The advantages of the “Nebo-M” complexes in the anti-missile link of the Russian Aerospace Force of the Russian Federation: irreplaceable assistants of “Voronezh” and “Podletov”

52

Decimeter radar module RLM-D (L-band) of the interspecific mobile radar 55Ж6М "Sky-M"


In the XXI century network-centric wars, long-range radar detection of promising tactical fighters of the 5 generation and their inconspicuous missile weapons is considered the fundamental basis for building reliable defensive tactics of both ground and air components of the air forces of any state, including naval naval forces. From 80-x - 90-x. last century, technologically advanced regional and world superpowers are making great efforts to develop mobile high-potential radar systems, as well as highly sensitive systems for electronic intelligence and passive location based on active and passive HEADLIGHTS, as well as ring-shaped HEADLIGHTS with a comprehensive airspace overview. No less important is the early detection of high-speed supersonic and hypersonic air attack weapons with a small radar signature, which include: warhead units of ballistic missiles of different classes, small-sized controlled combat "equipment" of M26 missiles of the Swedish-American MLRS GLSDB (represented by modified small-sized UAB GBU -39SDB) and other precision weapons.



For these purposes, the Russian and Chinese Armed Forces use a whole range of fixed and mobile radar systems with excellent power and transmission capabilities, operating in the meter, decimeter and centimeter wavelength ranges. Stationary systems include: radar missile attack warning systems of the types Voronezh-M, Voronezh-DM, Voronezh-SM (currently only in the project), as well as new Chinese projects of radar stations with unknown numbers. The stations are capable of detecting and accompanying the airborne space elements of the WTO with the 0,1 e2 EPR at distances from 3 to 5 thousand km. The most common Russian stations RTV and Air Defense Opponnik-G, Gamma-С1, Podlet-K1, 96Л6Е and Gamma-DE, as well as Chinese JY-26 and YLC-2V are considered mobile. Radar data are more often used as target targeting tools for long-range radar C-300PX1 / C-400 and C-300B4 and HQ-9, coupled with the latter through the data buses of automated control systems of the 9-CH-CHN-CHN-CHN-CHN-CHN-CHN-XN-XN-X-XNumX-CHN-52-CHN-4-CHN-1-CHN-1-2-59-6-200-1 and X-XNUMX-XNUMX-XNUMX-XNUMX-XNUMX-XNUMX-XNUMX-XNUMX-XNUMX-XNUMX-XNUMX-XNUMX-XNUMX-XNUMX. ". The distinctive abilities of these radars are: fast deployment time, different ranges of operation and unification of universal towers for work on low-altitude targets. For example, the L-band decimeter radar (XNUMX-XNUMX GHz frequency) XNUMXHXNUMXМ “Opponnik-G” is intended for long-range detection and tracking of aerospace objects at altitudes up to XNUMX km (low-orbit segment); the station can issue target designation of an air defense missile system, as well as more accurate centimeter radar stations of the combat mode of the Gamma-СXNUMX type. The latter may well be adapted to the tasks of target designation and illumination of anti-aircraft missiles with ARGSN and PARGSN.

The 48Я6-К1 “Podlet-K1” station can be considered as a radically improved low-altitude detector 76Н6. The target detection ceiling is only 10000 m, and the range is 300 km. At the same time, a solid-state PFAR operating in the centimeter X-band makes it possible not only to accompany on the aisle, but also to capture low-altitude cruise missiles with a small radar signature. Despite the possibilities of working on ballistic objects, the elevation viewing range from -2 to + 25 hail indicates that the station is “sharpened” for locating and ensuring the launch of the missile defense system exclusively for low-altitude targets. In other words, “Plyot-K1” is the only one of a kind multifunctional low-altitude radar, which has no analogues in the world. As for the maximum speed of the objects being followed, 49Я6-К1 has the limitation in 1200 m / s for this parameter (for hypersonic EHV with speeds ≥5М “Approach” does not work). Radar "Opponnik-G" has a speed limit of tracking 2200 m / s. But unlike “Podlyota-KHNUMX”, it works in the DM-range and does not allow auto-capturing of air targets with an accuracy of three to five tens of meters.


Despite the excellent viewing characteristics on the low-altitude and medium-altitude sections of the VO to 10 km (tropospheric section), the centimeter range of work, the ability to accompany on the aisle up to 200 VC, as well as capture some of them for accurate auto tracking, the multifunctional PLC “Podlet-K1” cannot used as a standalone radar. Its viewing angle in elevation reaches only + 25 degrees, and therefore a large, blind “dead zone” funnel with a huge 310-degree sector is formed over the RLC. For its overlap, RLC such as BBO 96L6E, etc. are needed.


The radar complex, which complements the “Flying-K1” on the stratospheric and exoatmospheric parts of space, is the 96ЛЛNNXXЕ high-altitude detector. This complex is used as the main target targeting means in the divisional link of the C-6PS / PM300 and C-1 “Triumph” air defense missile systems and has the highest tactical and technical characteristics. The BBO 400Л96Е has an upper limit of the detection zone - more than 6 km, has a maximum speed of the accompanying target - 100 km / h, and is also capable of tracking air targets from the EPR to 10000 м100 at a distance of 5 km on the 2 aisle. It is worth noting that the BBO 400L96E, which has a multi-beam antenna array, shows very flexible hardware capabilities for the formation of a radiation pattern in the elevation plane, and therefore is capable of interchanging Podlyot-KHNUMX in the tasks of detecting low-altitude air targets.

Chinese standby radars also keep up with domestic products. And the most interesting model from the Celestial is the radar JY-26 radar detection. For the first time, the station was presented at the International Aerospace Exhibition in Zhuhai in 2014, and a year later all the Western press and the Internet exploded with scandalous reports about the detection of subtle F-22A fighters over South Korea with radar data. The Raptors were deployed to Osan South Korean air base in the spring of 2013 to demonstrate support for Seoul in disagreements with Pyongyang on the Korean People’s Democratic Republic’s nuclear missile program, as well as in the framework of the US-South Korean teachings Fool Eagle (Foal Eagle) .

F-22A Raptor Detection by Chinese JY-26 Radars - news for the West, really stunning, because even with the placement of JY-26 on the eastern tip of Shandong province (issued 300 km into the Yellow Sea), F-22A were discovered at a distance of 250-300 km. After all, it is well known that “Raptors”, possessing EPR within 0,07 and 2, can be detected by modern ground-based radars of radio-technical troops at a distance of no more than 120-150 km. American and British experts say that the JY-26 operates in the meter and decimeter bands (VHF / UHF- from 136 to 512 MHz), which gives quite good advantages in detecting long-range small targets due to better propagation of low-frequency waves in the airspace. But a large role is still fulfilled by the high energy potential distributed between the 512 receiving-transmitting modules of the active phased array of the JY-26 station. If we are guided by such long-range indicators, it can be argued that a fighter-type target with 3 m2 EPR can be detected at a distance from 600 to 750 km. For comparison, even the domestic radar detector of the meter range with the 55Ж6U "Sky-U" is able to detect a target with a similar radar signature at a distance of no more than 420 km, and this with a pulse power of 500 kW. From this it follows that JY-26 should have a pulse power of more than 800 kW.


