Syrian War Test
Of course, there can be no talk of any summing up of the results of the Syrian war - it is very far from complete. But this war is too important for us and for all mankind as a whole. Today, Syria is the center of the world, although the Syrians themselves have not the slightest joy from it.
At the moment, the situation in the country is highly uncertain, the prospects may be very different. The reason for this uncertainty was the Russian military campaign, which began almost a year and a half ago. If it were not for us, everything would be much more definite: Syria today would be the scene of a showdown between three types of radical Islamists - the Islamic Caliphate (ISIL, prohibited in the Russian Federation), also banned in Russia by Jebhat an Qaeda, now Jabhat Fath al-Sham, the essence of the renaming does not change) and the others, whom in the West, and in part in our country, are considered to be “moderate opposition”. This term is also absurd, like the Arab Spring as applied to the current Middle East catastrophe (or the “revolution of dignity” as applied to the criminal-oligarchic coup in Kiev three years ago). Moreover, both words are absurd - “moderate” (what moderation is, nobody knows), and “opposition” (since when did armed gangs of thugs come to be so called?).
Perhaps the only thing in which the rest is better than the “caliphate” and “en-Nusra” is that they are not going to carry “Wahhabi happiness” beyond the borders of Syria. Only in this is their moderation. And that is why they are the weakest side of the internal Syrian conflict.
Radicals from all over the Islamic world go to the “caliphate” and “en-Nusra”, while the rest are forced to use internal resources that are far from unlimited. True, they receive various material assistance from Turkey, the Arabian monarchies and the West, but much of this assistance is soon provided by the same “caliphate” and “al-Nusra”, to whom the “moderate” recipients of this assistance constantly flow. After all, there are no ideological contradictions between “radicals” and “moderate”, their conflicts are in the nature of “intraspecific competition”.
ARMY ASADA DEEDS RESPECT
The Syrian army, like the “moderate opposition,” is forced to rely, first of all, on the country's internal resources, which are quickly drying up. External assistance before the start of the Russian operation was provided by Iran: its own fighters of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) and Shiite volunteers from Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, this assistance is not comparable in its scope with that received by the opponents of al-Asad. Our Syrian army is considered to be considered bad and weak, which obviously does not correspond to reality. A poor and weak army simply could not have waged such a cruel and exhausting war for so long. In the Syrian army there are many deserters, she suffered many defeats, but she didn’t have the transfer of whole units to the side of the enemy, as in Libya in 2011, or the stampede of whole divisions, when all weapon and the technique was left to the “caliphate”, as in Iraq in 2014. And about the defenders of Quairis and Deir-ez-Zor in general, you can compose odes as about epic heroes. Nevertheless, the Syrian army was doomed to defeat precisely because of the incompatibility of its resources with the resources of the enemy. Only Russia has managed to make a turning point in the war.
If we do not consider the two Chechen wars, which were essentially civil, the war in Syria for Russia for the entire period after 1945 was the most successful in military terms and the most just in the political. By engaging extremely limited forces, Russia achieved that the Syrian army not only ceased to retreat, but began to return the previously lost territory. This is very revealing against the background of the Western operation against the “caliphate”, which has been going on for a year longer than the Russian one, but it is extremely difficult to understand its results (however, it is not clear, but what the West was looking for).
Even more interesting is the comparison of our war in Syria with our war in Afghanistan in 1979-1989. Our losses in people in Syria are about 100 times lower than they were in Afghanistan (over the same period of time), in aviation technology - almost 10 times lower, there are no losses in ground equipment at all. At the same time, in Syria, we have achieved a qualitative improvement in the situation in our favor, while in Afghanistan during the first year and a half of the war the situation only worsened, although our current enemy in Syria is much stronger than it was at the beginning of the war in Afghanistan.
It is absolutely correct that the Russian group began to fight against all opponents of Assad. First, as mentioned above, there are in fact no “moderates” in Syria. Secondly, and more importantly, it is impossible to fight against the main enemy (ISIL), which occupies almost the entire east of the country, having many enclaves in the rear, from which the Syrian army is being attacked, "Nusra" and "moderate". Could we successfully fight with Hitler, having large internal uprisings, for example, in Uzbekistan and in Siberia? The negative answer is obvious.
The disadvantage of our grouping in Syria is one - its limitations. It is because of the lack of our forces that the success of the Syrian troops is less than expected, it is this lack that is the cause of the loss of Palmyra or the acute crisis in Deir ez-Zor. But the military is not to blame for its limited strength. Here we must talk about the political side of the war.
