Tanks "Abrams" and BMP "Bradley" in the operation "Desert Storm"
Evaluation of the combat qualities and results of the operation of US armored vehicles in the war against Iraq is set out according to foreign sources.
Shortly after the completion of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the US leadership instructed the Main Financial Control Department to conduct an analysis of the effectiveness of American weapons and military equipment during this operation in order to determine ways to improve them. In relation to armored vehicles actions were considered tanks Abrams (M-1 and M-1A1) and the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle (BMP) (M-2A1 and M-2A2).
By the outbreak of hostilities in the Persian Gulf were:
- Abrams 3113 tanks, of which deployed in 2024 units (M-1А1 - 1 904pcs and М-1-120pcs), in reserve - 1089pcs .;
- 2200 BMP "Bradley", including deployed in 1730 units (834 - M-2A2 machines with increased survivability), in reserve - 470pcs.
Management specialists conducted a questionnaire survey of direct participants in the operation (from division commanders to members of tank crews). The respondents were asked three questions:
- how combat vehicles showed themselves in the operation;
- what are the detected deficiencies and suggestions for their elimination;
- how are the actions of support and support machines evaluated.
Were also studied army reports on the technical condition and combat readiness of machines. After a preliminary analysis of the materials received, the department introduced them to the relevant services and agencies of the Ministry of the Army and the Ministry of Defense of the United States, with whom measures to eliminate the identified deficiencies were discussed.
The effectiveness of the combat use of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles was assessed according to five criteria:
- on combat readiness, characterized by the operability of machines in a combat situation (the ability to move, fire and maintain communication) and its maintenance;
- by firepower capable of hitting enemy targets;
-on survivability, which is determined by the ability to resist or avoid defeat by enemy fire due to passive protection and maneuverability;
- on mobility, realized by the ability to move around areas with different terrain at maximum speeds and maneuverability;
- on a power reserve (the maximum distance that a car can travel without refueling under given road conditions).
The combat readiness ratio was determined by the relative number of vehicles in the subunit, ready to perform a combat mission on a given day, expressed as a percentage. Malfunctions that do not affect the ability to move, fire and maintain communication were not taken into account when assessing the combat readiness ratio in a combat situation.
1. Evaluation of the fighting qualities of Abrams tanks
Tanks "Abrams" in the operations of "Storm in the desert" showed a high combat readiness. The number of Abrams tanks that were indicated in the army reports as ready for combat missions exceeded 90% during the entire period of hostilities. This level is confirmed by the reviews of tank commanders, crew members and maintenance personnel. Some crews in the reports indicated that the Abrams tanks were the best combat vehicles on the battlefield, others believed that tanks were able to travel long distances with minor difficulties in terms of maintenance.
The Abrams tank armament complex provides good shooting accuracy and has a strong striking effect. According to the reviews of tank commanders and gunners, shells 120-mm guns inflicted catastrophic defeats on Iraqi tanks. The ability of a tank thermal sight to detect a target in the dark, through smoke and fog, as well as the effectiveness of an armor-piercing sub-caliber projectile, which often led to the defeat of Iraqi tanks from the first shot, was noted. However, the multiplicity of increase and resolution of the instruments should be coordinated with the range of the 120-mm gun. Accuracy of 120-mm guns in combat exceeded the predicted, based on the results of assessment firing, conducted on the eve of events in the Persian Gulf, and is due to: high performance of the sight, which allowed US tanks to fire at Iraqi tanks at long distances in poor visibility conditions (sand storms , smoke, thick fog); short duration of hostilities and hence insignificant fatigue of personnel and slight wear of equipment; high level of tank readiness and crew training.
Army officials pointed to the need to install independent thermal imaging devices for the driver and commander, which will allow the commander to observe the battlefield and search for targets simultaneously with firing the gunner at other targets. The Ministry of the Army has included the installation of a commanding independent thermal imaging device in the list of improvements implemented at M-1A2.
Tanks "Abrams" showed high survivability during the fighting. The tanks of the enemy were not destroyed a single tank "Abrams". During the operation, the X-NUMX of the Abrams tank was damaged and damaged. Of the nine destroyed seven were subjected to fire "their", and two tanks exploded by coalition troops to prevent their capture by the enemy after they lost mobility. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce a “friend-foe” identification system. Commanders and crew members also indicated in reports on the feasibility of installing a tower position indicator relative to the hull.
Some crews noted in the reports that further, with direct hits from Iraqi T-72 tanks, M-1А1 tanks received minimal damage. There is one case in which the T-72 tank twice fired at the Abrams tank from a distance of 2 000 meters. As a result, one shell ricocheted, another stuck in armor. On the anti-tank mines, two Abrams tanks were damaged and insignificantly damaged, and the crews survived.
Anti-radiation, biological and chemical protection, fire-fighting equipment, additional booking, high speed, maneuverability and fire power - all this, according to the crews, increases their own confidence in safety.
The commanders and crew members of the Abrams tanks, as well as the commanders of the units indicated the rapidity, mobility of the tank and its ability to effectively maneuver in any terrain. Abrams tanks performed combat missions in a wide range of changing terrain conditions, including soft sand and rocky patches. Although the speed of the tank varied depending on the tasks and the terrain, the pace of movement was high. At times, tanks were forced to slow down to allow other vehicles, with the exception of the Bradley BMP, to follow them.
Despite the advantages noted above, the disadvantages of the Abrams tank were also mentioned, among them the limited power reserve.
High fuel consumption of the gas turbine engine limited the reserve of the tank, so refueling tanks was a constant concern of the support services. The tanks were refueled at every opportunity. Before the outbreak of hostilities, units trained in refueling on the go and in organized columns. Directly in the combat zone, it was necessary to refuel every 3 ... 5. High fuel consumption was a concern for crew members and army personnel. They believe that fuel efficiency can be improved by installing an auxiliary power unit.
The capacity of the tanks of the Abrams tank is 500 gallons (1900 l). The fuel is in four fuel compartments: the 2 compartment is in front, the 2 compartment is in the back. According to military estimates, the fuel consumption of the Abrams tanks was 7 gallons per mile (16,5 liters per km), including idling the engine, during which the engine worked primarily to ensure the operation of the tank electrical equipment.
During the fighting, the crews tried to ensure the development of the rear tanks in the first place due to less time spent on their refueling. Access to the fuel filler neck of the front fuel tanks is difficult, since for this it is necessary to turn the turret. As a result, the front fuel tanks served as reserve tanks, and the crews used every opportunity to replenish the rear fuel tanks.