Chinese promising radar-DRLO JY-26


Other radio technical anti-stealth means can be considered passive electronic intelligence stations. One of the best domestic RTR stations and passive locations is Valeria. Equipped with a passive annular phased array antenna, the antenna post, which rises on a telescopic tower to a height of 20-25 m, makes it possible to locate near and distant radio-emitting air objects at distances up to 500 km and altitudes from the earth's surface up to 40 km. Due to the fixed ring antenna array, the rate of updating information on radio-emitting targets does not exceed half a second, which is an advantage over standard rotating radars. SRTR "Valeria" operates in the meter, decimeter, centimeter and millimeter wave ranges, which allows the location of radio sources of the UHF / VHF bands, airborne tactical and strategic radars aviation (including those operating in the broadband mode of "low interception capability" of LPI and frequency hopping), radio altimeters of tactical and strategic cruise missiles, as well as active homing radar heads without revealing their own coordinates. “Valeria” will easily detect the radiation of the airborne radar AN / APG-77 and AN / APG-81 (installed on the F-22A and F-35A / B / C) in any operating mode, as well as record the radiation of their airborne tactical information exchange modules on channels "Link-16" JTIDS and IFDL.

DWL-002 is a similar Chinese electronic reconnaissance and passive location station. Information about the product appeared in May 2014, after participating in the 9th international exhibition of military electronics (CIDEX-2014). The Chinese analogue, like the Valeria SRTR, has the highest sensitivity to even the weakest radiation sources, which allows bearing not only air targets with operating radar facilities, but also in complete radio silence. How does this happen? In addition to the radiation of powerful surveillance and multifunctional radars of radio technical troops and air defense troops, an enemy aircraft can irradiate a huge number of other radiation sources, which are meteorological radars, mobile GSM towers of the decimeter range, etc. The radiation from them is reflected according to the principle of any other radio signal, and will certainly be fixed by the DWL-002 passive antenna. Thus, not a single air target will pass unnoticed near the Valeria or DWL-002 antenna post, but with the difference that it will be detected from a much closer distance than with the on-board radar.


Station electronic intelligence and passive location DWL-002 of the Armed Forces of China. As seen in the photo, one station is equipped with 2 receiving antenna posts.


As is known, passive location stations, in contrast to active radars, are usually represented by several antenna posts located on the ground, which operate in the meter, decimeter and centimeter ranges. Such a configuration implies an accurate determination of the coordinates of enemy radio-emitting objects when it is not possible to use the standard impulse method for determining the distance to an air object, which is used by standard radars. This method is called differential distance measuring. At least 3-x separated passive antennas are required to calculate two values ​​of the difference between the distances between each post and the target (by the difference between the arrival times of the signal), as well as determine the point of intersection of the hyperbolas of the obtained differences of time with the spatial locations of the passive antennas. A similar method is also used in the Kolchuga-M passive reconnaissance station.

Despite the numerous advantages of all the above-mentioned means of electronic and electronic reconnaissance, they are able to give a warning time before approaching numerous ultra-small hypersonic high-precision elements weapons (6-7М speed) total 1,5 - 2 minutes, which is extremely insufficient for timely bringing into combat readiness of all, operating in the network-centric alignment, anti-aircraft missile brigades of the VKS and divisions of military air defense. Additional mobile radar facilities with significantly higher energy qualities are needed, which would allow the anti-missile link in a certain section of the theater to notify the 7 fly-by-flight aircraft for 4-5 minutes before they are approached.

This is not equal to the promising multi-element interspecific radar complex 55ЖХNUMXМ "Nebo-M", combining the qualities of SPRN, DRLO, as well as the targeting radar for anti-aircraft missile units. According to the source in the Russian Ministry of Defense, during the 6 year, 2016 X-NUMX radar systems "Nebo-M" were transferred to the Air and Space Forces. The first sets began to arrive in the Air Force from the end of 5 year. Thus, as of 2012, PTB has more than 2017 Sky-M kits. The complexes are in service with the RTV units in the Eastern and Western military districts.

Having passed the ground tests in 2009, the sky-M radar complex was successfully sent to state tests, but not fully equipped. Only the meter-long radar module RLM-M, the UHF - RLM-D, and the control cabin of the KU RLK were completely ready; The centimeter RLM-S module was then at the level of a draft design. But even in such a composition, “Sky-M” was distinguished by unique parameters in its class. Due to the high energy parameters of the meter and decimeter modules, even in the overview mode, the target detection range with the 1 2 EPR reached 550 - 600 km, which was a record figure among all modern radar-DRLOs. RLM-D (as a single element) belongs to the most powerful mobile radar of the decimeter range, and, similarly to other modules of the Nebo-M complex, is equipped with its own 100 kW power generator. The module is represented by a multi-element solid-state AFAR with a phase shifter built into each MRP: such a step makes it possible to use the station both in the circular scan mode and in the sector view mode for more careful and long-term observation of the missile-hazardous direction.

The sectoral mode of operation is characterized by an even higher impulse power of radar modules, which made it possible to bring the instrumental range to 1800 km: at such a distance, "Sky-M" is able to detect launching operational-tactical ballistic missiles and medium-range ballistic missiles. The speed limit of detectable and tracking targets reached 5000 m / s. The target with 0,1 m2 EPR (combat unit MRBD or OTBR) can be detected at a distance of 600-650 km, and 0,01 m2 - 300-350 km. Thus, the Nebo-M complex is a record-breaker both in multifunctionality and in the parameters of early target designation (2-5 min) for the C-300B4 and C-400 "Triumph" linked to the EKO system.

DOES THE SKY-M COMPLEX ARE DEMANDED DUE TO THE SATURATION OF THE EKR OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION OF HIGH-FACTORY READINESS OF THE FAMILY OF THE FAMILY 77YA6 VORONEZH?



The long-term warning system (EWS) troops aerospace defense Russia today is based on the high-potential meter 77YA6 radar "Voronezh-M", their upgraded versions 77YA6-VP "Voronezh-VP" and UHF versions 77YA6-DM "Voronezh- DM ". Stations of this family are built on the basis of light modular elements of block-container composition; and, unlike such giant structures as the Daryal-U radar, the installation of all necessary elements usually takes no more than 18 - 24 months. From the moment of the accession, in February of 2012, to the combat duty of the Voronezh-M station in the village of Lekhtusi, Leningrad Region, the East-Kazakhstan region received 7-like radars. This year it is planned to launch 2 Voronezh-DM in Yeniseisk and Barnaul, and also Voronezh-VP 1 station in Orsk. The network of 7 stations has formed around Russia a rather dense radar field at all rocket-hazardous air directions at distances 4200 - 6000 km and altitudes from 150 to 4000 and 8000 km. The survey sectors of Voronezh stations in the European part of Russia overlap, which excludes the presence of overlooked “gaps” in the southwestern, western and northwestern air directions, and the record capacity of each Voronezh radar in 500 targets allows you to maintain control over the tactical situation even at the time of a massive strike by means of an aerospace attack of the enemy. But this concerns only exoatmospheric hypersonic armament, since the lower limit of the field of view for 77YA6 is about 100 km. All aircraft operating at altitudes up to 50-70 km are not included in the Voronezh target list.

You can not neglect the issue of radio horizon. Even if 77X6-DM were adapted to work on low-altitude and medium-altitude targets (from 15 to 20 km), the radio horizon would be just 400-550 km for them, which does not give stationary Voronezh any advantage over advanced Mobile sky-lasers like "Sky-M". In other words, the Nebo-M radar complex is the only mobile electronic reconnaissance device capable of performing SPRN functions for low-altitude and medium-altitude “equipment” of supersonic or hypersonic rockets and aircraft, while providing a decent time for warning of approach, as well as the ability to quickly transfer on one or another part of the rocket-hazardous VN. Are there many similar directions in our state? Not so much, but still there are!

