Military Review

Military science needs creators, not performers

Military science needs creators, not performersRecently, against the background of the general crisis of Russian science, there has been a crisis of military science, which is manifested in a reduction in the number of scientific military schools and military scientists, a decrease in the quality of research and dissertation research, a decrease in the number of scientific developments implemented in the military, etc. reasons for this phenomenon.

It should be immediately emphasized that in order to master military science, it is not enough to gain military knowledge, to become a military specialist, you also need to have an analytical mindset, and have creative abilities. After all, knowledge does not boil down to abilities. Abilities are individual personality traits that are the subjective conditions for the successful implementation of a certain type of activity. Knowledge is the result of cognition, and abilities are properties of the human psycho-nervous organization. Abilities have a natural base in the form of so-called natural inclinations. Capable is not only a knowledgeable person, but also able to extract and use new knowledge in life.

Science is creativity. Knowledge is only a prerequisite for creative activity. The creative nature seeks to see, explore, learn, improve and go beyond what is already known. Such people are always inspired by new opportunities. They are passionate about their work.

Characteristic features of the creative personality are: dissatisfaction with what has been achieved; the tendency to look at the same things differently; the desire to establish a relationship; willingness to experiment and to risk.

The creative abilities of military scientists in our time are claimed by the need for a systematic study of modern complex problems of war, fundamental qualitative changes in military affairs, and changed conditions for the preparation and conduct of hostilities. In addition to experience and knowledge, a wide range of military-political, operational-strategic and military-technical thinking is needed here.

But not all military personnel occupying scientific positions have the characteristic features of a creative personality. Most of them are content with existing knowledge and do not try to go beyond the acquired experience. And for fundamental research it is necessary not only to constantly replenish your knowledge, but also to go beyond what has been known.


At present, the main efforts of military scientists are aimed at solving applied urgent tasks. This is manifested in the development and publication of numerous methodologies, manuals, instructions, regulations, etc. documents military research and educational institutions.

At the same time, it should be borne in mind that in the field of war and defense security there are not only applied but also fundamental problems, such as the study of the nature and nature of military and non-military confrontation in the modern world, the identification of trends in the development of military and non-military means and methods of international confrontation, patterns of their change, determining the directions of parry and neutralization of military and non-military threats and dangers, as well as forecasting scientific, technological and military-technical development in duschih countries in the world and others.

These fundamental problems play a more important role than numerous applied tasks. Therefore, the attention of military scientists should be directed not to applied, but to fundamental problems. “Whoever takes on particular issues,” Vladimir Lenin pointed out, “without first addressing common questions, he will inevitably run across these common questions at every step unconsciously for himself.”

Reports on scientific work carried out by military research and educational institutions usually list the names of the research carried out, the number of documents issued, conferences and other events held. But nothing is said about new scientific ideas, discoveries, conclusions or suggestions made in the course of scientific work. At the same time, in many research reports, many conclusions and statements are repeated from year to year and flow from one report to another. The point is that some heads of military scientific institutions and military scientists themselves forget about the meaning of scientific work, seeing in it the scientific rationale for the orders and directives received from higher authorities, although the law on science clearly states: scientific activity is an activity aimed at obtaining and applying new knowledge.

Science, which directly serves practice, descends into craft. And you need to bring it out of this state. Writing manuals, instructions, regulations and other administrative documents is not a matter of scholar, but of an official. Therefore, when accepting research works and evaluating scientific activities, it is necessary to carry out strict demand from managers and implementers for the novelty, scientific significance and value of their research.


It should be noted that in cases where military theory was developed and developed in the course of practical activity by leading cadres, and scientists only substantiated and formulated the ideas put forward, the consequences turned out to be very sad.

It may be recalled how the military scientists scientifically substantiated the "under the order" of the military political leadership of the country for the destruction of medium and short range missiles, combat railway missile complexes, how scientific research was conducted to create mobile forces in Russia like the American ones, as evidenced by the need to move from regimental structure of the Ground Forces to the brigade, as the scientifically argued position that in the war with the use of nuclear weapons there will be no winner.

In military affairs, the question of working according to the principle of “what you will deserve” is particularly acute, because in the military service one can begin the development of practically any scientific idea, theory, and carry out scientific research on this or that problem only with the consent and approval of the senior officer. And from this point of view, increasing the demands on the integrity and honesty of scientific leaders of all degrees, their ability to defend the true, and not imposed from above point of view is of great importance.

Unfortunately, the heads of the military department are often dilettantes who do great harm to the development of military theoretical thought. You can recall experts in the field of taxes, fees and furniture trade Anatoly Serdyukov, who headed the Ministry of Defense of Russia, as well as a specialist in control over the turnover of alcoholic beverages Ekaterina Priyezhev, who led the Department of Education of the Russian Defense Ministry. Thanks to their efforts, the system of military education and science in Russia was ruined. In particular, several major military academies and universities were eliminated, the number of teachers was reduced seven times. The Ministry of Defense officers began to train on a three-level Bologna system (undergraduate, specialty and magistracy), which resulted in a sharp decline in the quality of officer training.

