Will there be enough ammunition for war?
As far as can be judged, the supply of small ammunition in Russia is not considered a particular problem. Sometimes they complain about the low quality of domestic cartridges, sometimes there are suggestions about improving production technology and updating the fleet of equipment of ammunition factories, but in general it is not considered that supplying a sufficient number of cartridges is somewhat difficult. In any case, in numerous discussions about small arms, and AK in particular, very often the idea is expressed that “the cartridges are full”, or that “we are supplying cartridges abroad with billions of pieces,” and this idea is presented as not requiring proof. My own point of view is that the problem of supplying cartridges not only exists, but is very acute.
What is the expense in wartime?
In the planning of the supply of ammunition, as evidenced by the experience of the interwar period between the First and Second World Wars, usually proceed from the estimated need for ammunition for a certain period of warfare: a month or a year. The figure of the need for ammunition could be obtained by calculation, that is, by determining the average consumption of ammunition in a combat operation of a unit, for example, a division, army or front in a certain period of time, or it could be derived from combat practice. Often, these calculations were combined, and the result of the calculation of the ammunition consumption was corrected by data from combat practice, which was most often done for large offensive military operations in which the ammunition consumption was above the average.
In the interwar period and during World War II, there were no particular problems in the calculations. The experience of the First World War and the experience of operations already carried out gave extensive statistics that could be used as a basis for calculations. In the course of the war, standards were developed for the supply of ammunition to troops.
The main problem in the current supply of ammunition is that neither the Soviet nor the Russian army did not have combat experience, allowing them to accurately estimate the need for ammunition during the fighting. First, after the war, a sharp change in the structure of small arms took place, and instead of a Mosin rifle, the Kalashnikov assault rifle became the main weapon. For this reason, the experience of the Great Patriotic War cannot be applied directly. Secondly, the Soviet Army has not waged large-scale wars involving millions of armies ever since. All wars were fought by relatively few contingents, and even the Afghan war was attended by the 40 Army, whose number at the peak in 1988 was 102,1 thousand, while the total number of the Soviet Army was 4,6 million.
But since it is necessary to make at least some assessment, it is necessary to use the data that is. Starting data will be the consumption of ammunition during the Afghan war, the fighting in which was very intense and included major offensive operations. Since the structure of the small arms of the Russian army is similar to the structure of small arms of the 40 Army, these data can be taken as a basis.
Of course, we are not spoiled by the statistics of production and consumption of cartridges. However, in Kazakhstan, during the discussion of the construction of the ammunition plant, some figures were mentioned. According to the former Minister of Defense of Kazakhstan, Army General Mukhtar Altynbayev, the Soviet contingent in Afghanistan spent about 300 million cartridges per month.
From here you can take this factor: the army in 100 thousands of people during the fighting spends 300 million cartridges per month, or 3,6 billion cartridges per year. This is a very rough estimate, but no other data has been published. Therefore, we will use them. So, if the Soviet Army would have entered a large-scale war, then its expenditure during the year of the war would have been 165,6 billion pieces of ammunition. The Russian army, which numbered a million in 2016 in a year, would have spent 36 billions of rounds in a year of war.
For comparison: during the entire Great Patriotic War 17 billion was spent cartridges. It is clearly seen how dramatically increased the need for ammunition with the transition to automatic weapons.
Consumption in peacetime
In addition to the consumption of ammunition during the war, there is also an expense in peacetime - for the needs of training personnel shooting. The more this expense, the better the skills of the fighters, which affects the fighting. For example, before the war in the USSR, a massive shooting training program was carried out with the award of the Voroshilovsky shooter badge, within which it was prepared from 6 to 9 million shooters according to various data, and the results were immediately noted by the Germans. With the first days of the war on the Eastern Front, losses from rifle-and-machine-gun fire sharply increased.
In the Soviet and the Russian army, there was very little ammunition for the practice of one arrow: three trial, three credits. For comparison: the standard "Voroshilovsky shooter" provided 3 test shots and 10 credits, excluding pre-training. Although in some units the ammunition was allocated much more, nevertheless, general rifle training was at a very low level, despite the fact that automatic weapons require more practice than a rifle. This had its reasons, as will be discussed below.
How many ammo needed to prepare the shooter? In general, the minimum consumption is 150 cartridges. Shooting a moving target requires the expenditure of 500 cartridges, and the skill of shooting on the move requires 1500 cartridges. Total: the average level of shooting training of each shooter would require 650 cartridges. Given the practice of firing bursts this figure can be increased to 1000 cartridges. Zinc on the soldier (1080 cartridges 5,45 mm) - this is the necessary expenditure of ammunition for training, providing good skills.
From this, it is not difficult to calculate that the conditional million people undergoing rifle training will spend 150 millions of ammunition for minimum training and 1 billion ammunition for intermediate level training for training. Another 13 million cartridges would be required to receive credit according to the standards of the Voroshilovsky shooter.
In the USSR, from 1932 to 1940 years, 750 thousands of people passed the standards of the Voroshilovsky shooter per year. Now there is no such thing in Russia, and shooting training is conducted in the army. Every year, about 300 thousands of draftees pass through the army (this was a call from 2011 onwards). To receive a test in the USSR, 9,75 million cartridges were spent per year. In Russia, the control shooting exercise No. 2 (2 UKS) provides for the consumption of 30-35 cartridges, but those who serve say that 12 cartridges are actually consumed. Total goes from the calculation of 12 cartridges 3,6 million cartridges, or, on the basis of 30 cartridges, - 9 million cartridges.