Firstly, this is the northeast air direction (VN), which has always been one of the weakest points of our aerospace defense. In this direction, the meter radar SPRN "Daryal-U". Like any other radar station, Daryal station has significant energy losses along the edges of the scanning sector, which means a loss of range, and the right edge of the radiation pattern (NF) just approximately covers the northern aerospace boundaries above the Laptev Sea, East -Siberian and Kara seas. It turns out that the sky over the northern parts of Siberia and Yakutia is practically not seen by the Pechorsky “Daryal”, and before being introduced into the “anti-missile unit” of the Voronezh-VP radar station in Vorkuta (with the sector of the review increased to 120 degrees), it still remains 2 of the year.

In such a situation, the 3-x “Sky-M” radar systems along the northern seas washing the Russian Federation can be an excellent solution. The first can be deployed near Norilsk. The second, in the vicinity of Tiksi: here it will serve not only as the radar of anti-ship missile systems and early warning of the northern air borders of our country, but also to act as a means of early warning and target designation for the anti-aircraft missile brigade and air defense, covering the main air base of the "Arctic forces" "Tiksi". As you know, this year Tiksi will gradually begin to turn into a strategically important air harbor of the Russian Aerospace Forces in the northern strategic direction. This AvB can also be deployed by the Tu-160 strategic missile-carrying bombers and the Tu-22М3 medium-range missile carriers. It is more expedient to deploy the third in the vicinity of Anadyr. First, a squadron or a MiG-31BM air regiment will also be stationed there; secondly, the sectoral mode of operation of the Sky-M complex will be able to cover the aerospace sector above the strategically important hub of the US Air Force - the united airbase Elmendorf-Richardson (Alaska), where tactical and strategic aircraft with hypersonic WTO can be placed .

The second very unpredictable air direction, where the Sky-M complex can be claimed, is the south-west high-voltage line. In this area, there is a particularly high activity of tactical and strategic reconnaissance aircraft of the US Air Force based on Turkish and Arabian air bases, and in the future, tests will be more often carried out on Turkish operational tactical ballistic missiles of the Yildirim family. This is the ever-growing military threat from Georgia, which plans to deploy a large contingent of NATO forces in the military base of Vaziani consisting of armored units and several batteries of the Patriot PAC-3 or SAMP-T complexes.

In addition, it is known that the commands of the US and British Armed Forces usually reinforce their ground contingent with promising modifications of the GMLRS multiple launch rocket systems, which are equipped with M30 and XM30 guided missiles with a range of up to 70-95 km. A similar decision was already made last year to strengthen the grouping of the British Ground Forces sent to Estonia. In addition to the BMP MCW-80 "Warrior", MBT "Challenger-2", shock drones MQ-9 "Reaper", as well as a contingent of a reinforced battalion (800 people), London will send M270A1 MLRS launchers to this Baltic country. Guided projectiles with a caliber of 227 mm pose a serious threat to the units of the Russian Army in the border regions of Leningrad and Pskov. They are no less dangerous than OTBR ATACMS; primarily due to the small radar signature of 0,04 m2. The Gamma-S1 radar station will be able to detect such projectiles at a distance of about 100 km, the Nebo-M complex at a distance of 200-250 km in sector mode and about 160 km in all-round mode. As a detector of small targets, Nebo-M is many times ahead of the Israeli EL / M-2084 radar of the Iron Dome complex.


The centimeter radar module RLM-CE is the main element giving the Nebu-M the highest multifunctionality. RLM-CE can perform the straightening of air routes, their capture for accurate auto tracking with accurate target designation for anti-aircraft missile units and air defense fighter squadrons. The module is a deeply improved version of the 96L6E high-altitude detector, and the Gamma-C1 multi-function radar detector


Returning to the south-western VN, it is worth noting that it is very logical to deploy the Sky-M RLC at the 102 military base in Gyumri. Here, it will be a worthy response to the Israeli Green Pine station acquired by Azerbaijan, as well as be able to control huge areas of airspace over Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Georgia. Any unauthorized tactical actions of NATO and Israel in the Middle East will be immediately recorded in the control room of the KU RLK complex.

The most important distinctive feature of the Sky-M RLC on the background of various standby radars is also the possibility of detecting exoatmospheric targets at an altitude of 1200 km, which is 6 times higher than that of the Opposnik-G radar. An advanced radar concept with pronounced anti-missile qualities, capable of detecting, accompanying and even capturing medium-range ballistic missiles outside the Earth’s atmosphere, is on the face. And despite all the emphasis made today on the creation and promotion of standard surveillance or multifunctional radars with a range of 300-400 km, the PTB units will no longer be able to do without such complexes as Nebo-M. After all, progress in the design of hypersonic elements of the WTO sooner or later will impose more severe rules of warfare.

Information sources:
http://forum.militaryparitet.com/viewtopic.php?id=12519
http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-690.html
http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-872.html
http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-610.html
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52 comments
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  1. +8
    18 January 2017 06: 20
    In my opinion, a very good and detailed article, where everything is detailed and colorfully painted and laid out on the shelves, so to speak .. And even about the performance characteristics of the complexes it is quite extensively said !! I learned a lot of useful things! complexes and their placement in the necessary "positions" of the defense of our Motherland. And the comparison with foreign counterparts is also more than clear and detailed !! Thank you very much to the author for the "gorgeous" article !!
  2. +4
    18 January 2017 07: 18
    The article is really very interesting and detailed, thanks for the work done.
  3. +1
    18 January 2017 07: 37
    Eugene hi Thanks for the work done, I liked the review. hi
  4. +1
    18 January 2017 09: 23
    Thank you very interesting, although I am more on the Navy. Thank you very much to the author for expanding the horizon. Hands do not always reach me to get acquainted with new products of land explorers
  5. +2
    18 January 2017 09: 30
    And can you make references (in English, preferably) to the situation when "all the Western press and the Internet exploded with scandalous reports about the discovery of stealth F-22A fighters over South Korea"? If the case is so high-profile, it's not difficult to find proofs, right?
    1. +2
      19 January 2017 00: 40
      Quote: ares1988
      "all the Western press and the Internet exploded with scandalous reports about the discovery of stealth F-22A fighters over South Korea"?

      there was no such- CE LAZHA /
      Chinese designers at the Airshow China claim the JY-26 radar has already spotted the US Air Force most advanced stealth fighter - the F-22 Raptor stealth fighter, as it flew in South Korea on recent exercises /
      1: Not Western, but Chinese. the Russian picked it up.
      2. In November 2014,at the exhibition as claimed by the Chinese radar developers
      (Two F-22 Raptor fighters were dispatched by the United States to 04.2013 South Korea)
      How could they take them on a stable escort in April 2013, when by November 2014 JY-26 was still damp
      3.F-22 why specially from the USA through Taiwan flew with a jump?

      "new Chinese radar JY-26 can detect American F-22 Raptor at ranges to 500 km"
      1. 0
        April 20 2017 18: 53
        And with the F-22, the Fresnel lens was removed? But they never flew outside the United States without it at all. If it was not removed, then at least 100500 km detection range. Just rubbish advertising for the Chinese radar.
  6. +3
    18 January 2017 13: 09
    Nice to read! Thanks! I can add from myself: when a prepared train works at the Kolchuga station (even without M), information flows in a stream (especially for the Americans). Very capable hardware! True, in our time there were no super-fast targets, but even without that there was enough work. When ours gave a couple of stations to Iraq, the Americans were very indignant. However, the guys there were unable to realize all the opportunities that they had. It all depends a lot on training. Thanks again for the article. It's nice to know how your favorite troop is developing.
  7. +3
    18 January 2017 13: 35
    Sky-M is a profanation of the task of radar control of airspace. Its radio horizon is about 30-40 km, which is equivalent to several minutes of flight time of high-precision guided weapons.