The trouble is not that these useless people stood at the head of the military department, military education and military science for several years. The main problem is that many military scientists snapped their heels in front of them and rushed to justify the need for reorganization and reduction of military command, including a significant reduction in the role of command and officer positions; reform of the military education and science system; the transfer of the Ground Forces to the brigade base and the abolition of the divisional and regimental level; transition to outsourcing. At the same time, all the others that did not coincide with the views of Serdyukov and Co. were rejected in advance, the opposite opinion was ignored, and military scientists, who had their own opinion on solving military problems, were persecuted.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitry Yazov described the activities of Serdyukov as defense minister in the following way: the “best” defense minister Anatoly Serdyukov brought a harem and almost killed the army. ”

In military science, there can and must exist different and even contradictory one points of view, different ideas, hypotheses. Science develops on the basis of the struggle of opinion. But the trouble is that not all managers can understand and accept this.

Therefore, it would be necessary to think about how in the present conditions it is better to bring up the breadth of thinking, creativity, the ability to understand and perceive different views, judgments, the ability to have and the ability to defend one’s own opinion. Military science should not close within the limits of predetermined views and concepts.


In the field of military science, more often than in the field of other sciences, the leaders of the highest ranks acted as pioneers of new ideas and carriers of true scientific views. It is believed that only major military leaders are able to cover and understand the existing problems in military affairs and suggest ways to solve them based on their own extensive knowledge and experience.

However, for fundamental research it is necessary to have not only knowledge and experience, but also the necessary skills and abilities, as already mentioned. Very often, lower and middle level officers are able to generate the right ideas that are not perceived by the top management.

We can recall the Soviet division commander George Isserson, who published the book “New Forms of Struggle (Experience in the Study of Modern Wars)” in 1940, in which he predicted, in particular: “War is not declared at all. It simply begins with pre-deployed armed forces. Mobilization and concentration do not relate to the period after the onset of the state of war, as was the case in 1914, but imperceptibly, gradually being carried out long before that. ”

However, Isserson’s ideas were rejected because they did not coincide with the ideas of the top military leaders. It was believed that in the initial period of the war, under the cover of troops deployed on the border, mobilization would take place, as Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov wrote in his memoirs: “There was no sudden transition to the offensive by all available forces, moreover, pre-deployed in all strategic areas. Neither the Commissar, nor I, nor my predecessors B.M. Shaposhnikov, K.A. Neither Meretskov nor the senior staff of the General Staff expected that the enemy would concentrate such a mass of armored and motorized troops and throw them on all strategic directions on the first day by compact groups. ”

Recall also that the French army, which was considered the strongest in prewar Europe, expected to secure its borders at the first stage of hostilities, relying on the Maginot Line, and the Parisian strategists believed that the Germans would deliver the main blow through Belgium. The possibility of the Wehrmacht’s strike through the forested and impassable Ardennes was not seriously considered.

You can also give an example of how, in 1912, a senior official of the Austrian-Hungarian War Ministry crossed out the draft tankproposed by Lieutenant Burtyn, accompanied by the inscription: “The man is crazy!”, and such prominent military leaders as the French Marshal Foch and the German General Ludendorf, although they recognized the role of tanks, they completely underestimated the importance of airplanes and saw in them only means for sports competitions.

It should be noted that the disdainful attitude of the highest military leadership to a different point of view, to new ideas generated by lower and middle-level officers, often led to grave consequences.

Therefore, it is completely unacceptable to assume that only the top military leadership is the bearer of true scientific knowledge, and only it is capable of generating new scientific ideas. And all the more unacceptable is a scornful attitude towards a different point of view and towards non-standard approaches on the part of lower and middle-level officers.


According to the Russian military historian Anatoly Kamenev, the main flaw in Russian strategic thought was the thoughtless copying of other people's samples and the neglect of the scientific developments of Russian military theorists.

We can give an example of copying by Soviet Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky the theory of conducting a short-term war, created at the beginning of the 20th century by German Field Marshal Schlieffen (the Schlieffen Doctrine), which was based on the plan of a lightning-quick defeat of the enemy with a crushing blow of a powerful strike fist on one flank of the strategic front. Taking the Schlieffen doctrine as a basis, Tukhachevsky substantiated an offensive strategy and developed a deep battle theory, a theory of continuous operations in one strategic direction. The doctrine developed by Tukhachevsky (“to fight with little blood, a big blow, on foreign territory”), which did not even envisage the possibility of defense, was the cause of the catastrophic defeats of the Soviet troops in 1941 – 1942 years. Yes, and the Schlieffen doctrine itself suffered a collapse in the Great Patriotic War.

The work of Russian military scientists should be based on the basis of the greatest and most basic military law: "The art of war is national."

It is necessary to develop and promote our own theories, forms and methods of using groups of troops (forces), rather than trying to use Western military theories as a procrustal bed for Russian military thought.

At present, the idea that future wars will, as a rule, be network-centric and non-contact, using mostly precision weapons, is being actively introduced into the consciousness of the military-political leadership of Russia. The concept of network-centric warfare developed in the United States, which is based on an increase in the total combat power of military formations by connecting them into a single network, becomes in the eyes of some Russian military scientists a new paradigm of warfare.