If the infantry training was conducted with the achievement of sustainable skills, then the expenditure of cartridges for training 300 thousands of people per year would be different: 45 million cartridges minimum and 300 million cartridges for the average level. Accordingly, for the same 8 years it would be possible to prepare 2,4 million people at a rate of up to 2,4 billion cartridges.
What are the ammunition production capacities and stocks in warehouses?
And now it is worthwhile to compare the obtained data on needs with the available capacities for the production of cartridges. Very little is known about this, but there are still some figures. The Soviet capacity at the end of 1980-s amounted to 6 billion cartridges per year. In order to provide the Soviet Army with a year of war, according to the above calculation of wartime needs, the cartridge industry should have worked without restoring 28 years.
This is the answer to the question of the miserable allocation of ammunition for infantry training in Soviet times. The reason is an extreme lack of production capacity, which is why the cartridge industry worked mainly at the warehouse, trying to form reserves at least for the 3-4 of the month of the war. At the same time, some of the cartridges still went to various military conflicts, to help allies in different countries (no data on these shipments are available, but they could reach significant values), which reduced the increase in stocks. For this simple reason, the army was allocated the very minimum of cartridges for rifle training, and for the same reason, the Soviet Union actively built ammunition factories from its allies, not only in the ATS countries. This is not from generosity, but from the fact that the possibilities of supplying allies with ammunition were extremely limited, and these supplies were made from military stocks.
In Russia, 6 cartridge plants remained. Exact data on the release of ammunition is not published. However, as stated by Viktor Yashkin, general director of the Barnaul Machine Tool Plant (which includes the Barnaul Cartridge Plant) in 2014, they had 420 million units per year, and in 2015 year they were going to get to 500 million units. In the absence of other data, it is necessary to assume that the rest of the cartridge plants have comparable capacity - about 500 million cartridges per year, which in total will give the release of 3 billion cartridges. To create reserves for the year of war, the Russian cartridge industry will have to work 12 for years.
It can be said that the stocks of stocks are hoo. Maybe. And maybe not. According to published data, about 2 billion of cartridges with a shelf life of more than 40 years (that is, 1976 of production year and older) are subject to disposal in the year. 2 billion cartridges - this is a third of the Soviet annual production. If in Russia there remain warehouses replenished in Soviet times with the same number of cartridges per year, then it can be calculated that 1976 billion of cartridges were received for future Russian warehouses from 1992 to 32.
And what, in the presence of 88% needs of the year of war? Do not rush to rejoice and rub your hands. Firstly, the arrival at the warehouses of ammunition during the years of the Afghan war was significantly less, due to the high consumption of ammunition in Afghanistan - 3,6 billion pieces a year. Since 1981, the battles have received a large scale and intensity, and in 1989 there was already a withdrawal of troops. Total 8 years of war. During this time, only about half of the current release could be sent to warehouses, up to 3 billion. Of these, the share of warehouses in the RSFSR accounted for a billion pieces. With this amendment to the warehouses could arrive 24 billion pieces of ammunition. Secondly, there was still a considerable expense during the Chechen war, at a time when ammunition factories sharply reduced output. It is difficult to estimate this expense, but I would accept the size of usable warehouse stocks of approximately 18-20 billion cartridges. That's enough for half a year of war.
It is also necessary to point out that the replenishment of warehouses after the disposal of old cartridges is set at least 1 billion rubles a year. If you take the purchase price in 8 rubles for a cartridge, then it is 125 million pieces. In this situation, warehouses are gradually becoming empty.
I take away all the accusations of inaccuracies and arbitrariness of assessments immediately, as I use extremely fragmentary data taken from open sources. I have no other data. As well as hopes that I will have those.
What are the conclusions?
With all the rough approximation of these assessments, the conclusions that seem plausible to me are as follows.
1. The available ammunition reserves will last for about half a year of a big war, in which the entire Russian army will take part.
2. The current production capacity of cartridges is extremely insufficient. Monthly military demand (3 billion pieces) Russian ammunition factories close for the year of operation. During the six months of the war, the factories will produce about 1,5 billion cartridges, possibly up to 2 billion units, if production is expanded, which will be spent in two weeks or so.
3. After the depletion of warehouses during the war (as well as the enemy can destroy part of the stock), an acute cartridge hunger will occur, completely uncovered by the current release. Under the conditions of ammunition famine, the Russian army will be able to fight unless special forces or airborne troops (250 million of the current monthly output can be distributed only between a few units, and these will, of course, be the most combat-ready units), while the rest of the army is in fact deprived of the opportunity to participate in battles
4. Although there are about 17 million AK in the warehouses, nevertheless, the arming of the mobilization contingent will be extremely difficult due to the lack of ammunition. One ammunition (250 cartridges) for this stock of machine guns will be 4,2 billion cartridges, from which it is clear that in terms of cartridge hunger, these machines simply will not have ammunition.
5. From the previous paragraph it follows that mass mobilization is impossible in the current state of the cartridge economy. Command can only rely on those who already serve in the armed forces, and on small contingents to replace those who have left or killed by wounds. The rest can not be armed. Or, allocating ammunition for 30 cartridges per barrel, use part of the AK stock (the ammunition of one million units will be 30 million cartridges), but in this case the Kalashnikov machine gun cannot be used for automatic firing and it will essentially turn into a self-loading carbine .
6. Finally, it is clear that the cartridge issue exists, it is very acute, and needs a speedy solution, providing for a sharp increase in the release of cartridges. Or you can be defeated in any major war that goes beyond a local armed conflict.
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