In peak Macedonian

6
The future world war will be a clash of information technologies, with whose help and against which “blows” will be delivered. This, of course, leaves a significant imprint on the appearance of the weapons system: on the qualitative component, and on the number of VVST of a particular type.

In this regard, the following tasks of research organizations of the Ministry of Defense in the field of technical equipment of the RF Armed Forces should be highlighted. The first is the building of the appearance of the weapons system corresponding to the nature of the wars of the new generation. The second is the determination of the order of formation of such an appearance, that is, the nature, sequence and timing of changes in the parameters of the WWST.



In the most general terms, scientific support for solving the listed problems will consist in conducting research in a number of areas. To solve the first you need:

1. Forecasting the development of science, technology and technology, assessing their impact on the appearance of means of warfare.

It is often extremely difficult to determine how this or that scientific discovery, technical achievement, technological trick will influence the nature of war. Therefore, here we are dealing with one of the most difficult types of forecasting. Moreover, the emergence of new species weapons in some cases, for a long time, it has a negligible effect on tactics. This is explained by the imperfection of the new weapon, and sometimes by its rejection by the military. For example, the closed system used during the Napoleonic wars was not much different from the phalanx of Alexander the Great, who fought only with melee weapons. One explanation for this is the low tactical-technical characteristics of single-shot smooth-bore rifles. Only the emergence of a more high-tech variety, a rifled one, and subsequently a quick-firing bug, finally buried the tactics of a closed formation. At the same time, the famous military leader Mikhail Dragomirov negatively assessed the effectiveness of the use of a machine gun.

Although opposite examples are known. The discovery of a chain reaction was used as soon as possible to create nuclear weapons, and the jet movement was initially improved only for military purposes.

The main scientific method of solving this scientific problem is to determine the needs of troops for the conduct of hostilities in modern conditions (that is, forecasting the nature of war, etc.), monitoring and forecasting scientific achievements, comparing these two information blocks and establishing, based on an analysis of contradictions between needs troops and the capabilities of the existing WWST. As well as the identification of those scientific areas that can be implemented in the new technology and technology of warfare.

2. Forecasting the development of VVST in leading countries.

Only a few states are capable of conducting research on the entire spectrum of armaments. In the rest, efforts are focused on individual priority research areas that can be intensively developed due to national peculiarities - economic, technical, technological.

The main task of research in this area is forecasting the development of military technology and technology, breakthroughs in this area in countries that are potentially able to become competitors in the arms market or opponents.

3. Determination of requirements for the performance of domestic prospective VVST.

Both symmetrical and asymmetrical approaches are possible here. The first is based on the principle “The performance characteristics of the domestic VVST should be no worse than the best foreign ones”. Asymmetrical development follows the principle “Domestic WWIS must ensure adequate resistance to foreign ones”.

In peak Macedonian


Certainly, a symmetric approach is more acceptable from the point of view of ensuring competitiveness in foreign markets, methodologically simpler, minimizes the risk when building up the combat potential of domestic groups of troops necessary to counter threats. However, this approach is not always feasible - above all economically. This is especially true of high-tech VVST, the development and production of which is several times or even an order of magnitude more expensive compared to samples of previous generations.

An asymmetrical approach is aimed at defeating the most vulnerable and costly elements of the enemy’s weapons. These currently include reconnaissance, information support systems, including communications and control. It is assumed that the cost of asymmetric destruction will be many times lower than the damage inflicted on the enemy, or will lead to a significant reduction in the effectiveness of his weapon systems.

We are talking about a proactive, conscious transition to the development of the domestic armament system on principles that are significantly different from those adopted in the states that are likely opponents. With regard to confrontation with highly developed countries, this is the desire to develop those samples that, at relatively low cost, are able to provide effective resistance to costly VVST. Of course, such an approach is more risky, since the potential of an asymmetric effect can be lost if the enemy has reliable means of protection.