However, an analysis of the hostilities that the United States conducted during the past 20 years shows that the concept of network-centric warfare is good in low-to-moderate intensity military conflicts against a deliberately weak adversary who is not armed with modern reconnaissance tools, primarily satellite, powerful weapons. including the long-range WTO, as well as modern management and communication automation tools.

Therefore, net-centrism cannot be considered as a panacea for solving problems in the Russian Armed Forces. And if the position imposed by the United States that future wars will, as a rule, be non-contact using mostly non-nuclear high-precision weapons, will prevail, then the Russian Armed Forces will prepare for a war in which they will not have a chance to win (programmed defeat).

But if as a “asymmetric response” to prepare a contact war with the use of all the armament and military equipment available in the country, the nature and the final of such a war will be completely different.

It should also be borne in mind that the tasks of the armed forces of the United States and our army do not radically coincide. For decades, the United States and its NATO allies have led offensive military operations outside their territory, always have the initiative to start a war, and are at war with a weak adversary. Therefore, their experience is atypical for us. First of all, we need to ensure the protection of our territory and therefore at the beginning of the war we will have to conduct defensive actions against a stronger, fundamentally different on each theater of the enemy.


"The peculiarity of wars is that their inherent laws and objective phenomena, being independent of the will and consciousness of people, do not act with the inevitable spontaneity of the laws of nature, but manifest themselves in other social phenomena, through the activities of people," the president of the Academy of Military Sciences of the Russian Federation Army General Makhmut Gareyev. - Knowledge of the laws, principles, methods of warfare facilitates practical activities, makes it possible to better anticipate the development of events, to act consciously. But this knowledge can not answer the question of how to act in a particular situation. Therefore, the provisions of military science cannot be applied in all cases, regardless of the conditions of the situation, with the same constancy and the same outcome as the laws of the natural sciences. ”

In 1911, the book “Modern War” was written by Colonel General Staff, Ordinary Professor of the Academy of the General Staff Alexander Neznamov. The author argued that “a theory cannot be set as a goal to indicate the best course of action in all cases. The situation in the war is so diverse and, moreover, changes so quickly that attempts to establish similar, always and everywhere suitable methods are doomed to failure in advance. ”

Military experience confirms the thesis: what was right in one case cannot be blindly applicable in another. In military affairs, one cannot proceed from the assumption that the adversary will act in the manner suggested by theory, common sense, and logic. The fascist German colonel-general Rendulich draws attention to this in his work “The management of troops” using examples from the times of the First World War:

“So, on the Russian front, the commander of one of our regiments, who once failed to overcome a wetland during the offensive, relied too much on the swampy area in front of his regiment, and the Russians here broke through the defense.

A particularly striking example in this regard was the action of the commander of the 12 Italian Army Corps, located at heights east of Isonzo, during the First World War before the 24 battle on the Isonzo. He was sure that the enemy could attack only from the heights, and in accordance with this he built his defense. However, the German-Austrian troops broke through the defenses in the Isonzo Valley and were soon in its rear. ”

“Every battle, operation, war is unique and unique according to the conditions of the situation and therefore solutions and methods of actions that correspond to the prevailing conditions must be creative, unique,” ​​the army general Gareyev points out.


The worst enemy of military science is pattern and dogmatism. Military science is dynamic, agile. The power of military science in creativity, innovation, originality.

“The main flaw in our strategy was the strange, unjustified decision of the Manchurian army commander and his quartermaster general to“ repeat the 1812 year, ”says Russian historian Anton Kersnovsky, speaking of the 1904 – 1905 Russian-Japanese war. - Kuropatkin and Kharkevich from the very beginning decided to retreat into the interior of the country. They did not feel the difference between 1812 and 1904 in the year between Russia and Manchuria and seriously intended to conduct a Patriotic War on Chinese soil. Having taken the external forms of the 1812 campaign of the year - a retreat, they did not bother to grasp their meaning. The 1812 retreat of the goal was led to the heart of Russia, in its native land, among the insurgents to the alien conqueror of the Russian people. The Russian armies in July 1812 were twice as weak as Napoleon. Barclay’s retreat maneuver was the only possible means of exhausting the enemy, occupying a more focused position and, most importantly, connecting with Bagration. The situation was completely different in April 1904. Against the three Japanese divisions that had landed in Korea, Kuropatkin could move seven distinct divisions of Siberian riflemen. The situation had nothing to do with the same 1812, the double superiority in power was just with us. Kuropatkin and Kharkevich believed that it was enough to apply the external “template” of the 1812 campaign of the year to get a victory, like a victory in the Patriotic War, under any political and strategic situation. They followed the example of those Bukhara “batyrs” who, seeing from a distance, how Russian soldiers, after the crossing, were shaking water out of their tops, and not understanding what was the matter, stood up and shook their legs, thinking that they had comprehended the whole secret of Russian tactics. The “pattern” of World War II in the 1904 setting of the year was at least as meaningless. ”

In this connection, it is appropriate to cite the words of the outstanding Russian military theorist Alexander Svechin, who was still in 1907, describing the routine thinking of some military men, wrote: “You cannot stay with the old templates. If our concepts do not change in accordance with the progress of military affairs, if we stop at the freezing point, then, worshiping immutable laws, we will gradually lose sight of the whole essence of the phenomena. Deep ideas will turn into harmful prejudices: our characters will lose their inner content; there will be an external empty shell, a lifeless idol. ”