Reducing fuel consumption is carried out in two directions:
-reduction of the main engine at idle due to the installation of an auxiliary power unit, which should supply energy to the tank electrical equipment when the engine is not running;
-developing an electronic control unit that will increase fuel efficiency on the 18. ..20%, thanks to automatic adjustment of the fuel supply when the engine is idling.
The frequent refueling of the Abrams tanks, due to the failures of the priming pumps, also limited the length of the marches. Fuel is fed from the rear fuel tanks to the engine with two fuel injection pumps built into the fuel tanks. The two rear tanks are connected in such a way that in case of failure, one other serves as a backup. When fuel in the rear tanks drops below the 1 / 8 level, it is pumped from the front tanks to the rear tanks. If the transfer pump fails, the engine power is reduced by half, as the fuel of the front tanks becomes unavailable. All units reported on the unreliable performance of inline and transfer pumps. Built-in fuel pumps have a high failure rate. As reported by the crews and mechanics of the units, the tanks often worked with only one serviceable built-in pump. In case of failure of only one pump, the tank can perform a combat mission. If both of the built-in pumps fail, the engine can still receive fuel by gravity, but the engine power and, consequently, the speed of the tank's movement decrease. To replace the right in-line pump, more than 4 ... 5 and more than 2 ... 3 h are required to replace the left one. If it was impossible to get new pumps to replace the failed ones, some units had to repair them themselves. Transfer pumps also often failed. Thus, in the 1 Infantry Division, in one of the companies, three out of four tanks could not reach the position due to pump failures. Crews explain these failures by the accumulation of sediments at the bottom of the front tanks: before deploying to combat formations, the tanks did not have long-distance runs, and the fuel was not produced from the front tanks for a long time, therefore precipitation clogged the pumps and led to their breakdowns. The army plans to buy new fuel pumps with a resource 3 000 h instead of - 1000 from the serial and to test them.
Considered two ways to improve the reliability of the transfer pump. The first is to change its mode of operation in such a way that the pump pumps fuel at the 3 / 4 level of the tanks, and not at the 1 / 8. This should provide more frequent fuel pumping and reduce the likelihood of sediment accumulation. The second is to run a pump with a higher flow, capable of pumping fuel in the presence of precipitation.
Frequent cleaning of air cleaners also served to limit the length of tank marches. The Abrams tank air cleaner was designed for use in Europe and the USA, including the California desert. In the Persian Gulf area, however, the Abrams tank air cleaner required more frequent cleaning due to thin, talc-like sand.
The army took into account the extreme conditions of the desert when deploying armored units in the Persian Gulf and was forced to carry out frequent and intensive maintenance of air cleaners. Despite this, cases of dust entering the engine began to appear immediately during the deployment, the failure of the engines occurred in all divisions. In particular, a large number of engine failures were in the 24 Infantry Division. The situation was complicated by the lack of filtering elements (filters) in the initial deployment period.
Despite the attention paid to the thorough maintenance of air cleaners, the units arriving after the 24 division also experienced difficulties due to engine failures for the same reason. Thus, the 1-I armored reconnaissance division lost 16 engines during training maneuvers. Other units also had engine losses due to dust admission. The commanders and crews of tanks quickly realized the importance of maintaining GTE air cleaners in the harsh desert conditions. Maintenance of air cleaners included: using a jet of compressed air to remove the sand from the filters and shaking out the filters or lightly tapping the tank hull or the ground to remove the sand.
Most tank crews said shaking the filters was the most common method, since it is the simplest and requires less time. Crews were instructed to check and clean the filters at each stop for refueling, i.e. every 3 ... 5 h. Depending on the weather they stopped even more often to clean the filters. However, despite all these measures, there were failures of air cleaners. Some crews noted that if at the beginning of the operation the weather was the same as at the end of the operation, the failures of the air purifiers would have been more acute. The crews of the 1 Armored Division stated that when the troops left Iraq, it was dry and dusty, and they experienced great difficulties due to clogging of the filters - the engines lost power and the tanks slowed down. Five tanks were captured by a dust storm and stopped due to clogging of filters after 15 minutes. after the start of the movement. Two of them stopped again due to the passage of dust into the engine. The Ministry of the Army is considering two possible solutions to the problem of air cleaning. The first is to install a self-cleaning air cleaner on the tank with a longer operating time before maintenance, the second is to use air intake through a tubular air intake device, which prevents the ingress of highly dusty air into the filter.
2. Evaluation of the combat qualities of the BMP "Bradley"
BMP "Bradley" in the operations of the operation "Desert Storm" showed high combat readiness. The percentage of machines ready for the combat mission of the day was close to or exceeded 90% during the entire time of the operation. The machine model M-2А2 had the value of the coefficient of readiness in the range 92 ... 96%. and the older M-2 and M-2A1 models are 89 ... 92%. The crews of "Bradley" and repairmen especially highlighted the combat readiness of the model M-2А2, which has increased reliability and better maintainability. At the same time, crews and mechanics of units noted a number of recurring defects in equipment and systems of the machine. These defects were insignificant: they did not affect the performance of combat missions and did not affect the values of the combat readiness ratios (table).
The weapon system of the BMP Bradley showed high efficiency, the 25-mm automatic cannon was a universal weapon. Crews used the 25-mm cannon mainly for “cleaning” bunkers and firing light armored vehicles. There were cases when the 25-mm automatic cannon fires hit enemy tanks. However, in order to build a tank with an 25-mm projectile, it is necessary to shoot at close range at the most vulnerable points.
ATGM TOU BMP "Bradley" had a striking effect at long distances against all types of enemy armored targets, including tanks. Crews 1-th Armored Division and 2-th Armored Cavalry Regiment used the TOW to destroy Iraqi tanks at a distance from the 800 to 3 700 m. Some commanders 'Bradley' crews and military experts have expressed concern that the BMP "Bradley" since the launch TOW until the target is hit must remain motionless. At this time, she is vulnerable to enemy fire, in order for the TOW to reach the target at a distance of 3, 750, and 20 with. Wishes are expressed to replace the TLU with self-guided missiles of the “fired and forgotten” type.
Crews and army specialists would like to have a built-in laser range finder on the Bradley machine to accurately determine the distance to the target, since in some cases the gunners opened fire on targets outside the range of the TOW. As a result, there were undershoots. When some crews used autonomous laser rangefinders, they were exposed to enemy fire. These devices are inconvenient in operation; it is difficult to obtain accurate readings using them in a combat situation. The Ministry of the Army is exploring the possibility of installing an integrated laser rangefinder on the Bradley BMP.