As mentioned above, without Russian intervention, Syria would now be under the complete control of Islamic radicals, automatically turning into an incubator for Sunni terrorism. This was Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001 year. However, Syria in this capacity is much more dangerous than Afghanistan: it is much better economically developed (in particular, it has a fairly strong industry) and is much more advantageous geographically located - it has access to the sea and is much closer to Russia and Europe. It would become an excellent base for the radicals, who would receive here practical and theoretical training, instructions, connections, money and weapons. And with all this, they would return to their homeland (or wherever the Wahhabi "party and government" would go). The objects of their expansion would be all countries with an Islamic population (even if it does not constitute a majority), but Russia would be the main direction.
WHY RUSSIA IS THIS WAR
We have a lot of resources, while we are actively fighting Islamic terrorism. Europe is less interesting in this respect, today it is rather another incubator of terrorism than its adversary. The United States is just too far beyond the oceans. That is, the expansion of radicals from Syria to Russia in the event of the collapse of Assad with probability 100% would start very quickly and on an ever-growing scale. It is so obvious that it is even strange to write about it. But it is doubly strange that almost no one sees it in some surprising way. Even supporters of our operation rejoice at how we strengthened our geopolitical positions and did not allow Qatar to build a gas pipeline to the Mediterranean Sea, and not because we are destroying the most dangerous enemy on its territory. Needless to say about the foolishness of the opponents of the operation (“why do we need someone else's war?”, “Why do we defend Assad executioner?”, “Putin distracts people from internal problems”, “we only need bases there” and other such nonsense). And if the terrorists, trained in Syria, begin their “work” with us, it is precisely now the foolish who will curse Putin most loudly for having admitted this (and in this case they will be right). At the same time, it is obvious that we need bases and Asad, because without them we simply cannot fight this absolutely necessary war for us.
However, the Kremlin has clearly had, and apparently still has, an additional political goal — through a common struggle against terrorism, to reconcile with the West. What was absolutely impossible: for the ruling Western liberals in the West, Russia is much more dangerous than the Islamic Caliphate, so there could be no reconciliation. Neither on the basis of the fight against terrorism, nor on any other basis.
It is the pursuit of this unattainable goal, coupled with the lack of forces, that is the cause of regular truces and the reduction of the already small forces that Moscow proclaims. The truce a year ago, as expected (see "Would not regret the truce" in the "NVO" from 04.03.16) did not bring "no benefit other than harm," only strengthening the enemy and delaying the capture of Aleppo. The current truce may be of some benefit due to the changing position of Turkey.
Until July last year, Turkey played a key role in the fight against Assad and his allies. Absolutely all the groups, including the “Caliphate” and “An-Nusra”, received help from people, money and weapons either from Turkey itself or through it. In July, an attempted coup occurred in Turkey 2016, the organization of which Erdogan attributed to the United States. It is extremely difficult to say how much he is right, but the very emotional and power-hungry Turkish president began to reconcile himself in a forced regime with Moscow and Tehran. And even to fight against the caliphate, to the creation of which he himself had a very strong hand (in these battles, the Turkish army had already suffered serious losses in people and technology). True, the main opponents of Turkey in Syria are the Kurds, who have always fought against the Sunni radicals. But the Kurds are too actively supported by the United States, which somewhat alienated Moscow from them and further aggravated the conflict with Ankara.
The so-called moderate is most dependent on Turkey. First of all, we are talking about the Free Syrian Army (FSA), a kind of personification of the mythical "moderation". In fact, the SSA is the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, which in Egypt is absolutely rightly banned for Islamic extremism. But the ruling Justice and Development Party in Turkey since 2002 has been the Turkish branch of the same “brothers”. Now Ankara began to demand from the SSA and other pro-Turkish groups not so hard to fight against Assad, but to switch to the “Caliphate” and “An-Nusra”. This has already led to a split in Idlib, the largest opposition enclave in northwestern Syria. The “moderate” people there under pressure from Ankara were forced to decide who they were with, or against. As was to be expected, the majority of the “moderates” chose an alliance with the “unlimited”, that is, with the local al-Qaeda, since they never had any moderation. But this has already led to a war in Idlib between Al-Qaida / al-Nusroy and those who continue to focus on Ankara, which should be considered the most important positive result of the current truce. The correctness of Assad’s policy to eliminate opposition enclaves in the south-west of the country, where militants surrender their territory, heavy weapons and with small arms freely travel to Idlib was confirmed. Now they began to kill each other there, which should be most welcome.