However, the reasoning about this is rather speculative, since the military story almost does not know examples of its effective implementation. You can recall the actions of the conquistadors armed with firearms against the American Indians or the use of tanks British, chemical weapons by the Germans in World War I. But these facts can hardly be attributed to the asymmetric approach. In the first case, there was a clash of different civilizations, which did not prepare for war with each other in advance. The second example is a reflection of the superiority in the development of technical and technological thought of one country compared to another, which ensured the sudden appearance of a new type of weapon. Moreover, the latest types of “asymmetry” were eliminated as soon as possible.

The history of the development of weapons, as the analysis shows, consists of a huge number of examples of “symmetry”. The appearance of new samples from one side led to the immediate creation of their counterparts from the other.

Consequently, this stage of scientific work is the most difficult and demanding, since not only the efficiency of resource expenditures allocated by the country for armament, but also its defensive ability in the long term depends on the chosen directions for the development of the VVST. It is necessary to build adequate and sustained models of power confrontation over a long historical period, to check with them the decisions taken regarding the development directions of the VVST taking into account the prediction results obtained in the course of the research indicated in paragraph 2.

4. Forecasting the parameters of equipment of the armies of leading countries with weapons and military equipment.

The calculation is based on the forecast of the gross domestic product of a particular country, the determination of the possible share of deductions from GDP for military needs and estimates of the directions of spending of these funds (in other words, the volume of financing the procurement of a particular type of VVST). This should take into account the capabilities of the industry of the studied state for the development and production of VVST, their price, cost parameters of samples that can be purchased abroad. That is, it is mainly about the methods of economic analysis. They, like those described in 3, are characterized by a high degree of uncertainty and, accordingly, their results can have a rather large error. Therefore, it is necessary to conduct duplicate studies, for example, using mathematical modeling and expert estimates, which would reduce the level of uncertainty and reduce the error.

5. Identification of quantitative requirements for the weapons system of the RF Armed Forces based on the content of threats, the likelihood of the occurrence and nature of wars into which Russia may be drawn, and the equipment of the opposing groups.

Conducting such research includes the following main steps associated with the definition:

the composition of the group of troops of the probable enemy and the dynamics of changes in the combat potential of VVST samples during the program period;
the likelihood of war on each of the strategic directions (this is necessary to reduce the requirements for the combat potential of its troops where the threat is low, otherwise there will be a need to implement the principle of “equal strength in all azimuths”, which is impossible economically);
permissible correlation of forces in directions depending on the type of operations performed, for example, when defensive operations are conducted by our troops, the ratio of forces 1: 3 in favor of the enemy is allowed;
states of the AMST being in the army during the program period;
the combat potential of the domestic military installation at the end of this period, excluding the replenishment of new and repaired;
differences in the combat capabilities of the military anti-missile forces of the opposing grouping of troops and the armed forces of the Russian Federation (in areas);
the required value of building up the combat potential of domestic VVS, taking into account the likelihood of conflict and the type of planned operations to repel aggression;
the contribution of the type of weapons to the solution of the tasks and, accordingly, the share of the combat potential for each of the types of weapons of military weapons;
rational decisions to ensure the supply of the required number of VVST.


In turn, to solve the second task, research is needed to determine the time frame for obsolescence of traditional AMEs and to start developing samples of new generations, their nomenclature, and financial costs.

This line of research is aimed at evaluating only those funds that are supposed to be developed on the basis of the continuity of the physical processes underlying their design (for example, tanks, airplanes, etc.). Such scientific problems lend themselves well to formalization, are based on well-known and proven mathematical methods, are sufficiently developed.

It is also necessary to determine the range of unconventional AMEs to be developed during the program period and the amount of financial expenditures required for this, as well as technical means to ensure the implementation of new methods of warfare. This direction is singled out as an independent one, since it is more complex, difficult to formalize, and methodologically very different depending on the type of VVST. Especially it concerns the evaluation of the effectiveness of products, since often there is no any clear concept of the combat use of new types of weapons, and there are no methods for predicting the costs of developing them. These include the weapons of non-lethal, laser, beam, information, etc.