It is also noted that the range of weapons exceeds the range of target identification, therefore, it is pointed out the need to increase the multiplicity and resolution of sights to prevent the defeat of "our own".
The survivability of the BMP "Bradley" could not be fully appreciated due to the limited information. Most of the wrecked cars were defeated by tank gun fire. It has been established that the Bradley BMP fire-fighting equipment system worked effectively.
Total destroyed 20 machines and 12 were damaged, but four of them were quickly restored. From the fire of "their" 17 BMP "Bradley" was destroyed and three damaged.
The commanders and crew members commented positively on the advantages of the M-2А2 model compared to the М-2 and М-1А1, since the additional booking, splinter screen and better mobility give a feeling of greater security.
The placement of ammunition on M-2А2 was changed to increase survivability, but this did not find a positive assessment from commanders and crew members who were more concerned about the replenishment of ammunition than survivability. Machines carried additional ammunition, which were located wherever possible. This could lead to an increase in personnel losses due to their explosion due to collisions during the movement of vehicles. The commanders and crews positively assessed the mobility and rapidity of the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, also indicating good maneuverability in the desert and the possibility of interaction with the Abrame tank.
Crews that fought on the Bradley BMP model M-2А2, were pleased with the more powerful 600-strong engine instead of the previous 500-strong, as well as improved maneuverability compared to older models of BMP.
As a drawback, a low reverse speed was noted, which reduced the ability of the BMP to interact with the Abrams tank. The M-2X2 has a reverse speed of about seven miles per hour (11 km / h), while the Abrams has an 20 miles per hour (32 km / h). In the course of the fighting, there were cases when the Abrams tanks were forced to move quickly backwards. BMP "Bradley" or lagged or unfolded, substituting the stern of the machine under the fire of the enemy. Provided to increase the speed of the reverse.
It also indicates the need to install the driver's thermal imager, which will allow him to see better in the dust, in the fog and at night. The Bradley serial cars are equipped with driver's electronic-optical night instruments. The driver's imager should be designed on the principle of a thermal sight. A thermal imaging device for the driver is in development, but decisions about installing it on the Bradley machine have not yet been made.
BMP "Bradley" has good performance reserve and fuel efficiency. The 2 armor reconnaissance regiment during the combat operation made the transition 120 miles (192 km) in 82 hours. The crew members of this regiment stated that they could do without refueling for the entire operation. Some crews noted that at stops for refueling tanks "Abrams" BMP "Bradley" never had less fuel than 1 / 2 ... 3 / 4 tank level.
3. General deficiencies in the operation of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles
Although the supply of spare parts was satisfactory in the theater area of military operations, there were many shortcomings in the system of their distribution among units. Some units experienced a significant shortage of spare parts, while others had them in abundance. Much of the spare parts did not reach the units for which they were intended. Therefore, most of the divisions sent their representatives to the central base in the port of Dhahran, and they were forced to sort through mountains of containers in search of the necessary spare parts. Units sometimes exchanged spare parts with each other or took them from machines that went down.
By the beginning of the fighting in a short time, the supply of spare parts from the USA and Germany in such quantities was ensured that the specialists of material and technical services did not know what spare parts they had or where they were stored. Registration of applications for parts sometimes took several days, in particular, due to the incompatibility of computer systems and formats. Then there were problems with transport. The army did not have enough vehicles, many of which were unreliable and outdated designs. The combat units changed their location and were hard to find.
Crew members, commanders and army experts indicated that improved optics were necessary for the sight of the Abrams tanks and the Bradley BMP. Although the gunners were able to see potential targets at a distance of 4 000 and more, the images had the appearance of “hot spots”. The identification of targets, i.e., the recognition of “friend or foe” was possible only at 1500 distances ... 2 000 m in clear weather and 500 ... 600 m and less when it rained. The main armament of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles could hit targets outside these ranges: ATGM TOU - at a distance of 3750 m, 120-mm cannon - 3000 m and more, 25-mm cannon "Bradley" - 2500 m.
The inability to identify targets at distances corresponding to the range of the weapons, limited the combat effectiveness of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. The crews indicated in the reports that they were delaying the opening of fire, waiting for the outlines of the targets to become clear.
The army experts simultaneously noted that the characteristics of the sights of the Abrams tanks and the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle exceeded the corresponding figures of Iraqi vehicles, due to which the American tanks and BMPs had a significant tactical advantage. Crews of Iraqi vehicles often simply did not see US tanks when they were firing.
The inability of crews to identify targets at long distances was one of the reasons for the large number of cases of erroneous shelling of their battle formations. So, there were 28 cases of their own fire, and in 10 cases, the shells hit the target. Some crews of the BMP "Bradley" admitted that they were afraid to get under the fire of the Abrams tank than they did under enemy fire. They also noted that the Bradley car could easily have been mistaken for long distances as an enemy's BMP.
During the fighting, various methods of identifying “friend-foe” were used: applying an inverted “V” sign on the car, attaching orange-colored panels, putting on color glass caps on the stern lights, setting bright blinking lights, setting the national flag, etc. All these measures had limited efficiency due to weather conditions, long ranges and the inability of thermal devices to distinguish individual details of the target.
In connection with the incidents mentioned, the US Department of the Army has taken certain steps to address the identification of “friend or foe”. Immediately after the events in the Persian Gulf, a special organization was approved to work out the identification of “friend or foe”. It is assigned the task of checking and introducing changes to the doctrine for the near future and for the next years, concerning the creation of an effective identification system of the friend-foe, as well as training, promising developments and material support. With the help of this organization, a number of projects are planned.
The US Department of the Army also believes that the use of sophisticated navigation equipment will help identify “friend or foe”. If the commander knows exactly where his car is and where other units are located, then it is easier for him to figure out where are “his”, where is “alien”. Currently, combat units and support services do not have a sufficient number of effective navigation systems. Combat units have one or two navigation systems per company, or approximately one for every 6 ... 12 vehicles. In the fighting, "Desert Storm" used two types of navigation systems: Loran-C and GPS. Loran-C locates based on beacon signals located on ground installations. In Saudi Arabia, a network of radio beacons was installed on the ground. To use existing infrastructure, the US Department of the Army purchased 6000 receivers. In the course of hostilities, the Loran-C system made it possible for machine commanders to determine their location with accuracy to 300 m.