TURNING OUT OF CONTRADICTIONS IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE
Thus, it is now possible, after achieving a truce with a part of the factions and allowing the militants to destroy themselves in Idlib, to focus on the fight against the "Caliphate." In the event of his defeat, all other groups will, in fact, be able to dictate the terms of surrender from Damascus and Moscow, since they have no chance of winning. But this is a theory. In practice, there are a number of very serious obstacles to the implementation of this scenario.
First, it is difficult to fight against the “caliphate”, because it is very strong, which is confirmed constantly in Syria and in Iraq. For a decisive victory over him need the deployment of powerful ground forces. Syrian troops are not enough for this even with a truce with some factions. The Iranians and friendly Shiites from other countries are not ready for a wider presence than they are now; they have already suffered very serious losses. Russia initially does not want to bear these losses, especially since we will also have serious logistical problems due to the lack of a border with Syria. By the same aircraft, it is absolutely impossible to defeat the “caliphate”.
At the same time, if we argue cynically, to a certain extent, we, like many other Islamic countries (now almost all of Europe are of this type), benefit from the existence of a “caliphate” in the current “limited form” rather than its total defeat. In the event of a defeat, the surviving militants will scatter around the world, taking up "favorite things" in their countries, including Russia. In its current form, the “caliphate”, on the contrary, attracts militants to Syria and Iraq, where they can be destroyed in any quantity. The trouble is that in the end it will lead to the collapse of the Syrian state, which is already exhausted to the limit, and then we get the sad version, which is described at the beginning of the article.
Secondly, Assad and Erdogan hate each other, there can be no real peace between them, which they do not hide. The conflict in the region of northeastern Syria in the area controlled by the “caliphate” of the city of Al-Bab can be a catalyst for the conflict. From the north, the Turks are attacking it in alliance with the SSA, while slightly east of the Turks are fighting against the Kurds, who, in turn, are also fighting against the “caliphate”. And from the south, through the positions of the same “caliphate”, the Syrian government army is making its way to the city. In the end, defeating the local grouping of the “caliphate”, the Syrian troops will meet with the Turks and the SSA, who are enemies for them, and the Turks are also the aggressors (Damascus did not invite them to their territory). Moscow can prevent a conflict for some time, but it will be impossible forever. Erdogan wants to control the north of Syria and defeat the Kurds, and for Assad, of course, the presence of Turkish troops in Syrian territory is unacceptable. From any point of view, Assad is right here, and in strategic terms Turkey was, is and will be our enemy. But now the direct Turkish-Syrian conflict will be our defeat and victory for the “caliphate”.
Third, the “blessed” Trump could be a big problem. Of course, he is better than Obama and European leaders because he is not a left-wing liberal. For him, Russia is not worse than the “caliphate”, but vice versa. Moreover, he is even ready for an alliance with Russia against the “caliphate”, which Moscow sought from the beginning of the Syrian operation. Unfortunately, Trump sharply hates Iran, without which victory over the “caliphate” is not possible. This country (unlike Russia and the United States) makes a significant contribution to the land war against the “caliphate” in Syria and Iraq, and airplanes (combat and transport) fly from Russia to Syria and back. There is no substitute for Iran neither in military nor in logistic aspect. In broad terms, Russia is completely unnecessary alliance with Iran, but in relation to the Syrian operation, this alliance has no alternative. If Trump really pursues an active anti-Iranian policy, this will become not just a victory, but a real triumph of the “caliphate”, and the rest of the “opposition”.
It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to break out of all these contradictions, and their aggravation can lead to a qualitative deterioration of the situation in Syria, crossing all our previous successes. Allowing ourselves to just “jump off” by declaring ourselves victorious, we cannot. No matter how much postmodernism triumph throughout the world, reality is still more important than the television picture. If we lose, declaring ourselves as winners will not make us so, even if the defeat is due to objective circumstances. We are not obliged from any point of view to save Syria, but its collapse, as mentioned above, will very soon lead the war to our territory. In this case, the sacrifices and expenses will be several orders of magnitude higher than what we bear now. Therefore, we must somehow maneuver between Tehran, Ankara, Washington and the Kurds, as well as between the natural reluctance to bear heavy losses, expenses and the absolute need to win a military victory. This task is extremely difficult, but it will have to be solved. Russia has made itself a key player in Syria, therefore, in all of world politics. For this success now have to pay.