As for the means of providing new methods of military actions, then, first of all, it is necessary to include computer-based decision support systems.

Large-scale research on the whole spectrum of weapons research on new physical principles in our country is impossible due to financial constraints. Therefore, it is necessary to define a list of works aimed at creating in the future a weapon system that ensures the effective conduct of military operations against any possible adversary.

This is a very costly business, so the initial stages require a detailed study of the feasibility of such WME, including timing, systemic assessment of industrial feasibility, including the capabilities of the raw material base, solving personnel, environmental and other problems. As well as an analysis of the effectiveness of combat use (taking into account international norms and obligations), advantages over existing weapons.

Next is the definition of the VVST nomenclature, the volumes of their deliveries during the program period, which are necessary to achieve the quantitative parameters of the armament system, established when solving the first task required for this financing. Linking the development plans of the weapons system with the budget allocated by the state for national defense.

As a rule, the development and production of VVST are expensive. Therefore, the formation of plans for the development of an armament system is connected with the solution of the task of maximizing its effectiveness under resource constraints (not only financial, but also raw materials, production, technology, personnel, and others).

The development of a methodology for the feasibility study of equipping the Armed Forces and other troops should provide a search for ways to effectively improve the country's defense capability, while significantly accelerating scientific and technological progress, changing methods of warfare, creating weapons on new physical principles. As well as the presence of numerous restrictions existing within our country and affecting the development opportunities of domestic AMC.
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  1. +3
    12 February 2017 15: 21
    After the invention of puff, there is no point in anything. 400-500 megatons can be detonated at the assembly site. And even cockroaches will not remain.
    No one is preparing for a global war. War consumables, tanks and planes cost so much that even the United States cannot take out mass construction to replace the departed. Even if it prints candy wrappers. There are simply not enough qualified specialists. Big uncles can fight in some kind of Bantustan for the sake of their interests, and the sun is sharpened for this.
    To apologists of a maneuverable war I’ll ask one question, how to deliver fuel in a territory that is not 100% controlled? For hundreds of tanks and armored personnel carriers, this is possible: Iraq is an example, but if the bill goes to thousands? Are distances measured in hundreds of kilometers?
  2. +2
    12 February 2017 18: 13
    Unexpectedly good article. Is our military science still somewhere else? Still not dead in at least one head? It’s amazing. So then, in general, the complete impression is that by “military science” they now understand a golem cut, accompanied by a science-like boltology ... However. Here it is:
    As applied to the confrontation with highly developed countries, this is the desire to develop those models that, at a relatively low cost, are able to provide effective resistance to the costly IWIS. Of course, this approach is more risky, because in the event of the enemy appearing reliable means of defense, the potential of asymmetric impact may be lost.
    However, discussions about this are rather speculative, since military history hardly knows any examples of its effective implementation.
    Is that right? And let's give an example? He sprang up like a peppy guy, pure indulge. He loved to fight before dinner ... The Napoleonic army was distinguished by the most advanced weapons at that time. Artillery was beyond praise, moreover, controlled by a brilliant (without exaggeration) commander. Plus the resources of all of Europe. Plus fired veterans, masters of the then war. What did Russia contrast with all this?
    The guns are medium. The cavalry is strong, but nothing more. Cossacks, Bashkirs with bows. Extremely resilient, but without serious experience infantryman. No wonder Napoleon set aside a complete victory for a couple of months ... So. The “Special Expedition” presented the command not some results of the horse search in the direction of the enemy’s positions, as was then customary, but the full layout of the enemy’s army, as well as of supplies, suppliers, and manufacturers of weapons and equipment. Plus a whole program of sabotage in the enemy rear. Plus "agents of influence." Plus ... So in those days no one fought. Nobody did it at all, and didn’t even think about it. Well, except that Napoleon issued fake Russian bank notes. where did Chernyshov get all this ?! The riddle ...
    Farther. Force to force did not begin to beat. Kutuzov blew the enemy under Borodin and calmly walked away. Clearly and accurately, I am sure that with the calculations, Kutuzov hit the French with supplies. I contrasted the war machine with the burned-down Foragir cart and long, long versts. In the mud, in the rain, in the snow. Across the rivers began to attack, military geniuses? Well, do not say that you were not warned ...
    Here is an example of the purest alternative approach to war. Superbly worked. By the way, quite in line with the thoughts and ideas of the author. To contrast the generals who have been at war with the last decades, carefree and carefree (the printing press pays for everything, the bandits are fighting instead of the soldiers) in the style of the unforgettable Eric Frank Russell Kutuzov’s approach. Thought. Counted. Abandoned the "beauty." Let the enemies fight with robots, we will take it with the mind, we have our own intelligence, instead of the machine one. Then we will win. As usual.
  3. +4
    12 February 2017 19: 32
    The idea is true. Asymmetric answer - it is always more profitable. Here is a small example with sighting systems on the Su-24. Not very complicated, in general, an additional system - and simple "cast-iron" turned into high-precision ammunition ...
    Too sophisticated weapons tied to even more sophisticated positioning systems, and wound control systems - causes concern. Here is the artillery. I got attached to the map, hit myself and the target, a couple of minutes with a calculator - and I'm ready to shoot. On the sides of the world to orient - a compass to help you. Of course, Glonas is convenient, but if he is not there, the shells will fly to the target. And if the enemy artillerymen without a satellite can no longer prepare data for firing - and the satellite suddenly - stops working? Or, even more fun, the enemy EW gives an error in the coordinates? Expensive is not always better. Especially in a war where everything is against you ...
  4. 0
    12 February 2017 23: 44
    Quote: Mountain Shooter
    Expensive is not always better.