The GPS navigation system uses signals from satellites. On the BMP "Bradley" and tanks "Abrams" installed small SLGR receivers that received satellite signals. SLGR receivers allowed commanders to locate machines with 16 accuracy ... 30 meters. 8 000 SLGR devices were also purchased, of which 3500 were delivered to machines. The crews were able to use both systems, but the SLGR was preferred because of the increased accuracy in determining the coordinates. According to the commanders, crews and army officials, the US ground forces units would not be able to locate without navigation systems. Navigation systems made it possible for US units to quickly cross the poorly protected desert in Eastern Iraq and cut off Iraqi troops in Kuwait. The captured Iraqi general pointed to the use of the SLGR as an example when Iraqis were beaten by high American technology.
Parts of support such as repair and maintenance services, logistics, also used SLGR to locate. The engineering service of the 24 Infantry Division used the SLGR for laying new combat tracks.
The personnel of the tank units of the US Army praised the advantages of GPS navigation systems and spoke in favor of installing them on all tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. There were also suggestions to install GPS receivers on the Bradley BMP and Abrams tanks.
The Ministry of the Army, in conjunction with other organizations, is developing military standards and requirements for a new family of GPS navigation system PLGR receivers. Although commercial PLGR receivers worked well, they did not fully meet military standards. The Ministry of the Army plans to purchase commercial receivers and modify them in accordance with the requirements of the military.
The Ministry of the Army is also considering expanding the use of the global GPS navigation system in all combat and training units. The first step in this direction can be the installation of receivers on most ground combat vehicles. There is a requirement that every combat vehicle be equipped with GPS navigation equipment, and in support groups every second vehicle. The Arms Acquisition Advisory Council should soon decide on the full-scale production of NAUSTAR GPS systems. According to experts, the cost of the program for the production of 55 thousand GPS systems will be 6 billion.
Attaching great importance to eliminating cases of “on their own” because of poor identification of targets, the Ministry of the Army developed a long-term 9-year plan for research and development (R & D), the results of which will be phased in.
At the first stage (1992-1994) the combat vehicles in the park (infantry fighting vehicles, tanks, helicopters, self-propelled artillery mounts, etc.) will be equipped with the available navigation and identification means: GPS integrated navigation receivers built into the military standards, thermal beacons.
At the same time, the second stage begins - the development of more modern navigation and identification systems based on the latest technologies. Their implementation can begin with 1995-1996.
The third stage, the terms of which extend beyond 2000, provides for the implementation of fundamental and exploratory research on the creation of embedded multi-functional means of identification, navigation, and integrated information processing. Information about specific areas of research is not available.
The R & D plan is supposed to coordinate at each of the stages of work of the combat equipment and fire control systems entering the troops with the automated systems of reconnaissance, communications and command and control entered into service.
The commanders and crew members of the BMP and the tanks indicated in their reports that their radio stations were not working reliably. Most of the Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and Abrams tanks that participated in the hostilities were equipped with VRC-12 radio stations of 1960 release. In the 1 reconnaissance divisions, the radio stations failed due to overheating. Crew members had to put wet towels on the radio to protect them from overheating. Some crews carried several spare radio stations. In some cases, armored units communicated using signal flags.
Several years ago, the Ministry of the Army recognized the need to develop a new type of radio station. In 1974, tactical and technical requirements were approved. In 1983, work began on a contract to develop an improved radio station SINGARS. However, in the US military units, by the start of Operation Desert Storm, only one battalion of the 1 Reconnaissance Division was equipped with new serial SINGARS radio stations. According to the commanders' comments, the new radio stations provided stable and reliable radio communication in the 50 radius of km. In combat, SINGARS radio stations had a time between failures 7 000 h compared to 250 h obsolete radio station VRC-12. Before the 1998, the Ministry of the Army plans to supply SINGARS with a total number of 150 000 units to the troops, and with 1998 to begin developing and adopting the next model of radio station. It is not yet determined whether this will be a new type of radio station or an upgraded SINGARS.
In conclusion, it should be noted the insufficiently effective operation of support and support vehicles, which in some cases made it difficult for BMPs and tanks to operate. BREM M-88А1 worked unreliable and often could not evacuate tanks M-1А1. There was an insufficient number of transporters for the transfer of tanks and heavy equipment. According to crew reports, the speed of the Abrams tank and the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle slowed down so that the M-109 self-propelled artillery and support vehicles based on the M-113 armored personnel carrier could overtake them. The exception was made by cars on the basis of the modernized M-113A3. The unsatisfactory mobility of wheeled trucks, which hampered their interaction with tanks, was also noted.
Conclusion. The analysis of defects and shortcomings in the operation of the Abrams tank and the Bradley BMP allowed the American specialists to take them into account when adjusting the development plan for the models of armored vehicles and their systems. In this case, the timing of the proposed implementation of the event is divided into two groups: priority, based on well-developed technical solutions, and activities that require R & D. The first group includes:
-installation on tanks and infantry fighting vehicles of more advanced opto-electronic devices (with increased multiplicity and increased resolution), which improve the recognition of targets at long ranges;
-installation on the Abrams tanks with the modernization of an independent commanding thermal imager;
-Injection into the power plant of the Abrams tank of an electronic fuel supply control unit, a self-cleaning air cleaner, fuel-boosting fuel pumps of increased reliability;
-installation of temporary means on the chassis of the tank and BMP, which facilitate the identification of "their" and "alien" machines (thermal beacons, thermal tapes, etc.);
-Equipment of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles elements of the navigation system;
-Installation on the BMP laser rangefinder.
The activities of the second group include:
- the use of built-in receivers of satellite GPS navigation system combined with the automated reconnaissance, control and communication system implemented on modernized machines on tanks and BMPs;
- installation of an autonomous power supply unit on the Abrams tank;
-increasing reverse speed and installing the driver's thermal imaging device (for the Bradley BMP.
In addition, adjustments have been made to the development plans for support and maintenance vehicles, since the existing fleet of these vehicles did not interact satisfactorily with tanks and infantry fighting vehicles due to lower mobility.
Shortly after the completion of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the US leadership instructed the Main Financial Control Department to conduct an analysis of the effectiveness of American weapons and military equipment during this operation in order to determine ways to improve them. In relation to armored vehicles actions were considered tanks Abrams (M-1 and M-1A1) and the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle (BMP) (M-2A1 and M-2A2).