The outstanding Soviet military scientist, Major-General Alexander Svechin wrote: “The situation of war ... it is extremely difficult to foresee. For each war, it is necessary to develop a special line of strategic behavior, each war is a special case that requires the establishment of its own special logic, and not the application of any template. ”

“The insignificant period of time introduces significant changes in the method of conducting the operation,” said French military theorist Jules Louis Leval. - Improvement of weapons, new equipment, other relationships and other techniques form dissimilar conditions and environment, sharply different from the previous time. Scientific work is the only means to stay up to date with the present and at the height of the future. He who begins a campaign, guided by obsolete memories and customs, immediately turns out to be backward and inferior to the enemy. The experience gained, instead of being a source of strength, creates in these conditions only weaknesses and shortcomings. ”

For example, educated on the traditions of the slow pace of development of military operations during the First World War, the French were not psychologically able to adapt to the new conditions, and this was the reason that French troops were so quickly paralyzed (during the military operations against the Nazi troops in 1940 year. - vm). The greatest weakness of the French was not so much the lack or poor quality of weapons, as in the backwardness of their theory. Their views on the conduct of the war developed more slowly compared with the views of their opponents. As often happens in stories, victory in one war engendered complacency and led to conservatism in views, which was the reason for the defeat in the next war.

“The same Clausewitz advises us to take examples from the history of an era close to us,” writes Boris Mikhailovich Shaposhnikov in his book “The Brain of the Army,” and Moltke says: “We should not ignore the experience of previous wars, but it must be remembered that it cannot serve scale for the present. Decades and even centuries are separated from these wars, during which both political and strategic conditions have changed. Therefore, in order to achieve the desired result, there remains only one means, namely, to try to foresee the course of future events and delve into the modern situation. ”

There is a saying - bad generals are always preparing for the last war. You cannot say the same about American military scientists. They are always “ahead of the rest of the world” in terms of inventing new unknowns to military science theories like “network-centric warfare”, “wolf pack”, Boyd cycle, etc.

As for the network-centric warfare, in addition to what was said above about it, it should be added that analyzing the concept of network-centric warfare allows us to consider it as a new way of organizing command and control of troops and weapons, as a tool to enhance the combat capabilities of diverse forces and means, but not as a theory. The organization of the interaction of various types of the Armed Forces and the arms of different states is of crucial importance in the implementation of the concept of the “wolf pack” However, the problem of the interaction of troops was most accurately and fully resolved by the author of this article, and the full results of the research are set forth in the monograph “Theory of Interaction of Troops”, published in the 2002 year. The whole Boyd cycle (Observation – Orientation – Decision – Action) does not propose any new principles, much less patterns of military art, just as it does not refute existing ones. In addition, Boyd’s cycle is more applicable to tactics, not to operational art and strategy.

Unfortunately, some of our military scientists pick up these and similar American theories, begin to deeply analyze them and develop them on the basis of the analysis, discarding all the accumulated domestic, foreign scientific and practical experience.

But does the emergence of new theories of war mean that we should abandon the classical theories developed by military theorists of the past? Certainly not. Although the classical theories of war require adaptation to the changed conditions, they remain fundamentally fair. There are long-term, unshakable lessons from past combat experience that cannot be ignored.

The fact that among the American military establishment the belief that future wars will be unique and unlike any of past wars is strong enough, speaks of the immaturity of military science in the United States. The intellectual challenge facing military science in the 21st century is not to send military theorists of the past to the dustbin of history. The task is to learn how to effectively use their creative heritage in relation to new conditions.