    In addition, a priori there can not be many weapons. It will ruin any country.
    An example from antiquity - it seems Ancient Rome (do not hit with slippers, if this is not a historical fact, but a fiction).
    A highly professional army with quite good weapons from expensive bronze and a crowd of "barbarian" and iron swords, albeit from a fairly soft, not hardened. The armies of the barbarians of the Romans could not oppose the army of the same amount. There were people, but weapons .....

    And the main thing is not only to study and predict, but also to act. Using the already accumulated experience of local wars and for issuing TK for the development of weapons and military equipment
    1. 0
      13 February 2017 06: 23
      Quote: Old26
      An example from antiquity - it seems Ancient Rome (do not hit with slippers, if this is not a historical fact, but a fiction).

      Here for such a crap not slippers, sandals of the Roman infantryman must be beaten! angry Yes
      Quote: Old26
      A highly professional army with quite good weapons from expensive bronze and a crowd of "barbarian" and iron swords, albeit from a fairly soft, not hardened. The armies of the barbarians of the Romans could not oppose the army of the same amount. There were people, but weapons .....

      There were just people and commanders! The names of Gaius Maria, Lucius Cornelius Sulla, and finally, Gaius Julius Caesar tell you something? Read on occasion, as they barbarians “could not” overcome! belay Does Caesar seem to have fought in Gaul, about 8 years old? And there were resources, and people and weapons! But when the Romans got sick to fight, and when barbarian mercenaries began to predominate in the army instead of Roman citizens, then at that time the Western Roman Empire came kirdyk! So there weren’t enough weapons, but just people! Yes hi
  5. 0
    13 February 2017 17: 32
    Quote: Vladislav 73
    There were just people and commanders! The names of Gaius Maria, Lucius Cornelius Sulla, and finally, Gaius Julius Caesar tell you something? Read on occasion, as they barbarians “could not” overcome! belay Caesar how many in Gaul, about 8 years seems to have fought? And there were resources, and people and weapons! But when the Romans got sick to fight, and when barbarian mercenaries began to predominate in the army instead of Roman citizens, then at that time the Western Roman Empire came kirdyk! So there weren’t enough weapons, but just people!

    What was the end result? Did the Romans conquer and smash the barbarians or did the barbarians multiply Rome by zero?