By the outbreak of hostilities in the Persian Gulf were:
- Abrams 3113 tanks, of which deployed in 2024 units (M-1А1 - 1 904pcs and М-1-120pcs), in reserve - 1089pcs .;
- 2200 BMP "Bradley", including deployed in 1730 units (834 - M-2A2 machines with increased survivability), in reserve - 470pcs.
Management specialists conducted a questionnaire survey of direct participants in the operation (from division commanders to members of tank crews). The respondents were asked three questions:
- how combat vehicles showed themselves in the operation;
- what are the detected deficiencies and suggestions for their elimination;
- how are the actions of support and support machines evaluated.
Were also studied army reports on the technical condition and combat readiness of machines. After a preliminary analysis of the materials received, the department introduced them to the relevant services and agencies of the Ministry of the Army and the Ministry of Defense of the United States, with whom measures to eliminate the identified deficiencies were discussed.
The effectiveness of the combat use of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles was assessed according to five criteria:
- on combat readiness, characterized by the operability of machines in a combat situation (the ability to move, fire and maintain communication) and its maintenance;
- by firepower capable of hitting enemy targets;
-on survivability, which is determined by the ability to resist or avoid defeat by enemy fire due to passive protection and maneuverability;
- on mobility, realized by the ability to move around areas with different terrain at maximum speeds and maneuverability;
- on a power reserve (the maximum distance that a car can travel without refueling under given road conditions).
The combat readiness ratio was determined by the relative number of vehicles in the subunit, ready to perform a combat mission on a given day, expressed as a percentage. Malfunctions that do not affect the ability to move, fire and maintain communication were not taken into account when assessing the combat readiness ratio in a combat situation.
1. Evaluation of the fighting qualities of Abrams tanks
Tanks "Abrams" in the operations of "Storm in the desert" showed a high combat readiness. The number of Abrams tanks that were indicated in the army reports as ready for combat missions exceeded 90% during the entire period of hostilities. This level is confirmed by the reviews of tank commanders, crew members and maintenance personnel. Some crews in the reports indicated that the Abrams tanks were the best combat vehicles on the battlefield, others believed that tanks were able to travel long distances with minor difficulties in terms of maintenance.
The Abrams tank armament complex provides good shooting accuracy and has a strong striking effect. According to the reviews of tank commanders and gunners, shells 120-mm guns inflicted catastrophic defeats on Iraqi tanks. The ability of a tank thermal sight to detect a target in the dark, through smoke and fog, as well as the effectiveness of an armor-piercing sub-caliber projectile, which often led to the defeat of Iraqi tanks from the first shot, was noted. However, the multiplicity of increase and resolution of the instruments should be coordinated with the range of the 120-mm gun. Accuracy of 120-mm guns in combat exceeded the predicted, based on the results of assessment firing, conducted on the eve of events in the Persian Gulf, and is due to: high performance of the sight, which allowed US tanks to fire at Iraqi tanks at long distances in poor visibility conditions (sand storms , smoke, thick fog); short duration of hostilities and hence insignificant fatigue of personnel and slight wear of equipment; high level of tank readiness and crew training.
Army officials pointed to the need to install independent thermal imaging devices for the driver and commander, which will allow the commander to observe the battlefield and search for targets simultaneously with firing the gunner at other targets. The Ministry of the Army has included the installation of a commanding independent thermal imaging device in the list of improvements implemented at M-1A2.
Tanks "Abrams" showed high survivability during the fighting. The tanks of the enemy were not destroyed a single tank "Abrams". During the operation, the X-NUMX of the Abrams tank was damaged and damaged. Of the nine destroyed seven were subjected to fire "their", and two tanks exploded by coalition troops to prevent their capture by the enemy after they lost mobility. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce a “friend-foe” identification system. Commanders and crew members also indicated in reports on the feasibility of installing a tower position indicator relative to the hull.
Some crews noted in the reports that further, with direct hits from Iraqi T-72 tanks, M-1А1 tanks received minimal damage. There is one case in which the T-72 tank twice fired at the Abrams tank from a distance of 2 000 meters. As a result, one shell ricocheted, another stuck in armor. On the anti-tank mines, two Abrams tanks were damaged and insignificantly damaged, and the crews survived.
Anti-radiation, biological and chemical protection, fire-fighting equipment, additional booking, high speed, maneuverability and fire power - all this, according to the crews, increases their own confidence in safety.
The commanders and crew members of the Abrams tanks, as well as the commanders of the units indicated the rapidity, mobility of the tank and its ability to effectively maneuver in any terrain. Abrams tanks performed combat missions in a wide range of changing terrain conditions, including soft sand and rocky patches. Although the speed of the tank varied depending on the tasks and the terrain, the pace of movement was high. At times, tanks were forced to slow down to allow other vehicles, with the exception of the Bradley BMP, to follow them.
Despite the advantages noted above, the disadvantages of the Abrams tank were also mentioned, among them the limited power reserve.
High fuel consumption of the gas turbine engine limited the reserve of the tank, so refueling tanks was a constant concern of the support services. The tanks were refueled at every opportunity. Before the outbreak of hostilities, units trained in refueling on the go and in organized columns. Directly in the combat zone, it was necessary to refuel every 3 ... 5. High fuel consumption was a concern for crew members and army personnel. They believe that fuel efficiency can be improved by installing an auxiliary power unit.
The capacity of the tanks of the Abrams tank is 500 gallons (1900 l). The fuel is in four fuel compartments: the 2 compartment is in front, the 2 compartment is in the back. According to military estimates, the fuel consumption of the Abrams tanks was 7 gallons per mile (16,5 liters per km), including idling the engine, during which the engine worked primarily to ensure the operation of the tank electrical equipment.
During the fighting, the crews tried to ensure the development of the rear tanks in the first place due to less time spent on their refueling. Access to the fuel filler neck of the front fuel tanks is difficult, since for this it is necessary to turn the turret. As a result, the front fuel tanks served as reserve tanks, and the crews used every opportunity to replenish the rear fuel tanks.
Reducing fuel consumption is carried out in two directions:
-reduction of the main engine at idle due to the installation of an auxiliary power unit, which should supply energy to the tank electrical equipment when the engine is not running;
-developing an electronic control unit that will increase fuel efficiency on the 18. ..20%, thanks to automatic adjustment of the fuel supply when the engine is idling.
