole country! How to make up for it? Move the rolling stock from the east? And where are we making up for? And how will we supply cities and factories in the territories where gauge remaking is taking place? Maybe we will temporarily stop the enterprises and ask the population not to eat, not to drink? Do you understand what economics is?

      The arguments are compelling. Everything seems to be right. A radical reconstruction of the railway network in these areas would cost the state, as I already noted, a huge amount - 9 billion rubles. Not counting the indirect losses that the People's Commissar Kaganovich spoke about. This view - the economic considerations of today - prevailed. Stalin agreed with Kaganovich, and the reconstruction of the railroads was again postponed indefinitely.

      [...] A year will pass and this cost will cost us too much. The railways of the Baltic states, the western regions of Ukraine and Belarus will meet the war, poorly prepared for it. The enemy will throw troops in a fist into battle. And we will meet the fist with spread fingers. Our troops will be forced to advance on 200 – 300 km on foot marches, and the enemy will beat them in parts. From the very first days of the war, we will have many shortages — both in shells, in fuel, and in other items of weapons and supplies. And all this is largely because the railways are not really prepared for a big war, and that in preparing for it we did not take into account the most important factor in saving - time. As a result, in one or two weeks we will suffer enormous military losses, we will lose all these territories with their fields, forests, factories and factories, with millions of people.

      http://militera.lib.ru/h/kymanev_ga2/11.html



      2. Scheme VOSO RKKA 1943, but the state of the lines on it - at the beginning of 1941. It can be clearly seen that the 1524 wide gauge stretched to the dock, and then it was reloaded onto the euro gauge and other wagons.



      3. From there. In 1941, this territory was almost all in European gauge, and only the strategic supply line to Lviv - Przemysl was switched over to a wide one.
  10. The comment was deleted.
  11. +2
    28 February 2017 16: 19
    The fact that the capacity of the railways built before the revolution was inadequate is evidenced by some supply difficulties that appeared during the war years. Railway communications that worked normally in peacetime were not ready for wartime conditions. As General N. N. Golovin wrote: “As a result, even after the shocks caused by the evacuation have been eliminated by rail, the latter cannot cope with the tasks of supply transportation falling on it. Difficulties in this area increase as Russia emerges from the crisis strip in combat supplies, and the latter are sent to the army in ever greater quantities. From personal 18-month experience in the post of Chief of Staff of the VII Army (from October 1915 to April 1917), the author can testify that, as a rule, the army received less than an average of 25% of its supplies. The reasons for this shortage should be fully attributed to the insufficient carrying capacity of our railways. ”9)

    The situation especially worsened after the loss of transport hubs in Vilna, Lida, Baranovichi, due to the retreat of the Russian army. For justice, it is important to add that it was during these years that a lot of railways were built. But these were more likely “fire” (emergency) actions.

    “Such a weak rail connection was, of course, completely unsatisfactory. With possible urgency, in a very unfavorable time of the year, a branch was built bypassing the Baranavichy junction from Sinyavka station to Budy, the canvas was completed on the northern section of the Podolsk railway (Kalinkovichi - Korosten) and a temporary wooden bridge was built across the river. Pripyat. After that, the situation improved slightly. The railway transfer of troops to the South-Western Front, made during 1916, is measured by several thousand echelons. Nevertheless, the size of this transportation did not satisfy the strategic requirements of the current situation.

    One of the reasons that the Galician victory in 1916 did not give the strategic results that could have been expected is that the operational transportation required for this was completely beyond the power of our railways. ”N. N. Golovin 10) In tsarist Russia, more iron was built ...
    cccp-2.su ›New Topics› 43678010198
    1. +1
      28 February 2017 20: 36
      Uncle Murzik, back in the 70s, believed that Stalin was annoyed by the low capacity of our railways (due to the fault of the NKPS) and all the railroads were transferred to the General Staff, in my opinion Khrulev, put things in order with transport
      1. 0
        1 March 2017 07: 19
        By 1913, the total length of railways in the Republic of Ingushetia was 68370 versts (of which double gauge, only 16 889 versts), this number also included 2494 versts of private local railways. (Russia 1913; Transport; 1. Railways Table 3) 7). This is the length of roads both of general use and local importance. Translated into kilometers (68370 multiplied by 1,06679) it turns out about 72 936 km.

        In the USSR, by the 1960 year, the length of public railways, according to the statistical yearbook “The National Economy of the USSR in the 1960 Year”, amounted to 125 thousand km (Section: RAILWAY TRANSPORT. Table: OPERATING LENGTH OF RAILWAYS OF THE MINISTRY OF WAYS FOR THE END OF THE MESSAGE ; thousand kilometers) s. 353) .8)

        However, this number does not include local roads. On the same page, under the above table, there is an entry: “In addition to the indicated operational length of the public railways of the Ministry of Railways, there are railway access roads to industrial enterprises and organizations; the length of these non-public routes was at the beginning of 1961, 102,4 thousand km. ”All these are local railways, which also played a crucial role in communications. And of course, they also had to be built.

        Total, the total length of railway in the USSR was 227,8 thousand km. The difference from 1913 is 155 thousand km. Divide 155 by 40 (roughly from 1920 to 1960) and get an average of 3,8 thousand km. in year. Even such rough and primitive calculations give an idea of ​​the pace and scale of the construction of railways at that time. This despite the fact that the country suffered such terrible disasters as the civil war from the First World War and the Second World War.) In tsarist Russia more iron was built ...
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        1. 0
          5 March 2017 21: 33
          there are also narrow gauges, for example, the export of peat and firewood, in the Urals, now lost villages with the only mode of transport.
      2. 0
        5 March 2017 21: 31
        no one can restore order without economic necessity. the peasants did not go because the townspeople and they do not need 2 ways, + stations + 2 levels of traveling. Only industry forced to build commercial interests (and they worked against former serfs).
        The transition to a predominantly urban life solved the issue with the railway. Now, I believe, we need to develop more suburban railway (BUILD !!!) and connect entire regions of the country. This February Altai turned to a halt — the cars were closed, and they were working (this is probably one of the reasons for the return of Stolypin migrants from harsh Siberia).
        In an agrarian country there is always peace and quiet ... without moving.
  12. +1
    28 February 2017 20: 28
    Alexander, thank you for the story, but let me clarify: the father and son of the Cherepanovs AFTER a trip to England built a translation ("History of military-historical intelligence")
    The construction of the Moscow-Petersburg Railway in every way was sabotaged by the landowners and the highest dignitaries "if the Emperor has such a toy, there is Tsarskoye Selo and enough" and only the tsar’s will has broken the stubbornness of dignitaries "(Science and Life, Homeland). It is noteworthy that even in At the beginning of the 20th century, there were many dissatisfied with Russian society for the construction of railways: “trade fell, cities were desolate” (Ignatiev, “Fifty Years in Service”)
    About the "strategic foresight of Nicholas 1" the first time they spoke in WWI and in the fall of 1941, supposedly these are the words of L. M. Established
    I doubt that there was a strategic foresight of Nicholas, probably the Americans modeled the roads in the Southern states, the American Whistler was from Alabama ;?)
  13. +1
    1 March 2017 11: 28
    Ours in the WAR had even more difficult: if the Wehrmacht, when re-flashing the gauge, could use our existing sleepers (wider - not already), then when the Red Army entered the geyrop we also had to put new sleepers, since their length (calculated for a narrow gauge) did not Meets the technical requirements of our broad gauge ...

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