    The only modern means of radar control is an airborne radar on board an AWACS or UAV aircraft. Until these radars appear at the RF Aerospace Forces, all the "novelties" in this area will be nothing more than a cut of the budget.
    1. +2
      18 January 2017 17: 28
      Quote: Operator
      Its radio horizon is about 30-40 km

      it is at a height of 50m. At this altitude, only UAVs and KR fly. But for their detection, along with Sky-M, a Podlet type radar is installed.
      Quote: Operator
      airborne radar on board an AWACS or UAV.

      Of course, it significantly increases detection ranges at low altitudes, but they are far from all weather and cannot be used in standby modes. It should be borne in mind that the transition from duty to combat mode for air defense systems is only 5 minutes. Therefore, the performance characteristics of the reconnaissance systems of the combat and standby regimes are not very different.
      Sky-M radar is the only station that can effectively detect stealth F-35 aircraft massively entering the arsenal of NATO countries. These stations also detect cruise missiles well despite the fact that they have lower radio horizon utilization, they have a higher level of frequency stability and transmitter phase, which makes it possible to more effectively detect low-altitude targets against a reflecting surface.
      1. +4
        18 January 2017 18: 04
        For a long time ago, attack aircraft have been flying below 50 meters in automatic terrain enveloping mode, but we are not even talking about them - the article states that the "new" radars are designed to detect high-precision weapons that fly even lower than strike aircraft.

        No need to think about the uniqueness of the meter Sky-M - stealth devices are also perfectly detectable by centimeter and decimeter radars, it all depends on the radiation power. The ancient centimeter target radar of the Soviet S-125 air defense system in Yugoslavia carried out the capture of the F-117 (which is much less noticeable than the F-22 or F-35) at a distance of 13 km.

        The only problem is the detection range - in the ground Sky-M it is limited by the radio horizon, in airborne radars - by the radiation power.
        1. +2
          18 January 2017 19: 44
          Quote: Operator
          stealth devices are also perfectly detectable radar centimeter and decimeter ranges,
          the problem is that all stealth devices also perfectly detect any radar, and their on-board computers allow you to calculate the optimal flight paths.
          Quote: Operator
          The ancient target centimeter radar of the Soviet S-125 air defense system in Yugoslavia carried out the capture of F-117
          using an optical channel, and the notification of the flight was carried out by a cell phone after visual detection. It is rather an exception to the rule, which is triggered once in a hundred. An interesting fact about the use of VHF radars in Yugoslavia is that to destroy the P-12, the Americans fired more than 10 "high-precision" missiles, the cost of each is more than the cost of the radar itself, but they could not destroy it. All ALARMs lie down exactly 150 meters. Then they destroyed it by a sabotage group that landed from a helicopter overnight.
          1. +2
            18 January 2017 20: 49
            Quote: Vita VKO
            using an optical channel

            F-117 shot down in the dark.
            Quote: Vita VKO
            and their onboard computers allow you to calculate the optimal flight routes

            What does optimization look like when striking through layered air defense?
            1. +2
              18 January 2017 21: 25
              Quote: Parsec
              What does optimization look like when striking through layered air defense?

              There are many ways, you can write several volumes on tactics and operational art. In fact, it is impossible to create an absolutely insurmountable air defense system. While the defensive side always has a tactical advantage in ground operations, the situation is exactly the opposite in anti-aircraft operations. Many scientists in the field of radar believe that since the 2000s there has been a crisis in radar, which is due to the fact that modern air defense systems are much more efficient. Therefore, it is necessary to fundamentally change approaches to the creation of new reconnaissance and target destruction systems. Unfortunately. This is not profitable for the industry, and in the Moscow Region they prefer not to risk unverified development.
              1. 0
                19 January 2017 00: 55
                Quote: Parsec
                What does optimization look like when striking through layered air defense?

                Answer:
                Quote: Vita VKO
                There are many ways, you can write several volumes on tactics and operational art.

                Mdya The answer is comprehensive, what is already there.
                Once again: there are overlapping lesion zones around the object, the weapon requires entry into the launch zone; and how will the media path be optimized there?
                Every time I hear the word "optimization", I want to ask - by what criterion?
                Quote: Vita VKO
                If the defensive side always has a tactical advantage in ground operations
                ...
                The non-defender chooses the time, place, strike weapon and method of its application. Doubtful thesis.
                Then there is such wandering in sparse layers ...

                Quote: Vita VKO
                ... modern air defense systems are much more efficient.

                All effectiveness is obtained when a strike force is created, delivering a massive strike, when the number of aircraft in the strike exceeds the technical firepower of the air defense group by a factor of multiple. Starting from the first Iraqi and then on, that’s the case - the coalition, frantic concentration of aviation at distances that cannot be imagined in a real war. And who counted those orders?
                Quote: Vita VKO
                Therefore, it is necessary to fundamentally change approaches to the creation of new reconnaissance and target destruction systems.

                Fundamentally. Change. Approaches. To the creation. Are you a journalist?
            2. 0
              18 January 2017 21: 28
              Quote: Parsec
              F-117 shot down in the dark.

              A French night-vision device was installed on the Yugoslav TOV S-125.
              1. +6
                19 January 2017 00: 28
                Quote: Operator
                Sky-M is a profanation of the task of radar control of airspace. Its radio horizon is about 30-40 km, which is equivalent to several minutes of flight time of high-precision guided weapons.

                ... The first nonsense ... laughing
                Quote: Operator
                For a long time ago, attack aircraft have been flying below 50 meters in automatic terrain enveloping mode, but we are not even talking about them - the article states that the "new" radars are designed to detect high-precision weapons that fly even lower than strike aircraft.

                ... Second nonsense ... laughing
                Quote: Operator
                No need to think about the uniqueness of the meter Sky-M - stealth devices are also perfectly detectable by centimeter and decimeter radars, it all depends on the radiation power.

                ... Third nonsense ... laughing
                ... there's nothing to talk about ... complete profanity ...
                ... ah, to Evgeny Batkovich from me + ... a good article, solid, not without a flaw, too "Sky-M" smeared with spruce, already in three layers, too shiny ... but I agree with a good radar of the RTV troops on duty. .. I would still put one + for being probably the first of the authors, although I may be wrong, but definitely one of the few mentioned the capabilities of the Valeria SRTR and RTR means ... for example ... there is such a three-coordinate radio intelligence complex 85V6-B ... sees a 1 W radiation source at a distance of at least 30 km. ... for example, 1W is your household Wi-Fi router ... wink
                Quote: Vita VKO
                There are many ways, you can write several volumes on tactics and operational art. In fact, it is impossible to create an absolutely insurmountable air defense system.

                ... I agree ... but at the moment we have the most powerful and deeply layered air defense and missile defense system managed centrally and with the most powerful means of detection and destruction ... and work on it has not been completed and is ongoing, I must say thanks to those who are still at the dawn of the 70s, it was already laying its foundations in the USSR ... the first KSA / ASU air defense systems, RTR, electronic warfare systems, aviation operating in one bundle ... now this is a trend - a network-centric control system ...
                Quote: Vita VKO
                While the defensive side always has a tactical advantage in ground operations, the situation is exactly the opposite in anti-aircraft operations.

                ... disagree ...
                Quote: Vita VKO
                Many scientists in the field of radar believe that since the 2000s there has been a crisis in radar, which is due to the fact that modern air defense systems are much more efficient.