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  1. Mavrikiy
    Mavrikiy 15 January 2017 07: 16
    The work of Russian military scientists should be based on the basis of the greatest and most basic military law: "The art of war is national." Quite right. It was Germany's limited resources that led to the Lightning War plan. But with "huge distances", the resources of the whole of Europe were not enough for "lightning".
    1. Mavrikiy
      Mavrikiy 15 January 2017 07: 25
      But does the emergence of new theories of war mean that one should abandon the classical theories developed by military theorists of the past? Of course not. Although the classical theories of war require adaptation to changing conditions, fundamentally they remain valid.
      Fair enough. The Chinese "Art of War" has not lost its relevance in the 20th century and will not lose in the future. (About "Science to Win", the same)
      And Svechin is a lamp (for Russia) in strategy, like Pushkin in literature,
      1. gridasov
        gridasov 15 January 2017 11: 41
        New theories of war were formed in the new circumstances of the time in which we live. This is a huge transformation complex both in the energy sectors and in industry and engineering and in the minds of people and information technology. Therefore, naturally, theories must also be transformed. However, the basic foundations of victory in any military performances will remain the level of scientific and technological potential on which the entire superstructure of the armed forces is built. In general, the one who is more educated and more mobile in development will benefit. In this case, there should be real projects for the implementation of knowledge in armaments and everything else.
    2. knn54
      knn54 15 January 2017 09: 33
      - "Military art nationally."
      Without military history, there is no military science.
      The military theory is practically not studied at the Higher Educational Institutions either. There are few textbooks published. Methodist educators were cut almost in the first place.
      And the MAIN-Military Science WEAKLY demanded by both political and military (like Serdyukov) leadership of the Russian Federation.
      1. gridasov
        gridasov 16 January 2017 17: 36
        Everyone will be right in their statements, but the truth will be visible to everyone only over time. We have to constantly repeat that no component cannot be thrown out of life processes. Therefore, in any process or science, etc., everything must be considered as a complex problem, which each solution will be considered as an algorithm in the process. Naturally, both history and new methods of warfare are fully compatible aspects of science. But one thing can be said that everything is so serious. that neglect of any of the issues can lead to defeat You may not even notice how you are already in captivity and enslaved. However, it is worth recalling that in confrontation .. each side has the weakest "points of defeat" and these "points" are people. Therefore, the methods of destruction of the enemy's armies consist not only in the confrontation of weapons, but in those issues that only scientists know about.
  2. midshipman
    midshipman 15 January 2017 07: 42
    Dear readers of "VO", I have devoted my whole life to the creation of military and military equipment, new enterprises and research institutes, new scientific areas, as well as the creation of complex civil systems. After working in Moscow (35 years old) he returned to St. Petersburg. He headed the department at the University and forced the scientists of the department to publish the textbook "System Analysis" for generalists, students of academies and students. One of the authors is the Chief Designer of the ACS of the USSR Armed Forces, therefore, the material presented is based on what the author of the article suggests to take into account in the development of military science. I have the honor.
    1. demiurg
      demiurg 15 January 2017 09: 22
      Well, you burned.
      Tell me, how difficult is it to give at least a general education lecture to sofa theorists like me, telling about the actions of at least a battalion regiment in the offensive and defense? Describe, at least in general terms, the actions of each of the armed forces, motorized infantry, tanks, artillery, and the conditions for requesting air strikes.
      And, if this is of course not a state of secrecy, show the KShU cards, with an explanation of the rules of the game.
      1. gladcu2
        gladcu2 16 January 2017 20: 59
        Thanks to the author.

        Unfortunately, the article is too large and raises many questions.

        Something interested.

        But is there no department in the General Staff for setting new scientific tasks?

        Who will formulate the tasks, finance them and control them?
    2. gridasov
      gridasov 15 January 2017 11: 51
      System analysis based on binary logic and with a lack of understanding of the multipolarity of all interactions is already a thing of the past. The growth rate of the information capacity of the space of our existence has incredibly increased and is growing. Therefore, only on the basis of the properties of the number expressed in its constant value can we give a real equivalent justification for what information is and how to dispose of it in its incredibly huge transformations.
      We have long been talking about fundamentally new methods of mathematical analysis precisely on the new properties of numbers. And these are not empty words. Behind this is the opportunity to analyze complex complex processes in hydro-gas dynamics and in the physics of highly intensive and highly dynamic processes. Therefore, we remain incomprehensible in the positioning of new aircraft turbines and multipolar transistors. in DC transformers and new electrical devices, which are not even mentioned at all. This article very closely echoes the article on education. Therefore, we are not talking about milking methods, but about methods supplemented in the educational environment and in new areas of scientific research.
    3. Dekabrist
      Dekabrist 15 January 2017 12: 27
      I don’t want to offend you, dear Michman, but I would like to know about at least one air defense system that you created.
      1. midshipman
        midshipman 15 January 2017 13: 01
        Dear "Dekabrist" I have no right to answer for known reasons. But if you wish, read in "VO" my article "The History of My One Order". I have the honor.
  3. rotmistr60
    rotmistr60 15 January 2017 07: 50
    it’s not about sending military theorists of the past to the trash bin of history. The challenge is to learn how to effectively use their creative heritage in relation to new conditions.

    You can’t even argue, because this should be a dogma.
  4. SPACE
    SPACE 15 January 2017 08: 49
    The worst enemy of military science is pattern and dogmatism. Military science is dynamic, agile. The power of military science in creativity, innovation, originality.

    It is necessary to distinguish between the concepts of "military science" and "combat operations." If for military science, the template and dogmatism are unacceptable, then the basis of successful hostilities just the same should be templates and dogmatism, charter, plan, etc., this is the key to the stability and controllability of troops, and therefore success. The scenario, the program of the war must be thought out in advance, planned, scheduled by the minute and communicated to the personnel, about the role of each. It's too late to think in a war, you need to fight.
    1. gridasov
      gridasov 15 January 2017 11: 55
      It is more accurate and correct to say that a balance of dogmas, patterns and novelty is needed. And it is important to understand that this balance is always in the dynamics of relations, taking into account very many aspects of influence. Therefore, again and again I will repeat about new methods of analysis.
      1. Cat man null
        Cat man null 15 January 2017 12: 10
        Quote: gridasov
        Therefore, again and again I will repeat ...

        - Gridasov, have you yourself been tired of it yet?
        - You, after all, are different from a clown (or a holy fool) here ... let's just say not many people who perceives (I personally such I don’t know at all, but I admit that they are)
        1. gridasov
          gridasov 15 January 2017 12: 27
          You are an outspoken provocateur and enemy of the people. I then have to play my role against the background of people who do not understand much and at the same time I repeat that everyone needs to take the right step. It’s not my problem that there is a volatility to adopt innovative ideas that has been and will be. But what you are striving for is something I understand, but this is a rather rare case.
          1. Cat man null
            Cat man null 15 January 2017 12: 47
            Quote: gridasov
            It's not my problem that volatility exists.