At the moment, the situation in the country is highly uncertain, the prospects may be very different. The reason for this uncertainty was the Russian military campaign, which began almost a year and a half ago. If it were not for us, everything would be much more definite: Syria today would be the scene of a showdown between three types of radical Islamists - the Islamic Caliphate (ISIL, prohibited in the Russian Federation), also banned in Russia by Jebhat an Qaeda, now Jabhat Fath al-Sham, the essence of the renaming does not change) and the others, whom in the West, and in part in our country, are considered to be “moderate opposition”. This term is also absurd, like the Arab Spring as applied to the current Middle East catastrophe (or the “revolution of dignity” as applied to the criminal-oligarchic coup in Kiev three years ago). Moreover, both words are absurd - “moderate” (what moderation is, nobody knows), and “opposition” (since when did armed gangs of thugs come to be so called?).
Perhaps the only thing in which the rest is better than the “caliphate” and “en-Nusra” is that they are not going to carry “Wahhabi happiness” beyond the borders of Syria. Only in this is their moderation. And that is why they are the weakest side of the internal Syrian conflict.
Radicals from all over the Islamic world go to the “caliphate” and “en-Nusra”, while the rest are forced to use internal resources that are far from unlimited. True, they receive various material assistance from Turkey, the Arabian monarchies and the West, but much of this assistance is soon provided by the same “caliphate” and “al-Nusra”, to whom the “moderate” recipients of this assistance constantly flow. After all, there are no ideological contradictions between “radicals” and “moderate”, their conflicts are in the nature of “intraspecific competition”.
ARMY ASADA DEEDS RESPECT
The Syrian army, like the “moderate opposition,” is forced to rely, first of all, on the country's internal resources, which are quickly drying up. External assistance before the start of the Russian operation was provided by Iran: its own fighters of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) and Shiite volunteers from Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, this assistance is not comparable in its scope with that received by the opponents of al-Asad. Our Syrian army is considered to be considered bad and weak, which obviously does not correspond to reality. A poor and weak army simply could not have waged such a cruel and exhausting war for so long. In the Syrian army there are many deserters, she suffered many defeats, but she didn’t have the transfer of whole units to the side of the enemy, as in Libya in 2011, or the stampede of whole divisions, when all weapon and the technique was left to the “caliphate”, as in Iraq in 2014. And about the defenders of Quairis and Deir-ez-Zor in general, you can compose odes as about epic heroes. Nevertheless, the Syrian army was doomed to defeat precisely because of the incompatibility of its resources with the resources of the enemy. Only Russia has managed to make a turning point in the war.
If we do not consider the two Chechen wars, which were essentially civil, the war in Syria for Russia for the entire period after 1945 was the most successful in military terms and the most just in the political. By engaging extremely limited forces, Russia achieved that the Syrian army not only ceased to retreat, but began to return the previously lost territory. This is very revealing against the background of the Western operation against the “caliphate”, which has been going on for a year longer than the Russian one, but it is extremely difficult to understand its results (however, it is not clear, but what the West was looking for).
Even more interesting is the comparison of our war in Syria with our war in Afghanistan in 1979-1989. Our losses in people in Syria are about 100 times lower than they were in Afghanistan (over the same period of time), in aviation technology - almost 10 times lower, there are no losses in ground equipment at all. At the same time, in Syria, we have achieved a qualitative improvement in the situation in our favor, while in Afghanistan during the first year and a half of the war the situation only worsened, although our current enemy in Syria is much stronger than it was at the beginning of the war in Afghanistan.
It is absolutely correct that the Russian group began to fight against all opponents of Assad. First, as mentioned above, there are in fact no “moderates” in Syria. Secondly, and more importantly, it is impossible to fight against the main enemy (ISIL), which occupies almost the entire east of the country, having many enclaves in the rear, from which the Syrian army is being attacked, "Nusra" and "moderate". Could we successfully fight with Hitler, having large internal uprisings, for example, in Uzbekistan and in Siberia? The negative answer is obvious.
The disadvantage of our grouping in Syria is one - its limitations. It is because of the lack of our forces that the success of the Syrian troops is less than expected, it is this lack that is the cause of the loss of Palmyra or the acute crisis in Deir ez-Zor. But the military is not to blame for its limited strength. Here we must talk about the political side of the war.