                ... oh-whether ... what are these for example? ... here it is worth mentioning what E. Damantsev missed in the article ... for example ZGRLS "Monolith B" by the way, it belongs to the RTV troops and is attached to the "Bastion" up to 600 km. detection range of surface and air targets ... ZGRLS "Volna" in Nakhodka, controlling the Pacific Ocean from Kamchatka to the Philippines at a distance of 3000 km., ZGRLS "Container" Mordovia / Nizhny Novgorod region, covering a sector from Spitsbergen to Israel by 3000 km. ...
                Quote: Vita VKO
                Therefore, it is necessary to fundamentally change approaches to the creation of new reconnaissance and target destruction systems. Unfortunately. This is not profitable for the industry, and in the Moscow Region they prefer not to risk unverified development.

                ... again, I don’t agree ... we won’t even touch upon the announcement of the KRET, new developments in the field of the EHF border of the 30-300 GHz range ... it’s enough to mention such a little mentioned in the public domain, but already embarked on combat duty in the Western Military District in 2014 Source: http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm
                ? id = 11990281 @ egNews
                Until the end of this year, six more new stations of various radius of action are planned to enter the radio-technical troops of the Western Military District, including Casta-2E2, Gamma-S1M, Podlet, Resonance.
                - Radar "Resonance" ... an amazing contraption opposite to it, any aircraft, even if it is made entirely of radio-absorbing materials, is still like a New Year tree ... in a nutshell ... Radar "Resonance" does not catch its sounding signal reflected from the target ... but, it catches the re-reflected energy of its signal from the boundary medium, albeit different from the original signal in the directional pattern, frequency ... resonant reflection, there is such a concept in radar, the funniest thing is that the EPO (Effective surface of reflection) of an object grows several times at this ... the detection range of "Stealth" and small-sized UAVs is from 600 to 1100 km. ... well, everything seems to be traditional, it works in the meter and additional X-band ... hi
                1. 0
                  19 January 2017 10: 44
                  Quote: Inok10
                  oh ... what are these for example?


                  This is the data for 2000. There is evidence that since that time, the improvement of electronic suppression systems has been suspended, because even then they exceeded the ability to protect any radar, even promising ones, by an order of magnitude.
                  In recent years, PRRs have been improved mainly with the aim of increasing the effectiveness of the use of the meter band radar. And there is every reason to believe that now the presence of several electrical centers will not save the meter radar from destruction. Software development there is not complicated.
                  1. +3
                    19 January 2017 23: 34
                    Quote: Vita VKO
                    This is the data for 2000. There is evidence that since that time, the improvement of electronic suppression systems has been suspended, because even then they exceeded the ability to protect any radar, even promising ones, by an order of magnitude.

                    ... an extremely bold statement ... I didn’t hear the list of means ... the plate is beautiful ... but not so simple ... the radar signal is not quite as simple as it seems at first glance ... all the more so modern radars are pulsed and have signal modulation, frequency, amplitude and phase ... and not very good filters to suppress noise ... and it’s very difficult to suppress the AFAR receive path ... since the interference is the same radio signal and everyone applies to it the same rules as for the radar signal ... hi
                    1. 0
                      20 January 2017 17: 15
                      Quote: Inok10
                      it is very difficult to crush the AFAR receiving path ... since the interference is the same radio signal

                      The fact is that many experts who do not delve too deeply into the theory of radar experience similar illusions when they think about introducing modern electronics. They forget that the physics of the process of reconnaissance and target detection remains the same, and quantization noise is still added to ordinary thermal noise, and ferrite phase shifters in the headlamp make a significant attenuation of the useful signal. By the way, there are practically no AFAR radars in RTV and ZRV now, all stations use span technologies and use a powerful transmitter such as a klystron or magnetron.
                      As I already said, there are developments and are even patented by military scientists in the Russian Federation.
                      http://bd.patent.su/2240000-2240999/pat/servl/ser
                      vlet6c22.html
                      http://www.freepatent.ru/patents/2472176
                      That's just, according to a strange tradition, they are used by Western companies.

                      But Russian designers, most of whom are already under 70 years old, pretend that this is a dead end.
                      1. +2
                        22 January 2017 01: 40
                        Quote: Vita VKO
                        The fact is that many experts who do not delve too deeply into the theory of radar experience similar illusions when they think about introducing modern electronics.

                        ... a very interesting wording is called about nothing ... wink
                        Quote: Vita VKO
                        They forget that the physics of the process of reconnaissance and target detection remains the same.

                        ... vo-in, as well as the determination of the source of interference and guidance on it SAM ... remember since the time of the S-300PM ... wink
                        Quote: Vita VKO
                        and quantization noise is still added to ordinary thermal noise, and ferrite phase shifters in the PAR lead to a significant attenuation of the useful signal.

                        ... the topic is overly controversial and a few pages ... depending on what to compare and how ...
                        Quote: Vita VKO
                        By the way, there are practically no AFAR radars in RTV and ZRV now, all stations use span technologies and use a powerful transmitter such as a klystron or magnetron.

                        ... there is some thought about the use of PAPHAR in the S-400 ... judging by the appearance ... a semi-active phased array ... by how pure AFAR will be redundant in this case ...
                        Quote: Vita VKO
                        As I already said, there are developments and are even patented by military scientists in the Russian Federation.
                        That's just, according to a strange tradition, they are used by Western companies.

                        ... as far as my memory serves me ... we together discussed the aircraft detection system that was put into operation on the basis of the existing GSM network of Russian operators and the direct transmission of data via GSM channels directly to the National Defense Center, only in the summer, isn’t it? ... and remember, at the same time, it was announced the deployment of an electronic warfare system based on the same towers of mobile operators, the difference between the news was about 7 days ... hi
                2. +1
                  21 January 2017 18: 24
                  - LLC a very interesting comment! It’s not clear to me how to bring down these aircraft discovered by all these complexes? Where then to send target designations, because GOS on missiles SAM work on the old principles and low-power.
                  Quote: Inok10
                  - Radar "Resonance" ... an amazing contraption opposite to it, any aircraft, even if it is made entirely of radio-absorbing materials, is still like a New Year tree ... in a nutshell ... Radar "Resonance" does not catch its sounding signal reflected from the target ... but, it catches the re-reflected energy of its signal from the boundary medium, albeit different from the original signal in the directional pattern, frequency ... resonant reflection, there is such a concept in radar, the funniest thing is that the EPO (Effective surface of reflection) of an object grows several times at this ... the detection range of "Stealth" and small-sized UAVs is from 600 to 1100 km. ... well, everything seems to be traditional, it works in the meter and additional X-band ...
                3. The comment was deleted.
              2. 0
                19 January 2017 01: 01
                Quote: Vita VKO
                A French night-vision device was installed on the Yugoslav TOV S-125.

                Quote: Vita VKO
                using an optical channel

                You do not distinguish between the optical and infrared channels. Interesting.
                The first reports generally said that the Serbian colonel finalized the rocket (!) By installing an infrared head. In the field!
                According to the reports, there are no IRs on the TOV (!), The normal control center from the radar.
                1. +1
                  19 January 2017 10: 29
                  Quote: Parsec
                  According to the reports, there are no IRs on the TOV (!), The normal control center from the radar

                  I studied with air defense officers from Yugoslavia, who were directly involved in this. They even brought a piece of the F-117 skin to the museum of our academy.
              3. +2
                19 January 2017 09: 20
                This is which Philips company and which Dani Zoltan bought for his hard-earned money? Well, they read it. And who conjugated it with CHP-125 and SOTs? By the way, the south used P-18, and not P-15/19, as usual in the USSR
          2. +2
            19 January 2017 00: 26
            Vita VKO

            1. Flying radars allow you to create a continuous field of radar.

            2. The F-117 was first discovered with a divisional survey radar of the meter range at a distance of 20 km, and then taken to escort the battery target radar of a centimeter range at a distance of 13 km.