The frequent refueling of the Abrams tanks, due to the failures of the priming pumps, also limited the length of the marches. Fuel is fed from the rear fuel tanks to the engine with two fuel injection pumps built into the fuel tanks. The two rear tanks are connected in such a way that in case of failure, one other serves as a backup. When fuel in the rear tanks drops below the 1 / 8 level, it is pumped from the front tanks to the rear tanks. If the transfer pump fails, the engine power is reduced by half, as the fuel of the front tanks becomes unavailable. All units reported on the unreliable performance of inline and transfer pumps. Built-in fuel pumps have a high failure rate. As reported by the crews and mechanics of the units, the tanks often worked with only one serviceable built-in pump. In case of failure of only one pump, the tank can perform a combat mission. If both of the built-in pumps fail, the engine can still receive fuel by gravity, but the engine power and, consequently, the speed of the tank's movement decrease. To replace the right in-line pump, more than 4 ... 5 and more than 2 ... 3 h are required to replace the left one. If it was impossible to get new pumps to replace the failed ones, some units had to repair them themselves. Transfer pumps also often failed. Thus, in the 1 Infantry Division, in one of the companies, three out of four tanks could not reach the position due to pump failures. Crews explain these failures by the accumulation of sediments at the bottom of the front tanks: before deploying to combat formations, the tanks did not have long-distance runs, and the fuel was not produced from the front tanks for a long time, therefore precipitation clogged the pumps and led to their breakdowns. The army plans to buy new fuel pumps with a resource 3 000 h instead of - 1000 from the serial and to test them.
Considered two ways to improve the reliability of the transfer pump. The first is to change its mode of operation in such a way that the pump pumps fuel at the 3 / 4 level of the tanks, and not at the 1 / 8. This should provide more frequent fuel pumping and reduce the likelihood of sediment accumulation. The second is to run a pump with a higher flow, capable of pumping fuel in the presence of precipitation.
Frequent cleaning of air cleaners also served to limit the length of tank marches. The Abrams tank air cleaner was designed for use in Europe and the USA, including the California desert. In the Persian Gulf area, however, the Abrams tank air cleaner required more frequent cleaning due to thin, talc-like sand.
The army took into account the extreme conditions of the desert when deploying armored units in the Persian Gulf and was forced to carry out frequent and intensive maintenance of air cleaners. Despite this, cases of dust entering the engine began to appear immediately during the deployment, the failure of the engines occurred in all divisions. In particular, a large number of engine failures were in the 24 Infantry Division. The situation was complicated by the lack of filtering elements (filters) in the initial deployment period.
Despite the attention paid to the thorough maintenance of air cleaners, the units arriving after the 24 division also experienced difficulties due to engine failures for the same reason. Thus, the 1-I armored reconnaissance division lost 16 engines during training maneuvers. Other units also had engine losses due to dust admission. The commanders and crews of tanks quickly realized the importance of maintaining GTE air cleaners in the harsh desert conditions. Maintenance of air cleaners included: using a jet of compressed air to remove the sand from the filters and shaking out the filters or lightly tapping the tank hull or the ground to remove the sand.
Most tank crews said shaking the filters was the most common method, since it is the simplest and requires less time. Crews were instructed to check and clean the filters at each stop for refueling, i.e. every 3 ... 5 h. Depending on the weather they stopped even more often to clean the filters. However, despite all these measures, there were failures of air cleaners. Some crews noted that if at the beginning of the operation the weather was the same as at the end of the operation, the failures of the air purifiers would have been more acute. The crews of the 1 Armored Division stated that when the troops left Iraq, it was dry and dusty, and they experienced great difficulties due to clogging of the filters - the engines lost power and the tanks slowed down. Five tanks were captured by a dust storm and stopped due to clogging of filters after 15 minutes. after the start of the movement. Two of them stopped again due to the passage of dust into the engine. The Ministry of the Army is considering two possible solutions to the problem of air cleaning. The first is to install a self-cleaning air cleaner on the tank with a longer operating time before maintenance, the second is to use air intake through a tubular air intake device, which prevents the ingress of highly dusty air into the filter.
2. Evaluation of the combat qualities of the BMP "Bradley"
BMP "Bradley" in the operations of the operation "Desert Storm" showed high combat readiness. The percentage of machines ready for the combat mission of the day was close to or exceeded 90% during the entire time of the operation. The machine model M-2А2 had the value of the coefficient of readiness in the range 92 ... 96%. and the older M-2 and M-2A1 models are 89 ... 92%. The crews of "Bradley" and repairmen especially highlighted the combat readiness of the model M-2А2, which has increased reliability and better maintainability. At the same time, crews and mechanics of units noted a number of recurring defects in equipment and systems of the machine. These defects were insignificant: they did not affect the performance of combat missions and did not affect the values of the combat readiness ratios (table).
The weapon system of the BMP Bradley showed high efficiency, the 25-mm automatic cannon was a universal weapon. Crews used the 25-mm cannon mainly for “cleaning” bunkers and firing light armored vehicles. There were cases when the 25-mm automatic cannon fires hit enemy tanks. However, in order to build a tank with an 25-mm projectile, it is necessary to shoot at close range at the most vulnerable points.
ATGM TOU BMP "Bradley" had a striking effect at long distances against all types of enemy armored targets, including tanks. Crews 1-th Armored Division and 2-th Armored Cavalry Regiment used the TOW to destroy Iraqi tanks at a distance from the 800 to 3 700 m. Some commanders 'Bradley' crews and military experts have expressed concern that the BMP "Bradley" since the launch TOW until the target is hit must remain motionless. At this time, she is vulnerable to enemy fire, in order for the TOW to reach the target at a distance of 3, 750, and 20 with. Wishes are expressed to replace the TLU with self-guided missiles of the “fired and forgotten” type.
Crews and army specialists would like to have a built-in laser range finder on the Bradley machine to accurately determine the distance to the target, since in some cases the gunners opened fire on targets outside the range of the TOW. As a result, there were undershoots. When some crews used autonomous laser rangefinders, they were exposed to enemy fire. These devices are inconvenient in operation; it is difficult to obtain accurate readings using them in a combat situation. The Ministry of the Army is exploring the possibility of installing an integrated laser rangefinder on the Bradley BMP.
Defects of the elements of equipment BMP "Bradley"
It is also noted that the range of weapons exceeds the range of target identification, therefore, it is pointed out the need to increase the multiplicity and resolution of sights to prevent the defeat of "our own".
The survivability of the BMP "Bradley" could not be fully appreciated due to the limited information. Most of the wrecked cars were defeated by tank gun fire. It has been established that the Bradley BMP fire-fighting equipment system worked effectively.