As mentioned above, without Russian intervention, Syria would now be under the complete control of Islamic radicals, automatically turning into an incubator for Sunni terrorism. This was Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001 year. However, Syria in this capacity is much more dangerous than Afghanistan: it is much better economically developed (in particular, it has a fairly strong industry) and is much more advantageous geographically located - it has access to the sea and is much closer to Russia and Europe. It would become an excellent base for the radicals, who would receive here practical and theoretical training, instructions, connections, money and weapons. And with all this, they would return to their homeland (or wherever the Wahhabi "party and government" would go). The objects of their expansion would be all countries with an Islamic population (even if it does not constitute a majority), but Russia would be the main direction.
WHY RUSSIA IS THIS WAR
We have a lot of resources, while we are actively fighting Islamic terrorism. Europe is less interesting in this respect, today it is rather another incubator of terrorism than its adversary. The United States is just too far beyond the oceans. That is, the expansion of radicals from Syria to Russia in the event of the collapse of Assad with probability 100% would start very quickly and on an ever-growing scale. It is so obvious that it is even strange to write about it. But it is doubly strange that almost no one sees it in some surprising way. Even supporters of our operation rejoice at how we strengthened our geopolitical positions and did not allow Qatar to build a gas pipeline to the Mediterranean Sea, and not because we are destroying the most dangerous enemy on its territory. Needless to say about the foolishness of the opponents of the operation (“why do we need someone else's war?”, “Why do we defend Assad executioner?”, “Putin distracts people from internal problems”, “we only need bases there” and other such nonsense). And if the terrorists, trained in Syria, begin their “work” with us, it is precisely now the foolish who will curse Putin most loudly for having admitted this (and in this case they will be right). At the same time, it is obvious that we need bases and Asad, because without them we simply cannot fight this absolutely necessary war for us.
However, the Kremlin has clearly had, and apparently still has, an additional political goal — through a common struggle against terrorism, to reconcile with the West. What was absolutely impossible: for the ruling Western liberals in the West, Russia is much more dangerous than the Islamic Caliphate, so there could be no reconciliation. Neither on the basis of the fight against terrorism, nor on any other basis.
It is the pursuit of this unattainable goal, coupled with the lack of forces, that is the cause of regular truces and the reduction of the already small forces that Moscow proclaims. The truce a year ago, as expected (see "Would not regret the truce" in the "NVO" from 04.03.16) did not bring "no benefit other than harm," only strengthening the enemy and delaying the capture of Aleppo. The current truce may be of some benefit due to the changing position of Turkey.
Until July last year, Turkey played a key role in the fight against Assad and his allies. Absolutely all the groups, including the “Caliphate” and “An-Nusra”, received help from people, money and weapons either from Turkey itself or through it. In July, an attempted coup occurred in Turkey 2016, the organization of which Erdogan attributed to the United States. It is extremely difficult to say how much he is right, but the very emotional and power-hungry Turkish president began to reconcile himself in a forced regime with Moscow and Tehran. And even to fight against the caliphate, to the creation of which he himself had a very strong hand (in these battles, the Turkish army had already suffered serious losses in people and technology). True, the main opponents of Turkey in Syria are the Kurds, who have always fought against the Sunni radicals. But the Kurds are too actively supported by the United States, which somewhat alienated Moscow from them and further aggravated the conflict with Ankara.
The so-called moderate is most dependent on Turkey. First of all, we are talking about the Free Syrian Army (FSA), a kind of personification of the mythical "moderation". In fact, the SSA is the Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, which in Egypt is absolutely rightly banned for Islamic extremism. But the ruling Justice and Development Party in Turkey since 2002 has been the Turkish branch of the same “brothers”. Now Ankara began to demand from the SSA and other pro-Turkish groups not so hard to fight against Assad, but to switch to the “Caliphate” and “An-Nusra”. This has already led to a split in Idlib, the largest opposition enclave in northwestern Syria. The “moderate” people there under pressure from Ankara were forced to decide who they were with, or against. As was to be expected, the majority of the “moderates” chose an alliance with the “unlimited”, that is, with the local al-Qaeda, since they never had any moderation. But this has already led to a war in Idlib between Al-Qaida / al-Nusroy and those who continue to focus on Ankara, which should be considered the most important positive result of the current truce. The correctness of Assad’s policy to eliminate opposition enclaves in the south-west of the country, where militants surrender their territory, heavy weapons and with small arms freely travel to Idlib was confirmed. Now they began to kill each other there, which should be most welcome.