            Only the full-time target radar was tightly connected with the guidance of S-125 air defense missiles, so no other, including optical guidance channel at that time was impossible. The thermal imaging channel was added to the C-125 after the war in Yugoslavia.

            In addition, the F-117 flew at an altitude of 6000 meters, and the clear cloud height was 1000 meters - optical detection of the aircraft was impossible.
            1. +1
              19 January 2017 09: 21
              But I didn’t notice your answer
          3. +1
            19 January 2017 09: 23
            And here, please, in more detail. Americans mocked PRR meter radar? Hmm, Zadornov was right, stupid.
            1. 0
              21 January 2017 20: 18
              Most sources say something like this: "in Operation Allied Force, up to 95% of the attacks on the positions of the Yugoslav air defense forces were delivered with the use of high-precision weapons (with the effectiveness of strikes being at least 70%)",
              and at the same time "according to one of the participants in the reflection of air strikes of those days, almost the only means of conducting radar reconnaissance were Soviet-made radars of the meter range (P-12 or P-18)".
              Or maybe in America they don’t know about the first Fresnel zone?
  8. +3
    18 January 2017 20: 04
    The author has a bit of a problem with logic.

    Let's say they put Sky-M in the 102nd base. We started to monitor Israel, Syria, Iraq, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Sense? To monitor the Middle East, it is enough to put it in Syria, where there are Russian military bases.
    Keep track of Azerbaijan from Armenia? Why, if Russia has a direct border with us.
    By his logic, in order to fly from Moscow to Vladivostok, the plane must fly through Kaliningrad. This part somehow did not adorn the work that he put into this article.
    1. 0
      19 January 2017 07: 10
      Maybe this is the best location?
      A radar thing is not cheap, you can’t buy a lot, you can’t build it quickly ... Again the relief and elevation + politics (Armenia is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization).
      Everything written is solely my guess.
      Sincerely, Arthur
  9. +1
    18 January 2017 20: 12
    still would tell who will work on this equipment ..... you look at these experts, I do not want to live ....
  10. 0
    18 January 2017 22: 53
    I don’t quite understand why do we need hypersonic target detection stations with a range of a thousand km if the launch positions on land and US ships at sea are closer than this distance?
  11. +2
    19 January 2017 00: 26
    Quote: Author: Evgeny Damantsev
    The most important distinguishing feature of the Nebo-M radar against the background of various standby radars is also the ability to detect exoatmospheric targets at an altitude of 1200 km, which is 6 times higher

    fool
    Where are the "firewood"?




    1800 km * sin80gr? wink

    55Ж6М (Е) Interspecific mobile radar detection complex aerodynamic and ballistic objects at medium and high altitudes.
    Power Consumption - 100 кВт
    Transmit Power:
    - impulse power - 500 кВт
    - average transmitter power - 5 kW

    Opponent-GE (59H6-E)
    Power consumption - 100 kW
    Impulse: 500 кВт; Average transmitter: 12 kW.


    power flux density of radiated radar electromagnetic waves рq at the location of the target

    where Рradar - power of electromagnetic waves radiated by the radar in the direction of the target.


    200km, which is SIX TIMES?
    And then 200km ... it depends on what purpose. 10m ^ 2 &
  12. +1
    19 January 2017 02: 40
    Quote: Inok10
    The "Resonance" radar does not catch its sounding signal reflected from the target ... but, it catches the re-reflected energy of its signal from the boundary medium, albeit different from the original signal in the directional pattern, frequency ... resonant reflection is such a concept in radar

    Saved for history - I can’t drink so much laughing

    "Resonance-N" is a stationary VHF radar complex. Consists of six surveillance radars with an azimuth viewing angle of 60 degrees each. The principle of location and performance characteristics are standard for radars of this range. Disadvantages - limited view in elevation (radio horizon +1,5 degrees, there is a "dead funnel" above the complex with an opening angle of 20 degrees).
    Built in 2014 by Shoine (Nenets Autonomous District of the Russian Federation). "Resonance-NE" was built in Iran - Germsar (2014) and Akhvaz (2015).
    1. +5
      20 January 2017 01: 02
      Quote: Operator
      Saved for history - I can’t drink so much

      ... well, you’ll drink nothing to you ... all the same, the horse will not feed ... having memorized a Smart word - A radio horizon as a parrot repeating it to a place and out of place, it’s not a big deal ... laughing
      ... so much about the radio horizon ...
      - firstly, the radio horizon is a definition of radio communication and has nothing to do with radar ... in radar there is a definition of "line of sight of the radar" ... these are somewhat different things ... and for the gifted, radio waves do not propagate in a straight line lines are like the beam of a laser pointer ... but, they go around the earth, the phenomenon is called refraction and it can be different we look Ris.1

      ... everything is clear:
      - Standard refraction - good for radar
      - Critical refraction - very good for radar
      - Over refraction or surface waveguide - amazing for radar
      - Subrefraction - very bad for radar
      ... now I hope all Kamrads understand what the line of sight of the radar is ... ah, "Individual with Radio Horizon" to teach and smoke materiel! ... for calculations, the radius of Mother Earth is used to straighten the beam, it is easier ... but, in fact, everything is as in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 ... only Individuals believe that everything breaks off beyond the horizon, the same at one time claimed that the Earth is flat ... laughing
      Quote: Operator
      "Resonance-N" is a stationary VHF radar complex. Consists of six surveillance radars with an azimuth viewing angle of 60 degrees each. The principle of location and performance characteristics are standard for radars of this range. Disadvantages - limited view in elevation (radio horizon +1,5 degrees, there is a "dead funnel" above the complex with an opening angle of 20 degrees).

      ... no not standard ...
      - firstly - it will measure four coordinates, three traditional and one very interesting one - radial velocity ...
      - secondly uses Beam Resonance Reflectionalthough this is more re-emission than reflection ...
      ... here I feel a little have to climb into the jungle ... a little walk on the basics of radar ...
      There are three types of reflection of radio waves:
      - Diffuse - the simplest ray flew in and reflected in all directions, including towards the radar in the picture ...

      ... it’s this type of reflection that traditional radars use ... a ray arrives, is reflected in all directions, including returning in some quantity to the radar ...
      - Mirror - here it is worth remembering the fundamentals of the basics: "The angle of incidence is equal to the angle of reflection" I hope everyone remembers ... it is typical, for example, of the calm sea or large flat spaces, for example, the runway of an airfield ... only the ray is reflected at the same angle, but in the opposite the side of the radiation source, which is the basis of the "stealth" technology ... everyone remembers, flat surfaces and angular shapes of "American stealth funderfall" ... here you still need to touch on such a thing as aerodynamic quality, but this is already aerodynamics, this will be below ...
      - Resonant reflection is the most interesting and incomprehensible action for many nowadays, especially for "children across the river" ... peculiar to the meter range, when the wavelength is close to the dimensions of a reflective flat surface and falls on it at a very acute angle ... an interesting moment arises - re-emission with an increase in the reflected signal towards the radiation source, although the signal already has completely different parameters, frequency, directional diagram, etc. but it remains within the range, a kind of echo that is louder than the primary sound ... that is, there is an increase in the image intensifier tube - Effective reflective surface ... which turns the "stealth fly" into ordinary elephant ... now back to - aerodynamic quality, by and large it is ... smooth air flow around the glider of an aircraft and the smoother it is, the better for an aircraft, less air resistance ... which cannot be said about "stealth" here about laminarity ( smoothness) flow can only be dreamed of ... solid flat surfaces mating at different angles ... which creates a lot of problems like turbulence, streamline disruption, etc., which in turn creates areas of compaction of the air in various places of the aircraft, border environment ... we all remember the radar can see the clouds, so, so ... and so these seals and jump points created around the stealth glider are the same clouds with a certain density and they have completely different properties in relation to radio waves emitted by the radar than just laminar (smooth air flow around) the airframe of the aircraft ... therefore, neither in the USSR, not in modern Russia they play games with stealth ... only as one of the means of reducing radar signature, not to the detriment of the aerodynamic quality of the glider, take a look at T-50 and after the F-22/35 ... it's better not to look at the F-117 ... laughing
      ... and in conclusion ... The "Resonance" radar complex uses exactly - Resonant reflection / re-emission ... it is by no means a very simple VHF station ... its main "clients" are small-sized UAVs and "stealth wunderfafli" ... hi
      1. 0
        20 January 2017 01: 56
        Quote: Inok10
        True, the signal already has completely different parameters, frequency, radiation pattern, etc.