            - you have another problem - you do not know how to express thoughts with words
            - And you confuse cases, childbirth and declensions, and then it’s impossible to understand what you want to say, even if you wish:

            Quote: gridasov
            The growth rate of the information capacity of the space of our existence is incredible has grown and is growing...

            - who, aphid, is "growing"?
            - what kind of "space of our (or your?) existence"? What kind of entity is this ?!

            About this acceptance yes
            1. gridasov
              gridasov 15 January 2017 13: 10
              I agree! But obviously you do not see the topics that are being discussed and highlight what is important to you. In addition, I basically do not edit my text. Just writing in the hope of seeing people who think. rather than being built literate.
              1. gridasov
                gridasov 15 January 2017 13: 12
                I will supplement myself and say that smart people do not express themselves and, moreover, do not prove their views to each other. They give each other directions of reasoning within the framework of which they coordinate their reasoning.
              2. Cat man null
                Cat man null 15 January 2017 13: 38
                Quote: gridasov
                In addition, I basically do not edit my text

                - zgya, my friend, zgya ... (s)

                Quote: gridasov
                Just writing in the hope of seeing people who think.

                - yeah .... and at the same time write complete nonsense
                - laziness is now to lay out your extreme writings on vectors, it has already been done, and more than once, and not only by me alone
                - But nonsense, patented ... or just a dummy ... here are two options that suit any of your opuses.

                Something like that request
                1. gridasov
                  gridasov 15 January 2017 14: 07
                  Any reasoning, of any person always remains very subjective in how this person perceives the surrounding events. Therefore, in simple words, you cannot create artificial intelligence or expand the capabilities of your brain so that you can analyze complex and highly dynamic processes (such as hyper-speed in aviation). Therefore, the equivalent of what exists as a physical process should be a tool that could fully express this physical process and the totality of their interactions as information. Such tools is mathematics, and in particular its foundation as a number. But! Modern mathematics is built on binary logic, which makes a person look for the right solution. And no matter how much we change the input mathematical data, we always get an unrelated mathematical sequence. But!!! It is only in a linear mat. analysis of simple physical events. Then how can analysis be built on events that occur not linearly but in the entire radial structure of space. (I already omit geometric concepts). That is, in other words, how to build physical processes and their analysis in the radial space of their ongoing processes? You will always receive a particular solution as a static one, and if you increase the speed of such processes of transforming one physical event into another, you will simply be lost in the calculations. Therefore, you need to use some property of the number. which will allow not only to build an analysis as particular solutions, but also allow them to be combined with related processes, and all this in different dynamics. .
                  For example, I don't need to know much. what is important to you in defining who is who. It is enough for me to see the potential of possibilities in the reasoning of that person or another. I communicate with information that is in a person, and not with a person in your concept. This distinguishes people by their ability to see many obvious processes that ordinary people do not see. And your principles and dominants in your analysis are absolutely not important to me. Therefore, I know why you clung to me, but you do not know yourself.
    2. Glory1974
      Glory1974 15 January 2017 20: 25
      successful fighting must be based on patterns and dogmatism.

      Here are our fathers and grandfathers and heaped on German dogmatists. REMEMBER: 9 in the morning, the German had breakfast, now he will start shooting. Or a blow to the forehead, then flank coverage, environment. As ours learned German dogmas, they began to oppose them.
  5. cap
    cap 15 January 2017 09: 12
    Therefore, we should think about ways in modern conditions to better educate military personnel in breadth of thinking, creativity, the ability to understand and perceive different views, judgments, the ability to have and the ability to defend one's own opinion.

    Something similar lies with each commander, or with the duty officer on the part. I read it and I printed it, and no initiative. The prose of life in the nuclear age.
    1. demiurg
      demiurg 15 January 2017 10: 37
      Absolutely logical. People in a relaxed atmosphere have chosen the best from several options.
      The commander was pulled at night into the unit, where bombs are swinging, possibly nuclear. Is there 100% certainty that a team will come from a superior, and that the decision will be right?
      You can improvise, but only within the framework of a given order. Otherwise, Makhnovism will begin.
    2. gridasov
      gridasov 15 January 2017 12: 21
      The media leaked open information that the NSA is openly looking for people with unique abilities to analyze large amounts of information. In other words, they understand that there are no methods of training specialists, and the dimension of information flows is growing and "business must be done." Therefore, this does not apply only to abstract information about everything. This concerns specific and innovative technical solutions that can take any country to a higher level of achievement. in any and especially the military sphere. And now imagine that someone is talking about a fundamentally new model of an aircraft engine - a turbine, and there are justifications and calculations. Therefore, the lack of interest in such applications only means that analysts are unable to perceive information within the framework of the reality of its existence. And this is a crisis in the structures on which the most important strategic task lies in the analysis of key processes. This is the security of the country and the nation for years and years to come. At the same time, the confrontation will only grow and grow
  6. jovanni
    jovanni 15 January 2017 10: 49
    "science needs creators, not performers"

    In general, our Motherland needs creators, not just performers. However, the two previous ministers of education systematically destroyed this very education. The same Fursenko (who is now happily an adviser to the president) stated that we need "qualified users". So, mostly lawyers - economists and salesmen stayed in the country ... It is always easier to destroy it! And build ...
    1. Kenneth
      Kenneth 15 January 2017 12: 12
      The market will decide everything.
    2. cap
      cap 15 January 2017 13: 23
      Quote: Jovanni
      So, mainly lawyers and economists and sellers remained in the country ... It is always easier to break it! And build ...