TURNING OUT OF CONTRADICTIONS IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE
Thus, it is now possible, after achieving a truce with a part of the factions and allowing the militants to destroy themselves in Idlib, to focus on the fight against the "Caliphate." In the event of his defeat, all other groups will, in fact, be able to dictate the terms of surrender from Damascus and Moscow, since they have no chance of winning. But this is a theory. In practice, there are a number of very serious obstacles to the implementation of this scenario.
First, it is difficult to fight against the “caliphate”, because it is very strong, which is confirmed constantly in Syria and in Iraq. For a decisive victory over him need the deployment of powerful ground forces. Syrian troops are not enough for this even with a truce with some factions. The Iranians and friendly Shiites from other countries are not ready for a wider presence than they are now; they have already suffered very serious losses. Russia initially does not want to bear these losses, especially since we will also have serious logistical problems due to the lack of a border with Syria. By the same aircraft, it is absolutely impossible to defeat the “caliphate”.
At the same time, if we argue cynically, to a certain extent, we, like many other Islamic countries (now almost all of Europe are of this type), benefit from the existence of a “caliphate” in the current “limited form” rather than its total defeat. In the event of a defeat, the surviving militants will scatter around the world, taking up "favorite things" in their countries, including Russia. In its current form, the “caliphate”, on the contrary, attracts militants to Syria and Iraq, where they can be destroyed in any quantity. The trouble is that in the end it will lead to the collapse of the Syrian state, which is already exhausted to the limit, and then we get the sad version, which is described at the beginning of the article.
Secondly, Assad and Erdogan hate each other, there can be no real peace between them, which they do not hide. The conflict in the region of northeastern Syria in the area controlled by the “caliphate” of the city of Al-Bab can be a catalyst for the conflict. From the north, the Turks are attacking it in alliance with the SSA, while slightly east of the Turks are fighting against the Kurds, who, in turn, are also fighting against the “caliphate”. And from the south, through the positions of the same “caliphate”, the Syrian government army is making its way to the city. In the end, defeating the local grouping of the “caliphate”, the Syrian troops will meet with the Turks and the SSA, who are enemies for them, and the Turks are also the aggressors (Damascus did not invite them to their territory). Moscow can prevent a conflict for some time, but it will be impossible forever. Erdogan wants to control the north of Syria and defeat the Kurds, and for Assad, of course, the presence of Turkish troops in Syrian territory is unacceptable. From any point of view, Assad is right here, and in strategic terms Turkey was, is and will be our enemy. But now the direct Turkish-Syrian conflict will be our defeat and victory for the “caliphate”.
Third, the “blessed” Trump could be a big problem. Of course, he is better than Obama and European leaders because he is not a left-wing liberal. For him, Russia is not worse than the “caliphate”, but vice versa. Moreover, he is even ready for an alliance with Russia against the “caliphate”, which Moscow sought from the beginning of the Syrian operation. Unfortunately, Trump sharply hates Iran, without which victory over the “caliphate” is not possible. This country (unlike Russia and the United States) makes a significant contribution to the land war against the “caliphate” in Syria and Iraq, and airplanes (combat and transport) fly from Russia to Syria and back. There is no substitute for Iran neither in military nor in logistic aspect. In broad terms, Russia is completely unnecessary alliance with Iran, but in relation to the Syrian operation, this alliance has no alternative. If Trump really pursues an active anti-Iranian policy, this will become not just a victory, but a real triumph of the “caliphate”, and the rest of the “opposition”.
It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to break out of all these contradictions, and their aggravation can lead to a qualitative deterioration of the situation in Syria, crossing all our previous successes. Allowing ourselves to just “jump off” by declaring ourselves victorious, we cannot. No matter how much postmodernism triumph throughout the world, reality is still more important than the television picture. If we lose, declaring ourselves as winners will not make us so, even if the defeat is due to objective circumstances. We are not obliged from any point of view to save Syria, but its collapse, as mentioned above, will very soon lead the war to our territory. In this case, the sacrifices and expenses will be several orders of magnitude higher than what we bear now. Therefore, we must somehow maneuver between Tehran, Ankara, Washington and the Kurds, as well as between the natural reluctance to bear heavy losses, expenses and the absolute need to win a military victory. This task is extremely difficult, but it will have to be solved. Russia has made itself a key player in Syria, therefore, in all of world politics. For this success now have to pay.
Information