        The radiation pattern s and gnala - not applicable in this case.
        Aerodynamic quality of an aircraft - the ratio of lift to drag (or the ratio of their coefficients) in the flow coordinate system at a given angle of attack.
      2. 0
        20 January 2017 02: 04
        Something you have completely gone into a binge - the radar sees the clouds not as a kind of "thickening" of the air, but as an area of ​​100% humidity surrounded by airspace with humidity less than 100%.

        Your "smart" thoughts about the use of refraction in the radar of the meter and lower ranges - generally a complete waste laughing
        1. 0
          20 January 2017 02: 28
          Now about the resonant re-reflection of the locating radio signal - it arises in the only case when the frequency of oscillations of electric charges in the conductive shell of the irradiated body coincides with the frequency of the radio signal.

          This effect does not depend on the radar, but on the nature of the surface conductivity of the aircraft. Therefore, all aircraft made using stealth technology with a ferromagnetic absorbing (non-reflective) coating applied to the surface are not, by default, susceptible to resonant reflection from the word at all.

          PS Monk, what kind of troops did you serve in the cavalry, no? laughing
          1. +2
            21 January 2017 00: 13
            Quote: Operator
            Now about the resonant re-reflection of the locating radio signal - it arises in the only case when the frequency of oscillations of electric charges in the conductive shell of the irradiated body coincides with the frequency of the radio signal.

            ... well ... well, the angle of incidence doesn’t affect anything? ... yes, and again you confused an object with a finger ... the coincidence of frequency is for reflective surfaces (antennas) ... in our case we are talking about radar ... the angle is important here, the more so speech for absorbing surfaces, which are two species:
            - an interference type and a purely absorbing one ... we will fold the first ones since they are firmly tied to the calculated wavelength +/- 5% ... well, let’s deal a little with absorbing ones and laugh ... wink
            ... the fact that you "float in the subject" can be seen without an armed eye ... bully
            Quote: Operator
            This effect does not depend on the radar, but on the nature of the surface conductivity of the aircraft. Therefore, all aircraft made using stealth technology with a ferromagnetic absorbing (non-reflective) coating applied to the surface are not, by default, susceptible to resonant reflection from the word at all.

            ... well, well ... here's a sim. You finally signed in your own Ignorance ... we are talking about the meter range ... that is, a wavelength of at least 1 meter (meter range from 1 to 10 m wavelength) ... what we are told The basics of radar ... the radar absorbing coating should be at least half the thickness in thickness waves ... that is, 0,5 m and more! ... this is not even a penguin - it's a hippo turns out, not a plane ... a, Hippos do not fly, although I will be very glad for the US Air Force - Hippo to appear in service laughing ... and just in the meter range we have the same resonant reflection, or rather re-radiation ... and another such moment ... resonant reflection of the signal can be achieved in other ranges ... well, you will really have to try with the number of radiation sources. .. although now there are plenty of them, GSM towers, Radio towers, etc. ... You are a Profan Mil Friend ... and this is a fact! ... hi
            1. 0
              21 January 2017 03: 02
              You do not understand the basics of the operation of emitters and receivers of radio waves: the antenna selector should not be equal to the wavelength, it only needs to be a multiple of it - 1 / 2, 1 / 4, 1 / 8, etc.

              Think at your leisure how the linear size of your cellular antenna is related to the GSM carrier wavelength.
            2. 0
              21 January 2017 20: 44
              Operator on the issue of rights coverage (for SMV and UHF): "The first steps were taken in Germany at the end of World War II. As a result of night attacks by British aircraft equipped with radars, the losses of German submarines increased sharply. It was then that they began to apply radar absorbing coatings on their felling and a serial technology was developed for the production of finely dispersed ferromagnetic fillers used in coatings"
              1. +2
                22 January 2017 01: 14
                Quote: KVIRTU
                The operator in the issue of rights coverage (for SMV and UHF):

                ... you don’t need to play ball games ... Kiev Higher Engineering Radio Engineering School shame too ... am ... a graduate of his such nonsense will not write when ... from a word at all ...
                Quote: KVIRTU
                The first steps were taken in Germany at the end of World War II. As a result of night attacks by British aircraft equipped with radars

                ... the conversation was for meter range waves ... so now we read for the radar of the time:
                An option designed for action on the sea was the anti-submarine Wellington Mk. Viii. Using a glider and engines from the MK version. 1C, the designers installed on it the ASU Mk review radar. II working in decimeter range and allowing to detect a submarine in a positional position in the absence of visibility, as well as a powerful spotlight mounted on the site of a retractable FN9 turret. The searchlight was supposed to be used to escort declassified German submarines, breaking through in the water at high speed at night through the British-controlled Bay of Biscay. The effectiveness of the spotlight was confirmed by military tests. The crew increased by the radar operator and amounted to 6 people. The armament consisted of two 420-pound (191 kg) depth charges, and if necessary, an aircraft torpedo was suspended. Defensive weapons corresponded to the version of MK.1C.
                In 1943, modifications based on Wellington Mk.Kh. began to be adopted by the Coast Command. with Hercules engines and a four-point aft turret FN 20A. These were daytime naval bombers: Mk.XI with ASU Mk.II radar for target search and armed mainly with a torpedo; Mk. XII with more perfect centimeter radar ASU MK.III in a fairing under the nose of the fuselage. And the installation in place of the nose turret of an American-made SCR 720 fighter radar as on night fighters De Haviland DH 98 and Mosquito NF XII led to the appearance of a specialized training aircraft Wellington Mk. XVII, designed for training radar operators.

                ... that is, the ASU Mk radar. II decimeter range as well as radar ASU MK.III centimeter range ... has nothing to do with the allegations The operator about wave absorption meter range with a wavelength of 1 to 10 meters ... well, but you just confirmed it ... by balling with SMV / UHF this fact ... hi from KVAIU them. S. M. Kirov ... laughing
                1. 0
                  22 January 2017 02: 38
                  Inok - I sincerely admire the train of your thoughts on the decimeter thickness of a ferromagnetic coating that absorbs decimeter-wave radio waves, greetings from VKSh to them. CM. Budyonny laughing
                2. 0
                  22 January 2017 15: 38
                  Argue with yourself. And shame (your terminology), for that matter, KVAIU.
                  Give my clarification "(for SMV and UHF)"in the commentary, here are the performance characteristics of the onboard radars, of the same range.
                  I did not write about MV, read carefully.
  13. 0
    22 January 2017 15: 05
    Quote: Inok10
    .. in-in, as well as the determination of the source of interference and guidance on it SAM ... remember from the time of the S-300PM ... wink

    If everything was so simple! Unfortunately, when jamming, any multichannel air defense system, including the S-400, becomes single-channel and is capable of firing only the jammer. Moreover, the first missile serves only to determine the range, and the second to destroy the PAP itself.
    Secondly, for more than 20 years a potential adversary has a huge range of towed antennas for jamming, which provide for the detonation of a rocket at a safe distance.
    Thirdly, it’s not when the strike group itself will be unmasked to interfere, and the jammer is usually outside the SAM zone,
    Further, solitary disturbances rarely cause them; they almost always have a group character, which sharply reduces the possibilities for spatial selection and direction finding.
    And believe me, this is far from all the possibilities to effectively counter radar reconnaissance. There are still possibilities for various combinations of passive and active interference.