      Now they cook on TV hard. Watch sickening.
      "-Who do you want to become, an astronaut?
      - no chef! "
      and this is all over the country. am
  7. Kenneth
    Kenneth 15 January 2017 12: 11
    Here is the first world war. Our top commanders are entirely scientists with the Academy of the General Staff and so on. In general, training at the academy gave serious advantages in the service. But they didn’t know how to command. And German practitioners beat them as they wanted. Because any German commander had to go through all the levels of command in the field, and not just like that, but the required time
    And the headquarters gene is certainly good, but not so important.
  8. Dekabrist
    Dekabrist 15 January 2017 12: 29
    About the author of the article: Vasily Yuryevich Mikryukov - Doctor of Pedagogical Sciences, Candidate of Technical Sciences, Full Member of the Academy of Military Sciences, SNA, specializing in Operational Art in General and by Armed Forces, Armed Forces and Special Forces, Honored Worker of Science and Education.
    1. Kenneth
      Kenneth 15 January 2017 12: 35
      After 5 years of service in approximately the troops, the rest went to the glorious forts of various institutes. The author is a pure theorist, although well-deserved. A strange product of senseless military science.
      1. Cube123
        Cube123 16 January 2017 16: 58
        Quote: Kenneth
        The author is a pure theorist, although well-deserved. A strange product of senseless military science.

        So I got exactly the same feeling. Lots of abstract information, with each paragraph contradicting the previous one. And at the same time, modern promising areas of military science were not even touched upon. Somehow - "Game theory", which is precisely designed to find optimal solutions in conditions of uncertainty.
        Maybe I'm wrong, but in my opinion the main problem of a military scientist in the absence of a worthy opponent in peacetime. Therefore, theories sucked from a finger are invented, crumbling to dust in a real battle. Work colleagues cannot be such opponents by definition, simply because they are all products of the same school and think in much the same way. In real hostilities, the military is confronted with a different school, a different way of thinking, which is the reason for the unpredictable consequences.
        In my opinion, the main thing that could push military science is the development of computer simulation methods. Creation of computer models on which it would be possible to run in real ideas, and run in regardless of the dogma of the authorities and subjective opinion. And checking these models on real historical data, so as not to come off too much in "pure theory".
        And as the author suggests, it reminds too much of an old anecdote: "Even a standing clock shows the correct time twice a day. The main thing is to know when to look at it."
  9. pts-m
    pts-m 15 January 2017 13: 45
    Yes, it’s all true. But when a soldier offers a startling idea at first glance, then the higher commanders look at him as if only a thought was brewing in their minds ... how dare this boor, upstart, not of noble origin, be Smarter than me with a higher academic education. And it seems everyone studied in the same Soviet school. Where did this barriness come from.
    1. gridasov
      gridasov 15 January 2017 14: 26
      This is the same problem as always and everywhere. How to balance both individuality and slave subordination. In the army, this is very important. And after all, everything is logical. Try to be the boss, and everyone will start to move their ideas - you get a mess. And on the other hand, in each individual process, it is individuality, ingenuity, wisdom and determination that must be shown. In general, these are precisely the processes that in mathematical analysis have a very important role. These are questions of the dimension of interconnections at each level. And this is exactly what we introduced in the analysis as an additional property of a number in determining its potential, which means that in a processing machine you can always understand where and which processes are combined and at what potential level, and where they go as opposed or different. In general, complex analysis methods are an undeniable future that many still do not think about.
  10. captain
    captain 15 January 2017 14: 38
    I am not a scientist, a simple infantry officer, I ended up serving as a brigade commander. The author raised an interesting topic, but apparently he has a very poor idea of ​​who and how is training personnel for military science. From 1985 to 88, I studied at the Frunze Academy. We were trained there for the tactical link of the regiment division. Who taught us there? All teachers were candidates of science, but not one of them commanded a regiment a day in life. Maybe other groups were happier, but ours was not lucky. Maximum NS Regiment. And so basically, former company companies from schools, ns battalions. What military science can we talk about? These were storytellers !!!
    1. Glory1974
      Glory1974 15 January 2017 20: 18
      You were unlucky. I was at 2007 courses in OVA, we were taught by an officer who passed the Second World War. Under 90 he was years old, but he taught brilliantly.