Total destroyed 20 machines and 12 were damaged, but four of them were quickly restored. From the fire of "their" 17 BMP "Bradley" was destroyed and three damaged.
The commanders and crew members commented positively on the advantages of the M-2А2 model compared to the М-2 and М-1А1, since the additional booking, splinter screen and better mobility give a feeling of greater security.
The placement of ammunition on M-2А2 was changed to increase survivability, but this did not find a positive assessment from commanders and crew members who were more concerned about the replenishment of ammunition than survivability. Machines carried additional ammunition, which were located wherever possible. This could lead to an increase in personnel losses due to their explosion due to collisions during the movement of vehicles. The commanders and crews positively assessed the mobility and rapidity of the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, also indicating good maneuverability in the desert and the possibility of interaction with the Abrame tank.
Crews that fought on the Bradley BMP model M-2А2, were pleased with the more powerful 600-strong engine instead of the previous 500-strong, as well as improved maneuverability compared to older models of BMP.
As a drawback, a low reverse speed was noted, which reduced the ability of the BMP to interact with the Abrams tank. The M-2X2 has a reverse speed of about seven miles per hour (11 km / h), while the Abrams has an 20 miles per hour (32 km / h). In the course of the fighting, there were cases when the Abrams tanks were forced to move quickly backwards. BMP "Bradley" or lagged or unfolded, substituting the stern of the machine under the fire of the enemy. Provided to increase the speed of the reverse.
It also indicates the need to install the driver's thermal imager, which will allow him to see better in the dust, in the fog and at night. The Bradley serial cars are equipped with driver's electronic-optical night instruments. The driver's imager should be designed on the principle of a thermal sight. A thermal imaging device for the driver is in development, but decisions about installing it on the Bradley machine have not yet been made.
BMP "Bradley" has good performance reserve and fuel efficiency. The 2 armor reconnaissance regiment during the combat operation made the transition 120 miles (192 km) in 82 hours. The crew members of this regiment stated that they could do without refueling for the entire operation. Some crews noted that at stops for refueling tanks "Abrams" BMP "Bradley" never had less fuel than 1 / 2 ... 3 / 4 tank level.
3. General deficiencies in the operation of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles
Although the supply of spare parts was satisfactory in the theater area of military operations, there were many shortcomings in the system of their distribution among units. Some units experienced a significant shortage of spare parts, while others had them in abundance. Much of the spare parts did not reach the units for which they were intended. Therefore, most of the divisions sent their representatives to the central base in the port of Dhahran, and they were forced to sort through mountains of containers in search of the necessary spare parts. Units sometimes exchanged spare parts with each other or took them from machines that went down.
By the beginning of the fighting in a short time, the supply of spare parts from the USA and Germany in such quantities was ensured that the specialists of material and technical services did not know what spare parts they had or where they were stored. Registration of applications for parts sometimes took several days, in particular, due to the incompatibility of computer systems and formats. Then there were problems with transport. The army did not have enough vehicles, many of which were unreliable and outdated designs. The combat units changed their location and were hard to find.
Crew members, commanders and army experts indicated that improved optics were necessary for the sight of the Abrams tanks and the Bradley BMP. Although the gunners were able to see potential targets at a distance of 4 000 and more, the images had the appearance of “hot spots”. The identification of targets, i.e., the recognition of “friend or foe” was possible only at 1500 distances ... 2 000 m in clear weather and 500 ... 600 m and less when it rained. The main armament of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles could hit targets outside these ranges: ATGM TOU - at a distance of 3750 m, 120-mm cannon - 3000 m and more, 25-mm cannon "Bradley" - 2500 m.
The inability to identify targets at distances corresponding to the range of the weapons, limited the combat effectiveness of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. The crews indicated in the reports that they were delaying the opening of fire, waiting for the outlines of the targets to become clear.
The army experts simultaneously noted that the characteristics of the sights of the Abrams tanks and the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle exceeded the corresponding figures of Iraqi vehicles, due to which the American tanks and BMPs had a significant tactical advantage. Crews of Iraqi vehicles often simply did not see US tanks when they were firing.
The inability of crews to identify targets at long distances was one of the reasons for the large number of cases of erroneous shelling of their battle formations. So, there were 28 cases of their own fire, and in 10 cases, the shells hit the target. Some crews of the BMP "Bradley" admitted that they were afraid to get under the fire of the Abrams tank than they did under enemy fire. They also noted that the Bradley car could easily have been mistaken for long distances as an enemy's BMP.
During the fighting, various methods of identifying “friend-foe” were used: applying an inverted “V” sign on the car, attaching orange-colored panels, putting on color glass caps on the stern lights, setting bright blinking lights, setting the national flag, etc. All these measures had limited efficiency due to weather conditions, long ranges and the inability of thermal devices to distinguish individual details of the target.
In connection with the incidents mentioned, the US Department of the Army has taken certain steps to address the identification of “friend or foe”. Immediately after the events in the Persian Gulf, a special organization was approved to work out the identification of “friend or foe”. It is assigned the task of checking and introducing changes to the doctrine for the near future and for the next years, concerning the creation of an effective identification system of the friend-foe, as well as training, promising developments and material support. With the help of this organization, a number of projects are planned.
The US Department of the Army also believes that the use of sophisticated navigation equipment will help identify “friend or foe”. If the commander knows exactly where his car is and where other units are located, then it is easier for him to figure out where are “his”, where is “alien”. Currently, combat units and support services do not have a sufficient number of effective navigation systems. Combat units have one or two navigation systems per company, or approximately one for every 6 ... 12 vehicles. In the fighting, "Desert Storm" used two types of navigation systems: Loran-C and GPS. Loran-C locates based on beacon signals located on ground installations. In Saudi Arabia, a network of radio beacons was installed on the ground. To use existing infrastructure, the US Department of the Army purchased 6000 receivers. In the course of hostilities, the Loran-C system made it possible for machine commanders to determine their location with accuracy to 300 m.
The GPS navigation system uses signals from satellites. On the BMP "Bradley" and tanks "Abrams" installed small SLGR receivers that received satellite signals. SLGR receivers allowed commanders to locate machines with 16 accuracy ... 30 meters. 8 000 SLGR devices were also purchased, of which 3500 were delivered to machines. The crews were able to use both systems, but the SLGR was preferred because of the increased accuracy in determining the coordinates. According to the commanders, crews and army officials, the US ground forces units would not be able to locate without navigation systems. Navigation systems made it possible for US units to quickly cross the poorly protected desert in Eastern Iraq and cut off Iraqi troops in Kuwait. The captured Iraqi general pointed to the use of the SLGR as an example when Iraqis were beaten by high American technology.