    Quote: Inok10
    aircraft detection system based on existing GSM network

    Using GSM is a special case, and the differential-ranging method raises a large number of problems with the unambiguous determination of coordinates and efficient use of energy.
    There is the possibility of using, in principle, any energy for solving the problems of detection and guidance, including jammers themselves, but the most efficient is the energy of GLONASS, GPS satellites
    1. +2
      24 January 2017 00: 17
      Quote: Vita VKO
      If everything was so simple! Unfortunately, when jamming, any multichannel air defense system, including the S-400, becomes single-channel and is capable of firing only the jammer.

      ... here I don't understand ... how is it? ... from the enemy's side an armada with a lot of jammers ... and, we have a lonely S-400 battalion "poor and poor"? ... maybe "someone" decided to breed everyone on chaff? ... no ? ... so let's talk about the Air Defense System! ... including and dividing the means of RTV of the Standby mode, means of the Combat mode, means of guidance, means of destruction, means of RTR / RER and electronic warfare of the Aerospace Forces and, in addition, everything is the same only in the air defense of the Ground Forces (Ground Forces) ... and all this in a single a bunch of KSA / ACS starting with "Universal" and then "Baikal", "Polyana", "Rubezh", "Ranzhir", "PORI" ... and in general who said that the Air Force does not participate in repelling a massive enemy raid? ... the same "Baikal" directs up to 3 fighter regiments (IAP) through the "Rubezh" ... and, already, "catch" the jammer RVV-SD / BD with a 9B-1103M-200PS seeker having an active (capture up km.) and an additional passive channel with a detection range of up to 50 km. very simple ... so there is still a question to whom it will be more difficult ... bully
      Quote: Vita VKO
      Secondly, for more than 20 years a potential adversary has a huge range of towed antennas for jamming, which provide for the detonation of a rocket at a safe distance.

      ... I repeat ... GOS 9B-1103M-200PS ... you can still 9B-1103M-PA - active semi-active GOS ... wink
      Quote: Vita VKO
      Thirdly, it’s not when the strike group itself will be unmasked to interfere, and the jammer is usually outside the SAM zone,

      ... oh-eh? ... well, what about the "Container" ZGRLS? ... laughing ... Your group is already - DETECTED! ... in two ways ... azimuth and speed, albeit without elevation ... but beyond 3000 km. ... well, there’s no problem classifying the aerodynamic target by secondary parameters and speed ...
      Quote: Vita VKO
      And believe me, this is far from all the possibilities to effectively counter radar reconnaissance. There are still possibilities for various combinations of passive and active interference.

      ... I won’t believe it anymore ... I’ll have to fight not with Iraq from the time of Hussein and not Libya from the time of Gaddafi ... it's not so simple as you write ... you have to fight with the Air Defense System! ... deeply echeloned in both detection and destruction ...
      Quote: Vita VKO
      Using GSM is a special case, and the differential-ranging method raises a large number of problems with the unambiguous determination of coordinates and efficient use of energy.

      ... and not required ... tea Country Russia, not Liechtenstein ... transparent radar ... have you heard of this? ... GSM stations just work as usual ... well, they’re already reporting changes ...
      1. 0
        24 January 2017 21: 17
        Quote: Inok10
        Will have to fight not with Iraq since Hussein

        For your information, during the start of Operation Desert Storm, all the radar stations on duty in the coastal zone of the Black Sea coast were completely suppressed. The difference was in the degree of suppression. Only some m-range radars of the Defense type could fix bearings, the rest simply did not have enough dynamic range, the screens were black, as if turned off. Now estimate the distance. Since then, little has changed in the area of ​​anti-jamming radar.
        And your praises "about the most" with stupid bully bully laughing they say that you either don’t understand the physics of the electronic warfare process itself, where the difference between the energies necessary for suppression and detection differs accordingly as a square root and a cubic root in range, or an ordinary troll.
      2. 0
        14 December 2017 12: 34
        Those. Nuclear weapons have already been canceled, disarmed and put into fuel assemblies for nuclear power plants?
        What sort of clarification of the relationship between the Armada and the Air Defense System are we talking about?
        The only option is precisely Libya, Syria, Iran and other Liechtenstein ...
        Otherwise, immediately after the discovery of the “armada” of ZGRLS (not important by the Container, Sunflower, Murmansk or Monolith) at a distance of thousands of kilometers from the borders of the Russian Federation, the hand of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief is nervously shaking on the “red button”, and Trump or someone there still inconsistently on the "red phone" begs her not to press, because the "mistake came out" and everything that took off immediately "will return to the stall."
        And to train, to measure the size and depth of penetration, indeed, we will be "on cats".
  14. +1
    29 January 2017 08: 01

    Detection of the F-22A Raptor by Chinese JY-26 radars is really stunning news for the West, because even taking into account the location of the JY-26 at the eastern tip of Shandong province (it extends 300 km to the Yellow Sea), F-22A were detected at a distance 250-300 km. After all, it is well known that the "Raptor", having an EPR within the limits of 0,07 m2, can be detected by modern ground-based radars of radio engineering troops at a distance of no more than 120-150 km. American and British experts claim that the JY-26 operates in the meter and decimeter bands (VHF / UHF-from 136 to 512 MHz),


    Boo-ha-ha-ha !!
    Americans accuse the Chinese of foul play ???
    Are their vaunted "invisibles" not invisible at all?
    They will be detected by long-wave radars with 400 km, antiaircraft missiles will be prepared in advance, which are with short-wave, but then accurate radar and alert! No longer invisible!
  15. 0
    1 January 2019 09: 58
    Quote: Operator
    The only modern means of radar control is an airborne radar on board an AWACS or UAV aircraft. Until these radars appear at the RF Aerospace Forces, all the "novelties" in this area will be nothing more than a cut of the budget.

    I do not quite understand, i.e. Is RTV a cut in the budget?
  16. 0
    1 January 2019 10: 20
    Inok10 ... I agree ... but at the moment we have the most powerful and deeply layered air defense and missile defense system managed centrally and possessing the most powerful means of detection and destruction

    Even the directions are not all closed (only the early warning missile system has been restored), can you tell us more about the "separation"?

"Right Sector" (banned in Russia), "Ukrainian Insurgent Army" (UPA) (banned in Russia), ISIS (banned in Russia), "Jabhat Fatah al-Sham" formerly "Jabhat al-Nusra" (banned in Russia) , Taliban (banned in Russia), Al-Qaeda (banned in Russia), Anti-Corruption Foundation (banned in Russia), Navalny Headquarters (banned in Russia), Facebook (banned in Russia), Instagram (banned in Russia), Meta (banned in Russia), Misanthropic Division (banned in Russia), Azov (banned in Russia), Muslim Brotherhood (banned in Russia), Aum Shinrikyo (banned in Russia), AUE (banned in Russia), UNA-UNSO (banned in Russia), Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people (banned in Russia), Legion “Freedom of Russia” (armed formation, recognized as terrorist in the Russian Federation and banned), Kirill Budanov (included to the Rosfinmonitoring list of terrorists and extremists)

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