      Although the trend you voiced "on the face".
  11. Normal ok
    Normal ok 15 January 2017 15: 00
    Bravo!!! I personally feel bitter about how my school OVAKOLU was destroyed in Ukraine. We have all the teachers had experience how MINIMUM, the start of the regiment. This is not counting any doctorates in those sciences. Many graduated from the academy. And they ditched all this not now, but even under Kravchuk. Now there is "Academy" damn it - a pitiful excuse for a left hand. I know that the same thing happened throughout the former union. Who will think now? Performers? Sometimes they can, but they are not given. More often, they do not know how. Will Putin think for everyone? Passed, damn it in 1941.
  12. Aviagr
    Aviagr 15 January 2017 18: 49
    Come on. Our Sovereigns need servile bydlo. What difference does it make - who will win future wars: it will still be required to control the local aborigines Gauleiters from the adjoining fifth column, which we have all the current superstructure over Basis...
    But in general, Tactic connected with available weapons. And with possession only a gun - you need to reduce the distance with the enemy (as an example).
    Therefore for tactics mosquito weapons need SAMO mosquito weapon.
    For victory at sea - We need combat gliders, RPBKs and missile submarines.
    For the usual theft of money from the budget, you can think of "armata", "leaders" and other crap - and the uryakryakalka are happy, and the offshore companies are not do nothing.
    But then the Chinese are bustling - apparently understand that existing scrap metal they cannot keep the islands. And money - it is a pity ... Let them ask the South American Indians - did the saved gold help them? ... laughing
  13. Glory1974
    Glory1974 15 January 2017 20: 14
    [quoteIt was Germany's limited resources that led to the Blitzkrieg plan. But with "huge distances", there were not enough resources for the "lightning" and the whole of Europe] [/ quote]

    Do you think that "General Space (huge)" helped?

    And I thought Soviet generals and officers, using knowledge, learned to resist the blitzkrieg.
  14. iouris
    iouris 15 January 2017 20: 17
    Everything is correct, but: the USSR surrendered, the Russian Federation is the "successor of the USSR". And that labor productivity and production volumes have grown strongly in the Russian Federation after 1991, the people are happy and multiply intensively, producing the necessary quality of future soldiers, or the economy and population are degrading in a race?
  15. Glory1974
    Glory1974 15 January 2017 20: 30
    Previously, a teacher at a military university, lieutenant colonel, 15 years of service in the army, was equated with a candidate of sciences. The new "Education Law" canceled this.

    Now, military professors are recruiting teachers of the category: senior lieutenant, length of service in the troops 1 year, but candidate of science.

    Question: who better to teach the cadet?
    1. iouris
      iouris 17 January 2017 12: 27
      Tell me, how can you equate the length of service in the army and scientific qualifications? There is no linear connection. The problem is different: at some stage, military educational institutions lost contact with the troops, and the troops stopped preparing for war in this way. A counter-revolution took place in the country, the country fell apart, and the army, it seems, remained the same. But this does not happen.
      How to explain the lack of military doctrine for many years? How did this affect military and military-technical policy and science? What have they been doing all this time in the troops, in universities, in research institutes and in defense enterprises? That is why it is time to collect stones.
      1. Glory1974
        Glory1974 17 January 2017 13: 11
        How can we equate the length of service in the army and scientific qualifications?

        In order to train a platoon, company, battalion commander in a military school, you need a person who has gone through all these stages in practice. And this person was equated with a candidate of sciences in this sense - the one who knows all this "excellently" (well, "good" at least.

        at some stage, military schools lost contact with the troops

        Now the teacher, the one who simply learned by heart the BUSS, practically did nothing from what the platoon, company, and battalion commander did. Pure theorist. He does not know many things for which it is not necessary to be a candidate of science, but he must be able to do practically.
        1. iouris
          iouris 18 January 2017 10: 11
          Quote: glory1974
          Now the teacher, the one who just memorized BUSV,

          This is already from Raikin: "Forget deduction and induction - let's produce ...", "We are not for quality, we are for quantity" ..., etc. Those. the situation is post-control. 15 years is not a period for the establishment of a university. As the saying goes, "come back in fifty years - we'll talk."
          1. Glory1974
            Glory1974 18 January 2017 19: 48
            Maybe you’re right, but I’m afraid we don’t have 50 years.
            Although it can be so.
  16. Radikal
    Radikal 15 January 2017 20: 44
    The trouble is not that these worthless people headed the military department, military education and military science for several years.
    Here, the author could continue, for example, like this:, ... and how and why these worthless people ended up in such important positions .... This, in my opinion, is the most important question that should be voiced in this article.
  17. gridasov
    gridasov 16 January 2017 12: 32
    In the military sciences, as elsewhere, however, it is very important to see a real and objective situation, and not to lie and blur oneself and others with fables. So when you read about power and technological accomplishment
    It is clear that this combat vehicle is being shot down by a bearded man from MANPADS for a thousand dollars, and it’s clear. who is lying. If planes fall every day and hundreds of people die and after that it is obvious that aircraft engines do not provide guaranteed take-off qualities or others, and after that scientific ideas in the development of engines are not considered, then it is clear who is lying and why. ... And after that, some "kat ma zeros" are still looking for incorrectly placed commas, it is clear that landmarks and values ​​have been lost. I hope not for everyone!
  18. Baursak
    Baursak 19 January 2017 08: 42
    "Military Science" ?! And what is it? Does it exist?
    If, of course, we consider geography and history as a science, then probably - yes, it has a right to exist.