Parts of support such as repair and maintenance services, logistics, also used SLGR to locate. The engineering service of the 24 Infantry Division used the SLGR for laying new combat tracks.
The personnel of the tank units of the US Army praised the advantages of GPS navigation systems and spoke in favor of installing them on all tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. There were also suggestions to install GPS receivers on the Bradley BMP and Abrams tanks.
The Ministry of the Army, in conjunction with other organizations, is developing military standards and requirements for a new family of GPS navigation system PLGR receivers. Although commercial PLGR receivers worked well, they did not fully meet military standards. The Ministry of the Army plans to purchase commercial receivers and modify them in accordance with the requirements of the military.
The Ministry of the Army is also considering expanding the use of the global GPS navigation system in all combat and training units. The first step in this direction can be the installation of receivers on most ground combat vehicles. There is a requirement that every combat vehicle be equipped with GPS navigation equipment, and in support groups every second vehicle. The Arms Acquisition Advisory Council should soon decide on the full-scale production of NAUSTAR GPS systems. According to experts, the cost of the program for the production of 55 thousand GPS systems will be 6 billion.
Attaching great importance to eliminating cases of “on their own” because of poor identification of targets, the Ministry of the Army developed a long-term 9-year plan for research and development (R & D), the results of which will be phased in.
At the first stage (1992-1994) the combat vehicles in the park (infantry fighting vehicles, tanks, helicopters, self-propelled artillery mounts, etc.) will be equipped with the available navigation and identification means: GPS integrated navigation receivers built into the military standards, thermal beacons.
At the same time, the second stage begins - the development of more modern navigation and identification systems based on the latest technologies. Their implementation can begin with 1995-1996.
The third stage, the terms of which extend beyond 2000, provides for the implementation of fundamental and exploratory research on the creation of embedded multi-functional means of identification, navigation, and integrated information processing. Information about specific areas of research is not available.
The R & D plan is supposed to coordinate at each of the stages of work of the combat equipment and fire control systems entering the troops with the automated systems of reconnaissance, communications and command and control entered into service.
The commanders and crew members of the BMP and the tanks indicated in their reports that their radio stations were not working reliably. Most of the Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and Abrams tanks that participated in the hostilities were equipped with VRC-12 radio stations of 1960 release. In the 1 reconnaissance divisions, the radio stations failed due to overheating. Crew members had to put wet towels on the radio to protect them from overheating. Some crews carried several spare radio stations. In some cases, armored units communicated using signal flags.
Several years ago, the Ministry of the Army recognized the need to develop a new type of radio station. In 1974, tactical and technical requirements were approved. In 1983, work began on a contract to develop an improved radio station SINGARS. However, in the US military units, by the start of Operation Desert Storm, only one battalion of the 1 Reconnaissance Division was equipped with new serial SINGARS radio stations. According to the commanders' comments, the new radio stations provided stable and reliable radio communication in the 50 radius of km. In combat, SINGARS radio stations had a time between failures 7 000 h compared to 250 h obsolete radio station VRC-12. Before the 1998, the Ministry of the Army plans to supply SINGARS with a total number of 150 000 units to the troops, and with 1998 to begin developing and adopting the next model of radio station. It is not yet determined whether this will be a new type of radio station or an upgraded SINGARS.
In conclusion, it should be noted the insufficiently effective operation of support and support vehicles, which in some cases made it difficult for BMPs and tanks to operate. BREM M-88А1 worked unreliable and often could not evacuate tanks M-1А1. There was an insufficient number of transporters for the transfer of tanks and heavy equipment. According to crew reports, the speed of the Abrams tank and the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle slowed down so that the M-109 self-propelled artillery and support vehicles based on the M-113 armored personnel carrier could overtake them. The exception was made by cars on the basis of the modernized M-113A3. The unsatisfactory mobility of wheeled trucks, which hampered their interaction with tanks, was also noted.
Conclusion. The analysis of defects and shortcomings in the operation of the Abrams tank and the Bradley BMP allowed the American specialists to take them into account when adjusting the development plan for the models of armored vehicles and their systems. In this case, the timing of the proposed implementation of the event is divided into two groups: priority, based on well-developed technical solutions, and activities that require R & D. The first group includes:
-installation on tanks and infantry fighting vehicles of more advanced opto-electronic devices (with increased multiplicity and increased resolution), which improve the recognition of targets at long ranges;
-installation on the Abrams tanks with the modernization of an independent commanding thermal imager;
-Injection into the power plant of the Abrams tank of an electronic fuel supply control unit, a self-cleaning air cleaner, fuel-boosting fuel pumps of increased reliability;
-installation of temporary means on the chassis of the tank and BMP, which facilitate the identification of "their" and "alien" machines (thermal beacons, thermal tapes, etc.);
-Equipment of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles elements of the navigation system;
-Installation on the BMP laser rangefinder.
The activities of the second group include:
- the use of built-in receivers of satellite GPS navigation system combined with the automated reconnaissance, control and communication system implemented on modernized machines on tanks and BMPs;
- installation of an autonomous power supply unit on the Abrams tank;
-increasing reverse speed and installing the driver's thermal imaging device (for the Bradley BMP.
In addition, adjustments have been made to the development plans for support and maintenance vehicles, since the existing fleet of these vehicles did not interact satisfactorily with tanks and infantry fighting vehicles due to lower mobility.
Article submitted to the editorial board of 20.06.94.
Gur Khan: An article from a secret journal just recently - you read and understand: it's not for nothing that secrets! For envy take how quickly Americans work. They immediately collected information, analyzed, gave the industry assignments for refinement and modernization - got the result. Why do we have any slip all the time? After all, we see our own mistakes, and we are learning from others, and the events have been developed a long time ago, various new designs have been invented, but almost none of this is being introduced, and if it is being introduced then in some short and cropped versions, in extremely small quantities. It seems that in our Government and the Ministry of Defense in particular, all the pests are sitting. One message that the whole of Russia has enough 2000 tanks is worth something! Read above - the USA attracted more than 3000 tanks to only one local operation, of which more than 2000 were directly deployed in combat units. It's a shame, however ...
- A.V. Yerokhin, V.L. LICHKOVAKOV Herald of Transport Engineering №3 / 1994g
- http://gurkhan.blogspot.com
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